MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
SUBJECT: Status of the Internal Lao Talks

SECRET
GDS by Auth Stearnan, 1981

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 1/4/93 F92-1408
By MAC- NARA, Date 5/6/93
SA 99 (Part)
Serious -- but less acute differences -- exist on other military related matters such as the size and powers of the ICC, the conditions for receiving foreign military aid, the accounting of MIA's and the modalities of foreign troop withdrawal. On all these issues, the Communists' position is basically "take it or leave it."
In summary, the talks averted a possible rupture this week over the troop stationing issue, but certainly will fail to meet Souvanna's self-imposed deadline of July 1 for reaching an accord. Indeed, agreement on any of the issues is not in sight. Despite recent Chinese statements favoring an early settlement, the North Vietnamese clearly are playing a waiting game, hoping for a break in Cambodia, a Congressional vote or further erosion in Thai SGU strength to force the RLG into an unfavorable agreement. Meanwhile, our Chargé in Vientiane has sought to buck up Souvanna. He has discouraged unnecessarily soft positions and reminded him of our interest in sensitive issues including MIA's and military aid and our preference for foreign troop withdrawals which are not supervised by the ICC. Chargé Dean believes -- and we concur -- that the NVA will not resume fighting if the deadlock continues and predicts that a tough but reasonable RLG stand is conducive to a more meaningful final settlement.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION

March 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT: Clearance of State Cable on Pace of Lao Negotiations

State has submitted a strong message to Vientiane (Tab B) which notes our impatience with the slow pace of the implementation of the Vientiane Agreement. The message instructs Godley to widely register our displeasure with "LPF" footdragging, singling out the Soviet Ambassador for full treatment.

We support State's cable with a few minor changes to emphasize our view that the LPF is responsible for delayed implementation. We also have added references to the U.S. POW issue on Laos and have authorized Godley to recall Hanoi's understanding on releasing our prisoners and note we will not tolerate any delays.

Recommendation:

That you approve the cable at Tab A.
SECRET

Ref: Vientiane 1774
Subject: Pace of Lao Negotiations

For Godley

1. Slow pace of implementation Vientiane Agreement, and absence of senior Pathet Lao negotiator from Vientiane, raises our suspicions and is trying our patience. Because time clock for withdrawal of DRV forces from Lao territory begins running only after political settlement, we suspect DRV has instructed Pathet Lao to move slowly at this stage in order to prolong its military presence, and exasperate the issue of U.S. POWs in Laos.

2. You should show your displeasure at Pathet Lao footdragging in every quarter where it will register some effect. We especially wish you to single out Soviet Ambassador for the full treatment, and give as your personal estimate the prospect that the ceasefire, including the restraint of U.S. air power, cannot repeat not last much longer in the absence of progress on the political front.

You should ask him pointedly what he, as a representative of the Soviet co-chairman is going to do to prevent renewal of military activity. You should also state that we continue to hold North Vietnam to its commitments on releasing all U.S. POWs in Laos by March 28 and will not tolerate any delays.
MEMORANDUM

SECRET  NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR:  MR. KISSINGER
FROM:  JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
SUBJECT:  POW Section of Lao Protocol

The RLG has asked that we submit by March 15 our recommendations for the military and political protocols (to the Lao Agreement) which it is now drafting and hopes soon to table.

State has sent us for clearance a telegram (Tab A) recommending that the military protocol provide for:

-- Lists of captured foreign POWs to be furnished when the protocols are signed;
-- The release of all foreign POWs the day after the signing;
-- Mutual assistance by both sides in tracking down MIAs and locating graves.

The telegram instructs Embassy Vientiane to make clear to the RLG that we expect the release of U.S. foreign POWs by March 28 and that it should begin at the start of the sixty day period (which, according to the Lao Agreement, is supposed to begin on March 23).

Given the danger of slippage in the Lao timetable, the protocol should specify that all U.S. prisoners are to be released by March 28 (as per our understanding with Hanoi). We have, therefore, amended paragraph 1, B of State's draft to make this clear.

Recommendation:

That you authorize clearance of the telegram to Embassy Vientiane at Tab A as amended in paragraph 1, B.

Approve [ ] Disapprove [ ]

SECRET  XGDS By State (4)
SECRET

D/PU: FASIEVERTS: GM
3/13/73 EXT. 2819454
EA: W. SULLIVAN

DOD/ISA: DR. SHIELDS
L/EA: MR. JOHNSON
EA: LC: MR. KELLY
WHITE HOUSE

IMMEDIATE
ROUTINE
BANGKOK

EXDIS

E.O. 11642 GDS
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, PFOR, LA
SUBJECT: DRAFT MATERIAL ON PW'S
REF: VIENTIANE 1780

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT MATERIAL ON RELEASE OF FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS 95 (INCLUDING US) FOR USE AS ENVISAGED PARA THREE REFTEL:

A) COMPLETE LISTS OF CAPTURED FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS SHALL BE FURNISHED ON THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOLS.

