Richard Nixon Presidential Library Contested Materials Collection Folder List

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | No Date | Subject | Document Type | Document Description |
|-------------------|---------------|----------------------|---------|----------------|----------------------|--|
| 52 | 32 | 10/23/1972 | | Campaign | Memo | From Patrick J. Buchanan to RN RE: Ideas and recommendations for campaign. 3pgs. |

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT TYPE DOCUMENT RESTRICTION SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE NUMBER Price to Kehrli re: "pow vote Letter", 9/14/72 C (Nixin) Memo N-1 [DX#341] Buchanan to RN re; the homestretch. memo DX #342 Flanigan to RN re: "CAB International OMSM Air cases TOOC#3431

FOLDER TITLE

FILE GROUP TITLE

material Staffed in October 1972]

RESTRICTION CODES

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enforcement purposes.
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NA FORM 1421 (4-85)

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: Staff Secretary Box Number: 56

[Material Staffed in October 1972] [#2] Folder:

| Document | Disposition | | | |
|----------|-------------|-------------------|--|--|
| 341 | Retain | Open | | |
| 342 | Return | Private/Political | | |
| 343 | Retain | Open | | |

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1972

POLITICAL MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Coming out of the backturn and into the homestretch -- two weeks to go -- we are in an enviable position, some 25 points ahead by Harris. This memorandum is essentially an argument against any policy of pulling back on the accelerator and coasting home.

In 1968, at this point in time, Humphrey was pouring on the coal, making his harshest attacks on RN, and the Democrats were returning to the fold by the millions. The only way for us to prevent this is to keep the McGovern negatives front and center -- before the Democrats.

Currently, RN is rated between 59 and 62 points by some national polls. In my judgment, everything we get above 55 -- from 4 to 7 points, from 3 million to 5.5 million voters -- is less pro-Nixon than anti-McGovern. This group of voters is the "softest" in the electorate; it has probably voted Democratic all its life; it is anti-McGovern, not pro-RN; and it is holding for us, just about solely because it is holding its nose over George McGovern.

If McGovern can focus national debate and attention the last two weeks upon the Watergate and our handling of the economy; and we fight it out the final two weeks on those front -- he can diminish our margin appreciably. Thus, I think we should in this week continue to go all out -- at the entire surrogate level, below the President -- to keep before these Democrats the reasons why they should vote against George McGovern.

IDEAS & RECOMMENDATIONS

l) Made to order for us is the rising, and increasingly reported squabble over who will take over the machinery of the Democratic Party. This is the best political news since the Eagleton Affair. The battle for the corpse of the Democratic Party -- two weeks before it has even passed away -- is indeed good news. Strongly recommend that our Democrats for Nixon move directly and publicly into the fray -- calling on fellow Democrats to a) repudiate McGovern in November, and re-capture the party from the radicals in December. If there is one thing to get the

McGovernites to focus away from RN and the campaign and onto other matters -- it is the idea that the Democratic defectors and deserters are going to take back over the party in December they took a walk on in the fall.

We have a letter along these lines prepared for Connally -- we believe it should be signed by as many Democrats for Nixon as possible, and should make these two points only a) McGovern must be repudiated by Democrats in November, else he will control the party of Roosevelt, etc., for years to come -- and b) after crushing McGovern at the polls in November, let's take the party away from him and his radicals in December.

A bitter internecine war over the future of the Democratic Party -- one week before election -- can only benefit the unified Republican Party and the President.

- Remembering that our "soft" vote -- from 55% to 60% is more anti-McGovern than pro-Nixon -- this week we should continue our anti-McGovern attacks by surrogates, and anti-McGovern ads on the national media -- as well as the non-partisan pro-RN, presidential material. We need both -- not simply one or the other. As stated many times, a Democrat can believe RN is doing a good job, and feel no qualms about voting for McGovern. But a Democrat who thinks McGovern is a crazy, incompetent radical will not vote for McGovern -- even if he thinks RN is a lousy Republican.
- 3) In addition to Connally who has a strong appeal to some Democrats, we need to re-surface and re-publicize the norther, ethnic, Catholic, labor, blue collar types for RN -- publicly again. Why? So that their types -- working class stiffs -- can be aware that voting for Nixon is not betraying their party and their traditions -- because their leaders are doing it openly. We need to broaden the Democrats for Nixon appeal -- which is right now a heavy Connally for Nixon appeal.
- 4) Perhaps the President himself should communicate with the surrogates to urge them to keep on the pressure, and not let it off now. Perhaps RN can be seen again with the Democrats for Nixon who have national recognition, and are Northern -- as opposed to merely Southern Conservative Democrats.
- 5) The issues that should be focused upon in our attacks are those issues appealing to Democratic defectors -- i.e., radicalism, loss of jobs through weakening America's defense, welfare giveaways, amnesty for deserters. We have prepared radio ads on exactly what bases in what states will be shut down and exactly how many jobs will be lost -- perhaps

in the final Sunday of the campaign, we can go with full page ads in major papers in swing states, headed up -- "If McGovern Wins, You Lose," and hitting hard the three or four negatives on McGovern in those states, in terms of social issues -- and job losses and welfare costs.

- 6) The President should remain in the Presidential level -- the purpose being to give the partisan anti-McGovern Democrats, who are probably not pro-Nixon, some reason for pulling the switch for their old adversary.
- 7) Our get-out-the-vote effort should really be going full-blast of course, especially with any Republicans anywhere where RN is pulling better than 95% of the vote -- but remembering this is not where the swing votes are, and this is not where or to whom we should be directing our anti-McGovern appeals.
- 8) While Ehrlichman did a good job, my own view, is that it is a serious mistake to attempt to defend <u>our</u> economic record when McGovern attacks it. We only re-elevate the issue which is our weakest at best. Our approach should be essentially a) McGovern has nothing good to say about anybody and anything in this country; b) we have the highest rate of growth and lowest rate of inflation in the Western World; and c) McGovern's welfare boondoggle and \$150 billion budget increase would put half the nation on welfare, raise taxes for the working man, raise prices for the working man -- and do for U.S. economy what General Sherman did for the economy of Georgia.

Buchanan