

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
34	10	7/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Howard to Strachan. RE: Abel's comments and their use with the labor movement. 6 pgs.
34	10	7/25/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Klein, Ziegler, and Colson. RE: Written Q&As. 1 pg.
34	10	7/25/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Buchanan Assault Book on McGovern. 1 pg.
34	10	7/25/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Strachan. RE: campaign song. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
34	10	6/27/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Safire to Haldeman. RE: songs. 2 pgs.
34	10	7/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ziegler to participants of the 8:15 staff meeting. RE: statement by McGregor. 2 pgs.
34	10	7/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Higby. RE: Ehrlichman Political Meetings. 1 pg.
34	10	7/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Key State Analysis. 2 pgs.
34	10	7/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Strachan. RE: MacGregor strategy meeting. 14 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
34	10	7/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	"Status Report" on campaign by Wallace. 1 pg.
34	10		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	Author unknown. RE: top and low priority states. 2 pgs.
34	10	7/3/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Teeter to MacGregor. RE: second wave polling results. 4 pgs.
34	10	7/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Finkelstein to Marik. RE: priority states. 5 pgs.
34	10	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Flanigan's statement of support. 4 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
34	10	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Vice President. RE: afternoon notes. 5 pgs.
34	10	7/10/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gov. Whitcomb telephone call. 1 pg.
34	10	7/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: individual state polls. 4 pgs.
34	10		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Author unknown. RE: talking paper for the president. 4 pgs.
34	10	7/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: campaign direct mail. 3 pgs.

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34	10	7/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From High to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Materials, with edits. 1 pg.
34	10	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Higby. RE: campaign materials. 1 pg.
34	10	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to unknown. RE: meeting with MacGregor. 1 pg.
34	10	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Wallace. 1 pg.
34	10	7/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Ziegler Line to Press. 1 pg.

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34	10	7/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman. RE: RN's meeting with Connally. 6 pgs.
34	10	7/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: convention program. 1 pg.
34	10	7/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: incident at Democratic Convention. 3 pgs.
34	10	7/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: copies of letters between McGovern and Retail Grocers. 7 pgs.
34	10	7/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From MacGregor to RN. RE: Campaign Progress. 16 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
34	10	7/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Author unknown. RE: public appearances of RN and notes. 4 pgs.
34	10	6/26/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Higby. RE: Magruder's Press Contacts. 2 pgs
34	10	6/25/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman and Mitchell. RE: timing of Godwin's support. 1 pg.
34	10	6/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to unknown. RE: talking paper. 1 pg.
34	10	6/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: campaign strategy session. 3 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
34	10	6/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to unknown. RE: publicly getting Democrats out in support of RN. 1 pg.
34	10	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Conversation with Mitchell. 1 pg.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

July 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON STRACHAN

We are using I. W. Abel's comments extensively, but very subtly, with the labor movement.

*Your
understanding?*

In answer to your second question, we do not and will not have a Labor for the President organization as such. The only way we can hope to get local labor people to work for us and vote for us is if we do perform a very subtle operation which is what Don Rodgers is doing now through local labor leaders. Any outward or formal Labor for Nixon set up would only coalesce organized labor against us and make our job much more difficult. Therefore, it will be a very subtle and low played, but hopefully quite effective, operation.



W. Richard Howard

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

July 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DICK HOWARD

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

G

SUBJECT:

Abel Seconding Speech

Attached are Bill Safire's comments on the I. W. Abel speech seconding the nomination of Henry Jackson. His notes on the bottom should be of interest to you. The question is whether they are underway and if the individuals he suggests, former Under Secretary of Labor in the Eisenhower cabinet is being used. Would you let me know?

cc: Ken Khachigian

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

July 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BILL SAFIRE

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT:

Abel Seconding Speech

Attached is a transcript of the I.W. Abel speech seconding the nomination of Henry Jackson. You may have some suggestions as to how we might use this. Please advise.

cc: Ken Khachigian

Do we have a "Lulu for Kiser"
Committee? If not, why not?
(Irene Belthorpe, ex - undersec of Labor in
Civilian Control, will be good to help set up.)
This should be the part of them workings.

And we are tired of the politicians who denounce "big labor" and "labor bosses" on Monday, and then come to us on Tuesday with their hands outstretched.

We have heard a lot about hypocrisy at this convention -- especially from those who called them advocates of a "new politics."

Well, let us end hypocrisy.

Let us end the hypocrisy of candidates who tell us they are for the working people and then turn around and vote for the right to work laws and against minimum wage programs.

Let's end the hypocrisy of candidates who say they are for the working people and then serve as a mouthpiece of the weak lobbies.

Let's end the hypocrisy of candidates who say they are for young people and then vote against summer jobs for youth.

Let's end the hypocrisy of candidates who say they are for the blacks and then seek to weaken the voting rights provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

And let's end the hypocrisy that says that democracy is only for Americans -- and the hell with the rest of the world.

To those who say that building a democracy at home is the road to peace in the world I say: Yes, but if democracy is worth building at all it is worth defending in the world.

There are those among us who say that the way to win in November is to reject the traditions and the values of our

party. And to them I say: Where were you when the chips were down four years ago?

If some of these new politicians had worked this hard to support our party as they subsequently worked to reform our party, we would be meeting here tonight to renominate and lay plans to re-elect President Hubert Humphrey.

This is the party of working people.

Give us a candidate with a unblemished labor record.

Give us a candidate with an outstanding civil rights record.

Give us a candidate with a perfect record of pioneering for a better environment.

Give us a candidate who believes in a strong America -- and who believes that the cause of freedom does not stop at the water's base.

Give us a candidate who can put America back to work.

Give us a candidate who speaks for the vital progressive center - where the people are. Give us a candidate working people can support.

I give you such a candidate who can defeat Richard Nixon in 1972. Fellow delegates, there is only one candidate whose name is before you who meets these tests. I am proud to second the nomination of the great Senator from Washington, Senator Henry Jackson.

July 25, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: HERB KLEIN
 RON ZIEGLER
 EHUCK COLSON

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT: Written Q&As

The President has agreed to provide written Q&As such as the current request from SEVENTEEN and the inevitable forthcoming one from AP. The stipulation here must be that there will be no personal Presidential involvement and all questions will be submitted in writing and answered in writing. There will be no special photographs made or anything of that sort. Also, we should be selective in the determinations of which publications to get into.

cc: Ray Price
 Dwight Chapin

HRH:LH:kb:KB:kb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 25, 1971 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **CONFIDENTIAL**

HIGH PRIORITY

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN
FROM: L. HIGBY

Bob would like you to look into the situation regarding the campaign song. It should be ready for the convention at the very latest. Please find out what is happening here and give him a report. One approach he suggests would be to get some of our country music people to work on some songs. A good simple song to a country beat might be the best possibility for us.

7/26 Bailey - listened in NY +
CC to MacG who wants
to give to P.

Reed

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 27, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT: Songs

Appears that McGovern may adopt "Bridge Over Troubled Water" as his theme song, the way that Bobby Kennedy used "This Land Is Your Land."

Is there any way we can work "God Bless America" into the convention proceedings or in any other rally-type occasion? Would make a good contrast.

(The writer of "Bridge Over Troubled Water" is Paul Simon, of Simon & Garfunkle, who also wrote "Mrs. Robinson" and "Feelin' Groovy," neither of which would be quite suitable for us.)

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PETER DAILEY

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Campaign Song

As you probably know, McGovern may adopt "The Bridge Over Troubled Waters" as his theme song in much the same way Bobby Kennedy used "This Land is Your Land".

One suggestion that has been made is that we try to work "God Bless America" into an appropriate song as it would be an excellent contrast.

I know you have probably received several suggestions about campaign songs, but would you advise me of the status of the campaign song project - when the options will be ready, possible recording artists, and any problems?

GS/jb
FU - 7/7

H

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JULY 24, 1972

✓

TO: PARTICIPANTS OF THE 8:15 A.M.
STAFF MEETING

FROM: RON ZIEGLER

Clark asked me to send this to you for your
information.

STATEMENT BY CLARK MacGREGOR, July 22, 1972:

President Nixon's re-election campaign effort will carry the issues to the American people in a variety of ways through many spokesmen. The President will of course be participating personally this fall as the leader of this program.

The Nixon Administration's position on a broad range of key issues is clearly defined, well understood, and broadly supported by American citizens. The sharply divergent views of the President's opponent have been spelled out in this year's primaries, and have not found wide acceptance. The people know fully of the great differences on issues between the candidates.

Senior Senators and Congressmen of both parties have long felt that it was unwise for an incumbent President to engage in political debates. Senator John O. Pastore (Dem., R.I.) has been a leading voice in this regard, and Senator McGovern in the past has agreed with Pastore. On August 18, 1964, McGovern voted to kill a bill which would have permitted debates between Senator Goldwater and former President Johnson.

President Nixon is now engaged in directing many vital and highly sensitive negotiations for peace. Success in these negotiations must not be jeopardized. Debates would not serve the national interest.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓ 1+FU
7/27

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

July 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LARRY HIGBY

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

G

SUBJECT:

Ehrlichman Political Meetings

A check with Jana Hruska in John Ehrlichman's office indicates that John Mitchell did not attend the July 20 meeting in Ehrlichman's office because he was not invited. He was invited to the meeting this morning, according to Jana, but did not attend because Mitchell's secretary did not put the item on his schedule. In the future, John Mitchell will be invited to the Ehrlichman political meetings.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

To AS
Wallace
L

July 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Key State Analysis with
Wallace - Wave II Survey
Results

You reviewed the MacGregor Strategy Meeting determination of Key States on July 12. This memorandum reviews the Key States in light of the July 19 legal analysis of Wallace's ballot position in various states. The poll figures are from Wave II of the Campaign Surveys.

In the 10 Key States - California, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, Michigan, Ohio, Maryland and Connecticut - the President's margin over McGovern is cut by 1 to 6 if Wallace is in the race.

WAVE II

		<u>N</u>	<u>McG</u>	<u>Un</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>McG</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Un</u>
CALIF.	-3	48	42	11	42	39	11	8
N.Y.		Results will be available 7/28						
PENNA.	-3	49	42	9	42	38	12	8
N.J.	-2	49	42	9	41	36	16	7
ILL.	-5	56	35	10	47	31	12	10
TEXAS	-6	54	35	11	42	29	22	7
MICH.	-3	45	45	100	33	36	23	8
OHIO	-4	56	38	6	47	33	15	6
MD.	-1	52	42	6	44	35	16	4
CONN.	-2	53	37	10	47	33	10	10

The only state lost as a result of Wallace's entry is Michigan. However, as the Wallace ballot position chart indicates, George Wallace is precluded from being on the ballot as a third party candidate because he ran in the Democratic Primary.

In Maryland, where Wallace cuts the President's lead from 10 to 9 points and in Pennsylvania, where Wallace cuts the President's lead from 7 to 4 points, Wallace' is precluded from appearing on the November ballot as a third party candidate.

In New Jersey, where Wallace cuts the President's lead from 7 to 5 points, Wallace is already qualified on the general election ballot as a candidate of the American Party.

In the remaining Key States, California, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, Ohio and Texas, Wallace could obtain ballot position by convention, certification or petition. Each of these legal steps involves varying degrees of difficulty. As the chart indicates, Wallace could obtain nearly automatic ballot position in California, Connecticut and Ohio. Illinois and New York would be more difficult and Texas would be quite hard for Wallace to get on the general election ballot as a third party candidate.

GS:car

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date _____

TO:

AS

FROM:

L. HIGBY

~~Do~~ Do envelope of
Wallace.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

July 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

G

SUBJECT:

MacGregor Strategy
Meeting - July 11

Clark MacGregor met with the Campaign Strategy Group (Teeter, Magruder, Malek, Dailey, Marik, Finkelstein, and Miller) to discuss the Key States in light of Wave II polling results.

MacGregor opened the meeting with two comments. He said he planned on meeting with Mitchell, Connally, and possibly Colson to determine how the Democrats for the President would be arranged. Second, he advised the group that an appropriate approach was being made to Mayor Daley and that you had been informed.

MacGregor told the group that Governor Love and Secretary Morton would be in Miami Beach to welcome disenchanted Democrats. They will also push the line that McGovern heads an extreme elitist machine that has replaced the "party of the people". The Democrats cannot be allowed to keep that label. Many liberal Democrats are calling MacGregor to indicate their concern about McGovern.

MacGregor agreed with Teeter that the campaign should concentrate on the great national issues and McGovern's extreme positions. It is Teeter's view that McGovern's perception will be set in the minds of the American people in the next 2-3 weeks. MacGregor said the campaign will continue to hit McGovern through MacGregor's "Issues and Answers" appearance this Sunday, the distribution of the Wicker article, and the Pierre Rinfret discussions with economists. When Malek pressed for a single person within 1701 to run this operation, MacGregor deferred.

The Key State discussion focused on the three attached memoranda. There were two views expressed. Some thought the results showed the President so far ahead in Illinois, Texas and Ohio that the primary effort should be placed in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, New York and Michigan. All agreed Washington should be dropped. Malek led the argument to work in the big states regardless of what the polls indicate. MacGregor concluded that there should be three states for maximum effort -- California, New York and Pennsylvania. New Jersey and Cook County in Illinois should also receive First Priority attention. The Second Priority states would be Texas, Michigan, Ohio, Maryland and Connecticut.

MacGregor also emphasized that the campaign would not shift its attention to Senatorial or Congressional races because if the President wins by 54-55%, Congressional races will be helped naturally.

TALKING PAPER

In early May, Mr. Mitchell, in consultation with the Strategy Group, established three groups of priority states for the campaign:

Top Priority (Maximum allocation of resources and focus of management attention. "Must win" states.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
California	45	+0.2	+3
Illinois	26	-0.3	+3
Texas	26	-2	-1
Ohio	25	+6	+2
New Jersey	17	-1	+2
	<u>139</u>		

Second Priority (High allocation of resources and management attention.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
* New York	41	-6	-5
Pennsylvania	27	-2	-4
Maryland	10	-8	-2
Michigan	21	-2	-7
Connecticut	8	-8	-5
Washington	9	+3	-2
	<u>116</u>		

Third Priority (Lower allocation of resources and management attention.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
Missouri	12	-0.5	+1
Wisconsin	11	+4	+4
Oregon	6	+6	+6
West Virginia	6	-6	-9
	<u>35</u>		

The emergence of George McGovern as the probable Democratic nominee, as well as the successful foreign policy initiatives of the President, have substantially altered his relative standing in the large population states.

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the question of whether the original priority grouping should now be changed. The factors to be considered include:

1. What is meant by priority ranking, in terms of programmatic efforts, in-state campaign organization and total resource allocation.
2. How the President stands in terms of the number of electoral votes now leaning toward him. That is, how many of the large states must we win in order to carry the election.
3. How much should the June/July polls influence our thinking-- How firm do we believe the positive or negative margins to be.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

July 3, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE CLARK MAC GREGOR
FROM: ROBERT M. TEEIER
SUBJECT: Second Wave Polling Results

Attached are the sample ballot results from the second wave polling. The interviewing for this polling was all done between June 14 and June 25. I have noted differences in the two Nixon/Humphrey races from the first wave where applicable. We did not measure McGovern in the first wave which was done in December and January.

I will have the results from the National poll later today or tomorrow morning, the New York data in about ten days, and the Indiana data in about three weeks. The New York and Indiana polls were delayed to begin after the primary in New York and the State Nominating Convention in Indiana.

Generally these results are very optimistic and indicate that the President has improved his position since January. I think it is particularly significant that his committed vote is above or very near 50% in the two-way races against McGovern in the top priority states. This, as I am sure you are aware, has been a problem in the past.

While our situation has improved, we still appear to have some problems in Missouri, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Washington.

Also I just got an advance report of a telephone poll taken by Becker Research for the Boston Globe in Massachusetts which will be published tomorrow. It shows McGovern with 47%, Nixon with 44%, and 9% undecided. This is obviously a most optimistic result.

We will have the complete data from this second wave polling by July 15.

I will be happy to discuss these figures and the first wave data at your convenience.

Note: I will be giving these results to Gordon Strachan of Mr. Baldwin's office on the telephone at 5 o'clock, Pacific Time, this evening.

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES

	<u>U.S.</u>			<u>ALABAMA</u> ¹			<u>CALIFORNIA</u>			<u>CONNECTICUT</u>			<u>INDIANA</u>			<u>ILLINOIS</u>			<u>MARYLAND</u>		
	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>
Nixon	54			47	65	+18	47	47	0	--	56	---	53			--	56	---	49	58	+9
Humphrey	40			18	20	+2	40	40	0	--	32	---	38			--	34	---	45	36	-9
Undecided	6			35	14	-21	13	13	0	--	12	---	9			--	11	---	5	6	+1
Nixon	48			29	34	+5	44	42	-2	--	50	---	47			45	48	+3	44	48	+4
Humphrey	35			14	15	+1	37	35	-2	--	27	---	33			36	28	-8	43	29	-14
Wallace	12			36	43	+7	6	13	+7	--	23	---	11			7	15	+8	6	17	+9
Undecided	5			21	9	-12	13	11	-2	--	11	---	8			12	10	-2	5	6	+1
Nixon	--			--	63	---	--	48	16	--	54	---	--			--	56	---	--	52	---
McGovern	--			--	23	---	--	42	---	--	37	---	--			--	35	---	--	42	---
Undecided	--			--	14	---	--	11	---	--	10	---	--			--	10	---	--	6	---
Nixon	--			--	35	---	--	42	---	--	47	---	--			--	47	---	--	44	---
McGovern	--			--	11	---	--	33	---	--	33	---	--			--	31	---	--	35	---
Wallace	--			--	40	---	--	11	---	--	10	---	--			--	13	---	--	16	---
Undecided	--			--	7	---	--	8	---	--	10	---	--			--	10	---	--	4	---

1 First wave figures from a survey for Winter Blount, June, 1971.

NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES

	<u>MICHIGAN</u> ¹			<u>MISSOURI</u>			<u>NEW JERSEY</u>			<u>NEW YORK</u>			<u>OHIO</u>			<u>OREGON</u>			<u>PENNSYLVANIA</u>		
	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>
Nixon	--	49	----	43	43	+ 5	54	52	- 2	50			53	58	+ 5	48	50	+ 2	46	46	0
Humphrey	--	39	----	45	42	- 3	36	38	+ 2	40			40	37	- 3	30	31	- 7	43	41	- 2
Undecided	--	12	----	12	10	- 2	10	10	0	10			8	5	- 3	13	19	+ 6	8	10	+ 2
Nixon	--	36	----	37	37	0	49	44	- 5	47			48	50	+ 2	43	44	+ 1	44	40	- 4
Humphrey	--	30	----	40	35	- 5	33	30	- 3	39			38	30	- 8	30	24	-12	41	35	- 6
Wallace	--	24	----	12	20	+ 8	8	13	+10	5			8	15	+ 7	9	13	+ 9	8	13	+ 5
Undecided	--	11	----	11	8	- 3	10	9	- 1	9			7	5	- 2	12	15	+ 3	3	9	+ 1
Nixon	--	45	----	--	44	----	--	49 ⁺⁷	----	--			--	58 ⁺¹⁸	----	--	42	----	--	49	----
McGovern	--	45	----	--	46	----	--	42	----	--			--	38	----	--	45	----	--	42	----
Undecided	--	10	----	--	10	----	--	9	----	--			--	6	----	--	10	----	--	9	----
Nixon	--	33	----	--	35	----	--	41	----	--			--	47	----	--	37	----	--	42	----
McGovern	--	36	----	--	37	----	--	36	----	--			--	30	----	--	35	----	--	38	----
Wallace	--	23	----	--	20	----	--	16	----	--			--	15	----	--	15	----	--	10	----
Undecided	--	8	----	--	8	----	--	8	----	--			--	6	----	--	10	----	--	8	----

1 First wave figures from a survey for Robert Griffin, February, 1972 with Muskie, not Humphrey, as opponent.

NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%

<u>MICHIGAN</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>MICHIGAN</u>	<u>1W</u>
Nixon	41	Nixon	39
Muskie	42	Muskie	40
Undecided	17	Wallace	7
		Undecided	15

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES

	<u>WASHINGTON</u>			<u>WISCONSIN</u>			<u>TEXAS</u>		
	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>	<u>1W</u>	<u>2W</u>	<u>+/-</u>
Nixon	--	45	----	46	56	+10	49	55	+ 6
Humphrey	--	39	----	46	35	-11	40	35	- 5
Undecided	--	16	----	7	9	+2	11	10	- 1
Nixon	--	38	----	44	48	+ 4	42	43	+ 1
Humphrey	--	32	----	42	31	-11	36	23	- 8
Wallace	--	17	----	8	12	+ 4	12	22	+10
Undecided	--	13	----	7	9	+ 2	11	7	- 4
Nixon	--	41	----	--	44	----	--	54	----
McGovern	--	45	----	--	52	----	--	35	----
Undecided	--	13	----	--	5	----	--	11	----
Nixon	--	34	----	--	39	----	--	42	----
McGovern	--	39	----	--	47	----	--	28	----
Wallace	--	16	----	--	10	----	--	22	----
Undecided	--	12	----	--	4	----	--	7	----

NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

July 7, 1972

TO: Dr. Robert H. Marik
FROM: Arthur J. Finkelstein *AF*
SUBJECT: Priority States

Please find attached several charts depicting my thinking on the electoral vote situation that would exist in a Nixon-McGovern contest. As you can tell the Nixon total electoral vote surpasses by 16, the 270 votes needed for election. Further, there is an additional 188 electoral votes which realistically can still be considered undecided. Due to recent information, states such as Illinois, Maryland and Ohio have been added to the safe Nixon total. Wisconsin, Oregon and Missouri have been added to the McGovern total. Of the 188 undecided electoral votes, on the basis of recent information and past election analyses, it can be assumed that 104 are leaning to Nixon. With New York State's 41 electoral votes kept completely in the undecided column, the President receives a stunning 390 electoral votes, the making of a real electoral landslide.

Considering the possibility of an electoral landslide, it would make great sense to solidify those states which would clearly give us the margin of victory. Therefore, our priority states should be those which are not sure states but large electoral states now leaning slightly to the President. California, Pennsylvania and New Jersey fit this criteria. I would also add Connecticut, New York and Michigan because of the very nature of the closeness of this election.

You will note that I suggest dropping five presently targeted states either because we have secured them or because to win them would take more effort than frankly is essential or necessary for this campaign. Three of those five states dropped, Texas, Illinois and Ohio, account for 77 electoral votes which should be constantly kept track of. I would suggest greater than normal emphasis upon the states organizationally and the use of the telephone operations.

Dr. Robert H. Marik

July 7, 1972

Finally I include a list of third priority states which are chosen because of the strength of the President. None of these ten states are target states. All of these ten states will have senatorial contests in 1972, where Republicans can either hold on to a seat (Kentucky), or as in the case of the other nine, gain a seat. In each of these states with the exception of Rhode Island, a Nixon--Senatorial Candidate Campaign would be helpful to the Republican Senatorial candidate's chances. Since the Republicans only need to gain five or six seats in the Senate to take control of that body, I would strongly suggest that the campaign strategy develop which would emphasize in these areas the ideal Republican ticket.

