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TELEGRAM

L.L. J. Lawrence

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2400
BT
~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 0907

CONTROL: 1 6 9 7 Q
FEBRUARY 6, 1973
9:04 AM

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USDEL FRANCE

SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE IN LAOS

REF: STATE 022116

1. DCM SAW RLG DELEGATION CHAIRMAN PHENG PHONGSAVAN AFTERNOON FEBRUARY 6 TO PASS ON SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL.
2. CEASEFIRE AND ICC. IN ORDER TO AVOID MIS-UNDERSTANDING AND HELP PHENG FULLY UNDERSTAND US POSITION, DCM LEFT BRIEF PAPER IN FRENCH WITH HIM WHICH MADE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS:
 - A. WE BELIEVE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ATTAIN AN EARLY CEASEFIRE IF RLG HOLDS TO THE IDEA THAT MILITARY FORCES OF ALL LAO PARTIES MUST WITHDRAW TO JUNE 1962 POSITION WITHIN SPECIFIED PERIOD AFTER SIGNING OF CEASEFIRE.
 - B. THEREFORE IT IS PREFERABLE FOR RLG TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE.
 - C. REFERENCE TO THE ICC IN A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT MUST CONFORM TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1962 AGREEMENT DEALING WITH THE ICC. CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT MUST NOT HAVE ANY LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT IMPLY THE WEAKENING OF RESPONSIBILITIES ICC HAS UNDER THE 1962 PROTOCOL. PHENG PROMISED TO GET THIS INFORMATION TO HIS COLLEAGUES AS WELL AS TO SOUVANNA ALTHOUGH HE POINTED OUT THAT IN THE NEW CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT RLG PLANS TO TABLE IN A SECRET MEETING, THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWING TO THE 1962 POSITIONS HAS BEEN RETAINED.
3. ACCOUNTING FOR US MISSING IN ACTION. DCM URGED THAT CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT INCLUDE A PARAGRAPH ON THIS SUBJECT. AS EXAMPLE HE GAVE PHENG TWO DRAFT PARAGRAPHS IN FRENCH

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Reviewed by:	<i>E. E. E.</i>
	<i>10/18/93</i>

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-2-VIENTIANE 907, FEBRUARY 6, 1973 (NODIS)

FOR CONSIDERATION BY RLG. THE TWO PARAGRAPHS FROM WHICH THE RLG COULD CHOOSE READ AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE THE TWO PARTIES SHALL HELP EACH OTHER TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT THOSE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS OF THE PARTIES MISSING IN ACTION, TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION AND TAKE CARE OF THE GRAVES OF THE DEAD SO AS TO FACILITATE THE EXHUMATION AND REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS AND TO TAKE ANY SUCH OTHER MEASURES AS MAY BE REQUIRED TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT THOSE STILL CONSIDERED MISSING IN ACTION. UNQUOTE

THE ALTERNATE AND SOMEWHAT SHORTER PROPOSAL READS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE AFTER THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF ALL NATIONALITIES, BOTH PARTIES AGREE TO ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES THAT WILL PERMIT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR ALL PERSONS WHO ARE MISSING IN ACTION IN LAOS. UNQUOTE

DCM POINTED OUT THAT FIRST ALTERNATIVE IS PRECISE LANGUAGE INCLUDED IN THE US-DRV AGREEMENT AND THIS FACT MIGHT MAKE IT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PATHET LAO. PHENG SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THE TWO ALTERNATIVE PARAGRAPHS TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE RLG DELGATION FOR INCLUSION IN THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

3. PHOUMI VONGVICHIT'S ACTIVITIES. PHENG, WHO HAD SEEN SOUVANNA TODAY, SAID THAT PHOUMI MET WITH PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING AND SHOWED HIM LPF DRAFT AGREEMENT ON CEASEFIRE. SOUVANNA ALLEGEDLY RETURNED IT TO PHOUMI POINTING OUT THAT SOME PARTS OF THE LPF DRAFT ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE AND SHOULD BE REVISED. (WHEN I SAW SOUVANNA THIS MORNING, HE GAVE ME THE SAME INFORMATION.) PHENG SAID THAT PHOUMI WOULD PROBABLY SURFACE THE LPF DRAFT IN ONE OF THE SECRET SESSIONS WITH THE RLG DELEGATION IN THE NEXT 48 HOURS. IN REPLY TO DCM'S QUESTION, PHENG SAID THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE, LPF DRAFT DEALS WITH MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT.

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-3 -VIENTIANE 907, FEBRUARY 6, 1973 (NODIS)

PEHNG STRESSED THAT RLG DRAFT WHICH IS TO BE DISCUSSED
IN SECRET SESSION WITH LPF DEALS EXCLUSIVELY WITH
MILITARY MATTERS, DEFERRING POLITICAL PROBLEMS UNTIL
AFTER THE CEASEFIRE. DCM STRONGLY URGED RLG TO HOLD TO
THAT POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LPF.

GDS

GODLEY

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8157
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 3446

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1. I THOUGHT YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HAVING AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE CEASE-FIRE LOOKS FROM HERE AFTER THE FIRST THIRTY DAYS. THE SITUATION OBVIOUSLY KEEPS CHANGING FROM DAY TO DAY, AND I HOPE FOR THE BETTER, BUT THIS ABOUT THE WAY IT LOOKS TO US HERE AS OF TODAY.

1. SUMMARY

2. THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE GOING INTO EFFECT OF THE VIET-NAM CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, HIGH AT THE OUTSET, HAS DECLINED NOTABLY. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE BOTH IN LETTER AND SPIRIT; AND BOTH SIDES MUST SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM. JUST BEFORE JANUARY 28, THE COMMUNISTS LAUNCHED A NATIONWIDE OFFENSIVE TO SEIZE AS MUCH TERRITORY AS POSSIBLE BEFORE THE CEASE-FIRE. MOST AREAS THE GVN LOST IN THIS OFFENSIVE HAVE NOW BEEN RECOVERED. THE GVN CONSIDERED ITSELF FULLY JUSTIFIED IN THE USE OF FORCE TO RECOVER THIS GROUND BUT

WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS HAS FELT CONSTRAINED NOT TO ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE TRADITIONALLY VC CONTROLLED AREAS.

