

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

May 13, 1972

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Meeting with a Delegation of POW/MIA Wives
Monday, May 15, 1972
10:30 a.m. (15 minutes)
The President's Office

I. PURPOSE

To review the POW/MIA issue with three representatives of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS PLAN

A. Background: At a special national meeting of the National League of Families on May 5-7, it was resolved that a delegation of three would be elected to represent the League in soliciting a meeting with you to ask about progress of efforts to obtain the release of the POWs and an accounting of the MIAs. (The League met prior to your May 8 announcement, which has been strongly supported by the great majority of the League's members.) The delegation was instructed to report in writing to the League membership on the results of any meeting with you. The texts of the resolutions passed by the League are attached at Tab B.

B. Participants:

1. Mrs. Sybil E. Stockdale, wife of Captain James B. Stockdale, POW in North Vietnam since September 1965.
 2. Mrs. Maureen A. Dunn, wife of Lieutenant Joseph P. Dunn, MIA near Hainan Island, China, since February 1968.
 3. Mrs. Phyllis E. Galanti, wife of Lt. Colonel Paul E. Galanti, POW in North Vietnam since June 1966.
 4. Mr. Henry A. Kissinger or General Alexander M. Haig.
 5. Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft.
- DF

- C. Press Plan: Meeting to be announced. Press photo opportunity.

III. RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS

Recommended talking points are attached at Tab A.



TALKING POINTS

The League recently extensively discussed the positions of various Presidential candidates on the POW/MIA issue. Therefore, you might begin by reaffirming your strong personal commitment to the early release and full accounting of all the prisoners and missing in action in Indochina.

You might, at this point, want to express understanding for the emotional and political pressure on the POW/MIA families to demand facile, but infeasible solutions of the POW/MIA problem. And you might want to express your appreciation for their support of your Administration's efforts to resolve this problem.

You might next wish to cite the Administration's current extensive efforts and decisive actions (supported by the great majority of the League's members) on behalf of peace and the POWs/MIAs in Indochina.

Since the League's representatives will probably not expect new or detailed information on the current Vietnam situation or our policy, their questions can probably be satisfied by restating the salient points of your May 8 address.

The husband of one of the representatives (Mrs. Dunn) was shot down near Hainan Island (PRC) and she might well want to know what the Chinese told you about POWs and MIAs. The other representatives can be expected to ask you if you intend to raise this issue in Moscow. You might point out that we raised the issue with the Chinese and will continue to raise it in other appropriate channels, but that we are obliged not to reveal details of such conversations and contacts.



THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTIONS WERE ADOPTED AT THE SPECIAL MEETING ON

MAY 7, 1972

WHEREAS the Vietnamization policy of our government, thus far, has failed to provide any results toward resolving the MIA-POW problem; and WHEREAS our government continues to pursue this policy; THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the National League of Families make known and reaffirm its extreme distress at the failure of this administration's policy to resolve the MIA-POW issue and; BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the National League of Families expects the government to immediately adopt a policy which will insure an accounting of the missing men and the release of the prisoners of war, not just the withdrawal of combat troops.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia at the National Meeting May 5-7, 1972 shall elect 3 of its members in whom the great majority has complete confidence who shall arrange a meeting with President Nixon (within the next 10 days) to question the President as to what arrangements he has made or is making for the release of POWs and an accounting of the MIAs; and that this committee shall report back to the League membership, in writing, within 5 days of such meeting.

NOTE: Delegates elected, by written ballot, to call on the President were Mrs. James B. Stockdale, Mrs. Joseph Dunn and Mrs. Paul E. Galanti. Two alternates, Joe McCain and Mrs. Louise Mulligan, also were named. Delegates were elected from a list of 16 nominees whose names follow:

Mrs. Donnie Collins
Mrs. Sybil Stockdale
Mrs. Louise Mulligan
Mr. Virgil O'Connor
Mrs. Carole Hanson
Mrs. Maerose Evans
Mrs. Phyllis Galanti

Mrs. Sara Frances Shay
Mrs. Maureen Dunn
Mr. Joe McCain
Mrs. Evelyn Grubb
Mr. Bob Brudno
Mr. George Brooks
Mrs. Jane Denton
Mrs. Iris Powers

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: We recommend that the Paris Peace Talks be reconvened simultaneously with inspection of the POW camps in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam by an established recognized humanitarian organization----- not the promise, but the two events occurring simultaneously!

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: Before the national elections in 1972 the MIA/POW families, the American people, and our Congressmen and Senators show unity in standing behind our government in their efforts to gain identification and release of our men.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The League of Families compile a list of willing doctors from neutral countries to be presented to the Paris Talks (or other suitable place) for them to choose a medical team to inspect all POW camps in Southeast Asia.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: There be established an Economic Pressure Committee; and that the League of Families ask every candidate for the office of President or Congress to publicly sign a pledge. This pledge would state: QUOTE--"If the Vietnam Conflict is not resolved at the time of my election, I will actively support a trade embargo against all countries supplying goods or services to North Vietnam"--UNQUOTE. We further recommend that the League acquire space here in the Nation's Capitol and in Miami on which to erect a giant billboard, with the pledge emblazoned across the top, and bearing the names of all Presidential candidates, who have and who have not signed.

NOTE: This Committee was subsequently established by the Board of Directors with Mr. George Schultz of Altoona, Pa. as Chairman.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The League of POW-MIA Families strongly questions the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in its failure to hold hearings on the Prisoners of War situation in the eight years since Capt. Floyd Thompson became the first American POW. The League considers the Committee, its Chairman and its members derelict in its responsibilities toward American citizens whose rights under international law are patently violated by the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao forces. The families of these men must take cynical note of some of the topics considered by the committee as paramount interest -- including the inflight conduct of vacationing American ambassadors -- and yet the most profound human-rights-international-problem in U. S. history is granted no attention. The League can only assume, after repeated requests for such hearings have been ignored, that the Committee has retreated into a callous political position from which 1,600 prisoners and missing Americans can find no assistance. It must be further noted that the Committee's counterpart in the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, has held regular hearings throughout the last three years.

Copies of this resolution will be delivered to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to each member of the Committee, to the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, and to the Chairmen of the Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Rules and Administration.

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BE IT RESOLVED: That the National League of Families send the National Coordinator and/or qualified representatives to Geneva with specific regard to attending the General Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, now in session. The League representatives will be specifically charged with presenting a full portfolio of evidence concerning discrepancies on the December 1970 Hanoi list of POWs and the lack of such lists from the Pathet Lao and Viet Cong; and to demand that the national representatives to that session conform to the First Article of the Convention, which unequivocally requires all members to insure conformance to the Conventions by all member nations. If possible, the League representatives

will be encouraged to present the portfolio at other diplomatic capitols, and if financially feasible, will be accompanied by a qualified assistant in press relations in anticipation of press conferences and meetings.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: We move for a continuing and strengthening of the non-partisan political action committee as one way to make the POWs and MIAs an issue in the 1972 election. This should also be carried out through the individual from the precinct level and all levels to affect the outcome at the national conventions and the national elections.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The League of POW-MIA Families establishes a standing Committee on Identification and Discrepancies. The Committee's responsibility will be to gather from all possible sources evidence of discrepancies in the Hanoi list of POWs, Dec, 1970 and evidence of men captured in Laos, South Vietnam, China or any other nation connected with or near to the Vietnam Conflict. The Committee will seek to arrange the evidence in powerful displays and to arrange a brochure with verbal and photographic evidence which illustrates the problem, subject to the approval of the National Coordinator.

NOTE: This Committee was subsequently established, with Joe McCain as Chairman.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: In recognition of the fact that the discrepancies in, or the lack of, Prisoner of War lists are not a major news issue, but should be, the Committee on Discrepancies and Identification recommends and urges the League of POW-MIA Families to send a representative to major news media to set up editorial conferences to educate the press on invalidity of the so-called official Hanoi list of POWs. It is felt by the Committee that such conferences will be very fruitful in making the discrepancy situation an investigated topic in the press. Major media would be defined as major wire services, television networks, news magazines and daily newspapers in the top ten metropolitan areas.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The National League of Families urges the Government to make a stronger public issue of the known discrepancies in the so-called complete and official list of American POWs published in December 1970. It is felt that there is almost no public awareness of the proof --- photographic and eyewitness--- of dozens of American servicemen captured alive by the North Vietnamese, Viet Cong and Pathet Lao; and that unless a strong case is made for these men at all levels -- in the press and all international forums -- they will remain anonymous, forgotten, abandoned.

Copies of this resolution with an attached list of discrepancies will be delivered to the office of the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, to the Hon. William Porter, U. S. Ambassador-at-Large, to the Hon. George Gush, U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and to others deemed advisable by the National Coordinator.

BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The National League of Families sincerely thanks the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development for its diligence in continuous hearings on the Prisoner of War and Missing in Action problem during the last three years. The League feels that general knowledge on the issue has been significantly advanced due to the research and discussion that have taken place before the committee. The League urges, however, that immediate hearings be ordered on the discrepancies in the so-called official and complete list of American POWs published in December, 1970, and the lack of such lists from the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao forces. The committee is urged to thoroughly and in the public eye examine the multitude of proof that men who were captured alive by enemy forces have been studiously left off the Hanoi list, and investigate the evidence of capture of other Americans by the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao.

Copies of this resolution will be delivered to the Chairman and members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to the Speaker of the House, the House Majority and Minority Leaders, and to the Chairmen of the House Committees on Armed Services, Rules, and Veterans Affairs.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: Mrs. Evelyn Grubb, National Coordinator of the League of Families, is to be commended and thanked for an outstanding job during a trying initial seven months of office. Her creative initiative in reaching the highest levels of assistance has significantly advanced the POW-MIA cause. Her efforts in bringing together the many divergent philosophies and personalities in the POW-MIA movement have made a contribution to unity. Let this resolution be a vote of confidence in Mrs. Grubb to continue her labors.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: In any peace negotiations, all prisoners and missing persons in every country in Indochina MUST be included.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The International Control Commission (India, Poland, Canada) be encouraged to offer its services as a neutral body to act as a mediator for release and seek information on behalf of all prisoners and missing.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: It is the earnest intent of the National League of Families that the United States government and its people make every effort to secure information concerning the men who are missing in Laos and instigate exchange of mail between these men and their families.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The families of men missing in action and prisoners in Laos request the United States government inform us of actions taken in the past and what further actions are planned in the future to secure knowledge and release of the men captured or missing in Laos.

BE IT RESOLVED THAT: It is the feeling of the families of men missing and captured in Laos that contingency plans must be made for the release of the men held in Laos and the accounting of the missing there in the eventuality that these men are not released at the same time as those held by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The National League of Families suspects a tendency to associate the word POW with living captives and MIA with the dead. It urges the government to avoid such pitfalls whenever possible by using phrases such as "presumed captured" when referring to men missing in action. It is emphasized that a great many MIA men are believed to be alive and unidentified and should be considered alive until satisfactorily accounted for by the North Vietnamese, Viet Cong and Pathet Lao.

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BE IT RESOLVED THAT: Any member of a nominating committee, who is nominated and accepts nomination be immediately dropped from nominating committee and be replaced by a non candidate.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

sent
to Hoopes
12-13

4073

ACTION

May 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG
THROUGH: W. L. STEARMAN *WLS*
FROM: SVEN KRAEMER *SK*
SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with POW/MIA Families -
Monday, May 15 at 10:30

We were asked to develop talking points on the POW/MIA issue to be included in a memorandum from General Scowcroft to the President. As you know, the President is scheduled to meet for 15 minutes on Monday, May 15 at 10:30 a.m. with three delegates from the National League of Families.

