Richard Nixon Presidential Library White House Special Files Collection Folder List

Box Number	Folder Number	Document Date	Document Type	Document Description
32	34	09/12/1968	Memo	From Glen Olds to Nixon, cc: Haldeman, Garment, Mitchell, Keogh, re: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transition and tasks of a new administration, 1 pg.
32	34	09/21/1968	Memo	From Bryce Harlow to John Mitchell, re: suggested program development plan for Nixon Administration, 2 pgs.
32	34	09/12/1968	Memo	From Anderson to DC, re: President Johnson's request for representatives on the problems of transition, 1pg.
32	34	10/11	Memo	From Simmons to Higby, concerning The Transition: National Intelligence Mechanics at the White House, 2 pgs.
32	34	10/11/1968	Other Document	Handwritten notes on Presidential transition, 4 pgs.



NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE, P. O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036 PHONE (212) 661-6400

You have copy of this already. What was you and on? To Areaspon

MEMORANDUM

To: R. N.

From: Glenn Olds

Date: September 12, 1968

Subj: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transition and tasks of a new administration

After review of Frank's 30-page analysis of August 15 for R.N., discussed with R.N. in January, Hal Booth (I now have on loan from State Farm doing the basic analysis of manpower need, input, and coordination) and I spent the evening with their group in Cambridge, getting their recommendations and input. They are willing to continue to work on this area, drawing on their rather rich resources. I worked out an agenda of work for them that I need not burden you with now. The agenda covered the substance of their report on (1) Personnel, (2) Substantive program, (3) Government organization, and (4) Transitional arrangements. (Note: see attached notes from meeting)

In the sensitive area of recommendations, however, they would like to tap discreetly the judgment of unusually broad gauged people in the area. It would strengthen their study if you were willing to indicate your interest in their results. They propose the following which I believe is both innocent, protective of you and the campaign, but useful.

"Mr. Nixon is aware that we are doing this study and has indicated that it could be helpful to him. However, this study has not been commissioned by him, but rather is entirely 'selfstarted' with the hope that advance work will help him and his advisers meet the urgent problems of staffing a new administration."

Your reaction as to whether you concur or not will help me proceed in using their help.

cc: Messrs. Haldeman Garment Mitchell Keogh

jee -

TO: John Mitchell

FROM: Bryce Harlow

DATE: September 21, 1968

RE:

Suggested Program Development Plan for Nixon Administration

1. Retain Dr. Milton Eisenhower as Honorary Chairman.

2. Retain Dr. Paul McCracken as Operational Chairman.

3. Employ Roger Jones (Special Assistant to Director, Bureau of the Budget) as Executive Director to direct entire effort under McCracken's policy guidance.

 If Jones declines, Drs. Eisenhower and Arthur Burns and McCracken should promptly agree on a suitable Executive Director.

 Until an Executive Director is employed, no additional task forces will be activated, but those already in motion will continue:

- (a) Two now functioning -- Budget and Tax.
- (b) Five in formation -- State-Federal Relations, Financial Institutions, International Economic Policy, Governmental Reorganization, Government-Business Relations.
- (c) Eleven other planned (stopped until Executive Director is named).
- (d) Five Advisory Groups in operation -- Economics, Defense, Law Enforcement, Agriculture, Foreign Policy.

6. If RN should desire it, Jones could handle transition, as well as program development. In any case, RN should meet with McCracken and Jones, to assure that objectives are clearly defined and to make Jones know he is RN's specific choice for this work. John Mitchell

7. Olds and Boothe will supply Jones, as requested, suggested names for task forces from academic community; Greenspan, et al will furnish names of others, as requested. Neither Olds nor Research will be otherwise involved in this effort.

8. Task force members will be kept entirely confidential; only fact that the total effort is in progress can be publicized.

9. Jones will function in Washington, Michigan or New York City, as agreed between McCracken and Jones. He would doubtless be needed at least to the end of November and possibly until new Administration takes office. RN might wish to retain him permanently in a White House administrative role. Suspect his pay would have to be at roughly a \$30,000 a year rate for this interim period, plus secretarial, etc. backup.

10. I consider this effort a highly important one for RN; if elected, and if this task is done well, **bh** will save six months to a year in getting his new Administration in gear. Eisenhower lost a year (1953) for the lack of this.

BH/lac

Memorandum 42 9/12/68 M has means from Harlow Indianapolis ufgin me cc To: DC Roger Jones - exec der. -BH His his 70% sold. President Johnson's request for representatives on the problems of transition. Re: meast get someone on full-time basis.

President Johnson has invited each of the three major candidates to send representatives to the White Miceian House to work with his representative, Charles Murphy, Man. on the problems of transition.

It would seem that the two men who could handle this most effectively are Bryce Harlow and Maury Stans.

I have run this idea by Buchanan, Keogh, Greenspan and Allen. They agree that Harlow and Stans would bring to this difficult and delicate task an unmatched combination of seasoned judgment, broad government experience and an intimate knowledge of the key people in Washington.

Henry Loomis McCraeken) task force Acthen Burno - Tow Craws Arthur Burno - Tow Craws Frank Lincoln

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Transition

MEMO TO LARRY HIGBY FROM SIMMONS OCTOBER 11 RECEIVED FOLLOWING MEMO TO HALDEMANPFROM JERRY FRIEDHEIM, MILITARY AFAIRSEASSISTANT TO SENATOR TOWER, STAFF DIRECTOR, NIXON/AGNEW KEY ISSUES COMMITTEE

RNC DC

RMN NY

923.4616

SUBJECT: THE TRANSITION: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MECHANICS AT THE WHITE HOUSE

A MAJOR FACTOR INFLUENCING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM DURING THE PEIIOD L964-L967 WAS THE WHITE HOUSE/NATIONAL POLICY MAKING MACHINERY THAT FOMULATED THE POLICY. TO WHIT: THE PROCESS BY WHICH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING DECISIONS CAME TOEGTHER IN THE PERSON OF THE PRRSIDENT'S SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR NATIONAL \ SECURITY AFFAIRS, MR. WALT ROSTOW.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PLAYED NO SIGNIFIGANT ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF VIETNAME POLICY DURING L964-L968. THE DPUESDAY LUNCJEON CNUB (INFORMAL WEEKLY LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH THOSE REGARDED AS HIS KEY ADVISORS: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. MCNAMARA; SECRETARY OF STATE, RSUK) WAS THE VITAL DECISION MAKING MECHANISM USED BY THE PRESIDENT AND AS SUCH THIS UNOFFICIAL BODY CONSTITUTED A GROUPING EQUIVALENT TO, OR SUPERIOR TO, THE NSC. BUT TO FOCUS ATTENTION ONLY AT THAT MECHANISM IS TO OVERLOOK THE DECISIVE ROLE PLAYED BY THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT (MR. ROSTOW) IN STAFFING FOR THOSE MEETINGS AND IN THE DECISIONS ARISING THERE FROM.

IN PRACTICE, THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS BECAME UNDER LBJ A SORT OF "CHIEF OF STAFFF" WHO PUT TOGETHER FOR THE PRESIDENT THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. HE ALSO BECAME THE PRSSIDENT'S PRINCIPAL STAFF "INTELLIGENCE OFFICER" PASSING UPON AND PASSING UPWARD THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS OF THE ENTIRE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THIS IS A DANGEROUS COMBINATION.

IT BECAME ALL THE MORE DANGEROUS BECAUSE THE CONSENSUS PHILOSOPHY WHICH PERVADED THE WHITE HOUSE DURNNG THIS PERIOD, AND THE LARGE DEGREE OD PERSONAL AGREEMENT ON POLICY BETWEEN MCNAMARA, RUSK AND HELMS, CONTRIBUTED TO AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH EFFECTIVEL CLOSED OUT ARGUMENT AGAINST THE GENERAL DRIFTOF THE NATIONAL POLICY AS IT ALSO CLOSED OUT INTELLIGENCE PRODUTCS WHICH WOULD CONTRADICT OR AT LEAST UNDERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE DIRECTION OF THIS NATIONAL POLICY DRIFT.

ONE OF THE BETTER SPECIFIC EXAMPLESS OF THIS RESTRAINT UPON THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT WAS THE L964 DECISION TO CLOSE THE MILITARY ATTACHE OFFICES IN SAIGON BECAUSE THEIR REPORTING WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEW THEN BEING PURSUED IN WASHINGTON. THIS. EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED THE MILITARY SERVICES OF ANY MEANINGFUL "CHECK AND BALANCE" UPON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION WITHIN THE VITAL DECISION MAKING CENTERS OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT, AND IT RENDERED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN VIETNAM VIRTUALLY SUBSERVIENT TO THE U.S. EMBASSY THERE, THOUGH INDEPENEENT REPORTING CHANNELS CANTINUED TO EXIST.

