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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
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E.O. 12065, Section 6-102  
By jlw NARS, Date 1/4/83  
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MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: HERBERT G. KLEIN  
RE: Campaign 1972

Between Conventions

1. Between Conventions I would suggest that the President concentrate on domestic duties in Washington. Congress will be in frenzied session, and this will be the time to build on issues concerning congressional failures. It also will be the time to build the case between the Democratic platform and the Democratic performance in Congress.

I would suggest one excursion out of town. This would be an ideal time to emphasize the President's concern for the environment and to point up his legacy of parks program while people vacation. The trip should include a stop in perhaps two national parks to check facilities and to inspect two or three of the new "legacy" parks closer to cities, such as in California and Texas. In the national parks, we should stress pool press coverage of some events where he and Mrs. Nixon and Julie could check trailer facilities, see some animals, etc.

Post Convention

2. After the convention and into the fall the President should continue to stress the duties of office, particularly on foreign policy, but I believe he must campaign visibly so as not to give the impression of overconfidence which might be conveyed to workers and contributors. He should maintain a high level posture, but it must also be a fighting pose. Both can be done with the battle emphasis on rallies and quiet talk on television.

I would use the week after the convention for meetings with party and campaign leaders, ala Mission Bay. This could be done at San Clemente or Washington. This would give the feeling of gearing up and would show strong Presidential interest. I believe the President should launch his campaign efforts with a week of major activity in key states during the first week in September. This would knock down the idea of apathy. During the remainder of September, I would suggest that he work in Washington, invite in key groups here, and travel on long weekends only. We also have the fund raiser on September 26.

In early October I would step up the President's campaign activities to travel one or two days during the week and then again on Friday and Saturday with Sundays off. I think this should lead up to intensive travel and campaigning in the last two weeks. If he plans to campaign intensively prior to the election, the idea should be dropped to many of the newsmen much in advance so it won't appear to be last minute panic.

Travel should emphasize the key states, of course, but particularly in September, it should emphasize places which will bring good visibility with minimum trouble. Saturdays, for example, he could touch some states close by such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey, Tennessee, Ohio and upstate New York. He should mix this with some time in California, Texas and Illinois.

Some of the first week of September activities should be rallies to tie down the Nixon supporters early since the President will be leading in the polls. We have the early majority, as in 1968. The President might tie some events to tours of facilities such as high trade manufacturing plants (computers, etc.). Republicans haven't done this. He should have one or more events each emphasizing Black, Mexican American and, perhaps in some way youth. Early contact with these voting segments would

avoid the idea we are not seeking their votes. Throughout the campaign, I would look for special ethnic opportunities, particularly if Muskie is not on the ticket. The Vice President should work these areas hard, also.

General Thoughts

3. I would hope that the President personally would use informal television considerably, interspersed with short, direct television talks to the public. I would avoid most rally television even on a state basis. If the President is to answer questions on television, either regionally by community leaders or by newsmen, he should emphasize more press conferences this summer to avoid the charge that he will not answer newsmen but will handle the other programs.

I would prefer to see more 5 to 10 minute addresses by the President and few of 30 minutes duration. The addresses should be of high tone--the Presidency and the record. A contrast should be built between professionalism, calm competence and achievement as opposed to radicalism, uncertainty, confusion, and inexperience at a time when the world can't afford to experiment. I'd take some examples from the Roosevelt campaign in 1944 when you didn't want to change horses in the middle of the stream. A key point should be the high cost of McGovern.

4. The opposition (presuming McGovern) will hammer on the economy, Vietnam in one way or the other, food prices, taxes and, believe it or not, law enforcement (why haven't we done more?). They will stress the honest George theme, frank new face which is credible. They will try to focus on distrust and credibility and relate it to the President.

One part of our strategy should be humor. At the leadership meeting, for example, two jokes came up on whether the nation is McGovernable. A Chicago item columnist tried an idea I had: After this was printed without attribution, several people mentioned it to me in Chicago. All this has to be subtle and by word of mouth, of course.

In a more major way, I believe the President should spend most of his time emphasizing the positive. He is the leader and has a great record. If he meets the attack by staying above it, I think we gain. There must be hard punches taken at McGovern, of course, and occasionally, particularly if Q and A television is used, the President could do this to give emphasis in the public mind. Most of the counter battle should be carried in organized drum beat fashion by the Vice President, surrogates and congressional candidates. Regional drum beats carry nationally if they are organized.