General Scowcroft has indicated that Mr. Kissinger or you would attend the meeting, a brief session in which the President can personally reaffirm his priority interest in the full accounting and early release of the men.

Accordingly we have attached a brief talking points section (Tab A) to General Scowcroft's revised draft memo at Tab I.

General Scowcroft is unavailable today, but he agreed in earlier discussions to accept in advance any modifications we might suggest. He further agreed that you could initial the memo for him or substitute yours or Mr. Kissinger's name for his.

In the meantime we have received several phone calls from David Hoopes in Mr. Butterfield's office urgently requesting a copy of the memorandum to the President for their further review and circulation.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I, with attachments, and that your office so notify Mr. Butterfield's office (David Hoopes).



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT *B*

SUBJECT: Meeting with a Delegation of POW/MIA Wives
Monday, May 15, 1972
10:30 a.m. (15 minutes)
The President's Office

I. PURPOSE

To give encouragement to the families of the POW/MIA in Southeast Asia.

II. BACKGROUND

At a special meeting of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia on May 5-7, it was resolved that a delegation of three should be elected to represent the League in soliciting a meeting with you. The purpose of the meeting with you was to ask about progress of efforts to obtain the release of the POWs and an accounting of the MIA. (The League meeting took place prior to your May 8 announcement.) The delegation was instructed to report in writing to the League membership the results of any meeting with you. *The texts of the resolutions passed by the League are attached for your information at TAD.*

III. PARTICIPANTS

1. Mrs. Sybil E. Stockdale, wife of Captain James B. Stockdale, POW in North Vietnam since September 1965.
2. Mrs. Maureen A. Dunn, wife of Lieutenant Joseph P. Dunn, MIA near Hainan Island since February 1968.
3. Mrs. Phyllis E. Galanti, wife of Lt. Colonel Paul E. Galanti, POW in North Vietnam since June 1966.
4. Dr. Henry^A Kissinger *or General Atchaf*
5. Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft

IV. PRESS PLAN

Meeting to be announced. ~~White House~~ press photo opportunity.

V. TALKING POINTS

[The following talking points have been prepared by Dr. Kissinger:]

SA 99

B-446

4971

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

June 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN HOLDRIDGE *JH*

SUBJECT:

Request for Meeting with POW Wives

General Scowcroft has sent you a memorandum passing on a request from Mrs. Carole Hanson, Chairman of the National League of Families of American POWs and MIAs, for a meeting with you in San Clemente prior to July 7 (Tab A).

The League's Board of Directors is holding its bi-monthly meeting in Washington D. C. during the period July 7-9. The League originally requested that you meet with the entire Board in Washington at that time, but were told that you would be out of town in San Clemente. They have now changed their request, asking that you meet in San Clemente with Mrs. Hanson and perhaps two other members of the Board from the Los Angeles area. Mrs. Hanson proposes that you meet at some time convenient to you, but prior to the Board's meeting of July 7-9. She would presumably pass on to the Board the substance of her discussion with you.

We have discussed this request with General Scowcroft and with the POW officials in State and Defense. All agree that your past meetings with the Board or its representatives have been beneficial and that Mrs. Hanson is a solid leader and that the two other representatives would tend to be supportive of the Administration's efforts.

At the same time, however, it is felt that factors including speculation concerning the recent summit meetings, the League representatives' recent meeting with the President, and the proliferation of League groups each seeking separate appointments with various NSC, Department of Defense and State offices suggest that we give a negative response to Mrs. Hanson's San Clemente request at the present time. It is not felt that such a turn-down would create any special problems.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 8/23/93 F9301180

By *WRO* NARA, Date 9/20/93

SA 99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In view of the above considerations, we recommend against a San Clemente meeting with Mrs. Hanson and other Board members of the National League of Families. If you agree with this recommendation, we will suggest to General Scowcroft that he indicate to Mrs. Hanson that you will be unable to meet with the ladies in San Clemente. General Scowcroft could indicate to the ladies, however, that you should be able to meet with the Board prior to the League's national convention this fall.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you not meet in San Clemente with the representatives of the National League of Families.

HK

Agree - I do not wish to meet now.

Disagree - I do wish to meet now in San Clemente.
Please arrange.


MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Meeting with POW Families

The Board of Directors of the National League of Families is holding its bi-monthly meeting during the period 7-9 July. It is my understanding that your office told League representatives that you expected to be in California at that time and would be unable to meet with the Board.

Armed with that information, Mrs. Carole Hanson, Chairman of the League, called me to ask if you could meet with her and perhaps two other members of the Board from the Los Angeles area. She proposes that you meet with them at San Clemente sometime convenient to you but before the Board meeting. I presume she would then pass on to the Board the substance of her discussion with you.

If you will let me know your wishes with respect to such a meeting, I will make whatever arrangements are appropriate.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION~~SECRET~~

March 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT:

POWs in Laos

Alexander Butterfield has sent you a memorandum (Tab B) asking if Dick Helms could check on reports of an Australian photographer's claim to have heard from the Pathet Lao that as many as 200 U.S. POWs are being held in Laotian caves.

The Australian photographer in question, John Everingham, associated with the strongly new left Dispatch News Service, claims to have been "captured" by Pathet Lao forces in early February. After two weeks with the Pathet Lao, he was "released" and returned to Vientiane. In relating his experience with the Pathet Lao, he claimed they told him that some 200 U.S. POWs are being held by them in Laos. This was reported in U.S. media.

Everingham subsequently left for Bangkok reportedly to arrange for publication of his experience in Life magazine. Prior to leaving, he told the Australian Services Attache that he hoped to sell a pictorial story to Life which would be strongly critical of the Laotian Government and Army and of U.S. activities in Laos, but would portray a sympathetic picture of the Pathet Lao. Everingham expressed the hope that his story would be seized upon by one of the presidential candidates hostile to President Nixon as a campaign issue.

Our mission in Vientiane is extremely skeptical that his capture was bonafide and suspects it was arranged with the Pathet Lao. In any event, Vientiane feels that his own published accounts will be deliberately inaccurate and highly critical of the RLG and us.

The mission is now checking details of Everingham's story for inconsistencies and hopes to obtain additional information from him (especially in respect to POWs) when he returns from Bangkok.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 1/4/93 F92-1408

By *MRC* NARA, Date 5/6/93

SA 99 (Part)

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~~SECRET~~

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We have prepared a reply to Mr. Butterfield (Tab A) which informs him that Everingham's story is being checked by our mission in Vientiane and that we will give him the results of this investigation as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~

March 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUTTERFIELD

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: POWs in Laos



Our mission in Vientiane is currently checking the Australian photographer's account of his "capture" by the Pathet Lao which generated the press story on U.S. POWs in Laos to which you referred in your memorandum of March 13. The mission is especially interested in getting more details on the alleged holding of U.S. POWs in Laos. We will send you the results of the mission's investigation as soon as we receive them.

The Australian photographer in question is John Everingham who is associated with the strongly new left Dispatch News Service. Our mission in Vientiane is extremely skeptical that Everingham's capture was bonafide and feels that his own published accounts will be deliberately inaccurate and highly critical of the Laotian Government and the U.S. role in Laos. (Everingham presently intends to sell his story to Life magazine and reportedly hopes that it will be used as a campaign issue by presidential candidates hostile to President Nixon.)

We frankly doubt that the Pathet Lao are holding some 200 U.S. POWs in Laos, as they allegedly told Everingham; however, we believe that his report should be investigated as thoroughly as possible.

~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
SUBJECT: POW's (Action)

At the center of page 8 of today's News Summary there is a statement about an Aussie photographer who allegedly heard from the Pathet Lao that as many as 200 U.S. POW's are being held in Laotian caves.

If this is something Dick Helms might be able to investigate and report on, please have him do so without delay.

Forward your response (or that of Mr. Helms) to the Office of the Staff Secretary by 2 p.m. Friday, March 17.

Thank you.

SA 99 B-449

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 31, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE SX

SUBJECT:

National League of Families Request
for Meeting with You

General Scowcroft has forwarded the request of the National League of Families of American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia for a meeting with you on April 7 or 14. The League proposes that members of the League's Executive Board and a few others vouched for by the Board meet with you. They would fly to Washington especially for such a meeting.

The League's request for a meeting has come in the context of several concurrent developments in the field of POW/MIA activities which we have been evaluating in order to provide you with additional perspective on the issues as follows:

The League's Board has focused the timing of their request on the facts that: (1) their meeting with you scheduled for March 10 was postponed, and (2) their lead-time is shrinking in preparing for the major semi-annual national conference scheduled by the League early in May. The Board was greatly disappointed about the March 10 postponement, but they have reminded General Scowcroft that on the day of the President's recent signing ceremony for the National Week of Concern, you encountered them in a White House hallway and told them that you would definitely meet with them "in about a month."

With regard to the League's upcoming national conference, scheduled for May 5 through May 7, the Board expects confrontations and decisions on the issue of the League's "going political", i. e. whether or not the League should break with the Administration and go with the "set-the-date-now" groups and candidates. The League's moderate officers indicate that there is increased pressure from the McGovern, Muskie and Kennedy people and that the radical splinter groups among the POW wives are trying hard to have the League attack the Administration's policies.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 8/23/93 F9301180

By WKO NARA, Date 9/20/93

SA 99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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In a recent example of such pressure, the New York Times on March 29 carried a press story stating that: "Senator George McGovern accused President Nixon today of 'shabby' treatment of the families of prisoners of war by failing to answer letters from them if they contain criticism of his Vietnam policies." According to the Times, McGovern also said that "'The truth is that only by ending the war can we get out prisoners of war released' and that continued bombing in Southeast Asia 'insures that American prisoners will remain in their cells.'"

The League's leadership, themselves sensitive to shifting pressures and moods, are concerned that the White House continue to show the strongest possible interest in the POWs and in the League. They have thus far supported the President's efforts and initiatives. They have counted heavily on their meetings with you and have as a group been deeply distressed by any leaks which have resulted from these meetings.

Most recently the League has reacted favorably to the answers they received via General Scowcroft to the six questions on POWs and Indochina which they had asked of the President and of all of the major candidates, while they publicly criticized the responses provided by Senators Humphrey and Jackson. In addition, on March 23 their National Coordinator, Mrs. Evelyn Grubb, sent a telegram to the President stating that the League "applauds your strong new efforts to negotiate meaningful agreement with North Vietnam and her allies on POW-MIAs. We appreciate the priority you are giving this issue."

In view of the above considerations, we feel, as do General Scowcroft, State's Frank Sieverts and DOD's Roger Shields, that it would be important for you to meet with the League's officers some weeks prior to the League's conference scheduled for the first week of May. All of those working directly with the League's officers feel that the cost of not meeting with them at this time would indeed be very great and that under the political and emotional pressures involved, the League's responsible leadership would then not be able to prevent a snowballing public break with the Administration.

You have earlier expressed your strongest concern about the leaks which have occurred after several previous meetings. As we reported to you in earlier memoranda, General Scowcroft and the senior State and DOD officials working on POW affairs have made your concern on this point quite explicit in their discussions with the League. The League's leaders share your concern

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CONFIDENTIAL

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and they are determined that all possible steps will be taken to preserve the off-the-record nature of any future meetings. They have specifically agreed to vouch for any of their members attending, and to have each person pledge their confidentiality. Additionally we have through General Scowcroft insisted that only Board members and their closest national advisors attend any future meetings and that all attending must take their confidentiality pledge most seriously.

In considering both your schedule and the minimum three week lead time sought by the League's leaders in setting the tone of the League's upcoming national conference on May 5-7, we suggest Monday, April 10 as the best available time for a meeting with the League's Board. If you agree, we would arrange a late afternoon meeting on that date to begin at 5 or 6 p.m..

