

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List

| <u>Box Number</u> | <u>Folder Number</u> | <u>Document Date</u> | <u>Document Type</u> | <u>Document Description</u> |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Other Document | photocopy of envelope addressed to Mr. Larry Higby, Nixon for President Committee crossed out with handwritten notation "Haldeman Private, General Memos July". 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Memo | Buchanan to Haldeman re: results of Gallup poll with handwritten notes. 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/28/1968 | Memo | Dwight to HRH re: Convention - Tuesday Morning Delegate Meetings. 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/31/1968 | Memo | Safire to DC re: printing an election brochure. It implies there was a copy attached, but there is nothing attached to this memo. 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/01/1968 | Letter | John Jewett Garland to Nixon re: asking to escort him to the podium at the convention, including transcribed copy of original handwritten letter with attached notes from Hillings and Haldeman and mailing envelope. 6 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/23/1968 | Letter | Bryce Harlow to Peter Flanigan re: recommending John Anderson as Nixon's running mate. 1 page. |

| <u>Box Number</u> | <u>Folder Number</u> | <u>Document Date</u> | <u>Document Type</u> | <u>Document Description</u> |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| 36 | 1 | 07/10/1968 | Memo | John Whitaker to Chapin/Haldeman re: John Eisenhower's role in the new administration. 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/23/1968 | Letter | Paul Davies to Nixon re: meeting with Russell Giffen and Albert Russell. 2 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/17/1968 | Memo | Frank Shakespeare to Rose Mary Woods re: publicity opportunities for Nixon (Chet Huntley show, Joey Bishop show, Bill Buckley). 2 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/14/1968 | Memo | Safire to DC re: "Kremlining", involving strategy for negating any implication of influence Russia has on the election. 3 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/17/1968 | Memo | Safire to DC re: Aphorism, epigrams and quotable paragraphs for Acceptance and stump speeches. 6 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/14/1968 | Other Document | Draft speech. "the Next one hundred days". 9 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/16/1968 | Newspaper | copy of The Economist article "One Vote for Hubert". 2 pages. |

| <u>Box Number</u> | <u>Folder Number</u> | <u>Document Date</u> | <u>Document Type</u> | <u>Document Description</u> |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| 36 | 1 | 07/14/1968 | Newspaper | copy of New York Times article "Humphrey and Nixon: The First big issue of the campaign". 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/18/1968 | Memo | Glenn Olds to Nixon re: Pre-Convention Report - General Strategy for poli and manpower development. 3 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Report | List entitled "Foreign Affairs" listing people and their present postions and fields. 3 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Report | List entitled "Domestic Affairs" listing people and their present postions and fields. 2 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Report | List entitled "Fiscal and Economic" listing people and their present postions and fields. 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Report | List entitled "Justice, Law and Order" listing people and their present postions and fields. 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Report | List entitled "Health, Education and Welfare" listing people and their present postions and fields. 1 page. |

| <u>Box Number</u> | <u>Folder Number</u> | <u>Document Date</u> | <u>Document Type</u> | <u>Document Description</u> |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Report | List entitled "Administration" listing people and their present postions and fields. 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/16/1968 | Memo | Glenn Olds to Nixon re: Briefing from Edwin Reischauer about foreign policy recommendations. 3 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Report | Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia by Edwin Reischauer. 5 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/18/1968 | Memo | Glenn Olds to Nixon re: Briefing with Ed Guillion, former ambassador to Congo, about recommendations for the candidate. 3 pages. |
| 36 | 1 | n.d. | Report | List of Participants in the "Agenda for the Nation" Project. 1 page. |
| 36 | 1 | 07/15/1968 | Memo | Buchanan to Haldeman re: requesting help to bring in Neal Freeman. 1 page. |

*Haldeman
Private*

General

Memo

File

NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE
P. O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036

~~Mr. Harry Higby
Nixon for President Committee
P.O. Box 1968, Times Square Station
New York, New York 10036~~

Living English

File to RN
Javits has come out
praised V. N. stunt.
MR Fred Cove

Memo to Haldeman

From Buchanan

ridiculous
sky to come. on new polls -
blocked attempt to read V. N. stunt
(wasn't true)

Gallup and Harris in NY had a joint Press Conference.

They agreed on several points.

1) Race involving RM and HHH and George Wallace would be extremely close---with Wallace holding the balance of support.

2) Rockefeller has moved into an open lead over both his potential ~~in~~ opponents in the Democratic Party.

3) McCarthy's support shows the greatest volatility of any candidate's.

This has been a year of the unexpected---and the polls have reflected this.

1) ~~XXXXXX~~ Results of Harris and Gallup and Crossly are not as dissimilar as they might appear at first glance.

reiterated the line we
all discussed -
sounds like they're up a poll-takers
protective society -
We say based on varying pamphlet
techniques

Buchanan

File

Keast

*Covered by
Murdican*

7/31

July 28, 1968

*Will send mail
to Hurry's - to
arr. Sat AM.*

To: HRH

From: Dwight

RE: CONVENTION - Tuesday Morning Delegate Meetings

Complete background information on the Delegate meetings to be held August 6th, should be available for RN before leaving for Miami. This will help him in planing a little different touch for each group.

The information should contain (1) States represented; (2) key leaders who should be mentioned/ recognized; (3) Political points to be made; (4) Political summation of situation in the particular state(s).

You should program the political types to pipe this background to you next Sunday so the Boss will have it when he returns to NYC. Obviously-- there will be a necessity to update some of the information when RN arrives Monday night in Miami--- but he should have as much information as possible ahead of time to work with.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Memo to DC from Safire

July 31, 1968.

Here's the mint copy, hot off the press in Miami. Our plan is to print 20,000 there, distribute them to delegates and VIPs free, and sell the rest at Miami hotel newsstands.

Then we will substitute the acceptance speech for the "Expanded Democracy", add some victory pictures from the convention and run the other 80,000.

And if there is anything you want to change, it could be done for that second run.

Hobe Lewis threw a lot of his top talent at the Digest into this (as well as his own time); you'll want to call him soon. I'll arrange to get a list of his volunteers to receive notes from you.

We will wait until the "final" edition is run before binding fifty in leather for presentation to certain contributors.

I'll be in Miami when you get this, double-checking on the distribution; if there is some horrible error I've missed that requires that the whole effort be aborted, call me; after doing so, I will swim slowly out to sea.

P.S. Another subject: If you want to use that Dickens quote about "the to 1775, not in 1775.

For your information

From Pat Hillings

File ✓

To Bob Holdeman -
 I contacted Jack Garland
 who was my fellow
 delegate from my district
 at the last four conventions
 and explained this
 decision on escorting
 RN to the platform would
 be made in Miami -
 He doesn't plan to attend
 the convention as of now -
 can do I don't see why else we
 Pat H.

Helting -

Is this one for
you to handle?

If not let
me know -
cause someone
has to -

H

BOB HALDEMAN

Copy of handwritten letter
from
John Jewett Garland

July 1st, 1968

Dear Dick:

Needless to say, after having served on the past six California Delegations, I was hurt by not being even asked to be even an alternate delegate at the Miami Convention.

One reason is that I feel I let you down by not being selected, but it was not because I didn't try. My guess is that the Rockefeller delegates who knew of my unswerving loyalty to you felt that I would not be useful should they achieve a stalemate on the first ballot. Such, due to your magnificent primary victories is not going to take place and I rejoice as delegates and Republican leaders daily turn to you with their support.

My great ambition now is to be among the group honored by being selected to escort you (and Pat) to the platform when you accept the nomination on the final day of the Convention. In 1960 Bob Finch was on that committee, and also was not a delegate, so there is a precedent.

Always sincerely,

/s/

Jack

July 1st 1968

JOHN JEWETT GARLAND

117 WEST NINTH STREET
LOS ANGELES 15, CALIFORNIA

JUL 5 1968

Dear Dick -

Needless to say, after having served on the past six California Delegations, I was hurt by not being even asked to be ^{even} an alternate Delegate at the Miami Convention.

One reason is that I feel I let you down by not being selected, but it was not because I didn't try. My guess is that the Rockefeller delegates who knew of my unswerving loyalty to you felt that I would not be useful

should they achieve a stalemate
on the first ballot. Such, due
to your magnificent primary
victories is not going to
take place and I rejoice as
delegates and Republican leaders
daily turn to you with their
support.

My great ambition
now is to be among the
group honored by being select-
ed to escort you (and Pat)
to the platform when you
accept the nomination on the
fine day of the convention.

In 1960 Bob Finch was on
that committee, and also was not
a delegate, so there is a precedent.

Always sincerely

Jack

VIA AIR MAIL



Hon Richard M Nixon
810 Fifth Avenue
New York
N. Y.

PERSONAL

PERSONAL

JOHN JEWETT GARLAND
117 WEST NINTH STREET
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90015

John
ask after the
with the me

*Mr. Waldeman -
For your action*

BRYCE N. HARLOW

File

1730 K STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON 6, D.C.

July 23, 1968

Mr. Peter M. Flanigan
Nixon for President Committee
P. O. Box 1968
Times Square Station
New York, New York 10036

Dear Pete:

On July 19 Congressman Craig Hosmer of California called me, he confided, on "a very important matter."

It turned out he believes that Congressman John B. Anderson of Illinois would be just right as RN's running mate.

Hosmer avers that Anderson has one of the best minds and is one of the best speakers in all the House of Representatives -- full of energy, too -- and "one just can't find a better man anywhere."

Hosmer adds that Anderson speaks in a way to "get the people going." He's good looking. He's "a little to the left of the middle of the road."

I promised Hosmer to let the RN Valhalla have his advice.

