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**Bradley Patterson Interview Transcription**

15 February 2008

**Timothy Naftali**

Hi, I'm Tim Naftali. I'm director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. It's February 15, 2008. We're in Bethesda, Maryland, and I have the honor and privilege to be interviewing Bradley Patterson for the Richard Nixon Oral History Program. Brad, thank you for joining us.

**Brad Patterson**

I'm delighted, Tim, to be here and to have you in our home here. I have very warm memories. I served at the White House for 14 years under several presidents, two presidents -- three, and the first was Eisenhower, and the later were Nixon and Ford. And I was teaching school in Michigan at that time, in 1945, and a call went out from the State Department for people who knew German, because they wanted to have a diplomatic presence to go behind the troops in Germany, and they hired me as an auxiliary vice counsel. They waived the Foreign Service exams, and a group of us went to Washington for some months of training before we would go abroad. And -- however, in the spring of 1945, we had a crew abroad in Germany, right with the troops, looking for Nazi documents, evidences of Nazi papers. And on one rainy night in April, 1945, a German came up to our crew there in Germany and said, "My name is Schmidt, Paul Schmidt." He says, "I was Hitler's interpreter for all the years that he was Reichskanzler , and I have a whole collection of the minutes of all of Hitler's conversations with Franco, with du Bouchet [phonetic sp], with Von Ribbentrop and Molotov. He said, "I have them in a box, and you get me to America or England, I will give you the box." We said, "That's a deal, Schmidt." And these were the so-called Schmidt files.

And so into the State Department, in the spring of 1945, came cans of microfilm, 35-millimeter microfilm, with these incredibly important historic papers on them -- in them. And so the word went out around the State Department, "Who knows German?" So I never got to go overseas and later joined the civil service of the State Department, and was helping with these documents. You remember the State Department had put out a publication on Eva Peron, a Nazi collaboration on Peron, and Spain -- we were -- Franco was kept out of the U.N. originally, because he sympathized with Hitler, and showed -- these papers showed Hitler was trying to get him to join the war. Actually, there was a Spanish division on the Russian front.

**Timothy Naftali**

A blue division.

**Brad Patterson**

A blue division. But he also, I believe, offered some Spanish ports as basis for submarines, but he never actually formally joined the war with troops on the ground. Hitler was trying to do that. But these correspondents -- I think he had two meetings with Franco. Anyway, they were historic documents of first-rate importance.

**Timothy Naftali**

Brad, how did you come to work with Dean Acheson?

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**Brad Patterson****SANITIZED COPY**

Well, this was in the State Department in '45. Then I -- we gave that project -- Peter Dahl [phonetic sp], in a sense, we gave it to the historians, and I saw an opportunity in the executive secretariat of the department. This was a coordinating office in the Office of the Secretary, which Marshall set up. And Acheson inherited that -- came in when he was secretary. And it was a coordinating shop for all the papers coming to the office of the secretary. If a paper came in, was it coordinated with the other offices? Was it on time? Was it ready for presentation to the president and so forth? So we have a very outstanding, very good, very professional executive secretariat. It was headed by a gentleman of some fame, Karl Humison [phonetic sp], who later became president of Colonial Williamsburg. And we had a staff there in the secretariat, called the committee secretariat staff, we would be the secretaries of all the states committees, internal committees, and interdepartmental committees chaired by state. We'd do the agenda, make sure the papers are circulated, attend meetings, take notes, and so forth, as an executive secretary.

So I had a flock of several -- about 10 of us, all energetic young men who were interested in this, and for a while, that one assignment I had was executive secretary of the U.S. delegation to the talks in Paris, which resulted from the Berlin air lift and the blockage of access to Berlin. And there was a four-part conversation. Anyway, Acheson was the chairman of the delegation, and I was the secretary of the delegation. So I had a couple of assignments like that. And we worked, we got to know Acheson quite well, and he organized that secretariat beautifully, and it was one of the best run -- it was a first, really example in the U.S. Cabinet. Right around that time, Eisenhower was chief of staff in the Army, and he had been writing memos to the White House saying "You ought to have an executive secretariat in the White House." And Truman said, "Ah, that sounded too British." He didn't want to do that. But then the first Hoover Commission came along and said, "You ought to" -- just that. "You ought to have a secretary, executive secretary at the White House." And Eisenhower, by then, was there, and as president, and he said, "I'm certainly going to do that." And he set up the secretariat in the White House, and it worked for a little while. He wanted to have another take a look at it, in the summer of '54, and so we had one of his associate powers come over, who had been working in the State Department, and we had been working together, and he asked me to come over for the summer and help on this study.

So the two of us put a study together about the staff secretariat, the Cabinet secretariat, how we would work in the White House, and presented it to the president in the fall of 1954 in the Oval Office. And Eisenhower said "You've got it just right, I'm going to do just that here in the White House, strengthen the secretariat. And I'm going to have a hot dog roast up at Camp David with the Cabinet. You come up there and make this presentation to the Cabinet. I'm going to tell them, "That's the way I'm going to run the White House." They should get used to that, fit in with it, and maybe some of them ought to do the same." So we made the presentation, and at the hot dog roast line, Max Rabb, the secretary of the Cabinet, came up to me and said, "Look, Eisenhower is going to have this system, and I'm going to be secretary of the Cabinet, and I need some help. So will you join my staff?" That's how a civil servant like me got invited to join the White House staff. I didn't have any political background.

**Timothy Naftali**

You've written, by now, three important books on the structures of the White House.

**Brad Patterson**

Yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

Just for those watching, what is the secretariat? You say you need a secretariat. What is that?

**Brad Patterson**

A secretariat, in this sense, is a coordinating group, and papers, particularly all the [unintelligible] does on paperwork. Papers will go to the secretary asking for action, either action in the State Department or things he's going to present to the president, take over to the White House. The question is, you see the State Department has geographic bureaus -- four or five different geographic bureaus -- and they have functional bureaus, economics and intelligence and science and education and so forth, cultural affairs. And a paper coming to the secretary for action, and the question is, does it represent the -- has it been cleared with, checked with these other relevant bureaus, originating in one bureau, but what kind of coordination is that? And he wanted some professional people who had no interest in the policy, didn't want to get a hold or try to change the policy. But the question was, was the process working right?

And so they are professionals, non-partisans, people who look for the proper coordination of a piece of paper. Well, the same can be true of the president, exactly, only more intense, so to speak, because of the responsibilities. A paper going to the president, the president has to ask, "Well now, wait a minute, has this been checked with my secretary of state, has it been checked with my secretary of defense, has it been checked with my counsel and so forth?" So the same requirement is in the presidency that was in the State Department. Well, the state pioneered this executive secretariat under Marshall and then under Acheson, and the first Hoover Commission turned to the State Department as an example. One forgets that Acheson was vice chairman of the Hoover Commission, so it was sort of a model that he had established there. And the first Hoover Commission made their recommendations based on the Acheson model in state.

**Timothy Naftali**

If you don't mind going into the weeds with me for a moment, were you -- from your vantage point, did you see the struggle between the geographical branches and the new intelligence branch in the State Department and just after the war? It was a heck of a struggle.

**Brad Patterson**

No, I can't say I was familiar with that. See, I was part of the committee secretary of staff, that part of the executive secretariat which would provide secretary services to the committees in the State Department. For instance, one of our men -- I don't think it was myself, it was other than person, worked with Paul Nitze [phonetic sp] in the committee that put together NSC 68. I'm working -- Nitze took my hand --

**Timothy Naftali**

Sure.

**Brad Patterson**

-- you know, took a major lead in that. So we -- that was one of our duties in the State Department, was to help establish, to give the agenda, circulated the papers and so forth of these committees that were working in the state.

**Timothy Naftali**

Let me ask you about NSC 68, such an important document.

**Brad Patterson**

That's right.

**Timothy Naftali**

Atchison later said that, to get the American people to believe the existence of the Soviet threat, you had to hit them over the head. And that NSC 68 was designed to scare the bureaucracy. Do you remember sort of the -- how those inputs were designed, sort of the nature of the enterprise? What people were seeking to do?

**Brad Patterson**

I was not -- not one of my assignments, so I can't really give you a historically accurate -- I know that was the issue at the time. Of course that was the time when Kennedy sent his famous telegram.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes.

**Brad Patterson**

That was used, I think -- that was made public and was used by that. But anyway, I was asked if I could join the secretariat, the Cabinet secretariat in the White House, and my job was to attend the Cabinet meetings, to take notes, to help design the agenda. The agenda came out of our office, recommendations we would get from the Cabinet officers. Papers, they would be assigned to write or want to write, want to submit. And we would go to Sherman Adams with a proposed Cabinet agenda, and Adams made the decision on what was going to be on the agenda. I don't think he ever actually went to Eisenhower with it. And that was -- then we put out the agenda and circulate the papers in midweek or Monday early. And then every Friday was Cabinet meeting. I would say Eisenhower probably had Cabinet meetings every other week on an average. It was almost weekly sometimes. They would meet from 9:00 to 11:00 in the Cabinet room, and my job, as I say, was to take notes -- I took some shorthand, but not perfect shorthand, but enough to take good notes. And then, right after the Cabinet finished, Max Rabb and I would come into the Cabinet Room. Each Cabinet officer had a Cabinet assistant in their respective agencies, and the Cabinet assistants would come to the White House, sit in the still-warm chairs of their bosses, and Max and I would go over what happened in the Cabinet meeting.

And for instance, if you were Foster Dulles's Cabinet assistant, we would say, all right, "Dulles got this assignment, and the secretary of treasury got this assignment, and secretary of commerce got that assignment," and tell them that their bosses had these assignments, in case their bosses had left town by then, so they would be ready for it. And we'd talk about next week's agenda. That was why we'd use the Cabinet assistants. And that was my job for seven years with Eisenhower, and I was the first Cabinet secretariat in American history. We thought we were making history in American public administration.

**Timothy Naftali**

Let me ask you a few questions from the Eisenhower period before I focus a little more on Richard Nixon.

**Brad Patterson**

Nixon was vice president.

**Timothy Naftali**

Of course.

**Brad Patterson**

So I got to know him, and he got to know me a little bit, and that was that.

**Timothy Naftali**

What do you remember of the Suez Crisis?

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, now that's a different meeting. That's the NSC.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes.

**Brad Patterson**

Now, I didn't have anything to do with the NSC.

**Timothy Naftali**

So -- and there were no sort of Cabinet discussions related to that?

**Brad Patterson**

No.

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**Timothy Naftali**

How about Little Rock?

**Brad Patterson**

That was in the summertime, and Max Rabb was very much involved in that. He wore two hats -- he was secretary of the Cabinet and was also handling civil right matters, and that was all in the civil rights side, and I was not involved in that very much, either. I'll tell you one thing we did do.

**Timothy Naftali**

Okay.

**Brad Patterson**

Eisenhower was concerned with the problem of continuity of government, in case of a nuclear attack, and he used the Cabinet in there, and we were very much involved in this. And I don't know whether you remember, every summer for several years, '55, '56, about three or four of those years, we would have something called Operation Alert. Each Cabinet department would have a relocation site out of town somewhere. Some of it was underground, but it was out of town, and we would exercise this whole system. We would have the Cabinet secretary and five or 10 of his staff go to their relocation sites.

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And the White House went to its relocation site. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and I

[REDACTED] remember we had a Cabinet meeting in the tent. And Eisenhower -- and we were now pretending we had a massive nuclear attack, huge cigar shaped patterns of west-to-east winds carrying the atomic particles, fallout, and all of the nation just an absolute disaster. And Eisenhower said, "All right, now" - - and Arthur Flemming would present this. And in effect saying, "All right, Mr. President, what are you going to do?" I remember that very much.

What happened is Eisenhower said, "I'm going to declare nationwide martial law." And "Only militaries are organized enough to run the country in that kind of a circumstance." But we had that kind of -- every summer we did this, for several summers. And some of the Cabinet members were, "Why am I bothered with this? Why've I got to do this, play these games?" And it wasn't a game to Eisenhower at all. He was deadly serious about this. He said, "My God, I have been through war. I know what war is like. I know in the middle of war, the chaos of war, if you just wipe the dust off your desk, to know where your desk is, you're 10,000-degrees ahead of somebody who was just lost in the chaos. So we've got to do this, we've got to have an orderliness about it." It was amazing kind of a leadership of Eisenhower, the military man running a civilian government, and running it with care and with thoughtfulness and with professionalism. And later on, the presidents didn't pay much attention to that.

**Timothy Naftali**

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Let me ask you about this, because we all experienced 9/11, and how slow the government was to react. How was -- how did they assume that the entire Cabinet could be moved in time? I mean how many minutes' warning did they expect to have of a nuclear strike?

**Brad Patterson**

It would obviously be somewhat chaotic in any case, but maybe a few people who had done this knew where the relocation site was. We had communication systems built in, and just had a couple of people who were- knew enough about where to go and what to do and how to use the communication. You would be miles ahead if you didn't have anybody.

**Timothy Naftali**

So this communication system, was it connected to many cities in the country?

**Brad Patterson**

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Yes, several -- well, these relocation sites were outside of cities, and Eisenhower, there were several places he could go. But the sites were there, and I believe, obviously, if you had a building crisis, you'd have those sites staffed, so there would be people there all the time, in a crisis, I think. And actually, it was interesting, when the U-2 went down, Eisenhower was visiting the site,

[REDACTED] and they had to call an NSC meeting to discuss about what happened with the U-2. But these summer things, we, in the Cabinet, did this. And I remember going to one in Virginia, and then there was another one at [REDACTED] in Pennsylvania. And we went over there, and had a Cabinet meeting over there. But Ike was really serious about this, and nobody else in government had that seriousness, but Eisenhower did.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us about the role that Richard Nixon would play in these Cabinet meetings.