B) ALL CAPTURED FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS SHALL BE RELEASED ON THE FIRST DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOLS. U.S. WILL TAKE NEEDED MEASURES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED TO PERMIT THEIR RELEASE.

C) THE TWO SIDES SHALL HELP EACH OTHER TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS WHO ARE MISSING IN ACTION IN LAOS. TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION AND CARE FOR THE GRAVES OF THE DEAD SO AS TO MAKE POSSIBLE THE EXHUMATION AND RETURN OF REMAINS, AND TO PERMIT SUCH OTHER PEACEFUL MEASURES AS MAY BE DEVISED TO FACILITATE THE SEARCH FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THOSE WHO ARE MISSING IN ACTION.

CLEARED WITH SS (Andrea)
3/19/73 4:20 P.M. SECRET
Chris

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT USG EXPECTS RELEASE OF US/FOREIGN PRISONERS IN LAOS WITHIN THE SAME SIXTY DAYS SPECIFIED IN VIETNAM AGREEMENT--THAT IS, BY MARCH 28. YOU COULD FURTHER NOTE THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAOS FOR PHASING PRISONER RELEASES TO US TROOP WITHDRAWALS AS IN VIETNAM. RELEASE OF US/FOREIGN PRISONERS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT START OF SIXTY DAY PERIOD, AS STATED IN (B) ABOVE.
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

TO: PRES
KISSINGER
ROGERS
RICHARDSON
SCHLESINGER
SCHULENBURG
SCHOOLCRAFT

FROM: ADVANCE CY TO HAK/SCHOOLCRAFT
ROGERS
RICHARDSON
SCHOOLCRAFT
SCHLESINGER

SUBJECT: Full details of the last lecture

REFERENCE: 9/5

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ACTION | INFO
ADVANCE CY TO HAK/SCHOOLCRAFT |
FAH EAST
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA
EUROPE / CANADA
LATIN AMERICA
UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
SCIENTIFIC
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NEC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO TO HAK
MEMO TO PRES
APPROPRIATE ACTION
RECOMMENDATIONS
JOINT MEMO
REFER TO
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
CONCURRENCE
DUE DATE

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

3/14

FROM: HAK
TO:-office

HAK cleared cable

3/19

FROM: Davis
TO: State

Notifying State (2/22, re Haldridge)

3/19

FROM: Davis
TO: State

Will be notified by phone.

Dispatch:

Notify:

SPECIAL DISPOSITION:

OR RECORD COMMENT:

CY ROUTE SEE ABOVE PLUS:

CROSS REF:

SEE:

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

MICROFILM & FILE ROUTE:

CYS FOR:

OK

IN

WARN

TO

NS

EP

DESTROY BY:

# GOVT: 1973-693-688

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: U.S. Withdrawals and U.S. POWs in Laos

Attached is an excerpt from the minutes of yesterday’s WSAG meeting. You clearly indicated that final U.S. withdrawal would not take place until U.S. POWs in Laos were released.

As you know, there are two issues concerning our POWs in Laos:

-- The timing of their release which should be completed by March 28. None have been released so far.

-- How many prisoners are actually held? We have only been informed of 8 but have had indications that the Pathet Lao are holding more than these 8, which they have not yet identified to us.

Given the performance to date, it seems highly unlikely that the release will occur by March 28. In any event, it is most unlikely that we will be sure by that date that they have identified for us all of the prisoners they hold, much less have released them.

Defense understands that they are not to complete the withdrawal on March 28 unless the Laos POWs have been released. I wanted to confirm that withdrawal should be held up until:

- The Laos prisoners are released - Yes [ ] No [ ]

- We have clarified to our satisfaction that all of the prisoners held in Laos have been identified to us and that all are released - Yes [ ] No [ ]
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 20, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

We have just learned from our embassy in Vientiane that, barring some last-minute hitch, a ceasefire in Laos will be formally signed on February 21. The reported time for the ceasefire to enter into effect is noon, Vientiane time, on Thursday, February 22.

The agreement reportedly includes the formation of a new provisional government within 30 days, the withdrawal of all foreign forces within 60 days after that, and the exchange of all POWs in the same time frame as the withdrawal of foreign forces.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION
January 16, 1973

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Report from Murray Marder

Ambassador Godley has received a report, ostensibly from Murray Marder in Hanoi, which the Ambassador has been asked to send via telex to the Washington Post. In view of the contents, Ambassador Godley decided to forward it via you.

There is nothing particularly startling in Marder's report (Tab B) which states that:

--The Vietnamese are being extremely respectful to Marder, but top officials are delaying contact. Marder has plans for POW interviews.
January 16, 1973

TO: Ambassador Godley
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
Reference: Vientiane 6481

Thank you for referenced message. On balance, I believe it would be best if Marder's message came directly from you in Vientiane and I have no objection to your forwarding it in this manner.

