

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
21	3	10/9/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Patrick J. Buchanan to The President. RE: A discussion of problem areas in the President's campaign that could lessen his lead over McGovern. 3 pgs.
21	3	10/10/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Bruce Kehrli to Haldeman. RE: A message which reads: "For your political meeting. No copies have been distributed." 1 pg.
21	3	9/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: The overall positive reaction in response to President Nixon's campaign trips. 2 pgs.
21	3	9/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The Nixon "trips", and the media's coverage of "technique" rather than "substance." 2 pgs.

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21	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Message that states: "At Chapin and Higby's suggestion, I asked several people for their impressions of the P's campaign swing, etc." 1 pg.
21	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Indecipherable handwritten note dealing with "key impressions." 1 pg.
21	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	An opinion based report from Ambassador George Bush that details his impressions of the President's 2-day visit to New York and California. 1 pg.
21	3	9/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: Critique of the First Campaign Swing. 2 pgs.
21	3	9/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert M. Teeter to The Honorable Clark MacGregor. RE: The President's Trip to New York and California. 2 pgs.

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21	3	9/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE: "RN's Campaigning in New York and California." 3 pgs.
21	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	A brief account of John Sears' experience on the first week of Nixon's campaign for reelection. 1 pg.
21	3	9/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Len Garment to Haldeman. RE: The concern over Nixon's "inconsistency" in his speeches, and how the American public views Nixon's handling of foreign affairs. 1 pg.
21	3	9/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ken Cole to Haldeman. RE: The reaction to the President's trip to New York and California, based on accounts from the New York Times and Washington Post. 1 pg.
21	3	9/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: The New York-California trips, and the media's focus on the "techniques" of the campaign, both with regards to Nixon and McGovern. 3 pgs.

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21	3	9/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The assessment of the President's trip to both New York and California as having neither gained nor lost ground. 3 pgs.
21	3	9/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Daniel P. Moynihan to Haldeman. RE: The President's trip to New York and California, and Moynihan's conclusion that while the President demonstrated his campaigning skills, his misstatements could come back to haunt him. 1 pg.
21	3	9/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: Several reasons why Nixon's political trip cannot be considered a political winner. 2 pgs.
21	3	9/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: Nixon's trips to Texas, New York, and California, and their overall successes. 2 pg.
21	3	8/10/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Message that reads: "The balance of isolated issues and thoughts...are described on two additional pages." 2 pgs.

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21	3	8/9/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Message that reads: "The 4 best/4 worst strategy memoranda are tallied in the attached." 1 pg.
21	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	A detailed report entitled: "President Nixon-Senator McGovern Strong/Weak Issues." 8 pgs.
21	3	8/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The possible weak points of Nixon's campaign that McGovern could potentially utilize as a means to discredit his bid for reelection. 3 pgs.
21	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	A report detailing the four best issues for Nixon and the four worst issues for McGovern. 5 pgs.
21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Campaign Issues, including Nixon's best (peace, domestic tranquility, balance, and a solid economy), and McGovern's worst (the candidate himself, socializing America, etc). 2 pgs.

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21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ken W. Clawson to Haldeman. RE: The campaign strategy that highlights Nixon's best issues, and McGovern's best and worst issues. 3 pgs.
21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ken Cole to Haldeman. RE: Issues for the fall campaign from both the McGovern and Nixon points of view. 2 pgs.
21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Dwight L. Chapin to Haldeman. RE: "The response to August 7, 1972, Issue Memorandum." 2 pgs.
21	3	8/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: Issues in the campaign that include discussions of Nixon's best positive and best negative issues. 3 pgs.
21	3	8/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: "Issues--Positive and Negative." 4 pgs.

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21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Len Garment to Bob Haldeman. RE: Nixon's best issues that include: The "Nixon Doctrine", the SALT breakthrough, reduced defense expenditures and draft calls, and the honorable withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam. 3 pgs.
21	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Len Garment's "Notes on the Acceptance Speech", which details assumptions made about McGovern's strategies and tactics that he'll likely use against Nixon. 3 pgs.
21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From B. Harlow to Haldeman. RE: Answers to the August 7 memorandum concerning the positives and negatives of McGovern and Nixon as presidential candidates. 2 pgs.
21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Dick Moore to Larry Higby. RE: A detailed explanation of Nixon's four key issues, and McGovern's four key issues. 3 pgs.
21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman. RE: Whitaker's thoughts on the four issues raised in Larry Higby's memo on August 7. 3 pgs.

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21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: 1972, and the four best and worst issues that Nixon faces in his bid for reelection. 4 pgs.
21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert M. Teeter to Haldeman. RE: Nixon/McGovern Strong/Weak Issues. 4 pgs.
21	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	DEX-Information Sheet listing: The originators location, addresses location, etc. 1 pg.
21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE: Four Crow Points and Four Attack Points for RN and McGovern. 4 pgs.
21	3	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert H. Finch to Haldeman. RE: Issues in the fall campaign, including Sargent Shriver's possible candidacy as McGovern's running mate. 2 pgs.

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21	3	8/9/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bill Safire to Larry Higby. RE: The best and worst campaign issues for Nixon and McGovern. 2 pgs.
21	3	8/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Larry Higby to Mr. Sears. RE: Nixon's four best and worst issues facing him in the upcoming campaign against McGovern. 1 pg.
21	3	7/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Larry Higby's memo of July 19 concerning what role Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie would play in the campaign. 2 pgs.
21	3	7/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Al Haig to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Strategy Recommendations. 4 pgs.
21	3	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Larry Higby's request of July 19 that there be more of a focus on domestic issues in the campaign. 5 pgs.

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21	3	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Addendum to the Memorandum of July 20. 1 pg.
21	3	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: The television coverage of the convention, and the possibility of violence in the streets afterward. 1 pg.
21	3	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: Campaign strategies that include: Targeting McGovern, not the Democrats, appealing to dissident Democrats, and creating non-partisan forums. 2 pgs.
21	3	7/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Other Document	An outline for the Keynote Presentation regarding the film, "The Nixon Years." 3 pgs.
21	3	7/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Notes on the Keynote Outline, and on the Invitation that include: Structure, advantages, convention follow-up, and TV coverage. 3 pgs.

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21	3	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: The First Family Scheduling. 2 pgs.
21	3	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman and John. D. Ehrlichman. RE: Nixon's campaign strategy, and how he should proceed in the campaign from now until November. 8 pgs.
21	3	7/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Larry Higby to John Whitaker. RE: A request by Higby to forward Nixon's campaign strategy. 1 pg.
21	3	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Dwight L. Chapin to Larry Higby. RE: Comments made about the July 19 memorandum concerning campaign strategy. 1 pg.
21	3	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: The update on the June 16 campaign memo. 1 pg.

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21	3	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert H. Finch to Haldeman. RE: The update on Nixon's campaign strategy (In light of the Democratic Convention). 2 pgs.
21	3	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From John Scali to Haldeman. RE: The Election Strategy Addendum. 2 pgs.
21	3	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bryce Harlow to Larry Higby. RE: Follow-up on the campaign strategy. 1 pg.
21	3	7/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ken W. Clawson to Haldeman. RE: Nixon's campaign strategy, and the need for the surrogates and the government apparatus to involve themselves in the campaign. 2 pgs.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 299

Folder: Updated Campaign Strategy Memos

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
32	Return Private/Political Memo Buchanan to the President 10/9/72
33	Return Private/Political Memo Dent to HRH 9/29/72
34	Return Private/Political Memo Buchanan to HRH 9/29/72
35	Return Private/Political note Strachan to HRH 9/29
36	Return Private/Political note "The Following are Ambassador George Bush ND
37	Return Private/Political memo Safire to HRH 9/28/72
38	Return Private/Political memo Teeter to MacGregor 9/28/72
39	Return Private/Political memo McLaughlin to HRH 9/28/72
40	Return Private/Political notes "Thoughts from John Sorensen" "NL
41	Return Private/Political memo Garment to HRH 9/29/72
42	Return Private/Political memo Cole to HRH 9/29/72
43	Return Private/Political memo Price to HRH 9/28/72
44	Return Private/Political memo Colson to HRH 9/28/72
45	Retain Close Invasion of Privacy memo McCrory to Chapin 9/29/72
46	Return Private/Political memo Moynihan to HRH 9/29/72
47	Return Private/Political memo Buchanan to HRH 9/29/72
48	Return Private/Political memo Dent to HRH 9/29/72
49	Return Private/Political note Strachan to Higby 8/10/72
50	Return Private/Political memo Buchanan to HRH 8/7/72
51	Return Private/Political notes "Four Best Issues for Nixon" ND
52	Return Private/Political memo Dent to HRH 8/8/72
53	Return Private/Political memo Clawson to HRH 8/8/72
54	Return Private/Political memo Cole to HRH 8/8/72
55	Return Private/Political memo Chapin to HRH 8/8/72

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
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56	Return	Private/Political Memo	Cobson to HRH	8/7/78
57	Return	Private/Political memo	Hullett to HRH	8/7/78
58	Return	Private/Political memo	Garment to HRH	8/8/78
59	Return	Private/Political memo	Harlow to HRH	8/8/78
60	Return	Private/Political Memo	Moore to Higby	8/8/78
61	Return	Private/Political Memo	Whitaker to HRH	8/8/78
62	Return	Private/Political Memo	Price to HRH	8/8/78
63	Return	Private/Political memo	Teeter to HRH	8/8/78
64	Return	Private/Political memo	McLaughlin to HRH	8/8/78 w/ transmittal
65	Return	Private/Political memo	Finch to HRH	8/8/78
66	Return	Private/Political memo	Safire to Higby	8/9/78
67	Return	Private/Political memo	Higby to Sears	8/7/78
68	Return	Private/Political memo	Hullett to HRH	7/24/78
69	Return	Private/Political memo	Hais to HRH	7/24/78
70	Return	Private/Political memo	Hullett to HRH	7/20/78
71	Return	Private/Political memo	Hullett to HRH	7/21/78
72	Return	Private/Political memo	Safire to HRH	7/20/78
73	Return	Private/Political memo	Price to HRH	7/21/78
74	Return	Private/Political notes	"Keynote Presentation Outline"	7/16/78
75	Return	Private/Political notes	"Notes on the Keynote outline"	7/16/78
76	Return	Private/Political memo	Price to HRH	7/21/78
77	Return	Private/Political memo	Whitaker to HRH	JDE 7/21/78
78	Return	Private/Political memo	Chapin to Higby	7/20/78
79	Return	Private/Political memo	Dent to HRH	7/21/78
80	Return	Private/Political memo	Finch to HRH	7/20/78
81	Return	Private/Political memo	Seale to HRH	7/21/78

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

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82	Return	Private/Political memo	Harlow to Higby	7/21/72
83	Return	Private/Political memo	Higby to HARM	7/25/72

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1972

POLITICAL MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

With four weeks to go the political situation seems to have stabilized. With McGovern not moving as dramatically as necessary; indeed hardly moving at all, according to Harris.

The following are what I see as potential problem areas for us politically, which could cause a rapid dissipation of the present lead.

1) Sam Ervin & the Watergate. Should a Congressional hearing be called the focus of the campaign could be turned off of the "negatives" of McGovern onto our "negatives." Given the present disposition of the national media -- the major domos are disappointed in the lack of a contest and enraged and frustrated by RN's above-the-battle tactics -- the hearings would be the most celebrated since Army-McCarthy.

2) The McGovern anti-Nixon Commercials. McGovern's people seem finally to have come to the conclusion that their best hope lies not so much in resurrecting their candidate's image -- they don't have the time -- but in tearing down our man. My guess is that they will be extremely rough, and if they are not overdone, fairly effective.

→ My personal view is that we ought to, now, go on a crash program for some more anti-McGovern commercials to keep in stock.

Beyond that, the latest poll is certain to put pressure on McGovern; and given the fact that his three most sensitive points seem to be Vietnam, (he is proud of his "consistency) Eagleton and "credibility," maybe we ought to begin moving, with some of our surrogates, in a more direct way.

If we can get him talking and arguing about these -- we do well. Frankly, I would like to see the entire Eagleton business, which is such a loser for McGovern, re-elevated by some of our people.

Back to the commercials momentarily -- HHH's anti-Nixon commercials were brutal in my judgment, but effective -- and we should expect that McGovern's will go after the "scandal", "corrupt" issues -- and if they are smart they will not use their principal, McGovern, as they have mistakenly in the past, to act as the Prosecutor.

3) A sharp McGovern movement upward in the polls could conceivably cause a reverse leverage on the "analyses" and "polls" and "local statements" which are right now so damaging to him. Every time a newspaper or survey goes out they come in with startling negative returns for McGovern. And every time a local pol speaks off the record it seems, he raps George. This has to hurt in community after community -- if McGovern starts up, however, this will reverse and one will find poll after poll saying "McGovern closing the gap." While the possibility recedes with each week, the possibility remains of the "comeback" theme catching with the press and public.

4) The apathetic electorate and the low turnout. Though the liberal press has egg on its face now, for its earlier discussion of aroused and alienated electorate looking for McGovern's kind of politics, there seems to be some truth in the possibility of a low turnout, over-confident Republicans, and a McGovern-hard-core maximizing his vote, while we minimize ours. We ought to be giving this problem serious consideration -- although I do not believe it at all calls for RN to hit the stump at this point in time.

5) The media hostility. One has to have seen Agronsky & Co. to visualize it. Since the Broder column there has been piece after piece, taking up the theme that RN has "outwitted" the press, that he is using the enormous resources of the White House to such effect that it is no contest; that McGovern is at an unfair disadvantage; that the President is ignoring the issues, playing above-the-battle, refusing to "engage" in campaign debate, even by long distance, and -- to top it all -- appears headed for a landslide which the press can do nothing about. If one took a poll of the press corps, I would guess that ninety-five to one hundred percent want to see the gap closed.

Recognizing that they are negatively disposed to our campaign at this point, and anxious to leap on any embarrassment -- perhaps we should give consideration to an offensive media strategy to feed the animals, so they aren't chewing on us the rest of the campaign.

Dont' know what we have of substance coming down the pike -- but the more of that the better. One notes that RN's Texas visit which had some substance to it was played extremely well -- and the NY to LA jaunt was played equally badly. We should be thinking of something to give these fellows to write and talk about -- rather than bemoaning our "lack" of a campaign.

THOUGHTS & SUGGESTIONS:

A) We ought to have adopted in advance a strategy for the McGovern ads, whether to ignore them -- or attack them as "smear" -- hopefully they will be so bad that they will indict themselves. But it would be serious for us, I think, if McGovern's ads succeeded in moving the focus off of McGovern's screw-ups and incompetence and his radicalism -- which should be the last four weeks of this campaign.

B) We should be planning now -- not locking in, however -- some election eve, Saturday, Sunday, Monday type drills, which are certain to create massive national interest and participation in the election -- by our folks. We do need to have our troops excited more out there -- they do need to get stirred up -- and given the Presidential podium, one can get the national attention with relative ease.

C) In two weeks or perhaps three, the time may be ripe to be calling -- not for a mandate for RN -- but for a repudiation of McGovern by Democrats. On these grounds, we should move out the line that the McGovernites have given up; they are interested only in a large vote to control the party machinery -- and a Connally and Meany and Fitzsimmons and other Democrats can all call for a national "repudiation of extremism" -- so that the Great Democratic Party can be restored to its rightful owners, the American people. Cast a Vote Against Extremism kind of theme -- something that will convince Democrats that if McGovern even comes close their party is gone from them forever.

D) If we can contain McGovern for twenty more days even, or two more weeks, assuredly there is a fail-safe point at which local Democrats have to jump off and start pushing out their split-ticket sample ballots; with sort of an every-man-for-himself philosophy taking over. That almost but did not happen with Humphrey -- as the unions never deserted him. But if McGovern is hanging where he was last -- two or three weeks from now it could start with him.

E) The President should stay out of the attack business altogether, as of now. This still looks good. Also, the President of all the People, standing up for America, is something disgruntled and even anti-Nixon Democrats can vote for -- if the rest of us can keep McGovern painted as an incompetent and opportunistic radical -- who would do or say anything to win. With McGovern's recent horrible charges he has diminished the possibility of his becoming a sympathetic figure, a martyr, which leaves us some room for toughening the attacks on him.

Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date 10-10-72

TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: BRUCE KEHRLI *BK*

For your political meeting. No copies
have been distributed.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO TO: H. R. Haldeman
FROM: Harry S. Dent
SUBJECT: Trip reaction

My personal assessment, and those I'm picking up in the field on my trips, indicate the President's initial forays into Texas, New York and California were highly effective. The only negatives - except in Texas, as I shall detail momentarily - seemed to be limited to technicalities.

The following evaluation on specifics is the result of conversation with Burdell Bixby, campaign director for New York; Gordon Luce, Vice chairman of CREP in California, and Eric Jonsson, chairman, Texas CREP.

Positively, the highest scoring points included the Laredo trip and its enthusiastic reception, the identification with the ethnics through the remarks at the Statue of Liberty, and the speech before the Cancer group in California. The common feeling was that these events showed the President in warm settings, graphically demonstrating his concern and being received by "little" people. These events provided a focus apart from the fund-raisers, which, while necessary, don't get an overwhelmingly positive reaction from the public.

Eric Jonsson felt - and is picking up this attitude in Texas - that the visit to the Connally ranch resulted in a negative reaction from the general public, because the angle that came over was not so much that the President was meeting with Democrats as with "oil-soaked fatcats." I have noted this nationally. Jonsson said Texas Republicans have stretched to accept the Connally base, but feel they are being written off as important to the President's desire to win Texas.

As I indicated, the only other negatives are of a technical nature. In New York, there was a mix-up on press credentials, and some

H. R. Haldeman
September 29, 1972
Page Two

complaints from motorists because East Side Drive was tied up. That may have been done by the City of New York.

Bixby felt that the President came out very well on the situation with the demonstrators, and that "he strengthened his lead in New York."

California press has given particularly good play to the Cancer speech.

So, perhaps I could summarize the conversations this way:

1. The President needs to be identified with the "average" people on his trips. Occasionally it would be helpful for him to see lower echelon campaign volunteers.

2. He comes across very strongly on a personal level, and plenty of visibility in personal settings is the best rebuttal to the McGovern charge that RN is "unloved."

3. On balance, the trips had positive impact.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Judging from national and Washington media, the trip cannot be judged a political winner. Several reasons. First, the TV types, Rather, Pierpoint, Jarriel, and Mackin focus either on "technique" as opposed to substance, or see themselves as Vox Populi with responsibility for either rebutting or questioning any statement they feel is not precise. Last night we were not helped in the least by Miss Mackin's arrogant piece -- in which she assumed the nation was more interested in her analysis of what the President said, than in what the President said. Further, there were too many fund-raising records broken, which got enormous coverage, and one wonders whether that was to our benefit. Third, the President was seen too often in campaign environment, which is never as effective as the Presidential environment -- it tends to put us on a level with McGovern. Further, the media tries to arrange a long-range debate, in the absence of a live one -- and so anything RN says is seen as challenging or answering McGovern. If the reporters would get out of the way of the story, and let RN communicate directly with the people, we would have no problem -- but clearly they will not, especially the television types.

Had this been 1968 we would probably have been hurt worse. What we have going for us, however, is that the average American is sensitized to the media bias and nit-picking, and the media's own credibility has dropped handsomely.

Final point: If we have something of substance to say, hard news, this can often force the TV folks to cover it directly -- but if it is straight campaign rhetoric, repeating what has been said a number of times before, we should go without. The Texas trip was the success that this one was not -- because there was something there of greater weight than the appearance at the Statue of Liberty.

Lastly, the best campaigning the President can do is be seen clearly in the role of President dealing with the nation's business in the nation and the world. The Oval Office is a far more effective backdrop to meeting with Jewish leaders and labor leaders than the third floor of the Waldorf Astoria -- and we can make the front page of the LATimes from here as well as there.

Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 9/29

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

at Chapin and Higley's suggestion, I asked several people for their impressions of the P's Campaign Swing. ~~Attached~~ Colson, Sears, Teeter, McLaughlin, Cole, Price, Royster, Garment, Gofine, and Bush ^{McCrory} submitted ~~the attached~~ Buchanan, Clinton, ~~McCrory~~ Dent, and Harlow will submit comments later today.

9/28

C -

Impressions of what key people think of the surrogates

~~WJB (?)~~

~~Boyster (Boyer)~~

~~Chen Cabernet~~

~~Sofie~~

~~David (Gumbies)~~

~~McCarty (Ad)~~

~~McCarthy (Joan typing)~~

~~Chotiner (?)~~

Harlow (?)

~~Carson~~

~~Spencer~~

✓ Dent (?)

~~Teetzel~~

~~McCarthy~~

~~Boyer~~

✓ White



not elaborate memos, just short 1-2 pp.

FM - memo for L on new cabinet

Teetzel NY - 53 - 30 - 17 (X)

less than 1 hr.

Detroit News Poll

54 - 38 - 8

sun.

No substan change
RN down 1-2 pts.