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve a meeting with the Executive Board of the National League of Families on Monday, April 10.

Approve HK Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

SA 99

B-450

FBIS 19

U.S. PILOTS PRESENTED AT HANOI PRESS CONFERENCE
FOR YOUR INFORMATION B

(NOT SENT TO HAK)
C.L. file

HANOI IN ENGLISH TO SOUTH EAST ASIA AT 1000 GMT ON 19 FEBRUARY REPORTS THAT FIVE AMERICAN PILOTS CAPTURED IN THE RECENT AIR STRIKES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM WERE SHOWN TO VIETNAMESE AND FOREIGN PRESSMEN AT A HANOI PRESS CONFERENCE ON 19 FEBRUARY BY THE PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FOREIGN MINISTRY. THE PILOTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS:

1--RALPH WILLIAM GALATI, FIRST LIEUTENANT, BORN 22 MARCH 1948, COMPANY 25, WING 8, TAKING OFF FROM THE UBON AIRBASE IN THAILAND, SERIAL NUMBER , PILOT OF AN F-4 PHANTOM FIGHTER-BOMBER, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 16, 1972;

Sanitized D

2--WILLIAM RALPH SCHWERTFEGER, CAPTAIN, BORN 22 SEPTEMBER 1945, IN OKLAHOMA, COMPANY (2433), WING 8, TAKING OFF FROM UBON, SERIAL NUMBER , PILOT OF AN F-4, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 16, 1972;

Sanitized D

3--KENNETH JAMES FRASER, CAPTAIN, BORN 1 SEPTEMBER 1941, IN NEW YORK CITY, COMPANY 6010, WING 388, TAKING OFF FROM KORAT AIRBASE IN THAILAND, SERIAL NUMBER , PILOT OF AN F-105 THUNDERCHIEF FIGHTER-BOMBER, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 17, 1972;

Sanitized D

4--JAMES DICKINSON CUTLER, CAPTAIN, BORN 23 NOVEMBER 1940, IN KENTUCKY, COMPANY 6010, WING 388, TAKING OFF FROM KORAT, SERIAL NUMBER , PILOT OF AN F-105 THUNDERCHIEF FIGHTER-BOMBER, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 17, 1972;

Sanitized D

5--EDWIN ALEXANDER HAWLEY, CAPTAIN, BORN ON (220) JUNE 1944, IN ALABAMA, COMPANY (7135), WING 450, TAKING OFF FROM THE UDORN AIRBASE IN THAILAND, SERIAL NUMBER , PILOT OF AN F-4 PHANTOM FIGHTER-BOMBER, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 17, 1972.

Sanitized D

19FEB 1212Z JAS/GFE

DF

FBIS 24(SUB FOR 19)

FIVE U.S. PILOTS PRESENTED AT HANOI PRESS CONFERENCE

B191310 HANOI IN ENGLISH TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 1000 GMT 19 FEB 72

(TEXT) FIVE AMERICAN PILOTS CAPTURED IN THE RECENT AIR STRIKES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ON NIXON'S ORDER WERE SHOWN TO THE VIETNAMESE AND FOREIGN PRESSMEN AT A HANOI PRESS CONFERENCE HELD SATURDAY AFTERNOON BY THE PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY. THEY ARE:

1--RALPH WILLIAM GALATA, FIRST LIEUTENANT, BORN MARCH 22, 1948, COMPANY 25, WING 8, TAKING OFF FROM THE UDON AIRBASE IN THAILAND, SERIAL NUMBER [REDACTED], PILOT OF AN F-4 PHANTOM FIGHTER-BOMBER, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 16, 1972; Sanitized
D

2--WILLIAM RALPH SCHWERTFEGER, CAPTAIN, BORN SEPTEMBER 22, 1945, IN OKLAHOMA, COMPANY 433, WING 8, TAKING OFF FROM UDON, SERIAL NUMBER [REDACTED], PILOT OF AN F-4, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 16, 1972; Sanitized
D

3--KENNETH JAMES FRASER, CAPTAIN, BORN SEPTEMBER 1, 1941, IN NEW YORK CITY, COMPANY 6010, WING 388, TAKING OFF FROM THE AIRBASE OF KORAT IN THAILAND, SERIAL NUMBER [REDACTED] (AS HEARD), PILOT OF AN F-105 THUNDERCHIEF FIGHTER-BOMBER, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 17, 1972; Sanitized
D

4--JAMES DICKINSON CUTLER, CAPTAIN, BORN NOVEMBER 23, 1940, IN KENTUCKY, COMPANY 6010, WING 388, TAKING OFF FROM THE AIRBASE OF KORAT IN THAILAND, SERIAL NUMBER [REDACTED], PILOT OF AN F-105 THUNDERCHIEF FIGHTER-BOMBER, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 17, 1972; Sanitized
D

5--EDWIN ALEXANDER HAWLEY, CAPTAIN, BORN ON JUNE 16, 1944, IN ALABAMA, COMPANY (7135), WING 452, TAKING OFF FROM THE AIRBASE IN (7UDORN), SERIAL NUMBER [REDACTED], PILOT OF AN F-4 PHANTOM JET FIGHTER-BOMBER, CAPTURED IN QUANG BINH ON FEBRUARY 17, 1972. Sanitized
D

TWO OF THOSE (WORDS INDISTINCT) AMERICAN PILOTS GAVE FIRST IMPRESSIONS UPON THEIR BEING CAPTURED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND PEOPLE. HERE IS RALPH WILLIAM GALATA'S VOICE:

"MY NAME IS RALPH WILLIAM GALATA. I AM A FIRST LIEUTENANT IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE. MY SERIAL NUMBER IS [REDACTED]. I WAS BORN IN PENNSYLVANIA, MARCH 22, 1948. ON FEBRUARY 16, 1972, MY F-4 WAS HIT AND SHOT DOWN (WORDS INDISTINCT). I WAS CAPTURED BY SOME VILLAGERS AND BROUGHT TO A DETENTION CAMP. MY LAST MISSION (WORDS INDISTINCT)."

Sanitized
D

THAT IS THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN CAPTURED PILOT, RALPH WILLIAM GALATI. HERE IS WILLIAM RALPH SCHWERTFEGER:

"MY NAME IS WILLIAM RALPH SCHWERTFEGER. MY RANK IS CAPTAIN, MY SERVICE NUMBER IS [REDACTED] MY DATE OF BIRTH IS 22 SEPTEMBER 1945. MY HOME STATE IS OKLAHOMA. I WAS SHOT DOWN ON 16 FEBRUARY 1972. I WAS CAPTURED ON (216) FEBRUARY 1972."

Sanitized

D

THAT IS THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN CAPTURED PILOT, WILLIAM RALPH SCHWERTFEGER.

OPENING THE PRESS CONFERENCE, NGO DIEN, HEAD OF THE PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY, MADE IT PLAIN THAT WHILE THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE CELEBRATING THE TRADITIONAL LUNAR NEW YEAR FESTIVAL, U.S. AIRCRAFT ON FEBRUARY 16 AND 17 FLEW CRIMINAL RAIDS AGAINST A NUMBER OF POPULATED AREAS OF QUANG BINH AND VINH LINH AT THE SOUTHERNMOST END OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THOSE U.S. AIR RAIDS KILLED A NUMBER OF CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN. HOWEVER, THE AIR RAIDERS HAD TO PAY FOR THEIR CRIMES, WITH SEVEN U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN AND FIVE AMERICAN PILOTS CAPTURED.

NGO DIEN THEN DREW EVERYBODY'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES AIR ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM EARLY THIS SPRING TOOK PLACE AFTER THE WORLDWIDE-CONDEMNED ROBINSON CAMPAIGN AT THE END OF 1971. THIS PROVES THAT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION HAS CHALLENGED THE WORLD AND AMERICAN CONDEMNATION AND CONTINUED TO ENCR OACH UPON THE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY OF THE DRV.

EXPOSING THE BELLICOSITY AND OBSTINACY OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, NGO DIEN SAID THAT THE RECENT BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM'S POPULATED AREAS (WORDS INDISTINCT) IN NIXON'S (?MUCH-?AUNTED) EIGHT-POINT PEACE PLAN AIMED AT MAINTAINING U.S. NEOCOLONIALISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE DENOUNCED THE UNITED STATES FOR BETRAYING ITS OWN COMMITMENTS TO COMPLETELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY HALT THE BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM, INDEFINITELY POSTPONING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM.

OVER RECENT DAYS, NGO DIEN SAID, THE UNITED STATES HAS DISPATCHED MORE B-52 STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO FLY BOMBING ATTACKS IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA, WHILE MANY U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS HAVE ARRIVED IN THE TONKIN GULF FOR INTENSIFIED AIR ATTACKS. JUST ON FRIDAY, NGO DIEN SAID, WHEN NIXON ANNOUNCED SUSPENSION OF THE BOMBINGS OF THE DRV, U.S. AIRCRAFT LEFT BOMBING POPULATED AREAS IN QUANG BINH WHILE U.S. ARTILLERY BASED ON THE UNITED STATES SEVENTH FLEET AND ON THE GROUND SOUTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE POUNDED VINH LINH JUST ABOVE THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE ON THE DRV TERRITORY.

REFUTING NIXON'S CLAIMS FOR PEACE, NGO DIEN COUNTERED THAT THE CORRECT WAY TO BRING BACK THE AMERICAN SERVICEMEN TO THEIR FAMILIES SOON IS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO END THE WAR OF AGGRESSION, RESPECT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AND MEET THE SEVEN-POINT SOLUTION OF THE PROGRSV, THE TWO KEY POINTS OF WHICH HAVE BEEN ELABORATED IN A FEBRUARY 2, 1972, STATEMENT. HE WARNED THAT NIXON'S CONTINUED BOMBING WOULD ONLY LENGTHEN THE LIST OF CAPTURED AMERICAN SERVICEMEN.

19 FEB 1427Z O'D/G/G

SA 99 B-451

Rec'd 8:00 p.m., 2/16

General Haig:

I believe this is now OBE. Msg has already been sent to Porter (7:30 p.m., 2/16).

NCIL

ACTION

February 16, 1972

Wilma

Risult

PONTE

SUBJECT:

Ambassador Porter Recommends that After Peking Visit We Consider Suspending Paris Talks Unless DRV Permits Access to our POW's By Neutral Body and Agrees to Exchange of Sick and Wounded

Background

1.3(a)(4)

Ambassador Porter has sent you a message, **SANITIZED** recommending that after the Peking visit you consider sending a private message to the North Vietnamese to the effect that unless they permit access to prisoners by a neutral body and agree to an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners we will suspend the Paris Talks until further notice (Tab B).

Ambassador Porter notes that he has already dealt with Xuan Thuy's statement that access cannot be granted to our POW's in Vietnam because it might trigger a U.S. commando raid. In a recent plenary session Porter pointed out that it would be a simple matter to bring the prisoners to a neutral medical body in Hanoi for inspection without revealing the locations of detention camps.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Porter's Proposal

Advantages:

1. This course of action might actually have an impact on the DRV's approach to the handling of our POW's, if indeed they are sensitive about the prospect of losing the Paris Plenary forum.
2. The GVN would welcome this step as an indication of firmness in our position, particularly in the aftermath of all the fuss about "flexibility".

SECRET/EYES ONLY

DP 1.3(a)(4)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 1/4/93 F92-1408

By *MKO* NARA, Date 5/6/93

SA 99 (Part)

MEMORANDUM

DBE
Msg sent 2/16
7:30
1001
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

February 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN D. NEGROPONTE *JN*
SUBJECT: Ambassador Porter Recommends that After Peking Visit We Consider Suspending Paris Talks Unless DRV Permits Access to our POW's By Neutral Body and Agrees to Exchange of Sick and Wounded

Background

SANITIZED

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Advantages:

1. This course of action might actually have an impact on the DRV's approach to the handling of our POW's, if indeed they are sensitive about the prospect of losing the Paris Plenary forum.
2. The GVN would welcome this step as an indication of firmness in our position, particularly in the aftermath of all the fuss about "flexibility".

