

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
White House Special Files Collection  
Folder List

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53	4	10/07/1960	Letter	To Daniel Hofgren, from Christine O'Polka, secretary to Haldeman. RE: adding Haldeman's name to list of Advance Men. 1 pg
53	4	10/06/1960	Letter	To Daniel Hofgren, from Christine O'Polka. RE: Names and addresses of Advance Men. Attached to previous. 2 pgs
53	4	08/25/1960	Letter	To Lou Guylay, from Bob Haldeman. RE: Publicity Directors Convention. 1 pg
53	4	08/17/1960	Letter	To Robert Haldeman, from L. Richard Guylay. RE: Invitation for Haldeman to speak at and attend the State Publicity Directors Convention. Attached to previous. 1 pg
53	4	n.d.	Brochure	Tentative Program: GOP Public Relations Conference For State Publicity Directors. Attached to previous. 5 pgs
53	4	08/25/1960	Letter	To Edmund S. Power, from H.R. Haldeman. RE: Not seeing each other at the convention and work possibilities for Power. 1 pg

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
53	4	08/10/1960	Letter	To Bob Haldeman, from Edmond S. Power. RE: Not seeing each other during the convention and security work for the vice- presidential candidate. Attached to previous. 1 pg
53	4	1960	Newsletter	The Truth About Nixon by William V. Shannon. A reprint from The Progressive. 2 pgs

October 7, 1960

Mr. Daniel Hofgren  
Pan American World Airways  
135 East 42nd Street  
55th Floor  
New York, New York

Dear Dan:

In addition to the names sent you in our letter of October 6th, would you please add Bob's name:

H. R. Haldeman  
43 Bramble Lane  
Riverside, Connecticut

Thanks a lot.

Sincerely,

Christine F. O'Polka  
Secretary to H. R. Haldeman

Adv - F.V.I.

October 6, 1960

Mr. Daniel Hofgren  
Pan American World Airways  
135 East 42nd Street  
55th Floor  
New York, New York

Dear Dan:

Per our phone conversation of this afternoon, following are the names and home addresses of our Advance Men:

1. John Ehrlichman  
3820 Hunts Point Road  
Bellevue, Washington
2. Stanley Lothridge  
815 Virginia Terrace  
Santa Paula, California
3. Robert G. McCune  
1521 Elliott Place, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.
4. Richard Miller  
4505 West Fifth Street  
Los Angeles 5, California
5. Thomas G. Pownall  
10815 Burbank Drive  
Potomac, Maryland
6. Edward O. Sullivan  
63 Rockland Avenue  
Yonkers, New York
7. John Whitaker  
106 Thicket Road  
Baltimore 12, Maryland

October 6, 1960

8. James Murphy  
34 Dorchester Road  
Rockville Centre, L. I., New York
9. Robert Ogden  
1320 East 20th Avenue  
Spokane 35, Washington
10. J. Paull Marshall  
7721 Curtis Street  
Chevy Chase, Maryland
11. Sherman Unger  
3418 Ault View Avenue  
Cincinnati 8, Ohio
12. William Black  
9527 LaJolla Farms Road  
LaJolla, California
13. John W. Warner  
2816 R Street, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.
14. Robert Krill  
1620 Belmont Street, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.
15. Renouf Russell  
Sea Street  
Manchester, Massachusetts
16. George Aldrich  
Meyer Road  
Hamilton, Massachusetts
17. Paul O'Brien  
109 Summerfield Road  
Chevy Chase, Maryland
18. William Bumpus  
5805 Dawes Avenue  
Alexandria, Virginia

It was good talking with you. Don and his wife were down about a week ago and Don was inquiring about you. He is now Minister of Christian Education in Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania, a suburb of Pittsburgh and he is enjoying his work very much.

Sincerely,

Christina O'Balta

August 25, 1960

TO: Lou Gaylay

FROM: Bob Haldeman

RE: PUBLICITY DIRECTORS CONVENTION

Thank you very much for your letter of August 17 and the enclosed copy of the tentative agenda for your Publicity Directors Convention.

I will, of course, be very happy to accept your invitation to speak to this group on Wednesday morning, August 31.

Thank you very much for including me.

# Republican National Committee

1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST • WASHINGTON 6, D. C. • NATIONAL 8-6800

L. RICHARD GUYLAY  
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

THRUSTON B. MORTON  
CHAIRMAN

August 17, 1960

Mr. Robert Haldemann  
Nixon for President Headquarters  
1146 19 Street, N. W.  
Washington 6, D. C.

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of our tentative agenda for the State Publicity Directors Convention, which will be held on Tuesday and Wednesday, August 30 and 31.

This conference will be sponsored by the Republican National Committee, the Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the Congressional Committee. All state publicity directors will be present, as well as the publicity men for the incumbent Senators. We held a similar conference in 1956, and it proved to be very helpful in coordinating the publicity, TV and advertising functions in the several states with the national effort.

In consultation with Chairman Morton, Len Hall, Bob Finch, Senator Goldwater and Congressman Miller, we have worked out the attached agenda. You will note that we have scheduled you for the Wednesday morning session, and I hope that you will accept.

Sincerely yours,



L. Richard Guylay

LRG:MN  
Enclosure

TENTATIVE PROGRAM

GOP PUBLIC RELATIONS CONFERENCE  
FOR STATE PUBLICITY DIRECTORS

HOTEL WASHINGTON  
15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

Tuesday, August 30, 1960  
Wednesday, August 31, 1960

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, ALL SESSIONS  
WILL BE HELD IN THE NORTH ROOM OF HOTEL WASHINGTON

MONDAY EVENING, August 29 . . . . .

Arrivals and check-ins during afternoon

8:30 p.m. - REGISTRATION

Washington Room

Get-acquainted reception - cocktails

TUESDAY, AUGUST 30  
"WASHINGTON CAN HELP YOU - HERE'S HOW"

- 9:00 a.m. - WELCOME - L. Richard Guylay, Director of Public Relations  
Republican National Committee
- Importance of a unified public relations drive.
- Brief remarks by Jack McDonald, Vera Glaser
- 9:20 a.m. - Hal Short, Executive Assistant to Chairman Morton.  
Operation and setup of Chairman's office.
- 9:30 a.m. - Mrs. Clare B Williams, Asst. Chairman, Republican  
National Committee and Women's Division
- 9:40 a.m. - Mrs. Catherine Gibson, National President,  
Natl. Federation of Republican Women
- 9:45 a.m. - Tom Van Sickle, Chairman, Young Republican  
National Federation
- 9:55 a.m. - AB Hermann, Campaign Director
- |                    |   |                        |
|--------------------|---|------------------------|
| Nationalities      | - | John Hvasta            |
| Minorities         | - | Val Washington         |
| Labor              | - | Robert Gormley         |
| Farm               | - | Rollis Nelson          |
| Veterans           | - | Curtis Jewell          |
| Arts & Sciences    | - | Arthur Peterson        |
| Senior Republicans | - | Bernard Van Rensselaer |
- 10:25 a.m. .... COFFEE BREAK .....
- 10:40 a.m. The Speakers Bureau - Mrs. Vera C. Ash, Director
- 10:50 a.m. Research - Dr. William Prendergast
- 11:05 a.m. Presentatton- Precinct Organization - J. J. Wuerthner
- 12:00 noon - LUNCHEON - Chairman Thruston Morton presiding
- Mrs. Clare Williams . . . . "Fat for First Lady"  
James Hagerty . . . "The President's Role in the  
Campaign"

TUESDAY, AUG. 30 - Contd.

2:00 p.m. - Mr. Guylay presiding.

"OPERATION DIXIE" - Lee Potter, Spec. Asst. to Chairman,  
RNC

2:15 p.m. - REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

Hon. William Miller of New York, Chairman

"The Case for a Republican Congress"

Organization and Operations - William Warner, Executive Director

Field Operations - Chauncey Robbins

Radio, TV & Publicity - Paul Theis

Congressional & Campaign Aids - Lee Wade, Director

3:15 p.m. ....COFFEE BREAK .....

3:30 p.m. - REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE

Hon. Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Chairman

"Elect Republican Senators"

Organization, Operations and Publicity - Victor Johnson

Watching the Record - Irv Swanson

QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

4:30 p.m. - SERVICES OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION OF THE  
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Gus Miller - Buttons, Decoration Kits, Graphic Campaign materials,  
etc.

Jim Ellis - Radio and Television

Don Baldwin - Literature

Bernard Esters - Clip Sheet

Vera Glaser - Women's Division Literature

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

7:00 p.m. Cocktails and buffet supper (Ballroom, Washington Hotel)  
Showing of several/films after dinner.  
campaign

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31

"THE NIXON-LODGE TICKET"

9:00 a.m. - Honorable Leonard Hall

(Importance of state activities to national effort. Outlines difficulty of task ahead. A few reflections on '52 and '56. How this campaign differs).

9:20 a.m. - Robert Finch

(Which areas require the most work. Specifies on what should be done)

9:35 a.m. - Peter Flanagan, Volunteers for Nixon

Pat Gorman, Dick Nixon Clubs

(Explain setups, how public relations people can tie in)

9:50 a.m. - James Bassett

"Scheduling the Candidates" - Preview of travel plans, if possible  
- scheduling problems and how state public relations people can help.

10:10 a.m. - Robert Haldemann

"Advance Planning" - how state public relations people can help  
advance preparations for Nixon-Lodge appearances

10:25 .....COFFEE BREAK .....

10:40 a.m. - James Shepley

"Issues and General Strategy, 1960"  
Followed by questions and answers

11:20 a.m. - Herbert Klein, Press Secretary to the Vice President

Specifics on how publicity chiefs can help the Nixon press effort

Ambassador Lodge's Activity

Vincent O'Brien, Press Secretary, Cam Newberry, Campaign  
Director

Questions and answers

12:00 noon - ADJOURN

WEDNESDAY, AUG. 31, (Contd)

12:30 - LUNCHEON (To Be Announced)

2:00 p.m. - SPECIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES - Mr. Guylay presiding

2:10 p.m. - "Answer Desk" - Oliver Gale, Director

2:20 p.m. - "Departmental Team Play" - Hon. Robert Merriam, Deputy Asst.  
to the President for Interdepartmental Affairs.

2:30 p.m. - "GOP TRUTH SQUAD" - Sen. Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania

SPECIAL CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES - Mr. Guylay presiding

2:50 p.m. - "Radio and Television" - Carroll Newton, Vice President, BBD&O

3:00 p.m. - "Tips for TV Appearances" - Ted Rogers, Consultant to  
Vice President Nixon

3:10 p.m. - "Public Opinion Polling" - Dr. Claude Robinson

3:25 p.m. - "Newspaper Advertising in Politics" - John Holzapfel, ANPA

3:40 p.m. - "Speech Writing" - John Franklin Carter

3:55 p.m. - "Direct Mail" - Walter Wentz, Direct Mail specialist

4:00 p.m. - "Posters and Materials" - Lee Greenhouse

8/25/60  
C/S

August 25, 1960

Mr. Edmund S. Power  
Suite 1505  
53 West Jackson Boulevard  
Chicago 4, Illinois

Dear Ed:

Thanks so much for your letter. I too, was sorry to have missed you during the Convention. Some time I hope I can have the details on your trip around the world.

There was some discussion of your name in connection with security work with the Vice Presidential candidate prior to Convention and I had intended to recommend strongly that you be approached regarding this assignment.

However, after Ambassador Lodge was nominated, it developed that he had some thoughts in this regard and he and his staff worked out an arrangement with another man to take over this area of his campaign and of course I was not able at that point to interfere.

We certainly appreciate your interest and sorry it didn't work out that we could get together. When we get to Chicago during the campaign I trust there will be an opportunity to at least say hello and perhaps to work together.

Sincerely,

H. R. Haldeman

HRH:cfo

# THE EDMOND POWER AGENCY

FORMER MEMBER U.S. SECRET SERVICE

INDUSTRIAL AND MARITIME INVESTIGATIONS  
WATCHMEN - GUARDS - PATROLS FOR INDUSTRIAL  
PLANTS, MARINE DOCKS AND WAREHOUSES

SUITE 1505  
53 WEST JACKSON BOULEVARD  
CHICAGO 4, ILLINOIS

August 10, 1960

Dear Bob,

I am sorry to have missed you during the convention; however, I too was engaged in activity mildly exciting at that time. Briefly I was on an investigation that took me around the world.

Recently I learned that I had been recommended, or at least my name mentioned in connection with advance work or security matters for the Republican Vice Presidential candidate. Since there is a chance someone attempted to contact me while I was away, I was wondering if you know anything about it or if you have any suggestions. I am interested enough to want to discuss it with someone. I would appreciate any thoughts you might have on the matter.

Gratefully,



Edmond S. Power



# The Truth About Nixon

by WILLIAM V. SHANNON

THERE ARE five tests by which we should measure a man seeking the Presidency in the 1960's.

First, the Presidency is a place of moral leadership. A President should be an educator and a spokesman of a people whose destiny is greatness.

Second, a President must be a sagacious politician. The best of intentions are vain if the man in the White House is not practiced in the arts of political leadership and astute in party management.

Third, the Chief Executive must be just that: an effective executive. He is at the apex of a vast governmental structure employing millions of persons and spending billions of dollars.

Fourth, a President in the 1960's governs under the shadow of nuclear danger. He must have sound judgment and steady nerves in a time of recurring crises.

Fifth, a President should have sympathy for and comprehension of the needs and emotional drives of the colored and the impoverished and the restless peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, whose national and social revolutions may transform the world scene in the last forty years of this century. America should have a leader who can communicate and collaborate with the leaders of the underdeveloped countries.

By each of these five standards, Richard Milhous Nixon, the certain Republican candidate for President, fails.

The truth about Nixon is that he is not big enough for the biggest job in the world. No man, in the full sense of the term, is qualified to be

President of the United States, but measured against the standard of the ideal candidate, Nixon falls so far short he is demonstrably unfit.

Nixon's strongest qualities are intelligence and industriousness. He is neither brilliant nor notably talented, but he is somewhat above average in intelligence; his mind seems quick, alert, orderly, and logical. His speeches and arguments, if dully phrased and often disingenuous, are invariably lucid and well-organized. He has roughly the same order of mental competence as the usual run of lawyers and business managers.

His industry is perhaps more than average. He has always been fiercely ambitious. As a student in high school, at Whittier College, and in Duke University Law School, he had to carry outside jobs, but he pushed himself to find time for extra-curricular activities and maintain scholarship grades. These accomplishments are no different from those of thousands of other students, but they are nonetheless praiseworthy and, in Nixon's case, particularly important because hard work, tenacity, and singleminded ambition are still his outstanding positive character traits.

Having cited his intelligence and industriousness, one has about exhausted the list of Nixon's strong points. An additional factor often mentioned by his advocates is a certain inner toughness, but this is, in Nixon, a considerably more ambiguous and complex strain than is usually described. The self-confident and the cruel are both tough, but if self-confidence is a strength, cruelty is a weakness.

Innocence until proved guilty is an adequate position in criminal court but it is no persuasive plea for making a man President of the United States, the grandest, most honored, most powerful public office to which an American can aspire. What is wrong with Nixon is his negative, empty record, the absence of his accomplishments, the paucity of his talents, the very ordinariness of the man.



This emptiness and these glaring deficiencies are more significant than the intermittent squalor of his methods or whether he is conservative or liberal. Every politician has enemies and is the object of controversy. He uses practical means that may sometimes be impugned. Nixon is probably the most hated major politician in American life today, but this would not matter if he had substantial achievements and a positive record. Nixon, however, has no visible claims to the office of President. A specious availability caused him to be placed on the ticket as a makeweight with General Eisenhower in 1952, and for eight years he has managed to retain that post. For five of those eight years, the President's fragile health has given Nixon an unusual leverage on the party machinery; there has been widespread awareness that he might, at any moment, become President through an act of fate. Nixon has been the man on the scene. He has blocked off potential competitors on the avenues to the throne by his presence and his manipulations.

*Reprinted from The Progressive • Madison, Wisconsin • 1960*

## Nixon Stirs Doubt, Antagonism, and Anxiety

Throughout the 1956 campaign, Richard Nixon told audiences: "Now at last we have a President we can hold up to our children as an example." If Nixon himself occupies the White House, will we be able to make that statement? It is in this context that Nixon's shabby record as a campaigner counts heavily against him. Our best and greatest Presidents were men of character and moral worth which enabled them to serve as exemplars for their own and later times; one has only to think of Washington and Lincoln and Wilson, each so different from the other but alike in their fierce integrity. The weight of the charge against Nixon is that he has not given any hint that he could provide this kind of high example; on the contrary, he has stirred doubt, antagonism, and anxiety.

The campaigns on which these misgivings are founded were his first, in 1946, when he defeated incumbent Democratic Representative Jerry Voorhis, now the president of the Cooperative League of America; then in 1950, when he defeated for the Senate Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas, the famous actress and wife of actor Melvyn Douglas; in 1952 when, as General Eisenhower's running mate, he made several reckless speeches, and again in 1954 when he tried to keep alive McCarthyism and Communists-in-government as profitable issues but with no success. These four campaigns, one local, one statewide, and two nationwide, are the basis of the picture of the "old Nixon." During those eight years he established the pattern of behavior from which the more recent "new Nixon" is said to depart.

Stewart Alsop, the former member of the team of brothers who wrote the famous syndicated column and now an editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, is favorably disposed toward Nixon as a potential President and makes an almost plausible case in his defense. For this reason, it is worth quoting from Alsop's recent book, *Nixon and Rockefeller*, on this phase of Nixon's career. The motif of the old Nixon's career, in Alsop's words, was the use of "specious and sleazy debating tricks."

"Consider a few of these debating tricks. There is the juxtaposition of words, as when Nixon, in 1952, in the course of accusing Truman and Stevenson of tolerating Communists in the government, called them 'traitors to the high principles of the Democratic Party.' In the context of those days when McCarthy rode high, the words 'traitor' and 'Democratic Party' were the words that remained in his hearers' minds.

"There is the use of the undeniable statement with a false implication. An example from the fund speech: 'Every penny of it was used to pay for political expenses that I did not think should be charged to the taxpayers of the United States.' In fact, the purpose of the fund was to meet expenses which *could not* be charged to the taxpayers of the United States.

"There is the trick of the coupling of categories, as in the 1954 campaign statement: 'We have driven the Communists, the fellow travelers, and the security risks out of government by thousands.' It is true that several thousand so-called 'security risks' were dropped in the early Eisenhower years to appease McCarthy. But Nixon failed to point out that the vast majority of these people were fired for reasons having nothing to do with subversion, that many of them were hired initially by the Eisenhower Administration itself, and that the total included not a single known Communist. Thus again, the implication of what he said was false."

In discussing these and other examples of Nixon's political techniques of smear and innuendo, Alsop notes that 1954 was a year of particularly flagrant behavior. "In that year," he writes, "Nixon came closest to justifying Walter Lippmann's description of him as a 'ruthless partisan . . . [who] does not have within his conscience those scruples which the country has the right to expect in the President of the United States.'"

Alsop cites a classic example of Nixon's technique which occurred in the spring of 1954 when in the course of a telecast defending the Administration's foreign policies, he made a famous aside. "Nixon looked up from his script and asked, as though on the spur of the moment: 'And incidentally, in mentioning Secretary Dulles, isn't it wonderful finally to have a Secretary of State who isn't taken in by the Communists?'

"Nixon didn't say that Dean G. Acheson and George Marshall were 'taken in by the Communists.' But he very clearly implied it, and the implication is grossly misleading. To make his implication, Nixon made use of both an essentially specious 'Communist issue' and a sleazy debater's trick, the rhetorical question. He asked his rhetorical question, moreover, not when he was a young Congressman . . . but when he had already been Vice-President of the United States for two years . . . That rhetorical question explains why, to some reasonable and fair-minded people, the case against Nixon is a convincing case."

Having quoted Alsop at such length, I must in fairness add that he deprecates the importance of this evidence in making his over-all assessment of the man, but the evidence he cites is nevertheless incontrovertible; each of us is entitled to make his own assessment of its significance.

## Nixon Tries to Tidy Up For the Eastern King-Makers

One counter-argument adduced in Nixon's favor is that these "sleazy debating tricks" are only words and, after all, are not most politicians heated or somewhat careless in their use of words? The fact is, however, that a politician's words are his deeds. Unless a man has a record in executive office—which Nixon does not—his words, next to his votes in Congress, are the most important materials we have on which to base a judgment. Moreover, political men do not habitually use words lightly, or regard them as of no lasting importance. A reporter has only to misquote a politician slightly or criticize him mildly to arouse an extraordinarily outraged reaction. Most politicians most of the time value, or overvalue, what they say, choose their words with care, and have fairly clearly in mind what effects they hope to achieve by their words. Nixon's repeated use of reckless, inflammatory, and defaming language is not a series of momentary indiscretions; it is a considered procedure for which he must be held responsible.

A different argument often advanced in recent years in Nixon's behalf is that he has "matured." The "new Nixon," it is contended, is great-

ly changed from the "old Nixon." However, we cannot allow the matter to rest there. The question arises: why did he change? The change-over would be persuasive if his defenders could point to some single event or series of events that caused this beneficial transformation. They never do. The change is simply dated from the end of the 1954 campaign when his "white collar McCarthyism" failed to hold Congress for the Republicans. Or it is blandly suggested that with the passage of the years he has grown.

If anything would properly account for a dramatic change in a man's character and outlook, it would be a traumatic experience of some kind. In Nixon's case, the near-catastrophe of the "secret fund" disclosures leading up to his Checkers speech called in doubt his political methods and put his career in jeopardy. Yet patently it had no reforming effect. Two years later, he was back on the stump using the same tricks and techniques he had used before the trauma of the fund fight. Here certainly was no great divide in Nixon's career.

Another explanation is more logical. The new, smoother, more unctuous, more careful Nixon began to emerge only in the winter of 1955-56, after President Eisenhower's heart attack. Up until that time, Nixon had simply carried out the job for which he was chosen by the party managers in 1952: the job of hatchetman and handshaker for an Administration headed by a politically inexperienced general. Nixon's hope of future reward depended upon his doing that job well, and he did it the only way he knew. He was a slugger in what he himself called "rocking, socking campaigns" and, alternatively, he cut up his opponents by fast debating methods.

After Eisenhower's heart attack, Nixon, for the first time, realized in a palpable way that the Presidency might be within his own grasp. The one great danger was that he would be vetoed by the Eastern, internationalist faction which controls the Republican Party. This group repeatedly blocked the late Senator Robert A. Taft because it suspected his isolationist views. Nixon determined to pay court to the financiers and politicians who had successively nominated Willkie, Dewey, and



Eisenhower. At that very time, these same men of power decided to "take up" Nixon as a protege and give him a close inspection. They were motivated principally by the consideration that their faction had no suitable candidate to replace Mr. Eisenhower. If Governor Nelson Rockefeller had captured the governorship of New York four years earlier, subsequent national political history might have been much different. But as it was in the winter of 1955-56, Nixon, if he proved satisfactory, was about the best available.

Nixon proved quite satisfactory. He had early begun to cultivate former Governor Thomas E. Dewey, who had been instrumental in selecting him as Eisenhower's running mate in 1952. Now he began to be drawn more fully into the inner circle of the "Dewey crowd" in New York. He attended several skull sessions arranged by Dewey to exchange views and hear expert briefings, particularly on foreign affairs. A close associate of Nixon in this development was William Rogers, later to become President Eisenhower's Attorney General in the second Administration. Rogers began his Washington career back in the 80th Congress of 1947-48 when he served as a Dewey contact man with the "wrong side" of the Republican Party, the isolationists and Midwestern conservatives. His formal job was as legal counsel for Senators Owen Brewster and Homer Ferguson, the fumble-and-stumble twins. Rogers was a talent spotter with an eye for bright young men. He soon met Nixon, introduced him to Dewey, and laid the basis of later events.

The result of Nixon's courting of the New York financiers and politicians and their extended period of "looking him over" was the emergence of the "new Nixon." The ambitious Vice President dropped his hatchet and began to impersonate a statesman. This is why he abruptly shifted in the 1956 campaign to a steady diet of bland, platitudinous speeches. This is why there was a new note of nebulous liberalism such as his rosy prediction of the early arrival of a four-day week and his announcement that he was a card-carrying member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

#### The New Nixon, Like the Old, Is a Man Ever on the Make

It was all reminiscent of Dewey's own soporific 1948 campaign. This is also why Nixon in 1956 and 1957 became such an articulate missionary on behalf of foreign aid. He had voted for the Marshall Plan as a member of the House, but he had previously not been averse to making the standard Republican speech about "waste and extravagance" in foreign aid. Now he dropped all negative references. Nixon likes to point to these speeches as proof of the authenticity of his conviction because "there are no votes to be won defending foreign aid." There may be few votes to be won from ordinary voters, but Nixon was building credit with the people who counted if he was to get the Presidential nomination—the influential bankers, politicians, and publishers. If Paris was worth a Mass to Henry IV, the White House was worth a few unpopular speeches to Richard Nixon.

The truth is that the new Nixon, like the old Nixon, has never sacrificed his interests to his convictions. He has kept his positions on issues sufficiently flexible to make them accord with his political needs. He would have been glad to be Taft's Vice President in 1952 if Taft had looked like a winner. He could defend doing nothing on civil rights in 1956 and defend the use of troops in Little Rock in 1957. He could be the cut-throat debater of 1954 and the sleepytime sandman of politics in 1956. The new Nixon, like the old Nixon, is fundamentally a man

on the make. His commitment is to nothing larger or more impersonal than his own ambition. He is on fire with no ideal, dedicated to no great cause, champion of no enduring philosophy or consistent viewpoint.



There are numerous pieces of evidence that might be cited other than his disreputable campaign techniques and debating tricks. There are his years as a go-between for and accomplice of the McCarthyites when they rode high in the early Fifties. But let us limit ourselves to a single item: Nixon's lack of eloquence and literary skill. Nixon, commendably, drafts his own speeches in longhand. These speeches are never graced with a felicitous phrase, never illustrated with an interesting quotation or apt literary allusion, never charged with strong, passionate conviction. Nothing lifts them above the commonplace. They are invariably cagey, routine, and dull. One is reminded of the late MacKenzie King, the platitudinous prime minister of Canada, who once remonstrated with a speechwriter over some colorful line: "I cannot say that. It would be remembered."

Here is a random sample of phrases from Nixon speeches and interviews: "All we need is a win complex . . . Lip-service Americans . . . Jefferson and Jackson would turn over in their graves . . . The same old Socialist baloney any way you slice it . . . You hear some yakkity-yakking that campaigns should be limited to ivory-tower, philosophical discussions of issues . . . A rocking, socking campaign . . . If that is the way the ball bounces."

These are not the words and phrases of a man fit to stand in Lincoln's place and bear witness to the American dream. This tired, banal language reflects the banal, shallow mind that produces it.

If Nixon's credentials as a moral leader and an eloquent spokesman are below the standard we have a right to expect Presidents to attain, his talents as a politician are rarely called in question. Yet here his native sagacity has been much overrated.

Two of the darkest marks on his record in the view of independent vot-

ers were his campaign speeches using the "softness on Communism" argument against Jerry Voorhis in 1946 and Mrs. Douglas in 1950. In both those years, the Democrats lost everywhere, and worst of all in California. Earl Warren, William Knowland, and many less well-known California Republicans won easy victories without using the so-called Communist issue. Nixon would have defeated Mrs. Douglas if he had not done much more than praise California's oranges and sunny climate. Even as a crass opportunistic device there was no need to smear her by dishonestly linking her with the late Representative Vito Marcantonio of New York, who fairly consistently followed the Communist Party line.

In 1951-52, Nixon collected a fund from his business backers to finance various political activities. This meant taking an enormous risk for a nominal gain. When the fund became widely known in the 1952 campaign, the uproar nearly knocked Nixon off the ticket. Was it worth risking the loss of the Vice Presidency to gain a few free trips to California and the cost of a few thousand Christmas cards?

Nixon's enemies have often stigmatized him for his duplicity within the California delegation at the 1952 convention. Warren, then governor, was making his last bid for the Presidency. Although nominally pledged to support the governor, Nixon

worked tirelessly to weaken Warren's hold and spread support for Eisenhower. What is often overlooked in accounting this little tale of inside politics is that it was, in terms of Nixon's own interests, extremely dangerous and wholly unnecessary. It was needless because the Eisenhower managers chose him as the Vice Presidential candidate for reasons having nothing to do with his power or lack of power to deliver the California delegation. It was dangerous conduct because it transformed Warren from an unsympathetic colleague into a sworn enemy. If Warren had wished, he could have kept Nixon off the Eisenhower ticket in 1952 by interposing his veto when the party managers "cleared" Nixon's name with him. Nixon is lucky that Warren is a magnanimous loser.

Another incident that raises questions about Nixon's political judgment occurred in the 1952 campaign when he made his famous speech magnifying Adlai Stevenson's remote, unimportant connection with the Alger Hiss case. Eisenhower's 6,600,000-vote majority showed Nixon's gratuitous assault on Stevenson's character was not necessary. The only purpose it served was to blacken Nixon's reputation with a great many independent voters.

During the first two years of the Eisenhower Administration, Nixon busied himself as "the bridge" between Joe McCarthy and the Administration—a self-assigned mission. Nixon did not seem to realize any more than did the politically inexperienced Eisenhower that McCarthy could not be appeased or tamed or made a docile member of the team. From first to last, he misread McCarthy's character. The only result of Nixon's two years of futile and devious maneuverings was to get himself identified in the public mind with various ignominious deals and surrenders such as the "chicken lunch" between Army Secretary Stevens and McCarthy which Nixon arranged.

In the 1954 campaign, Nixon toured the mountain states where several Senate seats were at stake. He charged James Murray in Montana and Joseph O'Mahoney in Wyoming with being soft on Communism. Such an attack was patently ridiculous against men who are old-fashioned, Roman Catholic politicians with long



Herblock in the Washington Post

"Let's See—What'll I Wear Today"

public records. Not surprisingly, Nixon's tactics failed and both Democrats won. Nixon did even worse with his speeches in the next off-year campaign, in 1958, when he charged a Democratic victory would mean socialism and regimentation. One wag, after that campaign ended in Republican catastrophe, toted up the number of miles Nixon had traveled and the states he had visited and proved statistically that the more Nixon traveled the worse his party did and that the Republicans fared better in the areas he did not visit than in those he did.

From time to time there have been other incidents that make one doubt Nixon's much-vaunted prowess. The most famous of these was in February, 1956, when he foolishly dragged Earl Warren's nonpartisan office into a political speech, calling him "a great Republican Chief Justice." The roof practically fell in on Nixon as Republican newspapers joined in exploring this lapse of taste.



It was clever and it was dirty for Nixon to link Voorhis and Mrs. Douglas with the Communists, to distort Stevenson's connection with Hiss, to knife Warren at the convention, to play both ends against the middle on the McCarthy issue, and to claim partisan credit for the unanimous school desegregation decision of the Supreme Court by attributing it to a Republican Chief Justice. But leaving aside the cleverness which his friends admire and his enemies distrust, and leaving aside the dirtiness of these tactics which his friends rationalize and his enemies dwell upon, what about their practical political wisdom? Did they serve any useful purpose for Nixon? The answer is that they did not. He could have attained any of his immediate aims without using these methods and he would be surer of his own ultimate goal, the Presidency, if he had never used them. He demonstrated only that he is one of those individuals who is too clever by half to be wise. He demonstrated also that he does not have a moral governor controlling his political tactics and no large conception of his own interests. He is a mediocre politician playing it by ear and relying upon lack of scruple, quickness of mind, and ruthlessness to make



The Nashville Tennessean

### We Have to Face the Possibility

up for the lack of any coherent philosophy or considered judgment.

The truth about Nixon is that he is a manufactured politician. He is not a natural political animal. Observers always comment upon the coldness, the reserve, the controlled air. "I do have this aversion to going up to a stranger, or someone I don't know well, and asking for political support or a contribution," Nixon told one interviewer.

Nixon learned politics under the tutelage of Murray Chotiner, a Los Angeles lawyer and professional campaign manager. Chotiner outlined his techniques in September, 1955, to a private workshop for GOP state chairmen. The transcript of this speech quotes Chotiner as saying: "Like it or not, the American people in many instances vote against a candidate, against a party, or against an issue rather than for . . ."

Chotiner advised his audience to remember that "an attack is always a smear when it is directed against our own candidates."

He urged candidates to introduce the principal subject they wished to discuss by first informing their audiences they had been warned not to talk about it.

"You will be amazed at the popular response to such a method. In case after case [in his 1950 campaign] Dick Nixon told audiences, 'I have been advised not to talk about Communism, but I am going to tell the people of California the truth,'" Chotiner declared.

Nixon has followed Chotiner's precepts throughout his career. He

epitomized them when he told Republican candidates for the House to answer every criticism with an attack: "If he asks you where you stand on Dulles, ask him where he stands on Acheson."

Nixon's practice of this negative theory that a candidate should attack rather than defend or advocate new programs has produced an important incidental benefit for him. He has managed to retain the appearance of a middle-of-the-road Republican when, in fact, his voting record on major domestic issues in his six years in Congress was indistinguishable from that of such celebrated Tories as John Bricker and William Jenner.

Nixon voted for the Taft-Hartley law, for the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, against public power, and in favor of exempting railroads from anti-trust legislation. He was notably hostile to the Rural Electrification program. Although he voted for rural telephones in 1949, he voted to cut REA funds in 1947 and again in 1948, voted against funds for power development and transmission lines in the Missouri Valley and at Bonneville in 1947, for limiting the growth of the Southwest Power Administration in 1951, and against TVA expansion.

### Nixon More Reactionary Than Senator Taft On Housing

On housing, his record is extremely conservative. He cast one vote for renewal of rent control in 1951 during the Korean War and that one vote is repeatedly cited to show his "independence" from the real estate lobby. But in the years before and after 1951, he opposed rent control, voting for weakening amendments in 1949 and against extension of it in 1950 and 1952. These other votes are usually glossed over or not mentioned by those depicting him as a liberal or middle-of-the-roader. He voted against the Taft-Ellender-Wagner housing bill in 1948 and again in 1949, when it passed. As a Senator, he was for cutting public housing units from 50,000 annually down to 5,000 in 1951 and against any public housing authorization at all in 1952. Nixon is usually depicted as a newer, more progressive Republican, but on all housing issues he was much more reactionary than was Senator Taft.

This explains why he is sometimes called a "young fogey."

On social welfare legislation such as social security, minimum wages, and the school lunch program, Nixon occasionally voted for such measures on final passage because the battle is usually over when the final roll call comes. But on the votes on the crucial amendments, he repeatedly sided with the enemies of these welfare programs. In 1947, as a freshman in the 80th Congress, he supported the House Republican leadership in favoring a cut in the school lunch program of \$30,000,000. The next year he voted against adding 750,000 workers to the social security program. In 1949, he voted for a particularly unfair amendment that successfully deprived 1,000,000 low-paid workers the protection of a 75-cent minimum wage. As a Congressman, Nixon at Congressional hearings and at Labor Department hearings in California participated actively on behalf of the big corporate farms that employ migratory Mexican laborers at low wages and sometimes under frightful conditions.



Nixon voted several times during his four years in the House and his two years in the Senate in favor of the tidelands oil giveaway, for abolition of federal regulation of natural gas prices, and against reduction of the 27.5 per cent oil depletion allowance.

On civil rights for Negroes and other minorities, Nixon has a mixed record. He voted for an anti-poll tax bill in 1949. In 1952, he joined with Taft in signing a minority report opposing a Fair Employment Practices Act with enforcement powers. But as Vice-President, he has used his authority as presiding officer of the Senate to assist in bringing liberal civil rights bills to a vote.

On some matters, Nixon's position has shifted with the pressures. He was vaguely for federal aid for school construction when the Eisenhower Administration was sponsoring such a bill but subsequently he went on record against federal aid to education when the President's interest in the matter waned. It was Nixon's vote that broke the tie and killed a major school aid bill early in the present session of Congress. And that vote

against federal aid to education came less than a week after Nixon told a Republican dinner in Chicago that "inadequate classrooms, underpaid teachers, and flabby standards are weaknesses we must constantly strive to eliminate."

Nixon's tendency to swing back and forth on major issues shows up vividly in the field of foreign affairs. As a Senator, for example, he endorsed the old Bricker Amendment which would have undermined the President's constitutional authority on foreign policy, but as Vice-President he supported the Administration when President Eisenhower opposed the amendment.

He supported the Marshall Plan, but ducked a vote on Point Four appropriations. He seemed to favor the liberalized tariff program of reciprocal trade, but voted for crippling amendments. He seemed to be on both sides of American policy regarding Korea and Indo-China.

Thus, on August 31, 1953, speaking before the American Legion Convention in St. Louis, Nixon said that in his decision to halt Communist aggression in Korea, former President Truman was right and "deserves the credit for it. Let's recognize right now that the decision to go into Korea was right because the Communists had to be stopped." But a year later, in his 1954 election eve speech, he charged that the Truman Administration's "wrong policy" had "resulted in a war, a war in Korea that cost us 140,000 American boys as casualties."

Similarly, on April 16, 1954 speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, Nixon said: "If, to avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and Indo-China, we must take the risk now by putting our boys in, I think the executive branch has to take the politically unpopular decision and do it, and I personally support such a position." A fortnight later, Nixon was quoted by the New York *Herald Tribune* as saying that the Administration must avoid sending American troops to fight in Indo-China or anywhere else "if we can." In later speeches, he praised the Administration for avoiding hostilities in Indo-China although he had told the newspaper editors that he personally supported intervention with American boys.

Perhaps the crispest analysis of this curious political behavior came from

Richard H. Rovere, writing in *Harper's*:

"What stands out in any consideration of the whole record is the flexibility that suggests an almost total indifference to policy. Nixon appears to be a politician with an advertising man's approach to his work. Policies are products to be sold the public—this one today, that one tomorrow, depending on the discounts and the state of the market. He moves from intervention to anti-intervention with the same ease and lack of anguish with which a copywriter might transfer his loyalties from Camels to Chesterfields."

#### Nixon Is Concerned With

#### Techniques More Than Issues

Nixon's voting record as a legislator ended, of course, when he became Vice President, but he has had seven opportunities to break ties during his incumbency as presiding officer of the Senate. The issues at stake involved major conflicts between the liberal and conservative blocs and dealt with significant controversies on federal aid to education, agriculture, veterans and organized labor. "In each case," the *New York Times* reported recently, Nixon "has reflected the Eisenhower Administration's policy against more liberal proposals sponsored by the Democrats."

Since he never talks about his own voting record, Nixon can easily offer a verbal commitment to Eisenhower Republicanism or any other kind of Republicanism that may be fashionable. He can link hands with liberal Senator Jacob Javits of New York and reactionary Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois. He could campaign for the disreputable Senator Joseph McCarthy in Wisconsin and for respected Senator Clifford Case in New Jersey.

Beyond the negativism and evasiveness, however, Nixon's hallmark as a politician is his preoccupation with the techniques and artifices of his craft. Having learned much from Chotiner, he has still the fascinated interest of a sorcerer's apprentice.

On September 14, 1955, the same month in which Chotiner was addressing the GOP campaign school, Nixon spoke to a meeting of the Radio and Television Executives Society in New York. The report in *Variety* was headed—"MEMO TO

VEEPEE NIXON: 'WANT AN AGENCY JOB?'

Nixon had been such a success in his talk that one advertising agency representative had jocularly offered him a vice-presidency.

*Variety's* account said: "Nixon showed the over 300 attending experts that he's as hep to the realities of good drama and to the theories . . . of successful time-buying as any of them. He gave about 30 minutes worth of advice on 'what a candidate should do to use this medium [television] effectively.'

"The disparity was taken to be slight between the way the No. 1 veep would have the advertising profession handle political candidates on video and the way advertising men already conduct campaigns for admittedly more commercial products . . . He advised use of saturation selling of candidates through one- and five-minute 'spots' as he called them because, he said, a 'great number of voters vote only names, not platforms.'"

Between insulting the informed voters by rebutting every argument with a diversionary attack and manipulating the uninformed voters by playing upon their emotions and their ignorance, Nixon betrays a notably cynical attitude toward the democratic process. But the point here is not the ethics of Nixon's political style, but what it reveals of his curiously detached and manipulative attitude toward political work. No politician caught up in the great issues and political projects of his time, whether he was conservative or liberal, would waste his time giving such a speech or even thinking of such matters. It is hard to imagine a natural politician, a Harry Truman or a Robert Taft, bothering himself with this kind of thing. This is the stuff of dilettantes and technicians, not of statesmen.

The political tasks of a President are to keep control of his party's machinery in order to use it in behalf of his legislative program, rally public opinion behind his objectives, create unity on the great issues of war and peace that transcend party politics, and cooperate, if need be, with the opposition party. Nixon could be counted upon to keep control of his party's machinery. But for what purpose? Nothing in his political career indicates he has any national goals toward which he is working. His consciously acquired techniques and his experience have all been in beating

down an opponent and not in rallying support for positive programs. He is such a partisan, such a divisive figure that he would find it difficult to organize national unity and enlist the cooperation of the Democrats. He has political skills, but they are not those of a national leader in times of recurring crises.

Nixon's record as an executive is a blank page. This tends to be true of any national politician who made his principal reputation in Congress. The difference is that Nixon has assiduously attempted to create the impression that he has acquired some useful executive experience during the eight years of the Eisenhower Administration. His apologists lay heavy stress on the fact that he has attended Cabinet and National Security Council meetings, but Vice-Presidents have been attending Cabinet meetings for forty years. Such attendance keeps a Vice-President informed, but by itself it provides no executive experience. Nixon attempted to get an executive post in 1957 when he sought the chairmanship of the Operations Coordinating Board, an obscure but fairly influential group which works at the secondary level of the Administration pulling together defense, foreign affairs, and propaganda. Eisenhower turned him down. The evidence from the Cabinet meetings reported by Robert Donovan in his book, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, clearly indicates, moreover, that Eisenhower consults Nixon and respects his opinion on strictly political matters but ignores him on questions of broad governmental policy, and has at times cut him short.

The two committees that Nixon has chaired are both paper outfits. He is chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth. The infrequent reports of this impressive-sounding committee are the occasion of much merriment among professional economists. The reports are thick with solemn affirmations of the obvious, such as: "Prices of industrial commodities have been rising in wholesale markets and this is usually followed by rises at retail."

Professor J. K. Galbraith of Harvard, writing in the February *Harper's*, analyzed the first three reports of this committee. He noted that Nixon ascribed inflation to two causes: "(1) the pressure for more public spending and (2) the implacable upward pressure of wages on prices."

## Record Shows Nixon Achieved Nothing On Inflation Problem

Having verbally attacked inflation, Nixon began his list of remedies by telling what he would not recommend. He would not urge wage and price controls. But, Galbraith pointed out, "if wages and prices are untouchable, then nothing *directly* can be done about the wage-price spiral which both the President and Mr. Nixon hold to be a cause of inflation. And unless some substitute action can be effective, then inflation won't be controlled.

". . . Moreover, if prices reflect the power of the unions and the compensating action of the corporations, then government intervention does not have the damaging consequences that Mr. Nixon and his colleagues condemn. For then such intervention *doesn't* interfere with the reading of priorities and scarcities—the unions and the corporations have already spoiled that. What intervention does is substitute public regulation for what Mr. Nixon and his associates have condemned as bad private control by unions and companies."

As remedies, Nixon proposed a Congressional resolution making "reasonable price stability" a specific goal of federal policy, a curtailment of government spending, and permission to the Treasury to raise the rate of interest on long-term government bonds.

Galbraith and other economists quickly pointed out that price stability "has been a goal of federal policy for generations. It has been proclaimed repeatedly and with passion. The new resolution . . . would give the Administration no power it does not now possess."

The suggestion for curtailed government expenditure, the Harvard economist observed, "runs into the familiar problem that some of the things for which higher expenditures have been sought—schools, housing, defense, law enforcement, conservation—are rather urgent. To this Mr. Nixon is indifferent. He describes the pressures for increased spending as 'irresponsible.'

". . . More important still, while a budget deficit when the economy is operating at capacity can certainly be a cause of inflation, to balance the budget does not cure the inflation. That is because balancing the budget

will not arrest the wage-price spiral. Mr. Nixon, though he blames the spiral, makes no claim that budget-balancing would stop it."

Nixon's third recommendation, for an increase in interest rates, "represents a continuation of the [high interest rate] policy he was asked to improve."

Galbraith concluded: "The judgment to be rendered seems to me clear. Mr. Nixon has done nothing. Nor in seeking to persuade us that he *has* done something does he show a high regard for intelligence."

Nixon is also chairman of the President's commission on non-discrimination in government contracts. This group provides Nixon with a useful sounding board for speeches about what he has done for the Negro. The commission, in fact, has accomplished very little. Cases move through its toils at a leisurely pace, often taking three or four years and not getting anywhere.

The business about being "the best-trained Vice-President in history" is a myth. The speech-making, traveling, hand-shaking, and paper-shuffling Nixon has done for more than seven years provide no clues as to what kind of chief executive he would be.

#### Opinions on Foreign Affairs Follow No Clear Pattern

The most crucial area of a modern President's responsibilities is that of foreign affairs. The country could stand any number of mistakes and regressive policies in the management of its domestic affairs. What it might not survive would be a President with bad judgment and erratic instincts in foreign policy. To elect a man to the Presidency is to cast a vote of confidence in his character. It is here that Richard Nixon poses the greatest difficulty. There is little in his demeanor and his public record to inspire confidence and much to provoke anxiety.

It is awkward to question a man's character because we will never know for certain what kind of a President Nixon would make unless he becomes President. There are those who are cheerily optimistic that he would grow in the job. They belong to what I call the "reform school theory" of the Presidency. The White House is hardly a training school where

political delinquents are made into statesmen by the magic of their surroundings.

There are grounds for deep concern. A politician so reactionary as Nixon on domestic economic issues cannot convincingly portray himself abroad as the liberal champion of the oppressed and underprivileged. The ease with which demonstrations were whipped up against him in his disastrous tour of Latin America proves how hard it is to wear one face at home and another abroad.

Nixon has a weakness for heroics and theatrical gestures. He is also a man of violent passions beneath that tightly controlled exterior. It was purely a play to the galleries, for example, for Nixon to visit Caracas and plunge into the howling mob after his previous narrow escape in Lima and the repeated warnings of danger. Nixon is also enamored of the idea that words are a substitute for policy. His stated opinions on foreign affairs follow no clear pattern, now bristling with threats of massive retaliation, then later enthusiastically endorsing friendly talks with the Russians. In 1953, Nixon boasted that the Administration had extricated the country from the land war in Korea but the following year he came out in favor of involving our forces in another land war on the continent of Asia if it was necessary to save Indo-China.

Preoccupation with appearances is a weakness Nixon has sometimes indulged to fantastic extremes. The most extraordinary of these episodes occurred in August, 1955 when President Eisenhower returned from the Geneva summit conferences. His plane landed in Washington during a driving rainstorm. Nixon and all top officials were on hand to greet him. Most had umbrellas but at Nixon's request they did not open them. He feared the unfortunate symbolism of the umbrella which had been Neville Chamberlain's trademark when he met another dictator seventeen years earlier at Munich.

In describing the kind of President America needs, Nixon in January 1960 said: "The American people and the free world need in the Presidency a man who has judgment, a man who in a crisis will be cool, a man who won't go off half-cocked and give an appearance of leadership when,

actually, his speaking out might be disastrous to the whole world."

Ironically, Nixon in this passage summed up several of the reasons why the country cannot risk putting him in the White House. He is intelligent enough. He is industrious enough. What is in grave doubt is his judgment, his inner calmness, his self-confidence. He has always been preoccupied with the "appearance of leadership" rather than leadership itself. He has repeatedly said foolish and demagogic words that are bad enough coming from a Senator or a Vice President but would be disastrous coming from a President. He is frequently going off rashly and half-cocked, whether to libel a political opponent, put American troops into a ground war in Indo-China, drag the Chief Justice into partisan politics, plunge himself into a mob in Caracas, or charge some innocent State Department employe with "undercutting" the Administration. No one could feel safe if the hydrogen bomb were in such imprudent hands.

The Presidency is a place for greatness. Richard Nixon's soiled record as a campaigner, his reactionary views as a domestic legislator, and his evasive, opportunist, and self-contradictory record in foreign affairs disqualify him. Ambition alone is not enough.

## The Truth About Nixon

by WILLIAM V. SHANNON

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