A. J. F.

AJF:kvf
Attachments
cc: J. Magruder

PRIORITY STATES

First Priority

A	{	1. California	-	45
		2. Pennsylvania	-	27
		3. New Jersey	-	17
B	{	4. Connecticut	-	8
		5. New York	-	41
		6. Michigan	-	<u>21</u>
				159

Second Priority

1. Texas	-	26
2. Illinois	-	26
3. Ohio	-	<u>25</u>
		77

Third Priority

1. Alabama	-	9
2. Georgia	-	12
* 3. Kentucky	-	9
4. Montana	-	4
5. New Hampshire	-	4
6. New Mexico	-	4
7. North Carolina	-	13
8. Oklahoma	-	8
** 9. Rhode Island	-	4
10. Virginia	-	12

TOTAL STATES

	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>U</u>
Alabama	9		
Alaska			3
Arizona	6		
Arkansas	6		
California			45
Colorado	7		
Connecticut			8
Delaware	3		
D. C.		3	
Florida	17		
Georgia	12		
Hawaii		4	
Idaho	4		
Illinois	26		
Indiana	13		
Iowa	8		
Kansas	7		
Kentucky	9		
Louisiana	10		
Maine			4
Maryland	10		
Massachusetts		14	
Michigan			21
Minnesota		10	
Mississippi	7		
Missouri		12	
Montana	4		
Nebraska	5		
Nevada			3
New Hampshire	4		
New Jersey			17
New Mexico	4		
New York			41
North Carolina	13		
North Dakota	3		
Ohio	25		
Oklahoma	8		
Oregon		6	
Pennsylvania			27
Rhode Island		4	
South Carolina	8		
South Dakota			4
Tennessee	10		
Texas	26		
Utah	4		
Vermont	3		
Virginia	12		
Washington			9
West Virginia			6
Wisconsin		11	
Wyoming	3		
	<u>286</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>188</u>

UNDECIDED STATES

	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>U</u>
Alaska		3	
California	45		
Connecticut	8		
Maine	4		
Michigan		21	
Nevada	3		
New Jersey	17		
New York			41
Pennsylvania	27		
South Dakota		4	
Washington		9	
West Virginia		6	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	104	43	41
Safe	286	64	--
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	390	107	41

GEORGE C. WALLACE (GCW)
STATUS REPORT 7/19/72

STATE	CAN GCW RUN	AS CANDIDATE OF	ACTION REQUIRED	DATE	STATE	CAN GCW RUN	AS CANDIDATE OF	ACTION REQUIRED	DATE
Ala.	Yes	AIP	Convention	9/9 *	Mo.	Yes	New Party	Petition:	7/31**
Alas.	Yes	AIP	Request	8/10 *	Mont.	Yes	AP	Convention	9/23 *
Ariz.	Yes	AIP	Convention	*	Neb.	No	All Applicable filing dates passed		
Ark.	Yes	AIP	Convention	9/4-9/24 **~H	Nev.	No	No Petitions Filed		
Cal.	Yes	AIP	Certification	9/6 *	N.H.	Yes	AP	Certify	9/27
Colo.	Yes	New Party	Petition: 300 sigs.	9/24 *	+ N.J.	Yes	AP	Already Qualified	
Conn.	Yes	George Wallace Party	Non-Papers	9/20 *	F.M.	Yes	AIP	Certify & Petition: 3% last vote	9/12 *
Del.	Yes	AIP	Convention & Certify	7/22 * 9/1	- N.Y.	Yes	Indep.	Petition: 20,000 sigs.	8/28-31 **~E
D.C.	Yes	New Party	Petition: 13,000 sigs.	8/15 **~H	N.C.	Yes	AP	National Convention	*
Fla.	Yes	New Party	Petition: 1% last vote	8/15 **~H	N.D.	Yes	New Party	Petition: 300 sigs.	9/29**E
Ga.	No	No Petitions Filed			- Ohio	Yes	AIP	Convention	8/25 *
Hawaii	No	No Petitions Filed			Okla.	Yes	AP	Convention	8/10 *
Idaho	No	No Petitions Filed			Ore.	No	Ran in primary and lost		
+ Ill.	Yes	New Party	Petition: 25,000 sigs.	7/31-8/7**~E	+ Pa.		No (See Text) All applicable filing dates passed		
Ind.	See Text	New Party	Petition: 8,500 sigs.	9/1	R.I.	Yes	Indep.	Petition: 500 sigs.	7/28**
Iowa	Yes	AIP	Convention	8/4-9/3 *	S.C.	Yes	AP	Certify	10/4 *
Kans.	Yes	Conservative	Already Nominated		S.D.	Yes	Indep.	Petition 2% last vote	9/2 **
Kty.	Yes	AP	Already Qualified		Tenn.	Yes	AP	Convention	9/7 *
La.	Yes	AP	Certify	9/18 *	- Tex.	Yes	New Party	Petition: 22,300 sigs. & Convention	9/1 ** 9/19
Me.	No	No Petitions Filed			Utah	Yes	AIP	Convention	7/31 *
+ Md.	No	No Certificate of Candidacy Filed			Vt.	Yes	New Party	Petition: 1,535 sigs.	9/20**
Mass.	No	No Petitions Filed			Va.	Yes	AIP	Petition 9,100 sigs.	9/8 *
+ Mich.	No (See Text)	Ran in primary and lost			Wash.	Yes	New Party	Convention & Petition: 100 sigs.	9/19** 9/26
Minn.	Yes	New Party	Petition: 2,000 sigs.	7/5-9/12 **~E	W.Va	No	All applicable filing dates passed		
Miss.	Yes	New Party	Petition: 1,000 sigs.	9/27 **~E	Wisc.	Yes	AP	Already Qualified	
					Wyo.	Yes	Indep.	Petition: 5,815 sigs.	9/27**

* States where Wallace can obtain nearly automatic ballot position if nominated by the American Party National Convention in Louisville, Kentucky, August 3-5.

** States where Wallace can obtain ballot position by petition; in seven it would be hard (H); in eleven it would be easy (E).

TALKING PAPER

In early May, Mr. Mitchell, in consultation with the Strategy Group, established three groups of priority states for the campaign:

Top Priority (Maximum allocation of resources and focus of management attention. "Must win" states.)

State	Electoral Votes	Nixon Margin (%)	
		1960	1968
California	45	+0.2	+3
Illinois	26	-0.3	+3
Texas	26	-2	-15
Ohio	25	+6	+25
New Jersey	17	-1	+24
	139		

Wave II
 $48-42 = 11/42 = 39-11$
 $35-10/47 = 31-12-10$
 $35-11/42 = 24-22-7$
 $38-6/47 = 33-15-6$
 $42-9/41 = 36-16-8$

Second Priority (High allocation of resources and management attention.)

State	Electoral Votes	Nixon Margin (%)	
		1960	1968
New York	41	-6	-5
Pennsylvania	27	-2	-4
Maryland	10	-8	-25
Michigan	21	-2	-7
Connecticut	8	-8	-55
Washington	9	+3	-24
	116		

$42-9/42 = 38-12-8$
 $42-6/44 = 35-16-4$
 $45-10/33 = 36-23-8$
 $37-10/47 = 33-10-10$
 $45-13/34 = 39-16-12$

Third Priority (Lower allocation of resources and management attention.)

State	Electoral Votes	Nixon Margin (%)	
		1960	1968
Missouri	12	-0.5	+1
Wisconsin	11	+4	+4
Oregon	6	+6	+6
West Virginia	6	-6	-9
	35		

$44-46 = 10/35 = 37-20-8$
 $44-52 = 5/29 = 47-10-4$
 $42-45 = 13/37 = 39-15-10$

The emergence of George McGovern as the probable Democratic nominee, as well as the successful foreign policy initiatives of the President, have substantially altered his relative standing in the large population states.

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the question of whether the original priority grouping should now be changed. The factors to be considered include:

1. What is meant by priority ranking, in terms of programmatic efforts, in-state campaign organization and total resource allocation.

2. How the President stands in terms of the number of electoral votes now leaning toward him. That is, how many of the large states must we win in order to carry the election.

3. How much should the June/July polls influence our thinking-- How firm do we believe the positive or negative margins to be.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 7/21

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Jon Rose in Flanigan's office advised us that Don Kendall planned on putting this very supportive statement in the Pepsico quarterly report. Malek and Magruder for MacGregor agree. Dean obtained an opinion from Justice that such a statement would not violate any laws.

Flanigan will advise Kendall to proceed.

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

July 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON C. STRACHAN

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

Per our discussion, attached is a copy of
Kendall's approved statement.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

Donald M. Kendall - Message to Stockholders

It was recently announced in Washington that Donald M. Kendall, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Pepsico, Inc., has been selected to serve as Chairman of the Business and Industry Committee for the Re-election of President Nixon.

Following a recent meeting with the President (see photos), Mr. Kendall discussed some of his reasons for supporting Mr. Nixon's candidacy:

"As a businessman, I've been very impressed by the soundness and effectiveness of the Administration's actions in the economic sphere. At the same time, I'm very concerned about the approaches favored by his opponents.

"In sharp contrast to the present Administration's favorable attitude towards the free enterprise system, the opposition's policies seem to proceed out of distrust and even outright hostility toward the legitimate objectives of American business enterprise.

"I refer specifically to the opposition's plans that involve confiscatory taxation to support overly ambitious and ill-conceived social goals, and to the formulation of such proposed legislation as the Burke-Hartke Bill, with its isolationist quotas on imports, punitive tax levels on overseas profits, and intolerable restrictions on foreign investments -- all based on the erroneous assumption that these repugnant measures will alleviate domestic unemployment, though studies indicate that the opposite is actually the case.

"For all American business, and especially for multinational corporations such as Pepsico, I would regard the election of an Administration and Congress bent on such policies as potentially disastrous for this country and its role in international trade.

"Moreover, those who are workers and shareholders in American business would, I believe, inevitably feel the direct impact of this anti-business bias -- not only in the impediments placed on the potential of their jobs, but also on the value of their investments.

"On the other hand, there are several positive achievements to which I believe the current administration can point.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

"The President's forthright measures to check inflation, taken without regard for the political criticism they were sure to provoke, have done much to strengthen our nation's economy and protect the purchasing power of the wage-earner's dollar. The short term unemployment picture is improving, and the long term security of the American worker will rest on firmer ground as a result of his actions.

"Mr. Nixon's bold initiatives in foreign relations, particularly with China and the Soviet Union, have been a dramatic step beyond the rigid sterility of cold-war dogma, and open the way to a new and fruitful era of peaceful co-existence with our country's main potential adversaries -- replacing tension and mistrust with the possibility for scientific, commercial and cultural interchange in a world at peace. At the same time, he has taken these steps without in any way diminishing our essential defensive strength.

"Lastly, Mr. Nixon has responded to one of the most agonizing challenges ever to face an American President by dealing with our military involvement in Southeast Asia, which he found upon entering office, in a manner compatible with our national honor, the credibility of our international commitments, and the safety of our armed forces and prisoners of war.

"For all these reasons, and because I believe the re-election of President Nixon is vital for the future of our economy and our nation, I urge all who share my concern to work earnestly in his support during the current campaign."

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By OP NARS, Date 4-2-82

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

I thought it might be helpful to you to have a copy of my rough notes from the meeting this afternoon, and am attaching them herewith.

Attachment

EYES ONLY

NOTES FROM MEETING OF JULY 21, 1972

It was agreed that the basic point to make is that we believe this is a time when issues are too important for partisan, political treatment. We are not dividing the country, all are welcome in support of our new coalition. The vocal raucous minority that nominated McGovern will be answered by the great silent majority that support our team.

Suggestions on how to handle some of the things that come up:

1. Never mention the Vice Presidential candidate. Always take on McGovern directly -- totally ignore Eagleton.
2. It's important not to make the Vice President the issue. Don't give them the ammunition. Be hard-hitting on the issues, but avoid becoming the subject of controversy.
3. Regarding the press -- Ignore their existence, let others take them on. Possibly make a complete twist and make the point specifically that the idea the Administration is anti-press is wrong.

4. Regarding McGovern -- Avoid making a martyr of him by characterizing him in any way.
5. Praise the President and his initiatives and kick the opponent for his bad ideas, but stay with McGovern's original positions. Don't take him on for changing his views, don't let him off the hook of his extreme positions.
6. Develop a contrast with Eagleton who is basically a smart aleck by a basic show of dignity, stability, responsibility, avoiding any crownish appearance, but using a little humor to kid yourself. Let the Democrats, labor people, veterans, etc., cut up McGovern and Eagleton personally, but don't do it ourselves. Stay on what McGovern has said and why it's dangerous.
7. No discussion in any form regarding a candidacy in '76. Make the point that the job at hand is to end in '72.
8. Make a positive point of talking to people while maintaining dignity. Do some unscheduled drop-bys. Get pictures at the fence in other situations with people. Stay around after a rally or a dinner and shake hands for a while so the media can't say that you are aloof.

Over-rule the Secret Service. Don't let them keep you away from people because they have a different goal than you do. Do some unexpected things that will get played up in the media.

9. Go hard on the issues. Be tough, but avoid personalities. Be outgoing with people, but retain dignity.

10. Work on the three areas in which the President cannot work. First, concentrate on ethnics, labor groups, and that sort of potential. Second, take up the slack on party activities which the President cannot do. Don't overload the schedule with this kind of thing, but do the important events. Still take the nonpartisan line, even at party activities regarding the open door. Third, get Senate and House members in on a regular basis and just talk to them. The President can't do this. Hear their beefs, talk a little politics, ask about the issues.

11. The true Democrats today are homeless. They have been driven out by the McGovernites. Make this point to the Republicans, especially in the South -- that we've got to let the Democrats in.

12. In all speeches, regardless of subject, spend at least five minutes on foreign policy and hit this point hard, because it's our best issue.

13. Never miss a chance to hit marijuana, amnesty, and the other key bad positions of McGovern's.

14. Their major effort will be to get off the bad points that they are on now. Our job is to make sure they don't succeed in doing this.

HRH
July 21, 1972

HRH:kb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

HFU 7/28 MS
de this est. 3
ger name.
yes
7/26

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

July 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT:

Governor Whitcomb Telephone Call

Governor Whitcomb called you this morning to ask for a meeting with the President. He wants to discuss the request by several Indianapolis people that he address the RNC Convention on behalf of a Vice Presidential candidate other than Agnew. Yet Whitcomb favors Agnew; he claims he is caught as the Chairman of the Indiana delegation.

I told the Governor the President was not having any political meetings, and so that a meeting with him would probably not be possible. Whitcomb accepted that.

Whitcomb would not elaborate on this Vice Presidential challenge which he referred to as the "Indianapolis Situation".

Recommendation:

- or John Mitchell

That Clark MacGregor be asked to call Governor Whitcomb to obtain more of the facts and to prevent any further request for a meeting with you.

H. Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comments _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: July 18, 1972

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Although you don't usually see individual state polls, you may be interested in this Texas poll from Finch which shows McGovern ahead of the President. You may want to discuss this with Connally.

**The
Texas
Poll**

THE STATEWIDE SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION

Report #834

*Belden is one of the
Consistently Best State
Pollsters!!*

Release Monday, July 10, 1972

McGOVERN'S CHANCES AGAINST NIXON IN TEXAS BETTER THAN EVEN;
CONNALLY WOULD ADD LITTLE TO REPUBLICAN TICKET

To Belden

By Joe Belden
Director, The Texas Poll

If the Democrats nominate Senator George McGovern for president at their convention this week, his chances of carrying Texas in November against President Richard Nixon are today slightly better than even.

And if Nixon should select the state's man of the hour, John Connally, as his vice presidential running mate, little might be gained by the Republicans.

Those are the highlights from the latest Texas Poll, completed a few days ago across the state, a study that reveals two paradoxes underlining the realities of party politics. First, while McGovern displays the ability to sneak the state away from Nixon -- just the way Hubert Humphrey did in 1968 -- the senator from South Dakota is far from being the most popular nominee among Texans. Second, while the survey shows that Connally would add only insignificantly to the Nixon ticket, the former governor is Texans' top choice for vice president.

Interviewers asked a representative cross section of adults 18 or older to select their current choice from two hypothetical presidential and vice presidential tickets: Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew for the Republicans versus George McGovern and Edmund Muskie for the Democrats. They were also asked to name a choice with the names the same except that Agnew was replaced by John Connally as the Republican candidate for vice president.

These were the results on the first selection, among people who say they are voters:

Nixon-Agnew	44%
McGovern-Muskie	51
Neither	3
Undecided	2

(More)

Each Texas Poll report is based on face-to-face interviews made in all sections of the state by a permanent staff of 150 trained interviewers using a uniform questionnaire. From 1000 to 2000 persons are usually included in each sampling, never less than 500. The cross section of interviews is controlled so that correct proportions are included as to sex, age, race, socio-economic level, region of the state, and place of residence: farms, ranches, villages, towns, and cities. The Texas Poll was established in 1940 and is supported by the newspapers that publish its results.

When Connally was substituted, these were the replies:

Nixon-Connally	45%
McGovern-Muskie	49
Neither	3
Undecided	3

A previously-reported Texas Poll finding has been that, given a free choice, only about one Texan in ten selects McGovern for president, Nixon and George Wallace being far more popular.

Interviewers also asked this open-choice question: "Whom would you like to see elected vice president of the United States in the general election in November?" with these results among voters:

John Connally	22%
Edward Kennedy	15
Spiro Agnew	12
Hubert H. Humphrey	12
George Wallace	9
Edmund Muskie	8
George McGovern	6
Wilbur Mills	2
Others	1
Undecided	13

The battleground in Texas between the two major parties is primarily among those voters who are traditional Democrats. A breakdown of these self-styled Democrats shows that currently about seven out of ten would vote for a McGovern-Muskie ticket. The addition of Connally to the Nixon camp would cause only about 2 percent to defect to the Republicans. But none of this takes the coming campaign into account.

One of the sharpest divisions of opinion in Texas that the presidential race may bring out is along racial lines. This is the current vote using Nixon-Agnew against McGovern-Muskie:

	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Demo.</u>
Anglo Americans	52%	42
Blacks	8%	88
Mexican Americans	23%	70

(The remainder from 100 percent in each line goes to "neither" and "undecided.")

An analysis by age, however, fails to show any great differences in support between the two parties, the Democrats generally holding a lead among young and old alike.

This Texas Poll was conducted between June 21 and July 1, being based on 1,031 interviews made in all parts of the state.

TALKING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT

MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT
AND BOB HALDEMAN ON
POLITICAL STRATEGY

BACKGROUND

At your direction, Bob Haldeman has called the Vice President and asked him to come over to discuss campaign strategy, particularly in terms of issues, activities, and generally what the Vice President should be doing between now and the Convention. Mr. Haldeman will be the only person sitting in on this meeting, and the Vice President will have had no time to prepare. This meeting should give you the opportunity to outline in specific as well as general terms how the Vice President should operate over the next four months.

TALKING POINTS

1. I have been discussing with Bob Haldeman my schedule as well as the family schedule, and I told Bob that I want the same planning to go into your schedule as goes into mine and my family's. Obviously we want to dovetail events and activities in order to realize the maximum benefit from every appearance of any one of us.
2. I have been talking with some of the political operatives here and at the Committee with regard to activities in which you and I should be engaged between now and the Convention. Polls that have been taken show that there are four crucial issues that are of concern to the electorate:
 - (a) The Administration's success in obtaining a just peace in Vietnam.
 - (b) Drug/crime.
 - (c) Cost of Living (George Meany).
 - (d) Busing (on a regional basis).

TALKING PAPER

~~TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH~~
Points to cover with THE VICE PRESIDENT *re Schedule.*

BACKGROUND

In order to involve you right from the start when the President meets with the Vice President to discuss the Vice President's posture between now and the campaign, it is recommended that you make the initial telephone call setting up the meeting. You would sit in on the meeting and then have the opportunity to follow up and involve members of your staff with the Vice President and his staff. As a result of that meeting, another talking paper will be developed for your subsequent meeting with the Vice President.

You will call the Vice President approximately 15 minutes before his meeting with the President. The purpose of this short notice is so that the Vice President will come in to the meeting cold, without any staff accompanying him, and be told what it is that the President expects of him.

TALKING POINTS

1. Mr. Vice President, the President would like you to come over in 10 or 15 minutes to discuss some political items on which he has been working. I'll be sitting in on the meeting, but the main purpose is to have a closed session between you and the President so that there can be a free exchange of ideas.
2. I am not sure precisely what the President wishes to discuss, but it probably will touch on the coordinated program for Administration speakers, including the President, First Family, and you, which is currently under development.

2. The strategy that I should be exercising should be to maintain a non-political posture, speaking moderately about issues, and carefully selecting the forums to which I speak. I plan on engaging in no overt political activities between now and the campaign.

3. There are a number of groups throughout the country where you have ~~great strength and~~ ^{particular} ~~Although they may be in the Democratic quarter now,~~ ^{they may} ~~will come over to our side~~ ^{soon} next November were you to approach them. ~~I noted with great interest the tremendous reception you received with the police group in New York City.~~ Other groups to which you have a terrific appeal include blue collar workers, certain Union groups, and members of ethnic groups. You are able to relate to them and they, in turn, have a respect for you as a man of candor.

4. Certain polls indicate that much of the so-called "anti-establishment vote" that Governor Wallace received in Florida and Wisconsin came from this middle-America section I just described.

5. Bob and some of the scheduling group have been working on a calendar of events that integrates activities of all of us, including other Administration spokesmen. Some of the events that I would like you to take on are outlined on this calendar (specific schedule suggestions attached).

6. ^{The President has asked to} ~~I have told Bob to have one of our top people assigned to you to assist in the planning and execution of your outside speaking engagements. Meanwhile, they tell me that you've got a good man working over in your intergovernmental relations section by the name of Jim Kolstad. At the present time he is setting up the Austria portion of my USSR trip for me, but you should use him after he returns in late May.~~

7. I feel that the moderate but firm approach you have been taking in your recent speeches has been extremely good. I wonder how you can reach more people and more groups without spending all of your time making public appearances. I have found myself that it is a waste of my time to sit through an entire dinner of three hours just to give a 10-minute speech. Rather, I arrive during dessert, make my remarks, and leave after 10 minutes, thus saving a good deal of time that can be put against other events.

8. The Democrats will be tearing themselves apart for the next few months as they approach their primary, but they will be throwing some barbs at us. I feel that we should not respond directly to such attacks by words, but by deeds, standing on the successful record that we have. What are your thoughts on this?
9. I wanted Bob Haldeman to be here at this meeting so that he could hear firsthand your views and thoughts. I would like to have Bob work with you now on specific details for implementing some of the ideas we have discussed today. Bob--I want you to make sure that your staff is giving full attention to the Vice President's activities and is lending full support to the Vice President and his staff. Make sure that you give the Vice President more input on what I and all the others are doing. Sit down with some of our people and go over the highlights of what we have discussed today, come up with a plan, and discuss this again with the Vice President in a few days. We have made a good start, but I want to make sure that we have good, effective follow-through.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN **G**
SUBJECT: Campaign Direct Mail

Magruder is asking whether a direct mail letter over the President's signature can be considered for the campaign. He claims he is under severe time pressure or I wouldn't have forwarded this to you without complete staffing.

I believe such a letter would be a mistake. It raises the President's campaign profile too high. It demeans the Presidency. It cannot be self-laudatory, harshly critical of McGovern's issue stands, or "political" enough to accomplish the goal of getting the President's voters to the polls.

G → Reiser 7/19

NO!

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

July 14, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT: Direct Mail

In our planning for direct mail, several of our people have suggested that a letter signed by the President would be more effective than any other approach. Such a letter would be "Presidential" in tone, and printed on official-type letterhead. The notation, "Not printed at government expense" would be included at the bottom of the page.

These would be computer letters, with personalized inside address and salutation. The first and last paragraphs would be standard, but interval paragraphs might be varied to reflect specific issues of interest to each voter segment.

It is now contemplated to send such letters to Democrats and Independents in priority precincts of the target states. The objective would be to exert strong influence on potential ticket splitters early in the campaign -- about mid-September. Although the mailings are several weeks in the future, we must commit on paper very soon. The paper for this mailing would be of a higher quality than that used for other mailings. If it were procured now, but not used as proposed, it could be sold back to the vendor, or applied to other mailings. Either option would incur some moderate cost. At the appropriate time, the proposed text of the letters and the areas to be mailed would be prepared for review before the President's signature is obtained. A small test mailing to one market will also be proposed, to measure any possible negative factors before the total mailing is committed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The purpose of this memo is to solicit an indication that a campaign mailing bearing the President's signature can be considered, so that the long lead-time procurement can begin, if appropriate.

Agree that the option of a mailing signed by the President should remain open and that procurement should proceed on that basis.

Agree _____ Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

July 14, 1972 ✓

TO:

HAH
~~GORDON STRACHAN~~ H

FROM:

L. High
~~PHIL JOANOU~~ ~~Jordan~~ ~~St~~ ~~Hubert~~

SUBJECT:

Campaign Materials

Attached is a photostat of the campaign materials catalog. This is the catalog that will be sent to all state chairmen, and contains the materials that will be available to them. There are some corrections in the catalog, which ~~we~~ have made in red. Also attached is a notebook containing photographs of the promotional items. The cover will be done in color, as will the first page showing a picture of the President.

~~We are aware of earlier comments on the use of the flag, and hope this treatment will be found acceptable.~~

If it is at all possible, I would appreciate getting this catalog back Monday evening in order to review it with Clark MacGregor Tuesday morning.

cc: Pete Dailey

P. Joanou

July 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

Get me a report on the Campaign materials situation, particularly, bumper strips and buttons. We are to drop the use of the "Re-Elect the President" immediately and go with the little gold "N"s, the flags, the President Nixon bumper strip and the Nixon now bumper strip.

We should concentrate on getting our new ones out quickly, especially in the primary states where there are a lot of McGovern bumper stickers out now. We need to do this to counteract the McGovern bandwagon effect immediately.

HRH:kb

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J Mac". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "J" and a horizontal line extending to the right.

ACTION MEMORANDUM

MacGregor should get all of the organization together and make the point to them of the danger of our troops picking up enemy quotes such as the idea of while McGovern can't win it that Nixon can lose it. We must not play the enemy line. We must be up-beat.

We've got to get away from our obsession of berating everything we do. We should not get into any fights inside and within ourselves.

HRH
July 13, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1972

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: L. HIGBY *L*
SUBJECT: Wallace

Gordon Strachan reports that MacGregor, Mitchell and LaRue are working with Eastland -- and -- a couple of Eastland's major contributors are going to act as emissaries to Wallace. They are now in the process today of trying to set up a meeting.

Gordon will keep us advised.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: L. HIGBY
SUBJECT: Ziegler Line to Press

Ron Ziegler asked that you discuss two questions with the President regarding the line he will take this evening.

1. Did the President watch the acceptance speech?

Ziegler suggests that we say that he did.

2. What is the President's reaction to the selection of the Vice Presidential candidate and the ticket in general?

Ziegler suggests that we say something to the effect of, "The President followed the Convention with interest, but had no specific comment."

NOTE: Ziegler indicated that you run the fine line between no comment which suggests an uptightness and some brief, but noncommittal, relaxed comment. He requested that you discuss this with the President, or perhaps, the President would want to call him and discuss it directly. Also, he said we may want to get some of our people back East thinking about what the most appropriate response would be.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY



July 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Attached Two Memos

In talking with the President this morning, he told me he had had a full report from you on the meeting with Connally yesterday. He also indicated he had talked to Connally, but didn't tell me any of the conversation, nor obviously did I ask. I did explain to the President the "chicken and egg" dilemma the Connally situation created. I also told the President I was preparing a memo which might be helpful to him before his meeting with Connally, which he said he would like to have; attached is an indepth account of our meeting yesterday and also a memo that briefly reports the current status of Democrats for Nixon. You might wish to go over some of these points with the President before he meets with Connally. We do have a real problem in getting this off the ground and in finding out exactly where Connally stands. Clark and I both feel very strongly that we need a formal organization announced as early as possible, preferably with Connally, but if not with Connally, then without him. Until we have his answer, however, we obviously are in limbo.

EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with John Connally, Clark McGregor and
Charles Colson, July 11, 1972

Conclusions:

1. Connally honestly wants and needs a rest.
2. Despite whatever else he may say, he is keenly interested in his own future and I do not believe he is ruling out any options. He is very anxious to know what the President wants from him in the way of future assignments, and in my opinion would jump at the prospect of being on the ticket this year.
3. Understands fully the dilemma of Democrats for Nixon, is happy that we have not set up an organization, he does not want to be handed a "fait accompli" but at the same time realizes we need to get the organization set up and running immediately and agrees completely with the strategy of getting the Democratic endorsements now. In short, he totally understands the difficult situation we are in, but he is not ready to make his own decision.
4. If he assumes the chairmanship of Democrats for Nixon, he wants it to be a real campaign, well financed; he wants to play a major role and wants to be damn sure he has complete control in the areas for which he is responsible.

A more detailed summary of the meeting is attached.



Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

July 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with John Connally, Clark MacGregor
and Charles Colson, July 11, 1972

MacGregor opened the session by explaining how he wants to take over the campaign, the things the President had discussed with him, the steps that he, MacGregor, was taking to reorganize the Committee to Re-Elect the President, the general situation politically around the country. He then discussed the importance of the Democrats for Nixon effort. MacGregor said he was very hopeful that John Connally would agree to be the head of our national effort in this area. I then explained all of the Democratic support we expected to get -- Teamsters, other major labor leaders (Connally expressed some surprise over some of the names), leading Jews, businessmen and politicians. Several times during the conversation, Connally came back to this point wanting to be sure we really had the people lined up that we said we did.

I explained the dilemma we were in, that we had good people ready to go, in fact eager to, but we were reluctant to create any organizational framework until we found out what interests Connally had in this area and obviously if Connally was interested in this area, we would not set up anything that didn't have his complete approval. He seemed very appreciative of this point and also said he understood the dilemma completely. He further said he felt it was important to move fast and to get Democrats defecting while their passions were aroused as they are now. In short, he felt we shouldn't wait, that we should move out immediately but also expressed appreciation for our not moving until he could be involved. I used the Paulucci example saying that we were holding him at bay, not accepting his \$1 million because we didn't know if Connally would want Paulucci involved.

We also discussed the difficulty of getting defections without having a place for the defectors to go. In the case of labor there is no problem. Unions can announce their own endorsements and their leadership can announce their personal endorsements. The same is true for politicians, like Rizzo. But someone not in a public office has an entirely different problem. I used the illustration of John Kenney, who was formerly Jackson's campaign treasurer, former Democratic National Committeeman from Washington, D. C. and former Under Secretary of the Navy. He wants to support Nixon but feels that it would be highly presumptuous to call a press conference to do so, that he, in effect, is just an ordinary citizen. If, however, he could announce as a member of the Board of Directors of Democrats for Nixon, there would be a plausible reason for a public statement. I also pointed out that in a few weeks Kenney might be taken in by McGovern, whereas today we have him. Hence the need to have an organized plan, people in place and an operation functioning.

Clark talked about his conversation with Dwayne Andreas, the fact that the Democrats operation was as important as anything we would have in the campaign and that in his judgment, a view he was sure the President shared, that Connally was the only man who could do this. At a number of points in the conversation, Connally kept saying, "Are we sure there isn't anyone else who could do this?". He several times expressed concern over his need to begin making money again, his plans to go back to the law firm, but to retain sufficient personal freedom to be able to campaign, the need to maintain an apartment in Washington and, as he put it a myriad of other mundane details. He also said that if he were to take the operation over, he would want to run it himself; he had not gotten where he is in life by allowing other people to make mistakes for him. If mistakes are made, it would be because Connally made it on his own behalf. He indicated that he would want to assume full responsibility for the South and the Southwest, would want to handle money, advertising and organization. He felt the effort would demand at least \$2 to \$3 million and MacGregor assured him those funds would be available.

At several points in the conversation, Connally asked what kind of campaign the President wanted. MacGregor spent a considerable amount of time explaining this, the gist of which was the President, in MacGregor's view, would not start campaigning until Halloween, that he would concentrate on being President, using the advantages of the office and letting surrogates handle the heavy load of campaigning. Connally kept asking

who would attack McGovern. I didn't make the point that Connally would be the best man for fear of turning Connally off. I did make the point that we would be hitting very hard on the issues, that we would not be attacking McGovern personally, but cutting his positions hard and all of our speakers would have to assume responsibility for this.

At 3 or 4 times during the meeting, Connally said, "When I do this..." or "The way I am going to run this is...". At several points I thought he was on the verge of saying yes. Needless to say, neither Clark nor I put it to him that hard to force an answer. At the end of the meeting, he said he never made decisions when he was tired and that therefore he didn't feel he could make a decision until he had had a little rest. He agreed, however, with the point that MacGregor and I made that the best time for a press conference would be Friday or Saturday, immediately following his meeting with the President.

I made the point at least twice that it was my idea to raise the issue with Connally simply because I felt we were under enormous time pressures, but I realized full well that the discussion should have taken place exclusively between the President and Connally. Each time I raised it, Connally demured and said he did not stand on protocol and in some ways preferred it this way because he could talk frankly and kick around the pros and cons. He also said he was glad to have time to think it through. I told him that we were frankly jumping the gun simply because we were getting so many urgent appeals from Democrats and we didn't want to accept support until after it had been discussed with Connally, but at the same time not lose it by delaying. He agreed with both points.

After MacGregor left, I deliberately stayed behind for a few minutes and said to Connally that I personally had very warm feelings for him, that I had no idea what his interests were in the future, but I didn't think anything that Clark or I were suggesting would in any way hurt Connally in the future; that in my opinion, a very historic political re-alignment was taking place, that Nixon was building a new coalition. The point I made was that whatever his interests are in the future, I felt it would not be detrimental to be part of the effort to build a new political

alliance, which I felt we had the opportunity to do this year. Connally said he had no personal ambitions of any kind but that he agreed with my analysis that we are on the verge of a massive change in political allegiances around the country and that the President could very well be the architect of a new majority in this country. He then asked me what the President meant in his last press conference when he said that he had another assignment for Connally in mind. I told him that I had never discussed that question with the President and that I didn't know, but that I knew for a fact that the President thought that Connally was one of the very few people who would have the courage to do the things that had to be done in the Government and I thought his remark that Connally was able to do anything in Government was very significant and reflected how highly the President regarded Connally. Connally said he thought the remark was very important; he had read the President's press conference very carefully, particularly the remarks about the Vice Presidency. He then said that, "Of course the President has no choice with respect to Agnew. I assume the reason he went through the answers he did was to get back at Agnew because he was still mad at the comment that Agnew made about a Democrat not running on a Republican ticket." I told Connally I had no idea, that this was one subject I had never discussed with the President, that a President always has all of his options open, especially this President, but that since the subject had never come up when I was present, I really couldn't cast any light on it. I simply said again how highly the President regards Connally and that whatever the President said, I am sure he said with great deliberatness. Several times Connally commented about the specific language the President used in his last press conference with regard to the Vice Presidency. Connally said he might like to talk to me again today, but in any event he would be in touch before leaving the city and that he would want to do anything that the President wanted him to do to be of help in getting the President re-elected which he felt was the most important thing he could do. I haven't the slightest doubt but that Connally was fishing with respect to what I could tell him on his future and in my opinion he is greatly interested personally in his own future, specifically this year.

PS1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 7/12

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

This is one of two copies of the Convention Program. 10,000 copies will be printed for the Convention.

The text has been cleared by Price, the Domestic Council (Harper) and the NSC (Lehman).

Dick Moore has the final word on all pictures used in the Campaign. He has vetoed three in this book which are marked.

Timmons is still trying to get the cover changed to correspond with your views on the flag.

6 → Moore 7/25 / L 7/24-H - OK to go out, no
A or D, just out

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Date: 7/12

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

By not watching the Democratic
Convention until 3:20 a.m. PDT
you missed this scene.

UPI-244

(GAY)

MIAMI BEACH--THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION EARLY TODAY SHOUTED DOWN A PROPOSAL TO ENDORSE HOMOSEXUALITY IN ITS PLATFORM BUT ONLY AFTER GIVING THE GAY LIBERATION MOVEMENT ITS FIRST FULL HEARING AT A NATIONAL CONVENTION.

THE PROPOSED ADDITION TO THE PLATFORM WAS REJECTED AFTER CATHY WILCH, A MEMBER OF THE PLATFORM COMMITTEE FROM OHIO, SAID ITS APPROVAL WOULD "INVITE THE RIDICULE OF THIS NATION."

BEFORE THE VOTE, TWO DELEGATES WHO ARE AVOWED HOMOSEXUALS PLEADED FOR APPROVAL OF THE MEASURE.

"WE HAVE SUFFERED THE GAMUT OF REPRESSION FROM BEING TOTALLY IGNORED AND RIDICULED TO HAVING OUR HEADS SMASHED AND OUR BLOOD SPILLED IN THE STREETS," SAID MADELINE DAVIS OF BUFFALO WHO DESCRIBED HERSELF AS "A WOMAN ... AND A LESBIAN."

JAMES FOSTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALLED ON THE "WHITE, AFFLUENT, MALE, HETROSEXUAL POWER STRUCTURE" TO PERMIT HOMOSEXUALS TO PURSUE THEIR OWN LIFESTYLES.

"THE 20 MILLION GAY MEN AND WOMEN ARE LOOKING FOR A POLITICAL PARTY THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO THEIR NEEDS," FOSTER SAID.

AFTER THE VOTE, GAY ACTIVISTS KISSED AND HUGGED EACH OTHER IN THE CONVENTION'S SPECTATORS SECTION.

7-12--LZ527A

UPI-246

-\$\$ 1 GAY MIAMI BEACH

THE GAY LIBERATION, REPRESENTED BY A DOZEN PEOPLE IN BLEACHERS IN ONE CORNER OF THE HALL, DEBATED NEARBY DELEGATES ON THE PLANK. THE EXHCNAGE BECAME HEATED AT TIMES, AND THE GAYS CHANTED, "JUSTICE NOW, JUSTICE NOW." ONE SPECTATOR WAS OVERCOME WITH EMOTION AND TURNED AWAY. FINALLY, HE TURNED BACK TOWARD THE HALL AND THE GROUP EXCHANGED KISSES AND HUGS.

7-12--LZ530A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 7/8 ✓

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Shultz sent you copies of these letters between McGovern and the Retail Grocers. Buchanan has copies for his McGovern file. The interesting note is the McGovern apology for the letter and the retracting telegram.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN
CHUCK COLSON
VAN SHUMWAY

FROM:

RAY PRICE *ray*

I think you will find this exchange of letters to be most interesting.

Attachments

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: RAY PRICE
FROM: DAVE GERGEN 
SUBJECT: McGovern Gaffe

Someday when you think our staff work has hit its sloppiest nadir, you might recall this exchange of letters between the retail grocers and McGovern.

I talked this morning with Frank Register to confirm the authenticity of the letters before circulating them. He informs me that they were genuine and that he was so taken aback that he sent the McGovern letter to his board of directors and since that time the letter has "caused an awful lot of comment in the food industry."

As a result, he continued, the McGovern office called him to apologize and on June 23 he received a telegram from the Senator saying that the letter was "unauthorized and ill advised" and praising the independent food stores as "one of the last bastions of free enterprise." McGovern's office apparently admitted they didn't know who Register represented; they also did not disclaim the original nor its signature, but said that the Senator didn't write it.

cc: Roland Elliott

TIFFANY & CO.
FIFTH AVENUE & 57TH STREET
NEW YORK 10022

WALTER HOVING
CHAIRMAN

June 29, 1972

Dear Mr. President:

I'm enclosing herewith
xeroxes of two letters. The
second letter signed by
George McGovern is a honey.

I never in my life
have read a letter that
showed more arrogance,
conceit and impertinence.

With all kind wishes,



WORKING COPY

May 22, 1972

Senator George McGovern
United States Senator from South Dakota
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator McGovern:

In yesterday's news telecasts, you were shown endorsing Caesar Chavez and the lettuce boycotts.

I would suggest that you consider this position carefully from a number of standpoints. Under existing law, such boycotts are clearly illegal. Secondly, the pattern established in the grape boycotts was one of damage and destruction to innocent third parties--in this instance, retailers who have no way of knowing who is right in a labor dispute many miles away. Thirdly, such tactics, if successful, result in increased costs which mean increased prices, a subject which I know is of concern to you.

Sincerely,

Frank D. Register
Executive Director

FDR/cms

WORKING COPY

June 1, 1972

Dear Mr. Register:

Thank you very much for your recent letter.

You should know, Mr. Register, that I have competent legal advice and you need not worry about me on that score.

Your reference to innocent third parties was intriguing to say the least. If you are suggesting that retail grocers are under any definition of the term "innocent," I would be surprised. It may interest you to know that I am fully aware of the monopoly meat and other commodity pricing practices of the chain stores. I am also aware of rate of return on your investment.

You may be sure, Mr. Register, that when I am President suits will no longer be brought by stockmen, egg producers and others, but by the Attorney General of the United States.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

George McGovern

Frank D. Register
Executive Director
National Association of Retail
Grocers of the U.S., Inc.
Suite 620
2000 Spring Road
Oak Brook, Illinois 60521

TIFFANY & CO.
FIFTH AVENUE & 57TH STREET
NEW YORK 10022



The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.



Committee
for the Re-election
of the President

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920

July 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: CLARK MacGREGOR
SUBJECT: Campaign Progress

In your recent discussions with me you indicated concern and gave me direction in several key areas. In my first days as Campaign Director, I have reviewed your areas of concern along with other aspects of the campaign, held discussions with John Mitchell, taken steps to deal with the most serious problems, and developed a plan of action to guide further efforts. This memo comments on the actions taken and outlines my future plans.

FIELD OPERATIONS

You felt there was a decided lack of progress in the critical task of building grass roots organizations in the States able to implement basic registration, identification, and get-out-the-vote drives. You also indicated concern about certain personnel in this area and felt there was a lack of overall direction. My initial review confirmed that the situation was at least as bad as you feared, and I have taken the following steps:

1. Appointed Fred Malek as Deputy Campaign Director with overall responsibility for field operations and Citizens activities.
2. Made it clear to all concerned that basic field organization efforts were my highest priority and that Fred had my full backing in strengthening our State organizations and getting the voter contact programs off the ground. This was done through a staff meeting, individual conversations, and with the Press.
3. Asked Bob Mardian to confine his activities full time to the DNC lawsuit, working with Fred LaRue. Bob is considering doing this or resigning altogether, and my guess is that he will leave.
4. Requested through Fred Malek that Harry Flemming leave the Committee. Harry has agreed to this without acrimony, and his resignation for personal reasons will be announced next week.

5. Called or wired all State Chairmen, emphasizing my expectations for intensified State activities and notifying them of my new appointments.
6. Ordered a complete review of all State budgets with the aim of finalizing them by July 15th. At present only 25 have been approved, and the budgets do not cover the areas of highest priority.
7. Arranged for closer relationships between RNC and 1701 field operations. In effect, Tom Evans has agreed that his Deputy along with other RNC field personnel would work for Fred on the Presidential campaign, and we would especially ensure a closer tie-in at the State level.
8. Solidified a basic approach to field operations, developed a plan of action for strengthening State operations, and identified initial candidates for key field positions. This is covered in more detail at Tab A and is worthy of your review. My future plans here are also covered at Tab A.

WOMEN'S PROGRAM

You indicated concern over the scope of the women's program, particularly whether we were effectively reaching the average homemakers across the country. I spent two hours with Pat Hutar reviewing her program. My conclusions were that she is doing a fine job of recruiting women volunteers for the State campaigns but an inadequate job of attracting top level, non-partisan women to your support. To begin rectifying this, I have taken the following steps:

1. Asked Pat Hutar to recruit past Presidents of leading women's organizations (e. g., Soroptimists, Junior League, General Federation of Women's Clubs) plus other women leaders to a National and State Advisory Committees for the Campaign. Her deadline is to have identified and invited these women by July 15th, and they will be used to get members of their organizations involved in the campaign.
2. Proposed a program for getting my wife, Barbara, along with wives of Cabinet Officers and senior White House staff to barnstorm various States during the campaign. Basically, the concept is that a trio of wives (representing the Cabinet, White House, and campaign) would hedgehop across a State each week recruiting

volunteers and talking to large groups of women about their families and their husbands' roles. I have asked Mrs. Hutar for a comprehensive, fully costed program by July 20th.

3. Requested that Mrs. Hutar and Barbara Franklin submit to me by July 22nd a comprehensive proposal for further reaching the women voters by broadening our approach and focusing on the average, non-partisan woman voter.

I am convinced that more yet needs to be done to attract the woman voter, and I intend to give continuing attention to this crucial area.

TAKING CONTROL AND TIGHTENING UP

In addition to the above, I have taken a number of other steps to assert my control over the organization. At the same time I have rejected, at least for now, several more dramatic moves (e.g., salary cuts) that could have a counter-productive impact on morale at this time. The actions taken included:

1. Designated Jeb Magruder as a Deputy Campaign Director with responsibility for his current activities (e.g., advertising, polling, research, administration). Also redesignated Fred LaRue as Special Assistant to the Campaign Director. These men have performed well, and their appointments preserve continuity.
2. Held a staff meeting Monday to lift the spirits of the organization and assert my priority on field operations.
3. Had Malek, Magruder, and Colson review the Democrats for Nixon program and intensify their efforts. A tentative selection has been made of an Executive Director, and Ed Failor has been assigned the responsibility of developing and implementing a comprehensive, hard-hitting program.
4. Let it be known that I expected a general belt tightening, especially around national headquarters. Included here is reducing the number of State people coming in for planning meetings (savings of \$25,000), suggesting longer hours for all personnel, and the personnel moves already discussed. I am considering further moves such as cutting the budget for Headquarters personnel by 10%.

PUBLIC ROLE

You asked me to spend more time as a spokesman. To this end, I have met with several groups of reporters, had an NBC interview Monday, and held a full press conference on Wednesday. I will be on the Today Show on Friday and on Face the Nation on Sunday. Further appearances are being developed, and I intend to maintain an active public schedule.

FUTURE PLANS

Our major efforts over the next month will be strengthening the field organization as outlined in the Tab A plan, further developing campaign strategy, preparing for the convention, and following through in other priority areas such as the women's program and Democrats for Nixon.

During the next week, I will spend a major amount of time with the State Chairmen who will be in Washington for final planning sessions. I intend to establish new relationships with them, emphasize the danger of complacency, and push them hard on the basic voter contact programs.

* * * *

Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to serve you in so meaningful an endeavor. The past few days have acquainted me with the enormity of the task ahead, but I am confident we can build the Committee and wage the strongest possible campaign.

Attachment

REVITALIZING THE FIELD ORGANIZATION

The central assignment of the Field Organization at 1701 is to organize the states so that they identify, register and turn out those voters favorable to you. You have expressed concern that the field organization is falling down on this assignment. Unfortunately, my discussions over the last few days indicate that your concern is more than justified. In fact, the situation is even worse than I expected it to be; and only fast, resolute, no holds barred action will get us back on track. After briefly summarizing the present situation, this memorandum outlines the action steps I feel are necessary to get the field organization moving. While the details of some of these steps may change as new facts come to light, I am sure the basic approach is sound.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

A reasonable goal for the field organization is to cover 60 to 65% of the precincts in the key states for voter identification, registration and turn out. In the non key states, a goal of 50% coverage, with the expectation that actual coverage will be nearer 40% is reasonable. Fortunately, core programs designed to assist the states in identifying, registering, and turning out favorable voters (e. g. , telephone, direct mail, and vote canvassing programs) have been developed both for the key states and the non key states. I have reviewed these programs and am satisfied that if implemented by the states, they will get the job done. Exhibit I is a more complete description of these programs.

Given the present circumstances in the field division, however, we would be fortunate to get these programs implemented in 10 to 20% of the precincts in the key states and less than 10% in the non key states. There is no need to review again how this came about, but I will summarize the specific problems caused by this situation to provide a perspective for judging the action steps proposed in the next section.

There are two basic problems which we must overcome:

1. The 1701 field division is poorly organized and does not have the resources necessary to implement the core programs in the states.
 - a. There are too few coordinators to organize the states and implement the core programs that have been developed and inadequate support staff for functions such as training. Also,

the workloads are out of balance. For example, one coordinator is responsible for handling five of the eleven key states.

- b. The 1701 budget procedures are in shambles. Only 25 of the 50 state budgets have been approved, and budgets do not include expenses necessary to establish a sound grassroots voter identification, registration and turn out effort.
- c. The states do not have campaign victory plans which set out the program, action steps and time tables we expect them to carry out.

2. Most of the state organizations are developing so slowly that they will not be able to begin implementing the core programs until mid-September, if then. Texas, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Michigan, California and Washington are of particular concern.

ACTION STEPS

In order to correct the problems confronting us in the field organization we intend to take these action steps:

1. Establish a field organization advisory group. Our internal strength will be operations and drive. To build in the political experience needed and, to lend weight to our field directors, we will form this advisory group. It would include seasoned political organizers such as Cliff White, Harry Dent, Chuck Colson, Al Abrahams, Len Hall, Ray Bliss, Steve Shattack, Steve Lampray, and Lee Nunn. This group would be used for two purposes:
 - a. To meet weekly at 1701 over a beer and sandwich supper to review and guide field organization plans, problems, progress and contemplated steps.
 - b. To serve in an advisory capacity to the field coordinators on specific problems in the states. Ideally each member of the advisory group would be a "Godfather" to one of the field coordinators, assisting him in working through problems, and handling difficult personalities in the states. The group will be formed and will begin meetings by August 1.

- c. Sell the Republican party and our volunteer force that the best political minds in the country are being brought to bear on their problems.

2. Reorganize the 1701 field headquarters to better carry out the task of setting up and giving guidance to the grassroots campaign in the states.

- a. Expand the field coordinator group from the present three to nine or ten. Exhibit II shows the tentative state groupings we expect to use. This expansion is necessary because the core programs are relatively complex and because we must telescope about four months work into the next thirty days if we are to get these programs off the ground.
- b. Bring in the most able men we can find to staff these coordinator jobs. I am using my recruiting group here at the White House, the RNC, and selected people at 1701 to identify men capable of playing this role. Exhibit III outlines the background of those men identified to date. I expect to begin my interviews on Saturday and the additional coordinators to be recruited and on board by July 14.
- c. Establish a new approach for working with the states. The 1701 coordinators will spend most of their time in the field. They will be in the office on Mondays to get general direction and strategy from Clark MacGregor and to meet individually with me on progress and problems within their states. They will spend Tuesday through Saturday in their states, pushing programs through to completion.
- d. Establish new budgeting procedures to set up budgets in those 25 states where there are none and to revamp those budgets which have been approved to date. The budget analysis has just begun, and thus we cannot yet outline the specific procedures at this time. It is already clear that we will need a full time budget officer in the field division at 1701 and we will have to streamline the present cumbersome system of budget guidelines and budget reviews. I have had an initial discussion with Maurice Stans on this problem, and we plan a wrap up budget review on July 15.

e. By July 31, take other necessary steps to:

1. Establish a training capability at 1701.
2. Cut short the state planning process.
3. Develop the capability to monitor the progress of the campaign efforts in the states.

3. Strengthen the state organizations. As mentioned in the previous section, the states are well behind in their efforts to develop effective grassroots organizations. In order to correct this, I will take the following steps.

- a. Evaluate the status of each state. This evaluation will include a look at the effectiveness of the state campaign management, the extent to which the state organization is in place, the budget, and any problems that need to be addressed in the state. I have started each coordinator on this evaluation and we expect to begin the review next Monday.
- b. Change state chairmen where necessary. Obviously, we want to minimize the number of changes for it is very late to attempt to build an organization from zero. But there are at least two chairmen in key states where we must seriously consider making a change - Tom Houser in Illinois and in Pennsylvania, where Arlen Specter is the chairman.
- c. Slot young, aggressive executive directors into these key states where our organization is lagging. Tentatively, we plan to put executive directors in Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, Washington. We plan to change the executive director in Pennsylvania. Finally, we are carefully reviewing California and Michigan to see if there are steps that can be taken to bolster those two organizations. Where possible, we would like the state chairmen to find and hire the executive directors. However, as part of the search effort for the additional field coordinators, I am also searching for men who would make suitable executive directors. Thus, if the states are not capable of finding suitable candidates, we can provide them so that within the next three weeks these men can be recruited, trained and put to work.
- d. Require each state to develop a headquarters staff to give direction and technical assistance to their county and city campaign managers in implementation of the grassroots programs.

- e. Instruct the state chairmen in the key states to hire fieldmen who would be assigned a specific key county. These men would be responsible for opening the storefront headquarters, for setting up the telephone operations, and for seeing that all operations county wide operate smoothly. Their assignment for the next four months would be to stay in that county to make the programs work there. Again, we would hope the state chairmen could find these men and bring them on board. To assure that this will happen, however, I have begun a search to locate some 40 or 50 men capable of handling this job. These men could be assigned as necessary to the states and should be recruited and on board by August 15.
4. Use every possible means to recruit the largest and most effective volunteer force ever assembled for a Presidential campaign. This will include pressing hard on all Voter Blocs and Citizens Groups to attract large numbers of volunteers in each state from their constituencies. All Voter Bloc and Citizens Directors will have this as their top priority and plans are underway to intensify these efforts. In addition, we will utilize national advertising to aid in volunteer recruitment.

The above steps and tight time tables will require the field organization to go on a war footing. I am sure, however, that they can be met and that we can recover the ground we have lost.

THE CORE PROGRAMS FOR
REGISTRATION, VOTER IDENTIFICATION AND VOTER TURN OUT

The purpose of our organizational activities in the field will be to:

1. Register all unregistered voters favorable to the President.
2. Identify favorable and undecided voters and record their names.
3. Use direct mail, telephone, and other persuasive devices to swing undecided voters to the President.
4. Make sure all favorable voters get to the polls on November 7th.

These programs should be carried out on a door to door basis in the priority areas of all states - where the President received 30% or better in the 1968 election. Besides identifying the favorables, the door to door volunteer will act as a sales force for the President. They will demonstrate support and enthusiasm for the Nixon Administration in every state.

In all eleven priority states, the state organization will be provided extra support for registration, voter identification, and turn out activities. Computer printouts of all registered voters will be provided in both street walking and alphabetical order. In addition, telephone banks will be established to supplement door to door activity.

The key to the successful operation of these programs will be the use of storefront headquarters in every priority county in America. Some larger counties will be sub-divided even further and several storefronts established. These headquarters should be opened after the convention and be fully staffed until election day. They will serve as the central coordinating point of all organizational activity.

As mentioned previously, priority states will be provided with computer canvass lists of registered voters. Non priority states will be given blank canvass sheets with a similar format that will allow the volunteer to record whether the person canvassed favors the President, is registered, will volunteer, etc. In addition, canvass kits with instructions will be provided to all states.

After establishing headquarters in priority centers or similar areas, the county or storefront staff should prioritize all precincts within its regions. Each precinct's canvass sheets and instructions should be placed in a canvass kit and in turn the canvass kit placed in an envelope with campaign materials. A precinct map and the precinct number should be attached.

Volunteers will be used to do precinct work in the following ways:

1. Assign a precinct canvass kit to a precinct captain who will come into the storefront headquarters and pick up his precinct kit and return the kit at a specified time.
2. Blitz - have all volunteers come to the headquarters at one specified time to receive instructions and kits. Have these volunteers return the kits at a specified time together.
3. Have the volunteers come in on an individual basis, give them brief instructions and ask them to return the kit at a specified time.

Depending upon the number of volunteers available, the following alternatives should be considered for door to door canvassing:

1. Canvass all households.
2. Canvass only registered voters.
3. Canvass only Democrats and Independents.

After the kits are returned to headquarters by the volunteers, appropriate chairmen should check for volunteers, those needing absentee ballots, and those who need to register. The election day chairman should start compiling lists for poll watching and get out the vote activities.

On or before election day, all favorable voters who have been identified should be contacted and reminded to vote.

In states where poll watching is appropriate, runners should return copies of poll watching lists to headquarters. Volunteers

then go door to door and telephone all favorables who have not voted and urge them to go to the polls.

The entire registration, voter identification and voter turn out program is based on the successful use of store-front headquarters for control and accountability. In addition, priority emphasis must be placed on recruiting volunteers before September who will make this program work.

TENTATIVE STATE GROUPINGS FOR
FIELD COORDINATOR ASSIGNMENTS

- | | | | |
|----|--|----|---|
| 1. | <u>California, Arizona, Nevada,</u>
<u>Utah, and Hawaii</u> | 7. | <u>Texas and the Deep South</u>
Texas
Florida
Georgia
Alabama
Louisiana
Mississippi
South Carolina
Arkansas |
| 2. | <u>New York and New Jersey</u> | | |
| 3. | <u>Pennsylvania and Delaware</u> | | |
| 4. | <u>New England and Illinois</u>
Illinois
Connecticut
New Hampshire
Vermont
Maine
Rhode Island
Massachusetts | 8. | <u>Farm States</u>
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
Kansas
Oklahoma
North Dakota
South Dakota |
| 5. | <u>Midwest</u>
Ohio
Michigan
Wisconsin
Indiana | 9. | <u>Northwest and the</u>
<u>Mountain States</u>
Washington
Oregon
Idaho
Montana
Colorado
Alaska |
| 6. | <u>Border States</u>
Maryland
Virginia
Kentucky
North Carolina
Tennessee
West Virginia | | |

POTENTIAL FIELD COORDINATORS

Albert E. Abrahams - Assistant Director for Congressional and Public Affairs, Cost of Living Council. Abrahams, age 48, has been actively involved with politics since 1953 when he served as Press Assistant & Legislative Assistant to the late U. S. Senator Robert C. Hendrickson. His past positions include Legislative Assistant to Sen. Clifford P. Case; Director, Washington office, Rockefeller for President Committee; Executive Director, Republican Citizens Committee; Executive Director, National Draft Rockefeller Committee; assisted in political campaigns of various elected officials and in 1967, formed his own campaign management firm. Abrahams is very bright, an excellent strategist and an outstanding politician.

A. Lamar Alexander, Jr. - Lawyer, Nashville, Tennessee. Alexander is in his early 30's and has had excellent political experience. He has served as Legislative Assistant to Senator Baker of Tennessee and headed up Governor Dunn's successful campaign for election in Tennessee. He is a real professional and an extremely capable young man. He has served at the White House and has excellent Republican credentials.

Robert E. Bradford - Administrative Assistant; Senator Bill Brock Bradford, age 41, has worked in the political area since 1958 when he joined Rep. Richard Poff as his A. A. He has since served as Executive Director, Illinois Republican State Central Committee and on a volunteer basis has been involved with the "Paul Revere Panels" (group of Republican Congressmen who toured mainly Democratic districts helping party candidates); Regional Field Director of Republican Congressional Committee that toured 18 states to help organize party campaigns; Region III Director of the Young Republicans. He is well respected on the Hill, is a good professional and would be willing to serve.

Richard B. Cheney - Assistant Director for Operations Review; Cost of Living Council. Cheney, age 31, has his Doctorate in Political Science and has been involved in politics since college. He has worked in the Wyoming State Legislature; in the Office of the Governor of Wisconsin; U. S. House of Representatives under Rep. William A. Steiger; and in 1969 joined Don Rumsfeld at the Office of Economic Opportunity. He has been working with Rumsfeld since that time and has moved with him from OEO to the White House and now to the Cost of Living Council.

Marvin Collins

Collins is a very heavy professional politician with tremendous experience. He managed both the Bush and Holten campaigns and would be extremely useful in Texas as he knows the state extremely well. He has excellent judgment and is very innovative.

Benjamin W. Cotten - Partner; Brault, Graham, Scott & Brault, Wash., D. C.

Cotten, age 35, has been an active Republican for many years and has held several offices in the Young Republicans both on the local and national levels. He has been involved in many campaign activities including speaking on various occasions in the Metropolitan Wash., D. C. area on behalf of the party ticket; Pre-convention - Field Representative & Assistant Director of Young Adults, United Citizens for Nixon/Agnew; Post-convention - Assistant National Field Director of United Citizens for Nixon/Agnew; Field operations director, Holton for Governor campaign, Campaign Manager, Echols for Senate Campaign. He is capable, bright and very knowledgeable in the political field.

Gordon Gooch - General Counsel; Federal Power Commission

Gooch, age 37, has outstanding political experience. Gooch has worked with George Bush in both his Senate and House races; served as General Counsel of the Harris County Republican Party and was responsible for the County Convention, including its organization, logistics, security and program; helped in organizing Senator Tower's campaign in 1966; headed County Ballot Security for the Nixon Campaign in 1968 and worked with Peter O'Donnell on the State Convention. Gordon has been asked to run for various public offices by party officials and is extremely well regarded in Texas. He is tremendously competent and would be willing to serve.

Ned Jennatta - Partner; William Blair & Company, Chicago, Illinois

Jennatta is a highly successful partner with William Blair & Co. in Chicago. He has had extensive political campaign experience in Illinois and ran Don Rumsfeld's first campaign for Congress. He is highly regarded by the Republicans in Illinois and described as being a superb professional.

William T. Kendall - Administrative Assistant; Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen

Kendall, age 51, has been with Rep. Frelinghuysen for the past ten years. He has run all of the Congressman's campaigns and has been extremely active in New Jersey politics. He has a tremendous amount of campaign experience and in addition has served as Rep. committeeman and precinct leader; Chairman of the Southeastern District, Morris County Republican Committee; Special Assistant to Chairman, Republican Congressional Campaign Committee. He comes highly recommended.

Robert Monks - Lawyer and Entrepreneur, Boston, Massachusetts

Monks, who is in his late 30's, is the recently defeated Republican candidate for the Senate seat in Maine. He established and maintained an excellent precinct organization for his campaign and displayed very good political judgment throughout his effort to unseat Senator Smith.

Richard D. Murray - Wisconsin District Director, SBA

Murray, age 34, was a Republican candidate for U. S. Representative, Second District, Wisconsin in 1968. He has long been active in Republican politics and has assisted in numerous political campaigns. He is highly regarded in

Wisconsin and at SBA where he has done an outstanding job.

Thomas Reed - Field Staff; Committee for the Re-election of the President
Reed was hired at the Committee by Bob Mardian. He is presently serving as Field Man for Texas and is doing an outstanding job. Prior to joining the Committee, he was a National Committeeman from California.

Richard Richards - Director, Political Division; RNC
Richards, age 40, has a very extensive background in politics. His past record includes such political activities as Past Chairman of Utah State YRs; Member, National Committee (1966-69); Chairman, Utah Delegation to National Convention in Miami Beach, 1968; Field Man for Sen. Wallace F. Bennett; Legislative Aide and Administrative Assistant to Cong. L. Burton of Utah; and Republican State Chairman of Utah. He has keen political instinct, good judgment and a sound knowledge of political campaigning.

Peter R. Sawers - Vice President; Robert H. Hayes & Associates, Inc., Chicago, Illinois. Sawers, age 38, has had excellent experience in political campaigns. Since 1961 he has served as Precinct Captain in Evanston Republican Organization; he was 50th Ward Chairman of the Rumsfeld for Congress Committee; Co-Chairman for Suburban Cook County in Percy's campaign for Governor; Campaign Manager, Rumsfeld for Congress Committee in 1966; Chairman for 6th, 10th and 13th Congressional Districts for both Primary and General Elections under Citizens for Nixon. Sawers is an excellent man, a superb politician and a tremendously effective individual.

Richard Thaxton - Director of Registration & Voter Turnout; RNC
Thaxton, age 30, has had extensive experience in political campaigns beginning with his volunteer work in Dallas, Texas while employed by the University Computing Company. He has served as Executive Secretary of the Colorado State Party and has done an outstanding job in his present position at the RNC.

Webster B. Todd, Jr. - Director of Senior Citizens; Committee for the Re-election of the President. Todd, age 34, is a very bright and competent young man who has had good political experience. He has been active in New Jersey politics serving as a member of the N. J. General Assembly in which capacity he served as Chairman, Taxation Committee; Member, Appropriations Committee; Member, Tax Exempt Study Commission; Chairman, Introduction of Bills Committee. Todd managed Ray Bateman's campaign for the N. J. State Senate and according to Bateman, ran the best organized county-wide campaign in the history of the county with Bateman's margin of victory being the largest ever in that county. He is an extremely effective organizer and has good administrative abilities.

H, L, FM, C Mac G in car

7/6

JM → H re memo not as bad as appears

H but tone of memo - drafted by FM

Can't cry "wolf"

H: JM + H Dept P for Campaign

Avoid the attempt at close

H took down FM list of field words

FM must contain outworded

Must treat people poli not

just hill ass.

Contrary to press reports JM did not

have direct contact w/P

during camp of '68 bec goal

of H + JM was to keep P out of camp



I assume that a low visibility schedule policy is generally in effect for the President; the purpose of this memorandum is to question the validity of some of the underlying assumptions of that policy in the light of several recent events. I think certain narrow exceptions to it are now justified and necessary.

We begin with the obvious: The President has unprecedented equity of China, USSR and the allied Summits.

The President's schedule must be designed, at optimum, to build equity, but at least not to permit undue loss. It is important to realize that loss not only occurs as a result of what the President does or does not do but, perhaps more importantly, because of what others do. He is the victim of imputed liability for the acts of the Committee, the Executive Branch, state organizations and even the wives of some of those agents.

So the problem is not merely to hold what we have by doing nothing. If we do nothing we lose, because collateral events will cost us something.

How to cut the collateral costs (e.g. the Watergate caper, Martha Mitchell, campaign funds disclosure and the

Ellsberg trial) is really a separate important subject. Suffice it to say that every one of these examples is a Mitchell subject and my confidence quotient in John is lower than it has been in a long time.

How to rebuild equity by doing things within our control is perhaps more important. We should analyze the nature of the losses we are suffering and then do the kinds of things which tend to counteract in the same generic area.

For example, both Watergate and funds disclosure attacks take the lack-of-candor line. The President can readily regain lost ground in this area in press conference answers if we're alert to the problem.

We may want to consider an event which emphasizes the family-man-President or church attendance going to the reassertion of moral precepts. Given the generic class of problems which are causing us losses just now -- essentially in the category of crass politics, dirty tricks, secrecy and non-disclosure, the schedule people should propose events in the opposite vein and we should strongly urge the President to do them.

That is why I thought the second flood story was a good one. Aside from the appeal to the South in going to

Richmond, if he has to put in a day's work and compete with Martha for news time on TV far better that it be on a compassionate errand just now, rather than a meeting with Republican Senators.

I won't labor the obvious. Simply: let's analyze how we're losing equity and do things to regain it - Obviously given the nature of our present problems this is not a call for scheduling stump speeches, trips to conventions or drop-bys to meetings of black educators.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

~~LARRY HIGBY~~ H

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN G

SUBJECT:

Magruder's Press Contacts

The January 17th suggestion by Bob to John Mitchell that Jeb should not be a press contact is not being followed. Aside from the special assignments to talk with the press, such as the shift of the Convention from San Diego to Miami Beach, Magruder meets periodically with the press. Most recently on Friday when I called his office told me that he did not want to be interrupted as he was "with a reporter". Whether Magruder continues to talk with the press is, I suppose, Mitchell's decision, but you should know that Bob's "personal view" is not being followed.

~~Confidential/Eyes Only~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 1205, Section 6-102
By EP , Date 4-2-82

January 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM : H. R. HALDEMAN

In spite of the outstanding job that Jeb is obviously doing in many phases of the organization of the campaign structure, it seems to me that he is exactly the wrong guy to be used as a spokesman for the campaign.

My personal view would be that Jeb should discontinue his present practice of holding press interviews, TV interviews, etc., and should become totally the man behind the scenes. Otherwise he's going to destroy his usefulness.

HRH:pm
cc: Jeb Magruder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



June 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: JOHN MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Last week or so, Mills Godwin, a respected former Governor of Virginia, announced that he could not support McGovern & Co., and was going for Nixon in November. That was good news, but terrible timing. Godwin got a nice little spread in the "metro" section of the local paper. If we have lined up, or know of, Democrats about to bolt to RN -- they should be called upon to hold until after the Convention, when it becomes major political news in terms of November, and then to do so, with Maximum Fanfare in their State Capitals. Also, this is probably being done, but we should orchestrate them, so that they fall sequentially, one or two major figures a week -- and then on a regular basis, the RNC or Re-Election Committee can send out a release listing major national Democrats who cannot support the "extremism" of McGovern. Muskie did most things badly, but one thing he did extraordinarily well was to drop the endorsements he had lined up with the kind of skill that made it appear opposition to him was hopeless. The fellow looked like he was filling up a straight, with ease, only to turn over nothing on the last card. But the buildup was impressive; and we should orchestrate similarly.

Buchanan

TALKING PAPER - MITCHELL

The President believes very strongly in the old Chotiner rule that a campaign team must be lean and that in their conduct they must think of themselves as the candidate. They must avoid ostentatious appearance of every kind such as fancy suites, booze in the rooms, fancy restaurants, etc.

Any such appearances just give the opposition ammunition regarding our being the party of the fat cats. Also, it's hard to justify to our contributors and our volunteers.

This matter must be handled very toughly with all of the campaign staff. We've got to tighten up the organization so it doesn't look fat.

This was brought to the President's attention by a recent Jack Anderson column saying that the Nixon people are travelling first class and living high, and that people are beginning to say, "here's where the \$10 million is going".

HRH

6/21/72

X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 6/20/72

EXC
7/15

TO: LARRY HIGBY
FROM: GORDON STRACHEAN

You mentioned yesterday morning that there would be no campaign strategy session. Do you nevertheless want to put this in follow up for 2 weeks?

*No make it post
convention
L.*

POLITICAL STRATEGY PAPER



We should probably have a strategy meeting, or retreat, going for a couple of days to get down to some basic decisions, both from the standpoint of therapy and ideas.

There should be a bigger advisory group putting in some thinking time such as the Committee of 100 and the Committee of 9, who thought they were running the Campaign, and were actually helpful for ideas and in enlisting loyalty.

We may be missing some smart people, such as some key Senators and Congressmen, or some Governors.

We are overlooking some of the old hands on our staff such as Price, Garment, Safire, Finch, Dent, Buchanan, Chotiner, Rumsfeld and Weinberger.

The great danger is for two or three people to think that they are the fountain of all wisdom. Of course, the other side of this coin is also worse, which is to try and run a campaign with a dozen or a hundred people. We need to get better organized on the process of touching bases, however.

We must avoid getting too ingrown in terms of political strategy decisions.

We should follow the pattern at the retreat of the August 15 Camp David meeting with sub-groups working on specific areas and then reporting to a small executive group of two or three.

HRH

6/12/72

ACTION MEMORANDUM

There should be a major effort now to get name Democrats to come out for the President on a periodic basis.

All present and former Democratic Governors, Senators, and Congressmen should be carefully reviewed to see which would be potential Nixon supporters, and then a program of contact of all of them should be initiated immediately.

Harlow would be one to carry on some of this contact effort.

HRH
June 19, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM : L. HIGBY

SUBJECT : Your conversation with John Mitchell
Re: Malek et al

I've given some more thought to the idea you mentioned to me earlier today of approaching Mitchell on moving Malek more into the operational aspects at 1701 in the manager role. I agree that the basic approach is good and your suggestion on how to broach the subject with Mitchell, very good. Below I've jotted some additional thoughts that might be helpful. ~~In addition you should review the attached. I think you'll see that Mitchell is already moving somewhat in the direction of toughening up at 1701.~~

-Fred is not the perfect man to move into the job but is the best of what is available. You should make it clear to Mitchell that the areas to move Malek in are the priority areas where we have specific programs already laid out and it's ~~merely~~ a matter of getting something accomplished in those areas. Also, don't be too hard on Magruder, he's done a good job of putting this situation together and now it's a question of making it run.

-Your approach to Mitchell is just right, i. e. the part about two people who have worked for Haldeman. I would put greater emphasis, however, on the Colson thing.

-This should be done with no announcement other than the fact that Fred is leaving the White House staff to join the campaign operation fulltime. It would be good to get into some discussion with John as to exactly what the priorities are. We're doing a great job of planning, figuring out advertising, etc. What we need is organization, particularly field organization. This is where the thing needs to be tightened up and Malek should become a force to be reckoned with. Also mention that Magruder needs to take a new "get tough" attitude. It will be helpful for him to have this. *reluctant as well as Malek.*