3. TWO ESSENTIAL STEPS HAVE STILL TO BE TAKEN BEFORE THE SHOOTING ENDS: UNAMBIGUOUS COMMANDS MUST GO OUT TO ALL MILITARY UNITS OF BOTH SIDES TO CEASE ALL OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES AND REMAIN IN PLACE AND AN EFFECTIVE TWO-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION MUST BE SET UP TO DETERMINE AREAS OF CONTROL AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 3 OF THE AGREEMENT. TWO-PARTY DISCUSSIONS ARE BEING HELD ON A REGULAR BASIS PENDING FORMATION OF A FORMAL TWO-PARTY JMC. ONCE THESE THINGS ARE ACCOMPLISHED, I BELIEVE THE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM CAN TAKE HOLD AND A START CAN BE MADE ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. I HAVE PRESSED THESE POINTS STRONGLY ON THIEU, AND I THINK HE REALIZES THAT HE MUST TAKE STRONG AND CLEAR ACTION TO ENFORCE THE CEASE-FIRE OR WE WILL LOSE SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR ADEQUATE U.S. AID TO SOUTH VIET-NAM.

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Date: 10/18/93

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4. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE LACK FULL CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY FACE UP TO THE COMMUNISTS IN A POLITICAL STRUGGLE. RECOGNIZING, NEVERTHELESS, THAT SUCH A STRUGGLE IS AT HAND, THEY ARE ENGAGING IN INTENSE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION ACTIVITY -- THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WHICH, IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS CLEARLY INDICATE THAT THE COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES ARE NOT CONFIDENT OF THEIR ABILITY TO WIN IN A CONVENTIONAL ELECTORAL CONTEST.

THEY ARE, THEREFORE, NOT LIKELY TO SET ASIDE THEIR TRADITIONAL WEAPONS OF TERROR AND ASSASSINATION; AND IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THEY WILL HOLD OPEN THE OPTION OF RESUMING THE WAR.

5. UNDER THE VIGOROUS LEADERSHIP OF THE CANADIANS, THE ICCS HAS BEGUN TO FUNCTION, AND I EXPECT ITS STABILIZING EFFECT WILL SOON BE FELT. HOWEVER, THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION IS STILL DEADLOCKED ON MANY ISSUES WITH ALL THREE VIETNAMESE PARTIES SHARING IN THE BLAME; THE PRG FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PERSONNEL; THE DRV AND PRG FOR STALLING AND OBSTRUCTIONISM; AND THE PVN FOR ITS LACK OF RESPONSE IN PROVIDING FACILITIES AND INSPIRING

DEMONSTRATIONS. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION, TO DATE, RAISES, I FEAR, SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THE TWO-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION WHICH WILL SUCCEED IT WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY ITS ASSIGNED ROLE IN KEEPING THE PEACE.

6. THE MALADROIT GVN PERFORMANCE IN THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION AND IN ITS FOOT-DRAGGING HANDLING OF SUPPORT FOR BOTH THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION AND THE ICCS IS GRADUALLY IMPROVING. RELUCTANT AS IT HAS BEEN TO GO ALONG WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, THE GVN UNDERSTANDS, I THINK, THAT IT HAS NO OTHER COURSE BUT TO BE LOYAL TO THE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE STRONG REASONS FOR DOUBTING THE COMMUNIST ATTITUDE. THE COMMUNISTS' STALLING TACTICS IN THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION, THEIR REFUSAL TO DEPLOY PERSONNEL TO JMC TEAM SITES, AND THEIR REFUSAL TO COOPERATE IN INSPECTION OF CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE DOING THEIR BEST TO RENDER INEFFECTIVE THE INSPECTION MECHANISMS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT.

7. EVEN MORE OMINOUS IS THE EVIDENT OF COMMUNIST INTENTION NOT TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 7 OF THE AGREEMENT, AS SHOWN BY THEIR ESTABLISHMENT OF MISSILE SITES IN QUANG TRI AND THE RECENT SUDDEN INCREASE IN THE MOVEMENT OF COMMUNIST PERSONNEL, VEHICLES, ARMOR, AND

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HEAVY ARTILLERY DOWN THE TRAIL.

II. THE MILITARY SITUATION

8. IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE JANUARY 28, THE ENEMY, ENJOYING THE ADVANTAGES OF AN OFFENSIVE POSTURE, SOUGHT TO SEIZE AND HOLD A NUMBER OF POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WHICH WOULD HAVE GREATLY INCREASED HIS CONTROL OVER TERRITORY AND POPULATION. HE SEIZED A KEY STRIP OF HIGHWAY AND COASTLINE IN SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI, AT SA HUYNH, AND SOUGHT TO DO THE SAME FURTHER SOUTH IN BINH DINH, AT DE GI. HE TRIED TO INFILTRATE BEHIND THE MARINE LINES IN QUANG TRI AND INTO THE LOWLANDS OF THUA TIEN, AND IS STILL ATTEMPTING TO DO SO.

COMMUNIST FORCES CUT THE HIGHWAY NORTH, SOUTH AND EAST OF
PLEIKU, ISOLATING THAT PROVINCE AND KONTUM. THEY SEIZED
INHABITED TERRITORY AND STRETCHES OF ROAD IN DARLAC AND PHU YEN.
IN MILITARY REGION III THE COMMUNISTS CUT MOST OF THE HIGHWAYS
AND MADE A MAJOR PUSH FOR TAY NINH CITY AND FOR NORTHERN BINH
THUY PROVINCE. IN THE DELTA, THEY TRIED TO TAKE HONG NGU; THEY
ATTEMPTED TO ISOLATE MY THO AND TO CUT ROUTE 4: AND THEY UNDERTOOK
A SERIES OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN CHUONG THIEN AND CHAU DOC
PROVINCES.