**Brad Patterson**

Well, Nixon, of course, sat directly across the table from Eisenhower, came to every meeting. It was interesting, at the beginning, Nixon had an assistant named Bob King. When we first started to have Cabinet papers, at the very beginning, in the fall of '54, I remember getting a call from Bob King. Bob said, "Brad, you're sending me Cabinet papers. We haven't got a locked cabinet safe in the vice president's office to put them in." That's how primitive the vice president's office was in those years.

**Timothy Naftali**

Maybe you can tell people where the vice president's office was.

**Brad Patterson**

Well, in the Capitol.

**Timothy Naftali**

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Did he have one in the White House?

**Brad Patterson**

No, at that time -- oh, no. It wasn't until Mondale, Carter and Mondale. Excuse me, Kennedy told Johnson -- brought Johnson down, Bob Johnson had his office in the Executive Office Building. It wasn't until Carter brought Mondale in, they gave Mondale an office in the West Wing.

**Timothy Naftali**

So when Nixon --

**Male Speaker**

Sorry. Do you want to switch -- okay. Rolling.

**Timothy Naftali**

Okay, I was asking you about Richard Nixon and the Cabinet, and I wanted to know, when he would come to a Cabinet meeting, what office did he use in the White House as he waited?

**Brad Patterson**

It's interesting, when we came in there in the beginning, there was no place for him to sit. And I remember doing my first book, the one you have, I was interviewing Rose Woods. She really didn't want to interview, but we were talking just a little bit. She said, "Well, you know, I remember there was a problem when Nixon would come to Cabinet meetings. He'd get there maybe 10 minutes early." "Where would he sit?" And he said, "He sat in the barber shop, waiting for Cabinet meetings." You see how primitive that office was, how primitive the White House was, in a way, in terms of the vice presidency.

**Timothy Naftali**

Now, Harry Truman did not have Alben Barkley chair meetings.

**Brad Patterson**

That's right.

**Timothy Naftali**

But Nixon chaired meetings, didn't he?

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, I was going to say, Nixon -- if Eisenhower was away on a trip, Nixon would chair the meeting. And then the Cabinet record of action would say, "These were the items presented when the vice

president was in the chair." On occasion, Nixon -- the meetings would be entirely political. Then I would absent myself, because I was a professional. But he would often chair the meetings himself. And the most interesting Cabinet meeting that I remember that took place was on education, on whether the government should issue bonds for school construction. This is, you know, right -- at the height of the -- in the post-war period when all the kids, little kids were going to school, thousands of them from the -- born in the war.

And Arthur Flemming brought in a proposal to have the government issue bonds so the school districts to build schools. And they had a debate in the Oval Office the day before -- I think it was on Wednesday or Thursday -- and Eisenhower said, "All right, all right, we'll take this to Cabinet." We got this hurry up call, "Get a hold of Arthur Flemming, get his paper, circulate it to the Cabinet. We're going to meet on Friday." So we got this 25 page paper, which we sent around and had a meeting. And I don't know whether you know Arthur Flemming, he's a very positive, very forward, very intelligent, very energetic man. So it came up on the agenda, and Eisenhower said, "Well, now Arthur has this proposal for bond -- to support bonds for school buildings. Now, this is the federal government getting into the education area." He said, "You know, I have been pretty hesitant about expanding the responsibilities of the federal government, and I'm concerned about this. We're taking in a new, sort of new departure of responsibilities for the federal government. I'm just not sure whether that's the right thing to do." And then he looked at Flemming, he said, "All right, Arthur, now I put the noose around your neck, go ahead and make your presentation." And Flemming answered with perfect demeanor, calm, and professional and yet energetic, and he made a very substantive and energetic presentation.

And then the Cabinet showed its divisions, and Arthur Summerfield, and Ezra Benson, I think Commerce Secretary Weeks said, well you know, "This is not right, this is the government getting into things we shouldn't be in," and then going off, setting new examples of federal responsibilities. And however, then secretary of labor and Stassen, I think, and Nixon -- Nixon at that time, of course, was sort of looked at as the heir apparent. This is 1956 -- '54, '55, I guess it was. And he, in effect, said, "Well, you know, education is a national resource, and the federal government is concerned with national resources. And I'm not -- I think Arthur has done the right thing here." And that's how it turned it around. It was the turning point in the discussion. And Eisenhower said, "All right, let's do it." He said, "I know if I present this up to Congress, it's like throwing pearls before certain animals, but I'm going to do it." And they did. I believe it was successful. But it was interesting, the Cabinet was split like this, and Nixon taking the liberal -- the liberal view, and turning the discussion, hung on. It was influenced by the position he took, interesting.

**Timothy Naftali**

How well did the Cabinet system work when Eisenhower was sick during his medical crises?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, here we would meet as a Cabinet on Fridays, with Nixon in the chair, and then Sherman Adams would take the notes of Cabinet meetings and the papers out to the president in Denver. And so Adams would get on the plane Friday afternoon and go out and take those things out to him, and lots of other things, I'm sure. So Adams was the shuttle, which was quite proper for him.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us a little bit about the --

**Brad Patterson**

Then we'd meet -- he came back to Gettysburg, and we had two Cabinet meetings at Camp David. In the Laurel Lodge, I think, up there. We won on energy, I remember, with interior making the presentation. So we flew up there, or drove up there and again, Eisenhower came over from Gettysburg up to Camp David.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you see any sort of effects of the -- I mean he, Eisenhower, had a heart attack, a mini stroke, I believe, and ileitis or something.

**Brad Patterson**

Yeah, Yeah. Well, we had, I'd say in his second term, the end of his second term, the Cabinet frequency I think was a little less, but we had continued to meet Fridays. At the meetings, he was a very vigorous guy. He would pound the table. He would swear, occasionally, and a very vigorous guy. There was no question what his decision was, made my note-taking pretty easy.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us a little bit about how Nixon evolves during this period. Do you see an increased confidence in

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, Eisenhower -- there was a special Cabinet committee that Eisenhower established, something about -- I think it had to do with trying to get the economy speeded up again. He made Nixon the chair of that Cabinet committee, and I'm trying to think whether I attended some of their meetings. But Nixon played a very strong role in the Cabinet. He wouldn't sit there silent. He always participated in the discussion. At some times, at some points he would make the big difference.

**Timothy Naftali**

Let me ask you about a few people who would reappear in the Nixon story. Did you interact with Elliot Richardson in the period?

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, I knew him pretty well. Not -- by the time Watergate came along, he was, of course --

**Timothy Naftali**

I meant in the Eisenhower period.

**Brad Patterson**

Yeah, yes. Let's see, he was -- wasn't he secretary of education?

**Timothy Naftali**

HEW --

**Brad Patterson**

HEW, that's right.

**Timothy Naftali**

Number two with HEW. How about Arthur Burns? What was he like?

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, he was in the White House. What he was sort of waiting for was his role as chairman of Federal Reserve board, but he had himself parked in the White House, and he was a counselor to the president. I think he was more of a conservative, on the conservative side, as compared with others. Came to Cabinet meetings, often would make a presentation on the economy.

**Timothy Naftali**

How about William Rogers in the Eisenhower administration? What role did William Rogers play?

**Brad Patterson**

He was -- wasn't he deputy attorney general?

**Timothy Naftali**

Mm-hmm.

**Brad Patterson**

And obviously, Brownell came to Cabinet meetings. Rogers made it once or twice, if Brownell was absent.

**Timothy Naftali**

From your perspective, what did you see of the Sherman Adams scandal?

**Brad Patterson**

Well -- of the scandal?

**Timothy Naftali**

Yeah, of what --

**Brad Patterson**

There is more to the scandal -- I wonder if you know all about the scandal --

**Timothy Naftali**

I don't.

**Brad Patterson**

Are you aware that Adams took money from people in New Hampshire?

**Timothy Naftali**

No.

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, not only Goldfine, but Adams was -- I guess this was a habit in New Hampshire, that the governor's office would help collect money, funds to run the governor's office from friends and businessmen and others, to some extent. It turned out that was continued down here in Washington. I hadn't the faintest idea about this, but there is a gentleman you really ought to talk with in Gettysburg. Help me, Shirley, what was it -- professor of history out there, who is writing a biography of Adams, and he's uncovered this. He almost went to jail, but Eisenhower intervened, so he wasn't prosecuted, publicly, to save him. But he actually was taking money, cash, from the friends around town when he was chief of staff. That was totally new to me.

Now, where you got -- where I heard he was, Goldfine had a -- had given these gifts, a coat, rugs, and things. And Goldfine had a case pending before the Federal Trade Commission, and he asked Adams to try and check on the status of the case. And Adams did what any of us would be fired for doing. He called up the Federal Trade Commission and asked, "What's the status of the case?" And a staff over there, a staff member of the commission recognized the connection, Adams, Goldfine, and Goldfine was one of the people being charged with improper behavior and leaked that story to the newspaper. And here was this story that Adams tried to, in effect, influence -- it wasn't just a status call -- but that's why we were told, never make status calls like that. And that's what got Adams into trouble, and it was right just before the election, and so that hurt Adams, and he finally had to leave. But this business of taking money -- I'll give you the name of the gentleman up in Gettysburg. I don't want --

**Timothy Naftali**

Brad, tell us how Sherman Adams organized. What kind of chief of staff was he?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, Adams was -- underneath, he was humorous and friendly and curious and organized -- one of the things he organized was square dances for the White House, he and Mrs. Adams. But on the surface he was brusque and no frills, not even bothering to say goodbye when he put the phone down, extremely businesslike, but to the point of being quite abrupt and brusque. But underneath he was friendly, and he was a good supporter of -- I felt he was a supporter of the Cabinet secretariat. We did business with him. Of course, I say -- I think he approved the agendas. I don't think he knew enough about what Eisenhower wanted to do or didn't want to do, so I don't think he bothered to check with the president.

And I remember sometimes -- now I was in my 30s in the White House, we'd meet Adams in a corner of the White House, and he'd stop us, look him straight in the eye and said "What have you done for your country today?" And I should have come back with a humorous remark or something, you know? But I was so just plain taken aback, and blah, blah, blah, making, probably, nonsense remarks. But his square dances was great fun. But he was all business, and I think just what Eisenhower wanted and needed there. If Eisenhower would have said, "Look, I don't want to have to be by own sergeant major. I'm going to have a chief of staff." And he was creating history when he did that, the first president who did that. And since then, except for Kennedy, and to some extent Johnson, that job now is an indispensable, indispensable part of the White House. But he started it, did it right, just what Eisenhower wanted, and so he set the tone for the history in American public administration.

**Timothy Naftali**

You interacted with two legendary secretaries of state. Before we move on, could you sort of compare, contrast, Dulles and Acheson? Their personalities at the very least?

**Brad Patterson**

I wasn't really that close to them, I just... I can't really -- I don't think I could say anything that's particularly insightful about that. I worked particularly with Jim Webb, the undersecretary under Acheson. And Webb was always very concerned about good organization, good structure. I remember he would say -- we would be in his office, and he would say, "Is all our foreign policy right here in this big black book? I want to be sure all our policy is right there under these covers. Have I got it all now? Anything missing? I want to have it in one black book."

**Timothy Naftali**

The election of 1960 occurs. New president comes in. You stay in the United States government when Kennedy is elected.

**Brad Patterson**

Yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

Where do you go?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, I thought first of the possibility of staying on as Cabinet -- deputy Cabinet secretary. I think I tried to approach Fred Dutton. I think I got word to him somehow that I might like to do that. No, he didn't want to do that. So General Persons , who had taken Adams's place at that time, sent me over to the Bureau of the Budget.

So I had a job over there working in the organization and management part of Bureau of the Budget, and I found that a little bureaucratic over there. I wasn't particularly comfortable over there, but within a couple months, word had gotten to Schreiber, organizing the Peace Corps, and he wanted somebody to be sovereign executive secretary of the Peace Corps. Somebody told him, "You ought to ask this guy, Patterson." And I think Schreiber was glad to find somebody. He assumed I was a Republican, of course, having been in the Eisenhower White House. He wanted to give a little bit of a -- bipartisan look for the Peace Corps, not all Democrats, most of them were, of course, -- so he interviewed me and hired me as executive secretary of the Peace Corps. And that was fun to see a government agency grow from just four or five people around the table, grow into an agency, with lots of -- of course we were very enthusiastic, all of us were. Schreiber was tremendous, personified that enthusiasm. I think we've done a great thing, organizing the Peace Corps then.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you see -- what evidence did you see of John F. Kennedy's interest in the Peace Corps?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, very great. For instance, and the question was what would the Peace Corps' relationship to the Department of State be? Shouldn't it be part of the Department of State? Or particularly, shouldn't it be part of the Agency for International Development, AID? And the issue came up, in effect, had to be raised with the president. I think possibly, maybe even that Rusk or the AID administrator might have asked to have the Peace Corps with the State Department. And Schreiber said, "No, no, no, no. We want it to be separate from any of that bureaucracy." We were new, fresh, young -- new change, something absolutely -- a fresh start. Wouldn't want to be associated with any existing bureaucracy. So Harris Wofford took that issue to the president for us and got the decision, no, we would be a separate agency. So that was important. And we had our own committee -- had our own Peace Corps representatives abroad as part of the embassies, but they'd report to Schreiber. So finally, we developed our own legislation. But this is before we had legislation, but we were still operating under AID money from the very beginning.

**Timothy Naftali**

Where were you when you learned that the president had been shot?