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

3. We would in effect be temporarily closing down a forum which is widely considered to be sterile. It is also a forum which many judge as offering a better propaganda platform to the DRV than to the allied side.

4. It would demonstrate in yet another concrete way that we really care about our men held captive in North Vietnam.

Disadvantages:

1. The suspension suggested might not have the desired effect of gaining access to our POW's and the exchange of sick and wounded.

2. This course might generate unnecessary criticism from those who would prefer to blame us rather than the DRV for lack of progress in Paris.

3. We would disrupt a channel which has been useful in minor ways (e.g. exchanging messages about POW packages, orchestrating our public stance with our private initiatives, and maintaining the talks as a symbol of our willingness to negotiate seriously with the other side whenever it is prepared to do so).

4. As a general proposition, we would simply be making more of a fuss about the Paris Talks than most people probably think it is worth.

Our Views

We think Ambassador Porter's recommendation has some merit and, of course, is very much in keeping with his innovative style.

The key judgment would seem to boil down to weighing the advantage of showing our real concern for our POW's versus the disadvantage of the adverse publicity we might get for in effect taking the initiative in suspending the talks.

We believe this is really a toss-up judgment which only you and the President can decide. We have, however, prepared a draft reply to Porter on the assumption that you will decide against the proposal, pointing out that this is an idea that we may wish to hold in reserve but we do not wish to rock the Paris boat quite so much at this time.

Recommendation:

That you approve the message to Porter at Tab A.

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR PORTER

SANITIZED 1

1.3(a)(4)

FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER

REFERENCE YOUR 570

1. Many thanks for your message under reference. We think your idea has merit although the President may wish to hold it in reserve for a little while.
2. In any event we will keep your suggestion very much in mind, and, of course, consult with you beforehand should we decide to go through with it.
3. Your kind wishes for the forthcoming trip are most appreciated here.

Warm regards,



~~SECRET~~

SENT

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VOLD

1972 FEB 14 13

1972 FEB 13
W. D. K.
Negroes
M. J. K.
SANITIZED
1.3(a)

1.3(a)(4)

XXXXETM

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FM PARIS

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 141240Z FEB 72

SANITIZED

FM AMBASSADOR PORTER 570

TO THE WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR DR. HENRY KISSINGER.
1. YOU ARE AWARE THAT NUNUKO REMAINS

1. YOU ARE AWARE THAT NVN/VC REMAIN DISTURBED BY PROSPECT OF PEKING TALKS. THEIR ACQUIESCENCE IN RUSSIAN/FRENCH CP EXCLUSION OF MAOIST FACTIONS FROM VERSAILLES CONFERENCE WILL NOT GO UNNOTICED IN PEKING.

2. I RECOMMEND THAT AFTER PEKING VISIT YOU CONSIDER SENDING PRIVATE MESSAGE TO NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT UNLESS THEY PERMIT ACCESS TO PRISONERS BY NEUTRAL BODY AND EXCHANGE OF SICK AND WOUNDED WE WILL SUSPEND NOT TERMINATED TALKS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. I HAVE ALREADY DEALT WITH THUY'S STATEMENT THAT ACCESS CANNOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE IT MIGHT TRIGGER U.S. COMMANDO RAID. IT WOULD BE SIMPLE MATTER TO BRING PRISONERS TO NEUTRAL MEDICAL BODY IN HANOI FOR INSPECTION WITHOUT REVEALING LOCATIONS OF DETENTION CAMPS. OR NVN COULD HAVE CLOSEUPS TAKEN OF PRISONERS PERIODICALLY FOR SENDING TO THEIR FAMILIES.

3. IN SUSPENDING TALKS HERE ON THIS ISSUE IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO MAKE MENTION OF PRIVATE MESSAGE THOUGH FACT OF IT HAVING BEEN SENT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO US LATER.

4. WARM REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS OF PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO PEKING.

25 Ø

4842

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

SA 99 B-452

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 4, 1972

POW

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRUCE KEHRLI

FROM:

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. (H)

SUBJECT:

POW/MIA Benefit by the Navy League

You have referred General Hughes' two memos to the President on POW matters dated January 27 to us for NSC concurrence.

There is no objection to his memorandum describing the POW/MIA family reaction to the President's Vietnam speech and we agree that it should go forward to the President.

With regard to the memorandum on the POW/MIA benefit by the Navy League, we would like to urge that the question of White House involvement in this project be reconsidered if planning has not already progressed too far.

We offer a number of reasons why we believe a conspicuous event of the sort envisaged would be unwise and untimely.

-- A lavish event of this kind involving Hollywood entertainers could be viewed by a number of the POW/MIA families as in poor taste while their relatives are missing or in captivity.

-- POW/MIA families are in general less needy of assistance than that much larger number of families whose husbands or fathers have been killed.

-- We have no assurance that the POW/MIA issue will not be a politically charged one at the time of the proposed event and many of the families involved might perceive attendance as an act of political choice, preferring to stay away from the benefit as a gesture of disapproval of the way we are handling the POW issue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(DF)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 8/23/93 F9301180

By MB NARA, Date 9/20/93

SA 99

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1972


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Benefit by Navy League

The Navy League hopes to sponsor a large scale benefit at the Kennedy Center in May to provide funds for scholarships for the children of POW/MIA. We were asked to lend informal support to procuring the services of Bing Crosby, Bob Hope and Frank Sinatra, as the entertainment for this affair.

I discussed this matter with Paul Keyes, and he readily agreed to ask each of these stars if they would accept an invitation from the Navy League, indicating of course, that this had informal White House blessing. Paul informs me that Bing Crosby has tentatively agreed to participate.

Paul said that Bob Hope told him that he would be with you Friday night and would mention it to you. The purpose of this memorandum is to bring the benefit to your attention and to ask you to urge Hope to participate if it is at all possible.


BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES D. HUGHES

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

00990

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 31, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG
FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *John H. Holdridge*
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Benefit by Navy League

The Navy League has been planning to sponsor a large scale benefit at the Kennedy Center in May to provide funds for scholarships for children of POW/MIA. This idea has been receiving some informal White House support and General Hughes has drafted a memorandum, in which our concurrence is being sought, which asks that the President urge Bob Hope to participate if possible (Tab B).

We have been opposed to the concept at the staff level, particularly to any high level political involvement, for the following reasons:

- POW/MIA families are certainly not in as bad straights as those whose husbands or fathers have been killed in the war.
- A benefit of this sort has what some would perceive as a distasteful aspect, e.g. mounting a lavish entertainment program while our prisoners are suffering in captivity.
- Many POW families will perceive attendance at such a benefit as a political decision and we could be faced with the prospect of significant numbers refusing to attend as a gesture of protest to the way we are handling the Vietnam war.
- By the time of the proposed benefit we will have progressed fairly far into the election year.

We still believe that if planning in this affair has not progressed too far, that it should be turned off or channeled into a somewhat less conspicuous form. A memorandum to this effect has been prepared for your signature to Bruce Kehrli (Tab A).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Also submitted for our concurrence is a memo from General Hughes to the President summarizing the favorable reaction of POW/MIA families to the President's January 25 speech (Tab C). The draft memo at Tab A states that you have no objection to that memorandum going forward.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo at Tab A to Bruce Kehrli.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Bruce Kellum
GENERAL HUGHES

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. *AD*

POW/MIA Benefit by the Navy League

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~~Bruce Kellum~~ has referred ~~you~~ two memos to the President on POW matters dated January 27 to us for NSC concurrence.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION OFF	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
01	27	01	28	20	00990	HOLDRIDGE	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____
KISSINGER _____ ROGERS, W _____
HAIG _____ ~~KEHRLI, B~~ Hughes, J

LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
BUO _____ EXDIS _____
EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Requests concurrence on two Hughes to Pres memos re POW/MIA benefit by Navy League --Family reaction to the Pres Vietnam Speech

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APPTS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST	X		
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK _____
MEMO FOR PRES. _____
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____
MEMO HAIG TO KEHRLI _____
RECOMMENDATIONS _____
JOINT MEMO _____
REFER TO STATE _____
ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____
CONCURRENCE _____
DUE DATE: 2/2

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
2/1	HOLD	HAIG	V	Sgn memo to Hughes (2/2)	
2/2		HOLD	S	Re-do (2/5)	
2/3	HOLD	HAIG	X	Sgn rev'd memo to Kehrlie 02/05	
2/4				HAIG sign memo to Kehrlie	
2/7		JDN	X		
2/7	S.	S.		Int. to Gen. S.	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____
SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____
JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

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SA 99

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Pow

SECRETACTION

January 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN HOLDRIDGE SK

SUBJECT: Talking Paper for Your Meeting with the
POW/MIA Families - January 28, 1972

You are scheduled to meet with representatives of the National League of Families of American POW's and MIA's in Southeast Asia. The meeting is scheduled for 5:00 p.m. January 28, 1972.

The following are some background notes for the meeting and some suggested points for you to consider.

Participation (List at Tab C)

The group will consist of 6 officers and 19 other members of the League, including Mrs. Evelyn Grubb (National Coordinator), Carole Hanson (Chairman of the Board) and Mrs. Joanne Vinson (the former National Coordinator). The leadership and the bulk of the members attending the meeting are moderates who have been generally friendly to the Administration's position.

Five or six of the League's more militant members will also be attending the meeting. They include the very militant Mrs. Gartley (who asked the question asked by Dan Rather), Mrs. Tschudy (who has been a bitter spokesman on TV), Mrs. Crow, Mrs. Beecher and Mrs. Rausch (a fairly critical member of the League's Board).

Also in the group will be Mrs. Eileen Cormier, who has managed to attend all of the sessions on both Coasts and who for this reason and for her recent New York Times exploitation of a claimed special friendship with you has created some resentment among the other members.

SECRET

DF

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 8/23/93 F9301180

By MRK NARA, Date 9/20/93

SA 99

SECRET

2

General Mood of the League

The President's revelations of January 25 and your backgrounders appear to have substantially eased the pressure that had been building on the League's leadership to either let the League "go political" by casting its lot with the Administration's "fix the date" critics, or to see a significant section of the membership do so at the cost of splitting the League.

The League's officers have expressed great satisfaction about the special efforts and proposals made by the Administration. They reflect confidence that, as you told them in the past, the record shows that everything has been done which could responsibly be done. They believe a withdrawal has been offered. They generally agree that any further concessions would indeed be surrender and not settlement and would tend to handicap rather than promote the release of their men.

Of special interest is the fact that the Administration's recent revelations have, at least for the present, converted two very forceful critics who will be at the meeting. Both Mrs. Sybil Stockdale and Mrs. Louise Mulligan, wives of Navy Captains held prisoner in North Vietnam since 1965 and 1966, appeared on television after the President's speech and expressed their agreement and confidence in his Vietnam/POW policy as outlined on January 25.

We understand that the League's militants have temporarily adopted a "wait and see" attitude, but that they have not been assuaged. They have indicated that they will take their clue from Senators Kennedy, McGovern and Hartke et al. and from the degree of success these political figures have in pushing their views in the Congress and with the media.

Basic Questions

The group is likely to focus all of its questions on the recent revelations. The friendly members can be expected to ask questions along the line of those asked at your backgrounders. They are sure to ask about Hanoi's reactions, what steps are contemplated next, the China trip, and when they can expect their men back.