9. THE GVN REFUSED TO ACCEPT THESE LOSSES. EMPLOYING TACTICAL AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT, THE GVN LAUNCHED COUNTERATTACKS TO RE-GAIN THE POSITIONS HELD IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE CEASE-FIRE. MILITARY COMMANDERS WERE ORDERED TO REGAIN EVERY HAMLET AND STRETCH OF HIGHWAY WHICH THE ENEMY HAD SEIZED. IN HEAVILY CONTESTED DINH TUONG PROVINCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PROVINCE CHIEF INDICATED BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE THAT HE WOULD CONCEDE NO HAMLET TO THE COMMUNISTS, AND WOULD FIGHT TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A GVN PRESENCE IN EVERY HAMLET. AT PRESENT, THE GVN HAS LARGELY RE-ESTABLISHED ITSELF IN ITS PRE-CEASE-FIRE POSITIONS. ITS MOST NOTABLE VICTORY WAS IN SA HUYNH, WHERE AN ICCS INSPECTION HAS CONFIRMED THE GVN'S CONTROL. THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, HOWEVER, THE COST IN LIVES AND PROPERTY HAS BEEN HEAVY. CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES THROUGH FEBRUARY 27 HAVE TOTALLED ALMOST 10,000 KILLED. BINH TUY AND CHAU DOC PROVINCES SUFFERED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. FORTUNATELY, CIVILIAN LOSS OF LIFE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LIGHT, ALTHOUGH A LARGE NUMBER OF NEW REFUGEES HAVE BEEN GENERATED.

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10. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT ATTRIBUTE ALL OF THE RVN MILITARY ACTIVITY TO A REACTION TO ENEMY INITIATIVES. IN QUANG TRI, THE MARINES DROVE TO THE MOUTH OF THE CUA VIET RIVER, WHICH THEY CLAIMED TO HAVE REACHED JUST BEFORE 8:00 A.M. ON JANUARY 28. IN THE DAYS THAT FOLLOWED THE COMMUNISTS DROVE THEM BACK TO THEIR ORIGINAL LINE WITH HEAVY LOSSES.

11. THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER INSTANCES WHERE THE GVN HAS LAUNCHED OPERATIONS INTO AREAS WHERE GVN CONTROL WAS TENUOUS OR NON-EXISTENT BEFORE JANUARY 28. THESE INCLUDE THE DAI LOC AREA AND PARTS OF PHU YEN, PHUOC TUY, AND DINH TUONG. ARVN OPERATIONS IN MANY INSTANCES DISPLAYED THEIR FAMILIAR HEAVY AND HIGHLY VISIBLE

RELIANCE ON AIR AND ARTILLERY. ICCS OFFICERS HAVE WATCHED AIR STRIKES FROM THE ROOF OF THEIR HOTEL IN MY THOP AND AT TH CIVILIAN AIR TERMINAL IN NHA TRANG ONE COULD WATCH GROUND CREWS ARMING THE ORDNANCE FOR STRIKE AIRCRAFT. DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS GVN ARTILLERY EXPENDITURE WAS EXTREMELY HEAVY. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE CEASE-FIRE, 30,000 ROUNDS A DAY WERE FIRED IN MILITARY REGION I. FOLLOWING STRONG REPRESENTATIONS BY GENERAL WEYAND TO THE JGS, USE OF ARTILLERY DROPPED ABRUPTLY.

12. ALSO, WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT THE GVN'S INSTRUCTIONS TO SOME COMMANDERS TO IMPLEMENT THE FEBRUARY 17 FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION JOINT APPEAL WERE QUALIFIED AND AMBIGUOUS. THE RESPONSE TO THE JOINT APPEAL VARIED FROM REGION TO REGION; IT WAS ACTED UPON PROMPTLY BY GENERAL TRUONG IN MILITARY REGION I AND BY GENERAL MINH IN MILITARY REGION III. HOWEVER, THE COMMANDING GENERALS IN MILITARY REGIONS II AND IV ACTED FOR SOME DAYS SEEMINGLY IN DISREGARD OF THE APPEAL. AS LATE AS FEBRUARY 21 PROVINCE CHIEFS IN MILITARY REGION II WERE TELLING OUR OFFICERS THAT THEY HAD ONLY HEARD ABOUT THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION APPEAL "ON THE RADIO." (THE COMMUNIST RADIO GAVE MORE PLAY TO THE APPEAL THAN THE GVN RADIO.) THE LEVEL OF COMBAT IN MILITARY REGIONS II AND IV REMAINS NOTICEABLY HIGHER.

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13. ASIDE FROM THE COMMUNISTS' PRE-CEASEFIRE OFFENSIVE, THERE ARE SEVERAL SERIOUS INCIDENTS WHICH MUST BE CHARGED TO THE COMMUNIST ACCOUNT. THESE INCLUDE THE DESTRUCTION OF A U.S. ARMY HELICOPTER SOUTH OF AN LOC ON FEBRUARY 16 AND THE SHELLING OF TRI TON DISTRICT TOWN FEBRUARY 25. A MAJOR BATTLE TOOK PLACE AROUND SA HUYNH IN QUANG NGAI FOLLOWING A COMMUNIST ATTACK BEGUN AFTER JANUARY 28. THE COMMUNISTS CHARGED THE GVN WITH VIOLATING THE CEASE-FIRE, BUT BY THE TIME AN ICCS TEAM ARRIVE THE TOWN WAS BACK IN GVN HANDS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COMMUNISTS ALLEGE A SERIOUS ARVN VIOLATION IN THE BOMBING OF DUC CO AFTER IT HAD BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE COMMUNISTS AS AN AUTHORIZED POINT OF ENTRY, AND THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS STILL NOT KNOWN. THE COMMUNISTS ALSO CHARGE THAT THE GVN ATTACKS DESIGNATED PICKUP SITES FOR PRG PERSONNEL. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN TRUE AT ONE TIME, BUT MAJOR GENERAL WOODWARD REPORTS THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE RECENTLY OF ATTACKS ON DESIGNATED SITES.

14. FAR MORE SERIOUS ARE RECENT INDICATIONS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT INTEND TO HONOR ARTICLE 7 OF THE AGREEMENT. GENERAL DONG (CHIEF, RVN DEL TO FPJMC) AND GENERAL WOODWARD HAVE CHARGED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WITH A MOST SERIOUS VIOLATION IN PLACING SA-2 MISSILES NEAR KHE SANH AFTER JANUARY 28 AND DEMANDED REMOVAL. AN ICCS INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN REQUESTED. WE ALSO HAVE OMINOUS REPORTS OF INCREASED PERSONNEL AND RECENT VERY HEAVY TRUCK, ARMOR, AND ARTILLERY MOVEMENT SOUTHWARD ALONG THE TRAIL.

