MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Ambassador Bunker’s Cease-fire Assessment

Attached at Tab A is a generally up-beat assessment by Ambassador Bunker of the Vietnam cease-fire after the first 30 days. The report -- summarized below -- describes a spotty record of cease-fire implementation of the initial shake-down period but notes some grounds for hope (e.g., ICCS progress and improved GVN attitudes). Although reluctant, the GVN understands it must be loyal to the Agreement; however, there are strong reasons to doubt the Communists’ sincerity. The DRV/PRG, for example, is blatantly violating Article 7 of the Agreement (illegal infiltration of men and supplies). Most ominously, Ambassador Bunker notes that the other side clearly is holding open the option of resuming the war and is doing its best to render ineffective the inspection mechanisms -- both ICCS and JMC -- provided by the Agreement.
Ambassador Bunker concludes that the other side still intends to release our POWs by the end of the sixty day period but will continue to link this with political issues. However, the release of Vietnamese POWs has not been conducted by either side in the spirit of the Agreement and the question of civilian detainees remains wholly unresolved.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN HOLDRIDGE
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Phuong

Attached at Tab A are suggested talking points for your meeting with GVN Ambassador Tran Kim Phuong March 6 at noon. Your talker focuses on four topics: U.S. aid to South Vietnam, GVN attitudes towards the JMC/ICGS, release of U.S. POWs and President Thieu's forthcoming visit to the U.S.

On March 7, Phuong will also meet with John Ehrlichman, possibly to discuss President Thieu's visit to the United States.

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SA 99
Talking Points for Meeting with Ambassador Phuong

-- First, let me tell you that the President is greatly impressed by your government's constructive approach to political negotiations with the other side. We share your hopes for an early substantive agreement in your talks at Paris. This encouraging attitude will, I believe, ease our persistent problems with Congress and the public over aid.
-- We will not let Hanoi use our POW's to get us to pressure your government into new concessions, most particularly on early release of civilian detainees. We will resist pressures on this critical question; however, we still believe that GVN flexibility toward the JMC and the release of Communist POW's on schedule would enhance the GVN's public relations in this country and would deprive the other side of ammunition to use against you.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

ACTION
March 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY
       JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT: Options and Reactions to North Vietnamese Infiltration

At Tab A is a memorandum for the President which describes the nature and possible motivation of North Vietnamese infiltration and violation of the cease-fire agreement and outlines the options for response. The memorandum considers the option of U.S. air strikes against infiltration routes in southern Laos and discusses the issue of whether this option should be pursued before or after final POW release.

The memorandum recommends that the President approve planning now for an air strike of two or three days duration against the infiltration routes in southern Laos commencing immediately after completion of the third increment prisoner release (March 16). Final decision would be taken at that time.

Recommendation:
That you forward the memorandum at Tab A to the President.

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