The more militant individuals are likely to ask about a unilateral fixed date, a residual force, Senator McGovern's continuing claims and the rationale for continuing to support the Thieu government.

SECRET

Your Basic Position

As the focus of the meeting is likely to rest with recent developments, you will be able to respond along the lines of your latest backgrounders. We have, therefore, not provided special sets of probable questions and suggested answers for you.

You might wish to point out that the lengthy secret negotiations have had only one purpose -- to produce something substantive -- and that while it would have been easy for you to step in earlier with rhetoric to placate the families, this would have been short-sighted and counter-productive.

In pointing out that our side has been very forthcoming in the negotiations, you might emphasize the facts that we have offered total troop withdrawals and a fair political settlement and that President Thieu and the Government of Vietnam have been similarly forthcoming. Projecting the future, you might express guarded optimism indicating that if the other side becomes convinced that it cannot count on our collapse, its own self-interest should lead it to responding to our generous offers.

Additional Questions

It is possible that some members of the group may wish to raise several residual questions of the type which Mrs. Hanson forwarded to you for comment last December. You will recall that at that time you provided a general response in a letter to Mrs. Hanson and that you indicated your willingness to comment on these types of questions on a background basis in future meetings with the League's Board.

In general, these questions have been overtaken by recent developments. You may, however, wish to review Mr. Hanson's letters and your reply attached for your information at Tab A. Attached at Tab B is a letter exemplifying the League's positive mood in the recent past. It was written to the New York Times on January 10, 1972 by the League's Vice Chairman, George Brooks, who will be attending the meeting.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: COLEMAN HICKS
FROM: SVEN KRAEMER SK
SUBJECT: Dr. Kissinger's Meeting with POW Families

General Hughes has called to let us know that CBS has heard about Dr. Kissinger's meeting scheduled with the POW families at 5:00 p.m. today. CBS has been calling the wives to encourage them to speak out about the nature of this meeting and about the Administration's policy.

The National League of Families selected a cross-section of representatives to attend the meeting and several of them have been strong critics. It is therefore likely that CBS will attempt to exploit these critics at this meeting.

Please let Dr. Kissinger know of this special media interest and of the fact that the network will, for example, seek to spot any possible divergence from Dr. Kissinger's recent backgrounder. While the militantly critical ladies may not totally heed the ground rules for these off-the-record meetings, it would probably be worthwhile for Dr. Kissinger to restate them at the outset for all those meeting with him for the first time.

We have now obtained an updated list of all those attending the meeting. The list is attached for your information.

On a separate matter, General Hughes indicated that each member of the League of Families would in the next few days receive a copy of the President's statement of January 25.

~~SECRET~~

<u>Name</u>	<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Member</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date of Incident</u>	<u>Place of Incident</u>
Bob Brudno	Brother	USAF	Capt Edward A. Brudno	PW	18 Oct 65	North Vietnam
John Coker	Father	USN	Lt George T. Coker	PW	27 Aug 66	North Vietnam
Evelyn Grubb	Wife	USAF	Maj Wilmer N. Grubb	PW	26 Jan 66	North Vietnam
Joan Vinson	Wife	USAF	Col Bobby G. Vinson	MIA	24 Apr 68	North Vietnam
George Brooks	Father	USN	Lt Nicholas G. Brooks	MIA	2 Jan 70	Laos
Barbara Rausch	Wife	USAF	Capt Robert E. Rausch	MIA	16 Apr 70	Laos
Bonnie L. Metzger	Wife	USN	Lt Wm. J. Metzger, Jr.	PW	19 May 67	North Vietnam
Janice Ray	Sister	USA	Ssgt Ronald E. Ray	PW	18 Mar 68	South Vietnam
Nancy Perisho	Mother	USN	Lcdr Gordon S. Perisho	MIA	31 Dec 67	North Vietnam
Eileen Corimer	Wife	AF	SMS Authur Corimer	PW	6 Nov 65	North Vietnam
Mrs. Samuel Beecher	Mother	USA	CWO Quentin R. Beecher	MIA	11 Jun 67	South Vietnam
Mrs. Geral Gartley	Mother	Navy	Lt Markham C. Gartley	PW	17 Aug 68	North Vietnam
Mary Winn	Wife	USAF	Col David W. Winn	PW	9 Aug 68	North Vietnam
Charlotte Christian	Wife	Navy	Lt Michael D. Christian	PW	24 Apr 67	North Vietnam
Mary Crow	Wife	USAF	Col Frederick A. Crow	PW	27 Mar 67	North Vietnam
Janet Shively	Mother	USAF	Capt James R. Shively	PW	5 May 67	North Vietnam
Sharon White	Wife	USAF	Capt James D. White	MIA		Laos

Revised
5:30 p.m.
27 Jan

Mr. Jeremiah A. Denton, III	Son	USN	Capt Jeremiah A. Denton PW	18 Jul 65	North Vietnam
Jane Tschudy	Wife	USN	Lcdr William M. Tschudy PW	18 Jul 65	North Vietnam
Kathy Plowman	Wife	USN	Lt James E. Plowman MIA	24 Mar 67	North Vietnam
Iris Powers	Mother	USA	CWO Lowell S. Powers MIA	2 Apr 69	South Vietnam
Sybil Stockdale	Wife	USN	Capt James B. Stockdale POW	9 Sept 65	North Vietnam
Louise Mulligan	Wife	USN	Capt James A. Mulligan POW	21 Mar 66	North Vietnam
Charlie Havens,	Legal Counsel				
Paul Wagner,	PR Advisor				
Admiral H. H. Epes,	DOD				
Mr. Roger Shields,	DOD				
Mr. Frank Sieverts,	State				
Mr. James Murphy,	State				

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mrs. Hanson:

I wanted personally to respond to your recent letter and to the several sets of questions submitted by you and other members of the National League of Families of POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia.

Let me assure you as strongly as I possibly can that the President and all members of his Administration have placed a high priority on the fate of these men and their families. Let me underline the President's personal commitment by citing an excerpt from his recent statement to the League's national convention in Washington, D. C. on September 28, 1971. In his remarks the President said:

"....I have considered the problem of obtaining the release of our POW's and missing in action as being one that has Presidential priority. I can assure you that every negotiating channel -- and now I will say something here that I am sure all of you will understand -- including many private channels that have not yet been disclosed, have been pursued, are being pursued, and will be pursued.

I can assure you that with regard to this problem, too, that whenever any matter comes to the attention of the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State, from a Senator or Congressman or the rest, it is brought to my desk and we run out the lead, whatever it may be.... We are doing that, I have personally ordered that, and we will succeed in our goal. That is my commitment that I make to all of you."

As you know this Administration has indeed sought to explore all possible channels and all responsible courses of action. We and the Government of South Vietnam have repeatedly proposed the complete release of all prisoners of war held by all sides. We have proposed

that sick and wounded prisoners and prisoners held in captivity for long periods be interned in a neutral country. We have advocated inspections by neutral observers. We have worked through our representatives at the United Nations and in many third countries and through special efforts such as that of Frank Borman. In addition, the South Vietnamese have with our support on a number of occasions unilaterally released large numbers of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners of war. And we have attempted the dramatic rescue mission at Son Tay.

Regrettably, the North Vietnamese and their allies have thus far totally rejected all proposals for neutral observers and prisoner releases. Instead they have set unconditional and unacceptable political ransom demands while continuing to violate the commonly accepted humanitarian standards and international conventions of POW treatment.

In spite of the other side's intransigence, however, this Administration will leave no stone unturned in seeking to gain a full accounting, the proper treatment and the early release of all our men.

Let me also assure you that the President has no intention of abandoning these brave men as American troops are withdrawn from South Vietnam under the Administration's Vietnamization program of giving the South Vietnamese the capability to defend themselves against North Vietnam's attack. The President has pledged that American forces will remain in South Vietnam until all of the prisoners have been released and until the South Vietnamese have a reasonable chance to defend themselves against North Vietnam's attack. We hope that North Vietnam's leaders may yet chose the path of negotiation and reciprocity and that they will treat and release the men on a humane basis.

- After saying the above, I must also say that I do not believe that either the national interest or the interests of the men would be served by my providing written answers at this time to the series of questions you have forwarded to me. As you indicated in your letter of November 28, 1971, you and the members of the League of Families certainly appreciate the nature of the complex issues involved and of the sensitivity of the meetings we have been able to have during the past year. I believe that these interests are best served and the questions can be more profitably discussed via the frank and confidential discussions we have had in the past. I also believe that we have discussed

a number of these questions during past meetings, and senior Administration officials including the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense have addressed a number of them publicly.

I will be glad to discuss these questions with you at our next meeting. In the meantime, I am sure that my staff and the officials in the Departments of State and Defense who are working on the POW/MIA problem will continue to be available to you.

I join most wholeheartedly in the hope expressed in your letter that together we will be able to rejoice at the success of the President's policy in Vietnam including a full accounting of our missing and the return of our prisoners.

Best regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

Mrs. Stephen Hanson
Chairman of the Board
National League of Families
American Prisoners and Missing
in Southeast Asia
24112 Birdrock Drive
El Toro, California 92630

SA99

B-454

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1972

GEN HAIG:

THE REASON MORE WAS NOT DONE WITH
THIS MATERIAL EARLIER IS THAT WE
WERE UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS FROM
HAK TO HAVE NO COMMENT OR
EXPLANATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S
REMARKS. INDEED, WE WERE TOLD TO
PULL BRAY BACK INTO LINE FOR THE
STATEMENT HE MADE (ATTACHED ~~TO~~ **TAB D**)

on

AN ADDITIONAL OR ALTERNATIVE
CHANNEL TO GET THIS LINE OUT
WOULD BE JOHN SCALI. WE CAN ADD
HIM IN THIS MEMO, OR I CAN JUST
PASS THE MATERIAL TO HIM.

LES

SSINGER

lanoi's Hard POW Position

Tab A), I am recommending
i statement (Tab B) you
marks (Tab C) to generate
or POW releases.

ady (on January 6)
nt (see Tab D).

*My report what
he thinks
to*

DF

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 8/23/93 F9301180

By WDO NARA, Date 9/20/93

SA99

January 18, 1972

General Haig:

You asked that I bring this to your attention today (Tuesday).

Muriel

Hold that right Haig

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

GEN HAIG:

THE REASON MORE WAS NOT DONE WITH THIS MATERIAL EARLIER IS THAT WE WERE UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS FROM HAK TO HAVE NO COMMENT OR EXPLANATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS. INDEED, WE WERE TOLD TO PULL BRAY BACK INTO LINE FOR THE STATEMENT HE MADE (ATTACHED → TAB D)

AN ADDITIONAL OR ALTERNATIVE CHANNEL TO GET THIS LINE OUT WOULD BE JOHN SCALI. WE CAN ADD HIM IN THIS MEMO, OR I CAN JUST PASS THE MATERIAL TO HIM.

LES

K

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, January 25, 1972

General Haig:

You wanted the attached brought to your
attention today.

mlh/lds

Ask John
Ney ^{reporter} What
he thinks
to

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KEHRLI
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Publicity on Hanoi's Hard POW Position

In response to your memorandum of January 8 (Tab A), I am recommending that State and our Paris delegation use the Hanoi statement (Tab B) you referred to and recent PRG press spokesman remarks (Tab C) to generate additional publicity on Hanoi's hard conditions for POW releases.

The State Department press spokesman has already (on January 6) replied to questions on the above Hanoi statement (see Tab D).

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY /~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG
FROM: LES JANKA *for*
SUBJECT: OBE Kehrli-gram

I have discussed the attached package on Hanoi's hardline in regard to POW's with John Negroponte. He feels, and I agree, that this is now OBE and that we should just hold the material against future need.