15. DESPITE MANY INITIAL DIFFICULTIES, THE ICCS HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKABLE PEACE-KEEPING MACHINERY. WHILE IT HAS YET TO DEAL CONCLUSIVELY WITH A MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE, IT IS NOW IN A POSITION TO DETER VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE ONCE THE CURRENT FIGHTING STOPS. THE ICCS IS, HOWEVER, HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON CANADIAN LEADERSHIP AND IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY WERE CANADA TO WITHDRAW.

16. WHILE AT FIRST THE REGIONAL GVN COMMANDERS WERE RELUCTANT TO GIVE THE ICCS COOPERATION OR TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY FACILITIES FOR THEIR MISSIONS, THE HIGH-LEVEL GVN INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOW REACHED THE FIELD, AND GVN SUPPORT OF THE ICCS IS MARKEDLY BETTER. THE GVN MADE ITS INITIAL PAYMENT TOWARD ICCS EXPENSES WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 14 (C) OF THE ICCS PROTOCOL. NO PAYMENT HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE DRV OR THE PRG.

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17. THE ICCS STAFF IS NOW AT FULL STRENGTH, AND DEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN EFFECTED TO THE SEVEN REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS, AND TO ALL BUT A FEW SUB-REGIONAL SITES. I AM ENCOURAGED AT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE CCS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH ITS DEPLOYMENT DESPITE OBSTRUCTIONISM BY THE DRV AND PRG IN THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION.

18. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE NOT ENCOURAGED DEPLOYMENT OF ICCS TEAMS TO CONTESTED AREAS OR TO LOCATIONS WHICH THEY CONTROL:

INITIALLY THEY REFUSED ICCS REQUESTS TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE IN SUCH PLACES, CLAIMING THAT FACILITIES WERE NOT YET READY. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOW PERMITTING SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND ONE ICCS HAS BEEN DEPLOYED TO DUC CO.

19. THE CANADIANS ARE DUE GREAT CREDIT FOR THE LEADERSHIP THEY HAVE GIVEN THE ICCS. FROM THE START THEY TOOK THE VIEW THAT ACTION MUST NOT BE BLOCKED BY THE UNANIMITY PRINCIPLE. THEY HAVE OVERCOME MANY DISCOURAGEMENTS AND PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES, OFTEN DRAGGING THE OTHER DELEGATIONS RELUCTANTLY ALONG WITH THEM. THE INDONESIANS HAVE BEEN CONTENT TO LET THE CANADIANS TAKE THE LEAD, BUT HAVE COOPERATED EAGERLY.

20. MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE POLES, HAVE NOT PLAYED THE OBSTRUCTIONIST ROLE THAT WE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED. THEY HAVE OFTEN BEEN SLOW TO MOVE AND HAVE BEEN OVER CONCERNED WITH PROCEDURAL DETAILS, BUT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN INFLEXIBLE. DESPITE THE SEEMINGLY GREAT AMOUNT OF TIME SPENT ON PROCEDURAL AND PROTOCOL MATTERS, AS WELL AS THE TIME AND EFFORT REQUIRED TO WORK OUT LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS, SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AND THE GROUNDWORK HAS BEEN LAID FOR MORE. THE HUNGARIANS TOOK OVER THE CHAIRMANSHIP ON MARCH 1 AND WE SHALL, OF COURSE, WATCH THEIR PERFORMANCE CLOSELY.

21. DESPITE PRG/DRV OBJECTIONS, THE ICCS, INCLUDING ITS COMMUNIST COMPONENTS, IS CONDUCTING FULL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE U.S. CH-47 HELICOPTER NEAR AN LOC ON FEBRUARY 16. THE FIGHTING AT SA HUYNH, AND THE COMMUNIST SHELLING OF TRI TON IN THE DELTA, WHICH CAUSED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE TO THE FUTURE ICCS QUARTERS. IN ADDITION, THE ICCS HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY THE GVN TO INVESTIGATE THE AGREEMENT VIOLATION AT KHE SANH.

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IV. FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION

22. DESPITE OUR DETERMINED EFFORTS, THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION HAS SO FAR FAILED TO DEVELOP INTO AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR ENFORCING THE CEASE-FIRE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS PROVED INDISPENSABLE IN ARRANGING THE RETURN OF OUR PRISONERS. THIS DISCOURAGING STATE OF AFFAIRS RESULTS FROM STALLING AND OBSTRUCTIONISM BY THE PRG AND DRV WHO APPARENTLY DO NOT WANT THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION TO HINDER THEIR ATTEMPTS TO ATTAIN THEIR MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN THE FIRST SIXTY DAYS.

23. FOR ITS PART, THE GVN HAS SYSTEMATICALLY HARRASSED AND MISTREATED THE PRG/DRV ELEMENTS OF THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION. IT HAS EXPLOITED LATENT POPULAR HATRED OF THE COMMUNISTS TO FOMENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND FOUR MOB ATTACKS ON DRV MEMBERS OF THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION. (THE PRG HAD NOT DEPLOYED PERSONNEL TO THESE LOCATIONS.) WE HAVE NOTED OVER 40 SUCH INCIDENTS, PEACEFUL AND OTHERWISE, SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING TWO-- ONE AT BAN ME THUOT AND ONE AT HUE -- WHICH RESULTED IN INJURY TO DRV DELEGATES. I HAVE TAKEN THIS MATTER UP URGENTLY WITH THIEU AND HE HAS PROMISED REMEDIAL ACTION.

24. IN PARTIAL EXTENUATION OF THE GVN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRG AND DRV DELEGATIONS, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WE HAVE INTELLIGENCE FROM RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATING THAT THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT INTEND TO HONOR THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. THESE REPORTS STATE THAT THE DRV AND THE PRG INTEND TO BUILD UP THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIET-NAM IN DEFIANCE OF THE AGREEMENT AND THAT THEY WILL NOT AGREE TO AN ELECTION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THESE AND OTHER SIMILAR REPORTS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE GVN AND UNDOUBTEDLY INFLUENCE ITS DECISION.

