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
~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ **EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY** 72

~~TOP SECRET~~ 053625Z AUG 72 SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
VIA BUNKER CHANNELS SECTION ELEVEN OF FIFTEEN

FM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER
CITE: WHS2102

AUG 5 PM 12:00

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM



FIRST, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY WHATSOEVER THAT WE WILL LEAVE INDOCHINA OR WILL AGREE TO ANY OF THESE PROPOSALS WHILE ANY AMERICAN PRISONERS ARE LEFT BEHIND ANYWHERE IN INDOCHINA. HOW YOU SOLVE THIS IS YOUR PROBLEM. BUT I HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT YOU HAVE ENOUGH INFLUENCE WITH YOUR ALLIES... YOUR POINT THREE IS AMBIGUOUS IN THIS RESPECT. BUT AT ANY RATE, IT IS A PROBLEM THAT MUST BE SOLVED, AND ON WHICH NO COMPROMISE IS POSSIBLE.

LE DUC THO: PRISONERS?

DR. KISSINGER: PRISONERS.



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 9/23/93 F9301194

By: M/KO NARA, Date 9/30/93

SA 99

(DF)

2 copies to hand
file

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

三

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF RELEVANT PARTS OF THE ABOVE TRANSCRIPT
 TO HELP YOU IN CONSIDERING OTHER SIDE'S PROPOSALS SENT IN REPTL.
 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING THERE WAS AN HOUR WRANGLE ON
 PROCEDURES FOR ANNOUNCING THE PRIVATE MEETINGS, THIS BY OPENING
 STATEMENT, THEN AN ATTACK BY TWO ON OUR BOMBING. THE FOLLOWING
 TEXT PICKS UP FROM THERE AND RUNS UNTIL THE CLOSE OF OUR
 SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

WHITE HOUSE
EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY
ON ROOM

'72 AUG 5 PM 2:16

~~TOP SECRET~~ 030626Z AUG 72 SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
VIA BUNKER CHANNELS SECTION FIFTEEN OF FIFTEEN

FM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER
CITE: WHS2102

REGARDING THE PRISONERS OF WAR IN INDOCHINA, IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM WE THINK WE SHOULD RESPECT THE RIGHT OF THE INDOCHINESE PARTIES. BUT WE ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM WILL CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ALL THESE QUESTIONS.

I DON'T SEE ANY DIFFICULTIES. I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE DETAILS BUT I THINK THAT IN CAMBODIA OR IN LAOS THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IS VERY SMALL. THERE ARE BASICALLY NONE AT ALL. THERE IS NO REASON WHEN WE SETTLE WITH YOU MUCH GREATER QUESTIONS, WHY WE CAN'T SETTLE MUCH SMALLER QUESTIONS, A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF PRISONERS. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THAT?

(PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION)

END OF TEXT

AL

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ ~~EXCLUSIVE~~ EYES ONLY

1972

22 06

~~TOP SECRET~~ 252059Z JUL 72 SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA BUNKER CHANNELS

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER

CITE: WHS2090

JULY 25, 1972

TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

REF: (A) SAIGON 0116

(B) WHITE HOUSE 2086

72 JUL 25 PM 6:11

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. OUR MESSAGE TO YOU ON PLAN FOR NEXT MEETING UNFORTUNATELY MISLED YOU BY USE OF THE TERM QUOTE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES UNQUOTE WHICH UNDERSTANDABLY SUGGESTED TO YOU A RETURN TO SOMETHING LIKE LAST FALL'S PLAN OF TWO FORMAL STAGES. THUS BECAUSE OF OUR CABLE YOU MAY HAVE UNNECESSARILY CONFUSED THIEU. YOU SHOULD CLARIFY OUR INTENTIONS AS FOLLOWS.