The attached memo to Bruce Kehrli informs him that the President's Vietnam speech of January 25 has made his request OBE for the present.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

ADMINISTRATIVELY /~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN 28 1972

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRUCE A KEHRLI
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER /S/
SUBJECT: Publicity on Hanoi's Hard POW
Position P-1971

Action on the referenced memorandum was deferred in anticipation of the President's January 25 speech on Vietnam. I now believe that this request has been overtaken by events, although we will remain ready to supply such material if needed in the future.

AMH:LJ:sfp:1-27-72

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB I

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

ADMINISTRATIVELY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN D. NEGROPONTE *W.L.D. / JDN*
SUBJECT: Publicity on Hanoi's Hard POW Position
REFERENCE: P-1971

In a January 8 memorandum (Tab A), Bruce Kehrli informs you of a request to put together a program designed to generate additional publicity on the hard line on POW's revealed in a recent Hanoi statement.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Kehrli with the above Hanoi statement (Tab B) and January 6 PRG Paris press spokesman remarks (Tab C) spelling out the Communist position on POW's. The memorandum states that you will recommend to State and our Paris delegation that they use the above materials to generate publicity on Hanoi's hard conditions for POW releases as appropriate. The memorandum also notes that the State Department's spokesman has already addressed this subject in one of his briefings (Tab D).

If you approve this approach, we will pass the above recommendation to State.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

ADMINISTRATIVELY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HENRY A. KISSINGER
CHARLES W. COLSON

FROM:

BRUCE A. KEHRLI **BAK**

SUBJECT:

Vietnamization & POW Release

The January 6, 1972 News Summary contained the following paragraph:

"In an apparent toughening of position noted only by ABC, Hanoi said the only way for RN to get the POW's back is to:
1) completely end the war and withdraw all troops; 2) completely end Vietnamization. This was said to be the 1st time that Vietnamization was directly linked to POW release."

It was noted that this statement was identical to the one made by Hanoi in the fall after Senator McGovern made his statement.

(It was requested that you obtain a copy of Hanoi's news release that went out at that time and put together a program that will generate some additional publicity on their hard position.

Please submit a report on your actions to the Office of the Staff Secretary by January 12, 1972.

Thank you.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
Alexander P. Butterfield

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

TAB B

Excerpts from Radio Hanoi broadcast of January 5, 1972

As far as our people are concerned, for a long time we have indicated to Nixon the best way to enable the captured U.S. servicemen to have an early reunion with their families -- that is, the PRGRSV's very sensible and reasonable seven-point solution of 1 July 1971. Following are the two basis points of this solution:

1--The U.S. Government must completely end the war of aggression in Vietnam, completely abandon the Vietnamization policy, totally and unconditionally withdraw from South Vietnam the troops, advisers, military personnel, weapons and war equipment of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, dismantle U.S. military bases in South Vietnam and put an end to all U.S. air and naval activities and all other military acts against the Vietnamese people in both parts of the country.

2--The U.S. Government must respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, renounce its support for and commitments to the fascist Nguyen Van Thieu clique and stop using this clique against the South Vietnamese people and thus pave the way for the establishment of a new administration in Saigon that stands for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy and that is willing to enter into serious talks with the PRGRSV with a view to setting up a broadly based government of national concord in South Vietnam.

These two points of great significance are closely interrelated because the Vietnamization scheme is designed to enable the Americans to withdraw their troops while continuing the way of aggression with puppet forces who are under U.S. command and who enjoy intensive U.S. support and assistance. The U.S. administration must therefore withdraw all U.S. troops and at the same time stop maintaining the puppet Nguyen Van Thieu administration as a tool for implementing the U.S. policy of aggression. Only in this way can the war be ended and peace restored in Vietnam...

The Nixon administration, however, has persistently and deliberately dodged the PRGRSV's seven-point proposal and, worse still, has sought to sabotage the Paris conference on Vietnam.

We again directly tell Nixon that as long as the U.S. aggressors stubbornly persist in prolonging and intensifying the war of aggression in Vietnam and in unleashing new military adventures against the DRV, U.S. servicemen

will continue to die uselessly, the namelist of U.S. servicemen captured while committing crimes will be lengthened and it will be even moreimpossible for these captured servicemen to be reunited with their families. Whether or not the captured U.S. servicemen can return home depends on the Nixon administration's stand and on whether or not it wants to end the war of aggression in Vietnam.

TAB C

Excerpts from the (Hanoi) VNA transcript of the PRG Paris press conference of January 6, 1972

Giniger (New York Times): In the last few days, we have witnessed in the United States discussions on the conditions required by your side for the return of prisoners of war. We wish that you will clarify this question and may I ask you to state once again your stand on the question of prisoners of war?'

Answer: I am going to ask you also to have a little patience in listening to us explain this question. Our people are the victims of the most barbarous war in history undertaken by the United States. What we desire most is to put an end to this barbarous war of aggression and to create a lasting peace in our land. The U.S. aggression against South Vietnam takes two forms -- a military form and a political form. With regard to the military form, the United States has sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the other side of the pacific ocean to commit aggression against our country. Regarding the political form, American administrations have set up puppet administrations, which absolutely do not represent anyone in South Vietnam as tools for their aggression. This is why a correct settlement of the South Vietnam problem must include the cessation of these two forms of aggression on the part of the United States. The question of the U.S. military personnel captured in North and South Vietnam is a product of the U.S. policy of aggression. That is why this question can only be settled when this aggression has been abolished.

An unidentified newsman cut in: Under both forms?

Answer: Yes, under both forms.

We are ready to settle the question of captured military personnel as soon as the Nixon administration has agreed to withdraw all its troops, advisers, military personnel, and weapons from South Vietnam and to renounce keeping in place the warlike Nguyen Van Thieu administration.

Tas (a Dutch newsman): You have just said that you would release prisoners of war once the United States agrees to withdraw all troops... Is that right?

Answer: I think that with regard to the question of details relative to the release of captured military personnel and of all civilians of all parties captured in the war, our seven-point peace plan was explicit. I

would like to call your attention to the fact that if at the present time the American military personnel captured in the war have not been able to return to their families, and if other military personnel were detained only more than 1 week ago, it is because the Nixon administration has not renounced its policy of Vietnamization of the war. The Vietnamization policy is a vicious circle because Vietnamization means maintaining in place the Nguyen Van Thieu administration, and to maintain Nguyen Van Thieu it is necessary to keep American troops in South Vietnam and to bomb North Vietnam. And because of this, American military personnel continue to be captured.

Tas: Again about the condition for the release of prisoners of war: Does it mean that only when the last American soldier leaves that the prisoner of war (will be released)?

Answer: The U. S. Government should state a reasonable deadline for the complete withdrawal from South Vietnam of all troops, advisers, and military personnel of the United States and of other foreign countries in the American camp and renounce all support for the warlike Nguyen Van Thieu group, then favorable conditions will have been created to settle the question of captured American military personnel.

Excerpt from State Department daily press briefing of January 6, 1972

Question: Charles, getting back to this Vietnam thing, your stress on the North Vietnamese position about the indivisibility of points 1 and 2, why is that so important to the United States in terms of the focus on the POW's?

Answer: Well, it is important because it has to do with the negotiating position of the other side with which we are confronted and which we have been attempting for some time to try to clarify, Marvin.

Points 1 and 2, taken altogether, would have us not only withdraw all our troops but in every effective way take steps to bring down the Government of South Vietnam.

I have noted overnight a statement from Hanoi which in effect reconfirms that the problem is not just one of setting a date for our withdrawal but of taking further steps with respect to Vietnamization, which I think the -- well, I'll leave it there.

Question: In Point 2, I gather neither of us really has the text of Points 1 and 2, but you say "bring down the Government of South Vietnam." How does the second point call upon us to bring down the Government?

Answer: I have the text in the office, Marvin. We can peruse it together.

Question: Charles, when you refer to something "overnight" which reconfirms what you understand to be the North Vietnamese position, are you referring to a Radio Hanoi broadcast from yesterday?

Answer: Yes.

5A99 B-455

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

00476

JRITY COUNCIL

*Jeanne,
Negroponte op'd
this action.
Hag's note, however,
indicates he wants the
proposal addressed in light
of the President's speech.
Should we plan?*

Close file

ACTION

January 14, 1972

NGER

HOLDRIDGE *[Signature]*

"White Paper" on POWs

January 14 it was proposed that a
document which would set forth the
issue definitively and point up where
the issue of releasing the POWs if
the United States withdraws from Vietnam.
favorable, and the representative
of the "White Paper" be issued in
which Klein's office mails to

selected editorial writers and journalists around the country.
Further distribution would be made to members of Congress, the
families of POWs, and others concerned with the POW issue.

In view of the fact that considerable popular misunderstanding still
appears to exist with respect to the Administration's and Hanoi's
policies on POWs, I believe that the "White Paper" proposal is a
good one. I also believe that issuance via Herb Klein's office as a
news letter would be the simplest way to get the job done.

Some idea of the contents of the publication can be gained from the
Defense/ISA item at Tab A, which is being mailed to all the POW
families.

Recommendation:

That you approve the preparation of a POW "White Paper" to be
issued as a news letter by Herb Klein's office.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

(DF)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 8/23/93 F9301180
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 9/20/93
SA 99

00476

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jeanne,

Negroponte op'd
this action.

Haig's note, however,
indicates he wants the
proposal addressed in light
of the President's speech.
Should we close?

Chas. Haig

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Holmes -
Memo to
Review in light
of new initiative
CD

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIALACTION

January 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *JH*

SUBJECT: Proposed "White Paper" on POWs

At the Ad Hoc POW meeting on January 14 it was proposed that a "White Paper" on POWs be prepared which would set forth the Administration's position on POWs definitively and point up where Hanoi actually stands, e.g., on the issue of releasing the POWs if a deadline is set for a complete U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The consensus at the meeting was favorable, and the representative of Herb Klein's office suggested that the "White Paper" be issued in the form of the regular news letter which Klein's office mails to selected editorial writers and journalists around the country. Further distribution would be made to members of Congress, the families of POWs, and others concerned with the POW issue.

In view of the fact that considerable popular misunderstanding still appears to exist with respect to the Administration's and Hanoi's policies on POWs, I believe that the "White Paper" proposal is a good one. I also believe that issuance via Herb Klein's office as a news letter would be the simplest way to get the job done.

Some idea of the contents of the publication can be gained from the Defense/ISA item at Tab A, which is being mailed to all the POW families.

Recommendation:

That you approve the preparation of a POW "White Paper" to be issued as a news letter by Herb Klein's office.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

7 January 1972

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Question: Will US prisoners of war in Southeast Asia be released if the United States declares it will withdraw its military forces from South Vietnam and cease military operations by a specific date certain; without resolution of the political issues of the war?

The United States cannot obtain an answer to that question. The NVN Chief Delegate in Paris has been quoted by Senator McGovern as answering in the affirmative. Senator McGovern said on September 12, 1971 on CBS-TV:

"I have, for example, been assured by Mr. Xuan Thuy and by representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary Government that if we agree to a withdrawal date of Dec. 31st and then proceed to withdraw, let us say, 15 percent of our troops during the next 30 days, 15 percent of our prisoners would automatically be released.

That is a task that we should begin without further delay.

In a very real sense President Nixon holds the key to the jail cells of Hanoi. That key is setting the Dec. 31st date for the withdrawal of American Forces."