25. AS A RESULT OF PRG PROCRASTINATION ONLY 208 (OF A COMPLE-

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MENT OF 825) PRG REPRESENTATIVES HAVE JOINED THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION STAFF. NO PRG PERSONNEL ARE AT ANY SUB-REGIONAL SITE AND THERE ARE NONE AT THE REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF HUE AND PLEIYU AND ONLY TWO LIAISON PERSONNEL ARE AT DANANG. THE PRG CLAIMS BY WAY OF EXPLANATION THAT FACILITIES ARE INADEQUATE, AND THE GVN HAS ATTACKED PICKUP POINTS. THE ATTACKS WERE PROBABLY TRUE AT AN EARLIER STAGE; HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM NOW. WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT THE PRG HAS NO DESIRE TO STAFF ITS FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION DELEGATION AND THAT IT IS USING PAST GVN ACTIONS AS A PRETEXT. IN ANY CASE, FAILURE OF THE PRG TO STAFF ITS DELEGATION HAS LEFT THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION A LARGELY INEFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE AGREEMENT WENT INTO EFFECT.

26. GVN PERFORMANCE IN THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION HAS BEEN POORLY COORDINATED AND SLOW. GENERAL NGO DZU, THE ORIGINAL GVN CHIEF DELEGATE, AND GENERAL VINH LOC, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE FOR JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION MATTERS, HAVE NOW BEEN REPLACED BY GENERALS DONG AND HONG RESPECTIVELY. THESE ARE BETTER MEN AND WE HAVE REASON TO HOPE THAT THE SITUATION WILL IMPROVE. I AND MY STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE GVN AT EVERY LEVEL TO BE MORE POSITIVE, IMAGINATIVE AND FORTHRIGHT -- AND MORE LOYAL TO THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT -- IN THEIR CONDUCT OF JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION AFFAIRS.

V. PRISONER OF WAR RELEASES AND THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN DETAINEES

27. AS OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE SHOWS, THE COMMUNISTS ARE DETERMINED TO EXTRACT EVERY ADVANTAGE THEY CAN FROM THEIR HOLDING OF OUR PRISONERS OF WAR AND THEY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE THEIR ATTEMPTS TO LINK THE POWS WITH POLITICAL ISSUES. NONETHELESS, I HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT THE DRV AND PRG AT THIS POINT STILL INTEND TO RELEASE OUR MEN, AS THEY UNDERTOOK TO DO IN THE AGREEMENT, BY THE END OF THE SIXTY DAY PERIOD. ON THE OTHER HAND, BY OBSTRUCTIONISM IN THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION THE PRG AND DRV HAVE SO FAR MADE A DEAD LETTER OF ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE PRISONER PROTOCOL WHICH PROVIDES FOR VISITS TO PLACES OF DETENTION BY DESIGNATED RED CROSS SOCIETIES.

28. THE RELEASE OF VIETNAMESE POWS HAS NOT BEEN CONDUCTED BY EITHER SIDE IN THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT. THE COMMUNISTS CAME UP WITH AN ABSURDLY SHORT LIST OF THE POW'S THEY HOLD, AND THE GVN IN RETALIATION HAS TWICE THREATENED TO RELEASE FEWER

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THAN THE PRESCRIBED NUMBER OF COMMUNIST PRISONERS. (ON BOTH OCCASIONS WE PERSUADED THE GVN TO REVERSE THEIR DECISION.) RELEASED GVN PRISONERS HAVE RETURNED WITH ACCOUNTS OF SERIOUS MISTREATMENT WHILE IN COMMUNIST HANDS.

29. THE QUESTION OF RELEASE OF CIVILIAN DETAINEES HAS STILL TO BE SETTLED. IT IS AN IMPORTANT MATTER FOR THE PRG, WHICH COUNTS ON THE VC CADRE RELEASED BY THE GVN TO CARRY ON THEIR POLITICAL AGITATION IN THE MONTHS AHEAD; AND IT IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR THE GVN, FOR THE SAME REASON. THE GVN GAVE THE PRG AN INCOMPLETE LIST OF DETAINEES AND HAS RECLASSIFIED LARGE NUMBER OF THEM AS COMMON CRIMINALS IN AN EFFORT TO EXEMPT THEM FROM THE EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT. THE PRG HAS PERFORMED NO BETTER. IT PRESENTED THE GVN A LIST OF ONLY 200 DETAINEES, WHILE IT SEEMS EVIDENT ON THE FACE OF IT THAT THE NUMBER OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ABDUCTED BY THE COMMUNISTS AND WHO HAVE NOT YET RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES MUST BE MANY TIMES THAT NUMBER.

30. HOWEVER, I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT THESE MATTERS, WHICH ARE NOT OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES, CAN BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE PRG AND THE GVN IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR BILATERAL TALKS. WHETHER THIS WILL BE DONE DEPENDS, OF COURSE, ON WHETHER THE TWO SIDES HAVE THE WILL TO WORK TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AS THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES.

31. NOTE: THE FOREGOING WAS DRAFTED BY AMBASSADOR BUNKER PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE TODAY.

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PARIS
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PRR, VN, US, VS
SUBJECT: NEW DRV EMBASSY REQUESTS TRANSMISSION OF MFA NOTE
TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. NGUYEN TUAN LIEU, COUNSELOR OF DRV EMBASSY, CALLED ON
EMBOFF TO DELIVER NOTE TO EMBASSY CONVEYING NOTE FROM DRV
MFA TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE. FRENCH TEXT OF EMBASSY NOTE
AND DRVIS INFORMAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MFA NOTE FOLLOW

2. LIEU WAS CORDIAL, BUT INDICATED HE WAS IN THIS CASE
ACTING MERELY AS MAILMAN IN FIRST UTILIZATION OF WHAT HE
DESCRIBED AS "CHANNEL AGREED UPON BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS."
HE DID NOT WISH TO REMAIN LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT EMBOFF TO
READ FULL TRANSLATION, BUT AFTER SCANNING NOTE, EMBOFF
INFORMED HIM THAT NOTE PRESENTED VIEW OF FACTS TOTALLY
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF U.S.

