

SA99 B-439
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


3616

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

June 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*
SUBJECT: Status of the Internal Lao Talks



~~SECRET~~ GDS by Auth Stearman, 1981

DP

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 1/4/93 F92-1408

By *MAG* NARA, Date 5/6/93

SA 99 (Part)

~~SECRET~~

2



Serious -- but less acute differences -- exist on other military related matters such as the size and powers of the ICC, the conditions for receiving foreign military aid, the accounting of MIA's and the modalities of foreign troop withdrawal. On all these issues, the Communists' position is basically "take it or leave it."

~~SECRET~~

In summary, the talks averted a possible rupture this week over the troop stationing issue, but certainly will fail to meet Souvanna's self-imposed deadline of July 1 for reaching an accord. Indeed, agreement on any of the issues is not in sight. Despite recent Chinese statements favoring an early settlement, the North Vietnamese clearly are playing a waiting game, hoping for a break in Cambodia, a Congressional vote or further erosion in Thai SGU strength to force the RLG into an unfavorable agreement. Meanwhile, our Chargé in Vientiane has sought to buck up Souvanna. He has discouraged unnecessarily soft positions and reminded him of our interest in sensitive issues including MIA's and military aid and our preference for foreign troop withdrawals which are not supervised by the ICC. Charge' Dean believes -- and we concur -- that the NVA will not resume fighting if the deadlock continues and predicts that a tough but reasonable RLG stand is conducive to a more meaningful final settlement.

~~SECRET~~

SA 99

B-440

MEMORANDUM

1373

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION

March 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *W.H. Jr.*

SUBJECT:

Clearance of State Cable
on Pace of Lao Negotiations

State has submitted a strong message to Vientiane (Tab B) which notes our impatience with the slow pace of the implementation of the Vientiane Agreement. The message instructs Godley to widely register our displeasure with "LPF" footdragging, singling out the Soviet Ambassador for full treatment.

We support State's cable with a few minor changes to emphasize our view that the LPF is responsible for delayed implementation. We also have added references to the U.S. POW issue on Laos and have authorized Godley to recall Hanoi's understanding on releasing our prisoners and note we will not tolerate any delays.

Recommendation:

That you approve the cable at Tab A.

~~SECRET~~ GDS

PD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 1/4/93 F92-1408
By *M/O* NARA, Date 5/6/93
SA 99 (Part)

~~SECRET~~

Ref: Vientiane 1774
Subject: Pace of Lao Negotiations
For Godley

1. Slow pace of implementation Vientiane Agreement, and absence of senior Pathet Lao negotiator from Vientiane, raises our suspicions and is trying our patience. Because time clock for withdrawal of DRV forces from Lao territory begins running only after political settlement, we suspect DRV has instructed Pathet Lao to move slowly at this stage in order to prolong its military presence, and exasperate the issue of U.S. POWs in Laos.

2. You should show your displeasure at Pathet Lao footdragging in every quarter where it will register some effect. We especially wish you to single out Soviet Ambassador for the full treatment, and give as your personal estimate the prospect that the ceasefire, including the restraint of U.S. air power, cannot repeat not last much longer in the absence of progress on the political front. You should ask him pointedly what he, as a representative of the Soviet co-chairman is going to do to prevent renewal of military activity. You should also state that we continue to hold North Vietnam to its commitments on releasing all U.S. POWs in Laos by March 28 and will not tolerate any delays.

SA 99 D-44/

1380

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION

March 14 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *JH*

SUBJECT:

POW Section of Lao Protocol

The RLG has asked that we submit by March 15 our recommendations for the military and political protocols (to the Lao Agreement) which it is now drafting and hopes soon to table.

State has sent us for clearance a telegram (Tab A) recommending that the military protocol provide for:

- Lists of captured foreign POWs to be furnished when the protocols are signed;
- The release of all foreign POWs the day after the signing;
- Mutual assistance by both sides in tracking down MIAs and locating graves.

The telegram instructs Embassy Vientiane to make clear to the RLG that we expect the release of U.S. foreign POWs by March 28 and that it should begin at the start of the sixty day period (which, according to the Lao Agreement, is supposed to begin on March 23).

