

***** T O P S E C R E T *****S COPY

FLASH /OP IMMED
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FM COL GUAY HAKTO 13

TO THE SITUATION ROOM

T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

HAKTO 13
DECEMBER 5, 1972
TO: KENNEDY --FLASH--
FROM: KISSINGER
REF: TOHAK 25 AND 28

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO THE
PRESIDENT. BEGIN TEXT.

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY CONSIDERATE MESSAGES. I
DON'T BELIEVE THERE IS A NEED TO TALK TO ADMIRAL MOORER UNTIL
I GET BACK. WE ARE READY TO MOVE MILITARILY ON VERY SHORT
NOTICE IN ANY EVENT. I BELIEVE SUSPENSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS AND MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON WOULD GENERATE
A CRISIS ATMOSPHERE THAT WOULD ONLY WORK AGAINST US AND
STRENGTHEN HANOI'S HAND. THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE MEETING
UNTIL TOMORROW SHOULD ALLOW ENOUGH TIME FOR ANY HELP WE
MIGHT GET FROM PEKING AND MOSCOW AS THE RESULT OF OUR
REPRESENTATIONS AND GIVE HANOI ENOUGH TIME TO RECONSIDER
WHERE WE ARE.

2. ASSUMING THE NEGOTIATIONS DO BREAK OFF, HERE ARE MY
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON OUR COURSE OF ACTION. WE WILL HAVE TO
TAKE THE INITIATIVE BOTH ON THE MILITARY FRONT, BY DRASTICALLY
STEPPING UP THE BOMBING, AND ON THE PUBLIC RELATIONS FRONT,
BY SEIZING THE INITIATIVE WITH RESPECT TO EXPLAINING THE
NEGOTIATIONS. I SHOULD OF COURSE GIVE A DETAILED BRIEFING
ON THE NEGOTIATING RECORD WHICH I WILL MAKE AS IMPECCABLE
AS POSSIBLE FROM OUR STANDPOINT BEFORE ANY BREAKDOWN. WE
HAVE A STRONG CASE.

3. I STILL BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT PRECISELY BECAUSE WE
ARE AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE WE WILL NEED A PERSONAL ADDRESS
BY YOU TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. WE OBVIOUSLY FACE A MAJOR
DOMESTIC PROBLEM AND WE SHOULD START OUT STRONGLY IN ORDER
TO GET ON TOP OF IT -- ESPECIALLY AS WE CAN EXPECT HANOI TO
LAUNCH A BROADSIDE. THUS I THINK IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT
YOU TALK BRIEFLY FOR 10 TO 15 MINUTES WITH CALMNESS, REASON-
ABLENESS AND DETERMINATION. I WOULD THEN FOLLOW UP NEXT
DAY WITH THE DETAILS OF THE RECORD. I FULLY AGREE WITH YOU

PSN:010246 RECALLED
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TDR:340/16:05Z DTG:051435Z

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