3. FRENCH TEXT OF DRV EMBASSY NOTE. BEGIN QUOTE.
L'AMBASSADE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU VIET NAM
A FRANCE PRESENTE SES COMPLIMENTS A L'AMBASSADE DES ETATS-
UNIS D'AMERIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'HONNEUR DE LUI DEMANDER
DE BIEN VOULOIR TRANSMETTRE AU DEPARTMENT D'ETAT DES ETATS-
UNIS AMERIQUE LA NOTE CI-JOINTE ADRESSEE PAR LE MINISTERE
DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU
VIET NAM.
L'AMBASSADE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU VIET NAM
SAISIT CETTE OCCASION POUR RENOUVELER A L'AMBASSADE DES
ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE LES ASSURANCES DE SA HAUTE CONSIDERATION.
PARIS LE 16 AVRIL 1973 END QUOTE.

4. ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DRV MFA NOTE TO DEPARTMENT:

***** WMSR COMMENT *****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, LORD, HOWE, HOLDRIDGE, STEARMAN

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Date: *10/18/73*

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BEGIN QUOTE.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND HAS THE HONOUR TO BRING HEREAFTER TO THE NOTICE OF THE LATTER THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIET NAM AND THE PROTOCOLS THERETO OVER THE LAST PERIOD:

1. THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIET NAM HAS BEEN SIGNED ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF VIET NAM AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. IT MEETS THE BAGER ASPIRATION FOR PEACE OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD, AND CONSTITUTES A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE PEOPLES.

PURSUANT TO THEIR COMMITMENT UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND THE ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIET NAM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AND THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET NAM HAVE STRICTLY RESPECTED AND SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTED THE AGREEMENT AND THE PROTOCOLS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAVE SERIOUSLY VIOLATED MANY ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS THEREOF.

SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE CAME INTO FORCE, THE SOUTH VIET NAM PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED IT ON ALL THEATRES OF OPERATIONS, HAVE REMAINED IN PLACE, AND STOPPED ALL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND HOSTILE ACTS. BUT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM, WITH THE BACKING OF THE UNITED STATES, HAS FAILED TO OBSERVE THE CEASE FIRE, THEREBY SERIOUSLY VIOLATING ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE AGREEMENT. IT HAS LAUNCHED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OPERATIONS INVOLVING REGIMENT-OR DIVISION-SIZE INFANTRY UNITS WITH AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO ENCRDACH ON THE AREAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. AS A RESULT, IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS AND MORE, THE CEASE-FIRE HAS NOT YET BEEN EFFECTIVE IN SOUTH VIET NAM, THE BLOODSHED HAS CONTINUE, THE PEOPLE HAVE NOT YET ENJOYED PEACE, AND HAVE CONTINUED TO SUFFER SO MUCH SUFFERING AND MOURNING. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS SITUATION WHICH JEOPARDIZES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE, AND POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO PEACE IN SOUTH VIET NAM.

2. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS HAD TO END THE WAR IN

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SOUTH AND NORTH VIET NAM, AND TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS AND THOSE OF ITS ALLIES FROM SOUTH VIET NAM. BUT AT VARIANCE WITH ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE AGREEMENT, THE WITHDRAWING U.S. TROOPS HAVE NOT TAKEN AWAY THEIR ARMAMENTS AND HAVE NOT DISMANTLED THEIR BASES. MOREOVER, THE UNITED STATES HAS LEFT BEHIND OVER TEN THOUSAND MILITARY PERSONNEL DISGUISED AS CIVILIAN ADVISERS, AND IT HAS ILLEGALLY BROUGHT BIG QUANTITIES OF ARMAMENTS, MUNITIONS AND WAR MATERIAL INTO SOUTH VIET NAM IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 5 AND 7 OF THE AGREEMENT.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE REMOVAL AND DESTRUCTION OF MINES IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS, PORTS, HARBOURS, AND WATERWAYS OF NORTH VIET NAM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAS AFFORDED ALL FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE U.S. SIDE TO CARRY IT OUT RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY. BUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS DELIBERATELY DELAYED THE MINE-CLEARING OPERATIONS, THUS PROLONGING IN FACT THE BLOCKADE OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. SO FAR, IT HAS EXPLODED ONLY THREE OUT OF THE TENS OF THOUSANDS MINES IT IS DUTY-BOUND TO CLEAR.

4. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 8 OF THE AGREEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AND THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET NAM HAVE RETURNED WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT ALL AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS CAPTURED AND HELD IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIET NAM. IN THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME, THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET NAM HAS ALSO RETURNED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM THE CAPTURED AND DETAINED MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE LATTER.

IN CONTRAST, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAS FAILED TO RETURN TO THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET NAM ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL CAPTURED AND HELD BY IT. MOREOVER, IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS AND MORE, IT HAS NOT RETURNED ANY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARRESTED AND DETAINED BY IT TO THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET NAM.

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AS A RESULT, HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR FAMILIES, AND ARE STILL BEING DETAINED, AND SUBJECTED TO THE WORST TORTURES AND TREATMENTS IN THE PRISONS OF SOUTH VIET NAM. THIS CONSTITUTES AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS SITUATION WHICH IS IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE AGREEMENT, AND AT VARIANCE WITH THE PLEDGE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. PUBLIC OPINION IN VIET NAM AND IN THE WORLD IS RAISING INDIGNANT CONDEMNATIONS, AND DEMANDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM IMMEDIATELY RETURN TO THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET NAM THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL STILL BEING DETAINED.

5. IN THE AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAS FRENZIEDLY INTENSIFIED ITS MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT AND COERCION AGAINST THE PEOPLE, CARRIED OUT REPRESSIONS AND PERSECUTIONS AGAINST PATRIOTS, AND PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE, AND THOSE WHO DO NOT BELONG TO THE RULING CLIQUE. IT HAS LAUNCHED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF POLICE AND 'PACIFICATION' OPERATIONS WHICH ARE IN NO WAY DIFFERENT IN TERMS OF SCALE AND ATROCITY FROM WAR-TIME OPERATIONS. IT MAINTAINS IN FORCE WAR-TIME LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND HAS ENACTED MANY NEW FACIST LAWS. THE FREEDOMS OF MOVEMENT, OF RESIDENCE, OF WORK, OF THE PRESS, OF GATHERING, ETC., CONTINUE TO BE DENIED TO THE PEOPLE.

6. AT VARIANCE WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIET NAM, THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDERTAKEN WITH ITS AIRCRAFT INCLUDING B-52'S THE BOMBING OF THE LAO TERRITORY RIGHT AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT ON RESTORING PEACE AND ACHIEVING NATIONAL CONCORD IN LAOS, AND IT IS INTENSIFYING CARPET-BOMBINGS IN CAMBODIA,

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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T-HUS SERIOUSLY VIOLATING THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NEUTRALITY OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

7. OBVIOUSLY, OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS AND MORE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAVE BRAZENLY AND SYSTEMATICALLY VIOLATED MANY ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIET NAM. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET BROUGHT STRICTLY TO AN END ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND ITS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOUTH VIET NAM, WHERE IT IS STILL TRYING TO CARRY OUT NEO-COLONIALISM. IF THE VIOLATIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIET NAM SHOULD CONTINUE, PEACE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED FOR A LONG PERIOD IN SOUTH VIET NAM. THIS WOULD BE COMPLETELY AT VARIANCE WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S EAGER ASPIRATIONS FOR PEACE, INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD, AND WITH THE DESIRE FOR PEACE OF THE WORLD'S PEOPLES. TO CONSOLIDATE AND MAINTAIN A LASTING PEACE IN VIET NAM AND INDOCHINA, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM MUST SCRUPULOUSLY AND STRICTLY IMPLEMENT THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIET NAM AND THE ANNEXED PROTOCOLS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM MUST STOP ALL ENCRDACHING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE LIBERATED ZONE, ALL POLICE AND 'PACIFICATION' OPERATIONS IN THE AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL, CARRY INTO EFFECT DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES FOR THE PEOPLES OF THESE AREAS, AND RETURN TO THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET NAM ALL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IT IS HOLDING. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST STRICTLY BRING TO AN END ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND ITS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOUTH VIET NAM, SCRUPULOUSLY CARRY OUT ITS OBLIGATION CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF MINES IN NORTH VIET NAM, AND CEASE ALL ACTS ENCRDACHING ON THE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AND THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET NAM AS WELL AFFIRM ONCE AGAIN THEIR UNSWERVING POSITION OF STRICTLY RESPECTING AND SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTING ALL PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND THE ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIET NAM. IN FACT OF THIS SITUATION, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 6 OF THE ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIET NAM, BRINGS THIS TO THE NOTICE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND DEMANDS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM STOP AT ONCE THESE VIOLATIONS, STRICTLY RESPECT AND SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENT ALL PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND THE ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL

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CONFERENCE ON VIET NAM.
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM TAKES THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO
THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THE ASSURANCES
OF ITS HIGH CONSIDERATION.
HANOI, APRIL 16, 1973 END QUOTE.

5. ORIGINALS OF ABOVE AND OFFICIAL VIETNAMESE TEXT ARE
BEING FORWARDED BY POUCH. WE ARE COMPARING VIETNAMESE
TEXT WITH TRANSLATION AND WILL REPORT FURTHER IN CASE THERE ARE
ANY DISCREPANCIES IN WHAT IS BASICALLY FAIRLY STANDARD
PROPAGANDA.

6. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT NOTE TO OTHER POSTS.
WE WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE AS TO LATERAL ADDRESSEES IN
THE FUTURE. WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN US AND DRV ON THIS CHANNEL AND ANY ADDITIONAL
PERTINENT INFORMATION.

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SUBJECT: CANADIAN ICCS TEAM IN HANOI

1. SUMMARY: CANADIAN EMBOFF HOWARD SINGLETON, WHO WILL BE SENIOR CANADIAN ON ICCS TEAM IN HANOI, HAD BRIEF INFORMAL VISIT WITH SECRETARY ROGERS JAN 29, FOLLOWED BY LUNCH (AT HIS SUGGESTION) WITH STATE AND DEFENSE POW SPECIALISTS.
2. SECRETARY ROGERS INVITED SINGLETON TO MEET WITH HIM BRIEFLY IN HIS OFFICE BEFORE LUNCH. SECRETARY TOLD SINGLETON OF IMPORTANCE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE ATTACH TO SPEEDY, HUMANE RESOLUTION OF POW QUESTION. HE SAID HIS MEETINGS WITH COMMUNIST REPS IN PARIS HAD BEEN DIGNIFIED AND CORDIAL, WHICH HE HOPED AUGURED WELL FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR POW RELEASES ON WHICH SINGLETON WOULD WORK.
3. SINGLETON TOLD SECRETARY HE LOOKED FORWARD TO ASSIGNMENT AND WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO HELP OUR MEN. HE SAID HIS ARRIVAL DATE IN HANOI AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WOULD AWAIT DISCUSSION BY THE ICCS IN SAIGON.
4. LUNCH STATE AND DOD REPS REVIEWED USG EXPECTATIONS REGARDING PRISONER RELEASE AND ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING, NOTING IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF ICCS TEAM COULD OBTAIN LIST IN ADVANCE FOR EACH GROUP OF RELEASEES. DISCUSSION ALSO COVERED POSSIBLE ROLE OF CANADIAN (OR OTHER) RED CROSS REPS IN VISITING POW'S AT PLACES OF DETENTION IN NVN.