Given the danger of slippage in the Lao timetable, the protocol should specify that all U.S. prisoners are to be released by March 28 (as per our understanding with Hanoi). We have, therefore, amended paragraph 1, B of State's draft to make this clear.

Recommendation:

That you authorize clearance of the telegram to Embassy Vientiane at Tab A as amended in paragraph 1, B.

Approve *HK* Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~ XGDS By State (4)

(DF)

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E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 1/4/93 F92-1408
By *MMO* NARA, Date 5/6/93
SA 99 (Part)

~~SECRET~~

D/PU: FASIEVERTS: GM
3/13/73 EXT. 2819454
EA: WHSULLIVAN

DOD/ISA: DR. SHIELDS
L/EA: MR. JOHNSON
S/S

EA: LC: MR. KELLY
WHITE HOUSE

IMMEDIATE VIENTIANE
ROUTINE BANGKOK
EXDIS

E.O. 11642 GDS
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, PFOR, LA
SUBJECT: DRAFT MATERIAL ON PW'S
REF: VIENTIANE 1780

WHS
FAS
DOD
EA/L
L/EA

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT MATERIAL ON RELEASE OF FOREIGN
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS 9# (INCLUDING
US) FOR USE AS ENVISAGED PARA THREE REFTEL:

A) COMPLETE LISTS OF CAPTURED FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL
AND CIVILIANS SHALL BE FURNISHED ON THE DATE OF THE SIGN-
ING OF THE PROTOCOLS.

B) ALL CAPTURED FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN
CIVILIANS SHALL BE RELEASED ON THE FIRST DAY AFTER THE
DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOLS. U.S. MILITARY AND
ARE BY ANY CASE, TO BE RELEASED.

C) THE TWO SIDES SHALL HELP EACH OTHER TO GET INFORMA-
TION ABOUT FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVI-
LIANS WHO ARE MISSING IN ACTION IN LAOS, TO DETERMINE
THE LOCATION AND CARE FOR THE GRAVES OF THE DEAD SO AS
TO MAKE POSSIBLE THE EXHUMATION AND RETURN OF REMAINS,
AND TO PERMIT SUCH OTHER PEACEFUL MEASURES AS MAY BE
DEvised TO FACILITATE THE SEARCH FOR INFORMATION ABOUT
THOSE WHO ARE MISSING IN ACTION.

Cleared with S/S (Andrea)
3/19/73 4:20 p.m.
Chris

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

| 2

2. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT USG EXPECTS RELEASE OF US/FOREIGN PRISONERS IN LAOS WITHIN THE SAME SIXTY DAYS SPECIFIED IN VIETNAM AGREEMENT--THAT IS, BY MARCH 28. YOU COULD FURTHER NOTE THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAOS FOR PHASING PRISONER RELEASES TO US TROOP WITHDRAWALS 9% (AS IN VIETNAM). RELEASE OF US/FOREIGN PRISONERS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT START OF SIXTY DAY PERIOD, AS STATED IN (B) ABOVE. YY

~~SECRET~~

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	3/14/79 13.0	

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS _____ UNCLAS _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

KISSINGER _____ RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ CODEWORD _____

ELIOT _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT *POW Section of the Lao Protocol*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT					MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY					MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST					REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA					APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA					MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA					RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA					JOINT MEMO..... ()
UNITED NATIONS					REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC					ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC					CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP					DUE DATE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					
OCEANS POLICY					

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
3/14		HAK	X	Clear Cable (3/15, HAK cleared cable)	
3/19		Davis	5	Notify State (21) (cy to Haldridge)	
3/19	Down	NS/S		State notified in phone.	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

OR RECORD COMMENT: _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: *yes*

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F/D _____ BY _____

CYS FOR) SA _____

) HP _____

ORIG) WH _____

TO) SF _____

) NS _____

) EP _____

DESTROY) DY _____

* GPO: 1973-489-668

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

March 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: U.S. Withdrawals and U.S. POWs in Laos

Attached is an excerpt from the minutes of yesterday's WSAG meeting. You clearly indicated that final U.S. withdrawal would not take place until U.S. POWs in Laos were released.