You have it. So now

Sincerely,


Bryce N. Harlow

File ~~Washington File~~
[Large scribble]

MEMORANDUM

JULY 10, 1968

TO: CHAPIN/HALDEMAN
CC: JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM: JOHN WHITAKER

RE: JOHN EISENHOWER

John Eisenhower has been calling me several times lately and in his last conversation he definitely wants guidance in nailing down his role from here to November.

He has accepted Tom Evans' request to head the United Citizens for Nixon in Pennsylvania.

He wants to come to Miami and I have assured him there is adequate housing and that Barbara should come along and that all expenses would be paid — Ehrlichman please advise me on what rooms they have and when you want them. He seems agreeable to being part of the reception committee when RN arrives in Miami and I told him I thought this was a good idea.

The basic problem with John is that he, as he puts it, "wants to be in a staff capacity to RN post-Convention and doesn't want to be another 'one of the family strap-hangers'" - translated I sense this means that he just doesn't really want to be out front in a celebrity position where he would be most useful to RN.

At any rate, I am on the hook to call John back and clarify his overall role from now to November and, more specifically, his precise role in Miami.

Please advise.

To Halde
John
Bob
This is your
area
C.
Advice to RN for

PAUL L. DAVIES
P.O. BOX 760
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95106

July 23, 1968

H - Ch.
Rmw ✓

File Done

Dear Dick:

I spent the weekend at the Bohemian Grove Encampment. The weather was ideal and we had the largest number in attendance in the history of the Grove. A number of your friends asked about you and expressed regret that you could not be in attendance.

I had as my guest, Russell Giffen, who you may remember when you were running for Governor, was the key farmer in the Fresno area. You and I flew to his ranch on the West side of the Valley where he had as his guests for luncheon a number of the outstanding agriculturists.

Mr. Giffen continues to be one of the largest farmers in the United States and is very active in the affairs of the Cotton Council and other top-flight agriculture organizations.

Mr. Giffen got in touch with me sometime ago and said that a Mr. Albert Russell, who is Executive Vice President of the National Cotton Council and lives in Memphis, but farms in Mississippi, was very anxious to have the opportunity of talking to you. If it were possible for you to arrange to meet him, Mr. Giffen would also plan to be present.

What they both would like to talk to you about, of course, is agriculture. According to Mr. Giffen, Mr. Russell is very influential in the South and is a member of the Mississippi delegation to the Republican Convention.

I know how crowded your schedule is prior to the Convention and I have told Mr. Giffen that I doubt whether it would be possible for you to see Mr. Russell and him, but I thought in view of the importance of Mr. Russell in connection with the Southern delegations and with agriculture, you might wish to have one of your aides make a suggestion as to what time, if any, you had before the Convention when you could see the two of them.

Mr. Giffen, in concluding his letter to me, said that Mr. Russell and he would be glad to go wherever it is convenient for you to see them, North, East, South or West.

I am sending copies of this letter to Rose Mary Woods and Bob Holderman, and if possible, would appreciate hearing from one of them as to the feasibility of this request, so I can pass the word on to Mr. Giffen and Mr. Russell. If it is impossible for you to see them prior to the Convention, I think it would be best for me to be in position to advise them of this latter fact.

Warm regards.

Truly yours,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
P. L. DAVIES

Paul L. Davies

Mr. Richard M. Nixon
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

cc: Mr. Robert Holderman
Miss Rose Mary Woods

7/17/68

FRANK SHAKESPEARE to rmw

Three things:

1. Re quest for interview on the Chet Huntley Show --

TD
(today after the luncheon I stayed on with them - the Executive Producer of the Huntley-Brinkley show said they have a concept of having two shows prior to the Republican Convention and two shows prior to the Democratic Convention. Huntley will do Nixon - Brinkley will do Rockefeller.

(this would be on the regular 1/2 hour evening show. It would be head to head in RN's apartment.

When rmw started to say something Frank said -- I want to have a Gentlemen's agreement that they won't take excerpts from RN and excerpts from Rocky and make it a debate. They have to be run completely separate day from the NR interview.

Also that they will not overshoot.

"I have already told them that his schedule is extremely crowded - going to California and will then be unavailable because he will be doing some writing, etc.

2. Warren Wallace with whom RN has been doing some shooting is going to go to California to look over the situation.

I understand Ed is in Seattle - he wants to get any family photographs, etc. -- to whom should he speak?

(rmw referred them to our own office for the early photographs as we have a good collection of them -- and said I would find out about Whittier, etc. -

Should we ask Clara Jane whether she has tht time to take this fellow around -- say to the home in Whittier - to Yorba Linda, etc.

(It may be that Wallace will decide that he should not do any shooting out there -- but if he does decide it could not be until Tuesday night since he does not get out there until Monday night.

QUESTION: Would RN want to do it (rmw said I did not think so on Tuesday night as he would just be getting started on trying to have some time alone to think.

But - would, of course, check this out

3. Joey Bishop Show -- Los Angeles -- would RN want to do this Monday night?

(rmw said I did not think so -- that I felt the meeting would go on most of the day and into the evening.

(He said to check it out -- and said "I think it is a perfectly suitable show to do it - it is a good exposure but whether or not it is encroaching on his schedule - or if RN wants to do it any other night while he is out there.

(I am sure the only reason they said Monday night they did not know he would be there longer)

I don't know whether RN saw the TV column in the Daily News --

Bill Buckley (the other day when we were talking with the ABC people at lunch they said they were doing a different coverage this year -- they are having a 90 minute wrap up in the evening)

~~ixwixm~~

There will be a 20 minute segment in which Gore Vidal and Buckley will make comment. When they asked Bill Buckley what he thought he would be doing he said "I will be running defense for Richard Nixon." Secondly he said Richard Nixon will win his support even in a contest with Ronald Reagan.

(Handwritten initials)

DC from Safire (cc Mitchell)

Re: "Kremlining"

July 14, 1968.

Hypotheses:

1. The Soviet Union will attempt to influence the U.S. election in hopes of electing the Democratic candidate.

2. Democratic strategy will take advantage of this to portray Humphrey as the peacemaker and Nixon as an old-fashioned cold warrior who will perpetuate East-West tension.

Support for Hypothesis #1:

a. There is precedent: Khrushchev admitted to Mike Wallace on CBS last year that he did what he could to defeat Nixon in 1960 by refusing to exchange the U-2 pilot.

b. The London Economist story (attached) titled "One Vote for Hubert" shows how Russian actions on disarmament this month are designed to help the Democrats.

c. Reporters I spoke to in London last week are certain that Kosygin has already invited LBJ to Moscow during the campaign in the U.S.

Support for Hypothesis #2:

a. Humphrey's intended Commonwealth Club speech was directed at accommodation with Soviet Union and ignored China. This was his most carefully prepared speech to date and indicates the first step in a continuing strategy.

b. Reston's column (attached) was the result of a backgrounder intended to establish Humphrey as the man the Russians trust more and will deal with more easily than Nixon. The column simply differentiates between candidates' approach to Soviets, makes no judgments about which is right; that will come later.

c. LBJ has already dropped a public hint about "The Summit."

cont'd...

d. Past patterns of Clark Clifford and Jim Rowe have been "turn a minus into a plus." Best way to get rid of "war party" image is not to defend reasons for the war, but to suddenly and dramatically stress a peace offensive, identifying Democrats as the party of *détente*. This is daring political strategy which Clifford has specialized in ("We have to throw a long pass." is the way he puts it).

Therefore, if these hypotheses are accepted as likelihoods, two sharply different counter-strategies present themselves:

1. Coin "Kremlining" and denounce it.

a. Ted Lewis column in N. Y. News, commenting on Economist article, shows typical hardliner reaction -- that any indication of Russian support for a candidate is the "kiss of death" and that U. S. public would prefer a man who can "stand up to the Russians."

b. Remind voters LBJ ran falsely as "man of peace" in '64 and is now warming over the same phoney technique.

c. Warn against LBJ Russian trip as a pure political ploy, similar to abortive Manila conference during '66 elections. Remind voters of Yalta, when tiring U. S. president was too willing to take Soviet assurances at face value, and his weakening grip cost West dearly.

d. Play up U. S. resentment at outside interference with U. S. elections, recall Khrushchev's previous action.

e. Stress need for wariness and strength in dealing with Soviets, with realistic Nixon better equipped to deal with them than desperate LBJ or naive Humphrey.

f. Caution against "secret agreements" that might tie the hands of the next President.

(NOTE: Democrats probably expect this reaction by Republicans, with Nixon forced into a moratorium during actual trip based on past performance, leaving denunciations to vice presidential candidate and National Chairman.)

2. Surprise counter-strategy: Seize the idea first.

a. Nixon suggests LBJ make a trip to Moscow soon.

cont'd...

b. At Convention, suggest Rockefeller, Percy or other defeated or unchosen Republican candidate accompany him; man chosen by Nixon would be widely interpreted as next Secretary of State. This would break the direct link between President's peacemaking efforts and Democratic campaign.

c. Stress good-will nature of trip, downplay negotiations; consider this laying the groundwork for hard negotiations by next President.

d. In campaign, focus on Asia as source of future trouble and hold Humphrey's feet to fire on area he prefers to avoid talking about.

e. In sum, be all in favor of a preliminary breaking of the ice by the retiring President, bolster need for bipartisan foreign policy and stress Nixon's capability of following through with hard bargaining that will best protect America's interests.

Basic advantages of counter-strategy denouncing "kremlineering" -- It relies on distrust of Johnson by electorate, stresses his foreign policy weakness and crassly political gambits.

Basic advantages of counter-strategy of getting ahead of the parade -- It identifies Nixon with hopes for peace, shows his nonpartisan concern for country first, and makes what is bound to happen his own unifying idea.

Worst potential Nixon mistake -- Lack of a plan to meet this Democratic strategy. This would result in a reaction that falls between two stools: reluctance to criticize forthrightly, sniping by secondary officials who may appear to be at cross purposes with candidate's high-minded stand, a general feeling that the newsmaking power of the Presidency causes Republicans to flounder.

