Richard Nixon Presidential Library Contested Materials Collection Folder List

Box Number	Folder Number	Document Date	No Date	Subject	Document Type	Document Description
50	14	6/6/1972		Campaign	Memo	From RN to Bob Haldeman RE: Suggested answers for Tricia and Julie when in front of press. 2pgs. 2 copies.
50	14	6/6/1972		Campaign	Memo	From RN to John Mitchell RE: Guidance in gaining Democratic and Independents votes. Also, McGoverns potential nomination. 3pgs. 2 copies.

Thursday, May 24, 2012 Page 1 of 1

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]								
DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION				
N-1 [134]	menio	RN to HRH re Julie : Tricia's ques. re responses about Denis. Candi- date	6/6/72	C				
N-2 [134]	diafe	copy of Doe # N-1	I6/6/72	7 C				
N-3	memo	RN to Mitchell se sensitive political massers	6/6/72	C				
[135]	4.15	copy of Doc # N-3	6/6/72	C				
N-4 [135] N-5	i		6/6/72	C				
[136]		RN to HAK se tactics of left- wrigers on SE asia						
N-6 [136]	diags	comy of Doc # N-5.	6/6/72					
N-7 [137]	memo	Clawson to RNse Godfrey Sperling article	6/10/72	C				
FILE GROUP	TITLE		BOX NUMBE	R				
FILE GROUP				L				

Memos - Lune 1972

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
- Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: President's Personal Files

Box Number:

Folder: Memos - June 1972

Document	Disposit	Disposition			
134	Return	Private/Political			
135	Return	Private/Political			
136	Retain	Open			
137	Retain	Open			

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT



Julie and Tricia were asking me over the weekend what kind of answers they can give now that the Democratic nomination seems to be pretty much a foregone conclusion when asked their opinion on the man or his stands.

My advice off the top of my head was for them to decline to get into personalities, but to simply say that they didn't know much about it except that from listening to the debates and what Humphrey and other Democrats had said that it would appear that McGovern might have a problem in uniting his party.

What I want you to direct Buchanan to do is to figure out all the tough political questions that are likely to be put to Tricia and Julie when they appear on talk shows over the next few months and for him to prepare suggested answers for them which will keep them from getting involved personally, but which will avoid their appearing to be totally non-responsive when such a question is raised. It is vitally important, of course, that they not get headlines which indicates that the daughters of the President are attacking the Democratic nominee. The more off-hand, subtle kind of answer is what I have in mind. This is not generally Buchanan's approach, but I think if you explain it to him he will find ways to tackle the problem that could be very effective. I want you to look over the Q & A after he prepares it before sending it on to Tricia and Julie. This should be done before the end of this week because they are both going to be on shows next week and the week after, as I understand it. They have done extremely well winging it on their own on these political questions up to this point, although I realize they have had considerable help from the staff on substantive matters on

where do I stand on environment, welfare, etc. In view of the Moscow trip I told Julie and Tricia that if they were asked what the major issue of 1972 would be that they should respond that while the domestic issues were, of course, extremely important, that where the Presidency was concerned it would be their opinion that most young people, as well as other voters, would be primarily interested in which of the two candidates was best qualified to lead the United States in international affairs and to build on the great peace initiatives we have begun in China and the Soviet Union. In any event, I want some more intensive thinking done on how they should respond to such questions in the light of our recent Moscow trip, having in mind the fact that we want to keep them and all of our speakers talking about our issue which is international affairs, and except for domestic issues that have a real appeal like busing, amnesty and pot to stay off of the domestic issues.

I think the materials prepared for them so far have probably put a little too much emphasis on the environment, welfare reform, revenue sharing, etc. These are good, safe things to talk about but they are relatively dull and will become rather irrelevant as the campaign heats up.

Haldeman

Julie and Tricia were asking me over the weekend what kind of answers they can give now that the Democratic nomination seems to be pretty much a foregone conclusion when asked their Ex opinion on the man or his stands.

My advice ***Extrement of the top of my head was for them to decline to get into personalities but to ***Exxx simply say that they didn't know much about it except that from listening to the debates and what Humphrey and other Democrats had said that it would appear that McGovern might have a problem in uniting his party.

What I want you to direct Buchanan to do is to figure out all the tough political questions that are likely to be put to Tricia and Julie when they appear on talk shows over the next few months and for him to prepare suggested answers for them which will keep them from getting involved personally but which will avoid their appearing to be totally non-responsive when such a question is raised. It is vitally important, of course, that they not get headlines which indicates that the daughters of the President are attacking the Democratic nom inee. The more off-hand, subtle kind of answers answer is what I have in mind. This is not generally Buchanan's approach but I think if you explain it to him he will find ways to tackle the problem that could be very effective. I want you to look over the Q & A after he prepares it before sending it on to Tricia and Julie. This should be done before the wax end of this week because they are both going to be on shows next week

and the week after as I understand it. They have done extremely well winging it on their own on these political questions up to this point, although I realize they have had considerable help from the staff on substantive matters on like where do I stand on environment, welfare, etc. In view of the Moscow trip I told Julie and Tricia that if they were asked what the major issue of 1972 would be that they should respond that while the domestic issues were, of course, extremely important, that where the Presidency was concerned it would be their opinion that most young people, as well as other xmetsxxxxmetexxx voters, would be primarily interested in which of the two candidates was best qualified to lead the xxxx United States in international affairs and to build on the great peace initiatives we have begun in China and the Soviet Union. In any event, I want some more intensive thinking done on how they should respond to such questions in the light of our ex recent Moscow trip, having in mind the fact that we want to keep them and all of our speakers talking about our issue which is international affairs, and except for issues -- domestic issues that have a real appeal like busing, amnesty and pot to stay off of the domestic issues.

I think the materials prepared for them so far have probably put a little too much emphasis on the environment, welfare reform, revenue sharing, etc. These are good, safe things to talk about but they are relatively dull and will become rather irrelevent as the campaign heats up.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN MITCHELL

FROM THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum is for your information and guidance, and the contents and observations should only be used on your own and not attributed to me since some rather sensitive political matters are contained in it.

In talking to John Connally he has decided within the last two weeks that McGovern will probably be nominated.

As you know, it has been his thought all along that Kennedy would inevitably pick up the marbles at the crucial time just before or during the Convention.

However, from a number of sources it is becoming apparent that a last-ditch effort may be made by Kennedy to try to have a deadlock so that Kennedy could still get the nomination.

This seems unlikely in view of his decision to get rid of his Secret Service, but on the other hand that might just be a ploy for the purpose of playing that game. There is no question but that there has been and probably still is a deal between Kennedy and Mills. In fact, from sources that I believe are absolutely reliable, Mills desperately wants to go on the ticket with anybody, including McGovern. This, incidentally, I think would be a great mistake on the part of whoever is at the top of the ticket because I think Mills is a shrewd operator in the House and a lousy national candidate.

In talking to Connally he made one point very strongly with which I totally agree. To put it in perspective it is necessary for me to point out that one of the major mistakes we made in 1960 was to allow Republicans, particularly in the Southern states, to control the Nixon organization and also to be out front in the Nixon effort. Their interest, of course, was to use the Presidential campaign for the purpose of building the Republican Party in their states. This was particularly true in Texas and

some of the other critical states in the South which we lost. It was also a national phenomenon. We avoided it in a state like California only because Bob Finch was totally aware of the California problems and saw to it that we ran a campaign that did not cut out the Independents and Democrats.

Connally's admonition is that as we see the inevitability now of a McGovern nomination we must "leave the door open" for Democrats and Independents not only to join us but to have positions of real leadership in the Nixon campaign. I can't emphasize too strongly how much I agree with his position. You will get squeals of outrage from the National Committee and from State Chairmen, but we must remember that if the Republican Party, weak as it is, is to be rebuilt it cannot be done so at the expense of risking losing the Presidential election. The time to do it will be after the election.

Every state is to be examined with a merciless and impartial eye as to what people in that state we need in order to carry it. Generally speaking, you will find that what we need are prominent Democrats and Independents who will join our cause and if possible who will take positions of leadership in it.

In California one of the reasons we probably have less of a chance in 1972 than we had in 1960 or in 1968 is the fact that Reagan and the regular Republicans will insist on running the campaign. This will make it a walking disaster and the same is true of Texas and all the Southern States as well as some of the other states, including states like Pennsylvania where we need prominent Democrats. For example, Rizzo is infinitely more important to us in Pennsylvania than Scott or Schweiker. Ways have got to be found to allow Rizzo to be out in front if he is willing to do so.

The purpose of this memo is simply to make sure that an examination is made of the state's situation with only one view in mind -- what men and women can do us the most good in getting us the votes we need -- the votes of Independents and Democrats? Always have in mind that only 24 percent of the people in the last Gallup Poll were willing to admit that they were Republicans. With this kind of a base, putting Republicans out in front, is simply asking for suicide. This does not mean that the Republican organization should be cut out -- it does mean that we should avoid identifying too closely with Republican

candidates who are weaker than we are or with Republican organizations that are in ill repute. It does mean that whenever we can get Independents or Democrats to take a lead role this could make the difference between winning or losing the state and even possibly the election.

