FIRST, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY WHATSOEVER THAT WE WILL LEAVE INDOCHINA OR WILL AGREE TO ANY OF THESE PROPOSALS WHILE ANY AMERICAN PRISONERS ARE LEFT BEHIND ANYWHERE IN INDOCHINA. HOW YOU SOLVE THIS IS YOUR PROBLEM. BUT I HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT YOU HAVE ENOUGH INFLUENCE WITH YOUR ALLIES... YOUR POINT THREE IS AMBIGUOUS IN THIS RESPECT, BUT AT ANY RATE, IT IS A PROBLEM THAT MUST BE SOLVED, AND ON WHICH NO COMPROMISE IS POSSIBLE.

LE DUC THO: PRISONERS.

DR. KISSINGER: PRISONERS.
F: Henry A. Kissinger
TO: Ambassadoraker
RFP: WHS:1319

TO: Ambassadoraker
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
RFP: WHS:1397

August 4, 1973

The following is the text of relevant parts of the August 1, 1973, speech to help you in considering other side's proposals. Text is reflet.

At the beginning of the meeting there was an hour or more of procedures for announcing the private meetings. Then an opening statement, then an attack by the on our position. The following text picks up from there and runs until the close of our substantive discussion.
RE: HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER
CITE: WHS2102

REGARDING THE PRISONERS OR WAR IN INDOCHINA, IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM WE THINK WE SHOULD RESPECT THE RIGHT OF THE INDOCHINESE PARTIES. BUT WE ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM WILL CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ALL THESE QUESTIONS. I DON'T SEE ANY DIFFICULTIES. I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE DETAILS BUT I THINK THAT IN CAMBODIA OR IN LAOS THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IS VERY SMALL. THERE ARE BASICALLY NONE AT ALL. THERE IS NO REASON WHEN WE SETTLE WITH YOU MUCH GREATER QUESTIONS, WHY WE CAN'T SETTLE MUCH SMALLER QUESTIONS, A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF PRISONERS. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THAT?

(PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION)

END OF TEXT
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

VIA BUNKER CHANNELS

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER
CITE: WMS2090

JULY 25, 1972

TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

REF: (A) SAIGON 0116
(5) WHITE HOUSE 2086

1. OUR MESSAGE TO YOU ON PLAN FOR NEXT MEETING UNFORTUNATELY MISLED YOU BY USE OF THE TERM QUOTE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES UNQUOTE WHICH UNDERSTANDABLY SUGGESTED TO YOU A RETURN TO SOMETHING LIKE LAST FALL'S PLAN OF TWO FORMAL STAGES. THIS BECAUSE OF OUR CABLE YOU MAY HAVE UNNECESSARILY CONFUSED THIEU. YOU SHOULD CLARIFY OUR INTENTIONS AS FOLLOWS.

4. IN SHORT, IN OUR NEW APPROACH AN OVERALL AGREEMENT, WHICH WE MISLEADINGLY CALLED STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, WOULD BE SIGNED AND CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWALS, AND PRISONER RELEASE WOULD ALL BEGIN. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE THERE WOULD IN EFFECT BE PRINCIPLES AGREED TO BUT THE DETAILS WOULD STILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN THE THREE-MONTH PERIOD WHICH IS NOW STIPULATED. AS WE OUTLINED IN OUR MESSAGE, THE ELECTION WOULD STILL BE SIX MONTHS AFTER ALL POLITICAL DETAILS ARE WORKED OUT, OR NINE MONTHS AFTER THE OVERALL AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.
THIEU WOULD STEP DOWN TWO MONTHS BEFORE THIS ELECTION OR SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE OVERALL AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.
5. OUR IDEA NOW IS TO PRESENT THIS NEW APPROACH IN COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS BUT WE WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO CALL IT A NEW PROPOSAL TO BOLSTER OUR NEGOTIATING RECORD.
6. PLEASE CLARIFY THIS FOR THIEU AND REPORT HIS REACTIONS.

WARM REGARDS.

---

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.12356.Sect.3.4
NKC 4/30/42
E9301194

By MIK NARA, Date 3/30/42
SA 99

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T O P S E C R E T 022302Z SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
SECTION TWO OF THREE VIA BUNKER CHANNELS

FM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER IMMEDIATE
CITE: WHS2097

THE U.S. MILITARY AID TO THE SAIGON ADMINISTRATION
WILL END WHEN THE CEASE-FIRE COMES INTO FORCE IN SOUTH VIET NAM.
3. THE RELEASE OF ALL MILITARY MEN AND CIVILIANS OF THE
PARTIES CAPTURED DURING THE WAR (INCLUDING AMERICAN PILOTS
CAPTURED IN NORTH VIET NAM) WILL BE CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY
WITH AND COMPLETED ON THE SAME DAY AS THE AFORESAID TROOP
WITHDRAWAL. THE PARTIES WILL EXCHANGE THE LISTS OF THE MILITARY
MEN AND CIVILIANS CAPTURED DURING THE WAR ON THE DAY OF THE
SIGNING OF THE OVERALL AGREEMENT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NSC 9/23/93 F9301194

By: [Signature]
NARA, Date 9/30/93
SA 99.
I was with Thieu this morning before arrival of Vice President. Up to that time, he had received no information from Saigon. It is ironic that the documents in your file covering the December meeting:

4. Using as basis foreign minister Lan's conversation with Senator Dirksen (NARA file), I asked Thieu whether I was to interpret the views the foreign minister had expressed as being based on his personal views on whether he was reflecting the views held by Thieu and the GVN.

5. Thieu said that was virtually the proposal which had been submitted to him by the president. He had said that the president and yourself had said that the racial proposal had been overtaken by developments.

6. I said that I forcibly did not understand Thieu's reservations about the GVN even with Northern Vietnamese troops remaining. They had always been here. The GVN with its retaliatory military resources would win in any internationally supervised cease-fire. It would be a clear violation of the agreement and the GVN would be unable to react swiftly and strongly. It had merely reflected the realities.

7. Thieu remarked that he had been shocked that the GVN had closed out the Thieu Kay meeting. It was the juridical aspect of the agreement which spelled out the composition of the GVN. It was the right of the North Vietnamese to be content with the GVN. The 17th day's resolution is the characterization of the GVN as a co-signer. The existence of the GVN as its creature, the liberation, and its insistence on these points is an objective is not a military but a political solution.

8. It was for this reason that the GVN had raised the issue of Article 1, the withdrawal of the North and NVA troops. But as far as the GVN is concerned, the withdrawal can be de facto and Kaoi can be vague about it as long as it eventually takes place.

9. Returning to the idea of U.S. disengagement, prisoners, Thieu said that he would be very happy to see the prisoners return in return for the American prisoners released. The GVN POWs would then have to arrange a settlement. There was an agreement to reduce military aid, including the helicopters.
1. A second alternative would involve U.S. disengagement and the return of the South Vietnamese to responsibilities for the situation in their country. However, I believe it would be futile to make this try unless we were willing to risk the situation in which the U.S. would have to face, in either case, the new government taking over full responsibility, but would need assistance only in doctrine. If, however, the big powers agreed on a gradual reduction of aid, the burden would be lessened. Thieu said that he had pointed out in 1970 and 1971 that this year the GVN would take all responsibility on the ground, but that it would need air support until the Air Force was Vietnamized. Vietnam has in fact accepted a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces except in one country.

6. I said that it seemed to me the problem that had to be faced was the fact that U.S. aid is essential for GVN survival. The question is whether an agreement which is less than perfect and contains some undesirable features but which will assure a continuation of U.S. support, as President Nixon has promised, is not preferable to following a course which almost inevitably would lead to a cut off of funds. Thieu agreed that this was the problem and that a way must be found to assure continuing U.S. support.

9. Allowing for the fact that Thieu’s concerns are genuine, he has gotten himself into a situation, because of the rigidity of the posture he has assumed and the widespread support for it, he has whipped up that will make it extremely difficult for him to survive should he now acquiesce. This is a view which has been expressed to us by a number of thoughtful and intelligent Vietnamese and it may explain Thieu’s thinking about resigning (Para 5, Ref C). He made no reference to this today, however, nor to any new initiative and is apparently awaiting the outcome of the talks this week.

10. On the other hand, there are a few individuals of influence such as Khieu, Ngoc, and Ky who have expressed the view that in draft agreement reflects and realities of the situation and should be accepted.

AN EDITIAL YESTERDAY IN CHINH LUIAN, THE MOST RESPECTED DAILY NEWSPAPER IN VIET-NAM, EXPLAINED AND ENDORSED THE AMERICAN VIEWPOINT. PREPARATIONS BY THE GVN FOR A CEASEFIRE ARE ALSO PROCEEDING Apace. THESE MAY BE STRAWS THAT MORE REFLECTIVE SECOND THOUGHTS ARE BEGINNING TO TAKE HOLD. IT WAS SOMewhat HEARTENING TO SEE THIEU’S AGREEMENT THAT WAYS MUST BE FOUND TO RETAIN U.S. SUPPORT.

11. VNR

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

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BUNKER

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE NEW PROPOSAL BY THIEU.

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE HAVE HAD INFORMATION TODAY FROM THREE DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT THIEU IS THINKING IN TERMS OF PUBLICLY MAKING A NEW PROPOSAL GREATLY AT VARIANCE WITH THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON WHICH YOU ARE WORKING. OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THIEU IS THINKING OF MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TERMS OF HIS PROPOSAL WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. IN SPELLING OUT HIS PROPOSAL MORE SPECIFICALLY TO HUYEN, THIEU SAID THAT HE WAS READY TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO DO ALL THAT HE COULD TO GET BACK THE US POWS, INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF "10,000 COMMUNIST POWS" NOW HELD BY THE GVN. HE WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT A ONE MONTH "LIMITED CEASEFIRE" DURING WHICH THE COMMUNIST AND AMERICAN POWS WOULD BE RELEASED AND THE "ATMOSPHERE" COULD BE PREPARED FOR WORKING OUT THE PROBLEM OF GETTING THE NVA TROOPS OUT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF ORGANIZING ELECTIONS WITH THE MLF. THIEU HYPOTHetically MENTIONED A TEN DAY PERIOD BEFORE CHRISTMAS AND TWENTY DAYS AFTER THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD.

3. THIEU TOLD HUYEN THAT THESE PROPOSALS WOULD BE MADE "WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS" SO THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CANNOT ACCUSE THIEU OF OBSTRUCTING PEACE, IF BEING UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH NORTH VIET-NAM, OR BEING A HINDRANCE TO PRESIDENT NIXON IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS. THIEU EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED TO OPEN A "CAMPAIGN" AGAINST HIM IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT WOULD SAY THAT IT WAS BECAUSE OF THIEU THAT WE HAD NOT GOTTEN BACK THE POWS QUICKLY AND THAT THIEU WAS OPPOSED TO A CEASEFIRE. BY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCING HIS PROPOSALS NOW, THIEU FELT THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEFLATE THIS "CAMPAIGN" BY SAYING THAT IT WAS HIS OWN PROPOSAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WITH A RETURN OF US POWS DURING THAT PERIOD.
3. IN A CALL WHICH I MADE ON FOREIGN MINISTER THAN VAN LAM TODAY, IN COMPANY WITH SENATOR PERCY, LAM ALLUDED VAGUELY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROPOSAL BY WHICH THE BOMBING AND MINING OF NORTH VIET-NAM WOULD BE STOPPED, ALL U.S. TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND THE GVN WOULD WORK OUT WITH THE NLF PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT FOLLOWED BY ELECTIONS. THE GVN WOULD RELEASE PRISONERS IN RETURN FOR THE RELEASE OF U.S. PRISONERS. WITH U.S. DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE WAR THE GVN WOULD QUALIFY FOR ASSISTANCE UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE.

7. THIEU HAS NOT BEEN IN HIS OFFICE FOR THE LAST THREE DAYS AND IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT HE HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO DEVISE SOME SCHEME AS A BACKFIRE TO OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT AND HAS NOW SURFACED THIS PROPOSAL WITH SOME OF HIS ASSOCIATES. SINCE FOREIGN MINISTER LAM AND TRAN VAN DON ARE BOTH AWARE OF HIS PLAN, I ASSUME THAT OTHERS ALSO HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO HIS CONFIDENCE, PROBABLY VICE PRESIDENT NHUNG AND PRIME MINISTER KHISIEM AND POSSIBLY OTHERS. GIVEN NORTH VIET-NAM'S COMPLETE INDIFFERENCE TO THE FATE OF THEIR OWN PRISONERS AND THEIR REFUSAL UNTIL NOW TO ACCEPT ANY PRISONER RELEASES, IT SEEMS DIFFICULT TO THINK THAT THIEU COULD BELIEVE HANOI WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A PROPOSAL. NEVERTHELESS THESE REPORTS THAT HAVE COME TO US SEEM TO INDICATE THAT HE MAY CONTEMPLATE MOVING ALONG THESE LINES SOON. IN ANY CASE, I THOUGHT YOU SHOULD HAVE THIS INFORMATION PROMPTLY.

8. WARM REGARDS.
Top Secret/Sensitive

FROM: Ambassador Bunker
Saigon 0269

TO: The White House, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

SECTION 1 OF 3

1. Mr. Nixon sent me this afternoon a memorandum entitled “Summary of the GVN’s Viewpoints as Expessed by President Nguyen Van Thieu in the Meeting Between the National Security Council and General Alexander Haig on November 11, 1972.” On perusal it seems to contain nothing General Haig has not already reported, but apparently it promptly.

BEGIN TEXT.

[Initials]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 9/23/83 F93C1194
By NARA Date 9/30/93
SA99
ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND THE POWS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS

The GVN thinks that the Communists claim of relationship between the non-withdrawal of GVN troops and the political prisoners in South Viet-Nam is completely undefendable. If the Communists release all the "American" POWs and the Vietnamese POWs detained throughout Indochina, the GVN will release all the Communist POWs detained in South Viet-Nam. In fact, the GVN has made that offer many times in the past.

The North Vietnamese troops have no justification to stay under the pretext of guaranteeing the release of prisoners.
SECRET SENSITIVE 22115Z OCT 72

FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL HAIG

REF: HAKIO 32

1. TWO HOUR MEETING WITH THIEU, WHICH BEGAN AT 0830, WAS POSTPONED FROM YESTERDAY AND FOLLOWED HIS EMOTIONAL TELEPHONE CALL LAST NIGHT IN WHICH HE ACCUSED MEMBERS OF KISSINGER'S AND HAIG'S STAFFS AND EMBASSY PERSONNEL OF LEAKING STATEMENTS CONCERNING PEACE PROPOSALS TO POLITICAL PERSONALITIES HERE.
I have obtained concession from Hanoi which we had here-
to-fore believed impossible. For example, they have accepted our
program on Cambodia, including withdrawal; Thieu's resigna-
tion has been superseded by the present agreement; our draft
crimes against prisoners in Laos and Cambodia has been accepted;
and I believe there is a 50-50 chance that they will accept a
cutoff of the tripartite composition of the HCRG. The tragedy
in fact, however, is the fact that if the plan becomes public,
our efforts will certainly cut off aid. We are already $4 billion
and by January will be $6 billion in the hole because of added
costs of the war. We believe that if we present this proposal as
a victory we can prevail; if not all that we have striven for will be
lost.
**Top Secret-Sensitive**

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 150525Z OCT 72**

**SANTIZED**

**(BUNKER)**

**FROM:** AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0189

**TO:** THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

**REF:** VHS 2218

**SUBJECT:** POLITICAL PRISONERS

1. IN ORDER TO GET AN IDEA OF THE TYPES OF PRISONERS PRESENTLY DETAINED

IN GVN CORRECTION CENTERS, I HAVE HAD OUR PUBLIC SAFETY PEOPLE PREPARE THE FOLLOWING RUN-DOWN:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>COMMUNIST OFFENDERS</strong></th>
<th><strong>UNSENTENCED PRISONERS UNDER INVESTIGATION</strong></th>
<th><strong>TOTAL</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,020</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>INVESTIGATION COMPLETED</strong> (WAITING ADJUDICATION)</td>
<td>1,459 3,479</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>AN TRI PRISONERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CATEGORY A</strong></td>
<td>4,325</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CATEGORY B</strong></td>
<td>4,615</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>CATEGORY C</strong></td>
<td>4,123 13,065</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SENTENCED BY MILITARY COURT</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LESS THAN 1 YEAR</strong></td>
<td>298</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1 TO 2 YEARS</strong></td>
<td>1,307</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2 TO 5 YEARS</strong></td>
<td>2,430</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>OVER 5 YEARS</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>MILITARY OFFENDERS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>UNSENTENCED PRISONERS UNDER INVESTIGATION</strong></td>
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<td><strong>SENTENCED PRISONERS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LESS THAN 1 YEAR</strong></td>
<td>147</td>
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<td><strong>1 TO 2 YEARS</strong></td>
<td>707</td>
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<td><strong>2 TO 5 YEARS</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>OVER 5 YEARS</strong></td>
<td>1,236</td>
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<td><strong>CRIMINAL OFFENDERS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>UNSENTENCED PRISONERS UNDER INVESTIGATION</strong></td>
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<td><strong>INVESTIGATION COMPLETED</strong> (WAITING ADJUDICATION)</td>
<td>3,346 8,024</td>
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<td><strong>SENTENCED PRISONERS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LESS THAN 1 YEAR</strong></td>
<td>1,753</td>
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<td><strong>1 TO 2 YEARS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2 TO 5 YEARS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>OVER 5 YEARS</strong></td>
<td>486</td>
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<td><strong>PRISONERS OF WAR</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>CONFINED FOR CIVIL CRIMES</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>WAITING TRANSFER TO PW CAMP</strong></td>
<td>94 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>36,663</td>
</tr>
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E.O. 12356, Sect. 34  
NSC 8/24/93 F9301193  
By NARA, Date 9/16/93  
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3. IT COULD BE NOTED THAT SOME OF THE CRIMINAL OFFENDERS ARE BEING DETAINED FOR CRIMES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH VC ACTIVITY. A VC ASSASSIN OR TERRORIST WOULD BE DETAINED IN THIS CATEGORY. WE HAVE NO BREAKDOWN OF HOW MANY CRIMINALS ARE BEING DETAINED FOR VC CONNECTED CRIMES.

4. MY INCLINATION WITH REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF RELEASING POLITICAL PRISONERS IS TO BASE OURSELVES ON THE LENGTH OF THE SENTENCES THEY HAVE RECEIVED AND THE KNOWN DEGREE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE VC MOVEMENT. UNDER THESE CRITERIA ONE COULD CONSIDER THE RELEASE OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES:

- UNSENTENCED PRISONERS
  - APPROXIMATELY HALF MIGHT BE RELEASED

- AN TRI PRISONERS
  - CATEGORY C: 4,125
  - CATEGORY B: (4,615)

- SENTENCED BY MILITARY COURT
  - LESS THAN 1 YEAR: 298
  - 1 TO 2 YEARS: 1,387

- CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
  - SENTENCED PRISONERS
    - LESS THAN 1 YEAR: 1,753
    - 1 TO 2 YEARS: 835

- TOTAL
  - CXAL (INCLUDING CATEGORY B): 9,018

(14,433)

5. UNDER AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT JUSTIFICATION THERE COULD BE FOR KEEPING CATEGORY A VC INCARCERATED. I BELIEVE PRESIDENT THIEU WILL BE RELATIVELY FLEXIBLE ON THIS SUBJECT PROVIDED CATEGORY A DETAINNEES WERE KEPT IN CONFINEMENT UNTIL A FINAL SETTLEMENT IS REACHED. HE RECOGNIZES THAT AN TRI PROCEDURES ARE OPEN TO CRITICISM AND I AM INFORMED THAT COLONEL BINH OF THE NATIONAL POLICE WAS RECENTLY BEGUN TO REVIEW ALL AN TRI CASES TO SEE WHICH MIGHT NOW BE CONSIDERED BY MILITARY COURTS. THIS INDICATES THAT THE GVN IS MINDFUL OF THE POLITICAL PRISONER "CONCENTRATION CAMP" ISSUE AND IS LOOKING FOR A SOUNDER LEGAL BASIS FOR THE DETENTION OF VC CADRE.

6. IF YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO DO SO I COULD BROACH THIS SUBJECT WITH THIEU WHEN I SEE HIM ON MONDAY. MY GUESS IS THAT HE WILL BE REASONABLE ABOUT LOW-LEVEL VC WHO HAVE BEEN GIVEN SHORT SENTENCE.

7. MARK REGARDS.
I MEET WITH THE OTHER SIDE HELD OCTOBER 3-11 AND TEXT OF THEIR
LATEST PROPOSAL (REFS A AND B AND PREVIOUS MESSAGES).
7. With regard to the political prisoners (Ref C), I am having figures checked to see how many of the 33,000 prisoners other than POW's may be considered political prisonejs. Under the Phoenix program, the total number detained, pending trial, and under investigation was 9,797 on September 30. I will need to get some estimate of how many among the other prisoners can be considered political. I will try to send you an estimate by Monday of what I think Thieu will be able to do with respect to these.
8. Warm regards.
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 160 FINAL SECTION OF 3

TO: EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

MEMORANDUM RE MEETING WITH DRV, SEPTEMBER 15, 1972

I. I HAVE RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM DRV. KISSINGER AMPLIFYING HIS REPORT OF THE MEETING WITH LE DUOC THO ON SEPTEMBER 15.
6. DR. KISSINGER STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE OTHER SIDE, ESPECIALLY THE PRG STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 11. HE ALSO CRITICIZED THEIR HANDLING OF POW RELEASES.
SECRET SENSITIVE 091221Z SEP 73
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER
SAIGON 8154
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REF: (C) SAIGON 0153

SECTION 1 OF 4

HEREWITH THREE DOCUMENTS LISTED REFTEL.

3. THE RELEASE OF ALL MILITARY MEN AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS CAPTURED THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA WILL BE CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AND COMPLETED ON THE SAME DAY AS THE AFORESAID TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THE PARTIES WILL EXCHANGE COMPLETE LISTS OF THE MILITARY MEN AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS CAPTURED THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA ON THE DAY OF THE SIGNING OF THE OVERALL AGREEMENT.
SECRET SENSITIVE 061201Z SEP 72
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0149 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

SECTION ONE OF THREE

REF: SAIGON 0148
HEREWITH MEMORANDUM ON THE GVN'S ASSESSMENT OF OUR MEMORANDUM AT 1300 ON AUGUST 29,

ASSESSMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM ON THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MEMO-
RANDUM DATED AUGUST 29, 1972

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4
NSC 9/23/93 F9301194
By: NARA, Date: 9/30/93
SA 99

THE GVN IS AWARE THAT THE US CAN HAVE SUCH A CHOICE, DEVOTING ITSELF TO THE NEGOTIATIONS OF MILITARY QUESTIONS ONLY, AND PROCLAIMING THAT POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE GVN. FOR ITS PART, THE GVN CANNOT ELUDE ITS RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS AREA BECAUSE BY THEIR VERY NATURE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PROBLEMS LIE WITHIN THE GVN’S SPHERE OF COMPETENCE, THEREFORE, IF THE GVN HAS MADE A POLITICAL OFFER TOWARDS A PEACE SETTLEMENT IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO WITHDRAW OR REDUCE THE OFFER IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DRAG ON, OR EVEN IF THE OTHER SIDE REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE OFFER.

WE THINK THAT WHEN WE WITHDRAW OR REDUCE OUR OFFER, WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND US PUBLIC OPINION WILL ACCUSE US FOR NOT BEING FAITHFUL TO WHAT WE HAVE PROPOSED.