As you know, there are two issues concerning our POWs in Laos:

- The timing of their release which should be completed by March 28. None have been released so far.
- How many prisoners are actually held? We have only been informed of 8 but have had indications that the Pathet Lao are holding more than these 8, which they have not yet identified to us.

Given the performance to date, it seems highly unlikely that the release will occur by March 28. In any event, it is most unlikely that we will be sure by that date that they have identified for us all of the prisoners they hold, much less have released them.

Defense understands that they are not to complete the withdrawal on March 28 unless the Laos POWs have been released. I wanted to confirm that withdrawal should be held up until:

- eight confirmed*
- a. The Laos prisoners are released - Yes ☒ No ☐
- b. We have clarified to our satisfaction that all of the prisoners held in Laos have been identified to us and that all are released - Yes ☐ No ☐

*Let Johnson
before we make final.*

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DF

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 1/4/93 F92-1408

By *M/A* NARA, Date 5/6/93

SA 99 (Part)

SA 99

MEMORANDUM

B-443

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 20, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

We have just learned from our embassy in Vientiane that, barring some last-minute hitch, a ceasefire in Laos will be formally signed on February 21. The reported time for the ceasefire to enter into effect is noon, Vientiane time, on Thursday, February 22.

The agreement reportedly includes the formation of a new provisional government within 30 days, the withdrawal of all foreign forces within 60 days after that, and the exchange of all POWs in the same time frame as the withdrawal of foreign forces.

DF *PD*
920915

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 8/23/93 F9301180

By *MMO* NARA, Date 9/20/93

SA 99

IMM
PRECEDENCE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMCEN CENTER USE ONLY

DAC

GPS

LDX

PAGES

TTY

CITE

DTG

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM

TO: STEVE BULL FOR THE PRESIDENT

20 13 38Z

NFO:

RELEASED BY:

HB

TOR:

201346Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

13 FEB 73 14 00 43

SH 99 B-444
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION



January 16, 1973

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER *BK*
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*
SUBJECT: Report from Murray Marder

Ambassador Godley has received a report, ostensibly from Murray Marder in Hanoi, which the Ambassador has been asked to send via telex to the Washington Post. In view of the contents, Ambassador Godley decided to forward it via you.

There is nothing particularly startling in Marder's report (Tab B) which states that:


-- The Vietnamese are being extremely respectful to Marder, but top officials are delaying contact. Marder has plans for POW interviews.


~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 8/23/93 F9301180

By *WZO* NARA, Date 9/20/93

SA 99

DP

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

[Sanitized]

1.3(a)(4)


January 16, 1973

TO: Ambassador Godley
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
Reference: Vientiane 648\'

Thank you for referenced message. On balance, I believe it would be best if Marder's message came directly from you in Vientiane and I have no objection to your forwarding it in this manner.

Warm regards,

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~



~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

MARDER TWO

EYE HAVE GOOD GENERAL ACCESS BUT TOP OFFICIALS DELAYING CONTACT
DUE UNCERTAINTIES AMERICAN GAME AND SENSITIVITIES SECRET TALKS BUT
INDICATE SITUATION FLUID STOP WESTERN EMBASSIES MOST COOPERATIVE AND
FEW DO HAVE INTERMITTENT TOP ACCESS AND REPORT SUDDEN SWITCH HERE
ABOUT MONDAY FROM PESSIMISM TO CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM BUT HANOI WARINESS
CONTINUING STOP EYEM ASSUMING EXTENSION MY EIGHT DAY VISA DEPENDENT
DEVELOPMENTS STOP AMONG OTHER THINGS NONDIPLOMATIC WILL ATTEMPT
BOMBING ASSESSMENT AND FYI ALL INCOMERS INCLUDING FRENCH DIPLOMAT
RETURNING AFTER TWENTY YEARS STRUCK BY FACT BOMB DAMAGE IN SWATCHES
BUT BULK OF CITY IN SURPRISING GOOD SHAPE STOP ALSO HAVE PROJECTED
PRISONER INTERVIEWS STOP EYE WILL RARELY BE ABLE FILE ADVISORIES
IN TIME DO YOU ANY GOOD SO PLS BEAR WITH IT STOP EYE BELIEVE
YOU CAN TRANSMIT PRIVATE MESSAGES IF REQUIRED VIA AMBASSADOR GODLEY
VIENTIANE VIA CANADIANS OR SWEDES IN HANOI BUT BEAR IN MIND ONLY
AIR TRAFFIC IS TUESDAYS AND SATURDAYS STOP ADVISE ANY SPECIAL
REQUESTS AS THIS BLIND MANS BUFF STOP PLEASE INFORM FRAN EYEM
FINEST AND HAVE STAFF OF FOUR INCLUDING WATCHERS AND HELPERS
ENDIT MARDER" UNQUOTE

