

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THROUGH: JON HOWE
FROM: BUD MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Leaks Early in the Administration

The following is a survey of selected leaks that occurred during 1969. The subjects addressed are: Vietnam withdrawals, bombing along the Cambodian border, strategic arms, and negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa. On each of these subjects, the objective is to provide: A) official documentation of the policy decision concerned; B) subsequent newspaper evidence of the leak; and C) a discussion of the significance of the leak.

Vietnam Withdrawals. Following a meeting of the National Security Council of March 28, the President directed (NSDM 9 - Tab A) that studies be conducted on several subjects associated with a settlement of the war in Vietnam. These included a study of alternatives for a unilateral phased withdrawal (NSSM 37). The study directive was issued on April 3. Immediately thereafter, in articles appearing in the New York Times on April 4 and 6 and in the Washington Post on April 7 and 8 the study objectives and terms of reference were summarized accurately. In early May, it was decided that the U.S. could unilaterally withdraw up to 25,000 men commencing September 1st. On June 3rd and 4th articles appeared in the Evening Star and New York Times respectively (Tab C) accurately summarizing this decision and announcing that it would be made public following the President's discussions with President Thieu on Midway Island the following Sunday.

At a time when the Administration was attempting to stress the importance of mutual withdrawals, and maintained hope of negotiating toward this objective with the North Vietnamese, this compromise of our policy

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By RS/MAK NARA, Date 9/17/2018
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deliberations could have seriously damaged our position. An awareness of our intentions and objectives would have placed us at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the North Vietnamese.

Cambodia. In early March of 1969, the decision was made to conduct a series of B-52 bombing raids on North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. It was extremely important that these raids remain secret for reasons of diplomatic sensitivity associated with Cambodian neutrality and the tacit support of Prince Sihanouk. In an article in the New York Times on May 9 (Tab D) William Beecher summarized the conduct of these raids quoting Administration sources.

If the bombing had been publicly confirmed, Prince Sihanouk would have been forced to protest and the bombing might well have been halted. At the time, the United States had over 500,000 men in Vietnam and was suffering more than 300 casualties each week, due in large part, to raids being launched from these Cambodian sanctuaries.

In addition, at the time, we were hopeful of opening private negotiations in Paris. Maintaining the secrecy of the raids facilitated this effort by enabling North Vietnam to negotiate privately without being under the public pressure to retaliate for a major U.S. military action. It was through these private negotiations that a settlement was finally reached.

Strategic Arms. During the first six months of the Administration, a comprehensive review was conducted of strategic arms policy in preparation for negotiations with the Soviet Union. A fundamental requirement was to assess correctly Soviet intentions in the strategic area and to determine what programs should be adopted to ensure the credibility of the American deterrent. Two of the key decisions required concerned the necessity for MIRV testing and the necessity for deployment of anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). A study of these issues and of the overall question of U.S. Strategic force posture had been directed on January 20. Prior to the completion of the report, an article in the New York Times on May 1st by William Beecher (Tab E) summarized the range of options in the report.

With regard to MIRV testing, the intelligence community had been engaged in analysis of this issue for several months. The report was extremely closely held. By mid-June there was still a lack of consensus as to Soviet intentions. The assessments varied in degrees of certainty, and, if made public, would provide a useful signal to the USSR as to: the efficacy of our intelligence systems; the disagreement within our government; and our primary concerns for the strategic arms talks. On June 18th the fact of the interagency disagreement and each agency's position was printed in a New York Times article by Peter Grose. (Tab F)

These leaks were of the most extreme gravity. As a presentation of Administration thinking on these key issues it provided the USSR with considerable insight to our approach to the SALT negotiations. Needless to say the compromise of our intentions with regard to MIRV testing and/or AMB deployment could seriously affect our success in reaching our SALT objectives and our apparent inability to accurately assess enemy capabilities could have enhanced his confidence in his own security.

Okinawa. On May 28, 1969, U.S. policy toward Japan was outlined in NSM 13 (Tab G). It included, inter alia, our negotiating strategy with respect to Okinawa. This included our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but as a fallback, to be prepared to consider the withdrawal of these weapons while retaining the storage and transit rights. Prior to the negotiations on June 3rd, Hedrick Smith, in an article in the New York Times (Tab H), stated the U.S. willingness to remove American nuclear weapons from Okinawa contingent upon reaching a satisfactory plan for the return of the island to the Japanese.

The release of this information, attributed to well-placed informants, obviously preempted the opportunity for gaining a more favorable outcome with the Japanese during the negotiations.

The above brief survey summarizes the adverse impact of leaks on the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in four selected areas. It is clear from the above that the Administration's concern over leaks reflected concern over the potential compromise of major national security interests. There was concern that leaks of information on our weapons system would provide the enemy with insight as to our capabilities and limitations that might alter his view as to the credibility of our

deterrent. In the same context, such knowledge could seriously impair our ability to achieve acceptable results in strategic arms limitations talks.

Outside the strategic context, there was a concern that continued leaks of classified information could seriously erode the confidence of our negotiating partner as to our ability to sustain private talks. From an internal point of view, there was the danger that publication of agency positions would destroy our ability to conduct policy deliberations in an atmosphere of forthrightness and candor. Finally, there was the danger that repeated leaks of information could compromise intelligence sources. These considerations contributed to the Administration's sharp sensitivity to the release of classified information, and suggested the necessity of pursuing a more aggressive program to prevent it.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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April 1, 1969

National Security Decision Memorandum 9

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, Office of Emergency
 Preparedness

SUBJECT: Vietnam

As a result of the National Security Council meeting on March 28, 1969, I have made the following decisions on the issues listed below:

The Issue of De-escalation

1. There will be no de-escalation except as an outgrowth of mutual troop withdrawal.
2. The U.S. side will not initiate any de-escalation proposals in the Paris negotiations.
3. If the DRV raise the issue of de-escalation, the U.S. side will listen ~~but~~ only discuss it in the context of mutual withdrawal.

The Issue of U.S. Forces Subject to Withdrawal

On the definition of U.S. Forces subject to withdrawal, I have decided that we should be prepared to withdraw all combat forces from South Vietnam if Hanoi meets specific conditions of a mutual withdrawal agreement. These conditions should include provisions for:

1. Verification and supervision of withdrawal.

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2. The withdrawal of North Vietnamese Forces from Laos and Cambodia, as well as from South Vietnam.
3. Guarantees to maintain the agreement.

The Issue of a Timetable for Completion of U.S. Withdrawal


There will be no public repudiation of the former U.S. position that we would complete our withdrawal within six months of the completion of Hanoi's withdrawal. This position will be adopted with the recognition that, in practice, the U.S. will be in a position to control the timing of the completion of our withdrawal, since we can determine if Hanoi has fully met the conditions of the mutual withdrawal agreement. The key point will not be the timetable but rather getting Hanoi to comply with the conditions for withdrawal.

The draft papers considered by the National Security Council on March 28, 1969, are approved with modifications reflecting the above decisions.

I have also directed that the following studies be undertaken for which appropriate NSSMs will be forthcoming:

1. Specific plan timetable for Vietnamizing the war.
2. Phased withdrawal under conditions of:
 - a. Mutual withdrawal, or
 - b. Vietnamizing the war.
3. Verification for mutual withdrawal.
4. Detailed political settlement for SVN.
5. International guarantees for above.

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 10, 1969

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

National Security Study Memorandum 37

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Vietnam

As indicated in NSDM 9 of April 1, 1969, the President has directed the preparation of certain studies on Vietnam. He has asked that the following papers be prepared by the interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam and submitted to the NSC Review Group by the dates indicated.

Phased Withdrawals

a. Mutual Withdrawal

This paper should examine the modalities of mutual withdrawal, whether agreed to publicly or privately by both sides, tacit, or de facto. It should cover timetables, phasing, types of personnel, regroupment, local cease fires and any other relevant subjects. Military, logistic, territorial and political factors and implications should be considered. (May 16, 1969).

b. Vietnamizing the War

This paper should examine the modalities of US withdrawals under conditions of our progressively turning over combat efforts to the South Vietnamese in the absence of reciprocal enemy withdrawals. It should cover timetables, phasing, types of personnel, regroupment, and substitution of South Vietnamese forces. Military, logistic, territorial, and political factors and implications should be considered.

This study should reflect the findings of the preliminary report of the Secretary of Defense on a specific timetable for Vietnamizing the war. (June 13, 1969). (See NSSM 36)

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Verification for Mutual Withdrawal

This paper should examine various means and mechanisms for verifying the process and completion of mutual withdrawals, whether agreed to publicly or privately by both sides, tacit, or de facto. It should set forth the advantages and disadvantages of various types of verification machinery including joint belligerent commissions, reactivation of the ICC, and creation of new international groups (such as an Asian body). The paper should include a discussion of our unilateral capability to verify withdrawals drawing on all sources of information. It should consider how agreed arrangements can usefully supplement our unilateral capabilities. (May 16, 1969).

Political Settlement for South Vietnam

This study should explore various types of political settlement within South Vietnam and the possible US role concerning these questions. The paper should examine all feasible options, including elections at all levels, sharing of governmental power before and/or after elections, constitutional considerations, agreed or de facto territorial accommodations, decentralization of government power. The study should discuss the feasibility of each alternative and the likely attitudes of the GVN, the various segments of the South Vietnamese populace, the NLF, and Hanoi. It should evaluate the likely evolution within South Vietnam under alternative arrangements. Finally, the possible US role -- in Vietnam as well as in the negotiations -- in achieving a political settlement should be covered. (May 16, 1969).

International Guarantees

The paper should explore the subject of international guarantees for

- mutual withdrawal
- political settlement in South Vietnam
- the DMZ
- any other appropriate aspects of an overall Vietnam settlement.

In so doing, the study should be consistent with the separate papers on mutual withdrawal, verification for mutual withdrawal, political settlement for SVN, and our policy on the DMZ. This paper should

discuss the advantages and disadvantages of attempting to achieve international guarantees, and ways to negotiate them -- e. g., at Paris, in a follow-on international conference, etc. (June 13, 1969).



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

May 1, 1969

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
Amendment to National Security Study Memorandum 37

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 • The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Vietnam

In NSSM 37, dated April 10, 1969, the specifications for a paper on Verification for Mutual Withdrawal should be amended by adding the following sentences after the first sentence:

"In addition, the paper should examine the requirements for verifying that there is no resumption of infiltration in the future, in a post-withdrawal situation. For both purposes, the means and mechanisms for verifying should include a careful discussion of manpower and logistic requirements. The paper should set forth . . ."


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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NY Times
June 4, 1969

NIXON-THIEU TALK MAY BRING ACCORD ON U.S. TROOP CUT

Washington Aides Prepare for a Joint Announcement at Meeting on Midway

TIMING A MAJOR FACTOR

Officials Feel Statement on Sunday Would Illustrate a Unanimity of Views

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3 — United States officials said today that preparations were being made for a joint announcement at Midway by President Nixon and the South Vietnamese President, Nguyen Van Thieu, of the first unilateral reductions in American forces in Vietnam.

Informants said the announcement was considered likely but that final decision to go ahead with the cutback in American forces awaited agreement by the two men at their one-day meeting on the Pacific Island Sunday.

Informants said several senior officials of the Nixon Administration believe the Midway meeting would afford a proper, positive occasion for such an announcement. Their reasoning is that a joint announcement would demonstrate solidarity on the troop issue and undercut in advance any speculation that either Washington or Saigon was trying to set a timetable for troop reductions.

Thieu Gives His View

In a news conference at Taipei today, President Thieu indicated the agenda for the Midway talks would include "replacement of U.S. troops by South Vietnamese troops" paving the way for withdrawal of some of the 540,000 Americans in Vietnam.

Military and civilian sources said that the Administration was thinking of pulling out about 50,000 troops this year, starting about Sept. 1.

One possibility, Vietnam planners said, was to withdraw part of the United States Ninth Infantry Division, operating in the Mekong Delta south of Saigon, and part of one other combat division.

Differences Are Denied

Some informants cautioned that the announcement of a withdrawal might include a provision that the rate of withdrawal would be affected by the response of enemy forces. If they launched large attacks against the South Vietnamese forces that replaced American troops, officials said, Saigon and Washington could decide to suspend withdrawals.

Both South Vietnamese and American officials continue to insist there are no basic differences between the two Governments as the Midway talks approach.

But privately, some American officials concede that the Administration is backing off from some of the statements on Wash-

Continued on Page 17, Column 8

NIXON-THIEU PACT ON TROOP CUT SEEN

Continued from Page 1, Col. 1

ton's negotiating posture made by Secretary of State William P. Rogers when he visited Saigon in mid-May.

Mr. Rogers was reported to have indicated that the United States considered an interim coalition government—as demanded by the Vietcong—special elections in Vietnam under international supervision, and amendments to the South Vietnamese Constitution as items open for negotiation in the Paris talks.

Although no one has disavowed these positions, some officials have suggested privately that Mr. Rogers may have overstepped in the interest of demonstrating American flexibility. But they also assert that Washington's acceptance of these ideas has always been clearly made contingent upon Saigon's concurrence.

Some high American officials are reported to be thinking of a mixed commission of Communist and anti-Communist elements to oversee elections in South Vietnam, but it is not clear whether Washington will put forward this plan at Midway.

The reasoning of some Americans is that this would strike a balance between the Vietcong demand for a provisional coalition to oversee the elections and Mr. Thieu's rejection of the coalition idea.

Independent diplomats have suggested that Mr. Thieu's rejection of a coalition, in public appearances in South Korea and Taiwan in the last week, was intended to quiet any private discussion of coalition schemes by United States officials.

Even before he spoke out, there was no American effort to persuade Mr. Thieu to accept a coalition. But since he has spoken out, American officials have been at pains to point this out and generally avoid discussion of the idea of coalition.

Officials also insist that President Nixon's Vietnam speech of May 14, outlining Washington's peace program, was checked out line by line with President Thieu. The South Vietnamese leader, officials say, gave the speech detailed approval after having suggested several changes in the text.

The speech contained a proposal for international supervision of South Vietnamese elections, which would come "as soon as possible" after the commission is named. South Vietnamese politicians have objected to both procedures on the ground that these proposals

infringe on the South Vietnamese constitution and national sovereignty. But Washington is holding firm to both points and expects to explore them at Midway.

The Evening Star

WITH SUNDAY MORNING EDITION

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WASHINGTON, D. C., TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 1969—46 PAGES

President Heads Westward, Talk of Troop Cut Grows

By GEORGE SHERMAN

Star Staff Writer

President Nixon left today on a transcontinental tour which will climax Sunday on Midway Island in a meeting with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

The President has summoned a full military and civilian entourage to be with him to the summit — including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earl Wheeler and the U.S. negotiator at the Paris peace talks, Henry Cabot Lodge.

The inclusion of Wheeler, traveling with Defense Secretary Melvin Laird — is feeding the belief in top circles here that Nixon and Thieu could announce a timetable for the first replacement of U.S. troops by South Vietnamese Army troops in the war. However, the conference was originally billed primarily as a session to hammer out joint

political strategy in the new phase of negotiations in Paris.

Officials close to Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who also will be on Midway together with White House national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger, refused to rule out the possibility that the first announcement of replacement of perhaps 50,000 American troops of the 543,000 in Vietnam will come from Midway on Sunday.

During Rogers' recent visit to Saigon, he discussed the plan with Thieu. The South Vietnamese president later said "significant limits" — as many as 50,000 men — of the South Vietnamese Army would be ready by September to begin replacing American troops.

But Premier Tran Van Huong later told this correspondent in an interview in Saigon that the plan, now in its final stages of preparation, must await a final joint decision by Nixon and Thieu.

Others on hand at Midway will include Elsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam; Laird, Wheeler, Lodge, Kissinger, Gen. Creighton Abrams, U.S. commander in Vietnam, and Adm. John McCain, commander in chief of the Pacific. Before leaving this morning,

Nixon presided over a joint meeting of the Cabinet and National Security Council to hear Rogers report on his 18-day trip to Saigon, Bangkok, Tientsin and other Asian capitals. Rogers is scheduled to give his second press conference since taking office later this week.

On his way to Midway, the President will give a radio address. See NIXON, Page A-1

NIXON

President Leaves on Tour

Continued From Page A-1
President plans to make four stops and two major speeches during the tour.

First Stop at Campus
Nixon's first major stop today was scheduled for General Beane College at Madison, S.D. here the White House said he would talk about "the basic values of America currently under challenge."

Administration sources indicated Nixon would deal broadly with such matters as morality, the rule of law, and the role of government.

At Air Force Academy commencement exercises tomorrow at Colorado Springs, Colo., the President will discuss "the role of a great nation in the world and the role of a military defense in our society." He is expected to talk about the fears of some Americans that the military establishment, and more particularly a military-industrial alliance, is wielding too much power.

After two days at his new San Clemente, Calif., home, Nixon will head across the Pacific for Sunday's meeting with Thieu on Midway.

Nixon's family is making the trip with him, with the exception of the top to Midway. Mrs. Nixon with daughters Tricia and Julie Eisenhower will spend Sunday in Honolulu. They will return to Washington June 19.

Sen. and Mrs. Karl E. Mundt, R.S.D., also were invited to accompany the President on the first leg of today's trip—to South Dakota.

Nixon's meeting yesterday with Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi appeared to be the first step toward a return of Okinawa to Japan.

The White House reported after the 20-minute conference that Nixon refused to promise that the Pacific island, site of a major U.S. Air Force base, would be returned to Japanese control by 1972, as Aichi requested.

But Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said the President felt

the meeting was "constructive" and that he was hopeful of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement on Okinawa before the scheduled visit to Washington in November of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato.

Sato is under heavy pressure to regain Okinawa, which the United States has retained since its capture late in World War II.

"In that connection Mr. Aichi stressed that we Japanese people have a unique feeling toward anything nuclear," a Japanese embassy spokesman said.

U.S. officials have been seeking to return Okinawa to

ing continued freedom of the military base facilities — the military wants to base nuclear weapons there.

Under present treaty provisions, the United States has retained bases in the main islands, and the Japanese have veto power over any change in Okinawa.

There were reports that the Japanese government has decided, however, to give up this once an

has been reached on

NY Times
May 9, 1968

Raids in Cambodia By U.S. Unopposed

By WILLIAM REEHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 8—American B-52 bombers in recent weeks have raided several Vietcong and North Vietnamese supply dumps and base camps in Cambodia for the first time, according to Nixon Administration sources, but Cambodia has not made any protest.

In fact, Cambodian authorities have increasingly been cooperating with American and South Vietnamese military men at the border, often giving them information on Vietcong and North Vietnamese movements into South Vietnam.

Information from knowledgeable sources indicates that three principal factors underlie the air strikes just inside the Cambodian border: west and northwest of Saigon.

Primary concern by military

Continued on Page 7, Column 1

CAMBODIA RAIDS GO UNPROTESTED

Continued From Page 1, Col. 2

men that most of the rockets and other heavy weapons and ammunition being used by North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces in the southern half of South Vietnam show signs by sea to Cambodia and never have to run any sort of bombing gauntlet before they enter South Vietnam.

A desire by high Washington officials to signal Hanoi that the Nixon Administration, while pressing for peace in Paris, is willing to take some military risks avoided by the previous Administration.

Apparent increasing worry on the part of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's Chief of State, that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong now effectively control several of Cambodia's northern provinces and that he lacks sufficient power to disrupt or dislodge them.

No Desire to Extend War

Officials say that there is no Administration interest at this time in extending the ground war into Cambodia or Laos either.

Discussing the on-again off-again statements of Prince Sihanouk on the re-establishment of relations with the United States, one official said: "Although the Prince has made various statements in recent speeches questioning the sincerity of our recognition of his frontiers, he has made none of these protestations to us. It may be that he's simply demonstrating to his people that any new deal he makes will be on his own terms."

The Prince has made United States recognition of Cambodia's "present frontiers" a condition for the re-establishment of relations.

Some American ground commanders have long urged that battalion-size forces occasionally be allowed to sweep into sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia to follow up air strikes.

Some American ground commanders have long urged that battalion-size forces occasionally be allowed to sweep into sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia to follow up air strikes. This plea has been rejected by President Nixon as it was by President Johnson.

But sources here say that to assure that accurate information can be obtained to provide "lucrative" targets for the bombers, small teams of men are permitted to slip across both the Cambodian and Laotian borders to locate enemy concentrations of men and matériel.

Coincided With Other Raids

The sources report, for instance, that to try to reduce losses in B-52 raids the enemy has dug in and dispersed supply caches in such a way that it is unlikely that all supplies in any one area would be hit by the linear pattern of bombs dropped by a B-52. Each plane, which normally carries about 30 tons of bombs, lays out a pattern that is 1,000 feet wide and 4 miles long.

The raids into Cambodia, the sources say, coincided with heavy B-52 raids on the Vietnamese side of the border 50 to 75 miles northwest of Saigon.

Over the last two weeks more than 5,000 tons of bombs have been dropped by B-52's in this area, according to one estimate.

There are reported to be three enemy divisions operating back and forth across the border in this area: the First and Seventh North Vietnamese Divisions and the Ninth Vietcong Division. Another division, the Fifth Vietcong, is now operating south and southeast of Saigon.

The decision to demonstrate to Hanoi that the Nixon Administration is different and "tougher" than the previous Administration was reached in January, well-placed sources say, as part of a strategy for ending the war.

Hints by Sihanouk Noted

Limited, selective bomb strikes into Cambodia, sources say, were considered feasible because Prince Sihanouk had dropped hints he would not oppose such actions and because they seemed to offer relatively little risk either expanding the war or disrupting the Paris peace talks.

In the past, American South Vietnamese forces occasionally fired across the border and even called fighters or helicopter gunships to counter fire they received from enemy units there. There had been no bombing of supply stockpiles or military camps in Cambodia, military men say.

Over the last several weeks the military sources say, Cambodian Army officers in border posts have held secret meetings with Americans and South Vietnamese to "coordinate" some actions against enemy forces.

The South Vietnamese have provided them with radios and in some instances the Cambodians have radioed information on enemy units moving in South Vietnam. At other times the Cambodians have fired colored flares—for example, red to mark an enemy unit and blue to mark their own—so that allied forces would not fire at the wrong unit.

"This cooperation is not starting to get off the ground," said one officer. "It's too early to tell how important this will turn out to be."

Administration Gets Study Of Global Nuclear Strategy

National Security Council Will Review Comprehensive Analysis of Options Including a Submarine Missile Force

By WILLIAM WOODWARD

WASHINGTON, April 27—The first half of a comprehensive review of the nation's nuclear strategy is scheduled to be completed by the National Security Council tomorrow.

The report, with options for strengthening the Pentagon, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Treasury Department and the Budget Bureau, was described by an Administration official as "the most comprehensive review of national security policy since the end of World War II."

The first half dealing with strategic policies and nuclear forces contains five force options ranging in cost from \$5 billion to \$16 billion a year.

STRATEGY REVIEW TO GO TO COUNCIL

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

"fortress America" to "world policeman," officials say. It will discuss the size of the non-nuclear forces necessary to carry out each after the Vietnam war is over.

Officials pointed out that the two parts of the report were interdependent but that the Nixon Administration wanted to decide first on nuclear strategy before it moved on to the conventional forces necessary to contend with non-nuclear crises. "The nuclear part was the non-nuclear one," one official said.

The review was conceived at the start of the new Administration before the emergence of a drive in Congress to slash defense expenditures. Officials insist that no costly, substantial military cuts would be prudent until basic decisions are made on whether some worldwide commitments are to be curtailed.

The purpose of the study, being conducted under chairmanship of David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, is to lay the groundwork for developing meaningful alternative policies for the next 10 years.

Timetable Moved Up

The portion of the report dealing with strategic forces had been scheduled for completion by July 1, but the timetable was accelerated to May 1 to enable the Administration to determine policy before the forthcoming arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. Those talks are expected to get under way this summer.

The existing mix of strategic bombers, missiles and submarines is designed to enable the United States to deter nuclear war by threatening overwhelming retaliation.

The current force of 1,000 Minuteman 54 Titan-2 and the Polaris missiles, with the 349 strategic bombers, is designed to enable enough of the force to survive a first strike and to counter by killing tens of millions of the foe.

It also contemplates other multiple warheads to advance Minuteman-3 and Poseidon missiles to penetrate any missile defense if the arms limitation talks fail to freeze Soviet defenses.

Finally, present policy protects a thin missile defense now called Safeguard to protect part of the Minuteman force from a first strike to guard against attack from Communist China, when it has long-range missiles and to counter an unauthorized or accidental missile launch.

In addition to the ability to deter nuclear war, the current force has the capability of fighting a limited nuclear war in which each side aimed only at weapon sites, not cities.

The Other Options

A continuation of essentially the same posture is one of the five options in the new study; the others contain these elements:

1. A massive build-up of intercontinental ballistic missiles, including a much longer range missile carried by a new nuclear-powered submarine. This force would be aimed at re-establishing the situation in which the United States, though quite unlikely to initiate nuclear war, would have a "credible" ability to launch so wide spread and accurate a first strike as to virtually disarm the foe.

2. Completion of the full Safeguard missile defense system with the addition of defensive coverage of Alaska and Hawaii; a modest increase in ICBM's with multiple warheads and acceleration of plans to build a new long-range bomber with better air-to-ground missiles.

3. A unilateral freeze of present strategic offensive forces, no deployment of the so-called multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) on Minuteman-3 and Poseidon missiles, and a curtailment of the Safeguard missile defense to protect only five Minuteman sites and a defense of the country at large against enemy missiles that is thinner than that presently contemplated.

4. A 10% or more reduction in ICBM's, but a substantial build-up of defensive missiles from 45 to 52, plus an effort to attempt to decrease the Soviet capability should deterrence fail and nuclear war break out.

*N Y Times
May 1, 1969*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 28, 1969

~~TOP SECRET~~

National Security Decision Memorandum 13

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Policy Toward Japan

As a result of the NSC meetings on Japan, the President has made the following decisions with regard to U.S. policy toward Japan:

1. We shall basically pursue our current relationship with Japan as our major partner in Asia, seeking ways to improve this relationship from the viewpoint of U.S. national interests and to seek an increasingly larger Japanese role in Asia.

2. We shall allow the present Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to continue without amendment after 1970 when it becomes subject to renunciation or amendment.

3. We shall continue to make gradual alterations in our base structure and base utilization in Japan to reduce major irritants while retaining essential base functions.

4. We shall continue our present policy of encouraging moderate increases and qualitative improvement in Japan's defense efforts, while avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially larger forces or to play a larger regional security role.

With respect to Okinawa, the President has directed that a strategy paper be prepared by the East Asia Interdepartmental Group under the supervision of the Under Secretaries Committee for negotiations with the Japanese Government over the next few months on the basis of the following elements:

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Our willingness to agree to reversion in 1972 provided there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing U.S. military use and provided detailed negotiations are completed at that time.
2. Our desire for maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.
3. Our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but indicating that the President is prepared to consider, at the final stages of negotiation, the withdrawal of the weapons while retaining emergency storage and transit rights, if other elements of the Okinawan agreement are satisfactory.
4. Other commitments to be sought from Japan with respect to Okinawa.


Henry A. Kissinger

U.S. Intelligence Doubts Soviet First-Strike Goal

By Peter Grose

WASHINGTON, June 15 — The United States intelligence community has reportedly concluded that the Soviet Union is not now striving for the capability to launch a first-strike nuclear attack against this country but is probably seeking to meet that goal with the United States in the next few years.

The Central Intelligence Agency's estimate of Soviet nuclear strength for the next two or three years is being sent to the White House as the official judgment of the intelligence community, the official and secret survey seems

bound to become embroiled in the current controversy over the opening of strategic arms talks with the Russians and the proposed deployment of an antiballistic missile system.

The White House announced today that the National Security Council would meet tomorrow on arms policy. President Johnson is expected to disclose the administration's position on the subject Thursday night when and where the Administration proposes to open the new round of disarmament negotiations.

Meanwhile, in a related development, 10 Senators—only 12 short of a majority—joined together as co-sponsors of a resolution urging the President to seek agreement with the Soviet Union to halt testing of nuclear weapons.

The resolution, introduced by Sen. Edward M. Brooke, R-Mass., and Sen. Edward W. Brooke, R-Mass., was the chief author of the resolution, which was endorsed by a total of 27 Democrats and 12 Republicans.

Members of the Administration are fearful that Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and Pentagon "stomps" have crowded the Secretary of State William P. Rogers and other potential restraining forces—including the Central Intelligence Agency—in pushing for a strong position and for more defense programs in the light of new expanded Soviet nuclear capabilities.

Among Congressional opponents of the safeguard antiballistic missile system, there is particular resentment at what they see as the Pentagon's haste to decide if not actually start the use of new intelligence data to make the program work.

It is in this context that the high-level assessments estimate the entire intelligence community assumes special significance.

The United States Intelligence Board is a high-level coordinating group that meets weekly to correlate all the data available across the Government. Sitting on the board under Mr. Helms' chairmanship are representatives of the CIA, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence branches of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security Agency.

These agencies agreed last week that the Russians appear to be moving rapidly, more so than expected several years ago, to strengthen their nuclear forces as a deterrent and are probably striving for more than equality of missile strength with the United States.

Desire and Intention

But in the board's judgment, this drive falls short of an effort to achieve a "first-strike capability"—the capability to destroy enough United States missiles in a first strike to prevent this country from launching an effective retaliatory blow.

The "desire" ultimately to acquire such a capability may be present in some Soviet policy-making circles, the board concluded, but both the capability and the specific intention to achieve it were ruled out for the foreseeable future.

This conclusion was reportedly stated in the formal "national intelligence estimate" without any dissenting footnotes from any of the participating agencies.

Pentagon strategists have repeatedly cited the threat of a Soviet first-strike capability to justify the need for the Safeguard ABV System.

Not a Direct Contradiction

The intelligence community's estimate minimized this threat, though it is not in direct contradiction with the official Pentagon view. Mr. Laird's statements raised the possibility of a Soviet first-strike capability by the mid-1970's, a time beyond the two or three years covered in the intelligence community's estimate.

Preliminary assessments prepared by the CIA and made available in a Congressional committee were understood to

have come down far harder in rebutting Mr. Laird's arguments about Soviet capabilities.

According to reliable sources, Mr. Helms, aware of the political controversy surrounding the estimates, softened some of the language of the final survey—without altering the basic conclusions—to avert an unnecessary confrontation between the CIA and the Pentagon.

The bureaucratic ordeal of achieving a consensus opinion among various Government agencies has surred Congressional interest in the reliability of top-level intelligence and the means by which raw data are analyzed.

In policy controversies, particularly on strategic arms questions, individual agencies' tentative or preliminary assessments are portrayed as the latest and most authoritative intelligence as they are passed around among participants in the debate.

The purpose of the United States Intelligence Board is to provide a high-level forum for the entire intelligence community to meet and try to achieve a bipartisan consensus for the President.

Mr. Helms acts as the spokesman for the community and the CIA in policy-making councils. Pentagon and State Department intelligence assessments can also be called to the President's attention independently by Mr. Laird, by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, and by Mr. Rogers.

NY Times
June 3
1966

U.S. SAID TO PLAN AN OKINAWA DEAL BARRING A-BOMBS

Nixon Decision Reported—Timing Hinges on Terms for Isle's Return to Japan

By HEDRICK SMITH

WASHINGTON, June 2—President Nixon has decided to remove American nuclear weapons from Okinawa once an overall plan for turning the island back to Japanese rule has been agreed upon, well-placed informants disclosed today.

The actual timing of the removal of the weapons to other sites in the Pacific area will depend on the terms of the reversion agreement; the sources indicated Japan wants the weapons removed and the island returned with the rest of the Ryukyu chain by 1972.

Mr. Nixon's decision, reportedly made after a National Security Council meeting in late April on the Okinawan question and related issues, is an important one. It is understood to reflect the judgment of the President's civilian advisers that maintenance of sound, long-term relations with Japan is more important than the military advantage of retaining complete freedom of operation on Okinawa.

Negotiations to Continue

Informed sources said Mr. Nixon's decision had not yet been communicated formally to the Japanese Government. But presumably it will be made known in the course of negotiations with Tokyo on the Okinawa issue this summer and fall.

The Japanese Foreign Minister, Kiichi Aichi, met with President Nixon for 40 minutes this morning at the White House to present his Government's request that the Ryukyu Islands, held by the United States since 1945, be returned to Japanese rule by 1972.

Mr. Aichi's call on the President marked the formal beginning of negotiations on the Okinawa issue, though there have been months of preliminary discussions at lower levels. The negotiations are expected to culminate in November with a visit to Washington by Japan's Premier, Eisaku Sato.

Now Under Military Rule

Mr. Aichi told the President today that Japan would like American bases in Okinawa to function after reversion on the same basis as United States installations in Japan's four home islands.

Under present conditions, with the Ryukyus governed by a United States administration headed by a military High Com-

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U.S. SAID TO PLAN AN OKINAWA DEAL

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

missioners, the United States has complete freedom to move nuclear weapons to and from the islands and store them there. It can also mount offensive operations against other parts of Asia, such as B-52 bombing raids on Vietnam.

Nuclear weapons are barred from United States bases in Japan proper, and under terms of the two countries' security treaty the United States must obtain Japan's approval in major commitments before using her bases in Japan for great operations in other areas.

The Ryukyus were captured by American forces in a bloody battle in the late stages of World War II. The peace treaty provided for United States administration of the islands, but Washington has acknowledged that Japan retained nominal sovereignty over them and gave a pledge that the islands would eventually revert to Japanese rule.

A Defense Keyston

In the intervening years, the United States has built a multi-billion-dollar complex of bases that Defense Department officials describe as the "keystone" of the American defense network in the Pacific.

After years of hearing American commitments in principle to return the islands to Japan, Japanese public opinion has become insistent on obtaining a specific timetable from Washington.

American and Japanese sources reported that President Nixon did not spell out in detail to Mr. Aichi today the American position on nuclear weapons and term for the use of the Okinawa bases. It is not yet

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THROUGH: JON HOWE

FROM: BUD MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Leaks Early in the Administration

The following is a survey of selected leaks that occurred during 1969. The subjects addressed are: Vietnam withdrawals, bombing along the Cambodian border, strategic arms, and negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa. On each of these subjects, the objective is to provide: A) official documentation of the policy decision concerned; B) subsequent newspaper evidence of the leak; and C) a discussion of the significance of the leak.

Vietnam Withdrawals. Following a meeting of the National Security Council of March 28, the President directed (NSDM 9 - Tab A) that studies be conducted on several subjects associated with a settlement of the war in Vietnam. These included a study of alternatives for a unilateral phased withdrawal (NSSM 37). The study directive was issued on April 3. Immediately thereafter, in articles appearing in the New York Times on April 4 and 6 and in the Washington Post on April 7 and the study objectives and terms of reference were summarized accurately. In early May, it was decided that the U.S. could unilaterally withdraw up to 25,000 men commencing September 1st. On June 3rd and 4th articles appeared in the Evening Star and New York Times respectively (Tab C) accurately summarizing this decision and announcing that it would be made public following the President's discussions with President Thieu on Midway Island the following Sunday.

At a time when the Administration was attempting to stress the importance of mutual withdrawals, and maintained hope of negotiating toward this objective with the North Vietnamese, this compromise of our policy

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

deliberations could have seriously damaged our position. An awareness of our intentions and objectives would have placed us at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the North Vietnamese.

Cambodia. In early March of 1969, the decision was made to conduct a series of B-52 bombing raids on North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. It was extremely important that these raids remain secret for reasons of diplomatic sensitivity associated with Cambodian neutrality and the tacit support of Prince Sihanouk. In an article in the New York Times on May 9 (Tab D) William Beecher summarized the conduct of these raids quoting Administration sources.

If the bombing had been publicly confirmed, Prince Sihanouk would have been forced to protest and the bombing might well have been halted. At the time, the United States had over 500,000 men in Vietnam and was suffering more than 300 casualties each week, due in large part, to raids being launched from these Cambodian sanctuaries.

In addition, at the time, we were hopeful of opening private negotiations in Paris. Maintaining the secrecy of the raids facilitated this effort by enabling North Vietnam to negotiate privately without being under the public pressure to retaliate for a major U.S. military action. It was through these private negotiations that a settlement was finally reached.

Strategic Arms. During the first six months of the Administration, a comprehensive review was conducted of strategic arms policy in preparation for negotiations with the Soviet Union. A fundamental requirement was to assess correctly Soviet intentions in the strategic area and to determine what programs should be adopted to ensure the credibility of the American deterrent. Two of the key decisions required concerned the necessity for MIRV testing and the necessity for deployment of anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). A study of these issues and of the overall question of U.S. Strategic force posture had been directed on January 20. Prior to the completion of the report, an article in the New York Times on May 1st by William Beecher (Tab E) summarized the range of options in the report.

With regard to MIRV testing, the intelligence community had been engaged in analysis of this issue for several months. The report was extremely closely held. By mid-June there was still a lack of consensus as to Soviet intentions. The assessments varied in degrees of certainty, and, if made public, would provide a useful signal to the USSR as to: the efficacy of our intelligence systems; the disagreement within our government; and our primary concerns for the strategic arms talks. On June 18th the fact of the interagency disagreement and each agencies position was printed in a New York Times article by Peter Grose. (Tab F)

These leaks were of the most extreme gravity. As a presentation of Administration thinking on these key issues it provided the USSR with considerable insight to our approach to the SALT negotiations. Needless to say the compromise of our intentions with regard to MIRV testing and/or AMB deployment could seriously affect our success in reaching our SALT objectives and our apparent inability to accurately assess enemy capabilities could have enhanced his confidence in his own security.

Okinawa. On May 28, 1969, U.S. policy toward Japan was outlined in NSM 13 (Tab G). It included, inter alia, our negotiating strategy with respect to Okinawa. This included our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but as a fallback, to be prepared to consider the withdrawal of these weapons while retaining the storage and transit rights. Prior to the negotiations on June 3rd, Hedrick Smith, in an article in the New York Times (Tab H), stated the U.S. willingness to remove American nuclear weapons from Okinawa contingent upon reaching a satisfactory plan for the return of the island to the Japanese.

The release of this information, attributed to well-placed informants, obviously preempted the opportunity for gaining a more favorable outcome with the Japanese during the negotiations.

The above brief survey summarizes the adverse impact of leaks on the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in four selected areas. It is clear from the above that the Administration's concern over leaks reflected concern over the potential compromise of major national security interests. There was concern that leaks of information on our weapons system would provide the enemy with insight as to our capabilities and limitations that might alter his view as to the credibility of our

deterrent. In the same context, such knowledge could seriously impair our ability to achieve acceptable results in strategic arms limitations talks.

Outside the strategic context, there was a concern that continued leaks of classified information could seriously erode the confidence of our negotiating partner as to our ability to sustain private talks. From an internal point of view, there was the danger that publication of agency positions would destroy our ability to conduct policy deliberations in an atmosphere of forthrightness and candor. Finally, there was the danger that repeated leaks of information could compromise intelligence sources. These considerations contributed to the Administration's sharp sensitivity to the release of classified information, and suggested the necessity of pursuing a more aggressive program to prevent it.

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