**Brad Patterson**

I was -- let's see. I was -- by that time, I was in Treasury. I was -- Treasury hired me over there to -- there was a small national security staff supporting Dillon. Kennedy invited Dillon to be a member of the NSC, so a fellow by the name of Charlie Sullivan, and two or three or four of us were over there. And we were working on supporting -- Treasury supporting the sales of American military equipment of other countries, Germany, Japan. I particularly took Japan and Spain. And I was over in the

Pentagon at a meeting about financing -- I guess maybe Spanish purchases in American military equipment, and we were in a meeting in the Pentagon when we found out about this. Across the street from us was Frank Church, he lives in the house across the street, right where you parked your car, and that was quite a blow, of course. But didn't he come to our church, I think, and gave a sermon?

**Female Speaker**

At the time the president was shot, the minister called me and asked me if I would approach Frank, get me the eulogy, the sermon. [Unintelligible] every weekend. And I asked him, and he did, and that was, of course, in conjunction to [unintelligible].

**Brad Patterson**

Yeah, he -- of course, then he ran for president. We had a secret service van parked on the street. I had children in school at the time. Every time they wanted them to come up the street, you'd see them peering out the window at our kids.

**Timothy Naftali**

So you were across the street when Church was investigating the intelligence community.

**Brad Patterson**

Well, yeah -- of course, that's right. We moved in here almost 50, almost 51 years ago, in '56 -- yeah, and he was there at that time, I think.

**Timothy Naftali**

When did you start working on the draft question? Selective Service?

**Brad Patterson**

Let's see, I was -- oh, I had been a -- I'm trying to think. My White House -- I was in treasury at the time, and John Macy was Johnson's sort of personnel guy, talent search of men, and I had gotten to know Macy quite well. And Johnson had set up this commission on the draft, a special independent commission. We were sending young white men to college and drafting young black men to Vietnam, and there was a sense that the draft was really quite unfair and deep division in the country about it. So Johnson established a special presidential commission under Burke Marshall, who had been the assistant attorney general in Justice and, of course, a Kennedy man. But we had Daniel Brewster of Yale. We had very senior people. Roosevelt's secretary of labor, the woman, she was on that commission, very distinguished commission. And Macy was told, "Find an executive secretary," so he called me. I was out climbing on the Tetons at the time, got this phone call from Macy's office, "We want you to take a job back here, get back here as soon as you can."

Treasury let me go, and I worked for Marshall. And I then -- that was involved, and then we prepared a paper, a report for the president, and, of course, Johnson was very eager that nothing leak. He didn't like reports for him leaking before he saw them. But Rumsfeld was a congressman at the time, and I think he had -- there was a conference out in Chicago, which he had played a big role in. And I went

out there to participate on a panel out there, but Johnson was watching the television all the time. He didn't want any of his people's faces to appear on that television set. So -- but I got involved, and that was a draft issue at that time, and we prepared a report for the president recommending a lottery, and the head of the draft at the time --

**Timothy Naftali**

General Lincoln --

**Brad Patterson**

Huh?

**Timothy Naftali**

Was it General Lincoln?

**Brad Patterson**

No, General -- I'll think of it in a minute. Names are skipping me this afternoon. Was furious, for instance, we would ask -- he put the draft members -- the draft board members are appointed by the president, I think, but they are really picked by the head of Selective Service. And he would pick all these old, old, old white men, in neighborhoods which were largely black neighborhoods. So we, as a commission, one of the first things we did is ask for the biographies of all the draft board members. And the head of the commission, Selective Service said, "What do you want this information for? We don't give this information out." We were a presidential commission. We had to extract it with a knife. And he was furious about us, and about our report, but Johnson overrode him, and we finally went to the lottery idea.

**Timothy Naftali**

How much support was there for a volunteer army at that point?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, not much, because you see, you couldn't get enough people. It was a draft at the time.

**Timothy Naftali**

Richard Nixon is elected. What happens to you?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, I'm working -- okay, then there was another -- Maury Lieberman was an associate of Johnson's. When our draft report got finished, Maury Lieberman was made chair of a committee on community action on the poverty program. Schreiber had been moved over to the poverty program. Morey was a very distinguished lawyer of Sidley & Austin in Chicago and a close friend of Johnson's. And Johnson said, "Maury, I want you to chair this committee." And Maury went to Macy and said, "Find me an

executive secretary." Macy said, "This guy, Patterson." So I was executive secretary of this commission on draft reform. On select -- on the --

**Timothy Naftali**

The community action.

**Brad Patterson**

-- on the community action program. I remember it was mainly set up in statute, same statute that created the OEO, provided for the establishment of this committee. That was a very interesting experience. I want to tell you about a couple of them.

**Timothy Naftali**

Please do.

**Brad Patterson**

I remember attending a staff meeting once, one of Schreiber's staff meetings. He had been my former boss, and he was director of OEO, and I was executive secretary of this committee, independent commission. I remember one of his financial guys, Bill somebody, at the staff meeting he -- we were going over the budget for OEO, and Schreiber turned to the budget and said, "What's this thing -- you're spending \$25,000 for mirrors. Bill, what you doing with these mirrors?" And the guy said, "Mr. Schreiber, some of these young people have never seen their own faces in poverty neighborhoods. They've never seen their own faces." So the OEO was buying mirrors to give them a sense of self worth, the very initial step, something we grow up with. These kids had never -- I thought that was a -- and then I got a call from one of the OEO people. Said, "We're going down to southern Mississippi, to a community action program down there, and do you want to come with us?" I said, "Yeah, I'd like to do that, see the community action program at practice and on the field." So I was down there, I'll think of the name of this little primitive town down there. "We're going down -- come with us."

So we went to this, and it was a -- it was a -- what they produce, pitch. You get pitch from this scar pine tree, and it drips off. Turpentine camp, turpentine camp. So I was -- we went around the turpentine camp. The kids, of course, were not in school. The cabins were primitive cabins, all black, of course. Hardly any front steps, you could almost climb into them. What was dinner? Collard greens was dinner. Breakfast, lunch, and dinner, it was collard greens. These people [unintelligible], first I ever had that experience. These people were not even living in this century. The men were out with the barrels, dripping pitch into these barrels. I couldn't think of a more dirty job. And the women and the kids were at home, so no school, no health program, no nothing. Collard greens for dinner. It just seemed to me, I never in my life experienced you know, such drastic poverty. It was a lesson to me, what the poverty program was really like, and it made an impression on me, and I never forgot it.

**Timothy Naftali**

When Donald Rumsfeld would take over OEO and Dick Cheney would be his assistant, one of the challenges they had was how to figure out how well the program was doing. In your position working for Schreiber, what kind of metrics, what kind of -- how was he estimating the success of what he was

doing? There was no question there was a demand and a need for it, but how did he see whether it was working?

**Brad Patterson**

Now, this is OEO.

**Timothy Naftali**

OEO, yeah, yeah. When you're with him at the OEO.

**Brad Patterson**

Yeah, I'm not sure. I think that's pretty primitive. Obviously, the census will tell you incomes, people out of poverty. But it was too early to tell, I think, anything -- much too early to make any measurements. My feeling was it was pretty primitive, but then, finally, I think, you know, wasn't Rumsfeld appointed to decommission OEO, get rid of it?

**Timothy Naftali**

Then he changed his mind, because they actually increased their demand, their budgetary demand. Well, Nixon had campaigned on getting rid of OEO.

**Brad Patterson**

Yeah, yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us a little bit about Schreiber before we move on to the Nixon --

**Brad Patterson**

Well, Schreiber was a wellspring of energy, brilliant man, tremendous personality, wonderful rhetoric in terms of expressing himself. He knew a lot of people in the campaign, very talented people. Well, the Peace Corps actually began -- it was interesting -- Kennedy made a promise in his campaign, and there was a foreign State Department, brilliant man named Warren Wiggins, who had been in the state for some time, maybe he was in AID, I guess. And he wrote a paper on how you could organize a Peace Corps, and what it could do, and what the promise would be, and how we ought to go about it. And somebody showed Schreiber that paper, and he said, "Get me Wiggins." He reached out to Warren and made him the director of policy in the Peace Corps. But in other words -- I don't know whether he asked Warren whether he was a Democrat or Republican. It didn't make any difference. He wanted bright people. He didn't ask me what I am -- maybe he was glad that -- he thought I was a Republican. I wasn't, but he never asked my politics, either. But he gathered around him a lot of really brilliant men. Bill Delanol

[phonetic sp]

and -- well, anyway, it was a -- people -- there was an outfit in Vermont. Alice somebody brought her down, that summer program where kids go abroad over the summer time. Experiment in international living.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you want some water?

**Brad Patterson**

That's all right. He brought her down. Wherever he reached in the country, to get the top people, the best people. So the Peace Corps, at the beginning particularly, was a very exciting place.

**Timothy Naftali**

It's 1968. There's an election. President Nix -- Richard Nixon is elected. What happens to you?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, I'll say I'm working with Maury Lieberman in the OEO -- in the -- on this committee, this commission.

**Timothy Naftali**

Actually, before we move on to that, do you remember how you dealt with the -- there were some riots that year.

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

What do you recall of the federal government's response and OEO's response to those?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, I was in the commission overseeing OEO, and I don't think we paid that much attention to it. We made an annual report on community action, but we saw it as a tragedy, obviously, happening right around us in a city. I don't think we took any particular action that I know of in our commission. Maybe Schreiber and the OEO people did.

**Timothy Naftali**

What did you recommend? We can all look -- what do you remember as being the most important recommendation of the commission?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, we wanted to strengthen the community action program. It was under some attack. Community action was organizing local groups to take money and try to rebuild their communities themselves, not necessarily money supporting the mayor or the governor. Sometimes, they would be in conflict with the mayor and the governor, and some of the mayors and governors were pretty unhappy to see federal money going to the south side of Chicago, or in San Francisco, Oakland, you know folks out there, and Woodlawn in Chicago. So the mayors and governors were, in large cases, were quite hostile to community action. And we tried to defend that program, pointing out how it should be well organized and careful with its funds, but it deserved to be a separate, new undertaking financed by the federal government. So I think, in general, tried to support community action against the attacks that came from mayors that were unhappy about -- the mayor of Chicago didn't particularly care about strengthening Woodlawn, although -- who's the guy who wrote Back of the Yards. Saul Alinsky? Yeah, that kind of folks. And, yeah, and of course it was interesting, Barack Obama was doing that kind of thing recently on the south side.

**Timothy Naftali**

So as I said, Richard Nixon is elected. What happens to Brad --

**Brad Patterson**

Well, was in with Maury on this commission, and nothing happened for a while until, I think, Lieberman -- I'm trying to think, I'm trying to think what the connection was. They wanted to do -- Nixon and the head of HUD, HUD at the time, his name escapes me, wanted to go to Philadelphia --

**Timothy Naftali**

Romney, you mean? When Romney was secretary of HUD?

**Brad Patterson**

No, I don't think it was Romney. It was somebody else, and they wanted to do a listening in Philadelphia, to pay attention to poverty areas in Philadelphia and different parts of the city, meet with the mayor and so forth. And I somehow got involved, maybe because of my OEO connection, with the gentleman from HUD, and the two of us went up there and advanced the trip. It was going to be the secretary of HUD and Len Garment, were going to be the ones to do a listening. And so we went to the different parts -- we went to the governor, we went to the mayor --

**Timothy Naftali**

Was it Van Dusen? I'm just thinking about who the -- go ahead.

**Brad Patterson**

The names, again, I'm not doing very well on names. But the [unintelligible] went to the -- I think we went up to a factory, we went to schools, we went to educational institutions, and we set up a program, a day long program for these VIP people, Len Garment from the White House and the head of HUD, come and see what was going on in these neighborhoods and these institutions that were trying to

work with them, and it was very successful. And it got good publicity for them. And Garment, then, said, "Look, I'm" -- then he was brought into the White House, I guess he was brand new at the White House at the time. He had come to be a law partner of Nixon's, come to Washington, moved to a law office in Washington, and then Nixon grabbed him in the summer of '69, and so Garment came into the White House, brand new, brand new to government, and he said, "I need someone around me who knows his way around this town, and you've done a good job in setting up this program in Philadelphia. Will you come join my staff? And I can't pay you," he said. "I'll detail you -- my old friend, Morton Abram [phonetic sp] will detail you to me." And he did. So for the first several years, I was on detail from Lieberman's office to the White House.

**Timothy Naftali**

You mean from the commission?

**Brad Patterson**

From the commission, that's right. And so they really -- they -- the White House does that quite often, but I did it for several years, then I finally joined the staff full-time. So Len -- and we hit it off wonderfully together -- he was brand new, and I always knew my way around, and of course, pretty soon a ton of bricks fell on us in the Alcatraz crisis, and we handled that one just the way we should have.

**Timothy Naftali**

Let's stop for a minute. Tell us the story of the moment you found out about the occupation --

**Brad Patterson**

Well, Garment's responsibility was special counsel to the president. He didn't report to the counsel of the president, he had his own reporting to the president, and civil rights was his responsibility. And then we had -- Alvin Josephy had written a monograph about Indian policy, and he was told that's Garment's responsibility. So somehow, Garment and I got taken -- saddled with responsibility of Native American affairs. And, all right, we'd be glad to help out what we can, and then bam, on the 20th of November, 1969, the ticker is bing, bing, bing, bing, bing, "Indians seize Alcatraz." And Ehrlichman and Haldeman said, "All right, Garment, that's your baby. Move in." And Garment said, "Come on, Patterson, we got to go figure out about this."

And my background with Indians was zilch. I didn't know any history. I never studied the history, sociology. I knew nothing about -- anthropology, nothing. But I did know where to go to learn things, interior, and BIA, places to go. And so we managed that Alcatraz crisis. The vice president was very much concerned. There was a statutory committee called the Committee on Indian Opportunity, chaired by Agnew. And his associate, C.D. Ward was his chief of staff, and this fellow named Bob Robertson was the executive secretary of this committee. So we got to know the -- and the members of that committee were some very liberal people: Ernie Stevens and Rose Crow-Flies-High and some of the Indian activists, not AIM activists, but activists who were trying to make some changes in the BIA, and trying to use this committee to do so. So we got to know them. They wanted to have a -- they wanted to have an appointment with the vice president. I remember they came to Garment, and they said, "Can you try to arrange this? And we did, and we sat in on that appointment. And so we began to

know some Indian leadership, particularly among these people here. And then came Alcatraz, and Garment took the lead on that, and that was, of course, a big news story in the middle of it. But Garment, as I tell the story, well, I'll tell you now that we're on camera, right away at the beginning, Garment looked and me and said, "Patterson, who's got Alcatraz?" I said, "I don't know, but I'll find out." And, of course, this Alcatraz was surplus federal property.

And the agency in the government that handled surplus federal property was the General Services Administration, the administrative arm of the federal government in that sense. So Garment said, "Oh, who's the head of it?" A fellow by the name of Robert Kunzig is the administrator. All right. "Well, I'll get him on the phone." "Get him on the phone.". So he got Kunzig on the phone and said, "Kunzig, this is Len Garment at the White House. I see Alcatraz comes under your jurisdiction. What are you going to do about the Indians?" And Kunzig said, "Well, we've got that under control, Mr. Garment. I'm going to bring in the U.S. Marshals, and we're going to beat them out of there at noon tomorrow." And Garment knew enough about Indians and American history to know that would be a disaster, another one like Wounded Knee 100 years before, so he said, "No way. I don't want to do that at all. That's a bad idea. Call off your cops. We want to spend Bob Robertson from the vice president's office out there to talk with the Indians, and see what the problem is, see what their concerns are. So no marshals, we're going to send a negotiator."

And Kunzig said, "Now, just a minute, Mr. Garment, I'm appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate, I'm the agency head, this is my responsibility. My agency has this responsibility. Now, this is my job. I'm going to do it." And Garment said, "You're going to do exactly what I tell you to do. Call off your cops." And Kunzig said, "I'll never talk to you again!" Slammed down the phone. Well, Alcatraz then hit the headlines, of course. I remember Ethel Kennedy calling Garment at one point and saying, "Garment, what are you going to do about those Indians on Alcatraz? Don't do anything to harm them. Give them Alcatraz, give them have the island, you know, surplus property." You could see Garment getting heated and heated and finally standing up from his desk with the phone in his hand, quite inopportune by Ethel Kennedy moving in.

But the mayor of San Francisco, a lot of Hollywood people went to Alcatraz, "Give them the island. Don't do anything to hurt these poor Indians." And, of course, people in America were waking up, particularly now that what we had been doing to Indians the last 200 years, and there was an enormous amount of sympathy, particularly from the Hollywood types and people like Ethel Kennedy. And we saw that, we felt that, and we knew damn well. And I think Garment knew that Nixon was quite friendly to Indians, because his football coach at Whittier, was Chief Newman [phonetic sp], and in his biography, Nixon writes of Chief Newman, "He was the one who always kept telling me never give up, always stay in there. Keep on fighting, never stop fighting. Never give up. You're going to make it. Never be discouraged."

And Nixon thought -- and he said this in his biography, and this is a quote, "Next to my father, he was the second most influential man in my life, was Chief Wallace Newman." So we knew that Nixon -- we learned soon that Nixon was quite sympathetic to the Indian cause. And now we had some hard law enforcement people in the White House, Bud Krogh and Geoff Shepard, and they were saying, "Hey, come on, this is a law enforcement problem. These Indians are taking federal property. Now come on, we got to solve this." The Coast Guard said, "No, wait a minute. The Indians put out the light on Alcatraz Island." Well, of course, you have these big tankers coming in onto the Golden Gate Bridge in the San Francisco harbor, and they needed a lighthouse, you know? The Indians had wrecked it, and

they burned it down. In fact, I have a piece of a -- charred piece of wood upstairs here. And so the maritime interests were putting pressure --

**Timothy Naftali**

You were saying the law enforcement people did --

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, in the White House, when Alcatraz was occupied, there were some people who handled law enforcement, Bud Krogh and his assistant, Geoff Shepard. You know Geoff of course.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes.

**Brad Patterson**

And they, as a matter of fact, put pressure on Ehrlichman, and maybe on the president. In effect, I think they thought that Garment and Patterson were being too friendly with the Indians and too tolerant of the Alcatraz situation. OEO came up with money -- see, the Indians had -- in San Francisco, had an Indian Community Center there, which burned down, and lacking that center, some of them went to Alcatraz. So we said, "We aren't going to do anything about Alcatraz." They wanted to establish a university there, but they thought that they would like to have some improvements in their center in San Francisco. We offered them money to help them build a new center, but we weren't going to build a university on Alcatraz.

But these negotiations went on, we were trying to give them some assistance. The problem here with Indians who are in cities -- let me explain a little bit -- Indians are on tribes, in tribes around reservations. In their capacity on reservations, they are wards of the government, and the government has a trust responsibility for their education and housing and all social services, health and so forth. But if the Indians move to a city, they lose their reservation status. They lose their status as wards of the government. They lose their status as being automatically eligible for social services. Indians, they lose that, when they join the urban poor. But a lot of them are in cities, lots of them are in cities, and so there is some discontent, and some of these Indian activists were concerned about this, too. But the government was not going to be moved on this. They were not going to start a special Indian program for urban Indians. They would fit under social services provided for all poor people, maybe, but not a special category. But the Alcatraz people burned down the lighthouse.

They -- and then the big -- the ships coming in, tankers and other big maritime traffic, the Coast Guard was quite concerned that the lighthouse was gone, so the Detroit -- the San Francisco Chronicle bought them -- bought them a generator to keep the light going and to keep the story going. It shows -- it's interesting the way a news organization will do something like that, in order to get the publicity, get the story in the Chronicle, they'll put a lighthouse on the island for them to keep the occupation going. We pretty soon learned about that. We'd have the tables in the State Department, people in Russia were concerned about Indians on Alcatraz. Lots of people in Europe were interested in American Indian Affairs, big interest out there. People in Germany, and France, and England, "What's going on? What are you doing about Alcatraz?" And we realized that the world was watching this

particular crisis. Not just us in America or people in San Francisco. But as I say, several Hollywood types, [unintelligible] forgot what his name was -- Winters, Jonathan Winters went to Alcatraz, and so they -- and they made a statement to the press. Why don't you give Alcatraz to the Indians? So there was a great deal of buildup one-way, and all sorts of sentiment against it, too.

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, had the -- the fact that the generator was needed, had the electricity been turned off?

**Brad Patterson**

The light was destroyed, the lighthouse.

**Timothy Naftali**

Oh, this is where -- so there would be a lighthouse.

**Brad Patterson**

So there would be a lighthouse, that's right, to damp down the Coast Guard concern. So this went on. Robertson went out there several times. Bob went out there, Bob Robertson went out to meet with the Indians, I think, either at Alcatraz or in San Francisco, and in one of his meetings, the Indians put mescaline in his coffee before the meeting started. Somehow Bob was tipped off about this and didn't drink the coffee, but it was that kind of -- that's the kind of people we were dealing with out there. The press was covering it all the time. Indians and the press were just like this. In fact, the Indians had long sessions with the press. Ahead of the occupation, they knew all about it in advance. They did -- I think the night before, they went out and decided that they couldn't make it, so they went back and then they did it the second night successfully.

The press was told about all of it, so they were in on it completely. Indians, these folks, AIM people really very, very wise in their use of the press. They knew exactly what they were doing; they were very effective in using the press to support their cause. And we saw this. We realized that. So the kind of war we were in was a very public war. This was not anything secret within the White House. It was the world attention and American attention.

So finally, 18 months later, we found examples of where the Indians were stealing copper and available metals from the Alcatraz buildings and selling them in San Francisco, and they lost interest. The world lost interest, the United States lost interest, the press lost interest. At that point, we felt we had the freedom to move them off, so we brought cops out there and moved them very peacefully, no violence, and took them out of there. So that ended in 18 months.

Then we had -- one of the next things that happened, I thought you'd be interested in, I'm not sure of my timing and my chronology here. The oil companies discovered oil in North Slope of Alaska. And they obviously wanted a lot of oil, billions of barrels, so they needed to build a pipeline right across Alaska, all the way down to the port city down there. I forgot the name of it. And they started to build the pipeline, survey for the pipeline, and they ran up against a little town over there in Alaska that said, "You can't come through here. This is Indian country." And they said, "How do you know it's Indian country?" "Well, it's always been Indian country. But you can't move that pipeline." And then they

began to look into it, and we realized that we never figured out who owned Alaska. It was never done at purchase from the Russians. It was never done at statehood. We just made Alaska a state. But the state claimed a lot of land, private people had land, Indians had land. Indians had land for centuries, but nobody knew where there were any boundaries, anywhere.

And the court took this case and said, well, you know, the Indians may well own that land. You can't build a pipeline until you figure out who owns the land. So then the Indians came to us, and said, "My God, we need to have -- all we need was an Alaska Native Claims Act." And that piece of legislation -- Congress couldn't make the determination, first time in history. So interior got working on it, and -- oh, we remember going crying calling over to BIA and saying, "Who is your expert on Alaska?" "Well, his name is so-and-so." "Where is he?" "He's up in Alaska." "Bring him down for lunch at the White House." And we did. And so we had a little luncheon -- Garment hosted a little meeting in the White House mess with some of the folks from BIA and Washington and this guy from Alaska. We brought him in from Alaska and said, "Tell us about the problems of Indians and Alaska and the questions of land ownership and so forth."

So we did -- all of a sudden went into a brand new subject for us, looking into history and looking into anthropology and so forth, and we realized we had to write a new law. So we -- the issue, of course, was how much land are they going to get? And the Indians said, "We don't want just the land. We want a slice of the oil profits from these oil companies. We know they're raking in millions of dollars from those millions of barrels, and we want a hunk of that." And the Indians hired a law firm in Washington, very good lawyers, and they dealt with us, too, and so the issue was, what would this Alaskan Native Claims draft legislation provide?

And I drew up an option paper about this. I remember it was a 25-page paper, and Garment said, "That's much too long, but we're going to have a meeting with Ehrlichman in Ehrlichman's office about this issue." And so there was a meeting in Ehrlichman's office. This is one of the more interesting things that I did in the White House, and I made the presentation. Don Rice was there from OMB, and Trisha Martin [phonetic sp] was there representing Interior, and Ehrlichman, of course, and Garment, and a few others, Bobby was there, and I made the presentation with a map and so forth, and things that were agreed to.

Then I said, "Now we get to a point where we don't agree yet on how much land and how much money. And the Indians wanted 40 millions acres, and they wanted -- I think it's a million dollars, or maybe more, and I'll give you the pros and cons." Ehrlichman interrupted the meeting -- [unintelligible] Morton interrupted the meeting, he said, "Oh, hell." He said -- it's a quote. "Give them 40 millions acres and a billion dollars." We all looked each other, you know, well, sounds good to us, 40 million-acres and a billion dollars. And so we broke up. And then I did what my secretariat training had taught me to do from the years before, write it down. So I wrote a memorandum, a memorandum of meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman. The agreed points were as follows, one, two, three, four, five. Money, billion dollars, and the land of 40 million-acres, and circulated that around. I met Don Rice in the West Executive Avenue the next day. He says, "You're crazy, 40 million --" I said, "Look, it's in writing. That's what happened in the meeting. Ehrlichman was there." We assumed that Ehrlichman was going to take this to the president. Many years later, I interviewed John for my book. I said, "John, what did the president say about this?" He said, "I didn't take that to the president. I knew he'd trust me to settle that.

That was a decision we made. He was very pro Indian, he'd back us up on that, so we made the decision." Interesting how policy is made in the White House. And we put that in the bill. Interior kept writing the bill not quite the way we wanted. Bobby or I would call up Interior, "No, you got to do it this way." Kept reminding them, no, no, you got to do it this way. And finally, we prepared a bill, and, of course, it went to Stevens, and we went and talked to Stevens' people. I remember we went up there, Bobby and I, briefed Stevens' people, some of the staff of the Senate Interior Committee. And both houses of Congress passed it, and -- oh, incidentally, that's right, they passed it. And, now, when the bill was ready, we had a meeting with, did have a meeting with the president. It was a formality. And the president of AFN -- remember we went --

**Female Speaker**

Russell Means?

**Brad Patterson**

No, no, no. Anyway, the president of AFN who we had worked with, Bobby and the rest of us were invited into the Oval Office to -- the press, I guess, came -- take pictures of the fact that the bill was going to be presented and sent to Congress. Nixon gave us each a souvenir. I still have it, little things with the presidential seal on it. And then we went to the press office, and the press secretary, Ron Ziegler, said, "We're going to present this bill now. We're sending this bill up to the Alaskan Native Claims Act to settle the questions of Indians in Alaska." And then he called on the Indian chief himself to make the rest of the presentation. At that point, by that time, the Indians had upped their ante to 60 million-acres, but we stayed with 40. And we were a little nervous, because here was this guy sitting at the White House podium, but he might take the position to criticize the very bill that we have been working on. He did not. He says, "We didn't get everything we asked for, but we have the White House paid attention to us, consulted with us. It's a fair thing. They took us in, looked for our views, took our advice, worked with us closely, and we support this bill," that from the White House podium, from the guy who could have sunk it. I thought that was really very -- and it went up, there and it did pass, and I remember right around late in December, and Nixon dictated, I wrote and Nixon read a -- there was a big, a commission up there at the time, the AFN, the Alaskan Federation of Natives. And Nixon did a radio address to them, celebrating the signature of this bill. And the bill sets up 13 different corporations, and then each was to make the surveys, draw some boundary lines. I gather there has been some criticism about who's on these boards of these corporations, but that's something beyond us now. But it was a history-making piece of legislation.