My recent soundings, documented in another memo, indicate to me that at this moment, the people are interested more in the big issues than the dissatisfaction supposedly shown in the McGovern-Wallace vote. Much of the dissatisfaction of Wisconsin may have been with other Democratic candidates (particularly Wallace votes). I get fewer questions on personal problems (social security, veterans benefits, etc.) and more on foreign policy and the economy than I did even three months ago.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN  
FROM: RAY PRICE  
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

I've no changes in my June 16 memo, but would add a few additional thoughts:

1. The target is McGovern, not the Democrats. I was glad this point was made so forcefully this morning, and I think it's essential that we stick with it. We should stress the open door theme, and keep coming back to the argument that RN represents the great, bi-partisan traditions of America -- the traditions not only of Lincoln and TR and Eisenhower, but also of Wilson and FDR, of Truman and Kennedy.

2. Whenever possible, RN should help cement this impression by referring back to these traditions, and to positions associated with them: to FDR's leadership of the free world in its time of peril, to HST's forging of the Atlantic alliance, etc.

3. Throughout our history, there have been fringe movements that were briefly and dramatically in the spotlight, then faded back into the shadows from whence they came -- while the great bi-partisan traditions were carried on. We should zero in on McGovern's as the latest of these.


4. We should have a moratorium on discussion of forging a new coalition that will make the GOP the majority party for the next generation -- this will scare off those dispossessed Democrats who see a resounding defeat of McGovern as the only way they can take their party back.

5. Non-partisan forums are the best forums. The President made this point to the surrogates; at this point it's doubly true for him, if we're to make him the rallying-point for disaffected Democrats as well as Republicans and Independents. To the maximum extent possible, the forums we book him into should be ones associated with those great bi-partisan traditions.

6. We should do our damndest to avoid getting into situations like the one we found ourselves in with Packwood and the Crippling Strikes Prevention Act. This hurts us at our most vulnerable point: it provides some of the most damaging support yet for the picture of RN as an unprincipled politician who would sacrifice anything for electoral support. We could use some fights on principle for unpopular causes to offset it; or at least to resist some obvious pressures to take the expedient course. I saw Packwood on two networks last night; it was devastating. We shouldn't delude ourselves that we can do this sort of thing (if we did) without getting caught at least part of the time, and being severely hurt by it. I think Stew Alsop was right in his column when he asked who could defeat RN in November, and concluded that only RN could.

7. In general, I thought the presentation of strategy this morning was right on target.

8. Attached is an outline I did last Sunday for the keynote presentation at the convention, together with some notes explaining it. It builds up to a direct appeal to dissident Democrats to join with us. I think this kind of thing could also be the keynote of the campaign.



Raymond K. Price, Jr.

Attachments

Notes on the keynote outline, and on the invitation:

1. Structure. This is broken into sections not by issue area, but to make a logical progression leading up to what I think should be the real "keynote" of the keynote, and of the convention: an explicit, direct appeal to disaffected Democrats to take refuge with us.

One of our real dangers has been that we'd come across as smug and complacent. This counters that, at the outset of the convention, in two ways: first, by starting off identifying ourselves with the dissatisfactions most Americans feel in one way or another, saying we share those, and that's why we want another four years to complete the unfinished task of combatting them; and second, by reaching out to the Democrats rather than merely patting ourselves on the back. There are more of them than there are of us, so we need them; people like to be courted, and this does so -- showing that we care about them.

The intro establishes an audience rapport by saying we know how you feel; it brags a bit, but without smugness, and leads logically into the film, which shows RN grappling with the inherited troubles and making headway against them in his first term; the film leaves us at 1972; Keynoter A then takes us from 1972 to 1976, in terms of our hopes and plans; Keynoter B draws the sharp distinctions between what we're offering and what the opposition is; this sets the stage for Keynoter C to make his appeal to the traditional Democrats to come with us.

2. Advantages. Keying off with this unusual sort of appeal to Democrats has several distinct advantages:

- a. Being unusual, it makes news.
- b. It plays against the weakness of the opposition candidate, and highlights Democratic divisions.
- c. It keys off our "party of the open door" theme.

d. It sets up some possible additional convention highlights (see notes below on this).

e. It establishes a set of explicit rationales for dissident Democrats to join with us.

f. It adds interest to what could otherwise be a dull convention, by introducing an element of contest and confrontation -- but making it confrontation among Democrats rather than among Republicans.

g. It provides a theme for the commentators to talk about, with a cast of characters.

3. Convention follow-up. I'd like to see us issue this call to Democrats at the outset, and then follow it up throughout the convention -- not only returning to it in subsequent speeches, but adding some items to the program that would pick it up. Examples:

a. A special, spotlighted appearance by Connally, speaking as a Democrat to his fellow Democrats.

b. On the second night, a special series of short speeches by Democrats responding to the Republican invitation -- assuming the right people can be rounded up. Examples: a prominent labor leader, life-long Democrat, saying the candidate who in 1972 best represents what labor represents is not McGovern, but RN; an attractive, articulate young voice of the New South, saying his party has left him; a respected academic or student leader, saying he's been a Democrat but McGovern is too much, and we need responsible leadership; Floyd McKissick saying the real road to black progress is not the McGovern way, but the Nixon way.

c. Release telegrams and letters from dissident Democrats during the convention, saying they're going Republican.

d. Plug dissident Democrats into the outside-the-hall schedule.

4. TV Coverage. Perhaps the biggest payoff, if we follow a course like this, will be in the cud-chewing of the TV reporters and commentators. They desperately need something to talk about, and if we can get them talking about how many Democrats the Republicans are going to get, and speculating about what Democratic switch-overs we're going to parade out next, we've achieved four crucial goals:

a. We've used our convention to condition Democratic voters, in explicit, personal terms, to thinking about voting Republican.

b. We've established a "prior approval" factor -- that is, we've made switching seem respectable to the TV viewer by showing him that other good Democrats are doing it.

c. We've injected a note of drama into the convention, and we've done it by moving the battle to the other guy's turf.

d. We've got the commentators talking about our issues.

Not to mention that we've opened our convention in an even better way than the Democrats opened theirs -- we've made it not just a GOP Convention, but a convention of and for the new coalition.

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Keynote Presentation: Outline

1. Moderator. There are discontents and dissatisfactions in the land; Americans feel frustrated with the present, and often fed up with government. We share these discontents and dissatisfactions, and we too are fed up with what all too often have been the failures of government. But we don't just complain. For three and a half years we've been doing something about it; we've made progress; the direction is set, the momentum is established, the players are lined up, the openings have been made to Russia, China and others abroad, and to new departures at home. Highlights of what we've achieved. What we've accomplished is a beginning, and a credential; now we're eager to get on with the job, and to finish what we've begun. In the film you're about to see, you will see some of those beginnings.

## FILM: THE NIXON YEARS

2. Keynoter A: What we will do for you. Our plans, our goals, for the future, as we look from now to 1976. A new prosperity without war and without inflation; the beginnings of a full generation of peace; a rebirth of pride in America; a fair shake for the farmer, security for the elderly, progress on the environment, etc.

3. Keynoter B: What we will not do to you. (The attack speech.)

All the McGovern nasties -- we won't take money out of the workers' pockets for a \$1,000 dole, we won't bus your kids, we won't let America become a second-rate power whose President has to beg, we won't spawn a new permissiveness that collapses moral values; we'll work with the young, but won't ignore the old; we'll turn America around without turning it upside down. We'll respect the student, the professor, the farmer -- and also the worker who wears a hard hat. Note: the focus of this will be entirely on the sins of the present Democratic nominee, not on the sins of past Democratic administrations.

4. Keynoter C. From the party of the Open Door, an Invitation.

From the podium of this Republican convention, we address this talk to the millions of loyal Democrats left homeless by Hurricane McGovern. Speaking to them directly, we invite them to make their home with us -- try it, you may like it. Think about why you're a Democrat. Is it because the Democratic party is the party of FDR, Truman and Kennedy? If so, then ask yourself whether Roosevelt or Truman or Kennedy would advocate crippling our defenses and abandoning our allies -- Roosevelt, who led the defense

of freedom in World War II; Truman, the architect of NATO and the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and patron at the founding of Israel; Kennedy, who declared we would "bear any burden," etc. Is it because the Democratic party is the party of labor? -- through a litany of why people in the past have been Democratic, and why those same reasons should now lead them to cast their lot with us in 1972. Its tone is one of respect for the Democratic Party as a great national institution, and sympathy with those members who have seen it seized by a self-appointed elite determined to convert it into a narrow ideological faction -- of warm and open-hearted welcome to those left on the outside at Miami a month ago, and of common cause with them because we share their hopes, their dreams, their concerns about America. In his acceptance speech, George McGovern said, "Come home, America." To millions of Democrats whose ideas no longer have a hearing in the national Democratic Party, I say tonight, "Come home, Americans -- come share our home -- give us not only your votes, but your hands, we will give you ours in welcome." This is the real keynote -- and it should be echoed throughout the rest of the convention proceedings.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: RAY PRICE

SUBJECT: First Family Scheduling

I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope that they'd be scheduled extensively. They've become a first-rate asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening and she was a knockout -- real star quality, said all the right things, and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus -- especially with parents and grandparents.

Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a chance to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people," etc., that there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap: I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, involved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous pleasure-seeker from Camelot.

I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly. Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.

A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in Peoria.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'RKP Jr.', written in a cursive style.

Raymond K. Price, Jr.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

*Doug Hallett*  
~~CHARLES COLSON~~

SUBJECT:

Larry Higby's Request of July 19.

The following is in response to Mr. Higby's request that I update and amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memorandum -- you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No, it's only half a joke.)

The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may recall, I suggested that the period between the conventions was a good opportunity to focus on domestic issues with some dramatic, colorful Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.

My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt, and feel, we should be aiming squarely at those peripheral urban ethnics and upper-middle-class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West, and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election -- and that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive positive approach geared around reprivatization, getting government off people's back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local, regional, and interest-group level, in turn, I felt, and feel, we should be directing our negative issues -- abortion, acid, homosexuality, our more extreme rhetoric about national security, tax reform, welfare reform, etc. -- in carefully-designed, well-researched, probably printed and front group formats so that we ourselves are not hurt by our own efforts.

To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being contravened. In particular, our positive national material -- the pamphlets, the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have seen -- is the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968. More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least so far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric -- "white flag budget" -- and under-researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice President's rhetoric -- "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward, progressive and potential even the middle ground to Senator McGovern.

On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be -- getting rigorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues -- Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings, particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to expand our constituency -- at least if the fact that there is not one Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example, that is true.

There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign so far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary -- how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use the Democratic Convention -- that we were going to encourage division, have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. -- how much was done?

And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on the particulars of his issues -- how much has been done?

In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is going to get him re-elected -- if only because nobody else will -- but there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:

1. Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive duplication of effort, inter-office rivalry, competition, holding back of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
  - (a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's -- 1701 would get lead responsibility -- and it would also get Colson. Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts -- dinners, funding requests, etc. -- have already been accomplished. (If they haven't, it's too late.) Now what we need is a hard-driving organizational and political effort and that can only be done from a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as many people from here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people, etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
  - (b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with authority to run all over the place. It needs it -- still.
  - (c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction to provide such support activities as are needed -- agency contact, White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming, etc.
  - (d) Writing -- now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief -- perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that one guy.

- (e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity -- and, in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate pretty well with the Shumway operation. P.R. -types like Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P.R. activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
  - (f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation -- presumably Ed Harper -- would report to Colson at 1701.
  - (g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as it is now -- as a separate Connally-Colson preserve -- it is going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
  - (h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the President. Starting now, the President should have a series of afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't believe how lax people are around here -- and mainly, I think, because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal identity with the President.
2. Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so response-oriented and so quick to jump at every quiver in the McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the President should be locked in -- and something attached to the President so he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The same goes for everybody else.
  3. Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign, with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around with a sense of humor.

4. Whatever the November Group is doing -- and I don't know anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been around the President for more than one campaign.

I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.

cc: Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 22, 1972

EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
THRU: L. HIGBY  
FROM: KEN W. CLAWSON *KC*  
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

(1) The President has maintained a high-level, busy executive posture between the conventions with the single exception of greeting Frank Fitzsimmons and members of the Teamsters Union Executive Board at San Clemente. I think this exception to the generally high-level tone the President has set was a justifiable one and really quite valuable.

(2) I am still convinced that in general terms the high level Presidential posture is still the most valid, but it is only meaningful if all 100 plus surrogates and, for that matter, the whole government apparatus is campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.

I feel strongly that to "free" the President to comfortably maintain his image as a Presidential candidate lies in how effectively the surrogates and the government apparatus really hurl themselves into the campaign. If we are less effective than we should be, I envision it becoming necessary for the President to come off his best posture and to, in effect, take over the campaign by interjecting himself fully into the fray. I find most Cabinet Officers and high-level surrogates with whom we deal are anxious to campaign extensively, but I think it is imperative that we monitor the surrogates program extremely closely to make sure we are getting every ounce of energy into the campaign.

As far as travel is concerned, I still believe that it should be Presidential-related travel, keyed to our target states and specific voting blocs.

(3) I think we should take great pains to paint McGovern as a "minority leader of a minority constituency." I think we should give every indication that any "regular, normal" American, whether he be Republican, Democrat or Independent, can find leadership and solice under the Nixon umbrella. I think that we should use words like "elite, fringe, extremist" and even in some cases "radical" to portray the constituency of Senator McGovern. Every effort should be made to isolate McGovern's more vocal backers from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and the nation as a whole.

Whether McGovern is before his time or after his time in philosophy and in substance, he and his followers should be portrayed as a small, closely-knit cadre of over-educated, lazy, fat-of-the-land type minority. In foreign policy, where we are, in my opinion, miles ahead, McGovern should be portrayed as inexperienced, rural, yokel, naive and isolationist. Personally, he should be portrayed as an individual who is not the kind of man that world leaders could respect. Indirectly, he should be portrayed as womanish, weak and a waffler. In short, a man without backbone, a candidate whose positions are never firm, who lacks courage to make the hard decisions and to stick to them in the face of adversity. For example, in Florida when he indicated he would keep a residual force in Southeast Asia on one day and then completely back away from it in the face of opposition from some of his more radical supporters in the Doral Hotel Lobby.

(4) As we were able to do in 1968, the McGovern people will have the advantage of being able to attack every little or big mistake from one end of the Executive Branch to the other and pin all of the failures and errors and foibles on the President. I personally think that Ted Kennedy will still be McGovern's most effective campaigner and that he will trumpet the health issue all over the country if we don't preempt him to the best of our ability starting now.

Kennedy, who seems bent on the '76 nomination for himself, will probably be given press coverage equal to McGovern's wherever he speaks, and I think we can count on his stumping for McGovern extensively so that he may report after McGovern loses in November that he did everything in his power to elect the Democratic ticket. We probably ought to have a team whose speciality is to monitor Kennedy and respond to him.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: AL HAIG   
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy Recommendations

I would not substantially modify my earlier recommendations on the subject of campaign strategy but rather would reiterate the following points:

1. The President should maintain a posture of being generally above the political infighting not just because he has to conduct the business of State but, more importantly, because his overall record speaks for itself and his "stooping to conquer" will only serve to enhance the McGovern prestige and tend to equate two totally unequal contenders.

The President's greatest personal asset is both the image and reality of an experienced, thoughtful, unemotional and exceptionally competent and tough national leader. Should he succumb to classic partisan gut-fighting, the activity would detract from this optimum posture. The tactics employed by the President himself should involve a careful and continuous appraisal of the need for his personal role as November approaches. It may be that the posture I am recommending will in the natural course of events develop the need for a fighting, tub-thumping, one-time Presidential speech in which the President rolls up his sleeves and takes on McGovern head on. While such a speech should be prepared and held for contingency use, a decision to proceed should only follow a most careful assessment that there is, in fact, a demand. If it is determined that a demand does exist then the speech should be given as late as possible in the campaign to prevent gutter type rebuttals which can again only result in an escalation of this kind of activity. Under no circumstances should a "tub-thumper" of this kind be considered for the President's acceptance speech at Miami.

2. With respect to campaigning and travel, obviously others will have more refined and experienced perspectives. I still, however,

continue to believe that the President should avoid over-exposure especially in contrived purely political environments. A non-frantic, 'business-of-State' schedule should insure plenty of preelection exposure but great care should be taken to develop venues which are Presidential in character and which will enable him to talk appropriately from a statesmanlike position with the full weight of the Presidency behind him, i. e., not just as another candidate. Venues should focus primarily on opportunities which can be nationally televised. These are the opportunities which get impact. In this vein, nothing is of greater importance than the timing (prime time) and substance of the President's acceptance speech.

Themes to be exploited should cover: foreign policy, National Defense and perhaps two or three domestic issues, such as law and order, philosophy of government and welfare.

3. In my view, the greatest single exploitable accomplishment of the President is foreign policy but beyond that it is his demonstrated willingness to make tough, courageous decisions in times of national crises, i. e., Jordan, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, May 8th and South Asia. For this reason, one of the greatest single dangers between now and November would be a panicky posture on Vietnam. In my view, the issue has been largely defused since American boys are not dying as before, American youths are not being drafted and most Americans attribute this to Presidential toughness above all else. Most Americans sense an aroma of finality in the policies we are currently pursuing in Vietnam. In a political sense, the benchmark for this American confidence was the decision of May 8. The backdrop, however, is an accumulative series of courageous decisions made all along the way which have in large measure proven to be correct. Should we panic in the last five minutes by accepting a compromise solution which is obviously detrimental to American and South Vietnamese interests there is a great risk that much of our constituency will become disaffected.

4. I agree completely with the theme that we should generally posture cabinet members and advocates in the direction of not personalizing attacks on McGovern's radicalism but rather take him on, issue by issue, in a repetitive fashion and being sure they credit him with his most extreme earlier positions. A specific line should be developed and approved for each issue and be repeated and repeated until it acquires a reality of its own which the opposition must squander all of its resources to counter.

The overall image of McGovern that we should attempt to develop is one of a sincere, well-meaning but totally inadequate and unqualified Presidential candidate. We must not permit the opposition to dig out of the extreme positions which McGovern has already placed on the record. The opposition is already launching a major effort to do so. Forcing the opposition to justify or in some cases to move away from earlier stated positions will tend to alienate their own extreme constituency and keep them in a defensive posture throughout.

5. To me, the greatest weakness of the McGovern camp is also its greatest strength. His current image is one of a loner who is honest and uncompromising in his desire to shatter all preconceived political, international, defense, management and welfare patterns of the U.S. Government. Beyond this, he is viewed as favoring a fundamental shift in the very life style of the American people. Unfortunately, there are many Americans, including many well-to-do intellectuals and even bureaucrats who live in a theoretical world which permits them to savor a whole new approach. The youth and intellectuals are obviously most attracted to this kind of logic. For this reason, it is essential that we focus primarily on the impracticalities of this approach, issue by issue and theme by theme. It is also important that our own positive statements clearly portray the President as a successful innovator who has himself, through skill and experience, brought about more change than could ever be experienced by the ill-conceived and pie-in-the-sky themes which characterize the McGovern platform.

These are, of course, generalities which must be specifically tailored for specific constituents. Labor, for example, must understand that McGovern would suck away their hard-earned earnings for the welfare parasite. The establishment must understand that their hard-earned financial rewards could not be shared with their heirs.

In the international area, the theme Secretary Rogers mentioned at the Leadership Meeting is an especially good one, i. e., McGovern seems to favor an extension and continuation of the large majority of our international programs but would self defeatingly deprive the country of the assets which have thus far made these programs succeed, i. e., military strength and responsible international involvement.

6. I would again emphasize the Presidential family concept through which the President, Mrs. Nixon and the daughters be employed at every turn in the months between now and November. The President's family man image and the public attractiveness of Mrs. Nixon and the girls cannot be over-emphasized. It also contributes in an indirect way to the great theme that President Nixon represents the personification of valued American family traditions which dramatizes by example the inadequacies of an off-beat zealot whose main appeal can only be to the misfits in American society.

7. Finally, and above all, it must be recognized that the preceding merely confirms a strategy for exploiting existing assets. Written strategy of this kind and generalizations about what we have going for us are meaningless without a detailed, well organized and, above all, disciplined machine for carrying the strategy forward in an effective way. Bad strategy can be overcome by effective management. A perfect strategy implemented in an ill-disciplined, poorly timed or sloppy way can be disastrous. I am not sure that our organizational arrangements and the detailed development of themes, scheduled Presidential appearances, Advocate appearances, etc., are precisely delineated or that a manned command and control mechanism is firmly in place and properly functioning. If this has not been done, it is the overriding task of the moment. This, you are best able to assess.