Warm regards,

-SECRET/EYES ONLY
MARDER TWO

EYE HAVE GOOD GENERAL ACCESS BUT TOP OFFICIALS DELAYING CONTACT DUE UNCERTAINTIES AMERICAN GAME AND SENSITIVITIES SECRET TALKS BUT INDICATE SITUATION FLUID STOP WESTERN EMBASSIES MOST COOPERATIVE AND FEW DO HAVE INTERMITTENT TOP ACCESS AND REPORT SUDDEN SWITCH HERE ABOUT MONDAY FROM PESSIMISM TO CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM BUT HANOI WARNES CONTINUING STOP EYEM ASSUMING EXTENSION MY EIGHT DAY VISA DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENTS STOP AMONG OTHER THINGS NONDIPLOMATIC WILL ATTEMPT BOMBING ASSESSMENT AND FYI ALL INCOMERS INCLUDING FRENCH DIPLOMAT RETURNING AFTER TWENTY YEARS STRUCK BY FACT BOMB DAMAGE IN SATCHES BUT BULK OF CITY IN SURPRISING GOOD SHAPE STOP ALSO HAVE PROJECTED PRISONER INTERVIEWS STOP EYE WILL RARELY BE ABLE FILE ADVISORIES IN TIME DO YOU ANY GOOD SO PLS BEAR WITH IT EYE BELIEVE YOU CAN TRANSMIT PRIVATE MESSAGES IF REQUIRED VIA AMBASSADOR GODLEY VIENTIANE VIA CANADIANS OR SWEDES IN HANOI BUT BEAR IN MIND ONLY AIR TRAFFIC IS TUESDAYS AND SATURDAYS STOP ADVISE ANY SPECIAL REQUESTS AS THIS BLIND MANS BUFF STOP PLEASE INFORM FRAN EYEM FINEST AND HAVE STAFF OF FOUR INCLUDING WATCHERS AND HELPERS ENOIT MARDER UNQUOTE RE SWEDES, I HAVE NO REPEAT NO CONTACT, CANADIANS HELPFUL ON DISCRETE BASIS.

AS EVER.

600

PSN:032367 PAGE 02 OF 02 TDR:016/18:45Z DTG:161657Z

***** SECRET *****S COPY
OP IMMED
DE YEKAOI #0648/1989 0161829
O 1616572 JAN 73 ZFF-1 ZYH
FM AMBASSADOR GODLEY, VIENTIANE

TO WHITE HOUSE (EYES ONLY DR. KISSINGER)
SECRET 1616572 JAN 73 [SANITIZED] 1.3.(4)(4)

FM AMBASSADOR GODLEY, VIENTIANE 648
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR DR. KISSINGER. EYES ONLY
EVENING JAN 16 UNIDENTIFIED LADY POSSIBLY AMERICAN BUT PROBABLY
CANADIAN DELIVERED TO EMBASSY GUARD ENVELOPE ADDRESSED TO ME
CONTAINING MESSAGED DATED SIXTEEN HUNDRED LOCAL JANUARY 16 FROM MURRAY
MARDER IN HAND REQUESTING I PASS FOLLOWING
VIA TELEX TO WASHINGTON POST. VIEW CONTENTS PREFER FORWARD IT VIA
YOU. TEXT MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

H&K,SCOWCROFT,LORD,HOWE

PSN:032367 PAGE 01 TOR:016/18:45Z DTG:161657Z

******** SECRET ********** COPY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OP IMMEDIATE

WH5152
DE RUE/HW 0158 0590027
D 280016Z FEB 73 ZYH
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER

TOP SECRET OTG 280016Z EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY VIA BUNKER

CHANNELS WHS 3153
FEBRUARY 27, 1973
TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER EYES ONLY
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER IMMEDIATE

1. STRICTLY FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY, BECAUSE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELAYS IN RELEASING U.S. PRISONERS, THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED THE SUSPENSION OF MINE CLEARING OPERATIONS AND U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS UNTIL THE POW ISSUE IS CLARIFIED. HE DOES NOT WANT ANY PUBLICITY ON THESE ACTIONS AND THEY WILL BE CONFIRMED ONLY IF THE NEWS SHOULD LEAK OUT.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA BUNKER CHANNEL

February 27, 1973

TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER IMMEDIATE
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS.

1. In my following cable I am repeating to you for your information only a note we received from the North Vietnamese today complaining about various violations of the Agreement by our side. This is obviously their rational for the holdup of prisoner release which we have already told them is unacceptable and cannot be linked to any other issues.

2. You should see Thieu immediately and convey to him in emphatic terms that the President cannot have the Agreement, and most particularly

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 9/23/93 F9301194
By  NARA, Date 9/30/93
SA99

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
the release of American prisoners, threatened by actions under the control of the GVN. Without referring specifically to the North Vietnamese message you should tell Thieu that his Government should undertake the following actions on an urgent basis:

--- Again as we have already discussed, some process must be launched on the issue of civilian prisoners.

3. In making the above points, you should point out to Thieu that the President cannot run the risk of having Thieu appear as the obstacle to prisoner release. In these conditions even the meeting between the Presidents

-TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY-
could be jeopardized.

4. Please send me a report on Thieu's proposed actions immediately.

Warm regards.

---

TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY