MEMORANDUM FOR:

THROUGH: JON HOWE

FROM: BUD MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Leaks Early in the Administration

The following is a survey of selected leaks that occurred during 1969. The subjects addressed are Vietnam withdrawals, bombing along the Cambodian border, strategic arms, and negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa. On each of these subjects, the objective is to provide:

- A) official documentation of the policy decision concerned;
- B) subsequent newspaper evidence of the leak; and
- C) a discussion of the significance of the leak.

Vietnam Withdrawals. Following a meeting of the National Security Council of March 28, the President directed (NSDM 9 - Tab A) that studies be conducted on several subjects associated with a settlement of the war in Vietnam. These included a study of alternatives for a unilateral phased withdrawal (NSSM 37). The study directive was issued on April 3. Immediately thereafter, in articles appearing in the New York Times on April 4 and 6 and in the Washington Post on April 7 and 8, the study objectives and terms of reference were summarized accurately. In early May, it was decided that the U.S. could unilaterally withdraw up to 25,000 men commencing September 1st. On June 3rd and 4th articles appeared in the Evening Star and New York Times respectively (Tab C) accurately summarizing this decision and announcing that it would be made public following the President's discussions with President Thieu on Midway Island the following Sunday.

At a time when the Administration was attempting to stress the importance of mutual withdrawals, and maintained hope of negotiating toward this objective with the North Vietnamese, this compromise of our policy
deliberations could have seriously damaged our position. An awareness of our intentions and objectives would have placed us at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the North Vietnamese.

Cambodia. In early March of 1969, the decision was made to conduct a series of B-52 bombing raids on North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. It was extremely important that these raids remain secret for reasons of diplomatic sensitivity associated with Cambodian neutrality and the tacit support of Prince Sihanouk. In an article in the New York Times on May 9 (Tab D) William Beecher summarized the conduct of these raids quoting administration sources.

If the bombing had been publicly confirmed, Prince Sihanouk would have been forced to protest and the bombing might well have been halted. At the time, the United States had over 500,000 men in Vietnam and was suffering more than 300 casualties each week, due in large part, to raids being launched from these Cambodian sanctuaries.

In addition, at the time, we were hopeful of opening private negotiations in Paris. Maintaining the secrecy of the raids facilitated this effort by enabling North Vietnam to negotiate privately without being under the public pressure to retaliate for a major U.S. military action. It was through these private negotiations that a settlement was finally reached.

Strategic Arms. During the first six months of the Administration, a comprehensive review was conducted of strategic arms policy in preparation for negotiations with the Soviet Union. A fundamental requirement was to assess correctly Soviet intentions in the strategic area and to determine what programs should be adopted to ensure the credibility of the American deterrent. Two of the key decisions required concerned the necessity for MIRV testing and the necessity for deployment of anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). A study of these issues and of the overall question of U.S. Strategic force posture had been directed on January 20. Prior to the completion of the report, an article in the New York Times on May 1st by William Beecher (Tab E) summarized the range of options in the report.
With regard to MIRV testing, the intelligence community had been engaged in analysis of this issue for several months. The report was extremely closely held. By mid-June there was still a lack of consensus as to Soviet intentions. The assessments varied in degrees of certainty, and, if made public, would provide a useful signal to the USSR as to: the efficacy of our intelligence systems; the disagreement within our government; and our primary concerns for the strategic arms talks. On June 18th the fact of the interagency disagreement and each agencies position was printed in a New York Times article by Peter Grose. (Tab F)

These leaks were of the most extreme gravity. As a presentation of Administration thinking on these key issues it provided the USSR with considerable insight to our approach to the SALT negotiations. Needless to say the compromise of our intentions with regard to MIRV testing and/or ABM deployment could seriously affect our success in reaching our SALT objectives and our apparent inability to accurately assess enemy capabilities could have enhanced his confidence in his own security.

Okinawa. On May 28, 1969, U.S. policy toward Japan was outlined in NSM 13 (Tab G). It included, inter alia, our negotiating strategy with respect to Okinawa. This included our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but as a fallback, to be prepared to consider the withdrawal of these weapons while retaining the storage and transit rights. Prior to the negotiations on June 3rd, Hedrick Smith, in an article in the New York Times (Tab H), stated the U.S. willingness to remove American nuclear weapons from Okinawa contingent upon reaching a satisfactory plan for the return of the island to the Japanese.

The release of this information, attributed to well-placed informants, obviously preempted the opportunity for gaining a more favorable outcome with the Japanese during the negotiations.

The above brief survey summarizes the adverse impact of leaks on the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in four selected areas. It is clear from the above that the Administration's concern over leaks reflected concern over the potential compromise of major national security interests. There was concern that leaks of information on our weapons system would provide the enemy with insight as to our capabilities and limitations that might alter his view as to the credibility of our
deterrent. In the same context, such knowledge would seriously impair our ability to achieve acceptable results in strategic arms limitation talks.

Outside the strategic context, there was a concern that continued leaks of classified information could seriously erode the confidence of our negotiating partner as to our ability to sustain private talks. From an internal point of view, there was the danger that publication of agency positions would destroy our ability to conduct policy deliberations in an atmosphere of forthrightness and candor. Finally, there was the danger that repeated leaks of information could compromise intelligence sources. These considerations contributed to the Administration's sharp sensitivity to the release of classified information, and suggested the necessity of pursuing a more aggressive program to prevent it.
National Security Decision Memorandum 9

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT: Vietnam

As a result of the National Security Council meeting on March 28, 1969, I have made the following decisions on the issues listed below:

The Issue of De-escalation

1. There will be no de-escalation except as an outgrowth of mutual troop withdrawal.

2. The U.S. side will not initiate any de-escalation proposals in the Paris negotiations.

3. If the DRV raise the issue of de-escalation, the U.S. side will listen but only discuss it in the context of mutual withdrawal.

The Issue of U.S. Forces Subject to Withdrawal

On the definition of U.S. Forces subject to withdrawal, I have decided that we should be prepared to withdraw all combat forces from South Vietnam if Hanoi meets specific conditions of a mutual withdrawal agreement. These conditions should include provisions for:

1. Verification and supervision of withdrawal.
2. The withdrawal of North Vietnamese Forces from Laos and Cambodia, as well as from South Vietnam.

3. Guarantees to maintain the agreement.

The Issue of a Timetable for Completion of U.S. Withdrawal

There will be no public repudiation of the former U.S. position that we would complete our withdrawal within six months of the completion of Hanoi's withdrawal. This position will be adopted with the recognition that, in practice, the U.S. will be in a position to control the timing of the completion of our withdrawal, since we can determine if Hanoi has fully met the conditions of the mutual withdrawal agreement. The key point will not be the timetable but rather getting Hanoi to comply with the conditions for withdrawal.

The draft papers considered by the National Security Council on March 28, 1969, are approved with modifications reflecting the above decisions.

I have also directed that the following studies be undertaken for which appropriate NSSMs will be forthcoming:

1. Specific plan timetable for Vietnamizing the war.

2. Phased withdrawal under conditions of:
   a. Mutual withdrawal, or
   b. Vietnamizing the war.

3. Verification for mutual withdrawal.

4. Detailed political settlement for SVN.

5. International guarantees for above.

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
As indicated in NSDM 9 of April 1, 1969, the President has directed the preparation of certain studies on Vietnam. He has asked that the following papers be prepared by the interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam and submitted to the NSC Review Group by the dates indicated.

Phased Withdrawals

a. Mutual Withdrawal

This paper should examine the modalities of mutual withdrawal, whether agreed to publicly or privately by both sides, tacit, or de facto. It should cover timetables, phasing, types of personnel, regroupment, local cease fires and any other relevant subjects. Military, logistic, territorial and political factors and implications should be considered. (May 16, 1969).

b. Vietnamizing the War

This paper should examine the modalities of US withdrawals under conditions of our progressively turning over combat efforts to the South Vietnamese in the absence of reciprocal enemy withdrawals. It should cover timetables, phasing, types of personnel, regroupment, and substitution of South Vietnamese forces. Military, logistic, territorial, and political factors and implications should be considered.

This study should reflect the findings of the preliminary report of the Secretary of Defense on a specific timetable for Vietnamizing the war. (June 13, 1969). (See NSSM 36)
Verification for Mutual Withdrawal

This paper should examine various means and mechanisms for verifying the process and completion of mutual withdrawals, whether agreed to publicly or privately by both sides, tacit, or de facto. It should set forth the advantages and disadvantages of various types of verification machinery including joint belligerent commissions, reactivation of the ICC, and creation of new international groups (such as an Asian body). The paper should include a discussion of our unilateral capability to verify withdrawals drawing on all sources of information. It should consider how agreed arrangements can usefully supplement our unilateral capabilities. (May 16, 1969).

Political Settlement for South Vietnam

This study should explore various types of political settlement within South Vietnam and the possible US role concerning these questions. The paper should examine all feasible options, including elections at all levels, sharing of governmental power before and/or after elections, constitutional considerations, agreed or de facto territorial accommodations, decentralization of government power. The study should discuss the feasibility of each alternative and the likely attitudes of the GVN, the various segments of the South Vietnamese populace, the NLF, and Hanoi. It should evaluate the likely evolution within South Vietnam under alternative arrangements. Finally, the possible US role -- in Vietnam as well as in the negotiations -- in achieving a political settlement should be covered. (May 16, 1969).

International Guarantees

The paper should explore the subject of international guarantees for

-- mutual withdrawal

-- political settlement in South Vietnam

-- the DMZ

-- any other appropriate aspects of an overall Vietnam settlement.

In so doing, the study should be consistent with the separate papers on mutual withdrawal, verification for mutual withdrawal, political settlement for SVN, and our policy on the DMZ. This paper should
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of attempting to achieve international guarantees, and ways to negotiate them -- e.g., at Paris, in a follow-on international conference, etc. (June 13, 1969).

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Amendment to National Security Study Memorandum 37

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
• The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Vietnam

In NSSM 37, dated April 10, 1969, the specifications for a paper on Verification for Mutual Withdrawal should be amended by adding the following sentences after the first sentence:

"In addition, the paper should examine the requirements for verifying that there is no resumption of infiltration in the future, in a post-withdrawal situation. For both purposes, the means and mechanisms for verifying should include a careful discussion of manpower and logistic requirements. The paper should set forth..."

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
NIXON—THIEU TALKS MAY BRING ACCORD ON U.S. TROOP CUTS

Washington Aides Prepare for a Joint Announcement at Meeting on Midway

TIMING A MAJOR FACTOR

Officials Feel Statement on Sunday Would Illustrate a Unanimity of Views

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 7—United States officials said today that preparations were being made for a joint announcement at Midway by President Nixon and the South Vietnamese President, Nguyen Van Thieu, of the first unilateral reductions in American forces in Vietnam.

Informants said the announcement was considered likely but that final decision to go ahead with the cutback in American forces awaited agreement by the two men at their one-day meeting on the Pacific Island Sunday.

Informants said several senior officials of the Nixon Administration believe the Midway meeting would afford a proper, positive occasion for such an announcement. Their reasoning is that a joint announcement would demonstrate solidarity on the troop issue and undercuts in advance any speculation that either Washington or Saigon was trying to set a timetable for troop reductions.

Thieu Gives His View

In a news conference at Taipei today, President Thieu indicated the agenda for the Midway talks would include "replacement of U.S. troops by South Vietnamese troops," paving the way for withdrawal of some of the 540,000 Americans in Vietnam.

Military and civilian sources said that the Administration was thinking of pulling out about 50,000 troops this year, starting about Sept. 1.

One possibility, Vietnam planners said, was to withdraw part of the United States Ninth Infantry Division, operating in the Mekong Delta south of Saigon, and part of one other combat division.

Differences Are Denied

Some informants cautioned that the announcement of a withdrawal might include a provision that the rate of withdrawal would be affected by the response of enemy forces. If they launched large attacks against the South Vietnamese forces that replaced American troops, officials said, Saigon and Washington could delay or decide to suspend withdrawals.

Both South Vietnamese and American officials continue to insist there are no basic differences between the two Governments as the Midway talks approach.

But privately, some American officials concede that the Administration is backing off from some of the statements on Wash-

Continued on Page 12, Column 8
President Heads Westward,
Talk of Troop Cut Grows

By George Sherman

Washington, D.C., June 3 — President Nixon will begin a transcontinental tour which will climax Sunday on Midway Island in a meeting with South Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu.

The President has summoned Vice President Agnew to fly to Midway Monday as a result of reports reaching the White House from Hanoi that talks have been held — possibly between Thieu and Premier Tran Van Huong — to scale down the current battle line in Vietnam.

Traveling with Defense Secretary Melvin Laird — the key figure in the top circles here — will be White House military aide Lieutenant Colonel William P. Rogers, who has been on a mission to Hanoi and Saigon.

Rogers is expected to arrive in Hanoi tomorrow to resume talks with U.S. representatives there.

First Stop at Camp Zama

Nixon's first major stop today will be at Camp Zama, Okinawa, to meet with General Creighton Abrams, U.S. Army chief of staff, and General Wheeler, U.S. Pacific Command commander.

Nixon will be returning to the United States from a visit to South Vietnam, where he talked with President Thieu and Premier Tran Van Huong.

Aides to the President said he would review the talks and determine what effect they had had on the war.

Aides said the President also would discuss with General Abrams the U.S. military mission in South Vietnam and the future of the Communist forces there.

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At Air Force Academy

Nixon will visit the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, Colo., to meet with cadets and others and to discuss the role of the military in the world.

He is expected to speak about the importance of maintaining a strong military to maintain peace and to ensure the survival of democracy.

The President also will hold a press conference at the Academy, where he will answer questions from the media.

After two days in the West, Nixon will return to Washington to continue his work on the budget and other issues.

Nixon's visit to Japan will be followed by a stop in South Korea, where he will meet with President Park Chung-hee and other leaders.

At the end of his tour, Nixon will return to Washington to attend to the business of the nation.

The President's trip is part of his ongoing efforts to strengthen U.S. relations with Asian nations and to demonstrate American military strength in the region.

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CAMBODIA RAIDS GO UNPROTESTED

Continued from Page 1, Col. 2

By W. F. B., By W. B.

WASHINGTON, May 9 - American B-52 bombers in recent weeks have dropped several thousand tons of bombs on North Vietnamese military targets in Cambodia, according to Defense Department sources. The raids have occurred at night, during hours when the United States is least likely to be challenged by North Vietnam's air force.

The raids, which began late last year, have been aimed at destroying North Vietnamese military installations in Cambodia. The United States has confirmed the extent of its involvement in the raids, but has declined to comment on the nature of the targets.

The raids have been carried out by the United States Air Force, which has been using B-52 bombers to strike at North Vietnamese targets in Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam.

The raids have been directed at a variety of targets, including North Vietnamese supply bases, troop concentrations, and command posts. The United States has not released information on the number of targets struck or the extent of the damage caused.

The raids have been carried out in response to North Vietnam's increasingly aggressive air attacks on the United States. The United States has been responding to the attacks with its own air strikes.

The raids have been carried out in coordination with the United States' other military efforts in the area. The United States has been providing military aid to the South Vietnamese government, and has been training and equipping the South Vietnamese military.

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Some American ground commanders have long urged that the United States' air attacks be increased, and that more effort be made to strike at North Vietnamese targets in Cambodia.

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Continued From Page 15 Cols.

APR. 10, 1969

BY MYRTE M. HOWARD

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara of the United States and the other NATO countries asked the Council of Ministers in Bonn today for a limited increase in nuclear weapons because of the increased threat from the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

The defense ministers of the NATO countries, meeting here today, said they were concerned about the possibility of a nuclear war starting from a confrontation between China and the United States and England.

The defense ministers also provided a report on the lighter participation of the United States and Great Britain in the NATO defense system.

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NY TIMES
May 1, 1969
National Security Decision Memorandum 13

TO: The Secretary of State
   The Secretary of Defense
   The Secretary of the Treasury
   The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Policy Toward Japan

As a result of the NSC meetings on Japan, the President has made the following decisions with regard to U.S. policy toward Japan:

1. We shall basically pursue our current relationship with Japan as our major partner in Asia, seeking ways to improve this relationship from the viewpoint of U.S. national interests and to seek an increasingly larger Japanese role in Asia.

2. We shall allow the present Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to continue without amendment after 1970 when it becomes subject to renunciation or amendment.

3. We shall continue to make gradual alterations in our base structure and base utilization in Japan to reduce major irritants while retaining essential base functions.

4. We shall continue our present policy of encouraging moderate increases and qualitative improvement in Japan's defense efforts, while avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially larger forces or to play a larger regional security role.

With respect to Okinawa, the President has directed that a strategy paper be prepared by the East Asia Interdepartmental Group under the supervision of the Under Secretaries Committee for negotiations with the Japanese Government over the next few months on the basis of the following elements:

TOP SECRET
1. Our willingness to agree to reversion in 1972 provided there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing U.S. military use and provided detailed negotiations are completed at that time.

2. Our desire for maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.

3. Our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but indicating that the President is prepared to consider, at the final stages of negotiation, the withdrawal of the weapons while retaining emergency storage and transit rights, if other elements of the Okinawan agreement are satisfactory.

4. Other commitments to be sought from Japan with respect to Okinawa.

Henry A. Kissinger
U.S. Intelligence Doubts Soviet First-Strike Goal

By Peter Grose

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 - The United States Intelligence Community, in a new report, has concluded that the Soviet Union is no longer developing a first-strike capability. This finding has been confirmed by a high-level conference of experts that meets once a year to assess the intelligence community's work.

The new report, which has been reviewed and approved by the National Security Council, states that the Soviet Union's recent military investments have been directed toward improving its second-strike capability. The report further notes that the United States Intelligence Community has not detected any evidence of a Soviet first-strike capability.

Desire and Intent

Although the report expresses confidence in the United States Intelligence Community's ability to assess the Soviet Union's capabilities, it also notes that the United States cannot ignore the possibility of a first-strike capability. The report emphasizes the importance of continued monitoring and analysis of Soviet military activities.

The report's conclusions have been met with mixed reactions. Some analysts have expressed concern that the United States is underestimating the Soviet Union's capabilities, while others have welcomed the report's findings as a sign of progress in arms control.

The report's findings are particularly relevant in light of the ongoing arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The report's conclusions have been welcomed by some analysts as evidence of progress in the negotiations, while others have expressed concern that the United States is not doing enough to ensure its own security.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the United States Intelligence Community has concluded that the Soviet Union is no longer developing a first-strike capability. This finding has been confirmed by a high-level conference of experts that meets once a year to assess the intelligence community's work. The report's conclusions are particularly relevant in light of the ongoing arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
U.S. SAID TO PLAN AN OKINAWA DEAL BARRING A-BOMBS

Jeanne D. Chambers—

U.S. SAID TO PLAN AN OKINAWA DEAL

Continued from Page 1, Col. 1

Washington, June 2—President Nixon has decided to remove American nuclear weapons from Okinawa, once it is returned to Japan, although recent statements have suggested that a return may be delayed.

Mr. Aichi, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, said today that a new government in Japan would like to see American bases in Okinawa returned to the United States after the return of the island. He added that the United States showed interest in the return of the island.

The return of Okinawa to Japan, now under military rule, is expected to take place in the next few months. The United States has its own military bases on Okinawa.

A Defense Review

In the meantime, the United States has built a defense facility on Okinawa, which is expected to be completed by the end of the year. The United States has its own military bases on Okinawa, which are not expected to be returned to Japan.

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At a time when the Administration was attempting to stress the importance of mutual withdrawals, and maintained hope of negotiating toward this objective with the North Vietnamese, this compromise of our policy
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In addition, at the time, we were hopeful of opening private negotiations in Paris. Maintaining the secrecy of the raids facilitated this effort by enabling North Vietnam to negotiate privately without being under the public pressure to retaliate for a major U.S. military action. It was through these private negotiations that a settlement was finally reached.

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If the bombing had been publicly confirmed, Prince Sihanouk would have been forced to protest and the bombing might well have been halted. At the time, the United States had over 500,000 men in Vietnam and was suffering more than 300 casualties each week, due in large part, to raids being launched from these Cambodian sanctuaries.

In addition, at the time, we were hopeful of opening private negotiations in Paris. Maintaining the secrecy of the raids facilitated this effort by enabling North Vietnam to negotiate privately without being under the public pressure to retaliate for a major U.S. military action. It was through these private negotiations that a settlement was finally reached.

Strategic Arms. During the first six months of the Administration, a comprehensive review was conducted of strategic arms policy in preparation for negotiations with the Soviet Union. A fundamental requirement was to assess correctly Soviet intentions in the strategic area and to determine what programs should be adopted to ensure the credibility of the American deterrent. Two of the key decisions required concerned the necessity for MIRV testing and the necessity for deployment of anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). A study of these issues and of the overall question of U.S. Strategic force posture had been directed on January 20. Prior to the completion of the report, an article in the New York Times on May 1st by William Beecher (Tab E) summarized the range of options in the report.
With regard to MIRV testing, the intelligence community had been engaged in analysis of this issue for several months. The report was extremely closely held. By mid-June there was still a lack of consensus as to Soviet intentions. The assessments varied in degrees of certainty, and, if made public, would provide a useful signal to the USSR as to: the efficacy of our intelligence systems; the disagreement within our government; and our primary concerns for the strategic arms talks. On June 18th the fact of the interagency disagreement and each agency's position was printed in a New York Times article by Peter Grose. (Tab F)

These leaks were of the most extreme gravity. As a presentation of Administration thinking on these key issues it provided the USSR with considerable insight to our approach to the SALT negotiations. Needless to say, the compromise of our intentions with regard to MIRV testing and/or AMB deployment could seriously affect our success in reaching our SALT objectives and our apparent inability to accurately assess enemy capabilities could have enhanced his confidence in his own security.

Okinawa. On May 28, 1969, U.S. policy toward Japan was outlined in NSM 13 (Tab G). It included, inter alia, our negotiating strategy with respect to Okinawa. This included our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but as a fallback, to be prepared to consider the withdrawal of these weapons while retaining the storage and transit rights. Prior to the negotiations on June 3rd, Hedrick Smith, in an article in the New York Times (Tab H), stated the U.S. willingness to remove American nuclear weapons from Okinawa contingent upon reaching a satisfactory plan for the return of the island to the Japanese.

The release of this information, attributed to well-placed informants, obviously preempted the opportunity for gaining a more favorable outcome with the Japanese during the negotiations.

The above brief survey summarizes the adverse impact of leaks on the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in four selected areas. It is clear from the above that the Administration's concern over leaks reflected concern over the potential compromise of major national security interests. There was concern that leaks of information on our weapons system would provide the enemy with insight as to our capabilities and limitations that might alter his view as to the credibility of our
deterrent. In the same context, such knowledge could seriously impair our ability to achieve acceptable results in strategic arms limitations talks.

Outside the strategic context, there was a concern that continued leaks of classified information could seriously erode the confidence of our negotiating partner as to our ability to sustain private talks. From an internal point of view, there was the danger that publication of agency positions would destroy our ability to conduct policy deliberations in an atmosphere of forthrightness and candor. Finally, there was the danger that repeated leaks of information could compromise intelligence sources. These considerations contributed to the Administration's sharp sensitivity to the release of classified information, and suggested the necessity of pursuing a more aggressive program to prevent it.