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5. COMMENT: SINGLETON IS EXPERIENCED CANADIAN DIPLOMAT WHO SERVED ON ICC IN HANOI IN 1957. HE IS A BACHELOR AND HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT SINCE BEFORE CHRISTMAS. BI, AS

SANITIZED

HE EXPECTS TO ARRIVE SAIGON ON PANAM FLIGHT MORNING OF FEB. 1. GDS ROGERS

DRAFTED BY: D/PW

APPROVED BY: EA:MARSHALL GREEN

CLEARANCES: EA: S/

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S/S:MR. ELIOT

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C. VIEWS REGARDING CEASEFIRE PROGRESS HELD BY INFORMED PERSONS SUCH AS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ICCS MEMBERS, DIPLOMATS, NEWSMEN, POLITICIANS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CEASEFIRE. GUIDANCE WITH REGARD TO CONTACTS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV AND NLF WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

4. THE ICCS.

B. ATTITUDES TOWARD CEASEFIRE HELD BY EACH OF FOUR NATIONAL COMPONENTS OF ICES.

C. ANY PROBLEMS SIGNIFICANTLY HAMPERING ICPS IN ITS WORK.

D. GVN AND PRG/DRV RELATIONS WITH ICCS AND ITS NATIONAL COMPONENTS.

5. COMMUNIST AFFAIRS.

A. INFORMATION BEARING ON PRG/DPW PLANS, SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM, REGARDING CEASEFIRE AND PEACE.

B. COMMUNIST NEGOTIATIONS WITH RVN ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
FORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF NCRC. PREPARATION FOR AN ELECTION
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

C. INFORMATION BEARING ON DEMOBILIZATION/WITHDRAWAL OF NVA.

D. RELEASE OF RVNAF POW'S. ACCOUNTING FOR MIAND KID-
NAPPED AND IMPRESSED PERSONS IN COMMUNIST HANDS.

F. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNISTS.

F. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP OF PRG, NLF, AND PROMINENT FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, CENTRAL, REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL.

G. ADMINISTRATION OF COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED AREAS: ORGANIZATION

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OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, TREATMENT OF FORMER GVN OFFICIALS AND SOLDIERS, ELECTIONS, TAXATION, PUBLIC WORKS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY, POLICE, PUBLIC INFORMATION, HEALTH SERVICES, ETC.

H. COMMUNIST POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE AREAS OF IMMEDIATE COMMUNIST CONTROL. FLAG SHOWING, DEMONSTRATIONS, ETC. ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE REFUGEES TO RETURN TO COMMUNISTS AREAS.

I. RELATIONS BETWEEN PRG AND DRV.

J. PRG DEALINGS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND FOREIGN POLITICAL MOVEMENTS. COMMUNIST ATTITUDES AND POLICIES TOWARD U.S., USSR, AND CHINA.

K. BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON COMMUNIST CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONALITIES.

6. GVN AFFAIRS.

TRADITIONAL FOREIGN SERVICE POLITICAL REPORTING, WITH EMPHASIS ON:

1. INFORMATION BEARING ON GVN PLANS REGARDING CEASEFIRE AND PEACE. GVN PROPAGANDA CONCERNING CEASEFIRE.

2. NEGOTIATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. FORMATION OF NVRC. PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. ACCOMMODATION WITH COMMUNISTS AT LOCAL LEVEL.

3. RELEASE OF COMMUNIST POWS AND DETAINEEES. CHIEU HOI ACTIVITIES. CONTINUING PHUNG HOANG/AN TRI DETENTIONS AND OTHER POLICE ACTIVITIES.

4. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD GVN.

5. EFFORTS TO REDUCE CORRUPTION, ENHANCE RESPONSIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS.

6. TRENDS IN PUBLIC SUPPORT OF GVN. ATTITUDES OF IMPORTANT POLITICAL GROUPINGS, INCLUDING AN QUANG BUDDHISTS, CATHOLICS, MILITARY LEADERS, BUREAUCRACY, BLOCS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. GVN SUCCESS IN BUILDING GREATER POLITICAL UNITY. EVOLUTION OF

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POLITICAL PARTIES. THE DEMOCRACY PARTY. APPLICATION OF DECREE
LAW ON POLITICAL PARTIES.

7. ECONOMIC FACTORS:

- A. SHARP PRICE INCREASES, OR SERIOUS SHORTAGES OF COMMODITIES.
- B. INTERRUPTION OR HARASSMENT OF COMMERCE ON ROADS AND CANALS.
- C. CLOSURE OF BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS.
- D. MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE FROM RURAL TO URBAN AREAS.
- E. UNUSUAL ACTIVITIES CONCERNING MONEY, GOLD, AND CREDIT (E.G.,
RUN ON LOCAL BANK, LARGE-SCALE TRANSFERS, GOLD-HOARDING, ETC.).
- F. VC TAXATION.

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SUBJECT: ICCS

1. SECRETARY MET WITH CANADIAN, INDONESIAN, HUNGARIAN AND POLISH AMBASSADORS TOGETHER MORNING JANUARY 24 TO CONVEY TO THEM FULL TEXTS OF BASIC AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOLS ON ICCS, CEASEFIRE AND JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, PRISONER RELEASE AND REMOVAL OF MINES.

2. DURING FOLLOW-UP MEETING LATER SAME DAY WITH AMBASSADORS, DEPTOFS ANSWERED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS REGARDING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ICCS PROTOCOLS AND THE LANS. EVIDENT THAT AMONGST OTHERS, CONCERNS ARE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF WHEN CEASEFIRE BEGINS. THESE CONCERNS WERE DISCUSSED IN MESSAGE WE JUST SENT SAIGON. THE MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) HANOI SHOULD ICCS PERSONNEL WAITING FOR ARRIVAL SAIGON

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EXDIS REVIEW

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By MRO NARA, Date 4/12/94

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(R) DOES GVN HAVE ANY PREFERENCE RE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WITH ICCS MEMBERS DURING NEXT FEW DAYS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF FIRST ICCS PERSONNEL?

(C) WHAT ARRANGEMENTS IS GVN MAKING TO EXPEDITE ENTRY OF ICCS PERSONNEL, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT LANDING CLEARANCES, VISAS, ETC.? (THIS POSES PARTICULAR PROBLEM FOR HUNGARIANS, WHO HAVE NO FORMAL CONTACT WITH GVN.)

3. IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN INITIAL ESTABLISHMENT ICCS, REQUEST EMBASSY SAIGON, IN CONSULTATION WITH GVN AS NECESSARY, PROVIDE ASAP AS MUCH DETAILED INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON THESE AND RELATED POINTS THAT WE CAN PASS ON TO REPRESENTATIVES OF ICCS GOVERNMENTS HERE.
GDS ROGERS

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