4. IN SHORT, IN OUR NEW APPROACH AN OVERALL AGREEMENT, WHICH WE MISLEADINGLY CALLED STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, WOULD BE SIGNED AND CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWALS, AND PRISONER RELEASE WOULD ALL BEGIN. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE THERE WOULD IN EFFECT BE PRINCIPLES AGREED TO BUT THE DETAILS WOULD STILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN THE THREE-MONTH PERIOD WHICH IS NOW STIPULATED. AS WE OUTLINED IN OUR MESSAGE, THE ELECTION WOULD STILL BE SIX MONTHS AFTER ALL POLITICAL DETAILS ARE WORKED OUT, OR NINE MONTHS AFTER THE OVERALL AGREEMENT IS SIGNED. THIEU WOULD STEP DOWN TWO MONTHS BEFORE THIS ELECTION OR SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE OVERALL AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.
5. OUR IDEA NOW IS TO PRESENT THIS NEW APPROACH IN COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS BUT WE WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO CALL IT A NEW PROPOSAL TO BOLSTER OUR NEGOTIATING RECORD.
6. PLEASE CLARIFY THIS FOR THIEU AND REPORT HIS REACTIONS.

WARM REGARDS.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~~~EXCLUSIVE~~

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC

9/23/93

F9301194

By

[Signature]

NARA, Date

9/30/93

JA 99

SA 99 C-47

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

1212

AUG

2

PM


21-20

WHITE HOUSE
STILL
033009

~~TOP SECRET~~ 022330Z SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES
SECTION TWO OF THREE VIA BUNKER CHANNELS

FM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER IMMEDIATE
CITE: WHS2097

THE U.S. MILITARY AID TO THE SAIGON ADMINISTRATION
WILL END WHEN THE CEASE-FIRE COMES INTO FORCE IN SOUTH VIET NAM.
3. THE RELEASE OF ALL MILITARY MEN AND CIVILIANS OF THE
PARTIES CAPTURED DURING THE WAR (INCLUDING AMERICAN PILOTS
CAPTURED IN NORTH VIET NAM) WILL BE CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY
WITH AND COMPLETED ON THE SAME DAY AS THE AFORESAID TROOP
WITHDRAWAL. THE PARTIES WILL EXCHANGE THE LISTS OF THE MILITARY
MEN AND CIVILIANS CAPTURED DURING THE WAR ON THE DAY OF THE
SIGNING OF THE OVERALL AGREEMENT.



(DP)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 9/23/93 F9301194
By 1110 NARA, Date 9/30/93
SA 99.

172 DEC 7 AM 7 05

72 DEC 7 AM 7:05

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DP

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 8/24/93 F9301193

By MPK NARA, Date 9/16/93

SA99

[SANITIZED]

(DO. (K))

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 071120Z DEC 72

FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0290 FLASH

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REFS: A) VHS 2265; B) VHS 2166; C) SAIGON 0188; D) SAIGON 0189.

1. I MET WITH THIEU THIS MORNING BEFORE ARRIVAL OF YOUR 2266. UP TO THAT TIME, HE HAD RECEIVED NO INFORMATION FROM PA IS OTHER THAN THAT CONTAINED IN YOUR 2265 COVERING THE DECEMBER 5 MEETING.

2. USING AS BASIS FOREIGN MINISTER LAM'S CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR PERCY (PARA 2, REF C) I ASKED THIEU WHETHER I WAS TO INTERPRET THE VIEWS THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED AS BEING HIS PERSONAL VIEWS OR WHETHER HE WAS REFLECTING THE VIEWS HELD BY THIEU AND THE GVN.

3. THIEU SAID THAT WAS VIRTUALLY THE PROPOSAL WHICH LUC HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PRESENT TO THE PRESIDENT (INEFFECT OUR MAY 8 PROPOSAL), BUT THAT THE PRESIDENT AND YOU HAD SAID THAT THE MAY 8 PROPOSAL HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN BY DEVELOPMENTS.

4. I SAID THAT I FRANKLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THIEU'S RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. EVEN WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS REMAINING IN THE SOUTH AND THEY HAD ALWAYS BEEN HERE - THE GVN WITH ITS OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY IN RESOURCES WOULD WIN IN ANY INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED CONTEST. UNDER AN EXISTING CEASEFIRE AN ATTEMPT BY THE NVA TO TAKE OVER THE SOUTH WOULD BE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND HE HAD SAID THE GVN WAS UNWILLING TO REACT SWIFTLY AND STRONGLY. IT SEEMED TO ME THE AGREEMENT MERELY REFLECTED THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION.

5. ON THE PRACTICAL MATTER THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE GVN HAD BEEN THE MAIN FORCE IN THE SOUTH. HE REMARKED THAT THE NVA HAD BEEN IN THE SOUTH SINCE 1954. THE GVN HAD CARRIED OUT THE ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, TWO ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT, IN MY VIEW, WERE SIGNIFICANT. IT WAS THE JURIDICAL ASPECT WHICH WOULD PRELIMINARY FOR THE GVN - THE COMPOSITION OF THE NCRC AND RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF NVA TROOPS TO REMAIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE JURIDICAL ASPECT WAS RANDI'S CONTENTION THAT VIETNAM WAS A SINGLE ENTITY. IN FACT, THE POINT IS THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE GVN AS ITS CREATOR AND BY IMPLICATION THE GVN AS ITS CREATOR; RANDI'S INSISTENCE ON THESE POINTS INDICATED HIS OBJECTIVE IS NOT A MILITARY BUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE GVN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE NCRC AND NVA TROOP WITHDRAWAL. BUT AS FAR AS THE GVN IS CONCERNED, THE WITHDRAWAL CAN BE DE FACTO AND RANDI CAN BE VAGUE ABOUT IT AS LONG AS IT EVENTUALLY TAKES PLACE.

6. RETURNING TO THE IDEA OF U.S. DISENGAGEMENT, RANDI SAID THAT HE WOULD OFFER TO RELEASE AMERICAN PRISONERS IN RETURN FOR THE AMERICAN PRISONERS. WITH A CEASEFIRE IN EFFECT, THERE WOULD THEN HAVE TO ARRANGE A SETTLEMENT. THIS COULD BE DONE IF THERE WERE AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE MILITARY AID TO BOTH SIDES. IF THE U.S., SOVIET UNION AND CHINA WERE TO AGREE TO CUT BACK ON

7. A SECOND ALTERNATIVE WOULD INVOLVE U.S. DISENGAGEMENT AND A RETURN OF THE FORCES BUT NO CEASEFIRE AND THE FIGHTING CONTINUING. THIS WOULD BE LESS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GVN, BUT A SITUATION WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE TO FACE. IN EITHER CASE, THE GVN WOULD BE TAKING OVER FULL RESPONSIBILITY, BUT WOULD NEED ASSISTANCE UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE. IF, HOWEVER, THE BIG POWERS AGREED ON A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF THE BURDEN WOULD BE LESSENED. THIEU SAID THAT HE HAD POINTED OUT IN 1970 AND 1971 THAT THIS YEAR THE GVN WOULD TAKE ALL RESPONSIBILITY ON THE GROUND, BUT THAT IT WOULD NEED AIR SUPPORT UNTIL THE AIR FORCE WAS VIETNAMIZED; VIET-NAM HAS IN FACT ACCEPTED MORE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

8. I SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THE PROBLEM THAT HAD TO BE FACED WAS THE FACT THAT U.S. AID IS ESSENTIAL FOR GVN SURVIVAL. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS LESS THAN PERFECT AND CONTAINS SOME UNDESIRABLE FEATURES BUT WHICH WILL ASSURE A CONTINUATION OF U.S. SUPPORT, AS PRESIDENT NIXON HAS PROMISED, IS NOT PREFERABLE TO FOLLOWING A COURSE WHICH ALMOST INEVITABLY WOULD LEAD TO A CUT OFF OF FUNDS. THIEU AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE PROBLEM AND THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO ASSURE CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT.

9. ALLOWING FOR THE FACT THAT THIEU'S CONCERNS ARE GENUINE, HE HAS GOTTEN HIMSELF INTO A SITUATION, BECAUSE OF THE RIGIDITY OF THE POSITIONS HE HAS ASSUMED AND THE WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR IT HE HAS WHIPPED UP, THAT WILL MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO SURVIVE SHOULD HE NOW ACQUIESCE. THIS IS A VIEW WHICH HAS BEEN EXPRESSED TO US BY A NUMBER OF THOUGHTFUL AND INTELLIGENT VIETNAMESE AND IT MAY EXPLAIN THIEU'S THINKING ABOUT RESIGNING (PARA 6, REF C). HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO THIS TODAY, HOWEVER, NOR TO ANY NEW INITIATIVE AND IS APPARENTLY AWAITING THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS THIS WEEK.

10. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE A FEW INDIVIDUALS OF INFLUENCE SUCH AS KHIEM, NGOC, AND KY WHO HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT REFLECTS AND REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND SHOULD BE ACCEPTED.

AN EDITORIAL YESTERDAY IN CHINH LUAN, THE MOST RESPECTED DAILY NEWSPAPER IN VIET-NAM, EXPLAINED AND ENDORSED THE AMERICAN VIEWPOINT. PREPARATIONS BY THE GVN FOR A CEASEFIRE ARE ALSO PRECEDING Apace. THESE MAY BE STRAWS THAT MORE REFLECTIVE SECOND THOUGHTS ARE BEGINNING TO TAKE HOLD. IT WAS SOMEWHAT HEARTENING TO SEE THIEU'S AGREEMENT THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO RETAIN U.S. SUPPORT.

11. WARM REGARDS.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Kennedy
Howe~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ Sent to Hanoi

Svt. pending re A

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ 041130Z DEC 72

Sanitized

1.3 (4x4)

(BUNKER)

FROM: BUNKER

SAIGON 0288

IMMEDIATE

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE NEW PROPOSAL BY THIEU.

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE HAVE HAD INFORMATION TODAY FROM THREE DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT THIEU IS THINKING IN TERMS OF PUBLICLY MAKING A NEW PROPOSAL GREATLY AT VARIANCE WITH THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON WHICH YOU ARE WORKING. OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THIEU IS THINKING OF MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TERMS OF HIS PROPOSAL WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

72 DEC

3. IN SPELLING OUT HIS PROPOSAL MORE SPECIFICALLY TO HUYEN, THIEU SAID THAT HE WAS READY TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO DO ALL THAT HE COULD TO GET BACK THE US POWS, INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF "10,000 COMMUNIST POWS" NOW HELD BY THE GVN. HE WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT/HKVFXIGH BWPQXN/A ONE MONTH "LIMITED CEASEFIRE" DURING WHICH THE COMMUNIST AND AMERICAN POWS WOULD BE RELEASED AND THE "ATMOSPHERE" COULD BE PREPARED FOR WORKING OUT THE PROBLEM OF GETTING THE NVA TROOPS OUT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF ORGANIZING ELECTIONS WITH THE MLF. THIEU HYPOTHETICALLY MENTIONED A TEN DAY PERIOD BEFORE CHRISTMAS AND TWENTY DAYS AFTER FOR THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD.

4. THIEU TOLD HUYEN THAT THESE PROPOSALS WOULD BE MADE "WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS" SO THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE COULD NOT ACCUSE THIEU OF OBSTRUCTING PEACE, OF BEING UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH NORTH VIET-NAM, OR BEING A HINDRANCE TO PRESIDENT NIXON IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS. THIEU EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED TO OPEN A "CAMPAIGN" AGAINST HIM IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT WOULD SAY THAT IT WAS BECAUSE OF THIEU THAT WE HAD NOT GOTTEN BACK THE POWS QUICKLY AND THAT THIEU WAS OPPOSED TO A CEASEFIRE. BY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCING HIS PROPOSALS NOW, THIEU FELT THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEFLATE THIS "CAMPAIGN" BY SAYING THAT IT WAS HIS OWN PROPOSAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WITH A RETURN OF US POWS DURING THAT PERIOD.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4


NSC 9/23/93 F9301194

By MRK NARA, Date 9/30/93

SA 99

(DP)

5. IN A CALL WHICH I MADE ON FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN LAM TODAY, IN COMPANY WITH SENATOR PERCY, LAM ALLUDED VAGUELY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROPOSAL BY WHICH THE BOMBING AND MINING OF NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE STOPPED, ALL U.S. TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND THE GVN WOULD WORK OUT WITH THE NLF PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT FOLLOWED BY ELECTIONS. THE GVN WOULD RELEASE PRISONERS IN RETURN FOR THE RELEASE OF U.S. PRISONERS. WITH U.S. DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE WAR THE GVN WOULD QUALIFY FOR ASSISTANCE UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE.



7. THIEU HAS NOT BEEN IN HIS OFFICE FOR THE LAST THREE DAYS AND IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT HE HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO DEVISE SOME SCHEME AS A BACKFIRE TO OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT AND HAS NOW SURFACED THIS PROPOSAL WITH SOME OF HIS ASSOCIATES. SINCE FOREIGN MINISTER LAM AND TRAN VAN DON ARE BOTH AWARE OF HIS PLAN, I ASSUME THAT OTHERS ALSO HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO HIS CONFIDENCE, PROBABLY VICE PRESIDENT HUONG AND PRIME MINISTER KHIEM AND POSSIBLY OTHERS. GIVEN NORTH VIET-NAM'S COMPLETE INDIFFERENCE TO THE FATE OF THEIR OWN PRISONERS AND THEIR REFUSAL UNTIL NOW TO ACCEPT ANY PRISONER RELEASES, IT SEEMS DIFFICULT TO THINK THAT THIEU COULD BELIEVE HANOI WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A PROPOSAL. NEVERTHELESS THESE REPORTS THAT HAVE COME TO US SEEM TO INDICATE THAT HE MAY CONTEMPLATE MOVING ALONG THESE LINES SOON. IN ANY CASE, I THOUGHT YOU SHOULD HAVE THIS INFORMATION PROMPTLY.

8. WARM REGARDS.

SA 99-C-31

HAIG
HAIG
LORD
HOWE
NEGROPONTE

QUNG

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1.3(2)(4)

Sanitized

(BUNKER)

EYES

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ 141713Z NOV 72
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0269
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECTION 1 OF 3
1. NHA SENT ME THIS AFTERNOON A MEMORANDUM ENTITLED SUMMARY
OF THE GVN'S VIEWPOINTS AS EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN
THIEU IN THE MEETING BETWEEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND
GENERAL ALEXANDER HAIG ON NOVEMBER 11, 1972. ON PERUSAL IT SEEMS
TO CONTAIN NOTHING GENERAL HAIG HAS NOT ALREADY REPORTED, BUT APPARENTLY
THE GVN WISHES TO SUBMIT IT FOR THE RECORD AND HAS ASKED ME TO FORWARD
IT PROMPTLY.

BEGIN TEXT.

DP

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 9/23/93 F9301194


By WKG NARA, Date 9/30/93

SA 99

ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS AND THE POWS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS

15) THE GVN THINKS THAT THE COMMUNISTS CLAIM OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NON-WITHDRAWAL OF NVN TROOPS AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM IS COMPLETELY UNDEFENDABLE. IF THE COMMUNISTS RELEASE ALL THE AMERICAN POW'S AND THE VIETNAMESE POW'S DETAINED THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA, THE GVN WILL RELEASE ALL THE COMMUNIST POW'S DETAINED IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. IN FACT, THE GVN HAS MADE THAT OFFER MANY TIMES IN THE PAST.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAVE NO JUSTIFICATION TO STAY UNDER THE PRETEXT OF GUARANTEEING THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS.



32.
I

EXCERPT


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1.3 (w) (4) House

Sanitized

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ 221152Z OCT 72 (BUNKER)
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0223 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL HAIG
REF: HAKTO 32

1. TWO HOUR MEETING WITH THIEU, WHICH BEGAN AT 0800, WAS POSTPONED FROM YESTERDAY AND FOLLOWED HIS EMOTIONAL TELEPHONE CALL LAST NIGHT IN WHICH HE ACCUSED MEMBERS OF KISSINGER'S AND HAIG(S STAFFS AND EMBASSY PERSONNEL OF LEAKING STATEMENTS CONCERNING PEACE PROPOSALS TO POLITICAL PERSONALITIES HERE.



(DP)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 9/23/93 F9301194

By MKC NARA, Date 9/30/93

SA 99

[REDACTED]

13. WE HAVE OBTAINED CONCESSION FROM HANOI WHICH WE HAD HERETOFORE BELIEVED IMPOSSIBLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAVE ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL ON CAMBODIA, INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL; THIEU'S RESIGNATION HAS BEEN SUPERCEDED BY THE PRESENT AGREEMENT; OUR DRAFT CONCERNING PRISONERS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA HAS BEEN ACCEPTED; AND WE BELIEVE THERE IS A 50-50 CHANCE THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT A CHANGE IN THE TRIPARTITE COMPOSITION OF THE NCRC. THE TRAGEDY WE NOW FACE, HOWEVER, IS THE FACT THAT IF THE PLAN BECOMES PUBLIC, CONGRESS WILL CERTAINLY CUT OFF AID. WE ARE ALREADY \$4 BILLION AND BY JANUARY WILL BE \$6 BILLION IN THE HOLE BECAUSE OF ADDED COSTS OF THE WAR. WE BELIEVE THAT IF WE PRESENT THIS PROPOSAL AS A VICTORY WE CAN PREVAIL; IF NOT ALL THAT WE HAVE STRIVEN FOR WILL BE LOST.

[REDACTED]

WEWARKOUDGRJ

SA 99 C-34
12 OCT 15 1972
HAK
Hagg
Howe
Ford
Kennedy
1.3(a)(4)

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ 150525Z OCT 72 [SANITIZED] (BUNKER)
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0189
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REF: WHS 2218
SUBJECT: POLITICAL PRISONERS
1. IN ORDER TO GET AN IDEA OF THE TYPES OF PRISONERS PRESENTLY DETAINED

IN GVN CORRECTION CENTERS, I HAVE HAD OUR PUBLIC SAFETY PEOPLE PREPARE THE FOLLOWING RUN-DOWN:

COMMUNIST OFFENDERS		
UNSENTENCED PRISONERS		
UNDER INVESTIGATION	2,020	
INVESTIGATION COMPLETED		
(AWAITING ADJUDICATION)	1,459	3,479
AN TRI PRISONERS		
CATEGORY A	4,325	
CATEGORY B	4,615	
CATEGORY C	4,125	13,065
SENTENCED BY MILITARY COURT		
LESS THAN 1 YEAR	298	
1 TO 2 YEARS	1,307	
2 TO 5 YEARS	2,430	
OVER 5 YEARS	295	4,330
MILITARY OFFENDERS		
UNSENTENCED PRISONERS		
UNDER INVESTIGATION	622	
INVESTIGATION COMPLETED		
(AWAITING ADJUDICATION)	110	732
SENTENCED PRISONERS		
LESS THAN 1 YEAR	147	
1 TO 2 YEARS	707	
2 TO 5 YEARS	1,136	
OVER 5 YEARS	1,236	3,226
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS		
UNSENTENCED PRISONERS		
UNDER INVESTIGATION	4,678	
INVESTIGATION COMPLETED		
(AWAITING ADJUDICATION)	3,346	8,024
SENTENCED PRISONERS		
LESS THAN 1 YEAR	1,753	
1 TO 2 YEARS	835	
2 TO 5 YEARS	581	
OVER 5 YEARS	486	3,655
PRISONERS OF WAR		
CONFINED FOR CIVIL CRIMES	58	
WAITING TRANSFER TO PW CAMP	94	152
TOTAL		36,663

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1.3(a)(4)

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E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 8/24/93 F9301193
By 1170 NARA, Date 9/16/93
SA 99

2. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOME OF THE CRIMINAL OFFENDERS ARE BEING DETAINED FOR CRIMES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH VC ACTIVITY. A VC ASSASSIN OR TERRORIST WOULD BE DETAINED IN THIS CATEGORY. WE HAVE NO BREAKDOWN OF HOW MANY CRIMINALS ARE BEING DETAINED FOR VC CONNECTED CRIMES.

3. MY INCLINATION WITH REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF RELEASING POLITICAL PRISONERS IS TO BASE OURSELVES ON THE LENGTH OF THE SENTENCES THEY HAVE RECEIVED AND THE KNOWN DEGREE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE VC MOVEMENT. UNDER THESE CRITERIA ONE COULD CONSIDER THE RELEASE OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES:

UNSENTENCED PRISONERS	
APPROXIMATELY HALF MIGHT BE RELEASED	1,700
AN TRI PRISONERS	
CATEGORY C	4,125
(CATEGORY B)	(4,615)
SENTENCED BY MILITARY COURT	
LESS THAN 1 YEAR	298
1 TO 2 YEARS	1,307
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS	
SENTENCED PRISONERS	
LESS THAN 1 YEEZ	1,753
NO TO 2IYEARS HI	835
TOTAL	9,0:8
OXAL (INCLUDING CATEGORY B)	(14,433)


4. UNDER AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT JUSTIFICATION THERE COULD BE FOR KEEPING CATEGORY A VCI INCARCERATED. I BELIEVE PRESIDENT THIEU WILL BE RELATIVELY FLEXIBLE ON THIS SUBJECT PROVIDED CATEGORY A DETAINEES WERE KEPT IN CONFINEMENT UNTIL A FINAL SETTLEMENT IS REACHED. HE RECOGNIZES THAT AN TRI PROCEDURES ARE OPEN TO CRITICISM AND I AM INFORMED THAT COLONEL BINH OF THE NATIONAL POLICE HAS RECENTLY BEEN ASKED TO REVIEW ALL AN TRI CASES TO SEE WHICH MIGHT NOW BE CONSIDERED BY MILITARY COURTS. THIS INDICATES THAT THE GVN IS MINDFUL OF THE POLITICAL PRISONER "CONCENTRATION CAMP" ISSUE AND IS LOOKING FOR A SOUNDER LEGAL BASIS FOR THE DETENTION OF VC CADRE.

5. IF YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO DO SO I COULD BROACH THIS SUBJECT WITH THIEU WHEN I SEE HIM ON MONDAY. MY GUESS IS THAT HE WILL BE REASONABLE ABOUT LOW-LEVEL VCI WHO HAVE BEEN GIVEN SHORT SENTENCE.

6. WARM REGARDS.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 142350Z OCT 72 [Sanitized] (BUNKER)
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0137 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REFS: A) WHS 2215; B) WHS 2217; C) WHS 2213
1. AT MEETING WITH THIEU THIS MORNING, I GAVE HIM A REPORT ON
MEETINGS WITH THE OTHER SIDE HELD OCTOBER 3-11 AND TEXT OF THEIR
LATEST PROPOSAL (REFS A AND B AND PREVIOUS MESSAGES).




DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 9/23/93 F9301194

By: MPK NARA, Date 9/30/93

SA 99



7. WITH REGARD TO THE POLITICAL PRISONERS (REF C), I AM HAVING FIGURES CHECKED TO SEE HOW MANY OF THE 30 OJC THOUSAND PRISONERS OTHER THAN POW'S MAY BE CONSIDERED POLITICAL PRISONERS. UNDER THE PHOENIX PROGRAM, THE TOTAL NUMBER DETAINED, PENDING TRIAL, AND UNDER INVESTIGATION WAS 9,707 ON SEPTEMBER 30. I WILL NEED TO GET SOME ESTIMATE OF HOW MANY AMONG THE OTHER PRISONERS CAN BE CONSIDERED POLITICAL. I WILL TRY TO SEND YOU AN ESTIMATE BY MONDAY OF WHAT I THINK THIEU WILL BE ABLE TO DO WITH RESPECT TO THESE.

8. WARM REGARDS.

~~SECRET~~

HAIG
HOWE1.3(2)(4)
Sanitized

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE 261050Z SEP 72
 FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 165 FINAL SECTION OF 3
 TO: EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
 MEMORANDUM RE MEETING WITH DRV, SEPTEMBER 15, 1972
 1. I HAVE RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM DR. KISSINGER AMPLIFYING
 HIS REPORT OF THE MEETING WITH LE DUC THO ON SEPTEMBER 15:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 9/23/93

F9301194

By MMK NARA, Date 9/30/93

SA 99

DP

6. DR. KISSINGER STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE OTHER SIDE, ESPECIALLY THE PRG STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 11. HE ALSO CRITICIZED THEIR HANDLING OF POW RELEASES.

XBOROR

C-37

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE 091221Z SEP 73
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0154 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REF: (SAIGON 0153

SECTION 1 OF 4

HEREWITH THREE DOCUMENTS LISTED REFTEL.

COMMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
ON THE REVISED US PEACE PROPOSAL AND PROCEDURES
FOR CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE
COUNTER-PROPOSALS BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 9/23/93 F9301194

By MRK NARA, Date 9/30/93

SA 99

(DP)

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE 091221Z SEP 72 | **Sanitized** (BUNKER)
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0154 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECTION TWO OF FOUR

PEACE PROPOSAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

3. THE RELEASE OF ALL MILITARY MEN AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS CAPTURED THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA WILL BE CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AND COMPLETED ON THE SAME DAY AS THE AFORESAID TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THE PARTIES WILL EXCHANGE COMPLETE LISTS OF THE MILITARY MEN AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS CAPTURED THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA ON THE DAY OF THE SIGNING OF THE OVERALL AGREEMENT.

END PAGE ONE

SA 99 C-38

HAK
HAKS
HAKS
LORD

NESROPONTE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 061201Z SEP 72
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0149 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

SECTION ONE OF THREE

REF: SAIGON 0148
HEREWITH MEMORANDUM ON THE GVN'S ASSESSMENT OF OUR MEMORANDUM IN 0 39
OF AUGUST 29:

ASSESSMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIET-NAM ON THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MEMO-
RANDUM DATED AUGUST 29, 1972

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 9/23/93 F9301194

By MKO NARA, Date 9/30/93

SA 99

3624

Sanitized

5. THE USG SUGGESTED THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS DRAG ON AND THE US POW'S ARE STILL HELD, THE US WILL GO BACK TO ITS MAY 8 PROPOSALS AND DROP THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS ALTOGETHER.

THE GVN IS AWARE THAT THE US CAN HAVE SUCH A CHOICE, DEVOTING ITSELF TO THE NEGOTIATIONS OF MILITARY QUESTIONS ONLY, AND PROCLAIMING THAT POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE GVN. FOR ITS PART, THE GVN CANNOT ELUDE ITS RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS AREA BECAUSE BY THEIR VERY NATURE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PROBLEMS LIE WITHIN THE GVN'S SPHERE OF COMPETENCE. THEREFORE, IF THE GVN HAS MADE A POLITICAL OFFER TOWARDS A PEACE SETTLEMENT IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO WITHDRAW OR REDUCE THE OFFER IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DRAG ON, OR EVEN IF THE OTHER SIDE REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE OFFER.

WE THINK THAT WHEN WE WITHDRAW OR REDUCE OUR OFFER, WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND US PUBLIC OPINION WILL ACCUSE US FOR NOT BEING FAITHFUL TO WHAT WE HAVE PROPOSED.