0/0
1/1
2/0
3/0

McG - 1/2 hr ABC -

"Attitude of whole crowd"
with Hofgren

Thayer - you would have done him a favor by not inviting him

9/29 - Home Douglas
John Whitney - bored, why invite me
Read NYT edit + its his opinion.
Must receive much attn.

The following are Ambassador George Bush's impressions of the President's 2-day visit to New York and California:

The Ambassador thought that the New York trip was quite well presented in the press, but he felt the Soviet Jewry issue was somewhat of a problem because of the press coverage. Ambassador Bush feels that the President's position on the issue of Soviet Jewry is good and that the Administration should stay with it and not demagogue this issue. The Ambassador feels it's better to improve relations with Russia and thus be in a better position to help correct the inequities that the Jewish community may feel Russian Jews are suffering.

The Ambassador felt the President's remarks at the Dinner were very effective and that the overall effect and impression of the Dinner was very good. Having the young people there was good. Ambassador Bush saw many Democrats in attendance at the Dinner and thought that there was a very good political mix of people. He was very encouraged to see the number of Democrats that he did.

The Ambassador has no real judgment on the California trip. His impressions are only taken from a fleeting reading of the newspapers.

The Ambassador feels that destructive hecklers such as those who broke the window of the Nixon Headquarters on Madison Avenue help the President rather than hurt him.

Not mentioning McGovern's name is effective, particularly when it's done by somebody with the stature of the President. It's not always possible for lesser candidates to pull that off very well.

The theme of continuity which the President stressed at the Dinner in New York has a strong appeal to the American people. The Ambassador thinks that talking about the importance of continuing the job which has already been started is very effective.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
RE: Critique of First Campaign Swing

If we were in any sort of contest, the first two days' campaigning would be cause for alarm.

These were the impressions a normal person would get from the activities:

1. The President went out to raise money. The huge headline in the New York Daily News, no liberal bastion, was "Nixon In Town To Raise Funds." Since over 2 million copies of that headline circulated in an area of 15 million people, it can be safely said that the negative message got across to the greater metropolitan area. In Washington, the Star headline was "Nixon Raises \$7 Million" and that carried also on radio and TV. On the positive side, the young people theme at the dinner went well.

The other story in New York, the Statue of Liberty visit, got good pictures but a bad play. The demonstrators left a bad taste. What I saw on television was a fairly obvious message from the President about how patriotic immigrants are -- very political, no uplift. Looked like a cover to his fundraising appearance.

The meeting with Jewish leaders came across well, with the "no harsh confrontation" theme predominant.

2. The President was apologizing for not campaigning. That's for others to say; not like Nixon to apologize the way he did in San Francisco and made the UP lead.

3. The President talked spending in San Francisco and holding down spending in LA. This impression created by Broder story and headline -- "Nixon Promises Spending, Thrift" -- but he influenced a lot of other writers and broadcasters. ✓

4. The thing wasn't in focus. Other stories dominated -- Kissinger in Paris, the POWs on the way home. Seemed like the campaign was being conducted in Europe.

Some lessons to be drawn:

1. Fundraising appearances at this stage are a great big mistake; the dead audience calls for an infusion of yelling kids, and the money could have been raised with a Presidential film at the dinners. Our fat cat image grows, and we do not appear to care. Fortunately, the other side doesn't know how to exploit it without seeming envious.

2. High-intensity, 17-hour campaign days preceded and followed by relative news calm make our campaign look herky-jerky. We do not have a stride, nor are we explaining what our campaign rhythm is; as soon as the poll difference begins to narrow, this kind of sporadic campaigning will be interpreted as "Nixon, worried about the latest poll showing McGovern momentum, cast aside his above-the-battle pose and plunged into... etc."

3. We're not campaigning for anything. The "four more years" chant is offensive. We know that people vote against, and we should help them be against McGovern and what he stands for; but the best way to be "Presidential" -- which is our best attitude -- is to carry a positive line. Some of this was in the fundraising dinner speech, especially toward the end, but the only way I know that is because I asked for a text. "The" speech is not yet with us.

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKING
P.O. BOX 10000, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540
Re: [redacted] 3-15-82

September 28, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE CLARK MacGREGOR
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER *RMT*
SUBJECT: The President's Trip to New York
and California

Gordon Strachan asked for my impressions of the President's trip this week to New York and California.

I think the trip was a success overall as he did three major fund raisers without any significant negative comment. They were very well surrounded and covered up by other activities.

The demonstrators issue appeared to be well handled. Our handling of demonstrators during the last five weeks may be particularly important in light of our slippage among young voters.

My only negative impression, which I received exclusively from the press, is that the President is spending too large a proportion of his time talking about national defense and not enough about how his domestic programs are going to help the average citizen. National defense ranks 7th, 8th, or 9th on the list of issues in terms of importance in determining Presidential vote and a large majority of voters are in favor of cutting the defense budget. At the same time, other issues have increased as being more important -- the economy, crime and drugs. It is also very difficult for individual citizens to interpret the effect of a strong national defense in terms of their daily lives. I'm not advocating that the President stop talking about national defense as it is an area we have a large advantage over McGovern but that our mix be a little more oriented to the economic issue. The overexposure to national defense might be ameliorated by discussing this issue in the future in terms of jobs rather than in a national security context.

We continue to be vulnerable on the bread and butter and pocketbook issues and these should receive more emphasis overall.

Overall, this does not change my view that personal appearances by the President should be limited throughout the campaign.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

JOHN McLAUGHLIN *John*

SUBJECT:

RN's Campaigning in
New York and California

1.) Statue of Liberty. The physical presence of RN with the ethnics was politically very lucrative. Faces of ethnics on the television screen, like the old Jewish man with the yarmulke, and their association with the President at the scene -- first rate. The verbal tussle between RN supporters ("Four More Years") and the militants ("Stop The War") favorable to the President because of the higher decibels of the RN supporters. The physical tussle between the two elements worked to RN's advantage too, providing drainage to millions of Americans who feel an irritated sense of surfeit with the demonstrators. RN's remonstrance, by indirection, to the television producers to focus not only on the handful of militants but on the thousand others gathered here was said perfectly: RN smiled as he made the very clear point. This segment on the ethnics took the edge off the wires' heavy coverage of CREP filling its coffers, and Dan Rather's stress on the \$40 million incremented by the 28 dinners. Two minor minuses: RN sounded a trifle angry when talking about ethnics believing in hard work, not a handout. RN should avoid the appearance of irritation. Secondly, I would have liked to have seen him warmer with the people, as happened with the Italians and the Scalobrine Fathers. Obiter Dicta: The "Jews For Nixon" sign on the TV screen (two networks) priceless; Machin's comment that RN appears to have the ethnic vote which he never had before, also very valuable. ✓

2.) Labor Leaders. Another very remunerative sequence. There is simply no substitute for the direct talk of Gleason and Brennan. One leader made the point that labor supported Rockefeller, despite Rockefeller's wealth; therefore, there's no reason why they can't support RN, since RN doesn't have Rockefeller's wealth. This language has no substitute: It grabs the working man where he lives. Minor Minus: In this sequence, too, RN looked a trifle too restrained. I would like to have seen more give-and-take with the labor leaders, more warmth.

3.) San Francisco. The BART sequence good, and reminiscent of the sight-seeing in Peking. An imaginative piece of politicking, associating RN with transportation innovation pictorially. Here again, however, RN would have benefited by meshing more with the crowd, not immersing himself in the flesh, but more contact than we saw on the screen.

4.) The Basic Strategy: For RN McGovern Doesn't Exist. Excepting Rather's forced comment that RN had attacked McGovern by the "confiscation of wealth" charge, the media play on New York and California left the impression that for RN McGovern doesn't exist. I think this strategy is absolutely sound and wise for this point in the campaign, and quite probably right through to the election. In his remarks, I would like to see more blue sky from RN, more stress on the future, more vision. On the issues, my feeling is that RN should avoid prose and modes of presentation of self that might suggest that he is confronting a McGovern allegation. (McGovern's single high point in an otherwise catastrophic campaign was his timing of his statement on drugs, creating an impression that RN was smoked out into a rebuttal.)

5.) Surrogates. The surrogate program is theoretically sound. There are practical problems with it, however, the chief of which is diffusion. RN can only maintain his "above-the-battle" stance, if his surrogates get media attention, not just locally (where they are getting considerable), but nationally. I see problems with nationally pick-up of surrogates: 1.) Mankiewicz is leaning on the networks to restrict their surrogate coverage, since the surrogate is not the candidate. 2.) Focus for the surrogate's national coverage appears lacking, i. e., with several surrogates in the field on a given day, the networks are given the license to select which surrogate to cover, and also their production task is increased. If the media could be trained to expect a prime surrogate response, we would be guaranteed that the subjects we want addressed, will indeed be addressed, thus taking away the power of selection from the networks. Recommendation: Provide focus for a daily prime surrogate response by establishing one platform, preferably the White House press briefing room. This would draw the surrogate and his political expressions closer to the President and in so doing help ease us by Mankiewicz's objection. Secondly, it would give us the control and national media power to blunt any momentum that McGovern may develop. The margin is going to shrink, as happens uniformly in Presidential races when the trailing contender is the candidate of the majority party. This movement can be contained, however, if the surrogates on national media confront, challenge, harass McGovern daily and demonstrate how RN's program in any given area is superior. I know that extensive discussion has taken place

on the political problems entailed in having a surrogate appear in the White House press room itself. Doubtless there is some substance to these concerns; nevertheless, I think we are hypersensitive in this regard. If the WH press room is unacceptable, then CREP might serve but in my view it would be a distinct second choice.

Conclusion: RN's campaign strategy is right on target and the visits to New York and California were both strong gains. The mechanism of the surrogate program needs some modulating, but its theory is excellent.

(Of Note: In a visit to Notre Dame this week, I learned that the students straw polled as follows: 1700 RN, 1500 McGovern and about 500 undecided. In Rhode Island, RN's 50th State in 1968, a private Becker poll (an excellent pollster who proved to be right on target in my own race) showed RN last week leading McG. better than 2 to 1.)

Thoughts from John Sears on first week of campaign:

Mr. Sears feels the first week went very well.

The President should do more of this; mainly, ~~stay~~
cloaked in the Office and away from the political
arena.

Perhaps in the last 7-10 days it would help to become
partisan but until that time stay away from partisan-
ship remarks - you could lose Democratic votes if you
were to begin now.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: LEN GARMENT

Impressions. I don't place much stock in press talk about "remoteness" or Broder-type (i. e., sophisticated) complaints about "inconsistency" in the speeches. I don't think the public is unhappy about the President's careful (and safer) campaign activities; they're apparently not paying that much attention to the entire campaign. The basic reason; the President's credentials are established; McGovern has settled in as an implausible candidate and "real" news events therefore loom larger than the campaign. There are problems - e. g., the Soviet wheat deal, the three POWs, Soviet Jews, the "special interests" issue - but I don't sense that the basic attitudes toward either man is as yet being affected by them. One thing that does bother me is the absence of any sense of hard material - programmatic or otherwise - in what the President is saying (IMF was an exception but an esoteric one). The little I've managed to see of the President on television in the past few days has shown him cool and Presidential, and to good advantage (e. g., Liberty Island). I don't think more or a different style of campaigning is needed. I would in fact trade off some of this for a couple of Presidential statements or speeches (and they could originate in Washington) that are more specific about what the second term will have as its short and long-term objectives. I don't think people realize how fundamentally "future-oriented" a hard-headed man like the President is, and, on the other hand, that the passionate moralists, like McGovern, are incapable of doing or refraining from doing the kinds of things that go into building for the future. Why can't some of this be said? The fund raising core of the past few days was pretty well muffled by all the surrounding activity and news. The Soviet exit permit issue is causing some damage. An added thought: If we can, I think we should be much more specific and aggressive about the positive results flowing from the Soviet Summit (e. g., withdrawals from Egypt, SALT I, Soviet cooperation versus terrorists, Vietnam, collaboration on environment, etc.) in countering the criticism on the Soviet wheat deal.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM

KEN  COLE

SUBJECT:

Reaction to President's
Trip to New York and
California

Based on network TV accounts, reports in the New York Times and Washington Post and the news summary, my reaction to the trip is that it was flat -- it had little national impact either positive or negative. As far as local impact is concerned, I can't judge.

Because the purpose was fund raising, however, I think we came out better than I expected we would given the purpose and opportunity for mischief by the press and the opposition. Still, the trip did little to further enhance the image of the President or broaden public support for his re-election.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: RAY PRICE *RPJ*
SUBJECT: New York-California trip

I don't really have a strong impression of the trip; such as I have is made up from what I happened to catch on the evening news, and read in the paper or the news summary -- thus it includes nothing of whatever may have been the local impact.

It didn't seem to me to have a great deal of impact -- but that fact, at this point, is not all bad. We wanted, after all, to minimize the attention paid to the \$1000-a-plate dinners.

One general impression I've been getting is that news coverage of the campaign this year is inordinately -- more so than before -- focused on the techniques of the campaign; not just in the coverage of us, but in the coverage of McGovern as well. Reporters seem to feel a greater compulsion than before, in reporting what the candidate said or did, to analyze why he did it this way, how it fits into his campaign strategy, etc. To a considerable extent, this is legitimate and responsible reporting: after all, the techniques of the campaign are an important part of the story, even though we'd rather not have them reported on when the focus is on us (though we like it when the focus is on McGovern). Thinking back impressionistically rather than scientifically over the reporting on this trip, it seems as if a great deal of it was focused on the busing in of crowds to provide backdrop for the cameras, the stationing of young people to cheer, the assembling of ethnic groups at Liberty Island, etc.; in short, this may be the year when, in effect, the advance man is pulled out into the spotlight. ✓ McGovern has gotten the same treatment: there's been heavy reporting of his staging events for the cameras, etc.

There's nothing we can do about the fact of this kind of reporting, but it looks as though we're going to have to take it pretty centrally into account in planning the rest of the campaign. One thing it probably means is that we should lean toward less rather than more contrivance. Another effect may be to make the White House comparatively more desirable (as against the road show) as a place from which to conduct the campaign, and real events more desirable as compared with manufactured events. It may also argue for comparatively greater emphasis on such things as written statements and formal (or radio or TV) speeches.

Vermont Royster had little in the way of specific comments on the trip; he noted that he's simply seen "bits and pieces on TV," plus what he'd read in the papers -- his general impression was that it "came off okay."

Reflecting on his understanding that it had received pretty heavy coverage in those places where the President was, but that the rest of the country had gotten only "snippets in the morning paper, or on CBS or ABC," he said he thought we should look for one or two occasions when he can get "a lot of public exposure all over the country in one hunk."

When I talked with him, I'd already written the comments above -- and I asked whether as an old-time newsman he'd had the same impression about the focus of coverage this year on techniques. He leaped to it, said absolutely, and that in fact he's taking part in a panel next month in which "that's precisely the point I'm making." He plans to cite as an example the coverage of McGovern's speech to the security analysts -- "the stories I saw down here all had long stories about his appearance, about the reaction of the security analysts, about George going into the lion's den -- but none told me what he'd said -- they were all writing about the mechanics of the campaign.... I'm having a hard time keeping up with George, with what he's saying." And on the President's visit to the Statue of Liberty -- "I guess he made a speech, but I don't know what he said. Four or five people started a little furor, and all the

cameras turned on them." So, he suggests, we've got to find a way of getting the focus on what he's saying -- which he thinks is one advantage of the formal speech, "the kind of thing you force the New York Times to carry the text of."

He also had some additional thoughts unrelated to the trip, which I'll pass along in a separate memo.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *CC*
SUBJECT: President's Trip to New York
and California.

Per your request, my assessment of the trip is that on balance we neither gained nor lost ground. ✓

On the positive side, there was some excellent footage of the President with Brennan and his boys, but only on ABC and Metro-media that I am aware of. (You realize my prejudice; naturally I would think this is a real plus.)

Also, on the positive side, we may have defused the criticism that the President is unwilling to campaign. I think there was just a little bit of this creeping into the press and perhaps the public consciousness; I am not sure of the latter. At least a trip like this enables us to show that we are not in hiding or that we are not taking the electorate for granted. The coverage was such that everyone knows the President was out campaigning this week.

Also on the plus side, we were able to get away with the fund-raising dinners without having them particularly visible. In other words, we did enough other things so that the public did not get the impression that we were just playing to the fat cats.

Finally, on the positive side, some of the crowd shots were good and the President directing the cameras on to the good guys on Liberty Island was a plus. Also, again I may be somewhat jaundiced in my opinions because I enjoyed seeing the President one-up the media.

On the minus side, one line moved out of New York indicating the President was calling for a Republican Congress. All the pollsters I talk to, along with my political instincts, tell me that that line is counter-productive. We ought to be doing nothing that sharpens up the Republican-Democrat focus. If we do our jobs right, our coattails will bring in a lot of Republican Congressmen but we mustn't make the issue a Republican Congress. The polls show that the public want a Democrat Congress.

Also on the negative side, the wires, the New York Times and to a much lesser extent, TV, made it appear that we were meeting McGovern head on, that the President was attacking him and defending against the charge that we should come out more often on the campaign trail. I think it is imperative that in everything the President says and does, he keeps the sharp focus on the issues that separate the candidates, but that beyond that he not get himself into a head-to-head confrontation directly with McGovern.

Another negative on balance was the speech on Liberty Island. On TV it looked like a campaign stump speech and in my opinion campaign stump speeches are losers for us. They take us right off the Presidential pedestal. In my mind at least the President doesn't even look like the same person he does when he is shown in the White House or doing Presidential things. (There was a big difference in the impact of the President visiting flood stricken families in Wilkes-Barre and standing on the podium at Mitchellville. The President doesn't always have to be confined in the White House to remain Presidential. He can be going out as President to see people and to see how federal aid is working in an area where there are clear Presidential responsibilities. That's campaigning as President rather than as a candidate.)

Another negative was the Broder piece today, although it's impact is probably very minimal. He got us on what appeared to be conflicting statements. I haven't seen this turn up anywhere else; hence I would view this one as a one-shot jab by Broder. The point is good, however; we should be careful on the statements that we drop in the future not to give them this opening.

Coincidentally, as we got on to the front pages campaigning, McGovern's campaign went back with the corset ads. Some people may look upon this as a plus; I don't. I am beginning to agree with Al Capp that the more campaign-type publicity McGovern and Shriver get, the better. If we shove them off the front pages, then that is not good.

The demonstration issue fizzled. The press simply will not buy our line; obviously they don't want to; it would help us. The most we got out of this was a little play on MacGregor's charges and a little play on the fact that we were trying to capitalize on demonstrators. I have a gut feeling that the American people already associate McGovern with anti-war protesters, and we don't have to spell out the connection. A hell of a lot of people saw the scene at the Doral. While I hate to admit defeat, I don't think the press will give us a decent break on this one. If we continue to try, it could boomerang. This one makes me sizzle because I think McGovern is so vulnerable, but I just don't see how to come at it.

The trip further strengthens my conviction that the less campaigning we have to do the better. I believe that people are bored with politics this year and that one of George McGovern's biggest liabilities is that his campaigning has been overexposed. Failing to show up for a vote in the Senate this week was very damaging to him in my opinion. He appeared to be putting politics ahead of the business of the country. The more he does and the less we do it, the better we are.

A final point with respect to the trip: I don't think we can get the President's whole message across to the people in any kind of campaign format. Predictably, the press focus on the trip was a great deal more on technique rather than on substance. The media tends to blur whatever message we are trying to get across. The President has to talk directly to the American people by radio or TV and he not only has to ask for their support, but tell them why they should support him. As to the latter point, he not only has to frame the issue to put us on the right side and McGovern on the wrong side, but he must talk about what he proposes to do in a positive way over the next four years. At some point, this is going to be very necessary. Right now we are asking people to vote for us because we stand for X and McGovern stands for Y. X is good; Y is bad. So far that is fine, but as the campaign grinds on, we have got to hold out the promise of what we will accomplish for this country, given another 4 years and then ask the people to give us that chance.

September 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

You asked my assessment of the President's first few days of campaigning in New York and California.

On the whole it looked it fine and read well. The President obviously likes to campaign, and this comes across nicely.

It was deeply disappointing, however, to find the President saying things that are not so. By which I mean misstatements of fact. His Acceptance Speech at the Convention was riddled with such errors, and it now appears that his stump speeches will be also. This demeans the Presidency and will mar his victory. ✓

You should hit those speechwriters hard. It is intolerable that they should put words in the President's mouth that are false. You are Chief of Staff for the President of the United States. You should not let anything demean his office or devalue Democratic discourse. Something of true value is entrusted to your care for the next five weeks. Be tough. |

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Judging from national and Washington media, the trip cannot be judged a political winner. Several reasons. First, the TV types, Rather, Pierpoint, Jarrick, and Mackin focus either on "technique" as opposed to substance, or see themselves as Vox Populi with responsibility for either rebutting or questioning any statement they feel is not precise. Last night we were not helped in the least by Miss Mackin's arrogant piece -- in which she assumed the nation was more interested in her analysis of what the President said, than in what the President said. Further, there were too many fund-raising records broken, which got enormous coverage, and one wonders whether that was to our benefit. Third, the President was seen too often in campaign environment, which is never as effective as the Presidential environment -- it tends to put us on a level with McGovern. Further, the media tries to arrange a long-range debate, in the absence of a live one -- and so anything RN says is seen as challenging or answering McGovern. If the reporters would get out of the way of the story, and let RN communicate directly with the people, we would have no problem -- but clearly they will not, especially the television types.

Had this been 1968 we would probably have been hurt worse. What we have going for us, however, is that the average American is sensitized to the media bias and nit-picking, and the media's own credibility has dropped handsomely.

Final point: If we have something of substance to say, hard news, this can often force the TV folks to cover it directly -- but if it is straight campaign rhetoric, repeating what has been said a number of times before, we should go without. The Texas trip was the success that this one was not -- because there was something there of greater weight than the appearance at the Statue of Liberty.

Lastly, the best campaigning the President can do is be seen clearly in the role of President dealing with the nation's business in the nation and the world. The Oval Office is a far more effective backdrop to meeting with Jewish leaders and labor leaders than the third floor of the Waldorf Astoria -- and we can make the front page of the LATimes from here as well as there.

Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO TO: H. R. Haldeman

FROM: Harry S. Dent

SUBJECT: Trip reaction

My personal assessment, and those I'm picking up in the field on my trips, indicate the President's initial forays into Texas, New York and California were highly effective. The only negatives - except in Texas, as I shall detail momentarily - seemed to be limited to technicalities.

The following evaluation on specifics is the result of conversation with Burdell Bixby, campaign director for New York; Gordon Luce, Vice chairman of CREP in California, and Eric Jonsson, chairman, Texas CREP.

Positively, the highest scoring points included the Laredo trip and its enthusiastic reception, the identification with the ethnics through the remarks at the Statue of Liberty, and the speech before the Cancer group in California. The common feeling was that these events showed the President in warm settings, graphically demonstrating his concern and being received by "little" people. These events provided a focus apart from the fund-raisers, which, while necessary, don't get an overwhelmingly positive reaction from the public.

Eric Jonsson felt - and is picking up this attitude in Texas - that the visit to the Connally ranch resulted in a negative reaction from the general public, because the angle that came over was not so much that the President was meeting with Democrats as with "oil-soaked fatcats." I have noted this nationally. Jonsson said Texas Republicans have stretched to accept the Connally base, but feel they are being written off as important to the President's desire to win Texas.

As I indicated, the only other negatives are of a technical nature. In New York, there was a mix-up on press credentials, and some

H. R. Haldeman
September 29, 1972
Page Two

complaints from motorists because East Side Drive was tied up. That may have been done by the City of New York.

Bixby felt that the President came out very well on the situation with the demonstrators, and that "he strengthened his lead in New York."

California press has given particularly good play to the Cancer speech.

So, perhaps I could summarize the conversations this way:

1. The President needs to be identified with the "average" people on his trips. Occasionally it would be helpful for him to see lower echelon campaign volunteers.

2. He comes across very strongly on a personal level, and plenty of visibility in personal settings is the best rebuttal to the McGovern charge that RN is "unloved."

3. On balance, the trips had positive impact.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: August 10, 1972

TO: LARRY HIGBY

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

The balance of isolated issues and thoughts that did not fit within the Four Best/Four Worst Issues tally are described on two additional pages.

DEX - INFORMATION SHEET

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ADDRESSEES LOCATION: CAMP DAVID	NR OF PAGES: 7
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN TO: LARRY HIGBY <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>	DTG: 091241 EDT SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: 4 BEST/4 WORST
TOT: 091241 EDT	TOR: INITIAL JW 091330 EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: August 9, 1972

TO: LARRY HIGBY
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

The 4 Best/4 Worst Strategy
Memoranda are tallied in the
attached.

Some of the categories are
imprecise, but 15 authors use
different language for the same
idea.

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

President Nixon's Best Issues

1. International Issues (China, Moscow, Peacemaker, Vietnam)
 - a. Listed First by: Moore, Harlow, Clawson, Sears, Cole, Dent, Buchanan, Hallett, Colson, Chapin, Garment (11 of 15)
 - b. Listed in Top 4 by everyone

2. The Economy
 - a. Listed First by: None
 - b. Listed Second by: Moore, Harlow, Cole
 - c. Listed Third by: Sears, Clawson
 - d. Listed Fourth by: Dent, Hallett, Colson
 - e. Not Listed as Positive Issue by: Teeter, Chapin, Garment, Buchanan, McLaughlin

3. Domestic Tranquility
 - a. Listed First by: None
 - b. Listed Second by: McLaughlin, Sears, Dent, Colson
 - c. Listed Third by: Cole
 - d. Listed Fourth by: Teeter, Hallett
 - e. Not Listed as Positive Issue by: Moore, Harlow, Clawson, Chapin, Garment, Buchanan, Whitaker

President Nixon - Senator McGovern

Strong/Weak Issues

4. Incumbency (competence, experience, professional)
 - a. Listed First by: McLaughlin, Whitaker, Price,
Moore
 - b. Listed Second by: Clawson, Chapin
 - c. Listed Fourth by: Garment, Harlow
 - d. Not Listed as Positive Issue by: Teeter, Cole,
Sears, Dent, Hallett, Colson, Buchanan

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

Senator McGovern's Worst Issues -- Our Attack

1. The Candidate Himself (Inexperienced, Indecisive, Credibility)
 - a. Listed First by: McLaughlin, Chapin, Garment, Moore, Teeter, Sears, Dent, Hallett, Price
 - b. Listed in Top Four by: Colson, Buchanan, Cole, Harlow, Clawson
 - c. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue by: Whitaker

2. McGovern's Radicalism (Non-Specific Issues)
 - a. Listed First by: Buchanan, Price, Whitaker, Harlow
 - b. Listed in Top Four by: McLaughlin, Moore, Teeter
 - c. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue: Colson, Hallett, Dent, Sears, Cole, Garment, Chapin

3. McGovern Issue Positions (National Defense, Welfare, Socialize America)
 - a. Listed First by: Colson, Sears, Cole
 - b. Listed in Top Four by: Chapin, Dent, Hallett, Buchanan, Price, Harlow, Teeter, Moore, Clawson, McLaughlin
 - c. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue by: Whitaker, Garment

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR MCGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

Senator McGovern's Worst Issues -- Our Attack

4. McGovern is Elitist
 - a. Listed First by: None
 - b. Listed in Top Four by: Price, Whitaker, Garment, McLaughlin, Buchanan
 - c. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue by: Harlow, Teeter, Moore, Hallett, Dent, Chapin, Sears, Cole, Colson, Clawson

Senator McGovern's Best Issues

1. Vietnam
 - a. Listed First by: Garment, Cole, Hallett, Moore, Harlow
 - b. Listed in Top Four by: Clawson, Colson, Chapin, Dent, Buchanan, Whitaker, Sears, Price
 - c. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue by: Teeter, McLaughlin
2. Personal Character, Honesty
 - a. Listed First by: Sears, Whitaker
 - b. Listed in Top Four by: McLaughlin, Garment, Cole, Dent, Hallett, Harlow, Buchanan
 - c. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue by: Teeter, Clawson, Colson, Chapin, Moore

PRESIDENT NIXON -- SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

Senator McGovern's Best Issues

3. The Economy
 - a. Listed First by: Teeter, Buchanan, McLaughlin
 - b. Listed in Top Four by: Cole, Hallett, Whitaker, Moore, Chapin, Colson, Clawson
 - c. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue: Garment, Harlow, Sears, Price

4. The Haves and Have-Nots
 - a. Listed First by: Price, Colson
 - b. Listed in Top Four by: Garment, Sears, Dent, Moore, Hallett, Chapin, Whitaker, McLaughlin, Buchanan
 - c. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue by: Teeter, Clawson, Harlow

President Nixon's Worst Issues -- McGovern Attack

1. Credibility, Trust, Ethics
 - a. Listed First by: Chapin, Cole, Moore, Dent, Sears, Price
 - b. Listed in Top Four by: Garment, McLaughlin, Clawson, Buchanan, Hallett, Harlow, Whitaker
 - c. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Colson, Teeter

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGovern

Strong/Weak Issues

2. The Economy

- a. Listed First by: Teeter, Whitaker, Buchanan
- b. Listed in Top Four by: Harlow, Hallett, Price, McLaughlin, Sears, Dent, Cole, Chapin, Clawson, Colson
- c. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Garment, Moore

3. Vietnam

- a. Listed First by: Harlow, Hallett, McLaughlin, Cole, Garment
- b. Listed in Top Four by: Colson, Clawson, Dent, Sears, Price, Whitaker, Buchanan
- c. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Moore, Chapin, Teeter

4. Priorities (Defense Spending, Establishment, Change)

- a. Listed First by: Colson
- b. Listed in Top Four by: Garment, McLaughlin, Hallett, Harlow, Teeter, Price, Whitaker
- c. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Chapin, Cole, Moore, Clawson, Dent, Sears, Buchanan

Miscellaneous -- General Themes, Non-Specific Issues, Isolated Support Issues

- 1. General moderation of President's proposals distinguished from McGovern's wild projects -- Buchanan, Dent

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

2. The President represents what's right with traditional America and her values and culture -- Buchanan, Cole
3. The President's fight against pollution should be considered one of the President's Four Best Issues -- Sears
4. The lack of big domestic legislative achievements will be a negative issue used by McGovern against the President according to Dent.
5. The President himself should be shown as the warm, decent human being that he is according to Clawson.
6. McGovern's lack of Labor support should be emphasized according to Ken Clawson.
7. Chapin believes McGovern's Vietnam undercutting of the President risking the POW's will damage McGovern.
8. Colson and Teeter urge the use of Tax Reform as a positive issue for President Nixon.
9. Colson urges use of the theme that "we (the Administration) have only begun".
10. The fact that McGovern favors forced busing should be used in our attack according the Colson and Moore.
11. Hallett and Garment urge use of returning power to the people, anti-bureaucratic issues.

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

12. Finch urges a continued assault on McGovern and his policies in spite of the addition of Shriver. Rumsfeld, not Agnew, should bracket Shriver's schedule and prevent Shriver from becoming the foreign policy expert.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN (As Requested)

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Were I counseling McGovern, on the attack phase of his campaign, I would stress primarily these four issues:

A) The traditional bread-and-butter attack. Economic Issue. Under the Nixon Administration your food bills have shot up; unemployment has hovered at five million out of work; we have had inflation, stagnation, unemployment -- all at once. Nixonomics has shafted the economic well-being of the common man and his family. ✓

B) Vietnam. Nixon failed to keep his promise to end American involvement in that bloody endless conflict; we gave him four years; that's enough, no more Americans dead -- get our men out, our ships out, our prisoners out and let the North and South Vietnamese decide their own future. We have enough troubles at home here -- to worry about wasting away blood and treasure and prestige and honor in an idiotic military adventure ten thousand miles away, an adventure all but the wildest hawks have written off as a gross mistake. Let's get our prisoners and go, man, go. (This is the leading issue for McGovern to keep his troops fired up.) ✓

C) The incestuous relationship between the Nixon Administration and the Corporate power brokers. Nixon & the Big Guys vs. McGovern & the Little Guys. Examples: ITT, and the \$10 million dollar slush fund from fatcats (unknown) buying future favors from a government whose door is open to the corporate heavies, but which cannot find time to hear out concerns of common men. A Wallace-type "tax reform" thrust here -- arguing that RN is the defender of the loopholes, and McGovern is the friend of the Common Man, a redistribution of income downward to "working people." ✓

D) The flawed morality and flawed integrity of the Nixon Administration using the "credibility gap," the Watergate incident especially and the PR-oriented White House. Would contrast the "candor, sincerity, honesty ✓

and openness" of my candidate with the secrecy, trickiness, deceptiveness of the Nixon White House, which is hostile to first amendment rights, to civil liberties, to a free press.

These above, I think, would be the best avenues of McGovern attack, at this point in time -- they are all issues that move him into the middle, into the traditional Democratic vote, which is the McGovern necessity at this point. As for the opposition's four weakest issues, where our attack should focus, they are:

1) McGovern, in his positions, statements, (character is an extremist), outside the mainstream of American politics, outside the center of his party. He is a fringe candidate; he represents not the great Democratic Party, but a hard-core ideological elite of zealots who have hijacked the great Democratic Party -- and driven out liberals and moderates. He is the most radical candidate ever proposed for President; and his philosophy would overturn much of what we know as the American way of life. ✓

2) His positions on economics, income distribution, defense, and foreign policy are just this side of insane. His economic proposals would bring a collapse in the stock market and a national depression, the end of the free enterprise system as we know it. His defense policies would leave America naked in a dangerous world, tempt aggression, and leave our closest friends in the most perilous condition since the rise of Hitler in the 1930s. His welfare proposals, and income proposals are a declaration of economic war against the American middle class. His drastic unilateral cutbacks would not make this a safe, but more dangerous world than we have ever known. ✓

3) He is a permissive pro-pot, pro-abortion-on-demand ultra-leftist wooly head, Ramsey Clark type whose life style and beliefs are part of the problem of America not part of the solution.

His campaign has attracted elitists and kooks and ultra-leftists and radicals; and a victory for him would be a victory for the radical chic and militant leftists -- over the values and traditions of Middle America and the common man. ✓

4) In a time when ice of the cold war is breaking up, and a great new cathedral of peace is being built, George McGovern and the men around him simply do not have the capacity or experience or understanding to lead the United States in the days ahead. They are not qualified by temperament or capacity to hold the job. ✓

OUR FOUR BEST ISSUES -- My view would be to dramatize and underscore our "differences" with McGovern on issues, ability, etc. Thus:

- a) The President's effort to bring peace to the world and Vietnam. What RN has done to end the war, bring troops home, bring the casualties down, the China opening, the Moscow summit, the SALT agreement, etc. When this is portrayed, it should be contrasted with McGovern who has simply dogged RN's tracks every step of the war; who clearly is no match for RN in knowledge or experience or ability to keep America safe in a dangerous world, to lead America into the future.
- b) The "moderation" of RN's proposals on welfare, and domestic spending as opposed to the wildness of McGovern. We ought to make sure that in this campaign, he comes off as the "Super Spender" and we come off as concerned about reduced taxes and the size of Government.
- c) RN's strong stands on crime, drugs, porno, bussing, permissiveness, etc. -- the man who represents and defends what is right about America and the best in its values and culture. Again, we should draw the line with McGovern here as permissive, etc. We ought to have the strong side of the social issue -- up and down the line -- with McGovern the soft permissive side. Though we need not be strident, we need to be right on these.

Lastly, we should be certain that when the voters enter the booth, they know who represents the common man and who the elite, who speaks for American strength and who for national weakness, who would be permissive on social issues and who would be tough, who is interested in more government "programs" and who wants tax cuts, who is the darling of the purple sunglasses set, and who represents Middle America, who is a moderate centrist and who is a exotic extremist, who is a man of the middle and who is a man of the far left, who would disgrace us in Vietnam and who would bring the prisoners home in honor, who would save Israel and who would lose it, who prefers J. Edgar Hoover and who prefers Ramsey Clark.

Buchanan

I. Four Best Issues for Nixon -

- A. International Issue (Easing of tensions with Soviets and Chinese, winding down the Viet Nam War, SALT talk agreement, etc.)
- B. Stability at Home (No more riots, easing of racial tensions, more conservative cast of the Supreme Court, etc.)
- C. The Success of the New Economic Policy (success of wage and price controls, indications of economic upturns this year, steadying of rate of inflation, etc.)
- D. Fight Against Pollution (Establishment of Environmental Protection Agency, actions taken by Transportation, Interior and H.E.W., etc.)

anyone else.

Comment:

There are a number of other issues which should be made to particular groups -- higher farm prices for the farmers, Social Security increases for the elderly, etc. I don't think achievements in winding down the war in Viet Nam should be singled out for particular emphasis but rather should be listed at the top of a list of international achievements and accomplishments. Of course, RN should come across as the man who will bring peace to the world if he is allowed four more years in office.

I think the domestic stability issue could be quite profitable, especially in light of the McGovern candidacy. I wouldn't

be fearful of citing the change in atmosphere at the Supreme Court as a solid achievement. The economy will be an issue anyway and I think we should stress the positive side of what the Administration has done as a solid achievement. The pollution issue is another good means of stressing the reasonable, Nixon approach to the problem solving. I don't think bussing is as much an issue now as it was in the Spring and thus, I don't think it should be overstressed even though we should always loudly maintain we are against it.

II. Four Worst Issues Against McGovern

- A. Credibility of His Issue Statements (How would he cut \$30 billion from the defense budget without causing massive unemployment in some areas, how does he intend to pay for his programs, etc.)
- B. Social Reform Issue (McGovern would divide the country by mindlessly pressing for a variety of social changes and thus destroy its social stability i.e., abortion, school bussing, etc.)
- C. Lack of International Experience (McGovern has none and will be hard put to cite any credentials in this area.)
- D. Indecisiveness (Recent experience with picking a running mate shows inability to make tough decisions in this area.)

Comment:

McGovern's credibility should only be attacked on the issues and not personally. His main personal selling point is that he's honest and if this point can be destroyed by citing his

dishonesty on the issues, he will lose some support among those who admire his personal character. The social reform issue is hard to express but the country is still weary of the quick changes which occurred during the 1960's and quite unwilling to jump off on any new, untested social directions. Running in a race against RN's international achievements, his lack of international experience should be quite damaging. His failure to properly handle the Eagleton affair should raise a lot of questions as to his ability to handle much tougher decisions in the White House.

I think we should refrain from attacking him personally and would be playing into McGovern's hands if we termed him as radical or ultra-liberal.

III. Nixon's Four Worst Issues

- A. Credibility and Honesty in Government (Democrats will be trying to make much of the ITT affair, the Democratic headquarters bugging and paint the Administration as one of special interests and no feeling.)
- B. Tax Reform (Democrats will say that the Administration is delinquent in not moving faster in this area.)
- C. Unemployment and Inflation
- D. Viet Nam

Comment:

It will be the McGovern strategy to personally attack the President and Vice President on a wide range of matters dealing with honesty, credibility and sensitivity. It will be their hope that they can draw the President and Vice

President into a name calling contest which they feel can best show off McGovern's assumed good, personal character traits. This will also allow them to keep from talking about some of their unpopular positions.

The tax issue arouses a lot of across the board support among groups who otherwise would be unfriendly toward McGovern. The unemployment and inflation issues are obvious and Viet Nam will be cited as an example where the President did not keep his pledge of four years ago to the American people.

IV. McGovern's Four Best Issues

- A. Honesty, Personal Character and Non-Political
(McGovern feels the country wants a non-politician so he will stress this aspect of his candidacy.)
- B. His farsightedness (He will stress his early opposition to the war as an indication that he is a far-sighted leader and has a feel for foreign affairs.)
- C. Lack of Control by Special Interests (McGovern will stress that he is not under the control of political bosses and special interests and thus has a free hand to do what is good for the majority of the people.)
- D. Sensitivity Toward the Have-Nots in the System
(McGovern will try to show that he is sensitive to the wishes of not only the economically poor but those who feel that government is not responsive to the needs of the people.)

Comment:

Very simply, McGovern will try to show that he's a nice guy with no strings attached who is aware and sensitive to the

needs of the people. He will hope to establish the present Administration as insensitive, under the control of special interests and overly political in its approach to decisions.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: HARRY S. DENT *HS-D*
SUBJECT: 1972 Campaign Issues

A. RN's four best 1972 issues

1. Peace, through strength, with honor. Leadership should be pushed here.
2. Domestic tranquility (law enforcement; anti-drug abuse progress; riots, burning, looting virtually gone; first family togetherness; overall stability).
3. Balance, fairness, responsibility, and moderation in appointments, running country, speaking out, etc. End of class, race and sectional warfare fostered by Demos. ✓
4. Economy moving good. Take the offensive here and sell our case. (Best defense is a good offense.) We have the statistics to present, and people generally feel times are good. Let's let them know how good.

B. McGovern's four worst 1972 issues

- ✓ 1. The candidate himself. Represents radical extremism, poor judgment, indecision, inability to run and control a staff, and lack of confidence abounds in his own party.

2. Second-class status for America. Surrender in VN, unilateral disarmament, unrealistic and dangerous defense cuts.
3. Soak the taxpayer and consumer with unlimited welfare schemes and other spending programs which would require twice the taxes and cause uncontrollable inflation.
4. Socialize America, moving from an enterprising, incentive system of success to a hand-out, socialistic society which produces less at a time when even the USSR is coming to recognize the values of using incentives.

C. McGovern's four best 1972 issues

1. Demos outnumber Republicans---get unity as fast as possible and address self to fellow Demos and Demo distaste for RN.
2. Haves v. have nots. Tax reform in forefront, populism, economics, etc.
3. Peace in VN.
4. Supposed freshness and candor.

*Rally
nem*

D. RN's four worst issues

1. Lack of trust Demos can create over ITT, bugging stories, special interests.
2. War still going.
3. Economic ills, which are better---thank goodness.
4. Lack of big domestic legislative achievements.

*Who
cares?*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: KEN W. CLAWSON
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

OUR BEST ISSUES

(1) Foreign Policy: I think we are all in agreement that this is a long suit both in substance and in image, and I think it essential that we get every ounce out of the subject.

(2) The President Himself: I have always felt that we could maximize the President as a person and world leader to a greater extent than we have done thus far. I do not agree that the President as a human being is something that should be hidden from the nation. Aside from his obvious leadership qualities and his imminent qualifications to be President, he is also, and probably as importantly, a warm, decent human being whose personal values most people can identify with. Especially with McGovern putting forth the image of the honest man, I do not think we should overlook those personal and human qualities the President exudes internally, but which the public at large is unfamiliar and believes to be non-existent.

(3) The Economy: Viet Nam or no, I am still convinced that more voters will vote their pocketbooks this year than for any other reason. We are in great danger, despite the best professionals saying that the economy is starting to boom and inflation is decreasing, of permitting McGovern to convince the public that economic conditions are still bad. He can use food prices and unemployment to bolster his case and indeed has an opportunity to convince people that they are actually worse off than they seem. I don't think too ✓
much attention can be given to exploiting the positive side of the President's economic program. d Moore

Since the facts support an improving economy, it is our responsibility as image makers to take McGovern head on and try to rest from his grasp a "bad" feeling toward the economy and replace it with a "good" feeling toward the economy.

(4) Crime-Drugs: Without question, this Administration has done more to address itself to the frustrating mores of narcotics usage in the country. Drugs now reach into the hamlets and rural countryside of the nation, and more and more people are being touched directly and indirectly by them. We must have a very hard-nosed attitude toward the eradication of this problem, and our sympathies should be directed to those innocent persons, i.e., mothers, fathers, relatives, the community, who see the entire morality of the country being lowered by those addicted to drugs.

McGOVERN'S WORST ISSUES

(1) The Economy: I don't think the nation accepts the concept that everyone who wants a job can have one. This appears to me to be the position that McGovern will ultimately have to make his lead economic issue since he has already discredited the \$1,000 per person concept that he initially advanced. 7

(2) McGovern Waffles: I think that it is a bonifide and exploitable issue that McGovern has already demonstrated that he can't make up his mind on one hand, and goes through a continuing evolution of changing his mind on everything from personalities to issues.

(3) Labor Support: It is essential for us and for Republicans in years to come to maximize the splitting of the trade union vote. This is potentially one of the best methods of undercutting McGovern's traditional base of power.

(4) Viet Nam: I know McGovern thinks this is his best issue, but any rational, sane person can better grasp the President's phased approach contrasted with McGovern's surrender. I do not believe that this country is even yet willing to accept defeat in an armed conflict.

McGOVERN'S BEST ISSUES

(1) Nixon Government: As we did in 1968, McGovern can legitimately exploit every faux pas committed by the Executive Branch during the last three years and blame it on the Nixon Administration.

(2) Democratic Bugging Incident: Because the Democrats have control of the civil suit, they can pump this issue about as large as they wish to and tie it to ITT to show that we are not honest men.

(3) The Economy: He can and will accentuate the unfavorable aspects of the economic program.

(4) Viet Nam: The fact is that the war is not over and ultimately this may be what the question boils down to.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: KEN COLE

This is in response to your request regarding issues for the Fall campaign.

I. My thoughts.

A. Our four best issues.

1. Foreign policy - the prospect of peace for generations, a stable world, Nixon the strong international leader, an honorable end to the Vietnam War.
2. Economic Policy - a booming economy, a strong economic leader, a return to real wage increases, no higher taxes, holding down the Federal budget.
3. A return to a stable society - crime down, strong program to cure drug abuse, urban riots and campus turmoil stopped.
4. Stable, strong leadership for the future - the President's personal strengths.

B. We should hit McGovern on -

1. Defense and foreign policy - reducing the U.S. to #2 in the world and jeopardizing the chances for peace.
2. Tax increases - a doubling of federal tax for those in the \$10,000 + bracket and even worse for higher levels plus bigger Federal Government, in addition a \$1000 per person welfare scheme.

3. A permissive society - a return to the instability of the late 60's, the incitement of emotions throughout the country, the promoter of what's wrong - not what's right, more drugs, easy on criminals.
4. Weak, uncertain leadership--can peace be trusted to a man who would beg to our enemies.

II. If I were McGovern.

A. Best issues.

1. Getting America back on the right track - ending the Vietnam War.
2. Unemployment - getting jobs for those who want work.
3. Concern for the poor and down-trodden and the middle class - a tax break (tax the rich), more government services.
4. Credibility - I'm honest, I work in the open - You can trust me.

B. Hit the President on -

1. You can't trust him - he promised to end the War and didn't - he promised jobs and too many are out of work, he's tied to big business and the rich.
2. The President doesn't care about the little people - health, food, welfare reform, race.
3. Taxes - the little people need tax relief - big corporations and the rich get tax relief at the expense of the little people.
4. Unemployment.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

High Priority

August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
VIA: MR. LARRY HIGBY
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN 
SUBJECT: Response to August 7, 1972,
Issue Memorandum

1. FROM THE PRESIDENT'S POINT OF VIEW

A. OUR FOUR BEST ISSUES

1. FOREIGN POLICY/GENERATION OF PEACE

- a. China - Opening communications.
- b. Russia - SALT/Trade and economic benefits of trip.
- c. Vietnam - Troop withdrawals and POW's.

2. A KNOWN QUALITY AS PRESIDENT

- a. Solid.
- b. Dependable.
- c. Professional President.

3. STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE

4. DRUGS

B. OPPOSITION'S FOUR WORST ISSUES

1. EXECUTIVE AND DECISION-MAKING EXPERIENCE/ ABILITY. ESPECIALLY UNDER PRESSURE.
2. WEAKENING DEFENSE STRUCTURE. INEXPERIENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS.
3. HIGH COST OF McGOVERN
 - Big spender, taxes, \$1,000 minimum, etc.
4. VIETNAM UNDERCUTTING OF PRESIDENT.
 - Risk to POW's.

II. FROM McGOVERN'S POINT OF VIEW

A. McGOVERN'S FOUR BEST ISSUES.

1. Big money, hidden money, questionable ethics.
2. Unsympathetic to the Have-Nots - from the poor to those suffering boredom on the assembly lines.
3. Nixonomics - Unemployment, inflation and taxes.
4. Vietnam - the high cost - end it - use the money at home.

B. OUR FOUR WORST ISSUES

1. Questionable acts/ethics.
 - Watergate.
 - \$10 million slush fund.
2. Inflation - unemployment - Nixonomics.
3. Represents big business - against little man.

AND OVER-CONFIDENCE.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Issues in Campaign

Our four best positive issues are:

1. Bring peace to the world -- ending our involvement in Vietnam, stability in the Middle East, new relationships with China and Russia, SALT, etc.
2. Peace at home. We have restored domestic tranquility. The nation was virtually in civil war when Nixon was elected. We are winning the war against crime and drugs -- and have changed the Supreme Court.
3. We stand four-square for no increased taxes, but for tax reform that will simplify the tax procedures and provide greater equity. (Right now this is not our issue, except for no higher taxes; we have to do more to make this a viable, positive issue.)
4. We have restored a stable economy -- increasing real take-home pay, creating millions of new jobs and stopping the rampant inflation that we inherited. (Today this is not a winner and may never be, but we are obviously going to have to put our best positive case forward; the economic issue cannot be avoided.)

NB: But, critical to all of this is the point that this is merely an unfinished agenda. We have only begun. Our goals in each of these areas will be realized in the next four years.

The four best negative issues are:

1. McGovern would put half the country on welfare. His \$1000-a-person plan is totally unworkable, "pie-in-the-sky".
2. McGovern would increase taxes particularly of the working middle class in order to pay for the \$1000 baby bonus and other unrealistic and extravagant schemes.

3. McGovern's proposals imperil the security of the United States. Irresponsible defense cuts would make the U.S. second best, give Russia superiority in the world and invite aggression and further war. He would bug out of Vietnam without our prisoner's and grant amnesty to draft dodgers.
4. McGovern lacks experience, competence, judgment and stability to lead the nation. He is dangerously erratic (can you trust him?); he has demonstrated a lack of accomplishment in the Senate, a lack of decisiveness in everything he has done since being nominated.
5. McGovern favors forced busing.

If I were running McGovern's campaign, I would build it along the following lines:


1. Nixon defends the status quo, big business, special interests -- is for the big guy and against the common man.
2. Our tax system is unjust and we need a radical set of reforms.
3. Guarantee a job for every American, promise to end the Nixon inflation by strong, more equitable price controls. Corporations are making record profits and can afford to hold their profits back.
4. End the war. I would say that I have been assured that if elected all prisoners will be returned before the 90 days in which our military operations would be terminated. I would save that bombshell, however, for mid-October.

These are the major positive and negative themes, but there are a whole set of subsidiary issues that need to be dealt with in specific geographic areas and with specific constituent groups. In addition to amnesty, we have two or three selected veterans issues that are very good. With the Catholics, of course, we have abortion and aid to parochial schools issues. With labor, we have a good point of attack on McGovern's anti-labor record. It's not that different from ours, but he professed to be a pro-labor candidate and took their money. With aging, we have a tremendous record and can really do a positive selling job. With retired military officers, we have a particular appeal on the recomputation

issue. To the maritime interests, we have a good record; the Democratic Platform was silent while we have done more than any other Administration in history. With the Jews, of course, we have the Middle East. A very large part of our efforts should be devoted to these specific targets of appeal.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DOUG HALLETT 
RE: Issues -- Positive and Negative

Positive

- (1) Foreign Policy -- The President is the consummate foreign policy strategist who has phased down the war, brought a new relationship with China, negotiated SALT with the Soviet Union, and, just as importantly if not more, needs four more years to complete his structure of peace.
- (2) Returning Power to People -- This is more a theme than an issue, but it does embody a range of issues -- revenue-sharing, welfare reform, governmental decentralization, etc. -- where we have done enough to get by and which reaches into the core of McGovern's appeal. This, too, must involve some discussion of what is to come as well as what has happened -- deregulation, reprivatization, etc.
- (3) Concern for the Workingman -- This, again, is more a theme than an issue, but it is a theme which can and should be used to unite our very commendable and very unknown record in this area -- occupational health and safety, pension guarantees, social security, tax reform, unemployment compensation, and the other Rosow Report issues. We should press hard with the idea (tacitly) that the Kennedy-Johnson Administration concerned itself almost exclusively with the exotic (and, if we want to get racist, with the blacks) whereas the Nixon Administration has reached out and involved itself in lower-middle-income and middle-income issues.

(4) The Economy -- This should be pressed not because our record is great (it is not), but because McGovern will be pressing it against us and the best way to obscure our debits is to claim (which we can, with some evidence) success in this area. The idea implicit in our discussions should be that the President is the cool, tough, pragmatic operator who can face the fact that his policy is not working, change and adjust it, etc. -- not explicitly said like that, but implicit in what we say.

(5) Restoration of Integrity to the System -- The President can travel anywhere, the campuses and cities are quiet, the Supreme Court has been turned around, our anti-crime efforts, etc. However, we must be careful not to take an undynamic approach here -- order is not good for its own sake and McGovern is right that people know it.

Negative

(1) McGovern is an inept, inexperienced, hyper-idealistic dreamer who is more concerned with the problems of the exotic few than he is with the problems of the majority of the American people. Our best issue is McGovern himself. This has to be handled carefully. Being heavy-handed refocuses attention on us -- and that we don't want, for the President is not exactly everybody's idea of what a President should be -- but a controlled, second-level attack from Democrats like Connally and through mailings, articles, etc. can get this across. McGovern's ties with liberal elitists, his concern for amnesty, abortion, homosexuals, etc. all get tied up with his inexperience, lack of toughness, etc. into an effort to make him seem incredible as President of the U.S.

(2) National Security -- The President's strength is McGovern's weakness. We shouldn't be quite so bombastic as Laird was, but, without the rhetoric, we can get the idea across that McGovern has no experience in and no knowledge of the realities of mid-twentieth century power politics. Getting Kissinger involved -- perhaps through an hour-long Walter Cronkite conversation or something -- would get across the real sophistication of our policy and mailings, etc. can be used to chip away at McGovern.

(3) McGovern is more of the same at a time when we need a new direction in domestic policy -- At the same time we're attacking McGovern as a light-weight idealist, we can also get him as just another high-spending, bureaucratic-oriented New Deal problem-solver -- behind the froth of "new politics" lies the same old stuff

we've gotten for the last thirty years -- more taxes for the workingman, no problem-solving for the poor. The "radical" tag can be put on with certain groups, but the focus for the national strategy should be that while Nixon is redirecting domestic policy, McGovern is just proposing a blown-up version of the failed solutions of the past. Shriver is a perfect point of attack for this.

(4) Specific Voter-Bloc Issues -- Veterans, aging, youth, Spanish-speaking, labor, etc. etc all have their separate range of issues on which McGovern's record can be attacked and compared with ours unfavorably. These should not be made into national issues by and large -- but should be pressed hard through front groups, Democratic organizations, mailings, local speakers, local ads, etc.

From McGovern's point-of-view, all issues are necessarily negative -- he's attacking us and his qualities are attributes only insofar as they differentiate himself from us. He will stress:

(1) End the War Now or if it's ended why not sooner -- McGovern believes that the American people, deep in their hearts, know the Vietnam war is a moral travesty and that only pride keeps us from ending it now. Whatever happens, he will use this issue to point out the frontier hubris which he sees at the core of America's lack of maturity and its failure as an international power since World War II.

(2) The Economy -- The domestic equivalent of Vietnam is our handling of the economy. McGovern will say we favor the rich against the poor, the powerful against the weak -- that the economy is suffering from no temporary malady, but needs to be unchained from corporate control through anti-monopoly laws and tax reform to allow greater competition and growth. Jobs for everybody and holding down of prices will be the immediate foci for his attack.

(3) Openness, Credibility and Candor of Government -- The President lies and when he does not lie, he does not level with the American people. The government is out of people's reach and beyond their control. It lies to them about bombing abroad, unemployment statistics at home, it bugs their telephones and collects massive data files on them, it controls their lives without being under their control.

(4) Nixon is a low-brow, not very thoughtful, low-quality mid-1930's Depression-influenced, out-of-date man on the make. Anybody who can keep Bebe Rebozo, John Mitchell, Bob Haldeman, Chuck Colson, Spiro Agnew, Billy Graham, Clement Haynsworth, and the other people Nixon surrounds himself with is not fit to be President of the United States in 1972. At a time when the country is searching for new values and new directions, Nixon represents the past at its most mediocre. Poor boy made good, he reflects all the worst aspects of American conservatism -- a bigoted, reactionary, unfeeling, un-humanistic make-it-or-else philosophy influenced far more by Horatio Alger than Edmund Burke. A wooden figure ready to use people for his own ends and then cast them off, Nixon cannot understand an America which has no choice but to confront itself and what it is becoming if it does not want to fall victim to the machinery and the psychology which has brought it to preeminence. Nixon's like a Fourth of July speaker who doesn't believe himself what he's saying; McGovern knows what's happening, baby. It's time to start speaking up to people, not speaking down to them in the hyper-patriotic, obscure-the-substance rhetoric Nixon uses.

(5) Corporate Bias -- The tax structure, ITT, the economic program, etc. -- all reflect a bias towards reactionary corporate chiefs. Peter Flanigan says the government is open to each and everyone, but, if I called him, I couldn't get through -- why should James Roche?

(6) Redirect Priorities -- Whatever we have done, it's not enough. The defense budget can be slashed and domestic spending must be increased.

cc: Charles Colson

August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: LEN GARMENT

A. Our best issues:

1. The "Nixon Doctrine" (a concrete and personalized way of talking about the "peace" issue) -- i.e., RN's carefully designed framework for the Summits, the SALT breakthrough, burden-sharing of dollars and manpower with our allies, reduced defense expenditures and draft calls, the orderly and honorable withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam, the disorderly expulsion of the Soviets from the Middle East, etc. The peace issue is far and away Number One, not only because of its intrinsic strength but because it buttresses the well-developed sense of RN's Presidential capabilities and helps extend it to the domestic area as well.
2. The "Freedom Without Coercion" issue -- i.e., the anti-bureaucratic, war-on-big-government proposals, the stand against forced integration in housing, against busing to achieve racial balance, against quotas, etc.
3. The "Social" issue -- i.e., RN's support of a system of traditional, rational values of restraint and common sense versus the free-wheeling, nervewracking, stability-threatening philosophy, rhetoric and experimental life style of the counterculture. (But the specific issues -- drugs, pornography, amnesty, patriotism, etc., have to be handled with sophistication and restraint).
4. The "Professionalism" issue -- i.e., the careful, orderly, effective, and visible performance of the President and his now tested and experienced team which has turned the country around from the crisis-ridden, planless chaos of 1968. This covers all issues -- even those where the pace of progress is relatively slow, as in the economic/inflation area -- and it rests on the proposition that - as a matter of self interest - you don't take a series of complex responsibilities and carefully planned pieces of domestic and foreign policy work, all of which is now in professional hands and moving forward and turn the whole kit and kaboodle over to amateurs.

B. McGovern's vulnerabilities:

1. He has no foreign policy experience, and no foreign "policy".
2. He is locked in to a powerful commitment to special issues, minority groups and a hodgepodge of "juvenile" and ideological constituencies in a way that signals a return to the emotionalism, division and spirit of confrontation of the 60's.
3. He sincerely holds to a political philosophy that spells more spending, more government, more bureaucratic pushing around.
4. He has shown no "governing" strength; he is coming across as a minor league leader; he is a vacillator on matters of substance; he is even an outcast in his own party -- i.e., a man without the unifying talents that an American President must have.

C. McGovern's best issues:

1. That he was "right from the start" on Vietnam -- and had the courage to speak out and the perseverance and political talent to win the nomination.
2. That he is an honest, open, credible and essentially anti-political personality, determined to break with the standard tricks and devices of conventional politicians.
3. That he offers a clear choice of fundamental issues affecting the economic and spiritual well-being of the majority of Americans, and is determined to slice up the American pie more equitably by basic reform of tax and income distribution systems. (Attached is a more detailed memorandum on this point that I drafted for Ray Price's Acceptance Speech package).
4. That he genuinely cares about the "frustrations" of ordinary people -- the poor and the disadvantaged minorities, the overtaxed middle class, the harrassed city-dweller, all the victims of high cost - low quality living -- and he's determined to do something about it, just as he was determined to gain the Democratic nomination despite the hostility and opposition of the political establishment at the beginning of his primary campaign. His basic issue: that the focus of government attention must be shifted from the world to the neighborhood.

D. McGovern's best points of attack:

1. That RN broke his pledge to end the war in Vietnam; the killing and spending goes on, and will go on indefinitely - or be stepped up - once RN gets past the political problem of the election.
2. That the ITT and Watergate episodes (and the \$10 million of "concealed" contributors) are merely examples of things to come in a flood in the next

term - favoritism for big business interests, the perpetuation of a swollen arms budget, the abuse of power through invasion of privacy, secret political deals to extend the power of the Republican party, public relations instead of progressive leadership.

3. That RN is not temperamentally equipped to deal with the nitty-gritty problems of the U.S. because he doesn't really care about little problems or little guys. He travels thousands of miles to confer with important leaders abroad but doesn't mingle with or listen to the ordinary people at home.

4. That RN is philosophically tied to the status quo and the Establishment, and therefore will not, nor would his important allies permit him to, push for the kinds of basic changes in national priorities and programs that are needed to make a recognizable difference in the lives of ordinary people here at home; and that the well-heeled reelection campaign is, in essence, a super-slick and smug snow job designed to gloss over the painful realities of U.S. life and the inadequacies of the Nixon Administration in coming to grips with them.

attachment



Notes on the Acceptance Speech

First, some background guesses and assumptions:

1. By the end of August, the McGovern campaign to improve life for the poor and middle class by soaking the rich, reducing the defense budget, etc., will be getting underway. His emphasis on issues of economic "equity" will be steadily increasing.
2. McGovern will be coming across as a credible politician who means what he says on these issues; and the media will be giving him a helping hand.
3. McGovern's pitch will be a simple and saleable one to millions of "working class" people fed up with high prices, high taxes, shoddy goods, shabby services, etc. They will be inclined to agree with McGovern when he says they are, as always, getting the short end of the stick, while the rich and powerful continue to get special privileges from "the system" and from Republican friends in Washington.
4. The busing issue will be getting murkier as McGovern and Eagleton make clear their lack of enthusiasm for busing. They will get considerable running room from their black supporters on this issue. McGovern's tax, welfare, health care and defense proposals will dominate his campaign thoroughly, the intent being to overshadow issues like busing.
5. The argument of the Democrats on foreign policy will be designed to reinforce this domestic focus: So RN met the Russians and Chinese. That's to his credit. We'll do the same, and more. Vietnam goes on. We're overcommitted elsewhere. The defense budget is going up. So are prices. Where, in short, is the domestic pay-off from trips around the world and expensive moonshots? Life at home is more difficult and less fair than ever for the working man and woman. That's the issue. And that's the way it's going to be as long as the fat cats of the military-industrial-Nixon Administration complex run the country. "Bring America home" - and so on.
6. By the end of August, the Democrats will have begun sorting things out, repairing relations, raising money, registering young voters, showing they "care", doing interesting and tough things on paid media, offering revised, and more generalized, substantive proposals, and, overall, beginning to look sharper and more cohesive than in August 1968. Defections

by the extreme left will be planned, provoked and welcomed as McGovern edges toward the center.

7. If my assumption as to a essentially single-issue focus in the McGovern campaign is correct, it would mean that one of RN's principal acceptance speech problems would be how to contend with an unfolding national appeal to pocketbook concerns that is simple, demagogic, effective, and difficult to answer in a responsible fashion. Against the general feeling that McGovern doesn't have a chance, one fact to be borne in mind is this: When people who are badly pinched are offered money by a credible figure - and McGovern's objective above all else has been to make himself credible - the offer is hard to resist. And simply to attack McGovern as a "radical" will not mean much. Quite a few people will manage to ignore the label if they come to believe they'll have more in their pockets with McGovern in the White House.

8. On these assumptions, the objectives of our general campaign would be, first, to lay out the affirmative case for RN's reelection; second, to establish that McGovern-style government means more bureaucratic manipulation and less individual freedom than ever before in U.S. history; third, to translate into personal and specific terms the impact of McGovern-style economics on the standard of living of most Americans; and fourth, to create skepticism, eventually disbelief, not about McGovern's sincerity - that's a difficult and dangerous tack to take - but about his ability to do what he promises.

9. In this framework, the basic function of the President's acceptance speech will be to set a certain tone, to make clear what the campaign will be and what it will not be; and, beyond that, to accept and declare, as central to that campaign, not an issue of personalities but one of Presidential responsibility; to define RN's concept of the Presidential "trust"; to account for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's assets in the difficult years of his first term; to articulate the connection between foreign policy achievements and domestic program capabilities; to show how the promises of the 1968 Acceptance and the 1969 Inaugural are being achieved; to reiterate that the reduction of the bureaucracy, the expansion of individual freedom from coercion, and the enlargement of every individual's control over the content and quality of his life is the essence of RN's philosophical commitment. One message I think the Acceptance could most usefully convey is the following warning set out in a New Republic editorial as an admonition to McGovern:

"It is never salutary to fire up Utopian expectations that are beyond any administration's power to fulfill. However compassionate, courageous or wise it may be, government cannot make night day. If there is a feeling of betrayal in many hearts, it is at least in part because so many politicians have wooed the personal rancor and disaffection in America that can be moderated, but no word from the White House, no legislation, no bureaucratic efficiency can banish it. When politicians encourage the disaffected to demand more than government can deliver, they run the risk of spreading disillusion. And in turn, if the disaffected demand deliverance now through politics, they run the risk of getting more government than they want, more than a free society can take and still stay free."

The President's plea to "lower voices" and his promise to move from confrontation to negotiation, were the central themes of his Inaugural. He has moved the country toward both objectives - dramatically in foreign policy, steadily in domestic policy. The mood of his Acceptance should be that he seeks reelection not to vindicate these efforts but to continue them, that he is not running against a man or a party, but for the opportunity to complete what has been begun.



August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: B. HARLOW

Abiding your injunction for brevity, telescoped below are answers to your August 7 memorandum:

1. RN Issues:

Peace with power, prosperity, proportion, prudence.

2. McGovern Vulnerabilities:

Radicalism at home, flab abroad, social permissiveness, demagoguery (vacillation on issues to pander for votes).

3. McGovern Issues:

Murder stopped in Vietnam, the privileged punished, the jobless and underprivileged saved, and integrity restored (no ITT, no secret contributors).

4. Nixon Vulnerabilities:

Vietnam, inflation and unemployment, bloated defense, pandering for privilege (including \$10 million "slush fund").

As asserted by the President, in this campaign the contrasts will be lively and clear:

The 1972 Choice (Republican):

Seasoned experience vs. amateurism
Solid performance vs. buncombe
Responsibility vs. radicalism
Strength vs. weakness
Accountability vs. expediency
Middle American ethics vs. New Left extremism
Preserving America vs. disruption at home and abroad

The 1972 Choice (Democratic):

VN war stopped vs. indefinite prolongation
Defense fat pared vs. bloated militarism
The rich soaked vs. the rich enriched
The poor succored vs. the poor exploited
Idealism vs. crass materialism
Candor and honesty vs. ITT-ism and secret contributors

As requested, I have not enlarged on any of these notions, though the temptation is great. Nor have I mentioned the "bugging" scandal or the GAO audit of the Re-Elect Committee. I do hope neither escalates into a dominant issue.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY HIGBY

FROM: DICK MOORE *DM*

I think our four best substantive issues are:

1. Nixon the Peacemaker, i.e. China, the Moscow agreements, and bringing home the troops from Vietnam. The Vietnam issue is fortified by the fact that the people respected the President's courageous decision on Haiphong and his resolute determination to get the prisoners back.
2. The Economy. The President has done things for the economy and 1972 is indeed becoming a very good year. (No President has been turned out with prosperity on the upswing.) It's true that food prices are high, but generally the President has slowed inflation and unemployment. More positively stated, he has created more jobs through both his domestic and foreign policies, and this is an item which should be hit.
3. Drugs and Crime. The initiative and momentum on both fronts are with us, and we must keep it up.
4. Busing.

Special Issue. I think the best issue we have going for us is more of a theme or underlying premise: our experienced and capable President is making good headway -- don't rock the boat. You will recall that the November Group survey of slogans showed that by far, the most favored was "Help him finish the job". This is really a variation of the theme which is the most powerful of all, when applicable: don't change horses in midstream.

Without using these words, we must keep hitting this theme, namely that the President's programs are ongoing - his journey toward peace and prosperity is proceeding very well, but it isn't finished yet, and this is no time to try a new pilot. Deep down, I think this is what the people feel, and we should keep nurturing it.

McGovern's four worst issues.

1. The man himself is unqualified by experience or character. He has never managed anything, and he is at worst, an unprincipled opportunist or at best, an indecisive, idealistic dreamer who will only screw things up.
2. McGovern will strip our defenses and cause wide spread unemployment in the process.
3. If McGovern were to be elected, we could expect a major depression. He simply does not understand American business or the American economy. That is why the men who make our economy tick are so deathly afraid of him. McG
market
4. His willingness to leave our prisoners to the mercy of Hanoi.

Special Issue. Again, in the case of McGovern, I think the best thing we have going is an underlying premise or theme, rather than a substantive issue, namely, that he is so irresponsible that he cannot even win the confidence or support of many loyal Democrats. The defection of so many of his normal constituents creates an aura of rejection and foreseeable defeat. We should nurture this.

McGovern's four best substantive issues:

1. He will end the war immediately.
2. He will close all the tax loopholes of the rich, and reduce the taxes of the middle class and poor.
3. He will cut the excessive expenditures of the military industrial establishment and pass the savings on to the aged and the needy, etc.
4. This country can provide a job for everyone, and McGovern will do it, even if the government has to be the employer.

Negative issues.

The four substantive issues on which McGovern will attack us are listed above. However, in the final analysis, I think McGovern will decide that his only chance is to make a massive assault on the President personally, and I think the campaign will be low and dirty. His main thrust will be the President's alleged lack of trustworthiness and compassion: ITT, Watergate, the "secret" 10 million, secrecy in general, plus a callous disregard for civil rights and the poor and the black, etc.

Finally, the minute McGovern moves up a point or two in the polls, I think we can expect a loud claim that he is on the Dewey-Truman syndrome. This possibility could have credibility and help generate enthusiasm in the McGovern camp where none could otherwise exist. We must anticipate it.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1972

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E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By , Date 3-13-82

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MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: John C. Whitaker



Here are my thoughts on the four issues raised in Larry Higby's memo of August 7 (Tab A):

I. Our best issues.

. Incumbent President -- responsible, constructive job only partly done; don't switch horses -- run as President, not as candidate.

. Mastery of foreign affairs -- cooling of cold war tensions; building a lasting peace -- affirmative substantive results in Russia, China and Middle East.

. Competence and thoroughgoing professionalism in the ways of government -- lifetime of experience in national leadership.

. Practical results on "the social issue" -- targeted to how it is perceived in various areas and among various voter groups -- drugs, health, aged, environment, bussing, etc.

II. Opposition's worst issues.

. Radicalism -- meaning however that term is perceived in the eyes of the beholder -- e.g., welfare proposals, low defense spending, abortion, gay plank. People are on automatic pilot on McGovern image. It makes no difference what he says in the next 100 days, people won't listen -- like Goldwater's "big bomb" issue. McGovern's idea of change is a break with and repudiation of the

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past. The President's brand of change is conservative in the traditional and best sense -- building on the base of American achievement and perfecting it, not turning our backs on our first two hundred years.

. McGovern as elitist -- chosen by a small group, not representative despite the "most open convention" -- the old intellectual cabal of Cadillac liberals trying to force their way in to use the Federal Government as a crucible for social experimentation.

III. Opposition strongpoints as viewed from within.

- . Sincerity, believability and concern of their candidate.
- . Receptiveness to new ideas -- youthful, anti-establishment, constructively iconoclastic image.
- . Early, vocal and easily understood opposition to Vietnam war.
- . Tax reform -- details don't matter, convince the majority of voters that we ought to soak somebody else.
- . Deficit spending during the first Nixon term -- potentially a good issue for McGovern, but I don't think he will use it, because his economists are all on record as saying we need more of it.

IV. Our worst issues from opposition viewpoint.

- . Economy -- wage/price freeze, taxes (Feds get blamed for increases at all levels of government), inflation, etc.
- . Big business image -- lack of concern for and empathy with the little guy. This establishment image translates into anti-youth and anti-new ideas.

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. Insincerity of the President -- he is just a politician --
"I don't like him, but I don't know why."

. Vietnam -- President broke campaign "promise" to end
involvement in one term -- continues expensive (and immoral)
U.S. support operations while threatening vetoes of all domestic
spending programs as inflationary.

Conclusion

In almost all of the categories, it is easy to think of the first
two points (admittedly with a lot of specific issue examples), but
difficult to come up with a long shopping list. Thus I think the
campaign will be fought on very limited issues -- the economy,
Vietnam and a shifting mix of a social issue. The public percep-
tion will be very much on personalities and the factor of trust.

cc: John D. Ehrlichman

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: RAY PRICE
SUBJECT: 1972

Re your query on the four best - four worst:

To begin with, the election is going to turn basically on the question: "Whom do you trust?" In which candidate do you have a greater gut faith that he has your interests at heart, that he can do the job, that he's as honest as can be expected, that the country is safe in his hands?

Against McGovern, we've got two basic things going for us: 1) radicalism, and 2) unreliability, which includes re-neging on commitments, shooting from the hip, lack of capacity, confusion -- which wrapped up together spell someone you don't want to entrust the Presidency to.

His radicalism -- including the takeover of the Democratic machinery by an arrogant, elitist faction -- can be our chief asset in prying away dissident organization Democrats, and those concerned with the future of the Democratic party. They can only get the party back by contributing to a resounding McGovern defeat in November.

His unreliability is, I think, a more potent asset for us in wooing the general public. In this regard, "1000 percent" has the potential to be to George McGovern what "brainwash" was to Romney and crying was to Muskie -- the incident that becomes a code surfacing all the underlying doubts about his candidacy and his capacity.

So far, it looks as though he's going to mount a hard, slashing and essentially negative attack. This can boomerang. True, he'll land some of his punches. But I thought that in his speech Saturday night he sounded like a typical hack politician, and the one thing he had going for him previously -- when he was getting such favorable attention -- was that he came across as an essentially good and decent guy who stood apart from the usual political posturings. If he continues as he's begun, he's going to continue losing this major asset.

Any selection of four best and four worst has to be somewhat arbitrary, because in public perceptions issues don't separate themselves out into neat issue-book categories. But here's a list:

From RN's Point of View

RN's 4 Best:

1. Capacity and competence. Experience, knowledge, recognized world statesman, a known quantity, proven performance, don't change horses.
2. Preserving values and institutions against assault from the Leftist fringes. A force for stability, but not for the status quo; for orderly, well-managed change, as opposed to headlong plunges into dreamland.
3. Peace and strength. The careful orchestration and successful achievement of major peace initiatives, Russia-China, a generation of peace and the strength to maintain it, not begging or crawling, never number 2. Bold new initiatives that worked.

4. Don't let them take it away. More people have more of a stake in the economy, and in not upsetting it; major progress is being made toward peace at home, toward healing divisions, curbing crime, cleaning up the environment without wrecking the economy -- let's continue this, not plunge back to ground zero.

McGovern's 4 Worst:

✓ 1. Bumbling and double-dealing. Can't manage the government if he can't manage his campaign, would you want him behind you 1000 percent, doesn't think before he acts (\$1,000, etc.).

✓ 2. A policy of weakness that would threaten the peace and invite disaster.

3. Neglect of the real people in his pre-occupation with the fashionable minorities and fashionable causes. Under-representation of the aged, farmers, ethnics, workers, at Miami; a fascination with the far-out-niks.

4. He'd bankrupt America. The high cost of his give-aways, more taxes, more inflation, taking from the worker to give to the non-worker, threatening the economic system itself.

From McGovern's Point of View

McGovern's 4 Best:

1. The voice of the little guy. Everybody feels put-upon, and he's the spokesman for their frustrations and discontents -- a powerful position to be in.

*Wallace
Condit*

2. "Priorities." We've got plenty of resources, we're just spending too much of them on bad things and not enough on good things; we should close loopholes and make the rich pay more, RN's the protector of the rich and the MIC. McG will soak the rich and the MIC.

3. Conscience. We've not done right by the young, the minorities, the environment, the poor -- we can do better and we must do better.

4. Peace. The real way to peace is to stop the war.

RN's 4 Worst:

1. Never trust RN (Watergate caper, too clever by half, dissimulation, too political, ITT, Carswell, campaign contributions) and never trust a Republican.

2. The economy. Deliberate unemployment, anti-labor, against the little guy, inflation, ITT, campaign contributions, never trust a Republican -- and why has it taken so long?

3. The war. If RN can end it now, why not four years and 20,000 lives ago?

4. Abrasiveness. We've been anti-young, anti-media, needlessly rubbing salt in the Nation's wounds (and he probably hopes that we'll do it again).

NB



Raymond K. Price, Jr.

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM

August 8, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
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E.O. 12066, DECLASS. S-102
By-EP-----/NAM, Date 3-15-82

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER *Rmt*
SUBJECT: Nixon/McGovern Strong/Weak Issues

As requested this memorandum summarizes my recommendations on what I think can be the most effective issues for us in the campaign, what are our most vulnerable areas, and McGovern's potential strengths and weaknesses. These recommendations are based on my interpretation of the June data and can, of course, change as the campaign progresses.

STRONGEST NIXON ISSUES

1. Vietnam

Vietnam has been, and will probably continue to be by far the most important national issue and the one more people say will be important to their potential vote than any other. There is a strong support for the President's Vietnam program and his ratings on handling Vietnam have been and continue to be high. It is the issue on which the President has the greatest advantage in terms of his perceived ability to handle it. Both our waves of polling and the focus group sessions indicated that with many voters the President's overall approval rating is closely tied to Vietnam.

Since Vietnam has been a major national issue, there have been several secondary issues which have risen and fallen and become at times code words for a broader set of attitudes. It appears now that "Amnesty" may become such an issue. There is no question that amnesty is now seen as an integral part of the Vietnam issue as opposed to an independent issue.

2. Peace/Foreign Affairs/National Defense

While the independent issues of foreign affairs and national defense are not ranked particularly high in terms of importance to voting, the President gets his highest ratings on them. When they are translated into ways the President is striving for peace, they can undoubtedly be effective in the campaign. They are also a means to take advantage of some of his greatest accomplishments, i.e. his Russia and China trips.

I think it is particularly important that the campaign show the breadth of the President's foreign policy accomplishments and that they always be interpreted as furthering the cause of World Peace.

3. Drugs/Crime

Drugs is a problem that is of intense personal concern to a wide spectrum of the electorate. It led the list in January of the issues that were of the most concern to the individual respondents. There is virtually no negative to anything the President might say or do on this issue and offers a great opportunity for us. It is the one issue where the President's ratings have increased sharply since January, and I think we should continue to use it extensively.

Drugs are also a believable and honest solution to the crime problem with many voters and does not get us tied up in the law and order, repression or anti-black problem. The greatest concern on the crime issue is personal safety and drugs are seen as a cause of it.

It is also an issue where the President can show his understanding, compassion, and determination to solve a problem about which there is a great deal of fear, apprehension, and lack of knowledge on the part of most older Americans, particularly parents.

4. General Unrest

I think the President can tie many issues together under this issue and improve his overall perception by using this theme which is directed at restoring a more orderly way of life in the country and decreasing the unrest. We need something to communicate the "lower our voices" and "bring us together" themes of 1968. This is the one area where the President can give people hope for an improvement in their lives.

Note:

The economy, particularly inflation, was on this list in January but is now one of our weaknesses rather than strengths. It is the second most important issue to the voters and it undoubtedly will become one of our strengths if the President takes further action, particularly with regard to food prices.

WEAKEST NIXON ISSUES

1. Inflation and Food Prices

This is the second most important issue in its effect on the vote, and the most important area where the President's ratings have dropped severely since January. In my opinion, if we get into trouble on this campaign, it will be on this issue. However, if the President should take further strong action to slow rising prices, particularly food prices, it would probably be one of our strengths rather than weaknesses.

2. Tax Reform

Taxes and tax reform are also important issues and ones where the President's ratings have decreased significantly. Rising taxes, particularly property taxes, are an important element of inflation and rising prices in general. I think the President should definitely make a major statement proposing tax reform, particularly for the middle income family early in September.

3. Change

The general issue of change is also one where we appear vulnerable. The great majority of voters think that we need major change in our governmental and economic systems and see McGovern as representing that change. More importantly, however, they see the President as being opposed to it. It is important that we portray the President as an innovator and advocate of responsible change in the campaign.

4. Unemployment/Jobs

Jobs is always an important issue and while we do not appear to be losing any votes over unemployment now, neither are we getting any votes on the jobs issue. Also the President's ratings on unemployment are low and leaving him vulnerable to attack by McGovern.

STRONGEST McGOVERN ISSUES

McGovern's ratings on the various issues are all very similar, which indicates that he is not identified to any great degree with specific issues. Rather, he has a general issue handling perception that covers most of the individual issues and is in many ways a personal dimension attached to him. I do think there are some areas that he will concentrate on.

1. Inflation/Food Prices

While there is no evidence in the data to indicate McGovern has any unique strength on this issue, it is our weakest point and a traditional Democratic issue, and one that is particularly usable by those out of office. It also appears to me that McGovern is beginning to zero in on this issue. He is undoubtedly looking at the same kind of data we are.

2. Domestic Priorities

This general area could be effectively used by including defense spending and the whole idea of spending less abroad and more at home.

I understand that there is some consideration of a "He cares about this country most" type of theme for McGovern which handled properly could be effective. There is strong support for the idea that we need to spend a larger portion of our resources on our own domestic problems.

3. Tax Reform

Tax reform is another area where we are vulnerable and it is an extremely important issue. It is also related to both change and inflation and clearly has great appeal to most middle income people. The President is now perceived as being far from the majority of the voters.

4. Change

This is also an issue where we are vulnerable and one on which McGovern appears to have some impact in the primaries. At this point he is only moderately identified with it but he seems to be focusing in on it. It will probably be fairly easy for him to broaden this into a concentration of power and help for the little man issue. The change issue is also directly related to the domestic priority issue.

5. Unemployment/Jobs

Unemployment is an issue that does not appear to be costing us any votes now but one I would work on hard if I were McGovern, emphasizing particularly the jobs and the need for more jobs rather than just unemployment. Jobs has always been an effective political issue as everyone who has a job wants a better job and everyone who does not have a job wants to find one.

WEAKEST McGOVERN ISSUES

1. Competence

The greatest weakness of McGovern is a lack of competence and the depth and breadth to deal with the problems of the Presidency. This is the area where the President has the greatest advantage over him now. It was a McGovern weakness in June and has undoubtedly been compounded by the Eagleton affair.

2. Government Spending/Welfare/High Taxes

McGovern's weakest substantive issue may also be economic. I think it will be fairly easy to label him as a big spender at a time when there is great objection to increased government spending, particularly for social welfare programs. It is important that we tie these McGovern programs to higher taxes, and prove to the voters that he simply cannot create these new programs without higher taxes.

3. Extremism

The seeds for establishing McGovern as an extremist and his ideas as outside the dimensions of acceptability were evidence in the second wave data. This idea can be set deeper as the campaign goes on; however, can best be done by monopolizing the center and shoving McGovern to the left on the issues without attacking him personally.

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

JOHN McLAUGHLIN *John*

SUBJECT:

Four Crow Points and
Four Attack Points for
RN and McGovern.

RN's FOUR CROW POINTS:

1.) Incumbency. RN has proven his competence. He can handle the job: sensible, level-headed, moderate responsibly progressive, politically astute, tough when called to be, professional, decisive. A combination of flexibility and steel, astringency and sentiment.

2.) Domestic Tranquility. Under RN the center held. 1968 saw division, riot, bombings, accelerating crime, drug indulgence, run-away inflation, a bloating war, an immobilized President. RN reduced crime, checked drug addiction through innovative programs, slashed inflation, turned the war around, made new court appointees. The Nation is back on the tracks.

3.) Peace Candidate. RN is the true peace candidate. One-half million men home from SVN. We are on the threshold of a settlement. This settlement is moral, a McGovern bug-out would have been immoral: blood-bath, prolongation of the war in Southeast Asia, enslavement (literally) for multiple generations of South Vietnamese and, probably, Laotians and Cambodians. War would not have stopped in Southeast Asia, moreover, if we had so precipitously withdrawn as McGovern proposes: millions of South Vietnamese would have continued to resist by guerilla warfare with incalculable loss of life.

RN has restructured U.S. relationship to the international community by lowering American profile, and at the same time restructured the international community itself, inclining nations to take a larger, more proportionate share of responsibility for their own defense. RN's historic Peking and Moscow summitry has created a global spirit of irenicism inclining nations to realistically compromise long-held disputes rather than resorting to protracted belligerency. A climate of compromise is demonstrated by developments between North and South Korea, East and West Germany, Japan and China, India and Pakistan, and possibly Egypt and Israel. RN can take his share of credit for this astonishing spirit of international detente.

4.) A Record To Build On. To prevent his gains from being wiped out, RN must be remanded by the American people. His stewardship has been sound and productive. It deserves extension. Look at what remains to be done: domestic programs languishing in Congress because of obstructionists' dilatory tactics. The next four years will bring prosperity and peace, a quality of life that Americans have not known before, ushering in the 200th anniversary of this country.

RN's FOUR ATTACK POINTS:

1.) McGovern Is Green. Inexperience. Incompetent. His failures of executive control have already been demonstrated: his staff at the convention. He does not even control his party.

2.) McGovern Is Dangerous. \$1,000 for every man, woman and child - for breathing - at a cost of \$200 billion. Welfare floor: \$6,500, which would put one-half of the Nation on relief and the other half working to support it. Decriminalization of marijuana, perilous defense budget cuts, abortion on demand. McGovern wants too much change: it would turn the Nation upside down.

3.) McGovern Is Divisive. North against South, blacks against whites, labor against management, young against old.

4.) McGovern is Indecisive. (To be stressed only after McG.

has been locked into his radical, leftist positions.) He fudges, waffles, muddles, and weasels: abortion, private school aid, POW's, troops in Southeast Asia. "I'm behind Tom Eagleton 1,000%."

McGOVERN'S FOUR CROW POINTS:

- 1.) Jobs. "I will put people to work." Inflation can be controlled without bleeding people of their jobs, the way Nixon has done.
- 2.) Trust. "You can put your trust in me."
- 3.) Populist. "I serve the people, not the fat cats."
- 4.) Open Government. "My administration will be open to all strata of society, and my books will be open."

McGOVERN'S FOUR ATTACK POINTS:

- 1.) Nixon Is A Destroyer. RN bombs North Vietnam, kills civilians, ruins dikes, mines harbors, causes refugees, napalms children.
- 2.) Nixon Is A Failure. Unemployment rages, inflation soars, streets unsafe, air dirty, water polluted, people disunited.
- 3.) Nixon Serves The Fat Cats. ITT, child care veto, no tax reform, unresponsive to youth, blacks, minorities.
- 4.) Nixon Is Sneaky. Watergate Five. RNC \$5,000 check payola. San Diego embarrassments. (Whatever heads must roll, ought to be rolled now, by the way.)

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

- 1.) McGovern must generate within the people a (synthetic) sense of need for major change. That sense is not present now; the people do not want the kind or volume of change that McGovern needs if he is to win. Our response to his effort to awaken a sense of need for change could degenerate into a plea for prolonged status quoism. This danger is endemic to incumbency campaigning.

Our counterpoint should be that RN has produced change - responsible, timely, moderately progressive, and absorbable change. Number 4 above under RN's positive points, therefore, should be hit hard by surrogates. The electorate needs a vision of the future as well as a sense of stability with the present.

2.) Don't Let The Rascals In. McGovern will assume the offensive, namely, "Throw the rascals out." RN must not simply batten down the hatches defensively. Our offensive strategy ought to be: "Don't let the rascals in." If McGovern says inflation has gone up, it is not enough for us to race to the television screen and say afterwards, "No, inflation has gone down." It must also be stressed that if McGovern's policies were adopted, inflation would sky-rocket. Analogously, if McGovern says that RN stands for war, our offensive response position is RN is the true peace candidate, McG. war candidate. In other words, the danger of an incumbency candidacy is that it assumes an exclusively defensive posture. McGovern ought not be allowed to determine which issues are to be focused on. If that happens, the Republicans will be made to look scared, even panicky.

So, in an incumbency campaign, the kind of response to opposition attacks is telling, namely, whether the attack is responded to or not; the timing of the response; its quality of restraint or force; and who actually does the responding. My present feeling is that we have more to risk by overkill in responding, than by underkill in responding. Our energies ought to be directed more to establishing the focus than to responding to McGovern's attack initiatives. Without over-profiling him, we can put him on the defensive and plot the battle grounds that we want to fight on.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT: Issues in the Fall Campaign

Given all circumstances, Sargent Shriver is probably the best running mate McGovern could have picked.

First, he reassures the old New Deal power brokers (witness Mayor Daley's enthusiastic statements) without carrying their liabilities since he has not run for office before, and, of course, additionally, has the Kennedy identification.

Second, he is youthful, attractive and liberal enough to insure favorable media coverage. Since even the press had finally despaired of McGovern, we can predict that Shriver will very soon have a romance going with the media that will put the "Muskie '68" to shame.

As to what we should do tactically and issue-wise in the face of this, I suggest the following.

1. Stay on course and sustain our assault on McGovern and his policies. In the final analysis, voters are comparing Nixon vs. McGovern for the Presidency so we should not build up Shriver by attacking him --- and, of course, that particularly means Agnew. We can cope with Shriver in the media partially by having young, attractive surrogates (e.g., Rumsfeld) bracket Shriver on his schedule and tie him to McGovern's extreme positions. With whatever friends we can find in the press, we must force Shriver to agree as fully and as soon as possible with all of McGovern's positions. Shriver must not be allowed to fuzz his and McGovern's positions.

2. Shriver personifies the old Federal handout - "War on Poverty" - categorical program approach. He should be roasted on why these programs failed and asked repeatedly where he stands on revenue sharing, etc. The strong support the President has among mayors, for example, who dislike the old categorical approach, should be used to full advantage in this area.

A good many big city votes could turn on how this is handled.

3. We must not let Shriver become a foreign policy expert or spokesman on the thin basis of his Peace Corps work and ambassadorship to France. Remember that McGovern and Eagleton could not even pretend sophistication on this score.

4. All in all, if I were in McGovern's position, I would move Shriver out front and keep him on the road, particularly for the immediate future. McGovern is tired and over-exposed after his primary and convention stints, and he and his staff need to recoup and regroup.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY
FROM: BILL SAFIRE (dictated from London)
RE: Campaign Issues

A. Our Best (Positive)

1. Nixon will bring peace that will last.
2. Nixon stands for the values most Americans believe in.
3. Nixon stopped the rise of crime and disorder.
4. Nixon is bringing about prosperity in peacetime.

B. Opposition's Worst (Negative)

1. That's your money they want to redistribute.
2. They would appease their way into another war.
3. They represent only the extremes and not the majority.
4. Millions of investors in stock market securities would suffer if they won.

C. Opposition's Best (Positive)

1. The average man will get a better deal through tax reform.
2. The war would end right away.
3. A spirit of compassion would bring the country together.
4. They would change priorities to spend money on people and not war machines.

D. Opposition's Worst (Negative)

1. Nixon the captive of special interests and fat cats.
2. Nixon's secret war chest conceals embarrassing donations.
3. Nixon broke his promises on the war and is strictly an opportunist without principle.
4. Nixon has shown he doesn't give a damn about the cities.

HIGH PRIORITY

August 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : MR. SEARS

FROM : L. HIGBY

Now that the dust has settled, the opposition Vice Presidential candidate picked, and the opposition candidate making it clear what his line of attack is going to be, Bob asked that you put together a brief memo that lists your thoughts as to what our four best issues will be for the fall campaign, and what the opposition candidate's four worst issues are - i. e., the things we want to hit him on.

Then, put yourself in the role of the opposition candidate and looking at it from his point of view, list what you feel are his four best issues and what our four worse issues are from his viewpoint or the issues he will be hitting us on.

Please forward your thoughts by 2:00 p.m. Tuesday, August 8th.

G → Sears 8/7

Gordon


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 24, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: HR. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: DOUG HALLETT 

RE: Larry Higby's Memo of July 19

This is in response to the second part of Larry Higby's memorandum of July 19, asking for my thoughts on the best use of Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie, during the campaign.

I have become a great fan of Mrs. Nixon's -- I think she is a great asset and can be a very substantial addition to the campaign. She should appear with the President quite frequently. In addition, she should have her own schedule of appearances at volunteer projects, hospitals, schools, etc. -- these she does fabulously well. Like the President, her appearances should be at least theoretically governmental. Carefully-selected TV talk shows might be another possibility -- these, however, would have to be carefully selected -- obviously Liz Drew's show would not be appropriate.

I would ^{nk} confine Tricia's appearances to the Deep South and joint appearances with Mr. Cox in which he is a speaker or otherwise the dominant performer. As part of this, she might do some Northern talk shows in conjunction with Mr. Cox or even alone. But these should be carefully selected. Merv Griffin's audience is appropriate -- Dick Cavett's would not be. If anybody has to waste time appearing before women's Republican lunches -- and I hope as little of this as possible can be done -- Tricia is the one.

Julie is excellent before virtually all kind of audiences except the most superheated and sophisticated liberal types. Ethnic picnics, volunteer projects, children's hospitals, schools, etc. -- these are the kinds of colorful, visual, and informal events at which I think Julie does well. Since she speaks Spanish, she should be

programmed for a lot of Spanish-type appearances in New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and especially California.

My memorandum of June 15 already suggested a Sunday evening before-the-election family show and a Monday daytime Nixon women show -- I reiterate these suggestions here.

cc: Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: AL HAIG 
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy Recommendations

I would not substantially modify my earlier recommendations on the subject of campaign strategy but rather would reiterate the following points:

1. The President should maintain a posture of being generally above the political infighting not just because he has to conduct the business of State but, more importantly, because his overall record speaks for itself and his "stooping to conquer" will only serve to enhance the McGovern prestige and tend to equate two totally unequal contenders.

The President's greatest personal asset is both the image and reality of an experienced, thoughtful, unemotional and exceptionally competent and tough national leader. Should he succumb to classic partisan gut-fighting, the activity would detract from this optimum posture. The tactics employed by the President himself should involve a careful and continuous appraisal of the need for his personal role as November approaches. It may be that the posture I am recommending will in the natural course of events develop the need for a fighting, tub-thumping, one-time Presidential speech in which the President rolls up his sleeves and takes on McGovern head on. While such a speech should be prepared and held for contingency use, a decision to proceed should only follow a most careful assessment that there is, in fact, a demand. If it is determined that a demand does exist then the speech should be given as late as possible in the campaign to prevent gutter type rebuttals which can again only result in an escalation of this kind of activity. Under no circumstances should a "tub-thumper" of this kind be considered for the President's acceptance speech at Miami.

2. With respect to campaigning and travel, obviously others will have more refined and experienced perspectives. I still, however,

continue to believe that the President should avoid over-exposure especially in contrived purely political environments. A non-frantic, "business-of-State" schedule should insure plenty of preelection exposure but great care should be taken to develop venues which are Presidential in character and which will enable him to talk appropriately from a statesmanlike position with the full weight of the Presidency behind him, i. e., not just as another candidate. Venues should focus primarily on opportunities which can be nationally televised. These are the opportunities which get impact. In this vein, nothing is of greater importance than the timing (prime time) and substance of the President's acceptance speech.

Themes to be exploited should cover: foreign policy, National Defense and perhaps two or three domestic issues, such as law and order, philosophy of government and welfare.

3. In my view, the greatest single exploitable accomplishment of the President is foreign policy but beyond that it is his demonstrated willingness to make tough courageous decisions in times of national crises, i. e., Jordan, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, May 8th and South Asia. For this reason, one of the greatest single dangers between now and November would be a panicky posture on Vietnam. In my view, the issue has been largely defused since American boys are not dying as before. American youths are not being drafted and most Americans attribute this to Presidential toughness above all else. Most Americans sense an aroma of finality in the policies we are currently pursuing in Vietnam. In a political sense, the benchmark for this American confidence was the decision of May 8. The backdrop, however, is an accumulative series of courageous decisions made all along the way which have in large measure proven to be correct. Should we panic in the last five minutes by accepting a compromise solution which is obviously detrimental to American and South Vietnamese interests there is a great risk that much of our constituency will become disaffected.

4. I agree completely with the theme that we should generally posture cabinet members and advocates in the direction of not personalizing attacks on McGovern's radicalism but rather take him on, issue by issue, in a repetitive fashion and being sure they credit him with his most extreme earlier positions. A specific line should be developed and approved for each issue and be repeated and repeated until it acquires a reality of its own which the opposition must squander all of its resources to counter.

yes

Good

The overall image of McGovern that we should attempt to develop is one of a sincere, well-meaning but totally inadequate and unqualified Presidential candidate. We must not permit the opposition to dig out of the extreme positions which McGovern has already placed on the record. The opposition is already launching a major effort to do so. Forcing the opposition to justify or in some cases to move away from earlier stated positions will tend to alienate their own extreme constituency and keep them in a defensive posture throughout.

5. To me, the greatest weakness of the McGovern camp is also its greatest strength. His current image is one of a loner who is honest and uncompromising in his desire to shatter all preconceived political, international, defense, management and welfare patterns of the U.S. Government. Beyond this, he is viewed as favoring a fundamental shift in the very life style of the American people. Unfortunately, there are many Americans, including many well-to-do intellectuals and even bureaucrats who live in a theoretical world which permits them to savor a whole new approach. The youth and intellectuals are obviously most attracted to this kind of logic. For this reason, it is essential that we focus primarily on the impracticalities of this approach, issue by issue and theme by theme. It is also important that our own positive statements clearly portray the President as a successful innovator who has himself, through skill and experience, brought about more change than could ever be experienced by the ill-conceived and pie-in-the-sky themes which characterize the McGovern platform.

These are, of course, generalities which must be specifically tailored for specific constituents. Labor, for example, must understand that McGovern would suck away their hard-earned earnings for the welfare parasite. The establishment must understand that their hard-earned financial rewards could not be shared with their heirs.

In the international area, the theme Secretary Rogers mentioned at the Leadership Meeting is an especially good one, i.e., McGovern seems to favor an extension and continuation of the large majority of our international programs but would self defeatingly deprive the country of the assets which have thus far made these programs succeed, i.e., military strength and responsible international involvement.

6. I would again emphasize the Presidential family concept through which the President, Mrs. Nixon and the daughters be employed at every turn in the months between now and November. The President's family man image and the public attractiveness of Mrs. Nixon and the girls cannot be over-emphasized. It also contributes in an indirect way to the great theme that President Nixon represents the personification of valued American family traditions which dramatizes by example the inadequacies of an off-beat zealot whose main appeal can only be to the misfits in American society.

7. Finally, and above all, it must be recognized that the preceding merely confirms a strategy for exploiting existing assets. Written strategy of this kind and generalizations about what we have going for us are meaningless without a detailed, well organized and, above all, disciplined machine for carrying the strategy forward in an effective way. Bad strategy can be overcome by effective management. A perfect strategy implemented in an ill-disciplined, poorly timed or sloppy way can be disastrous. I am not sure that our organizational arrangements and the detailed development of themes, scheduled Presidential appearances, Advocate appearances, etc., are precisely delineated or that a manned command and control mechanism is firmly in place and properly functioning. If this has not been done, it is the overriding task of the moment. This, you are best able to assess.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

Doug Hallett
~~CHARLES COLSON~~

SUBJECT:

Larry Higby's Request of July 19.

The following is in response to Mr. Higby's request that I update and amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memorandum -- you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No, it's only half a joke.)

The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may recall, I suggested that the period between the conventions was a good opportunity to focus on domestic issues with some dramatic, colorful Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.

My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt, and feel, we should be aiming squarely at those peripheral urban ethnics and upper-middle-class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West, and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election -- and that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive positive approach geared around reprivatization, getting government off people's back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local, regional, and interest-group level, in turn, I felt, and feel, we should be directing our negative issues -- abortion, acid, homosexuality, our more extreme rhetoric about national security, tax reform, welfare reform, etc. -- in carefully-designed, well-researched, probably printed and front group formats so that we ourselves are not hurt by our own efforts.

To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being contravened. In particular, our positive national material -- the pamphlets, the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have seen -- is the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968. More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least so far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric -- "white flag budget" -- and under-researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice President's rhetoric -- "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward, progressive and potential/even the middle ground to Senator McGovern.

On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be -- getting rigorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues -- Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings, particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to expand our constituency -- at least if the fact that there is not one Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example, that is true.

There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign so far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary -- how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use the Democratic Convention -- that we were going to encourage division, have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. -- how much was done?

And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on the particulars of his issues -- how much has been done?

In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is going to get him re-elected -- if only because nobody else will -- but there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:

1. Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive duplication of effort, inter-office rivalry, competition, holding back of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
 - (a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's -- 1701 would get lead responsibility -- and it would also get Colson. Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts -- dinners, funding requests, etc. -- have already been accomplished. (If they haven't, it's too late.) Now what we need is a hard-driving organizational and political effort and that can only be done from a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as many people from here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people, etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
 - (b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with authority to run all over the place. It needs it -- still.
 - (c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction to provide such support activities as are needed -- agency contact, White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming, etc.
 - (d) Writing -- now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief -- perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that one guy.

- (e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity -- and, in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate pretty well with the Shumway operation. P.R. -types like Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P.R. activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
 - (f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation -- presumably Ed Harper -- would report to Colson at 1701.
 - (g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as it is now -- as a separate Connally-Colson preserve -- it is going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
 - (h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the President. Starting now, the President should have a series of afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't believe how lax people are around here -- and mainly, I think, because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal identity with the President.
2. Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so response-oriented and so quick to jump at every quiver in the McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the President should be locked in -- and something attached to the President so he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The same goes for everybody else.
 3. Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign, with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around with a sense of humor.

4. Whatever the November Group is doing -- and I don't know anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been around the President for more than one campaign.

I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.

cc: Charles W. Colson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

21 July 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM DOUG HALLETT



RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July

I note in today's paper Clark MacGregor's recommendation that the President not campaign until the last three weeks of the campaign and then that that period be set aside for campaigning. Because my two previous memoranda have not been too specific on this point, I want to make my position clear. I think it is important that the President never appear to begin campaigning. He should phase into it after the convention. From September 1 on there should be a mix of D.C.-based substantive activities, substantive travel, and mass rally travel (5 or 6 at most for the entire fall). As September flows into October, the mix should just become more heavily weighted to substantive travel and then in the last two weeks more weighted to mass rally travel. Thus, there might be one mass rally on or about Labor Day, one in late September, one in mid-October, and two during the last two weeks -- and any rally appearance should be connected with a substantive appearance the previous or next day. On the substantive travel side, there might be three trips in September, three in the first two weeks of October, and four from mid-October on. Thus, the overwhelming weight of the President's appearances would be at least theoretically government-related -- and he would appear talking about governmental issues. There is no law that says you have to campaign with a bunch of goddamn balloons and Nixonettes and mouth a lot of partisan banalities -- the President can attract attention and dominate the airways and the issues in other, more effective -- and less destructive -- ways.

cc: Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
RE: CONVENTION

I was talking to Howard K. Smith last night about what he expects for television coverage, and he said that all the TV people expected a pretty dull convention with the likelihood of violence in the streets. That's not good -- will associate us with violence, inability to reduce dissent, etc.

Howard wondered if we were planning the usual lineup -- President and Vice President acceptance speeches on the same night. He suggested that if, for the first time, they could be on different nights, they would be separate news events, each a must for coverage in full.

Moreover, it occurs to me, a mass audience is less likely to sit through two long speeches practically back to back; in addition, if the VP's speech is really good, it detracts from the President's, and if it is no good, it loses the audience.

Good
PE /

Therefore, why do we not do something radical in the way of political conventions and nominate the Vice President on one night, have him accept that night, and do the President the next night?

This would be met with a lot of cluck-clucking as anti-traditional, but the real reason for putting them together in the past was to first determine the Presidential nominee and have him select the running mate; with a sitting President who will make his choice known before the Convention, that reason is obviated.

Thus, we could have two separate and distinct news stories, better ratings, and a more solitaire setting for the President on his night. Worth considering?

cc: Dick Moore

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: RAY PRICE
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

I've no changes in my June 16 memo, but would add a few additional thoughts:

1. The target is McGovern, not the Democrats. I was glad this point was made so forcefully this morning, and I think it's essential that we stick with it. We should stress the open door theme, and keep coming back to the argument that RN represents the great, bi-partisan traditions of America -- the traditions not only of Lincoln and TR and Eisenhower, but also of Wilson and FDR, of Truman and Kennedy.

2. Whenever possible, RN should help cement this impression by referring back to these traditions, and to positions associated with them: to FDR's leadership of the free world in its time of peril, to HST's forging of the Atlantic alliance, etc.

3. Throughout our history, there have been fringe movements that were briefly and dramatically in the spotlight, then faded back into the shadows from whence they came -- while the great bi-partisan traditions were carried on. We should zero in on McGovern's as the latest of these.


4. We should have a moratorium on discussion of forging a new coalition that will make the GOP the majority party for the next generation -- this will scare off those dispossessed Democrats who see a resounding defeat of McGovern as the only way they can take their party back.

5. Non-partisan forums are the best forums. The President made this point to the surrogates; at this point it's doubly true for him, if we're to make him the rallying-point for disaffected Democrats as well as Republicans and Independents. To the maximum extent possible, the forums we book him into should be ones associated with those great bi-partisan traditions.

6. We should do our damndest to avoid getting into situations like the one we found ourselves in with Packwood and the Crippling Strikes Prevention Act. This hurts us at our most vulnerable point: it provides some of the most damaging support yet for the picture of RN as an unprincipled politician who would sacrifice anything for electoral support. We could use some fights on principle for unpopular causes to offset it; or at least to resist some obvious pressures to take the expedient course. I saw Packwood on two networks last night; it was devastating. We shouldn't delude ourselves that we can do this sort of thing (if we did) without getting caught at least part of the time, and being severely hurt by it. I think Stew Alsop was right in his column when he asked who could defeat RN in November, and concluded that only RN could.

7. In general, I thought the presentation of strategy this morning was right on target.

8. Attached is an outline I did last Sunday for the keynote presentation at the convention, together with some notes explaining it. It builds up to a direct appeal to dissident Democrats to join with us. I think this kind of thing could also be the keynote of the campaign.



Raymond K. Price, Jr.

Attachments

Keynote Presentation: Outline

1. Moderator. There are discontents and dissatisfactions in the land; Americans feel frustrated with the present, and often fed up with government. We share these discontents and dissatisfactions, and we too are fed up with what all too often have been the failures of government. But we don't just complain. For three and a half years we've been doing something about it; we've made progress; the direction is set, the momentum is established, the players are lined up, the openings have been made to Russia, China and others abroad, and to new departures at home. Highlights of what we've achieved. What we've accomplished is a beginning, and a credential; now we're eager to get on with the job, and to finish what we've begun. In the film you're about to see, you will see some of those beginnings.

FILM: THE NIXON YEARS

2. Keynoter A: What we will do for you. Our plans, our goals, for the future, as we look from now to 1976. A new prosperity without war and without inflation; the beginnings of a full generation of peace; a rebirth of pride in America; a fair shake for the farmer, security for the elderly, progress on the environment, etc.

3. Keynoter B: What we will not do to you. (The attack speech.)

All the McGovern nasties -- we won't take money out of the workers' pockets for a \$1,000 dole, we won't bus your kids, we won't let America become a second-rate power whose President has to beg, we won't spawn a new permissiveness that collapses moral values; we'll work with the young, but won't ignore the old; we'll turn America around without turning it upside down. We'll respect the student, the professor, the farmer -- and also the worker who wears a hard hat. Note: the focus of this will be entirely on the sins of the present Democratic nominee, not on the sins of past Democratic administrations.

4. Keynoter C. From the party of the Open Door, an Invitation.

From the podium of this Republican convention, we address this talk to the millions of loyal Democrats left homeless by Hurricane McGovern. Speaking to them directly, we invite them to make their home with us -- try it, you may like it. Think about why you're a Democrat. Is it because the Democratic party is the party of FDR, Truman and Kennedy? If so, then ask yourself whether Roosevelt or Truman or Kennedy would advocate crippling our defenses and abandoning our allies -- Roosevelt, who led the defense

of freedom in World War II; Truman, the architect of NATO and the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and patron at the founding of Israel; Kennedy, who declared we would "bear any burden," etc. Is it because the Democratic party is the party of labor? -- through a litany of why people in the past have been Democratic, and why those same reasons should now lead them to cast their lot with us in 1972. Its tone is one of respect for the Democratic Party as a great national institution, and sympathy with those members who have seen it seized by a self-appointed elite determined to convert it into a narrow ideological faction -- of warm and open-hearted welcome to those left on the outside at Miami a month ago, and of common cause with them because we share their hopes, their dreams, their concerns about America. In his acceptance speech, George McGovern said, "Come home, America." To millions of Democrats whose ideas no longer have a hearing in the national Democratic Party, I say tonight, "Come home, Americans -- come share our home -- give us not only your votes, but your hands, we will give you ours in welcome." This is the real keynote -- and it should be echoed throughout the rest of the convention proceedings.

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Notes on the keynote outline, and on the invitation:

1. Structure. This is broken into sections not by issue area, but to make a logical progression leading up to what I think should be the real "keynote" of the keynote, and of the convention: an explicit, direct appeal to disaffected Democrats to take refuge with us.

One of our real dangers has been that we'd come across as smug and complacent. This counters that, at the outset of the convention, in two ways: first, by starting off identifying ourselves with the dissatisfactions most Americans feel in one way or another, saying we share those, and that's why we want another four years to complete the unfinished task of combatting them; and second, by reaching out to the Democrats rather than merely patting ourselves on the back. There are more of them than there are of us, so we need them; people like to be courted, and this does so -- showing that we care about them.

The intro establishes an audience rapport by saying we know how you feel; it brags a bit, but without smugness, and leads logically into the film, which shows RN grappling with the inherited troubles and making headway against them in his first term; the film leaves us at 1972; Keynoter A then takes us from 1972 to 1976, in terms of our hopes and plans; Keynoter B draws the sharp distinctions between what we're offering and what the opposition is; this sets the stage for Keynoter C to make his appeal to the traditional Democrats to come with us.

2. Advantages. Keying off with this unusual sort of appeal to Democrats has several distinct advantages:

- a. Being unusual, it makes news.
- b. It plays against the weakness of the opposition candidate, and highlights Democratic divisions.
- c. It keys off our "party of the open door" theme.

d. It sets up some possible additional convention highlights (see notes below on this).

e. It establishes a set of explicit rationales for dissident Democrats to join with us.

f. It adds interest to what could otherwise be a dull convention, by introducing an element of contest and confrontation -- but making it confrontation among Democrats rather than among Republicans.

g. It provides a theme for the commentators to talk about, with a cast of characters.

3. Convention follow-up. I'd like to see us issue this call to Democrats at the outset, and then follow it up throughout the convention -- not only returning to it in subsequent speeches, but adding some items to the program that would pick it up. Examples:

a. A special, spotlighted appearance by Connally, speaking as a Democrat to his fellow Democrats.

b. On the second night, a special series of short speeches by Democrats responding to the Republican invitation -- assuming the right people can be rounded up. Examples: a prominent labor leader, life-long Democrat, saying the candidate who in 1972 best represents what labor represents is not McGovern, but RN; an attractive, articulate young voice of the New South, saying his party has left him; a respected academic or student leader, saying he's been a Democrat but McGovern is too much, and we need responsible leadership; Floyd McKissick saying the real road to black progress is not the McGovern way, but the Nixon way.

c. Release telegrams and letters from dissident Democrats during the convention, saying they're going Republican.

d. Plug dissident Democrats into the outside-the-hall schedule.

4. TV Coverage. Perhaps the biggest payoff, if we follow a course like this, will be in the cud-chewing of the TV reporters and commentators. They desperately need something to talk about, and if we can get them talking about how many Democrats the Republicans are going to get, and speculating about what Democratic switch-overs we're going to parade out next, we've achieved four crucial goals:

a. We've used our convention to condition Democratic voters, in explicit, personal terms, to thinking about voting Republican.

b. We've established a "prior approval" factor -- that is, we've made switching seem respectable to the TV viewer by showing him that other good Democrats are doing it.

c. We've injected a note of drama into the convention, and we've done it by moving the battle to the other guy's turf.

d. We've got the commentators talking about our issues.

Not to mention that we've opened our convention in an even better way than the Democrats opened theirs -- we've made it not just a GOP Convention, but a convention of and for the new coalition.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: RAY PRICE
SUBJECT: First Family Scheduling

I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope that they'd be scheduled extensively. They've become a first-rate asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening and she was a knockout -- real star quality, said all the right things, and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus -- especially with parents and grandparents.

Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a chance to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people," etc., that there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap: I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, involved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous pleasure-seeker from Camelot.

I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly. Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.

A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in Peoria.



Raymond K. Price, Jr.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN

FROM: John C. Whitaker *John C. Whitaker*

SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

This is in response to Ken Cole's request for ideas on what the President might do from now through November, and Larry Higby's memorandum of July 19 (Tab A) requesting an update of my earlier thoughts on campaign strategy.

First, there are a number of things that the President can do that McGovern can't, capitalizing on the fact of being President. He can sign a bill, with a hoopla signing ceremony (or veto one frowning into the free TV cameras); he can have substantive meetings with international leaders, or their emissaries; he can have substantive meetings with Governors or Mayors (McGovern can meet with the latter group, but only in the stance of being briefed or looking strictly political.)

The idea of speeches only from the Oval Office gives me some problems. Beyond the obvious Presidential ones like veto messages or reports on the status of peace talks on Vietnam, it seems to me that other substantive dissertations, on either domestic or foreign topics such as drugs, busing, crime or international detente, whether on TV or radio, would, I assume, have to be paid for. This is out of my field, but I think that, particularly in the middle of a campaign, even truly national addresses will have to be accompanied by equal time for Democratic rejoinder under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus I am not

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sure how many of our eggs we want to put in the speech-from-the-White House basket. As a partial alternative, it seems to me that the plethora of fairly major Administration announcements which we traditionally handle by a 2,000-word handout from Ziegler accompanied by a Cabinet Officer press briefing might better be handled from now to November by the President himself making a 100-word statement to the TV cameras in Ziegler's shop. This will net us purely news TV coverage -- no opportunity for free reply -- and 30 to 90 seconds on the national evening news which is as much as we could expect from a more exhausting event like an all-day trip to St. Louis.

At the Convention

I feel strongly that we should get the President in and out of Miami Beach as quickly as possible because of the danger of confrontation with demonstrators (assuming that our best intelligence is the same as what I pick up from the papers). The relatively dull predictable show on the inside is bound to drive the TV networks outside the Convention Hall looking for street drama. Even a minor fracas there, dull though it may be, would probably be more photogenic than the business of the convention. Any interplay between the President and the demonstrators is going to be compared by the media and the viewers with the scene of the McGovern confrontation with the hippies in the Doral lobby which got pretty good notices. I think an overnight at Key Biscayne would be running a real risk because, even though you can seal off the causeway, there would probably be a confrontation there or outside the President's compound. Any defensive maneuver like that would just be played as the President ducking these strident types whom McGovern at least had the guts to talk to.

Thus my suggestion for the President's personal involvement with Miami Beach would be for him to leave about eight o'clock on Wednesday night (possibly with live TV from the South Lawn of

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his departure, either consulting with HAK or JDE on pressing State business, or even pouring over papers in his residence). I would fly directly into Homestead Air Force Base (TV but closed arrival and no comment to press), and chopper to the convention site timed for the President to make his acceptance speech about 10:15. (By 9:00 p.m. EDT people are not off the Los Angeles freeways and in front of their TV sets.) Immediately after his acceptance speech, I would have him make an unexpected visit to a separate location where a large, screened youth group would be having a meeting, unwarned that the President would join them. The point would be to have all under 25, and even some screened long-hairs, to drive home the point that everybody under 25 with long hair isn't for McGovern. After about a 30-minute hard-hitting speech to this group (maybe even some Q&A's, if we trust our screening enough), I would have the President get back in his helicopter and get back to Washington so that on Thursday he could be back at his usual stand being President. On Thursday, I would try to get lots of film in the White House (bill signing, National Security Council or Cabinet Meeting) -- in other words, strictly "playing President."

If our media types have hard data showing that the Wednesday TV audience will be a bust if we have a dull Tuesday night show, I would like to see a scenario such as I have just outlined moved up to Tuesday night if we can possibly get away with it without ruining the convention to the extent that Wednesday is purely anti-climax. Even a precedent-shattering move like having a two-day convention would be better in my mind than having the President spend two days in Miami Beach. One final thought -- if the problem is to build some drama into Wednesday night to assure a good TV audience, might it be possible to delay announcement of the President's choice of a running mate until then? -- That's "bassackwards" to tradition, but why not - provided the President doesn't plan to announce the V.P. pre-convention.

Particularly if we restrict the President's time in town, the risks of confrontation with hippies apply nearly as strongly to Mrs. Nixon and the rest of the First Family and to the Vice President. I agree that we should do everything we can to avoid their

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

being in direct proximity to the demonstrators, but this kind of defensive strategy argues even more strongly for having the President do a youth-oriented event while in town such as the youth forum described above.

General Campaign Strategy

We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition -- almost -- and the South for sure - ethnic groups in the North (Jewish and Catholic in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Labor. We should push Jewish and Catholic events for the President and embrace the tax credit for private schools more visibly -- beyond just endorsing the Mills bill. -- I know some Christian Scientists who don't buy this.

Assuming that the President's lead in the popularity polls is now about 16%, I think that we should run a low-risk campaign unless that gap gets down to 8%, or is dropping toward 8% precipitously. The question, as I see it, is how to run such a low-risk campaign without appearing to be doing so. Here is my list of don'ts:

- ✓ - Don't do any large political rallies - not one.
- ✓ - Don't engage in any debates .
- ✓ - Don't hold any press conferences for only the national press that are advertised in advance. -- East Room format.

The press is vital. The President has won when the press was with him (1968) and lost when the press was not (1960 and 1962).

(1) I think he has to give them some deep-think liberal red meat to pontificate about and give at least the appearance of accessibility. The thought pieces, I think, can be delivered as radio addresses. The theme would be of a thoughtful, forward-looking President winning the peace abroad and of solving our domestic problems, but with the job only half done. Interviews with pundits would be good.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

(2) As for press conferences, on the national level maybe 2 or 3 from now to the election. I would have the President do quickie press conferences in the Oval Office so that the national scribes don't come in loaded for bear.

(3) In addition, I would concentrate on the regional media in places like, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Dallas, St. Louis, Detroit and New York by calling press conferences without warning. While the national press would have to be included in these, and would be primed with their questions in advance, the softer questions from the more numerous regional reps should predominate. In addition, properly chosen regional sessions like these can ensure that the President's message gets to the voters in areas which he needs to win, but can't afford the time to pick his way through personally. For example, we could cover the southern media effectively from Atlanta and New Orleans, and New England by visiting Boston (a town which is tough to get in and out of because of the huge numbers of students, but where the New England impact should be worth the aggravation). -- Denver for the Rocky Mountains and Portland for the Pacific Northwest. We may want to consider paying for campaign air time to televise these in the particular region. The first few we might get away with scheduling without any advance notice on staff time in areas where the local media speaks to a particular constituency without having to pull the reporters out of the boondocks (such as Chicago for the farm belt). The strategy of suddenly-called press conferences in cities could change to announcing press conferences in advance -- buying regional TV time and sucking in reporters from the boondocks if his point spread with McGovern narrows, and he wants to increase the risks.

I recognize that the appearance of large crowds applauding the President is desirable on the nightly TV news. While I think the risk of rallies (hippies and a bore to the press) to produce them is too great to run, I think we can accomplish the same result in the eyes of the TV cameras by doing motorcades on the way to substantive events. The motorcade can stop occasionally and, if the crowd is friendly, the President could step up on his car

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and deliver a short general purpose speech. (By this time we must have something better than the old LBJ bullhorn.) This will require us to develop a pithy five-minute speech, or a series of them -- but not the 25-30 minute "the speech" for rallies that he has used in past campaigns.

One thing that we often talk about but seldom get done is a local color event. This is another easy way to free TV time and can help portray the President as a human being as opposed to the Machiavellian politician that McGovern will seek to make of him. I remember the success of the President's early morning visit to the peace demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial, and hope that we can be imaginative enough to work in some similar "unplanned" scenes like dropping by a local diner at 7:00 a.m. and sharing a cup of coffee with a couple of truck drivers.

I have a general aversion to telethons, but if we are looking for a television extravaganza, I like the format of the international town meeting. By satellite, we could have the network representatives in a number of international capitols relaying live questions answered by the President here in Washington. This would play to his strength -- international affairs, and even hostile questions, unlike those that come from domestic hecklers, tend to unite our citizens as "us" against "them." A "foreign heckler" will unite the country just like the Jews and Arabs would love each other if attacked by moon men. I like that format so much that I think we should consider paying for it. If we can get it free (and equal time for McGovern), then let him sympathize with the foreign heckler -- a good trap.

Pace of Campaign

Before the convention I think the President should schedule one major domestic event out of town. He should also continue to be visible going about the serious business of Government. Right after the convention, on Friday, August 25 (the day after his return from Miami), I think he should do a substantive domestic

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

event in either Philadelphia or Chicago. (I would prefer Chicago because I think we ought to save Philadelphia for Labor Day, although I don't have any specific event in mind for that important date -- I'm just tempted by the Rizzo angle.) The Chicago event could be a meeting with midwestern farm media together with Butz and Peterson highlighting the Russian grain deal. Although I don't know how, it would be nice to get Daley involved. A noon-time motorcade sounds like a natural, but that brings echoes of '68 which is a definite negative. On August 29, I think he should go off to Texas to do screwworms with Escheverria and John Connally (don't laugh, it's really a good regional story), but because that would be a joke as a national newslead, we need another event besides screwworms with a Mexican-American flavor done the same day.

As the campaign progresses, I would attempt to schedule no more than one trip a week -- and always substantive. The only out-of-country trip I can foresee might be one to Mexico, depending on how we read the effect on and need for the Chicano vote. The rest of the newsleads would come from Washington and, with the exception of paid radio talks and paid TV, would be natural outgrowths of being President.

The First Family

I think we should bend every effort to get them out of Washington and keep them on the road. Human interest shots in the Washington papers aren't going to be of any help. The only specific thought I have is that Mrs. Nixon's Legacy of Parks national tour was so successful that we may want to replay it -- if there is one thing that we can find in all of the key states, it's parks.

Theme of Campaign

From the disarray of the Democratic years, the President has made an important start at restructuring international and domestic affairs to bring us peace, stability and progress. But his reforms

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

X are still in the process of becoming -- his Presidency is only halfway home. We need to put that theme into a catchy phrase to compete with McGovern's (Fauntroy's?) "Come home, America." The major danger, as I see it strategically, is that McGovern will succeed in identifying himself as a general spokesman for discontent and the need for change -- a mood that the polls show is shared by a majority of the people. We have got to avoid being cast as defenders of the status quo. We should try to show, rather, that the President's first term has been one of change -- in restructuring international relationships, in proposing basic governmental reform, in salvaging the American spirit from the divisiveness of 1968 -- but that his type of change builds on the past that has made our country great and does not repudiate it.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

HIGH PRIORITY

July 19, 1972

EYES ONLY / ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN WHITAKER
FROM: L. HIGBY 
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

Bob asked that you forward to him by Friday of this week any updated thoughts or analyses that you have regarding his memorandum to you on "Campaign Strategy" (attached) of June 12, 1972. There is no need to completely redo the memo, just update or alter any of the original thoughts you had in light of the Democratic National Convention.

He also asked that you do a separate memo forwarding your thoughts on the best use from a scheduling standpoint of Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie during the period between now and the convention; and during the campaign period.

Attachmant

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972

2:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LARRY HIGBY

FROM:

DWIGHT L. CHAPIN



Regarding your July 19 memorandum on campaign strategy, any alterations I would make in my original remarks are minute. Therefore, I'll let my original memo stand as is.

Regarding a separate memo on the best scheduling use of Mrs. Nixon, Tricia and Julie, Parker and I have a memo on the way to Bob. It covers the President plus the ladies and their husbands. That memo will be in to you tomorrow.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: HARRY S. DENT *HSD*
SUBJECT: Update on June 16 Campaign Strategy Memo

I still agree with the basic suggestions contained in my June 16 memo. I add these post-convention suggestions:

- 1) A special organization to enlist blue collar workers similar to the proposed Democrats for Nixon organization.
- 2) Play up the snubbing of all the groups not given a quota at Miami--like farmers, blue collars, ethnics, senior citizens, veterans, et al. This can be done at our convention.
- 3) Establish McGovern's campaign emblem as the white flag-- pictures of him with the white flag behind his head.
- 4) Devise a PR program for Wallace people showing that RN got "the message." Voter ID programs and polls should reveal potential Wallace votes for us and how to get them.
- 5) Set up a realignment operation now to exploit switchover possibilities while the convention is fresh and as campaign heats up. This can be continued after the campaign to encourage and speed switching which should be good between now and 1976. The South is particularly ripe on this. If we don't program and plan on this, we won't reap our potential.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972

EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH *RF*
SUBJECT: Update on Campaign Strategy
(In light of the Democratic
Convention)

In addition to what was set forth in my earlier memo, I would argue that the only way we can lose the election is to foul up our own convention.

We must not make Miami Beach an armed camp.

We must tag those who want to embarrass and confront us as McGovern supporters.

It must be a Party convention simply re-nominating the President for re-election --- not a White House operation. The Convention must not disintegrate into youth vs. the President.

How do we accomplish this?

*Done
Dole*
Let's have Republican senators (i.e. Scott, Brooke, Javits et al) take the Senate Floor and insist that McGovern, Eagleton (and the few avowed Democrat senators who support their ticket) ask their supporters to refrain from violence at Miami Beach.

MacGregor and/or Dole should lay down a firm line distinguishing protest from violence. In other words, the Party wants discussion but will allow no disorder.

We should see to it that a large number of our young people move among the demonstrators. A few thousand Billy Graham Dallas-Explo types committed to non-violence could dilute the critical mass of hot and frustrated militants.

Cole
Don't

The Party should organize a group of young Administration spokesmen as a "communications corps" to offer to talk to demonstrators or be near by any television situation. Young Administration officials and Republican office holders who have had experience handling young, explosive crowds can be sent out where needed to avoid dangerous confrontations and to show the television audience that this Administration does communicate and listen. The group should have the proper racial, ethnic, and sex balance as well as being able to withstand verbal and physical abuse.


Let's have other events at the Convention which show continuity and confidence in our system, and in our Party, like the President meeting with former Republican National Chairmen. This will appeal to a lot of organization Democrats who have been badly treated and points up the ignoring of the LBJ types so obvious at their convention.

One final thought: Let's not indulge in overkill to the point where McGovern becomes a sympathetic figure. We have enough good, substantive material on the issues without getting into personalities.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JOHN SCALI 
SUBJECT: Election Strategy Addendum

I have these points to add to my Election Strategy memorandum:

1. It is increasingly clear McGovern's main supporters, those providing the vital thrust, will be the college-educated, young reformers obsessed with Vietnam as an issue. We should make a determined, skillful effort to separate from them as a bloc, the non-college, working youth. For each college grad already lined up behind, or inclined toward McGovern, there are three to four young workers who labor in the factory, the corner grocery, the farm, the office or in retail business. There is a natural rivalry between them which can be exploited for the President's benefit. Why not organize a "Working Youth for Nixon" organization which will dramatically publicize the gulf between them and the kooky college crowd. We might think of a big convention of the working youth, highlighting their support of the President and their deep interest in issues that bear directly on improved conditions for their advancement. This must be more than just lip service and a one-shot rally. To further wean young labor from McGovern, for example, the President could concentrate some attention on an issue which we have ignored: Ideas and studies to relieve the monotony of factory assembly work, a problem which already has caused some strikes. Presidential concern about how to improve quality of life for factory workers, particularly, would be welcome. This is an issue which McGovern and which labor has ignored thus far, but one with widespread appeal.

2. The President must devote more time and attention to an effort to "humanize" Richard Nixon. If not, he will come off second best by contrast to McGovern, the humble Methodist minister's son, who will "level" with the American people when elected President. I think it is folly in the extreme for the President to adopt a DeGaulle mold. He is already vulnerable to criticism that he is a "loner", isolated from the real America. How do we do this? In two ways (1) by becoming gradually more accessible to the press and by informal comments now and then which include "I made a mistake on that one, but I have learned" ... There is nothing that appeals to the fibre of Americans than to know that even the President will admit an occasional mistake. This will strike a responsive chord and humanize him more in the eyes of the voters; (2) by impromptu actions which seem unrelated to picking up votes. I have in mind such activities as not-previously-announced visit to a trade school where he would spend three to four hours carefully examining how students are taught, or a night-time visit to a police precinct where he would spend several hours at the station house and in a police cruiser. I would envision all of these as events announced after the fact, tending to prove that they are not publicity stunts. Newsmen, of course, would complain afterward but let them. The amount of TV reporting and print coverage would be almost as great afterward, once newsmen reconstructed the visit. I strongly recommend that this be tried over a period to help dispel the belief the President is in the hands of Madison Avenue and does not do anything which is not carefully programmed for maximum political advantage in advance.

I am not proposing that the President suddenly become a folksy, back-slapper. That would be out of character. But, he can successfully soften his image as the distant leader.

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY
FROM: BRYCE HARLOW
SUBJECT: Follow-Up on Campaign
Strategy

I stand on my previous memo as amended in the two meetings I have just attended with HRH.

(I talked with Mr. Harlow this morning and he asked that I submit this comment.) CaR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 22, 1972

EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

THRU: L. HIGBY

FROM: KEN W. CLAWSON *KC*

SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

(1) The President has maintained a high-level, busy executive posture between the conventions with the single exception of greeting Frank Fitzsimmons and members of the Teamsters Union Executive Board at San Clemente. I think this exception to the generally high-level tone the President has set was a justifiable one and really quite valuable.

(2) I am still convinced that in general terms the high level Presidential posture is still the most valid, but it is only meaningful if all 100 plus surrogates and, for that matter, the whole government apparatus is campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.

I feel strongly that to "free" the President to comfortably maintain his image as a Presidential candidate lies in how effectively the surrogates and the government apparatus really hurl themselves into the campaign. If we are less effective than we should be, I envision it becoming necessary for the President to come off his best posture and to, in effect, take over the campaign by interjecting himself fully into the fray. I find most Cabinet Officers and high-level surrogates with whom we deal are anxious to campaign extensively, but I think it is imperative that we monitor the surrogates program extremely closely to make sure we are getting every ounce of energy into the campaign.

As far as travel is concerned, I still believe that it should be Presidential-related travel, keyed to our target states and specific voting blocs.

(3) I think we should take great pains to paint McGovern as a "minority leader of a minority constituency." I think we should give every indication that any "regular, normal" American, whether he be Republican, Democrat or Independent, can find leadership and solice under the Nixon umbrella. I think that we should use words like "elite, fringe, extremist" and even in some cases "radical" to portray the constituency of Senator McGovern. Every effort should be made to isolate McGovern's more vocal backers from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and the nation as a whole.

Whether McGovern is before his time or after his time in philosophy and in substance, he and his followers should be portrayed as a small, closely-knit cadre of over-educated, lazy, fat-of-the-land type minority. In foreign policy, where we are in my opinion, miles ahead, McGovern should be portrayed as inexperienced, rural, yokel, naive and isolationist. Personally, he should be portrayed as an individual who is not the kind of man that world leaders could respect. Indirectly, he should be portrayed as womanish, weak and a waffler. In short, a man without backbone, a candidate whose positions are never firm, who lacks courage to make the hard decisions and to stick to them in the face of adversity. For example, in Florida when he indicated he would keep a residual force in Southeast Asia on one day and then completely back away from it in the face of opposition from some of his more radical supporters in the Doral Hotel Lobby.

(4) As we were able to do in 1968, the McGovern people will have the advantage of being able to attack every little or big mistake from one end of the Executive Branch to the other and pin all of the failures and errors and foibles on the President. I personally think that Ted Kennedy will still be McGovern's most effective campaigner and that he will trumpet the health issue all over the country if we don't preempt him to the best of our ability starting now.

Kennedy, who seems bent on the '76 nomination for himself, will probably be given press coverage equal to McGovern's wherever he speaks, and I think we can count on his stumping for McGovern extensively so that he may report after McGovern loses in November that he did everything in his power to elect the Democratic ticket. We probably ought to have a team whose speciality is to monitor Kennedy and respond to him.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

LDX'D SC
5:49 PM

July 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (Per HRH)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960.

First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign." (If there is a single hallmark of RN's runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not so much lose votes from August to November of 1968 -- as we lost a historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed a 13 point gap. What were the reasons for this?

A) Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate, if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention, but not a Nixon voter at heart.

B) We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North, who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our opportunity is renewed.)

The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls. Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide" that might have been.

But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings in 1968. Basically, they were these:

a) A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and unity HHH did not, was ideal for September. It was not for October.

Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By so doing, he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.

On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges, to attract interest.

b) The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press. Teddy White testifies to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition, I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at election time.

What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut down communication with them -- compared with the primaries where we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuvered into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two leading candidates. We did not deviate from the set-speech-Man-in-the-Arena-handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story, The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two. Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through late in the game.

c) But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of the various campaign, which are many -- but which are as well counter-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 -- based on the campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What we face in my view is:

THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964

If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:

- 1) We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not let him off of it until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we did this for the first three weeks -- then either HHH "got well" on Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order," and our issue hand had been played. Again, we have enough on McGovern to keep him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.
- 2) We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in 1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning is essential; plans are worthless." We should have a mapped-out game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at least once a week.
- 3) While we should rule out the President -- for the time being -- on the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.
- 4) We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the press and media between now and November. In my view, we have discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years -- indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the decline. But should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc -- because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise in the national polls by a single cubit.

5) We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ's performance and personality which won him 60% of the vote -- it was the portrayal of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.

In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate who is far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent, we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.

Thus -- it will not be how wonderful we are, but how terrible McGovern is -- that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this in mind.

To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues," clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the record to hang the guy -- what we have to avoid at all costs are such media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Caper, which they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues and his positions-- and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."

6) One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" -- of McGovern, if nominated, being case into the role of "under-dog" "anti-Establishment," "come-from-behind" candidate -- whose campaign will provide one hell of a good deal more media interest and human interest than ours.

We should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall -- to attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average Man against the Establishment and the Radical Chic.


Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign shortcomings -- and through the media. Again, how the media handles this will determine much. The media could treat McGovern like Goldwater, or they could make him into an inept, but good "under-dog" like HHH -- in which event, they could make a run out of it.

7) As for the suggestion that RN go out and do more, a la 1960, I would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning." However Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in action in the White House, as President, yes, and Richard Nixon addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutes as President, to strike a contrast with McGovern, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.

8) Scheduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities, Knights of Columbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is only -- at most -- 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not who wins, but whether or not it is a landslide, and quite frankly, that 20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of the North we never carried before.

9) Perhaps this has been repeated before -- but again, of maximum importance is that we not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with his positions, and if we need any characterization -- we can take that from the Democrats. Regrettably, the media does not allow us the same latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.

Buchanan



60

Gallup Poll - 1960
Nixon JFK Und.

	Nixon	JFK	Und.
Early June	48%	52%	
Late June	48	52	
July	50	44	6
August	47	47	6
September	47	48	5
October	48	48	4
November	48	49	3


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HHH

RN

WALLACE

Harris Poll - 1968

	RN	HHH	Wallace
May	36%	38%	13%
June	36	43	13
July	36	41	16
Aug.	40	34	17
Sept.	39	31	21
Nov. 1-2	42	40	12
Nov. 3	40	43	13

May

June


July

Aug.

Sept.

Nov. 1-2

Nov. 3



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 7, 1972

THOUGHTS ON THE POST-CONVENTION
(Democratic)

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
CLARK MAC GREGOR

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
KEN KHACHIGIAN

This memo deals with strategy thoughts strictly for the period between the conventions.

DISENCHANTED DEMOCRATS

This is the first priority. No sooner should the dust have settled from the Democratic Convention (a few days following, perhaps) than a National Democrats for Nixon should be formed publicly to serve as an "umbrella" for all of the less bold fence-straddlers to join. We should move fast on the Democrats, post Miami Beach, as they will be most vulnerable immediately following the convention. If we have a number of Democrats already locked in, to either abandon their ticket, or bolt the party -- we should trickle these out, state-by-state -- not drop them all at once.

In our judgment, if we have a choice it is far better for Democrats to stay in their party, and denounce McGovern -- than to switch parties now.

Elitism and extremism in the Democratic Party should form the basis of the abandonment of McGovern -- followed by support and endorsement of RN. But, in my view, the former is the more important news story.

Also, if a figure is immensely prominent, his departure should be for national television. But someone like Mills Godwin should have done it from a platform in Richmond.

In addition, we should focus upon and publish not simply the major names, but the minor ones -- state legislators and the like -- and publish those names in ads in the "swing states" especially. The purpose is to leave the impression of massive defections, not just major ones, from the Democratic Ticket. We should be working on these people right now -- all over the various swing states.

Sometime during the campaign, this fall, we need a national press conference, and a national mailing to all political writers etc. listing the hundreds of Democratic party officials who have publicly abandoned the McGovern ticket. The idea, of course, is to create a stampede so that the fence-straddlers and others who might want to hang in there will at the least be publicly disassociating themselves from McGovern.

Also, in this time, GOPers running for State Legislature, Governor, Senator, Congressmen, should be instructed to force their opponents to take a stand for or against McGovern and his positions. (This might well involve mailing a copy of the McGovern Assault Book to every GOP candidate, with instructions on how to use it).

THE SHAFTHING OF WALLACE

If this is a credible argument, it should be made intensively by our people. That Wallace who had more votes than any other candidate, before California, was stripped of delegates and dignity by the radicals at Miami. That the convention which was supposed to be "democratic" ended up stealing his delegates, and denying him the rightful claim to a voice in the platform. The Party is highly unlikely to buy the Wallace positions as announced today on national TV; we should go directly to these voters -- and the GOP Platform should mirror some of the Governor's concerns. On matters of defense, bussing, welfare, responsiveness of government, etc. this should not be difficult.

1701 (RNC) should be collecting assiduously all of the negative statements by Wallace people about their treatment at Miami and about the Democratic Platform; we already have some excellent ones that will go into the Briefing Book.

CONVENTION

The theme, "If they can't unite their party, how can they unite the country; if they can't even run an orderly convention, how can they run the United States," the same one used in 1968 is a natural.

THE MC GOVERN SMEAR

Again, clearly the McGovern answer to any and all attacks will be to charge the "Old Nixon" with his "smear" tactics. The response to Stein demonstrated this. We will have five or six of the most egregious McGovern attacks listed -- and out to all speakers, with a short memo by convention's end -- if McGovern is nominated. At that point we ought to elevate all of these horrible statements, and demand to know if McGovern intends to campaign on the issues -- or to continue in this vein of comparing RN with Hitler, calling his Administration "racist" etc. McGovern is still being allowed to get away with being "the most decent man in the Senate" and his rhetoric has been the wildest of any man in recent political history.

THE ESTABLISHMENT THEME

We ought to set this early that McGovern is not the candidate of the people, but of a small elite, of New Leftists, the elitist children, etc. Again, this impression should be made early in the campaign, before many voters have made their minds up. McGovern theme is certain to be to make himself the "candidate of the people" against the "candidate of the politicians," i. e. us. We have to get in early with this elitist idea; we have to capture the anti-Establishment theme early.

Again, my great concern is that McGovern may successfully establish himself as underdog, anti-Establishment, "out" candidate. Our speaking resources, early, should be directed to thrusting us into the position of the candidate of the common man, in the titanic struggle with the power of the Eastern Establishment.

THE WAFFLER

Again, another strength of McGovern's which will necessarily be weakened post-convention is his reputation for "candor, honesty," "you know where he stands," nonsense. He will start moving, he already is moving on the issues right now -- and there is no contradiction between nailing him with his \$1000 giveaway program one day, and denouncing him for "trimming" by abandoning it the next. For McGovern, movement in and of itself can be damaging -- because his whole campaign program is "Right from the Start." We should nail every shift, every movement -- and nail that "Right from the Start," right from the start.

Buchanan

Note: Have read the McGovern Book in part and analyzed his ads to a degree, and will have some followup thoughts on the "character" of McGovern -- and where he is investing his resources, what issues, what personality traits.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

SUBJECT: McGovern Problems with Party Regulars (News Summary Note)

Cronkite is right. The McGovern camp is divided between True Believers and Pragmatists; the former of whom would be distraught with a McGovern "deal" to save the Daley delegation, for example. The True Believers are not unlike the Goldwaterites in the galleries at the Cow Palace, who gave Rocky the treatment before a national audience, while Cliff White and the others on the floor were holding their people to a respectful silence.

The Pragmatists in McGovern's camp, however, are themselves divided, essentially over the question of what course to follow:

A) Stay on his positions, with little fudging, thus running against the President as a truthful, honest, candid, far-reaching reformer, who does not back off what he believes. (By doing this, he will force some Democrats to bolt).

B) Or move to the center, right in the public glare, by "embracing" a Democratic Platform more moderate than his own on welfare, taxes, defense, etc.

Manckiewicz and some of the others who are pragmatists apparently feel that the pragmatic thing to do is to stand fast -- to try to win not on coalition politics, but win on the undiluted Prairie Populism approach, which keeps the True Believers happy.

On the challenge at the convention, however, all of McGovern's pragmatists wish they would go away. They don't want Dick Daley kicked out of the Convention; they are not supporting the challenges openly; though it is inevitably their people (Jesse Jackson & Co.) who are carrying out purges.

The point of the matter is that right now, McGovern does not control his delegates, the way Cliff White and the others could control the Goldwater delegates. They are "issues" people, many of them, who

are womens lib, pro-abortion, anti-war, etc. types first, and McGovern delegates second. They are for McGovern because of his stand on these issues, not for the issues -- because McGovern is for them. Their first loyalty is, in many cases, not to form a coalition that can win -- but to guarantee the success of the particular and independent causes in which they are working. Some of them are using McGovern as a vehicle for the advancement of their own objectives, which McGovern's best interest may or may not dictate at this point in time.

And if McGovern tries to turn them off, they will raise hell publicly; and if he does not -- and lets the purges and challenges run amok -- he risks the outrage and alienation of the party regulars, because it is his animals raising hell in the cage.

Buchanan will be astonished, and we will be in for some difficulty, if those Gay Lib, Women's Lib, black militant, etc. types -- all of them camera hogs -- do not raise hell if they do not get their way at Miami Beach. At this point, it seems to me impossible for the Democrats to quietly reconcile the basic differences they have -- and highly improbable that the resulting internecine war can be kept off the television cameras.

Some of the preliminary caucuses promise exciting events for Miami.

Buchanan

A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE STAFF SECRETARY
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *WC*
SUBJECT: Action Memorandum #P-2105
Democratic Convention

Request

It was requested in Presidential Action Memorandum P-2105 to comment on a comment noted in the June 23 News Summary by Walter Cronkite as to McGovern's position on the Democratic Convention.

Response

I think Cronkite's point was absolutely accurate. It is a thesis that I have also been arguing. McGovern is in a very difficult position. The left forgives him moving to the center; the conservative regulars in the Democratic Party, the Meanys and the Daleys, etc., really do not trust him and will not believe him if he does shift positions. Moreover, he is beginning now to get some pressure from the left as he did in the Wicker column this week, challenging his credibility and in effect making it harder for him to shift.

The fact that he now controls the Platform Committee -- and that has been made public -- puts him in an extremely difficult position. If the platform comes out in moderate terms, he can be held accountable for the "sell-out"; if it comes out as a radical platform, we will call it the McGovern Platform. Either way he will try not to accept responsibility for it but he should be vulnerable to one side or the other.

Most of the press analyses that suggest that McGovern will clean himself up have been predicated on the fact that he can embrace a moderate platform and that is his excuse for moving to the center. He may no longer use that excuse, however, since he controls the Platform Committee.

Indeed, as Cronkite pointed out, the rules and credential fights also will be within his control. He can hardly avoid being held accountable for actions of the delegates and it is almost impossible for him to avoid taking sides himself. I don't think that Cronkite was simply trying to build suspense; I think he was reporting one of the toughest problems McGovern has.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 23, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHUCK COLSON
FROM: BRUCE KEHRLI *BK*
SUBJECT: Dem Convention

The June 23 News Summary had the following note on the Democratic Convention:

-- CBS had half-hour special (4:30-5:00) on Dem pre-convention hearings. McG seems well on his way, said Cronkite, but ahead lies a booby trap -- the rules, credential, and platform hearings. If McG extremists crowd out regulars and take extreme position it'll confirm worst fears of his opposition, said Walter, and it could even drive away supporters. If he sides with his backers, he'll risk alienating center and right, but if he backs the regulars in the interest of party harmony, he'll risk alienating his supporters.--

Referring to the above, the question was raised as to whether this was really a possibility or just a way to keep interest up.

Please forward your response to the Office of the Staff Secretary by close of business, Monday, June 26.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
Alexander P. Butterfield
Patrick Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: JOHN MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Last week or so, Mills Godwin, a respected former Governor of Virginia, announced that he could not support McGovern & Co., and was going for Nixon in November. That was good news, but terrible timing. Godwin got a nice little spread in the "metro" section of the local paper. If we have lined up, or know of, Democrats about to bolt to RN -- they should be called upon to hold until after the Convention, when it becomes major political news in terms of November, and then to do so, with Maximum Fanfare in their State Capitals. Also, this is probably being done, but we should orchestrate them, so that they fall sequentially, one or two major figures a week -- and then on a regular basis, the RNC or Re-Election Committee can send out a release listing major national Democrats who cannot support the "extremism" of McGovern. Muskie did most things badly, but one thing he did extraordinarily well was to drop the endorsements he had lined up with the kind of skill that made it appear opposition to him was hopeless. The fellow looked like he was filling up a straight, with ease, only to turn over nothing on the last card. But the buildup was impressive; and we should orchestrate similarly.

Buchanan