RE SWEDES, I HAVE NO REPEAT NO CONTACT. CANADIANS HELPFUL
ON DISCRETE BASIS.

AS EVER.

600

PSN:032367

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:016/18:45Z

DTG:161657Z

~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY



~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

OP IMMED
DE YEKADL #0648/1989 0161829
O 161657Z JAN 73 ZFF-1 ZYH
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO WHITE HOUSE (EYES ONLY DR. KISSINGER)


~~SECRET~~ 161657Z JAN 73 [SANITIZED]

1.3.(a)(4)

FM AMBASSADOR GODLEY, VIENTIANE 648

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR DR. KISSINGER. EYES ONLY

EVENING JAN 16 UNIDENTIFIED LADY POSSIBLY AMERICAN BUT PROBABLY
CANADIAN DELIVERED TO EMBASSY GUARD ENVELOPE ADDRESSED TO ME
CONTAINING MESSAGE DATED SIXTEEN HUNDRED LOCAL JANUARY 16 FROM MURRAY
HARDER IN HANOI REQUESTING I PASS FOLLOWING
VIA TELEX TO WASHINGTON POST. VIEW CONTENTS PREFER FORWARD IT VIA
YOU. TEXT MESSAGE FOLLOWS:



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, LORD, HOWE

PSN:032367

PAGE 01

TOR:016/18:45Z

DTG:161657Z

~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ *****S CJPV

OP IMMED

WHS152
 DE RUEIHW #0158 0590027
 O 280016Z FEB 73 ZYH
 FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

~~TOP SECRET~~ DTG 280016Z EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY VIA BUNKER

CHANNELS WHS 3153
 FEBRUARY 27, 1973

TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER EYES ONLY
 FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER IMMEDIATE

1. STRICTLY FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY, BECAUSE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELAYS IN RELEASING U.S. PRISONERS, THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED THE SUSPENSION OF MINE CLEARING OPERATIONS AND U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS UNTIL THE POW ISSUE IS CLARIFIED. HE DOES NOT WANT ANY PUBLICITY ON THESE ACTIONS AND THEY WILL BE CONFIRMED ONLY IF THE NEWS SHOULD LEAK OUT.

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, LORD, HOWE

PSN:001398 RECALLED
 PAGE 01

TOR:059/01:36Z DTG:280016Z FEB 73

***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ *****S CJPV

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC

8/24/93

F9301193

By WFO NARA, Date 9/16/93

SA99

SENT SA 99 C-53

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA BUNKER CHANNEL


February 27, 1973

TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER IMMEDIATE

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *K*

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS.

1. In my following cable I am repeating to you for your information only a note we received from the North Vietnamese today complaining about various violations of the Agreement by our side. This is obviously their rationale for the holdup of prisoner release which we have already told them is unacceptable and cannot be linked to any other issues.



2. You should see Thieu immediately and convey to him in emphatic terms that the President cannot have the Agreement, and most particularly

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY


(DP)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 9/23/93 F9801194
By *WKO* NARA, Date 9/30/93
SA99

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

2

the release of American prisoners, threatened by actions under the control of the GVN. Without referring specifically to the North Vietnamese message you should tell Thieu that his Government should undertake the following actions on an urgent basis:



-- Again as we have already discussed, some process must be launched on the issue of civilian prisoners.

3. In making the above points, you should point out to Thieu that the President cannot run the risk of having Thieu appear as the obstacle to prisoner release. In these conditions even the meeting between the Presidents

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

3

could be jeopardized.

4. Please send me a report on Thieu's proposed actions immediately.

Warm regards.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY