

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
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Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
7	84	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ray Price to Haldeman RE: schedule of RN and his family. 2 pgs.
7	84	7/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Doug Hallett to Haldeman RE: Higby's previous memo on the First Family. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs.
7	84	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman RE: analysis of previous election year polls. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 5 pgs.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN  
FROM: RAY PRICE  
SUBJECT: First Family Scheduling

I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope that they'd be scheduled extensively. They've become a first-rate asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening and she was a knockout -- real star quality, said all the right things, and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus -- especially with parents and grandparents.

Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a chance to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people," etc., that there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap: I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, involved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous pleasure-seeker from Camelot.

I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly. Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.

A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in Peoria.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'RKP Jr.', written in a cursive style.


Raymond K. Price, Jr.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 24, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: DOUG HALLETT   
RE: Larry Higby's Memo of July 19

This is in response to the second part of Larry Higby's memorandum of July 19, asking for my thoughts on the best use of Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie, during the campaign.

I have become a great fan of Mrs. Nixon's -- I think she is a great asset and can be a very substantial addition to the campaign. She should appear with the President quite frequently. In addition, she should have her own schedule of appearances at volunteer projects, hospitals, schools, etc. -- these she does fabulously well. Like the President, her appearances should be at least theoretically governmental. Carefully-selected TV talk shows might be another possibility -- these, however, would have to be carefully selected -- obviously Liz Drew's show would not be appropriate.

I would combine <sup>my</sup> Tricia's appearances to the Deep South and joint appearances with Mr. Cox in which he is a speaker or otherwise the dominant performer. As part of this, she might do some Northern talk shows in conjunction with Mr. Cox or even alone. But these should be carefully selected. Merv Griffin's audience is appropriate -- Dick Cavett's would not be. If anybody has to waste time appearing before women's Republican lunches -- and I hope as little of this as possible can be done -- Tricia is the one.

Julie is excellent before virtually all kind of audiences except the most superheated and sophisticated liberal types. Ethnic picnics, volunteer projects, children's hospitals, schools, etc. -- these are the kinds of colorful, visual, and informal events at which I think Julie does well. Since she speaks Spanish, she should be

programmed for a lot of Spanish-type appearances in New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and especially California.

My memorandum of June 15 already suggested a Sunday evening before-the-election family show and a Monday daytime Nixon women show -- I reiterate these suggestions here.

cc: Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

DOUGLAS HALLETT

SUBJECT:

Your Memo of June 27.

Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent support -- his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to 47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz. Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall. What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the electorate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey -- the Wallace vote declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas in 1960 the President's actions, both effective -- the TV blitz -- and ineffective -- the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned.

In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appropriate -- and given the situation -- effective during the preconvention period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as

*The undecideds always go down by definition -- + end at zero. In 1960 they moved evenly to N + R. In '68 they all went to H.*

*Wrong*

*no shift - not sig.*

*Right -*

*but his lead over H. declined from 15 to 2 on a steady line.*

*Other than a brief blip after Report Cont. N + R were even thru entire Campaign period Aug - Nov.*

*Wrong*

*Can't prove this. Campaign?*

usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur his campaign forward in the final weeks; i. e. the "security gap" speech and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the White House.

*Wrong - had it been two days earlier he would have - but he went down on Mon & Tues & would have continued to do so.*

1960

Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally, approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates, deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtuse observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and steel strike activities in the pre-1960 period -- why more of this was not done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me) and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented, even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he paused to give decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on constant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would have probably won.

*wrong premise what?*

1968

Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of rallies and the institution of thoughtful speeches, etc. The failure in 1968 was one of execution, not design. The mechanisms through which the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out; only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and -- being radio speeches and not visual events -- poorly designed to attract attention from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly

designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the 1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried out, both by the President and the people around him.

1972  
NO  
But  
above  
battle

What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that he should remain above and beyond the battle -- remain Presidential is the way Ray Price would put it -- as he did in 1968. The first approach would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the campaigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach, in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public attention -- it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate, and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican majority.

1972

What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days, with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices, fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and -- although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P.R. wise -- bringing about a new structure of peace -- and he should be doing all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the media operation -- our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential appearances made should be information, not rhetoric, oriented. Political rally appearances made should be few and far between -- and the rallies should be so massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed suggestions and I will not repeat them here.

I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is beginning to get battle-hungry -- the sight of George McGovern galavanting around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to resist. Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960 campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President, we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few corporations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at government expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the President now in the White House.

The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not -- and should not be taken as -- doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can lose it -- assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach -- the only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take advantage of his governmental tools and by failing to reflect a sense of dynamism, motion and anti-status-quoism, all of which will turn off those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good. But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office, not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad, not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference, and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our advantage in the election campaign now facing us.

pend this  
what say  
what ever

GALLUP POLL 1960

	<u>Nixon</u>		<u>Kennedy</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Early June	48	-4	52	
Late June	48	-4	52	
July (After Convention)	50	+6	44	6
August	47	=	47	6
September	47	-1	48	5
October	48	=	48	4
November 6	48	-1	49	3

GALLUP POLL 1968

	<u>Nixon</u>		<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
June	35	-5	40	16	9
July	40	+2	38	16	6
August	45	+6	29	18	8
September 3-7	43	+12	31	19	7
September 20-22	43	+15	28	21	8
September 27-30	44	+15	29	20	7
October 3-12	43	+12	31	20	6
October 17-21	44	+8	36	15	5
November 1-2	42	+2	40	14	4