**Timothy Naftali**

And the number 40 million acres came from the Interior Department --

**Brad Patterson**

Rogers Morton --

**Timothy Naftali**

And where did it come from? Did he ever tell you where that --

**Brad Patterson**

No, just came out -- well, the Indians had asked for 40 million. But [unintelligible] told us, "Make it 40 million acres and a billion dollars." And we did. We put it into law, and it was 40 million acres and a billion dollars. And the Indians -- and they built the pipeline.

**Timothy Naftali**

What role did Wally Hickel, who was the first secretary of interior, play? Or was he gone by the time --

**Brad Patterson**

I'm trying to think. He was there when Alcatraz happened, and I guess he realized it was really being handled in the White House. I'm not sure -- or the press paid some attention to him. I'm sure he was supportive of what we were doing. I don't remember dealing with him very much.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you have any pressure from the White House to do something about Alcatraz as it dragged on?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, we had pressure from Bud Krogh and Geoff Shepard, and possibly a little bit from Ken Cole, who was Ehrlichman's number two. But not -- never in the sense of using any violence, nobody ever asked us to do that. If we had let those guys do it, we might have, but we kept that issue in our hands, and Nixon didn't take it away from us. He knew we were handling it. He was pretty well briefed on what we were doing and the process and negotiations. But we were never asked to cut it short and use violence.

**Timothy Naftali**

What was the FBI telling you about the AIM, or what did the --

**Brad Patterson**

Well, the FBI -- it's interesting, they were going to Bud Krogh and Geoff Shepard with their report. They never showed them to me. They never showed them -- I don't think Garment saw them either, and neither Bud nor Shepard shared them with us. There was some separation in that White House. That was a certain -- law enforcement guys had somewhat of a world apart over there.

**Timothy Naftali**

Let's talk about the Indian message.

**Brad Patterson**

Okay, we wanted -- oh, I remember. A memorandum came around from Ehrlichman in 1969. It was right after the Alcatraz crisis was still going on and saying, "We want to have your ideas for the

messages which the president should present to Congress beginning next year," in 1970. Typically, the way it happened, usually the State of the Union message, in the State of the Union message, Nixon would say, "And I'm going to send Congress a special message on this. I'm going to send Congress a special message on that." And so Ehrlichman said, "What other kinds of" -- to the staff generally, "Give us some ideas of messages we ought to send to Congress next year." And Garment looked at me, and I looked at Garment, and we said, "How about a message about Indian Affairs?" He said, "That's great, fine." And we sent -- Ehrlichman said, "Great, you do it." Garment was labored with responsibility for that.

Well, we worked closely with C.D. Ward and Bob Robertson, because they had some Indian contacts with the tribal -- particularly with the tribal chairman. But -- and then they did -- in fact, Bob had some field hearings, I believe, with Indian tribal people, a lot of them, and took a lot of careful notes and a lot of recommendations, so we got a lot of ideas from them. I had an interesting role. There was a fellow over in Interior, in their legal shop, called Bill Veeder. I don't know if that name rings any bell with you. Bill was a very, very strong lawyer, advocate for Indian Affairs. He had been there for years and years. He knew Indian law backwards and forwards. And he often -- when he found out that I was handling Indian Affairs, we'd get together quite often for lunch in the White House often. Bill would come over and fill me up with stories about things that -- Indians were being mistreated, or being chiseled. And Bill would say -- I give you one example. For instance, was Yakima, a big mountain in Washington.

And how -- this is a true story, and how Yakima was a treaty in 1855, setting up the reservation. And the boundary line for the treaty, or the boundary line for the reservation, went over the top of a mountain there, Mount Adams, I think it was, right over the top. And so the treaty was signed and sent to Washington to be filed, and the map was attached to the treaty. But when it got to Washington, the map was lost, and nobody could find it. And the forest service said, "Well, now we want to set up a national forest there, and so here's where the national forest is going to be." And they took up half of that mountain. And the Yakima said, "No, no, no, that's ours. There's a treaty. We signed the treaty. That's at Yakima Reservation." The forest service says, "No, you can't prove it. We think it belongs to us. So we'll take it, make it national forest." And then the map was discovered. It had been misfiled. And it came out, and there it was, the Indians' line was right over the mountain. So the Indians came to -- this was years before -- and Indians came to Interior, they said, "Okay, now give us back that land." And Interior said, "Oh, I don't think we can do that." It's [unintelligible] Agriculture. Forest Service is part of Agriculture. So they went to agriculture, "Give us the land back." "No, can't do that."

And then they set up something called the Indian Claims Commission, handling Indian claims. Many of these claims were like that, from the history of the West. The Claims Commission, all they could do is offer money. They could never offer land. So again and again and again the Yakima came to the Claims Commission, "Give us the land." "You're right, you were screwed, but we can offer you some money." No -- well, as soon as Garment and I took office and Nixon came into office, the Yakima came, knocked on the door of the White House. And then they came to see me. And they said, "We want this land. We were screwed." And Bill Veeder was their protector, and he said, "They really were screwed. This belongs to the Yakima." I said, "What can we do?" "Well, we can go to Agriculture." We went to Agriculture, and they said, "No, we can't undo that." We went to Interior, and they said, "You should try. Yeah, you ought to be able to give them that land. Do you think we should?" Agriculture -- the attorney general solicitor of agriculture said, "Can't do it." Solicitor of interior said, "You can do it." Ah, so then we have two solicitors, differing opinion. So we sent a memo to the attorney general. Said, "Mr. Attorney General, you resolve this. Which solicitor is right? Can we give that land back, or are we

prohibited from changing the law -- changing the forest service thing?" And took them a year to go through it. Meanwhile, who was the Hollywood guy who charged me with -- they thought I was in charge of this, holding it up. Who was that? The guy that took -- movie -- who was in crime movies, anyway --

**Timothy Naftali**

Gene Hackman?

**Brad Patterson**

No, I'm sorry on names.

**Timothy Naftali**

That's all right. That's all right.

**Brad Patterson**

And finally, they came up with the opinion: you can give the land back. And so we took it away from Agriculture, and we gave the land back in a big presentation ceremony. And Agnew's daughter was given Air Force Two for a ceremony out there to celebrate, and they had a big pow-wow. And I went out on the plane, and several others. They gave her Air Force Two to do that. It was a great big celebration out there. I remember they put us on horseback, and we went up on the mountain where the land was now, and it was really a great thing. Now, these little kids, you could dress up in their costumes, very talented Indian dancing, if you've ever seen it, it's a beautiful thing. So we all felt so good about this. It was a wrong that had been done and undone in history for them, and we did it, our office really did it, and made the difference. And that's been made, so it happened that way, so that was one story. Another story is about Blue Lake. There again, the Forest Service had taken, and the Indians said, "No, it's ours." And the Forest -- and the Indian Claims Commission said, "Yeah, they're right. We'll pay for it." And the Indians said, "We don't want the money. We want the land. This is sacred land." And that took legislation. And so there was a bill, and we supported it, and I remember -- and the House passed it. And the senator from New Mexico was not very sympathetic with that, and we got word from the congressional liaison office in the White House, don't touch -- again, my --

**Timothy Naftali**

Clinton Anderson?

**Brad Patterson**

Anderson, Clinton Anderson. "Don't bother Anderson. We want his vote on the ABM treaty." So we had to stay away from Anderson until the ABM treaty went by, and then we tried to go and take this legislation up with the Senate. And we went to the Senate Interior Committee, and the Interior committee reported out the bill, which was paying them for the leasing of Blue Lake. And we overturned the committee on the floor of the Senate to take the house legislation without change and voted that in the Senate.

So a conference wasn't needed, didn't need a Senate/House conference. And we passed that bill, and Blue Lake was restored. And we had a great session in the White House, in the mess, with the president and the leaders of the team of the Blue Lake Pueblo, and they spoke in Tiwi [phonetic sp], and I have a picture upstairs, I'll show it to you later, unless you would like me to show it, and you take a picture --

**Timothy Naftali**

No, no, this would be better, thanks.

**Brad Patterson**

And it was this signing ceremony, and Nixon came down there. Haldeman was very unhappy to see the Democrats were being invited to the ceremony, but it was bipartisan, so he got overruled. And Nixon got up and made a presentation, and then the guy spoke his Tiwi, and then Nixon got up again, unexpectedly, and said, "You know, I'm about to go -- the next thing on my schedule is to go over to the commerce department and celebrate our one trillionth GNP." And he said, "I have been thinking about this, and we go over to the Congress department and celebrate financial success, but here today, we celebrate justice," words like that. It was just a major weep, so beautifully done. And Nixon really felt -- you could see he was speaking from his heart about this. And so Blue Lake was restored to the Taos Pueblo. And again, that was something our office had had a hand in, and there we worked, of course, with -- I remember going up to the Hill in Nixon's -- wait a minute, wait a minute, in Agnew's office, there was a [unintelligible], and typing out a speech for senator from Illinois, Chicago, my friend --

**Timothy Naftali**

Percy?

**Brad Patterson**

Percy, Chuck Percy. So that was [unintelligible].

**Timothy Naftali**

May I ask you, did you travel with the group that went to Blue Lake to look at --

**Brad Patterson**

No, I did not. Garment evidently did go out there, but I didn't. I went to -- I went to the Yakima celebration.

**Timothy Naftali**

Let me ask you one other question. How did you get -- how did you manage to get the Senate, the Senate Interior Committee overturned?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, we just had the votes on the Senate. People liked Chuck Percy -- or just -- who didn't really have an interest in Indians one way or the other, but were sympathetic. People have, and still do feel the Indians really got screwed throughout our American history, and I think so many Americans feel this way that a piece of legislation like that has a lot of sympathy. And, yeah, I remember Frank Church, my friend, good neighbor, Frank Church, I don't think he -- he voted against it at the time. But -- and of course the head of Interior -- what was his name? State of Washington.

**Timothy Naftali**

You mean Scoop Jackson, the senator?

**Brad Patterson**

Scoop Jackson, yeah. His committee got overturned on the floor of the Senate, which is very rare to do that. He wasn't very happy about that, but Blue Lake came back. Well, then we had, then we had the BIA building. Here we had -- the activists had pointed out that there were so many Indian treaties that had been violated, particularly, of course, the Black Hills. They organized a Trail of Broken Treaties, a march on Washington. So slowly groups of people joined, more and more people coming to Washington, and this was in the fall of '72. And they arrived in Washington, and Harrison Loesch, who had been the assistant secretary of Indian Affairs, was not very sympathetic at all, although he was the head of the Indian BIA report exam, but he told them, in effect, he didn't want anybody cooperating with Indians.

Well, they came to Washington, and they wanted to -- they came to Interior, and a lot of them went -- a big delegation of them came to the interior building that afternoon. And then 5:00 came, and workers went home, and the Indians stayed in the building, took over the building. And they demanded to meet with Ehrlichman. The Cabinet was out of town, and Ehrlichman's office called me up and said, "Patterson, you go meet with them." And they -- the law enforcement people, Geoff Shepard and Bud Krogh, had not briefed me on what they were like, and this is my first real adventure with them. So we met in Loesch's office, Loesch and I and Bob Robertson. And with the Indian activists leadership of Clyde --

**Timothy Naftali**

Russell Means?

**Brad Patterson**

Russell Means.

**Timothy Naftali**

Dennis Banks?

**Brad Patterson**

Yeah, Dennis Banks. And who was the very -- the orator there, Clyde -- well, there were maybe 40 of them, and they refused to meet with Loesch. He was such an enemy of theirs. This was in his own office, and they said, "You have to leave." So they forced Loesch out of his own office and then met there with Bob Robertson and me, and the oratory was very vigorous on their side, of course. They began the meeting by saying, "You know, Mr. Patterson, we're going to die tonight. You know we're going to die tonight. So we've decided on that. So let's talk from that." Well, that begins our conversation.

You can imagine, me, a good old civil servant, that was not the kind of a meeting I was used to having in the White House or anywhere else. But we tried to be -- [unintelligible] reasonableness about this, and how can we talk about it, the Trail of Broken Treaties. There were broken treaties, and that's right, so, no. Then about 10:00, a message came through from the police. They had surrounded the building. Indians were inside, and they were all with masks on -- gas masks and things -- and the word was, "Look, we're going off duty. Do we storm the building now or not?" So we broke up. I called Bud Krogh. I said, "Bud, they want to know whether to storm the building or not. Bob Robertson thinks maybe we should; I don't think we should. I differ with Bob here. I recommend against it." And Krogh says, "I'll get to the president." And he got to the president, and it was decided, "No, don't storm the building. Take it to court in the morning. We'll go to the court." So decided not to storm the building, and -- but the Indians occupied the building.

Now, they had typewriters there, at the top of the stairs they had gasoline that would have been a terrible, terrible disaster, if we had tried to take that building. And this went on for a couple of days. Finally, Garment came back. I went to see my son in San Francisco, so I was out of town a little bit. But then the Indians said, "All right, we'll meet with you," with Garment, and Carlucci, and me and a few others in the new Executive Office Building across the street. And we met there, tried to figure out what to do, and we agreed that we would -- they would send us a letter, and we would answer it, about the 20 points of the Trail of Broken Treaties, the things they wanted done, and we would answer that letter. And then they said, "All right, we'll leave town, but we haven't any money. How do we get out?"

So Carlucci dug up, I don't know how many thousand dollars from OEO, and paid their bus fare, just handed out the money, cash, and they went and left town. So they went to court. The court is the wrong place to handle crisis management, because all the judge can say is, "Do this by such an hour," where as soon as you set a deadline, of course, then all the guys with the television cameras come out and get ready, at the deadline, to take whatever is going to happen next. And they kept extending it and extending it and so forth. That's the wrong way to handle a crisis.

But the way it was handled was Carlucci handing on the money, and the Indians went home. But they trashed that building, and a lot of the files, tribal files, important historic documents about tribal files and tribal possessions and tribal finances were wrecked. Footnote, in the '76 -- I guess it was '76, I was asked to go out to meet with the Indians in -- at a conference out there and say some things in a political discussion defending the administration. And I did, and my journey was paid for by the party. But there was a reception afterwards, and I found myself dancing with Lenata Means [phonetic sp]. I guess she was his daughter or was his ex-wife. I don't know. And she was wearing this gorgeous piece of Indian jewelry. And I said, "Lenata, that's a beautiful piece of Indian jewelry." And she smiled, and she said, "Came from the BIA."

Timothy Naftali

Tell us the story of Ehrlichman, please, and the ambulance.

**Brad Patterson**

Okay, let me -- I'll put that on the list. One more thing, Wounded Knee. Now, here again --

**Timothy Naftali**

Before we go to Wounded Knee, I want to finish, if I may, with the BIA. Did Bud Krogh tell you that Kleindienst had wanted to storm the building?

**Brad Patterson**

No, he did not say. No, I didn't know that. Really? Well, I guess Nixon -- I guess -- sounds like that was a presidential decision not to. And I'm sure -- Nixon would come in when he needed -- when we needed him, he was there supporting us.

**Timothy Naftali**

The night that you -- the first night when you met with the leadership, the AIM -- so they left the building that they occupied, and they went to the Interior Department --

**Brad Patterson**

That's right. That's right.

**Timothy Naftali**

And then they were able to go back and reoccupy it?

**Brad Patterson**

They held the building. All the civil servants had gone on. They owned the building. They ran it.

**Timothy Naftali**

So at that point, the police --

**Brad Patterson**

Maybe the police let them through. I don't know. That must have been an arrangement, yeah. Okay, I want to mention Wounded Knee. Here, the AIM had a caravan of cars at Herentz [phonetic sp], and they were particularly unhappy with Dicky Wilson, who was the chair of the Lakota Sioux tribe, and -- because he was cracking down on some of them. And there were divisions in the tribe. There had been divisions in the Indian community. Tim, going way back to the Indian reorganization act of 1934, which set up Democratic governments in Indian reservation, voting for that, the tribal system. Now they were supposed to vote and have elected officers. That was 1934, and some of traditionalists didn't like that, never liked that. They said they wanted to run the tribes as they always had by, well, authority,

so to speak. They didn't like this idea of people voting. And some of that hung over into the Lakota Sioux tribe, and activists took advantage of it, particularly when they didn't win any votes. And so you had a split in the Lakota Sioux tribe with Dicky Wilson, the elected chair, who was pretty tough on some of the activists, and was put some of them in jail, and the activists and traditionalists saying, "We want to go back to the old ways."

So the activists had organized this big caravan of cars, and they drove on to the Lakota Sioux reservation. And where would they go? And the first thing they went to was up to this trading post up on the Hill above the village, I guess. And they took over the trading post. We first heard from tickers tick, bing, bing, bing, "Indians seize hostages," the people that ran the trading post. Well, of course, that's pretty serious. You're running a hostage operation. So again, law enforcement, and again, Garment and Patterson saying, "Now, wait a minute now. You need law enforcement, but be careful now. We don't want any violence." This was Wounded Knee, the same Wounded Knee where, 100 years before, you had that mass massacre. And boy, were we ever aware of that.

So the Marshals conducted themselves with great professionalism, and we were complimenting them for that. I think one Indian was killed, and a marshal was wounded, something like that. But they surrounded the Indians and their encampment. They took over the church, and I guess they ransacked the trading post, and that went on. And then Kleindienst sent a person out there to try to settle it, and we would -- [unintelligible] and I would go over to Kleindienst's office, he was deputy attorney general, I think, at the time, and have a meeting in his office with a long distant call out to his representative out there in Wounded Knee, and tried to figure out who was doing what. At one point, we had Colonel Volney Warner from the army join our staff meeting in Kleindienst's office. And we said -- and the question was, should we take any military action? And we said, "Colonel Warner, what would it be like?" And he said, "Well, we'd need tanks, and we'd need gas, and so forth." The more he talked, the more our jaws fell, and we said, "God, we don't want" -- and Colonel Warner said, "I don't want to do this either. Don't ask me to do it." We said, "We won't ask you to do it. We will never do that." But, you know, I'm glad we looked at it, and that was enough, just looking at it. I remember that conversation.

So finally, we tried to have a negotiating session in Washington, and that fell through. Finally, it was agreed that the White House would send five White House representatives to Wounded Knee to talk to the activists again about their demands and see what could be done, and I was to lead this group of five. Bobby was on it. We had a guy from justice who was a good lawyer, we had a guy from Interior who was a good historian. I forget -- we had one more. There were five of us. And we took a plane out there and went to a motel nearby and flew in a helicopter from that motel to this set up encampment. Had pine boughs and so forth on the table. And before we got to the -- as we landed at that encampment, Indians, all dressed up in their finery, feathers and everything, surrounded me, separated me from my other four colleagues, grabbed me this way, and took me over here, and surrounded me and said, "Now, Mr. Patterson, and Garment, remember, told me -- I don't want any pictures in the paper. I don't want any publicity. Just you keep this low key, Patterson." I said, "Yes, sir." It was a reporter, Frank --

**Timothy Naftali**

Bill Greider?

**Brad Patterson**

What was it?

**Timothy Naftali**

Bill Greider.

**Brad Patterson**

Bill Greider. I see him out of the corner of one eye, with his pencil in hand. And so they surrounded me, feathers, everything. "Mr. Patterson, give us back the Black Hills now. Give us the Black Hills." [Unintelligible] going. I said, "Gentleman, if I were the president of the United States, myself, I could not give you back the Black Hills. Only Congress can make that restoration." And the front page picture on the paper the next day in the Washington Post, Bill Greider, "'No,' said the Man From Washington. 'No,' He Could Not Rewrite History," which I thought was beautifully done. So then they took off their finery, and we sat down, and for three days, I think, we had these sessions. Now, somebody has made a movie -- the Indians made a movie of all this. This was all on tape. And I wonder where that tape is, that film is. But they did it, we didn't. But we explained the history, and we explained the law, and we explained, you know -- and again, I think what we said -- the 20 points was after the BIA, but we did send a letter.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you have anything to give them?

**Brad Patterson**

No, no, I think we finally agreed we would have some more correspondence, and we settled it peacefully, and they finally went home. Interesting, a year later, the owners of the trading shop brought suit against the federal government for the destruction or damage done to the trading shop at Wounded Knee. And the allegation of the suit was that the federal government's actions at the occupation of the BIA building were such as to encourage the Indians that they could get away with it, were too favorable to the Indians. And because we were leaned over backwards, favoring the Indians or not disciplining them, they thought they could do it again, and they did it again, and they wrecked our trading post. Therefore, it's the government, and the policy of the governments been following that is at fault. Therefore, we sue the government. Well, that claim went to the Court of Claims, and I didn't realize this, the Court of Claims can ask for an advisory opinion from the Congress. So they did, they asked for an advisory opinion from the Congress. And the Congress said, "All right, we will have a hearing, and Patterson will be a witness." So I testified at the hearing, and I pointed out -- I coined a phrase -- not coined a phrase, but I used a phrase -- I said, "Some of these tactics are really kind of guerrilla warfare, in the sense of trying -- rather skillful guerrilla warfare of trying to get good publicity."

**Timothy Naftali**

Guerilla theater.

**Brad Patterson**

Guerilla theater, that's what I'm trying to -- guerilla theater was my phrase. And a couple months later, the court came out with this opinion, which said -- no. I know, they had a special bill going through Congress, and Congress asked the court to give an advisory opinion. That's the way it went. And the court rendered its opinion and said -- and I quoted in my book, you see the quote there, which said, "You acted professionally and carefully and with a great deal of thoughtfulness and so forth, and you're to be complimented by the way you handled the situation." I thought that really put a cap on all those years in the White House for what we did. So those three crises, but having taken that job in the White House, I never knew that we would be in the Senate, not once, not twice, but three times, and each time I thought we did the right thing. We had the support of the president. Nobody -- except for one, Wounded Knee -- nobody got hurt, and we had the respect of Indian tribal people. And so that's -- I take those memories with me.

Now, many -- several years later I was in the Ford White House, I guess, I got a call from John Ehrlichman. He had been sentenced, you know, for -- to do penance out there, and he was out in the desert in the Southwest, and he said, "Brad, I'm here working with the Indians out here." And he said, "They're in a terrible situation. You know, we're in a very desolate area out here." I think he was working with Navajo. He said, "Do you suppose you could find a surplus, maybe GSA or somebody might have a surplus ambulance we could use out here to help take sick people on these long distances? Do you suppose you could find one somewhere?" I said, "John, I don't know, I'll try." I remember, I guess, I put in a call to GSA, and I'm not sure whether I dug up anything or not. And then John came to Washington, and we had lunch in a dark corner of a Washington restaurant. And John said to me, you know, he said, "I have been way out there on Navajo land, and seeing what it's like way out here [unintelligible] end of the federal delivery system." He said, "You know, if I were back in the White House, and somebody came and wanted a job on my staff in the White House, and I wanted to hire him, I would say, "All right, we'll take you on our staff in the White House. Before you come to the White House, you go out there and get out the farthest possible end of the so called federal service delivery system in America, and you live out there for several months, and see what comes out the other end. Then you come back and take your job in the White House."

**Timothy Naftali**

That's very good.

**Brad Patterson**

I thought that was very good. So that's my story.

**Timothy Naftali**

Before we move to a couple of the areas -- the Nixon administration overturned the U.S. policy on termination, the tribal --

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, well, Congress overturned it. There was a current resolution.

**Timothy Naftali**

But that was suggested in the Indian message.

**Brad Patterson**

That's right, and we did it. That was the great thing about the Indian message: almost all of it was put into law. One interesting -- the one that didn't make it -- this is where Bill Veeder comes in. Bill gave me these many examples of Indian treaty being, treaties being overwhelmed and un-abided by. So we wrote into the Indian message the proposal to create an Indian Trust Council, namely, a special law legal body in the executive branch, which would defend Indian trust rights. You can't always trust the attorney general -- the Justice Department to do that. You certainly can't trust the park service or the forest service, but even in the Justice Department, they have to represent the whole executive branch.

But since these are treaty relationships, with the trust relationship with the specific groups of Indian tribes, they need a person in the government who will always be their lawyer, government lawyer, not a private lawyer, government lawyer, because it's the government's that's involved. And we thought that was a good idea. Bill Veeder helped me write that, and it was in the message. Well, it got to Congress, and they weren't particularly crazy about it, and then the Indians opposed it because they said to themselves, "Wait a minute, five, six guys, six or eight people on the Indian Trust Council will be overwhelmed by hundreds of lawyers in the Justice Department, and so we're not sure we want to put our hands in just a little goop like that." As an alternative, Ehrlichman and Garment and I went to the Justice Department and said, "Look," and we went to the solicitor general, and we said, "If you have an Indian case, and -- agriculture, let's say, or the park service or something like that -- wants a piece of territory that has been disputed, you as justice can argue for them, but you have to also put in a brief for the tribe in your responsibility as trustee for the tribe. You have a split brief." And it was an example of that, a case where there had been land that had been purchased in a trust, and one of the tribes out there, I forget -- I think I mentioned in the book. And the question was whether that really was tribe's land, and it was in the court.

And so Interior went to court -- Interior has to go to Justice to go to court -- and Justice gave the brief for the government. It was not trust land. But then we had the Justice also send in a brief, signed in the Justice Department, speaking for the Indians as their trustee. And the judge looked at this and said, "What do you -- what's going on here? The government giving me two briefs on one case, taking different views?" And he sided with the Indians. So we thought we had that arrangement in the Justice Department to have split briefs, and we even asked that they do that, if necessary, in the Supreme Court, and the solicitor general, I think, agreed to do that. I don't know whether it ever came to that point. Whether that incident, whether that policy is in effect now, I don't know. It took the White House to do it.

**Timothy Naftali**

Was it -- was there a debate over whether to seek -- to end the policy of termination? When you were putting together the Indian message, did you all agree from the beginning --

**Brad Patterson**

Absolutely, absolutely, right away from the beginning. [Unintelligible] Senate resolution 108 had to be -- had to be terminated, and it was. That was the termination resolution.

**Timothy Naftali**

But your message predated that. I'm saying --

**Brad Patterson**

No.

**Timothy Naftali**

No?

**Brad Patterson**

That was Eisenhower period, I think. You know what gave us the motivation for that? Ada Dear [phonetic sp], friend of Shirley's, she worked with them in the Bicentennial Commission -- yeah, Yeah, Bicentennial Commission. Ada Dear was a tribe of the Menominees in Wisconsin. The Menominees were terminated, and the bank took over their Indian finances and Indian land, and private homeowners came and bought the land and built houses on Legend Lake up there. The tribe was practically just made -- was just run over with a steamroller. And Ada Dear, a wonderful woman up there, got that tribe organized and got the Congress to revoke the termination and got the bill through. I remember the bill coming to the White House, and the question, OMB, "Should we pass this bill?" And the government [unintelligible] landed on OMB with both feet, and we got it signed, and un-terminated the Menominees.

**Timothy Naftali**

Because, as we discussed earlier, the Eisenhower administration had supported the termination.

**Brad Patterson**

That's right. That's right. Glenn Evans, commissioner of Indian Affairs, would have me to lunch every now and then and argue for this. I didn't know one -- I had no view about it at all, on a policy position, and didn't have enough historical knowledge to know what was right or wrong.

**Timothy Naftali**

What I'm trying to see if you can remember, the sources -- I mean when the Nixon administration decided to make a side with the end of that policy --

**Brad Patterson**

That's right, strongly.

**Timothy Naftali**

Where did that come from? Did Ehrlichman say we're doing this, or did you all sit down --

**Brad Patterson**

It came from, mostly from the Menominees, who were just ruined by that, and Ada, of course, came and talked to some of us about this. I said, you know, this is terrible. It can happen in other tribes.

**Timothy Naftali**

So she deserved some of the credit for that --

**Brad Patterson**

A great deal of the credit.

**Timothy Naftali**

For being in the Indian message?

**Brad Patterson**

Yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

That's really interesting.

**Brad Patterson**

Well, it wasn't -- I'm sure Interior had no problem with putting that in. That wasn't -- nobody had any debate about it.

**Timothy Naftali**

Let's move to desegregation. What role did you play as an assistant to Garment on that?

**Brad Patterson**

Not very much, because that was, that was pretty much in his own hands, but the court, you see, had said this has got to be done. Again, they set a deadline, and Agnew, of course, no sympathy there. Pat Buchanan would write his speeches about Agnew, take to your feet, you know, leave. And Garment saw this as a national crisis, a really impossible -- could be violent as well as politically -- could be politically disadvantageous, but really, we had to do the right thing and go with the court on this and support them. So -- but the way to do this was to involve -- get local communities involved and try to find community leaders in each of these communities to take the lead for peaceful resolution in those communities. And I remember Garment -- I tell about this in the book --we found a community, I forget which one it was, now, and found some of the leadership and brought them up to the White House. We had dinner together, and Garment talked to them about the things we could do to get black and white talking to each other in that community and create a community of -- if not friendship, at least of good will and of opening up communications. So the president appointed -- I think he

appointed six or seven -- I think they were at the governor's level, task forces to try to handle this in several states, and the heads of those task forces came to the White House and met with the president. I believe the message mentioned that -- I have the message open on my --

**Timothy Naftali**

Was it Greenville, South Carolina?

**Brad Patterson**

I think it was Greenville, yeah. It's in my book.

**Timothy Naftali**

But didn't -- didn't George Shultz also play a role in this?

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, I think he did, although not quite as active as Garment, I don't think. Garment really put this together, and then Ray Price wrote the message with Garment, of course. Ray is someone you might want to talk to.

**Timothy Naftali**

We have.

**Brad Patterson**

Up in New York.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you remember when the president actually went to New Orleans as part of this?

**Brad Patterson**

That's right, that's right, I think he met with some of the people down there. That's right, and Ray wrote the message. Now, here, I was [unintelligible] Cabinet secretary saying, now, this were in the Eisenhower administration, that paper would have come to the Cabinet. Nixon wouldn't give that paper to any one, just a couple of people in the White House, Bryce Harlow and Pat Buchanan. I don't know where Pat would get his hands on it. And Bryce, I'm sorry to say, opposed it. And that's a lot of opposition in the White House. Nixon with -- all out there by himself on this, and Garment and Ray -- it was a divided White House. But he signed that message, and sent it, and the money -- \$75 million, I think, proposed. March 24, 1970.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us a little bit about Harlow. What was -- what was his position?

**Brad Patterson**

My feeling was that he was not sympathetic with that money and with that effort. I don't know any more than that. But there was no Cabinet meeting -- I don't even think there was a staff meeting. Nixon didn't like to discuss these things in groups. He liked to go all by himself and put his feet up on the desk and make the policy and write the paperwork, you know? He was a lonely decision maker.

**Timothy Naftali**

Compare his treatment of the Cabinet to Eisenhower's treatment of the Cabinet, please.

**Brad Patterson**

I don't think it was very active at all under Nixon, I guess we met a couple times. Too many people, too many leakers, I'm sure there was no Cabinet secretary. I'm not sure -- I don't know whether Nixon even had a secretary of the Cabinet. I can look through my White House phone book and see. But by that time, policy was more centered in the policy offices of the White House, and the departments were pretty much somewhat cut out of it, you know? My new book has --

**Timothy Naftali**

We'll look --

**Brad Patterson**

A quotation --

**Timothy Naftali**

That's all right. We'll look forward to --

**Brad Patterson**

A quotation from Lloyd Cutler about a Cabinet I'd like to read to you.

**Timothy Naftali**

Okay, I look forward to seeing that. And, of course, your second book, we used at the Miller Center. The Bicentennial, tell us about your work on the Bicentennial, please.

**Brad Patterson**

Well, Shirley was on the staff at the Bicentennial, and Garment, of course, was given that assignment. And -- but the staff -- it was a very powerful staff. We had a big director there, over there, and I was -- you had 50 people over there at least, didn't you? I think so, and divided into different parts. And there was one part of it called horizons. Shirley was a director of that in charge of that part of it, looking ahead, a lot of people doing history and so forth.

**Female Speaker**

[Unintelligible] it was Heritage.

**Brad Patterson**

Heritage. Horizons.

**Female Speaker**

Horizons, and what was the contemporary -- oh, a festival.

**Brad Patterson**

Festival, yeah, celebrations, yeah. And we thought it was [unintelligible] get inside reports from Shirley about what was going on over there, that the director was really sort of a floozy, he was surrounded by a couple of people who were even floozier, not a good job of it. I remember writing memos, either myself or from Garment to Ehrlichman saying, "Look, this thing is going off the track." And -- but they didn't want -- I don't think they really wanted to intervene very much. They sort of let it run by itself. And then they turned over to -- was it Warner, somebody from the Navy who took over?

**Timothy Naftali**

John Warner? John Warner.

**Brad Patterson**

Warner, yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

Whatever happened to the Philadelphia expo? There was supposed to be a world exposition, wasn't there? In 1976?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, I don't know. I guess so.

**Timothy Naftali**

But that was supposed to be the centerpiece of the bicentennial.

**Female Speaker**

There were a lot of centerpieces.

**Brad Patterson**

That would have been the Heritage people.

**Timothy Naftali**

From where you were sitting, what did you see of the Watergate scandal?

**Brad Patterson**

Practically nothing, no.

**Timothy Naftali**

How did it affect your --

**Brad Patterson**

Well, it affected -- you realized, of course, that it was in the press every day, of course, more and more and more, an ascending crescendo of publicity. And all we could look at each other and say, "This can't be. Could it be? How could it be?" Garment was taken away. I was separate from Garment for a while. I moved up to the fourth floor. My office was taken over by some of the assistants to Garment on this, and he was very gracious about it, but he says, "You handle Indian Affairs all by yourself now. I've got to do this." So I was really operating pretty much by myself. And I think Garment, in the end, looked down the road and didn't like what he saw at the end of the road, but I was not involved in it. He and I were separate. He went --

**Timothy Naftali**

Where were you the day of the president's departure?

**Brad Patterson**

Ah, Shirley and I were in the Sierras, just to take a nine day backpack with eight of us in our family on the John Muir Trail. And called up Garment and I said, "What do I do? I'm -- shall I come back? We're about to start on a hike in the Sierras." He said, "Take your hike." So I did -- we did, and we had a wonderful hike. We were a very close-knit family, a very athletic family.

**Timothy Naftali**

What did you find when you got back to Washington?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, I was with Garment for a little while longer. Then he, of course, left in November, and I wondered what was going to happen to me. And I -- Ted Morris was somebody who was helping out on Indian Affairs, too, in another office there. I worked with Ted a little while on some things we did. We had one issue, interesting issue, Indian healthcare bill, Indian Health Bill, and OMB wanted to

veto. And Morris and I argued for signature, and we won that one. Oh, I want to say one thing about Alaska claims. I want to go back --

**Timothy Naftali**

Sure.

**Brad Patterson**

-- and say something interesting about Alaska land. The Alaskan Claims Bill, one of the issues brought to Ehrlichman's office in that presentation was the cost of land, and OMB figured this way. Well, let's see, we had land, quite a lot of land up there -- government land had been exploited, explored. So OMB took the land with the richest find up there, so it gave the price per acre of, you know, so many million dollars. And then took that and multiply it by 40 million, and there is your cost the government is giving up if you give that land. And I said, "Wait a minute. That's not the fair way to do it. You take the richest land you can as the multiplier, and that's an unfair way to do it." I always felt then -- it confirmed me, that the people in OMB were people who were not in any way sympathetic to the Indian cause, and we, Garment and I, had to tangle with them. I remember very vivid, the Indian message itself, we showed it to OMB, and the assistant director of OMB for natural resources, which included Indians, was Jim Schlesinger.

And I remember Jim Schlesinger coming to Garment's office with this thing in his hand, and saying, "Garment, this is incredible, unbelievable, this kind of thing. For Indians? I mean, we want to strengthen the states. The Eisenhower -- we don't want the tribal governments strengthened. You're going to mess up the neat little federal system we have by strengthening Indian tribal governments? Are you really serious?" And Garment said, "Yes, Mr. Schlesinger, we're serious. And we went ahead with it. Years later, just a couple years ago, we had a Nixon reunion, you know, with the Nixon staff, and Schlesinger was there, and I interrupted my luncheon and went to him, and I said, "Jim, you remember that incident about the -- your concern with the Indian message?" He says, "Oh, I remember." I said, "Did you ever take your concern to the president and try to get the message stopped?" He said, "No, I didn't do that."

**Timothy Naftali**

I want to take you back to the BIA occupation. Did you ever -- did you fear that first night that there would be violence?

**Brad Patterson**

No, when the cops came to us and said -- tell us, now, we're going off duty. Should we storm the building or not, and we broke and got the decision, no, then the cops went home and left them alone. So -- if they were going to -- if they hadn't, the decision had been the other way, it would be a terrible - - the building would be in ruins. But, no, we -- no. We were sad to see they trashed the building so much internally, and Morton was pretty mad about it, and some of the members of Congress were pretty mad about it, because it was an expensive building.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us some of the other areas that you worked on with Len Garment. We've talked about the three major ones.

**Brad Patterson**

Well, there was there was -- -- Yakima. There was Alaska --

**Timothy Naftali**

I wasn't thinking in terms of the Indian issue. I was thinking more the NEA or NEH. Did you work with him on those issues? He was also interested in arts, the --

**Brad Patterson**

Oh, no, no, he and Nancy Hanks. He told me an interesting story. You might remember yourself, in Washington -- Shirley will remember. Corcoran Gallery was cattycorner from the Executive Office Building down there, New York Avenue and 17th Street, and Corcoran put these enormous, orange steel modernistic sculpture pieces right outside on that corner. You couldn't really look out any window in the White House, and there they were, and Nixon hated them. So Nixon went to Garment, and said, "Garment, you know, you're the arts man. Get rid of those things." So Garment, I think, went to Nancy Hanks, and somehow she went to the Corcoran, and one morning they were gone. They took pictures before and after.

**Timothy Naftali**

Comparison -- so you're a student of how White Houses are put together. Compare, please, the Ford White House to the Nixon White House. How was the Ford White House different?

**Brad Patterson**

The Ford White House had problems at the beginning, because you had people who had been with Ford personally, and particularly Don

**Bob**

Hartmann, I think his name was, was a speechwriter. And you had Hartmann moved in with Ford and had sort of a personal relationship with him and wanted to keep that personal relationship. Now, Ford was more than just a vice president. Ford was now the president of the whole place, and so you had to have a coordination across the whole staff, and Hartmann was not up to that at all, but Cheney was. Cheney was his chief of staff. So Cheney and Hartmann had an awful collision, and Hartmann wrote a book about this, very speaking and very devastatingly cruel terms about Cheney.

**Timothy Naftali**

And Rumsfeld, too?

**Brad Patterson**

And Rumsfeld, that's right. And it was -- and that --

**Timothy Naftali**

What kind of White House --

**Brad Patterson**

I didn't get involved in the personally, but I happen to know that that was the case.

**Timothy Naftali**

From Garment's office, what kind of White House did Haldeman run?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, strict and orderly, and Nixon was very tough about people who could see him and who he let into the Oval Office. And of course, Haldeman was the gatekeeper, and Nixon would -- as an example, for instance, secretary of veteran's affairs. What was his name, he was an Italian, had been the ambassador for Italy -- I forgot his name now -- and he would come to the Oval Office and bring up trivia, and Nixon told Haldeman, "Don't let that guy in my office ever again." And so he was frozen out. But the sad -- I thought it was a sad thing happened. There was a reception in the East Room at some point. And the secretary of veterans affairs came, was invited, and came down the line, and took out a piece of paper and a pencil and started -- tried to start doing business with Nixon in the receiving line. He had been so frozen out of Nixon, Oval Office. Another thing was students. We had a daughter-in-law -- granddaughter-in-law, who was -- won one of these awards, was a presidential scholar at high school level, and came up to Washington. And the question was whether she would see the president. And I think Haldeman knew that some of these students might ask tough questions of the president. My opinion was -- I'm not sure they got to see the president. I think Haldeman screened them off. Garment, you see -- Indians came to Washington at one point, and a few of them camped out on Lafayette Square, demanding to see the president and so forth. Garment went out and met with them. I went up to, up the valley, what's -- I had lunch with him up there. But Garment went out and met with them, and there was a feeling, you know, he might possibly could suffer injury. He didn't, obviously, but it was a very tense time, some of these guys. They were --

**Timothy Naftali**

How -- to what extent did the Kent State tragedy influence the way you handled Indian Affairs?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, simply, I guess what it influenced us was we said to ourselves, "That's the kind of violence we don't want to have. That's what will happen if things -- if the things in their hands, the wrong people." In this case, they were law enforcement people, so you shoot. Law enforcement, they all have guns, and police, and you shoot. And that's why we didn't want police or guns involved in Indian law enforcement, if we could help it. We wanted negotiators, people that would talk, and Kent State -- we had it on our mind all the time. We kept using this example, and all were thinking about this. That's what could happen if you don't do it right. If you do it wrong, that's your tragedy. And we would be

damned, we weren't going to have that kind of tragedy in any of these three crises, except for Wounded Knee, one example of Wounded Knee, and we didn't.

**Timothy Naftali**

Now, I believe there was a marshal who was hurt. Somebody was paralyzed.

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, I think one Indian was killed and one Marshal was paralyzed. That's right.

**Timothy Naftali**

You also mentioned that a little girl died.

**Brad Patterson**

Yes, that was at Alcatraz. She was the daughter of the leader of the occupation, and the place was a rickety place, she fell down a stairway and injured herself badly and died in the hospital. And Garment sent him, her father, a letter of condolence, even though we were worlds apart, but a friendly, lovely little letter from Garment. That's the kind of guy Garment was.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did Garment have -- we were talking about people with personal relationships with presidents. He was a -- had a personal relationship with the president.

**Brad Patterson**

Well, it was interesting, Tim. Yes, he had a personal relationship as a law partner, obviously, up in New York, and then helped him organize his campaign, and yet Garment spoke most deprecatingly of Jewish people. And every now and then in his public statements or in his letters or --

**Timothy Naftali**

Not Garment, you mean the president?

**Brad Patterson**

Nixon, yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

You mean the president --

**Brad Patterson**

And if I would have been Garment, I would wondered, where is this guy coming from? He spoke so deprecatingly of Jewish people, and yet he was -- one of the closest people to him was Jewish.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you hear the president -- we know on the tapes, that there is examples -- but did you -- was that something you knew at the time?

**Brad Patterson**

No, no, no. Garment probably knew it, but I didn't.

**Timothy Naftali**

But did you see -- what effect on the work you were doing did the personal relationship between the president and Garment have?

**Brad Patterson**

Garment had access to the president in terms of any memorandum he wrote. I don't have the impression that Garment saw the president very often. Occasionally, I think, but I think few and far between.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you recall him calling the president in your presence?

**Brad Patterson**

No, I don't, no. Haldeman would call occasionally. He would be out, and I'd answer -- we had a special intercom in the White House, we each had a three-digit number, a code number. Garment had one. I had one. Sometimes his would ring, which meant somebody else on the staff is calling him, and I'd answer the phone, and several times it would be Bob. And I would say, "Can I help you, Bob?" And so his contact with Haldeman was fairly often.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you interact with President Nixon? Do you recall any interactions with him?

**Brad Patterson**

Only once, only when we had the Alaska Native Claims Bill, and we all gathered in his office just before -- prior to the announcement of the bill, and Nixon, as I handed it, each of us a little souvenir, thanked us, and it was just pro forma.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you have a sense of his personality at all?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, I guess what I read about it, but he was not friendly, you know? He was removed, reserved. He wasn't -- he didn't feel sociable with people.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us about -- did some of the people you worked with in other agencies, did you interact much with Don Rumsfeld when he was the head of OEO? Because of the --

**Brad Patterson**

No, no, when he was head of OEO, no. I had known him in that draft business. He was a congressman interested in the draft. And then -- well, when he was head of OEO, he and Cheney asked me for -- asked -- we had a Cabinet committee, and we had a staff under Moynihan, and the deputy who had that staff was -- I'm trying to think now. And they asked me for a paper about how that staff should be organized, and I did that paper. And Cheney asked me for some information about maybe how -- about OEO, the beginnings of OEO. I remember preparing some materials for him and Rumsfeld, so we got to know each other a little bit. That's when we first got to know each other.

**Timothy Naftali**

What did you think about how they handled OEO?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, the big issue at that time that I remember was the California grape workers. There was a union there, as I remember, and they were striking. And having been in OEO, been a part of that, as part of that advisory commission, I was sort of in favor of keeping that organization. But the president had a view about it. You know, I wasn't in the line anymore on -- OEO did a lot of work with Indians in community action. They financed some of the schools. High school, Chinley [phonetic sp], I remember going out and visiting that school, run by OEO money, not by BIA, and Bobby, particularly, was involved in that, so he was very close to that.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you remember your or Len Garment's reaction to the murders at Jackson State, after Kent State? Two students were killed out in Mississippi.

**Brad Patterson**

Yeah, I don't -- I don't have much in my memory of that. Kent State was very much on our minds as a living example of how not to handle something.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you remember where you were when you heard about it?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, more than that, I was -- Garment was busy with Watergate, and I was by myself, and the Kent State people, the parents and some of the students paid a visit to Washington, and they wanted to see somebody. And the only person who would talk to them in the White House was me. These people -- maybe one of them was in a wheelchair, I forget -- and they came to my office and they said what are you going to do about this? And wasn't there a lawsuit, the family -- they --

**Timothy Naftali**

Well, the Justice Department was against --

**Brad Patterson**

Yes.

**Timothy Naftali**

Do you remember what the Justice Department's position was? They were against -- no one was charged. None of the --

**Brad Patterson**

That's right.

**Timothy Naftali**

The armed guardsmen were not --

**Brad Patterson**

They thought somebody should be charged, and they met with me. I guess I had knew that the policy was not to do -- so I was sort of helpless. All I could do is have the men in the office and talk.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you know why the policy was not to charge?

**Brad Patterson**

No, no, I didn't really.

**Timothy Naftali**

And this was in 1973, right, was when Garment was working on Watergate?

**Brad Patterson**

He was all busy on Watergate, yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did Garment let you know -- did he sort of talk to you at all about the Watergate issue?

**Brad Patterson**

Not one word, not at all.

**Timothy Naftali**

Tell us a little bit about -- what were some of the Indian issues besides healthcare that you had to deal with in the Ford administration?

**Brad Patterson**

In the Ford administration? That was the major one that I remember. I'm trying to think when the Menominee came up under Ford, or that was Nixon. Because -- I guess it was Nixon. One of his -- one of the senators from Wyoming was on his staff, senior member of his staff. And I remember going to that person on his staff and saying, "You know, we want to be sure this -- this is your home state. This doesn't -- the discussion doesn't yet vetoed." I can't remember whether that was Nixon or Ford.

**Timothy Naftali**

We talked about the public message on desegregation. Do you remember the debate over busing in 1972?

**Brad Patterson**

Oh, sure.

**Timothy Naftali**

Can you tell us what you recall, where you were in this particular discussion?

**Brad Patterson**

Well --

**Female Speaker**

Housing students.

**Brad Patterson**

Huh?

**Female Speaker**

We were housing students here.

**Brad Patterson**

Oh, really? A group of the protestors? They gave us a rose bush.

**Female Speaker**

They gave us a peace rose bush.

**Brad Patterson**

Oh, they came here from the demonstration.

**Timothy Naftali**

Which demonstration?

**Brad Patterson**

Some student --

**Timothy Naftali**

And you housed them here?

**Brad Patterson**

Yeah, yeah, well, we had kids in school -- kids in college at that time. We have four children, and two of them -- one of them in particular, was that age at that time. His friends brought them all here. I guess they slept over night here? I guess so.

**Female Speaker**

Yeah, we had 40 some kids here.

**Brad Patterson**

And then they gave us a peace rose bush.

**Timothy Naftali**

But let's talk about busing in 1972. That really divided the White House?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, it certainly did. Agnew and Buchanan and others, sure, but Garment felt that the courts -- we had to do what the courts were saying. That would be the -- you couldn't have the president disobey the courts.

**Timothy Naftali**

Are there some anecdotes that I didn't ask you about that you'd like to put on the record?

**Brad Patterson**

No, I think I've probably give you most of the -- spelled those out in my little text to you, my story here. I can't think of any others. There was one -- one Christmas time Shirley and I were invited to the mansion, at a reception up there in the president's personal quarters, Ike and Mamie. This wasn't Nixon, this was Eisenhower, I'm sorry.

**Timothy Naftali**

Yes.

**Brad Patterson**

And I guess the person I most admired in the White House in the Eisenhower years was the Staff Secretary General Goodpaster. He was just wonderful, my ideal of a White House staff officer. Anyway, Roma McFee [phonetic sp] and Andy and some of them -- there were about six or eight of them -- had bells, you know, Christmas carols with bells? And there were a row of them up there, and Ike and Mamie and some of them on the staff, and had a little Christmas reception and played bells on them. That was very friendly, very intimate session with the president and Mamie.

**Timothy Naftali**

It's interesting, I think you saw more of General Eisenhower -- President Eisenhower than you did President Nixon.

**Brad Patterson**

Oh, yes, much more. Every week, every Friday.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did they call him Mr. President? Did some of them call him general?

**Brad Patterson**

No, Mr. President.

**Timothy Naftali**

Mr. President.

**Brad Patterson**

Yeah, yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

How did -- and you said that he -- did he have a good sense of humor, General Eisenhower? President Eisenhower?

**Brad Patterson**

I would say he had a temper. I remember once there was a discussion at Cabinet about the education exchange program. And Congress was trying to cut it back, and Eisenhower compared the education exchange program to the cost of a bomber, or several bombers, and education exchange program a fraction of what it cost to buy a bunch of bombers. I remember he swore and banged the table, and a terrible thing, cutting back that program. That really does good when we throw our money away on the bombers. Andy

[unintelligible]

told me one thing about the famous message, Eisenhower's message to Congress in his farewell. You remember, he said there was a --

**Timothy Naftali**

Military industrial --

**Brad Patterson**

Military industrial complex. He said Eisenhower had another word in there that he took out, Congressional. Military industrial congressional complex, but he deleted it from his speech. One funny little story, at the very end of the Eisenhower administration, I remember Bill Hopkins came to me and said, "You know, the president is signing commissions to a few people," signed by the secretary of state, the great seal of the United States Senate, and signed by the president. There was a category of White House staff officers called commissioned officers.

If you have president in your title, assistant to the president, deputy assistant to the president, special assistant to the president, you're commissioned, and you have all kinds of [unintelligible]. And Bill said that some of these commissions are being made up, and we're making one up for you. And I mentioned this to Andy, and Andy said, "Well, I know they wanted to give me one, but I was afraid that might interfere with my career status in the military, so I said, 'Don't do that. I'll reject it.'" Then I thought, "Oh, wait a minute now, I've got to worry about the civil service. Well, after Eisenhower leaves, I'm going to be back in the civil service. I don't want a commission -- might interfere with that." So I said, "No, don't give me one, and they tore it up." That was the stupidest mistake I ever made in the White House, it would have been a great souvenir to hang on my wall, nothing more than that.

**Timothy Naftali**

One last point, you've studied the evolution of our government, you participated in it as a civil servant. What effect did Watergate have on the development of the United States government?

**Brad Patterson**

I think Watergate had the effect that we had to be watchful, that there are men among us, men and women among us who are very narrow -- narrow and negative purpose, and you have to watch them. And you have to guard against it. And you have to have systems that will work so the systems can prevent this. You can't just depend on people. That's why you need a staff system in government now. That's why you have -- and that's why I think the secretariat system is a good system, and why it's there in the White House. But you have -- America is full of advocates, and some of them go as far as Russell Means and that bunch in that kind of advocacy, almost to the edge of and maybe up to violence. And obviously, an example of our history, have gone a lot further than that.

And there are even people in government who are sympathetic with that sometimes, so you just have to keep thinking of the Constitution and always get to both sides of the question, always. Delve into both -- all these issues have both sides, sometimes three or four sides. And you have to look at them and then talk to the people who have these different views. Always have a dialogue going, always. You cut off your dialogue, then you just give a free hand to the people who are the extremists. And I think Garment went by that principle, and we did with the Indians, and whether it's blacks or Hispanics or wherever, you have dialogue, with people on the outside, too. Because people in the White House tend to be fairly -- you're walled off from the public a good deal. But when -- an example, what I did when I went out to Wounded Knee or Garment did when he went across the street -- and he had a wide circle of acquaintances in the news media and in private life. And he used that circle of acquaintances constantly, so always getting ideas, always talking with people who were his friends, which made him a better White House staff officer, made me a better White House staff officer.

**Timothy Naftali**

Just -- but -- I asked -- Watergate. You were focusing on the government, though. What -- do we need to be watchful about the government?

**Brad Patterson**

Well, yeah, even people in government who are -- have such strong views that they are willing to undermine government or twist the government to their own purposes. Yeah, some in government, sure.

**Timothy Naftali**

Give us a word picture of Russell Means. What was it like to work with -- you know, to --

**Brad Patterson**

I didn't know him very, very well, but he obviously was somebody who was very much angered and felt left out and organized this group of activists. I guess he fought for a good cause, a better life for

Indians, particularly Indians in urban areas. See, when an Indian leaves the reservation and goes in urban area, disadvantages, he leaves all the soft comfort of the reservation and the services that are available, and he's on his own. And he may be without family, and all he has is maybe a few other Indians and his own condition. And so it's a little tough to handle, to live like that. And Means, of course, took advantage of that. But more than that, I don't think I had very much personal contact.

**Timothy Naftali**

And did you have much personal contact with Vice President Spiro Agnew? Some of these issues did involve him.

**Brad Patterson**

Not him, but with C.D. Ward and Bob Robertson.

**Timothy Naftali**

And what kind of -- what was -- you mentioned Robertson in one case, but did they have -- did you get a sense that Agnew shaped the contributions that they made?

**Brad Patterson**

No, I can't -- I just don't know. I'm sure Agnew -- Agnew was chair of this committee, and I think he chaired a couple of meetings, so he must have had some -- obviously, he must have had some sympathy for Indian Affairs. I never heard him say anything against them or discourage them, because Bob and C.D. were right with us. We worked closely together.

**Timothy Naftali**

Brad, thank you for your time.

**Brad Patterson**

Well, I'm delighted.

**Timothy Naftali**

It's been great. Thanks very much.