However, on September 16, 1971, during the 129th Plenary Session of the Paris Meetings on Vietnam Ambassador Porter pressed the other side on the questions of outside clarification in general and separability in particular. He said, "The validity of your latest proposals has been severely damaged because of your refusal to clarify them in the established forum. You presented them in this forum before all parties, they concern all parties, you were questioned about them here and there is no good reason for refusing

to clarify them right here in these meetings or in a more privileged forum in the presence of all the interested parties." On separability he asked, "Another statement indicates that you now agree to separate the question of the release of our prisoners and a cease-fire during the withdrawal period from your objectives under point 2. I should tell you that, in connection with the second statement attributed to you which I have cited, reports from other sources, also after interviews with you, are to the opposite effect. They indicate that you insist that Points 1 and 2 of your proposals cannot, in any fundamental sense, be separated; that, for example, while the details of Point 1 might be negotiated in advance of Point 2, the prisoners will not be exchanged before you achieve your objectives under Point 2. Where is the truth in this matter?"

Thuy stated, "We have not changed our position in the least."

In his heated reply Xuan Thuy made the point that their proposal had two fundamental points, Point 1 and Point 2 and that he had not changed his position. In linking the two Points, Thuy asked, "And, concerning the matter of ending maintenance of their administration, will the US also announce this at the same time as the announcement concerning its troop withdrawal?"

Xuan Thuy's response was widely reported in the press as a repudiation of the McGovern report and the separability of the points.

- The Evening Star carried a headline, "Thuy Repeats Demands, Repudiates McGovern." The news article said, "Thuy at no time referred to McGovern or his statement but he and Thi explicitly differed from McGovern's interpretations on several other points."

- The Washington Post reported Hanoi's press spokesman as saying the Seven Points "forms a whole" and that it was "indispensable to reach agreement on the whole" package.

- Walter Cronkite, CBS TV, and John Chancellor, NBC TV, reported that the Communist had said that their proposal must be accepted in its entirety and that no US prisoners would be released until President Thieu was removed from office.

Following the 129th Session, the following exchange took place between newsmen present and the DRV spokesman, Nguyen Thanh Le:

Question: "That is to say that it will not be possible to release a single American POW before Point Two is dealt with and settled, is that right?"

Answer: "We have stated clearly our views on the matter, and furthermore Point Two is quite explicit on the matter and does reflect our good will."

Question: "You have known me for almost three years, do you understand why we no longer understand anything, do you understand the confusion in our minds? Either things are not clear, or I am a fool....If you want to say something off the record, go ahead, but for God's sake explain to us whether we are not able to understand anything or whether there has been a change in your delegation policy....Sincerely, this is not a game for us, and we are at a total loss."

Answer: "We already said that our statements are logical and consistent."

The press had the following exchange with the PRG spokesman, Ly Van Sau:

Question: "There is another point which is also very clear. Mr. McGovern told us very clearly and you read it in all the press dispatches, that you would have said to him time and again that point 1 might be implemented without there being a prior agreement on point 2. Is it or isn't it right?"

Answer: "As you know, Mr. Nixon continues to refuse so far to set a deadline for the withdrawal of the American troops in 71. Let Mr. Nixon set that date and he will find out about our good will."

Question: "In reading Monday morning's papers, did you have the impression that Mr. McGovern mirrored faithfully what you told him?"

Answer: "We respect everybody's freedom."

Question: "You said that you had a talk with Sen. McGovern. So far, all we know about that meeting is only Mr. McGovern's version. Then there are discrepancies between that version and the official position at the conference. That sort of thing sometimes happens to a government, and in that event a government can do one of two things: either it confirms the version presented by the other party in the discussion or it makes a denial. What are you going to do?"

Answer: "Whatever Mr. McGovern said to the press, we were not present to hear it. And what we found out about his statements, we found through the press. As to what we told Mr. McGovern, I disclosed it to you a while back."

Question: "What you read in the press, does it correspond to the truth?"

Answer: "As I said a moment ago, we respect Mr. McGovern's freedom, like everyone else's."

Question: "Does that imply the freedom not to tell the truth?"

Answer: "We have nothing to say."

On September 28, 1971, Senator McGovern's office in Washington issued a press release stating that Thuy had sent the Senator a message affirming that the POWs will be released if we "withdraw all US military forces and end US military operations."

At the press briefing following the 130th Plenary Session on September 30, 1971, the DRV spokesman, Nguyen Thanh Le engaged in this dialogue:

Question: Senator McGovern has just announced that he received a message from Minister Xuan Thuy which reaffirms Senator McGovern's interpretation of the 7-point program of the PRG; that is to say, that Point One can be separated from all the other points and that Point One can be settled separately... can you confirm Senator McGovern's statement?"

Answer: "I can say that Minister Xuan Thuy, during the meetings he has had with many friends, has stated that he entirely approves the 7-Points of the PRG. According to him, these 7 Points constitute a correct position leading to a settlement of the Vietnamese problem. He also added that these 7 points perfectly reflect the good will of the PRG and of the Vietnamese people. And the fundamental points of the 7 points are Points 1 and 2.... Therefore; in order to settle the Vietnamese problem it will be necessary to first settle the two fundamental points which we have mentioned."

In the same press briefing (130th Plenary Session), this exchange occurred with the PRG spokesman, Ly Van Sau:

Question: "There is some confusion on the part of your delegation regarding the 7 points. Senator McGovern has just restated what he heard in Paris, that is to say that Point number One can be separated from all the other points and can be implemented separately. Can you dispel this confusion and confirm what Senator McGovern said?"

Answer: "On this point, I can reaffirm what I told you last week during our press conference, namely that the Seven Point Peace Plan of the PRG is a whole, of which Points 1 and 2 are fundamental points. If these two points are settled the best conditions will be created for the settlement of all the other points.... This is why it is unrealistic to talk about the withdrawal of all the US troops without mentioning the fact that the US must stop supporting the Thieu administration."

Senator McGovern reaffirmed his understanding on January 3, 1972, despite all of the denials by DRV/PRG delegates and public spokesmen. On January 5, the Evening Star quoted Radio Hanoi as further repudiating Senator McGovern by stating: "The only way for President Nixon to get the US prisoners of war back to their families is to follow two basic points:

- "1. Completely end the war of aggression in Vietnam and withdraw all its troops from Vietnam, and
- "2. Completely end the Vietnamization policy of continuing the war."

At the 139th Plenary Session of the Paris Meetings, January 6, 1972, DRV Spokesman Xuan Thuy stated:

"If the Nixon Administration really wants to disengage itself from the Vietnam war and to rapidly repatriate all American servicemen, in combat or in captivity, then it should without delay abide by these fundamental points: On the one hand, to give up aggression, to stop the 'Vietnamization' of the war, to pull out from South Vietnam all the troops, military advisers, military personnels, armaments and war materials of the United States and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, to dismantle U.S. military bases in South Vietnam, to cease all air, naval and other military activities in both North and South Vietnam; on the other hand, to stop backing the Nguyen Van Thieu bellicose puppet group and to let the South Vietnam people form in Saigon a new administration that stands for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy and that is disposed to engage in serious talks with the PRG of the RSVN in order to establish a broad government of national concord in South Vietnam."

In other words, the other side is now officially on record that the price of the prisoners is the entire seven points.

Quite apart from the question of separability of Point One from the other points, there is some question whether the 7 point package was ever a serious offer. Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, addressed a banquet in Peking on November 21, 1971, during which he is quoted as saying, "On the diplomatic front, the 7-point solution presented by Minister Nguyen Thi Binh on behalf of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam at the Paris Talks is as offensive to drive the other side into a corner."

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B-457

POW

The Prisoner of War Issue

To Hanoi, American prisoners of war are primarily a bargaining counter to be traded for U.S. agreement to withdraw its troops, stop its air operations in South Vietnam and withdraw all support for South Vietnam. In short, Hanoi is using the POW's to gain the military and political ascendancy in South Vietnam which it has been unable to achieve by other means.

In addition to its inadmissible use of POW's as negotiating pawns, Hanoi has subjected them to inhumane treatment in total disregard of the Geneva Convention of 1949 to which North Vietnam acceded in 1957.

-- Hanoi has refused to allow Red Cross or any other kind of outside inspection of its POW detention facilities.

-- It has refused all requests to repatriate sick and wounded POW's.

-- It has not provided us with a complete list of captured American servicemen (some have been identified who are not on the list provided us).

-- Its "Viet Cong" subordinates have only identified only a fraction of the Americans captured in the South.

-- It has subjected POW's to inhumane and sometimes cruel treatment.

-- It has restricted the flow of POW mail to a level not only below that provided for in the Geneva Convention, but even below that officially said to be permitted by the North Vietnamese themselves.

-- It has refused to provide us information on hundreds of U.S. military personnel and dozens of civilians who are missing in Southeast Asia.

We have repeatedly pressed the other side to cease these violations, both in Paris Talks and through numerous other channels official and private -- with only limited success.

On our side, we have adhered to the Geneva Convention in the treatment of the over 36,000 Communist POW's held in South Vietnam (including over 8,000 North Vietnamese). Prisoner of war camps are open to inspection by the International Committee of the Red Cross. South Vietnam has repatriated 233 sick and wounded and other North Vietnamese POW's and would, if possible, repatriate more. This fall alone, South Vietnam released nearly 3,000 Communist POW's as a gesture of good will and in the hope of sparking substantial POW exchanges.

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On October 7, 1970, President Nixon asked that "all POW's, without exception and without condition, be released now to return to the place of their choice," and that "all journalists and other innocent civilian victims of the conflict be released immediately as well." This proposal was endorsed by President Thieu and tabled at Paris the following day.

The proposal has been categorically rejected by the other side even though perhaps ten times as many Communist as Allied POW's would have been released. A later proposal to intern POW's in a neutral country was also rebuffed by the other side.

Despite these rebuffs, we will not cease trying to secure the release of POW's. Failing this, we will do everything possible to see that the lot of American POW's is improved.

The North Vietnamese approach to the POW issue is dictated almost entirely by its negotiating position in Paris. Since September 1970, the Communist side has made it clear that our POW's would not be released until we were, in effect, ready to underwrite the defeat of South Vietnam and the collapse of our long and costly effort to help this country maintain its independence.

The latest Communist proposal, the so-called "7 Points" of July 1, 1971 led some people to interpret its vague formulations as meaning that we could get our prisoners back simply in return for a U.S. troop withdrawal deadline. When queried on this interpretation, the Communist spokesmen wouldn't say yes and they wouldn't say no.

After a conversation with North Vietnamese chief negotiator, Xuan Thuy, this September, Senator McGovern seemed convinced that, indeed, a withdrawal deadline would get our POW's back. When newsmen later pressed Xuan Thuy's press spokesman for a confirmation of Senator McGovern's interpretation, he refused to do so; moreover, his evasive tactics only served to convince those present that Senator McGovern had probably been led down the garden path.

On the same day (September 16), his Viet Cong colleague was more candid with the press. He stated: "As long as Mr. Nixon refuses to set a deadline in 1971 for the withdrawal from South Vietnam and also refuses to stop supporting the warlike Nguyen Van Thieu group, no question may be settled."

The Communist position has subsequently become clearer. They now say publicly that if we are to get our POW's back, we must at least:

- Withdraw the entire U.S. military presence from South Vietnam;
- Cease all air operations in over South and North Vietnam;
- Cease "all support and commitment" to the Thieu Government -- in other words, cut off all military and economic aid to South Vietnam.

In the Paris meeting of January 6, 1972, Xuan Thuy told us that if we want our prisoners back, it is "indispensable" that the above points be implemented "without delay."

Following the meeting, the Viet Cong press spokesman stated that if we set a deadline and "renounce all support" for Thieu, "then favorable conditions will have been created to settle the question of captured American military personnel."

It should, by now, be clear to anyone that setting a withdrawal date alone will not get our prisoners back. As things now stand, it seems that nothing short of our complete abandonment of South Vietnam will return our POW's. Hanoi, with massive Soviet and Chinese support, would at last be in a position to conquer South Vietnam. Just at a time when South Vietnam finally shows every sign of surviving as an independent nation, we are being asked by Hanoi completely to forget the enormous price we have paid in blood and treasure to achieve this objective.