A radio speech containing the opening salvo of counter-strategy #2 is attached; it quietly introduces the thought near the end.

DC from SAFIRE (via GARMENT)

cc: Haldeman

file

July 17, 1968.

Aphorisms, Epigrams and Quotable Paragraphs for Acceptance Speech and Stump Speeches.

Foreign Policy

We have never been the policemen of the world; we cannot be expected to be the welfare workers of the world; we do not presume to be the judges of the world. But by the example we set in the achievement of personal freedom, we can once again become the hope of the world.

(OR)

It is all very popular at the moment to recite the truism that we are not the world's policeman. But if we do not accept our fair share of responsibility in protecting peace and freedom around the world, we will find ourselves having to act again as the world's fireman---and we must not let that happen again.

When can a third-rate power embarrass or defeat a first-rate power? Only when that first-rate power has second-rate leadership.

There are always those willing to sell out our allies and sell short our resolution.

Change

The power to vote is the power to change. And that power to change is the greatest strength of a democracy.

Unrest

If we dismiss our discontented young people as "rebels without a cause" -- we shall find ourselves leaders without an effect.

There are those who wring their hands over living through a decade of demonstrations. They forget that the story of America is the greatest two-century demonstration in all the long sweep of human history. We are all demonstrators. We are all revolutionaries.

Unrest (cont'd)

Our campaign will not add to national tensions---our platform does not rest on unrest.

In achieving peace abroad, the diplomats can do more than the military; in achieving peace at home, the moderates can do more than the militants.

Law and Order

As we jealously guard the rights of the accused, let us give some thought to the rights of the abused. We must stop feeling guilty about protecting the innocent victims.

Wallace

There are those who form minority parties in order to deny rights to minorities.

I differ with the likely Democratic candidate on the dismal record of this Administration; I differ with the Democratic candidate on the failure to restore order in America; I differ with the Democratic candidate on the abuse of our dollar at home and the misuse of our power abroad. And if any splinter candidate wants to call this "a dime's worth of difference," all I can say is---that's some valuable dime!

To those who would divert the stream of protest to the backwaters of a third party, I ask: Do you want to register a futile protest, or do you want to make a change? And I urge: Don't vote to get something off your chest---vote to get someone on the job.

When they count your vote---will your vote count?

Protest has its place, but in the American system, a candidate runs to win---and a voter votes to elect.

Themes

We are met today at a watershed of American history.

Themes (cont'd)

We must offer the American people a true compass...a compass that will restore our sense of direction and enable us to get accurate bearings on where we really stand...a compass that will point the way to a new departure, a fresh approach...a true compass to chart a course of moral action. (This could be the metaphor for the new administration.)

Leadership

America needs preventive diplomacy and inventive leadership.

Promises

America is saying, "Deliver us from promises---promise us what you can deliver."

The "wave of the future" we were promised turned out to be a wave of crime and an underflow of war.

We have heard great pronouncements about a War on Poverty and a War on Crime. Abroad, we have been waging a war without declaring it; at home, we have been declaring wars without waging them.

Bossism

The handshaking of the primaries is better than the arm-twisting of the back rooms.

(OR)

In 1968, America is not going to elect a candidate who preferred the smoke of the backrooms to the fire of the primaries.

Uplift

The American Dream does not come to those who fall asleep. The American Dream is achieved by those who are wide awake to the ideals that beam hope to all mankind.

Uplift (cont'd)

In the long view of history, the first millenium brought man into the Dark Ages; the second millenium broke through to the hope of freedom and justice, as well as the danger of annihilation. We stand today at the threshold of a third millenium...

In A Tale of Two Cities, Charles Dickens wrote:

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times... it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair." The year he described was 1775, as the United States was coming into being, and that paradox applies again today.

In one sense, these are the worst of times... the worst riots, the worst crime, the worst inflation and the worst kind of war. But these are also the best of times. Never before has mankind had a better chance to shape his own destiny. Never before could each one of us participate so fully in changing the worst of times into the best of times.

Peace

We shall pursue the politics of peace in the furtherance of freedom.

Peace is not passive; the path of peace must be continually cleared. The road to war is paved with the neglect of little tensions.

Comeback

You have chosen as your nominee one who has tasted victory---and who is no stranger to defeat. A man can gain a lot from the one, and learn a lot from the other.

As a nation, America too has had its ups and downs in the Sixties. We have all suffered from the setbacks of this difficult decade. But I have learned as an individual, and I believe that we have all learned as a nation, that the only way to "come back" is to move ahead.

I believe that a great comeback is in store for the relations between the races. I believe that a great comeback is in store for those who have been robbed of their human dignity. I believe that a great comeback is in store for the cause of peace with freedom in the years ahead.

Individualism

As our opponents plead for unity, let us celebrate diversity; as they sanctify sameness, let us dignify uniqueness; as they think collectively of the people, let us think individually of the person.

Attacks

After the peaceful progress of the Fifties, we have seen the steep, surprising slide of the Sixties...

In the past five years, a shadow has fallen across America; and now, the Johnson-Humphrey administration seeks to cast its shadow across the next four years of American history.

New leadership cannot be achieved by a warmed-over administration with a carbon-copy platform and a Xerox candidate.

Welfare

Welfare is too important to be left to the Welfare Staters.

Decentralization

Government of the people and by the people has been replaced by government for the people. We must restore that delicate balance; government must seek the advice and consent of every American.

Experience

"What difference is there," some people ask me, "between Hubert Humphrey's background and your own? After all, you were both vice presidents." The difference is this: Humphrey learned about the Presidency from Lyndon Johnson, and I served under Dwight Eisenhower---and that makes all the difference in the world.

Useful Woodrow Wilson quotes:

"Government is not a warfare of interests...government is a matter of common council."

"We are witnessing a renaissance of public spirit, a reawakening of sober public opinion, a revival of the power of the people, the beginning of an age...with the new age we shall show a new spirit."

"We stand in the presence of an awakened nation, impatient of partisan make-believe."

"The Nation has been unnecessarily, unreasonably, at war within itself... Our task now is to effect a great readjustment and get the forces of the whole people into play. We need no revolution; need no excited change; we need only a new point of view and a new method and spirit of counsel."

"I believe that the greatest force for peace, the greatest force for righteousness, the greatest force for the elevation of mankind, is organized opinion..."

"I know the temper of the great convention that nominated me; I know the temper of the country that lay back of that convention and spoke through it."

file

1st Draft. July 14, 1968. WLS

THE NEXT ONE HUNDRED DAYS

Today, July 29, 1968, offers an interesting benchmark in this election campaign. One hundred days from today, Americans will go to the polls to select their next President.

One hundred days marked the time of Napoleon's last campaign; one hundred days at the beginning of Franklin Roosevelt's administration marked a period of enormous change in our nation. The span of time may be brief---but much can happen in a hundred days.

In these next hundred days, America will go through the tumult of choosing nominees at national conventions; we will go through the exhilaration and fascination of a national campaign; and then, in a moment of quiet and privacy in a voting booth, each one of us will make his or her decision about the future direction of our country.

To those who do not understand the American system, the next hundred days will appear to be a time of deep division, of angry voices, of charge and countercharge.

Those who do understand the workings of democracy know that this will be the time of our greatest strength. This is the testing-time, the crucible of freedom; as we change our leadership in this orderly way, we re-dedicate our ideal of government by the consent of the governed. Out of this struggle emerges a stronger nation and a reinvigorated people.

Our differences are real, and the candidates of the two parties offer sharply different approaches to the problems we face. But Thomas Jefferson put it this way: "Not every difference of opinion is a difference of principle." Whoever emerges as President of the United States will indeed be president of all the people.

In these next one hundred days what can the candidates do, what can you as a citizen do, and what can the President do to make this a creative, constructive campaign? What can we all do now to set the stage for a new unity after Election Day?

The Candidates' Responsibility

First, let's see what the candidates can do to sharpen the issues; to clarify the issues; to clarify the differences in philosophy; to help you make an informed choice. This is the nature of the campaign I foresee:

The campaign of 1968 will be a campaign of new ideas. It will have to be---I don't think the American people will stand for a situation in which one party cries, "It's time for a change." while the other party replies, "You never had it so good." That kind of campaigning is behind us. The problems of peace abroad, of controlling crime and violence at home, and of providing equal justice under law are too overriding to permit a retreat into the tired rhetoric of the past.

The new ideas in this campaign must be relevant to the needs of today and must prepare for the needs of tomorrow. You will be able to see, in this next hundred days, which candidate will be promising more of the

same old answers, and which candidate will come up with new answers, new approaches to problems that the old answers have not solved.

There is something else the candidates must do this year. We must show you what kind of people we are. And not just in carefully prepared speeches. Candidates in 1968 must be prepared to engage in the cut and thrust of debate. We must be prepared to answer questions, the hard questions, from people in audiences and from the reporters who represent them.

A President of the United States has to be prepared to think fast and to act wisely. His basic instincts have to be right, and he has to be able to say clearly what he thinks. You as a voter can judge a man's character in the way he responds to spontaneous and unhearsd situations. This year candidates will not be able to escape such tests.

Another way to judge a man's character is to look at his record--to see if what he says is consistent with what he has done over the years. In this campaign nobody will be allowed to run away from his record--or his administration's record.

There is another responsibility of candidates this year: To lock horns with the dilemmas and not with each other. There will be a certain amount of ribbing, that's all part of political campaigning--but this is not the year for bickering about personalities. Style is less important than substance; I believe the undecided voter will join the man who joins the issues.

Finally, candidates this year will have to demonstrate an ability to unite and to lead. Let me be clear about the ability to unite: We all know, that even in the greatest landslides, at least one American in three does not vote for the man who is elected. The nature of our system calls for the closing of ranks, the coming together of the nation, after the voice of the majority has spoken.

But there is a good way for you to judge the ability to unite the nation after election day: And that is the ability of a candidate to unite his party before Election Day. Preaching unity is one thing; being a unifying force is something else. Each candidate will surely try to bring together the widespread wings of his party; it is for you to judge who best succeeds.

The Voters' Responsibility

So far, I've been discussing the responsibilities of candidates in this next one hundred days. But what of your responsibility? What will you be called upon to do in this testing time for America?

There are certain things you do not have to do. You do not have to wear a button or wave a banner or blow up a balloon. If you enjoy that, fine---it's a good way of showing your enthusiasm and getting others excited and involved. But the outward trappings of political activity are only part of the picture.

The most important thing for all of us to do is to open our minds and stretch our understanding of what's happening in our country today. The pages of our newspapers and magazines that get all too quick a glance are

the pages that probe the trends of American life; the television programs that get the lowest ratings are those documentaries that pose the problems of hunger and crime and all our social ills. It's hard work to watch and read and comprehend, especially after a day on the job or raising a family. But it is this extra effort that is needed, especially in these hundred days of decision.

Election Day will not be the only day you vote. In a larger sense, you're voting every day---electing whether to participate or withdraw. When a neighbor asks you to come to a civic or political meetings---do you vote to participate or to withdraw? When a man on the job next to you suggests a project that would involve you with a community youth program---the decision you make is a way of voting.

President Truman used to have a sign on his desk that read, "The buck ends here." But the buck really does not end on the President's desk in Washington. It ends in the personal decisions in the daily lives of two hundred million individual Americans.

Certainly it's a big job, obeying the law, paying your taxes, providing for your family---but today there is more to the job of being a responsible American. When it comes to restoring racial peace, to opening up opportunity, to closing the generation gap---the buck ends with every one of us.

And there is another thing you can do in this hundred days: Make it tough on the candidates. I mean all the candidates from the most local office on the bottom of the ticket to the men running for President.

Here's a constructive way to make a candidate's life difficult. Listen carefully to what he says and ask yourself: "Have I heard all this before, or is he offering something new? Is he promising to make my life easy, or is he 'telling it like it is'? Does he have specific programs or is he dealing in generalities? Is he talking about problems of the past, or is he talking about my problems today?"

And don't just ask yourself these questions. Ask the candidate, or write him, and get quite specific. It will make us all better candidates. And it will make you a better informed voter.

The President's Responsibility

Now let me turn to what the President of the United States can do in these next hundred days to take the politics out of peacemaking, and to take peacemaking out of the American political campaign.

Four months ago, President Johnson told the American people he was not going to be a candidate for reelection, so that he could better devote his remaining months in office to the cause of making peace.

He felt, quite rightly, that he had to make this sacrifice to redeem an administration whose policies have led to wider war, frustration and failure.

As peace negotiations have begun, the President has been offered a great deal of offstage advice. I have not joined the chorus of those who have submitted a variety of peace plans, because I believe the United States should speak with one voice at the peace table.

Over the years, however, I have made it plain---time and again--- that the problem of peace in Viet Nam is not a localized matter, but one that has to be approached on global terms.

It is not unlikely that in the near future the President will be invited to Moscow for talks with Premier Kosygin.

I believe it would be fitting for the President to accept that invitation.

Such a trip, coming in the midst of election time in the United States, would undoubtedly cause some skepticism and some criticism. Memories of the hastily-arranged Manila conference during the 1966 congressional campaign would be awakened. There would be charges that the mission to Moscow was timed for our domestic election and politically motivated.

But let's be realistic: Everything the President does, whenever he does it, has a political impact. The question is not whether this will help the Democratic nominee; certainly, to some extent, it will. The real question is whether, in the long run, it could have a beneficial effect on world peace.

I think it could. Properly handled, and with bipartisan support, a good-will trip now by the President could pave the way for concrete negotiations later by the incoming Administration.

I am not unaware of the dangers of summitry. The "spirit of Glassboro" did not stop the Soviet Union from supplying 80% of the war material to North Viet Nam. The Soviet Union knows very well how to play upon the sincere hopes for peace in the Western world. And the Soviet leaders know that the President has a personal need for some dramatic compact to reverse the character of his past five years.

Despite changes of mood, I do not believe that the Soviet Union has changed its motives. They will accommodate our pressure for peace only as it suits their own economic and diplomatic purposes.

But neither do I believe that Lyndon Johnson has changed. He remains as shrewd and tough and politically adept as ever. I would hope, in the traditional spirit of bipartisanship in foreign affairs, that he would take with him some eminent Republicans who, like him, are not involved in election campaigns. I would further hope that the President would seek suggestions from both Presidential nominees about these advisers to accompany him; among these would be a man who would provide continuity of contact into the next administration.

This suggestion to the President is tendered not in a spirit of presumption, but in a spirit of cooperation in a cause larger than partisan politics.

I think we can all agree that the next hundred days will mark a turning point in American history. Who wins is obviously important, for it will determine the direction of our government as we begin the final third of this century. But how he wins, the nature of the campaign, is important as well, because a creative campaign will lay the foundation for re-unifying the American people after Election Day.

As we have seen, the President will play an important role; the candidates, all up and down the line, have special responsibilities this year to engage the great world issues and the urgent local issues.

And your own role in this watershed year of 1968 has never been more demanding nor more vital. Your own actions in these hundred days will bring America to grips with its problems; your careful attention will force candidates to speak with candor and clarity; and your vote is your voice in determining your own future.

July 6, 1968

One Vote for Hubert

Mr. Kosygin is voting early, and he is voting for Hubert Humphrey. It is more than a year since President Johnson started prodding the Russians to sit down and talk about fixing a limit to the number of nuclear missiles the two superpowers should be allowed to possess. That Mr. Kosygin should now have accepted Mr. Johnson's invitation, after dodging it for so long, means that he must have a motive.

It cannot be explained just by saying that it has taken him this long to see the force of Mr. Johnson's arguments. No doubt the Russian generals who don't like the idea of being put on a missile ration have been doing their sums all over again. They know that the number of attacking missiles they possess has gradually been creeping closer to the number the Americans have. They have probably realised at last that the "thin" anti-missile screen they are putting up around Moscow (see the next page) might just possibly ward off the sort of attack a minor nuclear power like France or China could launch against them, but that against a full-scale American attack it would be about as good as a colander in a thunderstorm. They also know that it would cost them the earth—maybe as much as a tenth of a whole year's national production—to try to protect themselves against the Americans with a "thick" anti-missile screen, which probably wouldn't work anyway. Yet none of this wholly explains why Mr. Kosygin should now have taken the plunge and accepted Mr. Johnson's invitation to negotiate. This is a major decision, and the creaking coalition that has been running Russia since 1964 does not like taking major decisions. Mr. Brezhnev, who was banging away at "decaying" America on Wednesday, probably mistrusts this decision. If Mr. Kosygin has now decided to defy his nervous nannies it is because of the American election.

For the last few weeks the Russians have been dropping hints, in the United Nations and elsewhere, that they want the next President of the United States to be a man who will continue Mr. Johnson's policy of co-operation with the Soviet Union. They doubt whether Mr. Nixon would run his foreign policy that way, and they may be right. They have probably written off Senator McCarthy's chances of getting the Democratic nomination. So they have accepted Mr. Johnson's year-old invitation in the hope that this will help Mr. Johnson's chosen successor, Hubert Humphrey.

This does not mean that President Humphrey, if that is the case, will have a treaty ready waiting for

him on a platter. When the Russian ambassador in London signed the non-proliferation treaty on Monday—while other copies were being signed in Washington and Moscow—he produced a list of no fewer than nine subjects his government would like to talk about next. The limiting of missile forces was discreetly slipped in among them. But the Russians also chucked in some of the oldest kitchen sinks in the propaganda business, including the dismantling of foreign bases and a total ban on the use of any nuclear weapons at any time.

The Russians know from 20 years' experience of talks about disarmament that the Americans are not going to agree to this until Russia agrees to some sort of control over the size of its conventional forces, above all in Europe. It is true that the Russian list on Monday drew a distinction between the dismantling of foreign bases, which it said the Geneva disarmament conference ought to "consider," and the much more important missile proposal, on which the Russian government "proposes to reach an agreement." It is a pretty piece of hint-dropping. But the length of the Russians' 9-point agenda, in which any one point can be made conditional on the other side's acceptance of one of the other points, makes it plain that there is going to be some tough bargaining. Mr. Kosygin will probably be asking, in particular, for "parity" between the superpowers' missile arsenals. This will not go down well with many members of the American Congress. They are used to having a clear-cut numerical superiority in missiles, and they have not yet accepted Mr. McNamara's argument that numbers matter less than "second-strike capability"; see page 10.

It is going to be a test of the negotiators' bottoms. Yet it is reasonably clear that the past week's events have carried the relationship between Russia and America, and the relationship between the pair of them and the rest of the world, into a new stage. The non-proliferation treaty that was signed on Monday by nearly 60 states has justified itself already. "Non-proliferation" is the most anaesthetic word of the 1960s. The fog of confusion that has hung over the three years of haggling about the treaty of Geneva since 1965 has prevented many people from grasping its importance. It is not that the treaty itself will automatically prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five countries that have them now. To that extent, its critics have quite fairly called it a scrap of paper. But, like other scraps of paper, its importance lies in the fact that the people who have caused

it to be put into circulation—the Russians and the Americans—now have a joint interest in making sure that it keeps its face value. In making the non-proliferation treaty stick, the United States and Russia face certain common problems, and they will have to tackle them together.

One of these problems is India, which has said that it is not going to sign the treaty. But even if the superpowers get that one under control they will still face the problem of preventing the other non-nuclear powers from one day rebelling against Monday's treaty. The only way they can do this is to demonstrate that they are willing to limit, and then to reduce, their own nuclear stockpiles. The novelty of the new round of talks to which Mr Kosygin has at long last given his consent is that the superpowers are now

ready to contemplate imposing this discipline on themselves. Nothing quite like it has happened before. So far the main nuclear agreements between Russia and America—the test ban treaty of 1963, and the non-proliferation treaty signed on Monday—have essentially been measures designed to keep the nuclear club as small as possible. A Russian-American agreement to limit missile forces would mean that the main members of the club were making rules for themselves as well as for other people. It would be the first real measure of nuclear self-denial the world has yet seen.

It is curious how the facts of nuclear life are quietly changing the pattern of power in the world. The United States and Russia, those implacable enemies of the 1950s, have now been drawn together in two different ways. First,

The missile balance

If it ever comes to nuclear war, both Russia and the United States possess a second-strike capability against the other. This means that either could absorb a surprise attack and still have enough missiles left over to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the other. How much is unacceptable? The Americans estimate that 400 1-megaton weapons could destroy a third of Russia's population and a half of its industry. Because the population and industry of the United States are more densely packed, the Russians probably need even fewer.

This deadlock is at the heart of the present state of nuclear deterrence. It implies that a retaliatory second strike would be aimed at centres of population as well as at missile sites. In no meaningful sense can either superpower be described as "inferior" to the other so long as it has this second-strike capacity.

But ideas of superiority and parity are still bandied about. There are three main yardsticks: megatonnage (1 megaton—a million tons of TNT); the number of warheads; and the number of missile-launchers.

Russia has developed bigger warheads than the Americans, probably because it hopes that one big warhead will destroy a target that would need three smaller ones. Some of its ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) are of 10 megatons, and it may possess some in the 30-megaton range. The biggest American ICBM warhead is somewhere over 5 megatons.

In numbers of warheads, the Americans claimed last September a 3-1 or 4-1 advantage (their forces, including the obsolescent manned bombers, carry more than 4,000 warheads). But Russia's build-up means that this advantage is gradually being whittled down. It may be down to 2-1 by 1970.

The Russians have been fast increasing their land-based ICBM launchers.

and 750 medium-range (1,100 miles) and intermediate-range (2,000 miles) missiles aimed at targets in western Europe, Japan and, probably, China. Through the use of reconnaissance satellites, both superpowers have a pretty accurate idea of the other's strength in missile-launchers.

In submarine-borne missiles, the Americans have a big edge over the Russians. They have 41 atomic-powered submarines, each carrying 16 missiles; 32 of the submarines are normally on station. Their *Polaris* missiles are being replaced by *Poseidons* (with a range of 2,500 nautical miles).

At present the Russians can fire 30 missiles, with an extreme range of 650 miles, from ten atomic-powered submarines; another 30, with a range of 400 miles, from 30 conventional submarines; and 240 surface-launched cruise missiles, with a range of 300 miles, from 20 atomic-powered and 24 conventional submarines. The firing of these missiles close to or on the surface adds to the risks of detection. The range of the missiles is being improved and it is estimated that by 1975 Russia could have a fully-fledged long-range *Polaris*-type force.

Both in submarine-borne and land-based missiles the Americans have established a lead over the Russians in the development of MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles). This is a system by which a number of warheads can be delivered from one launcher on to separate targets. The *Poseidon* missile possibly has three such warheads. But it is estimated that by 1975 Russia could develop and deploy an MIRV system. Unlike the United States, it has developed a FOBS (fractional orbital bombardment system). In this system a warhead of high megatonnage is put into low orbit around the earth and ordered on to its target before the orbit is completed (giving the defending

The United States is committed to installing the *Sentinel* system. It has two functions:

(1) "Area defence" against a limited attack such as China will be capable of launching in the mid-1970s.

(2) The defence of specific targets, mainly the American missile silos, against a full-scale attack by Russia.

In this system a highly developed form of radar tracks and predicts the path of incoming missiles. Then, in area defence, a long-range missile, the *Spartan*, is launched to intercept and destroy the incoming missile (using an X-ray device) well above the atmosphere (with, the Americans claim, "no fall-out hazard.") The defence of specific targets relies on a shorter-ranger interceptor missile, the *Sprint*, which explodes the missiles within the atmosphere (where, the Americans again claim, the fall-out danger is "negligible.")

This ABM umbrella is by no means leak-proof. If it were used against, say, a limited Chinese attack, the death roll could still be as high as a million (as against between 5 million and 10 million if there were no ABM system at all). In an all-out attack by the Russians enough missiles would penetrate the *Sentinel* defences to produce unacceptable damage. Hence the lobbying in America for a heavier, and much more costly, ABM screen.

The Russian system is more primitive and more limited. The *Tallinn* line (deployed across the north-western approaches to Russia) is no longer thought to have any "significant ABM capability." It is more in the nature of an early-warning system.

The *Galosh* ABM system is so far deployed only around Moscow. It is said to be similar to the *Nike-Zeus* system developed earlier by the Americans but never deployed, in which the radar trackers and the intercepting missiles were less sophisticated, less speedy and less reliable than in the *Spartan-Sprint* system. The Americans are certain that their missiles could penetrate the *Galosh* defence in sufficient numbers to destroy Moscow—

THOMAS HAYS SULZBERGER

Chairman of the Board

THOMAS G. SULZBERGER

President and Publisher

GANGROFT, Executive Vice President

JESSE CATLEDGE, Vice President

JAMES A. COX, Vice President

NEW FISHBURN, Vice President

JOHN WELT, Vice President

JAMES RESTON, Executive Editor

GREGORY GARDNER, Editorial Page Editor

NATHAN DANIEL, Managing Editor

MORTIMER S. SCHWARTZ, Sunday Editor

ROBERT MARKEL, Associate Editor

age by giving the delegates and the
te this opportunity to make an inde-

the Redwoods

poised—literally—over California's
last year. Then they struck. Only
lumberers had chopped down scores
they forced to suspend cutting in a
ed for permanent preservation.
descended over the forests. The
ature replaced the cacophony of
y.
poised again. This time they are
ressmen. They can save a frag-
ficent forests for the public or
ld for the lumberers. They can
National Park that is acceptable
write off a forest that will be
e symbol of what was once one
on the Pacific slope.

Committee shocked the nation

Humphrey and Nixon: The First Big Issue of the Campaign

By JAMES RESTON

The election campaign has been singularly free (so far) of the political clichés of the past. None of the major candidates has promised us The Good Old Days or Instant Peace and Prosperity. Nixon hasn't accused Humphrey (so far) of being Soft on Communism, and Humphrey hasn't accused Nixon (so far) of planning another Hoover Depression, and while George Wallace is backing into the future, nobody, praise the Lord, has dared to tell the voters that they "never had it so good."

Seldom in memory has there been so much desperate longing for peace and quiet in America or so few election promises of Immediate Salvation. Yet, while we are being spared the spectacular silliness of the past, the first major issue of the 1968 election between Humphrey and Nixon is beginning to appear.

The Big Issue

This issue is nothing less than how the United States is to approach the Communist world. Nixon is still talking as if Alger Hiss and Nikita Khrushchev were household words, and emphasizing what he calls "the fundamental fact

of the continuing confrontation between Communist ambition and Western resistance."

Humphrey, however, despite periods of anti-Communism in the past, is now saying that world conditions have changed and demand new priorities in American policy.

"They demand," he said this week, "a shift from policies of confrontation and containment to policies of reconciliation and peaceful engagement. The most important area of reconciliation—and the top priority for American foreign policy in the next decade—is that of East-West relations. This particularly includes relations among the United States and the Soviet Union, Western Europe and Eastern Europe."

The Differences

The differences between Humphrey and Nixon on this point could easily be exaggerated. Nixon is not saying nothing has changed and Humphrey is not saying everything has changed. Both recognize the changes in the Communist world and also the continuing menace, but the tendencies of their thought are different and this could be highly significant for the future.

Nixon's tendency is to as-

sume the worst about Communist ambitions, to give top priority to military security, to concentrate on Asia. He is not against "reconciliation," but the main thrust of his mind is on "confrontation" and "containment."

Humphrey's tendency in all relations—human relations, political relations and foreign relations—is to assume the best in other people. His top priority in the world, as he sees it now, is social reconstruction. He thinks first not about the Cold War—Nixon's priority—but about what he regards as the new Class War in the world between the rich people and the poor people within our own country, and the rich nations and the poor nations elsewhere.

These differing tendencies between the two leading candidates for the Presidency of the United States could be fundamental. Leave aside the question of who is right and who is wrong—that is a matter of opinion—but their minds and priorities are facts, and these differences between them could be decisive, not only in our election in November, but in world politics between now and the seventies.

On such a question, domestic and world politics get all mixed

up. Any hard look at the United States Federal Budget, even beyond the war in Vietnam, convinces not only the Nixon economists but Walter Heller, who is advising Humphrey, that the problem and menace of poverty at home and abroad cannot be funded adequately unless there is a substantial reduction in defense expenditures, amounting to tens of billions of dollars. And this obviously cannot be achieved without an accommodation, if not a reconciliation, between the two great arsenals of democracy and Communism in Washington and Moscow.

War and the Poor

Both Humphrey and Nixon recognize this, but their personalities, their assumptions and their priorities move them at different speeds and maybe in different directions. Nixon thinks first about the war between the East and the West. Humphrey about the war between the rich and the poor, and honest men can differ about who is right. But the question is now obviously coming to the fore, and if Nixon and Humphrey are nominated, it could be the decisive question in the election.

Foreign Affairs: Monsieur Cool

File

MEMORANDUM

To: R. N.

Date: July 18, 1968

From: Glenn Olds

Subj: Pre-Convention Report - May 15 - July 15, 1968

General Strategy for Policy and Manpower Development:

Priorities

1. Cultivation of key "policy makers" with creative ideas and proven experience for the development of "fresh perspective" on policy and manpower in (a) Foreign Affairs, (b) Domestic Affairs, (c) Fiscal and Economic Affairs, (d) Justice, Law and Order, (e) Health, Education and Welfare, and (f) Administration.
2. Sifting and distilling appropriate policy and manpower recommendations to the candidate.
3. Representing and being briefed for the candidate regarding selected and important persons and constituencies.
4. Developing substantive and strategic recommendations to the candidate regarding policy, manpower, and constituencies appropriate to the needs and demands of the people, the conditions of the campaign, the prospects of election, and the responsibilities and opportunities of the presidency.
5. Developing liason, leadership, and strategy with key constituencies in which it is generally believed the party and candidate are not strong; i.e. (a) the Black, (b) Poor, (c) Minority, (d) Student, (e) Intellectual, (f) Urban communities.
6. Developing liason with comprehensive components of R.N. campaign for coordinating, integrating and strengthening inputs on policy and manpower, with special reference to (a) Citizens, (b) Research, (c) Issues, (d) Party and Platform, (e) Delegates and politics, (f) the Convention and the Campaign.

Progress

1. In the two-month period, I have corresponded with over 500 key individuals, called and conferred with over 100, developed briefing papers from policy makers, and covered a comprehensive range of points of view, regions, centers of power, and spheres of influence. A selected sample of leaders seen in each field is appended as well as illustrations of briefing papers - i.e. Reischauer and Guillion.
2. Attended major international conference in Yugoslavia on behalf of the candidate, developing a range of contacts and ideas to supplement the American and domestic input.

3. Developed policy recommendations on (a) law and order, (b) extending the American revolution, (c) Peace-making and peace-keeping, (d) the human helping professions, (e) foreign policy advisers, (f) seminars for citizens on the politics of participation, (g) Black power and the black community, (h) policy planning and governmental reorganization, (i) policy and strategic priorities for the campaign.
4. Interpreted the philosophy and leadership of the candidate to key individuals (Hatfield, et al), constituencies (Harlem, universities, et al.) and critics (Stephen Wright, et al), with multiplier effect.
5. Cultivated leadership in critical constituencies (Puerto Rican, Black, Urban, Intellectual, Poor and Student) looking toward major campaign strategy and effort nationwide in these areas.
6. Worked to develop personal and professional relationships with staff and services of the candidate and campaign.

Perspective

1. Critical concern of voters less with "issues", "solutions", "programs", and more with "contact", "credibility", "communications", and the man.
2. The above symbolizes the problem, hunger, and hope of the people for personal participation, connection, responsibility, a meaningful, dignified role in "their" government and country. This is especially strong with the Black, student, minority, poor, and urban communities. It should dictate priorities, strategy, and program emphasis in the campaign.
3. There is a "credibility backlash" evident among the leadership of the nation. They are skeptical of "expert answers" to most of our problems; wary of proposed "solutions" to enduring problems. They believe the poor, conflict, crime, bureaucracy, party promises, and rivalries will be with us a long time. They respond more to the leader who accepts these realities, and speaks to attitudes and methods for making progress in changing them, than to the promised "savior" or "solver" of them.
4. The Vietnamese situation is slowly focusing, within a wider perspective, on foreign policy generally. Recent events in Czechoslovakia indicate the need and success of our broadly bi-partisan strategy over 20 years, and people are realizing that the measure of a president and the magnitude of our role in the world cannot be reduced to a view on Vietnam. Refinement and expansion of R.H.'s foreign affairs article on S.E. Asia will be in order and in line with this trend. Emphasis on a comprehensive fresh look at total foreign policy in order.
5. National preoccupation with Urban affairs, poverty, and minorities in the inner city must be kept in balance with our total domestic scene, and the balance of factors, governmental, voluntary, private, and industrial, must all be commissioned in dealing with them. Gimickry or excessive reliance on projects or strategies of high visibility and

little testability must be avoided. The massive nature of these problems will no doubt require more, not less, input of all these factors. Revision of this mix, mechanism, and role of each will be required.

6. The public generally wants more local responsibility and participation in government. The mechanisms of local and State government, however, cannot bear the weight of enlarged responsibility without major reform. Care must be taken not to encourage the belief that advocating more local responsibility will automatically create better government. Attention must be given the nature of this reform and steps begun now to enlist State and local authorities in the process of revision.

7. People generally are more interested in evidence of a changed attitude and fresh perspective on foreign and domestic policy, than in detailed proposals. Concentration on methods and mechanisms of reform involving responsible participation of appropriate people seems more honest and appealing than final solutions.

8. A range of specific suggestions, many worthy of special attention, have been developed. They relate to the scope of presidential responsibilities and the phasing of the campaign. All require a definition of priorities; more comprehensive coordination of policy and manpower development fully coordinated with all other phases of the campaign.

Problems

1. Access and feedback from candidate.
2. Organization, communication, and orchestration of total policy and manpower development.
3. Credibility of Olds' function in the light of public interpretation of the role.
4. Priorities for policy and manpower development.

cc: Messrs. Garment
Haldeman ✓
Mitchell

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

| Person | Position | Field |
|-------------------------|--|--|
| Adebo, Chief S. O. | Director UNIZAR | U. N. Revision |
| Ashabramner Brent | Deputy Director Peace Corps | Africa-India & Corps of Nation Building |
| Bailey, Stephen | Dir.-Instit. of Policy Studies-Maxwell School-U. of Syracuse | Inter. Develop. - Feder- alism |
| Bhutto, Zulfikar | Former Foreign Mini- ster-Pakistan | Mainland China-India- Pakistan |
| Bolling, Landrum | President Earlham College | Int. Communication |
| Bundy, MacGeorge | President Ford Foundation | Foreign Affairs |
| Burns, General E. L. M. | Adviser to Govt. of Canada on Disarma- ment | Peacekeeping & Middle East |
| Cleveland, Harlan | U.S. Permanent Re- presentative to NATO | NATO and the new Europe |
| Cordier, Andrew | Dean, Columbia U. | Int. Organization |
| Coulibaly, Sori | Special Assistant, President - Mali | Revolutions in the New Africa |
| Everton, John Scott | President-Roberts College, Turkey | Southeast Africa |
| Foster, William | Director, Arms Con- trol & Disarm. Comm. | Arms Control & Dis- armament |
| Gavin, James | Retired General Pres.-Arthur Little | National Defense |
| Geren, Paul | President Stetson Univ. | Development & Foreign Policy Training North Africa |
| Gonchoroff, Nicholas | Exec. Sec'y-Inter- national Affairs National YMCA | U.S.-U.S.S.R. |
| Griffith, Ernest | Dean, Int'l Studies American University | Foreign Policy, General-Vietnam |
| Gullion, Edmund | Dean, Fletcher School of Diplomacy, Tufts Univ. | Foreign Policy Disarmament Training |
| Haekkerup, Per | Political Spokesman of Social Democrat. Party-Danish Parlia. | The New Europe |

FOREIGN AFFAIRS - 2

| Person | Position | Field |
|---------------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| Hartman, Robert | Professor - Univ. of Mexico-formerly M.I.T. | U.S.-U.S.S.R. Peacekeeping |
| Jacobs, Philip | Professor - Univ. of Pennsylvania | Comparative Ideology |
| Larson, Arthur | Director-World Law Institute-Duke University | International Law & Foreign Policy |
| Linowitz, Sol M. | U.S. Representative Organization of American States | Latin America |
| Makonnen, Lij Endalkachew | Ambassador of Ethiopia to U.N. | African Affairs U.N. - Peace |
| Martin, Graham | Former Ambassador-Thailand-now at State Dept., Wash. | East Asia Foreign Policy |
| Mates, Leo | Dir. Inst. for Int'l Politics & Economics-Belgrade | Yugoslavia & Eastern Europe |
| Mayobre, Jose Antonio | Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Venezuela | Latin American Affairs |
| Millikan, Max | Director, Int'l Center, M.I.T. | Foreign Aid & Train. |
| Nathan, Reuben | Political Psychology and International Communication | Psychological Warfare |
| Nielsen, Sivert | President of Bergens Privatbank | Scandinavia and the New Europe |
| Pachachi, Dr. Adnan | Ambassador of Iraq to U.N. | The Middle East U.N. |
| Reischauer, Edwin | Professor-Asian Studies-Harvard | East Asia |
| Romulo, Carlos P. | President-Univ. of Philippines | Far East & Mainland China |
| Rossides, Zenon | Ambassador of Cyprus to U.N. | Cyprus and the Mediterranean |
| Rossiter, Clinton | Professor Cornell Univ. | American Government Abroad |
| Scalapino, Robert | Professor-Internat. Affairs-U. of Calif. Berkeley | East and Southeast Asia |
| Smirnov, Konstantin | U.S.S.R. Embassy Belgrade | U.S.-U.S.S.R. |

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

| Person | Position | Field |
|-------------------------------|---|--|
| Cousins, Norman | Editor, Saturday Review | Foreign Policy |
| Davis, Russell | Professor, Harvard Education Center for Ed. Studies | Manpower Develop- ment and Urban Affairs |
| deGautier, Dona Felisa Rincon | Mayor of San Juan | Puerto Rico Community |
| Folsom, Marion | Former Secretary, H. E. W. | Health, Education & Welfare |
| Ferre, Luis | President, Ferre Industries | Puerto Rican Community & Role of Puerto Rico in U.S. |
| Freeman, David | Exec. Dir., Wash. Metropolitan Area Jobs Council | Black capitalism |
| Harris, Ed | Lawyer Chairman, Rochester Community Council | Urban Affairs |
| Hendricks, Mrs. Rae | Chairman, Harlem Parents Corp. | Urban Affairs Ghetto Black |
| Hoxeng, Dr. Raymond B. | President, Inter- American Univ. | Latin America |
| Kravits, Sandy | Professor-Brandeis Consultant-State of Mass. | Community Service Corp. |
| Linford, Velma | VISTA | Rural poor |
| Marie, Sister Thomas | Sec'y, Board of Directors-ASPIRA | Educational Counsel- ing Agency |
| McFarlane, Alexander | President, Corn Products | Private Industry in Urban Renewal and Poverty |
| Moyers, Williams | Publisher, Newsday | Foreign and domestic affairs |
| Moynihan, Patrick | Center for Urban Affairs | Urban Affairs |
| Newton, Quigg | President, Commonwealth Fund | Urban Affairs |
| Negron, Frank | Executive Director ASPIRA | Educational Counsel- ing Agency |
| Nunez, Louis | Assistant Executive Director-ASPIRA | Educational Counsel- ing Agency |

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

| Person | Position | Field |
|-----------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| Baldwin, Dr. Ira | Vice President Emeritus, Univ. of Wisconsin | Educational Reform |
| Caldwell, Dr. John T. | Chancellor, No. Carolina State U. | Education and World Affairs |
| Everett, John | President, New School | Urban Education |
| Fleming, Arthur | Former Secretary, H.E.W. | Education |
| Folsom, Marion | Former Secretary, H.E.W. | H.E.W. (health planning) |
| Jacobs, Albert C. | President, Trinity College | Church-State |
| Keppel, Frank | Former Commissioner Education | Education |
| Kerr, Clark | Former President, U. of Calif. | Educational Planning |
| Marvel, William | President, Education & World Affairs | International Education |
| Mays, Benjamin | Former President Morehouse College | Negro education |
| Palm, Charles | College Dean, Cornell | EWA |
| Singletary, Otis | Vice President, American Council | Education and Culturally Deprived |
| Thackery, Russell | Ex-Secretary NASULGC | Land grant college adaptation |
| Wright, Stephen | President, United Negro College Fund | Negro education |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

MEMORANDUM

To: R. N.
From: Glenn Olds
Subj: Briefing from Edwin O. Reischauer

Date: July 16, 1968

Sunday afternoon was spent with Reischauer in his home, in a wide ranging discussion of major problems of foreign policy, with special reference to the Far East which he knows intimately. (Reared in Japan, Ambassador 5 years, Harvard professor in field) Though he is not prepared to declare political commitment to any candidate, I believe he can be won to R.N. support. He is writing the paper for Ford Foundation - Brookings - "Agenda for the Nation" on the Far East, will send us advance copy in two weeks, and would see R.N. if desirable. His points and recommendations follow:

1. Policy in the Far East - Special reference to Japan and China
 - (a) Japan's attitude toward U.S. and role deteriorating over past year, dramatically over past two months; fed by Vietnam, U.S. China policy, Base structure, and Okinawa.
 - (b) The next president will have not more than one (1) year to reverse this trend, or 1970 will bring trouble on the security treaty and its possible dissolution.
 - (c) Recommendations:
 - (1) Vietnam - (His position developed in his book Beyond Vietnam; see attached)
 - a. American presence must be maintained but not through massive manpower.
 - b. Shift responsibility to South Vietnamese and Asians
 - c. R.N. in strongest position to solve; i.e.
 - (1) not soft - hence no fear of "sell out" - even if we "get out" massive manpower
 - (2) Sees S.E. Asia in larger context
 - (3) Negotiations essential to be bringing some boys home in 1969
 - (4) Resists temptation of feeling failure, which could lead to a new isolationism; R.N. appeals to conservative yet is a committed internationalist.
 - (5) Utilize bi-partisan strategy in "ending the war." The Democrats started and bungled; a key negotiator to add is Carl Kaysen.
 - (2) China Policy
 - a. Encourage Japanese trade and cultural exchange
 - b. Encourage Far East and U.N. fresh approach to China - looking toward possibility of autonomous Taiwan within China with separate U.N. representation as Ukraine.

*He indicated he saw R.N. 3 years ago and R.N. advocated all the right things at that time! (on China)

- c. No likelihood People's Republic would accept U.N. membership or trade with U.S. now - but we should remove barrier of our opposition while insisting on conditions of civilized participation in family of nations.
 - d. U.S.-U.S.S.R. hold in check any nuclear blackmail from China.
 - e. Count on time, internal problems and demands, change of leadership to slowly open China to world - no early threat or prospect of major China thrust East-West-or South. (Note: Indonesia & Vietnam history!)
 - f. Play down polarization - encourage more presence there - Soviet Union - Japan - to diversify power structure in Asian Theatre.
- (3) U.S. Bases and Okinawa:
- a. Get rid of little things which have low strategic significance, but high political visibility.
 - b. Consider joint U.S.-Japanese development of Naval bases.
 - c. Okinawa, with 960,000 Japanese, not possible to keep, as of now, under U.S. military rule. A settlement should be wrapped up by 1969.
 - (1) The Nuclear Weapons Treaty (direct use without consulting Japan) should be modified. Any major military action in this arena will require Japanese understanding and support. The newer, mobile strategic weapons more effective, but great political and psychological leverage in "apparent" withdrawal of unilateral nuclear capability from Okinawa.
 - d. Emphasis on larger military development of Japan is counterproductive. Their 2% of GNP for military is enough - and the 7th fleet and nuclear shield our best presence in the area.
- (4) Economy
- a. Much larger role for Japan in Economic Aid in entire region.
 - b. Negotiation of wide range of economic irritants vis a vis Japan - (salmon fishing, tariffs, etc.)
2. Reorganization of Management of Foreign Policy:
- (a) Critical need for unified management by country under ambassador, by president through Sec'y of State.
 - (b) Critical need for policy planning - related to, but free of, operational responsibility (Note: Kennan's testimony) (Vietnam illustrates how a president can drift into crisis without planning.)
 - (c) Recommends a Policy Planning Board of seven (7) - 4 gov't. and 3 private - related to president and Sec'y of State - charged with policy planning and development - with 10-12 part-time specialists drawn from private side - no regard

for protocol, functions, or bureaucracy - responsible for contemporary, systematic policy planning for President and Sec'y of State.

- (d) Greatly strengthened and modified USIA - with prospect of quasi-public-private foundation for funding private initiatives of groups like Asia Foundation, etc., most effective overseas.

Summary:

1. Reischauer one of ablest men I have met - though politically independent, close to R.N. in major emphasis, highly regarded by State and intellectual community. A thinker and operator. I believe he can play an important role in policy development and implementation. Should program him to see R.N. briefly, after review of his "Agenda to the Nation" paper, after the Convention.
2. Follow his comprehensive list of persons, specialists and generalists in foreign affairs for policy development and administration; Olds will do.

cc: Messrs. Mitchell
Garment
Price
Buchanan
Anderson

BEYOND VIETNAM: The United States and Asia

Edwin O. Reischauer

Main Aspects of Our Asian Problem

Appalling contrast between the concentration of world's population in less developed countries and the world's wealth and power in the advanced nations. In southern temperate zone, except for Australia and New Zealand live two-thirds of the world's population, unindustrialized, underdeveloped and poor while almost four-fifths of wealth in northern zone.

Average per-capita income is more than ten times as great in the advanced nations as a whole than in the less advanced nations taken together, and discrepancies run higher than 50 to 1 between the richest nation, the U.S., and the poorest ones. Contrast between rich and poor growing greater.

Poverty and backwardness -
low levels of literacy and basic skills
inefficient economics
outmoded societies
faltering political institutions
instability and disorder

This instability of conditions affect the whole. Tension is heightened by all rich side except Japan are Occidental culture and southern zone non-white, non-western.

South and East Asia contain:
three quarters of population, less developed world
40% of wealth of advanced nations in U.S. hands

R. thinks South and East Asia minus Japan do not have much economic importance for U.S. under present conditions.

Asia's low level of per capita wealth - about 1/27 that of U.S. - makes its people poor customers.

Asia cannot supply us with much that we need.

Synthetics have reduced U.S. need for rubber of Malaysia and Indonesia.

Tin of Malaysia, oil of Indonesia, various minor mineral and agricultural products (tungsten and hemp) have significance - not vital.

No comparable U.S. interest in Asia like the oil of the Middle East and U.S. heavy investment in Latin America. Less than 3% of U.S. foreign investments in Asia.

No Asian exports are crucial to us.

U.S. trade with Asia, after aid has been subtracted from it, is much less than U.S. trade with Japan alone. Profits from it amount to far less than our expenditures for the area's defense. Trade profits will never compensate for even a tiny fraction of the financial costs of the two wars we have fought in Asia in the past two decades.

There is little immediate menace or direct threat from that part of the world to our security of vital national interests. Asia is just too weak. The total productive capacity of whole areas is much less than half that of Western Europe and less than two-thirds of the Soviet Union. With roughly five times the population of Western Europe - and seven times that of the Soviet Union, Asia uses almost all its meager production simply to keep its teeming millions alive at subsistence levels. Very little wealth is left over for purposes such as economic development, let alone threatening the vital interests of distant parts of the world.

A united Asia is sheer fantasy. History of last decade has disproved monolithic communist theory, particularly Sino-Soviet purpose. More difficult for Communist countries to cooperate because of dogmatic beliefs and cultural diversity. Unity is difficult in Asia through Communism or any other means. Nationalism too new for Asians to develop concert of actions.

Reischauer defines our interests in Asia as:

1. Asia is a major part of a now military world that the U.S. is trying to help toward peace, stability, and prosperity - Asia in terms of people is more than half the world - Asia is most explosively unstable part of world.
2. Asia's future - Someday Asian half of world will have much more relative power than it does today. U.S. should be less concerned over Asia tomorrow than Asia twenty or fifty years from now. Must begin to influence its development patterns towards cooperation rather than revenge.
3. U.S. moral imperative to help those who need help. Share the best of our value system. Self-interested efforts to build a healthier world environment for ourselves now and the future.

R. believes the U.S. should move slowly and cautiously toward a new Asian policy.

JAPAN

Fourth nation in the world in GNP.

Economy growing faster than any other major country in the world.

Sunk from fifth to seventh place in population among world nations due to population control programs.

100 million Japanese have produced more wealth than the 700 million Chinese.

Japanese GNP equals all of Latin American GNP put together; double that for whole of Africa; twice that of India.

Japanese per capita income averages 8 times that of other countries of Asia.

Literacy almost as close to 100 per cent.

Has a very stable, entirely orderly, middle-class type of society.

Steady political course through parliamentary democracy.

U.S. trade with Japan over 5 billion dollar mark - ranking second only to our trade with Canada.

More cultural and intellectual contacts with U.S. than with any other nation in the world.

Japan - a force for stability and an enricher of all those who have contact with it.

Japan's successful industrialization was based on foundations of a type that have not been fully laid in much of Asia. Preparatory stages for economic modernization will be slow and difficult.

Future Asian governments are likely to be inefficient dictatorships, or incomplete, limping democracies, or a combination of the two. Even partially modernized nations, like Russia after its revolution - or China today - while able to operate totalitarian systems, may not be capable of conducting their affairs through the more complicated techniques of democracy.

Modernized nations face the choice between a full totalitarianism and full democracy.

Japan's wavering between democracy and totalitarianism resulted in militaristic adventurism.

Instability will continue in Asia for a long time.

Japan is the most culturally distinctive of the modernized nations and did not become a rootless Asian outpost of Western civilization.

JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

Japan is not playing a major role in world affairs.

Japanese lost confidence in themselves as a result of World War II.

Japan realized its responsibility to contribute to development of other Asian countries but the resentments of Korea, Philippines, Singa-

pore, and Malaysia remained in varying degrees.

Japanese are in search of a role for themselves in the world but will move slowly due to past failures, domestic political divisions, and remaining animosities of neighbors.

R. takes position that Japan will continue to rely on U.S. nuclear umbrella and presence of Seventh Fleet in Pacific. This is debatable with threat of Chinese nuclear power in 20 years and expanded Russian naval presence.

The major threat to less developed countries is internal instability.

Remilitarized Japan would frighten its neighbors and reduce its influence rather than increase it.

Remilitarization would cut into Japanese prosperity and diminish economic aid resources for developing nations.

Japan should have no difficulty in reaching the figure of 1% of GNP for aid purposes, set as target by advanced nations and could exceed to 2%.

Japan's chief role should be as a supplier of economic aid and technological know-how.

Japan shifting from phase out reparations to voluntary aid in the form of commercial credits, "soft" loans, and even outright grants.

Discuss failures in Indonesia talks for "soft" loans and grants.

Normalized relations with South Korea promising more than \$300 million in grants, \$300 million in soft loans, more millions in commercial credits.

\$200 million contribution matched U.S. to Asian Development Bank in 1966.

Japan's experience in industrialization and institutional modernization more relevant for Asia than U.S., Soviet Union, or Western Europe.

Japan's experience achieved under geographic and cultural conditions - a rice agriculture, heavy population densities, and a non-Western cultural background - more like those of the rest of Asia than has the experience in modernization of the countries of the West.

Japanese bringing hundreds of South Asian students to Japan for advanced technical training.

Launched small Peace Corps; same in Africa - difficult to place in some defeated Asian countries where they have the most to offer.

Japanese face major language barrier to transmit technological skills to others.

Japanese a difficult language, writing system most complicated in world.

Japanese poor linguists - Other Asians competent in English find Japanese difficult and less rewarding than languages with wider international currency.

Japanese will have to develop technological institutions in Japan where language of instruction is English if they are to play role in technological aid.

Should modernize their own methods of English instruction.

This would increase Japanese efficiency in international trade and magnify Japan's somewhat inarticulate voice in world affairs.

Japan as a leader in Asia will be hard to provide. No Asian countries are looking to others for leadership, and Japan, in a present mood of self-doubt and caution are not likely to provide it.

No country is likely to become the leader of Asia.

Unless Japanese try harder to develop better skills at sensitive communication and understanding of neighbors, the term "ugly Japanese" will compete with "ugly American."

Japan may have a uniquely useful role in world history over next several decades, being an industrialized nation of the "North," on the one side, but a non-Western, non-Caucasian nation on the other.

The role Japan decides to play will in the long run be far more important for Asians and for Americans than the outcome in Vietnam.

MEMORANDUM

To: R. N. Date: July 18, 1968
From: Glenn Olds
Subj: Briefing from Ed Guillion, Former Ambassador to Congo,
Dean, Fletcher School of Diplomacy

Though a bi-partisan foreign service officer, with Democratic leanings, he is one of the most perceptive and eloquent on R.N.'s role and leadership. His points and recommendations follow:

I. Counsel to the candidate:

- A. The nation and the world needs leadership of conciliation and confidence. Accent "coalition" and "bipartisan" foreign policy.
- B. Continue posture on Vietnam, but speak to the world beyond Vietnam. Emphasize the responsibility of the presidency (the real issue in silence during negotiations), illustrating the irresponsibility and naivete of McCarthy and Rockefeller. He believes their (McCarthy-Rockefeller) irresponsibility has already delivered a million lives to Ho Chi Minh and that casualties have actually increased.
- C. Avoid the "facade" of "academic task forces from the Ivy League" - they are resented by the people, vulnerable to the critic, and, from his view, relatively irrelevant to the election - and to good government. (He considers this a meaningless and expensive fad - basically phoney. The people want to know what does the candidate think (shades of Philadelphia, yesterday), not what his aides, brain trust, or anyone else does. They respect him more the less dependent he is on "the expert.")
- D. R.N. begin now, and carry over into administration, direct "presidential confrontation" with the people on some systematic basis. He alone must be the spokesman of public policy - he must speak for the people as he speaks with and to them. This is his central task - a key to being elected and leading the people wisely and well.

II. Critical Comments:

- A. The bipartisan foreign policy of the past 20 years is fundamentally sound. Substantial and strategic errors in Vietnam should not blind the American people to its remarkable success. "Containment" was not our choice - but necessity, and was neither brinkmanship nor sentimentality. The tragedy is, youth never knew the necessity and success of this period,

and liberals forget. R.N. should constantly refresh this memory by recalling:

1. We remain the oldest democracy in the modern world;
2. Our history of self help to others eloquently illustrated in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Alaska, Hawaii;
3. The humanization of technology in production of goods and service unparalleled anywhere;
4. Widest personal, educational, and economic opportunity provided anywhere in world.
5. All this has been achieved while engaging in three critical wars - one to save the west from totalitarian tyranny, and two in the east; and at the same time establishing major contribution to instruments of economic stability and peace: (a) Marshall Plan, (b) U.N., (c) World Bank, (d) AID, (e) Monetary Fund, etc.
6. This strategy has recreated Europe, the two defeated powers - Germany and Japan, and encouraged the strengthening of over 50 new and independent nations. Is this an era of failure? He believes our present problems center in the failure of success.

B. Problems center in communication and the tools of foreign policy:

1. Communications:
 - a. Administration failed to take generation gap seriously. The youth does not know Hitler, Stalin, concentration camps, hence find incredible the real threat of terror and tyranny.
 - b. Vietnam couched in altruism for 5 years - deceived public - unprepared for its full or wider implications.
 - c. Absence of accountability - made no one responsible - deepened frustration.
 - d. Need for something like a domestic ministry of information - the people must be informed!
2. Improving tools of foreign policy:
 - a. The president makes foreign policy. He cannot delegate. The problem of Rusk and Johnson. R.N. take the reins and hold them!
 - b. The same must be true by country. The ambassador must articulate it there. (Note how CIA and even F.B.I. exert a control - even on the president through secrecy and power!)
 - c. AID - If falls below 2.9 billion - forget it. If not, give it a new setting - aimed at, at least, 1% of GNP.

- d. USIA - should play a role in policy making, but in practice be decentralized, topical, local, full of bright, mobile and highly paid creative people.
- e. CIA - complete overhaul - see Stanton's advisory council's 23rd annual report.

Finally: Maximize the first 100 days in fresh, tough, courageous, new directions along these lines.

cc: Messrs. Mitchell
Garment
Haldeman ✓
Anderson
Price
Buchanan

Participants in the "Agenda for the Nation" Project
(as of May 31, 1968)

Urban Problems

Nature of the Urban Crisis ~~(still open)~~ *Ted Sorensen*
Housing and Public Services Anthony Downs
Crime and Law Enforcement James Q. Wilson
The Negro Kenneth Clark
Welfare, Training and Jobs James Sundquist

Education

Higher Education Clark Kerr
Primary and Secondary Education Ralph Tyler

Government Organization

The Federal Government Stephen K. Bailey
States and Cities Paul Ylvisaker

Economic Policy

The Dollar Richard Cooper
Economic Stabilization Herbert Stein
Budget Priorities Charles Schultze
Poverty and Income Maintenance James Tobin

Foreign Policy

Central Issues in Foreign Policy Henry Kissinger (~~considering~~)
East-West Relations Marshall Shulman
Strategic Policy and Arms Control Carl Kaysen
Europe and Atlantic Relations Francis Bator
China and Asia Edwin Reischauer
The Middle East (still open)
Rich Countries and Poor Countries Max Millikan

~~Handwritten scribble~~ TG
file

MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

July 15. 1968

I mentioned to RN that Neal Freeman wanted to come aboard, and would be available. RN wants him used in the media area and an advisory PR capacity---much as Bud Wilkinson is now being used. He asked me to convey this to Len---~~but~~ my own thinking is that you would be a more "neutral" conveyance of the message. I will be happy to make the contact etc. with Freeman--if you will pass the word along to Len--and have len get in touch with me. Thanks, and good luck,

Pat