IN WASHINGTON MR. ROSTOW BECAME THE FOCAL POINT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY THE CIA, WHIH ALSO UTILIZED THE PRODUTC as ansootheroken bersnofotheonactonedomerdaternseasomkonstrerahe OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. HE WAS ALSO THE FOCAL POINT OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS G GENERATED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND DOD.

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EXPERIENCES SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND WELL THE RISKS

WHIH

WHICH ARE INHERENT IN HAVING THEIR G-2 IN ANY WAY SUBSERVIENT TO---OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO---THE PLANNING PROCESS. IN SUCH A SITUATION, INTELLIGENCE---WHCCH IS IN THE BEST OF CONDITIONS NOT EASILY PER-CEPTIVE OF THE WHOLE "REAL WORLD"---TENDS TO BECOME CONTAMINATED.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S STAFF SHOULD INCLUDE A SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WHO WOULD HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF ANY PART OF THE PLANNING OR DECISION MAKING PROCESS, HE SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE PRESIDENT (AND HIS STAFF) WITH THE "FACTS" IN SO FAR AS THEY ĀRE KNOWN BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS DIFFERENT "ANSWERS" AS FREQUENTLY OCCURS, HE SHOULD BE OBLIGED TOADVISE THE PRESIDENT THAT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION EXIST ON THE GIVEN POINT OF ISSUE.

IT IS CMMONLY ASSUMED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PERFORMS THE FUNCTION DESCRIBED ABOVE, BUT IN FACT HE NEVER HAS---MAINLY BECAUSE HE IS A BUSY ADMINISTRATOR INHIS ON RIGHT; AND ALSO BECAUSE IT IS THE NATURE OF PRSSIDENTIAL STAFFS (ALL STAFFS) TO PROCEED ALONG WITH THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THE MOMENT IN SERVICING THEIR BOSS' REQUIREMENTS. THUS THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF IS APT TOMOVE A GOOD DISTANCE ALONG IN THE FORULATION OF POLICY WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE BEST INTELLIGENCE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE DCI IS NOT A PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL STAFF. AN INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST, WHO KNOWS THE TRADE AND THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY CAPABILITIES. LIMITATIONS, VESTED INTERESTS, ETC., WOULD GREATLY IMPRIOVE THE HUMEINGUSESTHEFINTELLIGENCE PRODUCT BEING UTILIZED BY THE

MR. ROSTOW ABLE SCHOLAR AND PERCEPTIVE STRATEGIST THAT HE IS, WAS NOT SUCH AN "INDEPENDENT AGENT." FROM THIS LACK OF INDEPEN-DENCE FLOWED MANY OF THE LAST ADMINISTRATION'S VIETNAM MISTAKES, VACILLATIONS, PROCRASTINATION AND "CREDIBILIT

Please Call See tonight. Transition. Piño 10/11/68 2,500 ben people. C.S. - Con he transferred. - Broblem of information. - Put together small org. 1. Tap Bus for Scanoned talent. What do you ask for? Man that could run compay some day. - Start top down. 1. duterview then clean around. Must learn how to interview. Train those involved in campaign kerdell, O'Donnell.

Transition 3 levels of priority. 1 Top: Cabinet Communication. 1 25 1 200: Cabinet Communication. 1 25 1.

What type of people. -Defense Dept - - young Officers. Bols Service . Burein - Door to Door. Orientation What & Where we aregoing. Use advancemen for recruiting young Presidente Org. Peouding YPO - Bus. Academic Roof Rool Compution. Service has list of outstanding officen they would like to here that young genne. What are the anistants to huderec Carlegon are they Civil Source or

Piro - will put together a plan. White house Staff. 3 level. - 1. top misiden. 2. Top. people. 3. Top pool. "Salary levels in White house E - Problem of the "Dreenbook" Ambamadoi's Plume de fais degree. M- re. Possidele finamil avangent for Canpaigne. Poundation. Slal for Puro ÷.,