As President Nixon stated in the CBS interview on January 2, 1972, we will continue trying to get our prisoners back through negotiations. Should this fail, we will proceed with Vietnamization while sustaining our bargaining position on POW's through the retention of a remaining force in Vietnam and continuing the possibility of air strikes on North Vietnam.

SA 99 B-458

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1972

MEMO FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: LES JANKA

Charlie Bray exceeded his "no comment" guidance today and we do not know why, but thought you should see this press play. Charlie's comments were in response to a question from Marvin Kalb.

*Called Kennedy
on 7 Jan 71*

*pull him
back into
line.*

(65)

VIET-POWS

WASHINGTON (AP)—A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER PROPOSED A SPECIFIC DATE FOR TOTAL U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM IN RETURN FOR RELEASE OF U.S. PRISONERS, BUT THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE DEMANDING MORE THAN THIS.

THE REDS DEMANDS AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS, PRESS OFFICER CHARLES W. BRAY SAID, AMOUNT TO A CALL NOT ONLY FOR U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL BUT ALSO "STEPS TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM."

BRAY GAVE THIS RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ARISING FROM PRESIDENT NIXON'S STATEMENT SUNDAY THAT THE WITHDRAWAL DATE-PRISONER RELEASE ISSUE "HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION AT VARIOUS TIMES IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS."

"THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SAID DEADLINE FOR PRISONERS WAS NO DEAL," NIXON SAID IN A CBS INTERVIEW.

NIXON'S ACCOUNT WAS CHALLENGED BY SEN. GEORGE MCGOVERN, D-S.D. MCGOVERN, WHO TALKED WITH COMMUNIST DELEGATES AT PARIS LAST FALL, SAID U.S. NEGOTIATORS HAD NEVER DISCUSSED THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL-PRISONER RELEASE QUESTION WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

BRAY SAID MCGOVERN AND SOME OTHERS WHO HAD TALKED WITH HANOI NEGOTIATORS AS PRIVATE CITIZENS HAD COME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE A STRAIGHTOUT EXCHANGE OF U.S. FORCE WITHDRAWAL FOR RELEASE OF PRISONERS.

BUT WHEN THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR, AMBASSADOR WILLIAM PORTER, QUESTIONED THE COMMUNIST ENVOYS ABOUT THIS LAST SEPTEMBER THEY GAVE NO RESPONSE, HE SAID.

HE SAID THE REDS SOON THEREAFTER PUBLICLY MADE PLAIN THAT THEY ARE LINKING THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL PART OF THEIR SEVEN-POINT NEGOTIATING OFFER AND THAT PART WHICH PROPOSES A RESHAPING OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S POLITICAL FUTURE.

CR654P 6

WASHINGTON--ADD VIET-VPWS (156)

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO TRADE PRISONER RELEASE FOR A DETERMINATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S FUTURE.

BRAY SAID THE MOST RECENT INSTANCE OF HANOI'S MAKING ITS LINKAGE CLEAR APPEARS IN RADIO HANOI'S WEDNESDAY BROADCAST WHICH SAID:

"THE ONLY WAY FOR PRESIDENT NIXON TO GET THE U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR BACK TO THEIR FAMILIES" IS TO:

"1. COMPLETELY END THE WAR OF AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM AND WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM VIETNAM AND

"2. COMPLETELY END THE VIETNAMIZATION POLICY OF CONTINUING THE WAR."

A VIET CONG NEGOTIATOR IN PARIS HAS CHARACTERIZED AS "MERE CONCOCTION" A JAN. 2 STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAD "TOTALLY REJECTED" A RELEASE OF WAR PRISONERS IN EXCHANGE FOR A DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

REP. ROBERT L. LEGGETT, D-CALIF., MADE PUBLIC A TELEGRAM FROM NGUYEN VAN TIEN, WITH WHOM LEGGETT HAD TALKED IN PARIS ON MAY 31.

LEGGETT TELEGRAPHED TIEN MONDAY ASKING CONFIRMATION OR DENIAL OF NIXON'S STATEMENT THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAD SAID "NO DEAL" TO A WITHDRAWAL DATE--POW RELEASE EXCHANGE.

"THIS CONTRADICTS YOUR STATEMENT TO ME MAY 31," LEGGETT SAID IN HIS TELEGRAM.

THE REPLY FROM TIEN TODAY, AS RELEASED BY LEGGETT, SAID: "REASONABLE POSITION PRESENTED TO YOU MANIFESTED IN SEVEN POINT PEACE PLAN. BUT NIXON ADMINISTRATION STILL NEITHER RESPONDS NOR SETS ANY TERMINAL DATE FOR U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL. NIXON JANUARY 2 STATEMENTS WERE CONCOCTION."

CR658P 6

IT IS TO BE HANDLED WITH DISCRETION.

STATEMENT TO U.S. CONGRESS ATTRIBUTED TO CAPTURED U.S. AIRMEN
B020715 HANOI VNA IN ENGLISH 0702 GMT 2 JAN 72 B
(CAPTURED U.S. PILOTS ISSUE STATEMENT--VNA HEADLINE)

(TEXT) HANOI, VNA JANUARY 2ND--THIRTY CAPTURED U.S. PILOTS
DETAINED IN THE DRV HAVE ISSUED A STATEMENT TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE U.S.A. CONCERNING THE RECENT WAS ESCALATION OF THE NIXON
ADMINISTRATION. TWENTY OF THE SIGNATORIES WERE NEWLY CAPTURED,
MOST OF THEM B-52 FLIERS.

STATEMENT OF THE MILITARYMEN OF THE U.S.A. DETAINED IN THE DRV
TO: THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE WAR IN VIETNAM HAS MANY ASPECTS, JUST AS WE PRISONERS
REPRESENT MANY BACKGROUNDS AND OPINIONS.

RECENTLY OUR GOVERNMENT CLAIMED "PEACE IS AT HAND". BUT
NOW THE WAR IS MORE FIERCE THAN EVERY BEFORE, AND AMERICAN LIVES
ARE IN GRAVE JEOPARDY FROM THE ROUND-THE-CLOCK ATTACKS. THIS
CONTRADICTION COMPELS US TO ADD OUR VOICES TO THE PUBLIC OPINION
IN OUR COUNTRY. WHETHER WE HAVE BEEN DETAINED FOR A FEW
DAYS OR SEVERAL YEARS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU HEAR US.

OUR GOVERNMENT HAS NOT CONSUMATED THE "AGREEMENT ON ENDING
THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM", ALTHOUGH THIS
AGREEMENT WAS SATISFACTORY TO BOTH THE U.S.A. AND THE DRV AS
OF 20 OCTOBER 1972.

WE STRONGLY APPEAL TO THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO EXERCISE
ALL YOUR LEGAL AND MORAL POWER TO BRING ABOUT PEACE.

THIS STATEMENT IS MADE BY THOSE WHO KNOW THAT MORE DELAY
CAN ONLY INCREASE THE SUFFERING, LENGTHEN OUR CONFIRMENT AND
AGGRAVATE THE WELL-BEINGS OF THE COUNTRY WHICH WE SERVE.

MOST SINCERELY,

1. WALTER E. WILBER, COMMANDER, U.S.N. CAPTURED 16 JUNE 1968
2. RICHARD J. FULTON, 1ST LIEUTENANT, U.S.A.F., 13 JUNE 1972
3. EDWIN A. HAWLEY, CAPTAIN, U.S.A.F., 17 FEBRUARY 1972
4. PETER A. CALLAGHAM, 1ST LIEUTENANT, U.S.A.F., 21 JUNE 1972
5. EDISON W. MILLER, LT. COLONEL, U.S.M.C., 13 OCTOBER 1967
6. JOSEPH E. KERNAN, LIEUTENANT J.G., U.S.N., 7 MARCH 1972
7. LYNN E. GUENTHER, CAPT. USAF, 26 DECEMBER 1971
8. DONALD K. LOGAN, 1ST LIEUTENANT, U.S.A.F., 5 JULY 1972
9. CHARLES A. JACKSON, CAPT., U.S.A.F., 24 JUNE 1972

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11. WILLIAM W. CONLEE, L.D. COLONEL, U.S.A.F., 22 DEC. 1972
12. JOHN H. YUILL, LT. COLONEL, U.S.A.F., 22 DEC. 1972
13. MICHAEL R. MARTINI, 1ST LIEUTENANT, U.S.A.F., 20 DEC. 1972
14. PAUL L. GRANGER, 1ST LIEUTENANT, U.S.A.F., 20 DEC. 1972
15. LYNN R. BEENS, CAPTAIN, U.S.A.F., 21 DEC 1972
16. RICHARD E. JOHNSON, MAJOR, U.S.A.F., 18 DEC. 1972
17. WILLIAM T. MAYALL, 1ST LIEUTENANT, U.S.A.F., 22 DEC 1972
18. CARL H. JEFcoat, MAJOR, U.S.A.F., 27 DEC. 1972
19. BRIAN H. WARD 1ST LIEUTENANT, U.S.A.F., 27 DEC. 1972
20. DUANE P. VAVROOH, 1ST LIEUTANANT, U.S.A.F., 26 DEC. 1972
21. JAMES V. CONDON, MAJOR, U.S.A.F., 27 DECEMBER 1972
22. DAVID IAN DRUMMOND, CAPTAIN, U.S.A.F., CAPTURED 22 DEC. 1972
23. JAMES W. GONGH, MASTER SERGEANT, U.S.A.F., 27 DEC. 1972
24. ROBERT M. HUDSON, 1ST LIEUTENANT, U.S.A.F., 26 DEC. 1972
25. JACK R. TRIMBLE, 1ST LIEUTENANT, U.S.A.F., 27 DEC. 1972
26. HAL K. WILSON CAPTAIN, U.S.A.F., 19 DEC. 1972
27. TERRY W. GELONECK, CAPTAIN, U.S.A.F., 20 DEC. 1972
28. CHARLES A. BROWN, JR, CAPTAIN, U.S.A.F., 19 DEC. 1972
29. HENRY C. BARROWS, CAPTAIN, U.S.A.F., 19 DEC. 1972
30. RICHARD T. SIMPSON, CAPTAIN, U.S.A.F., 18 DECEMBER 1972.

2 JAN 0846Z EH/JZ

SA 99

B-447

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

POWS

2 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Prisoner of War Recovery Efforts

I have recently asked Admiral Moorer, Admiral McCain, and General Abrams to review authorities and procedures related to the recovery of US prisoners of war, in order to make certain, as we have stated, that we intend to take maximum advantage of every opportunity to save American lives. Among their responses was a request for authority to implement recovery efforts, using such allied assets as deemed necessary by COMUSMACV, upon notification of intent to Washington. Because large operations require substantial planning time and have a greater potential for causing an adverse public reaction, I feel that approval authority for such operations should remain in Washington. However, smaller operations frequently require a more rapid reaction. Accordingly, I am extending BRIGHT LIGHT PW/evadee recovery authorities which currently apply for South Vietnam and Cambodia to include Laos.



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC F9301187 10/4/93; DoD I-93/54551 10/28/93

By WKO NARA, Date 1/26/94

SA 99

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Page 1 of 1 PagesSec Def Cont Nr. X- 2576

Outside System

~~SECRETARIAT~~ - ACTION

Holdridge/WELANDER

Info copy given to Dr K

Mr. Holdridge

I did not send a copy of the attached to Admiral Welander, thinking you will coordinate with him.

If he should receive a copy, will you please ask your secretary to send him one.

thanx nancy