The McGovern strategy is becoming very clear now that he believes that he has the nomination wrapped up. His going to the Governors' Conference for the purpose of "clarifying his stand on amnesty, marijuana, abortion and welfare is a case in point. I know there are those who will say that he can't get away with it any more than Goldwater was able to get away with it when he tried to enlist Republican Governors in Cleveland in 1964. There are two very significant differences. McGovern is more clear and less principled than Goldwater and will say anything in order to win. And second, McGovern will have about 100 percent support from the media in his effort to clean himself up so that he can beat us in the final. This points up the necessity at this time to get Democrats and Independents, not Republicans, to nail McGovern on the left side of the road which his record so clearly identifies him with. We must remember our experience in 1970. We thought that with people like Adlai Stevenson, Burdick, Moss, et al and their total record of permissiveness, anti-defense, anti-law enforcement, a good hard-hitting supporter on our side could win. What happened was that people like Stevenson ended up riding in police cars and wearing American flags and the media, of course, completely refused to point up their hypocrisy in making the change. We are going to be up against exactly the same problem with the media in this case and every possible effort must be made to develop a program now to counteract this obvious tactic which is being developed.

 R^{N} Tape 6/6/72

Memorandum for John Mitchell

This memorandum is for your information and guidance and the contents and observations should only be used on your own and not attributed to me since some rather sensitive political matters are contained in it.

In talking to John Connally he has decided within the last two weeks that McGovern will probably be nominated.

· As you know, it has been his thought all along that Kennedy would inevitably pick up the marbles at the crucial time just before or during the Convention.

However, from a number of sources it is becoming apparent that a last-ditch effort may be made by Kennedy to try to have a deadlock so that Kennedy could still get the nomination.

This seems unlikely in view of his decision to get rid of his Secret Service but on the other hand that might just be a ploy for the purpose of playing that game. There is no question but that there has been and probably still is a deal between Kennedy and Mills. In fact, from sources that I believe are absolutely reliable Mills desperately wants to go on the ticket with anybody, including McGovern. This, incidentally, I think would be a great mistake on the part of whoever is at the top of the ticket because I think Mills is a shrewd operator in the House and a lousy national candidate.

In taskigxx talking to Connally he made one point very strongly with which I totally agree. To put it in perspective it is necessary for me to point out that one of the major mistakes we made in 1960 was to allow Republicans, particularly in Southern states, to control the Nixon organization and also too be out front in the Nixon effort. Their interest, of course, was to use the presidential campaign for the purpose of building the Republican party in their states. This was particularly true in Texas and some of the other critical states in the South which we lost. It was also a national phenomenon. We avoided it in a state like California only because Bob Finch was totally aware of the California problems and saw to it that we ran a campaign that did not cut out the independence of the Democrats.—Independents and the Democrats.

Connally's admonition is that as we see the inevitably now of a McGovern nomination we must 'leave the door open' for Democratw and Independents not only to join us but to have positions of real leadership in the Nixon campaign. I can't emphasize too strongly how much I agree with his position. You will get squeals of outrage from the National Committee and from state chairmen but we must remember that if the Republican Party, weak as it is, is to be rebuilt it cannot be done so at the expense of risking losing the Presidential election. The time to do it will be after the election. Every state is to be examined with a merciless and impartial

eye as to what people in that state we need in order to carry it.

Generally speaking, you will find that what we need are prominent

Democrats and Independents who will join our cause and if

possible who will take pesitions of leadership in it.

In California one of the reasons we are—probably have less of a chance in 1972 than we had in 1960 or in 1968 is the fact that Reagan and the regular Republicans will insiste on running the campaign. This will make it a walking disaster and the same is true of Texas and all the Southern states as well as some of the other states, including states like Pennsylvania where we need prominent Democrats. For example, Rizzo is infinitely more important to us in Pennsylvania than Scott or Walkerxxx Schweiker. Ways have got to be found to get Rizzo - allow Rizz o to be out in front if he is willing to do so.

The purpose of this memo is simply to make sure that an examination is made of the states situation with only one view in mind -- what men and women can do us the most good in getting us the votes we need -- the votes of Independents and Democrats. Always have in mind that only 24 percent of the people in the last Gallup Poll were willing to admit that they were Republicans. With this kind of a base, putting Republicans out in front, is simply asking for suicide. This does not mean that the Republican organization should be cut out -- it does mean that we should avoid identifying too closely with Republican candidates who are weaker than we are or with Republican organizations that are in ill repute.

It does mean that whenever we can get Independents or Democrats to take a lead role this could make the difference between winning or losing the state and even possibly the election.

The McGovern strategy is becoming very clear now that he believes that he has the nomination wrapped up. Itexis going to the Governors' Conference for the purpose of "clarifying" his stand on amnesty, marijuana, abortion and welfare is a case in point. I know there are those who will say that he can't get away with it any more than Goldwater was able to get away with it when he tried to enlist Republican Governors in Cleveland in 1964. There are two very significant differences. 'McGovern is more clever and less principled than Goldwater and will say anything in order to win. And second, McGovern will have about 100 percent from support from the media in his effort to clean himself up so that he can beat us in the final. This points up the necessity at this positorix time to get Democrats and Independents, not Republicans, to nail McGovern on the left side of the road which his record so clearly identifies him with. We must remember our experience in 1970. We thought that with people like Adlai Stevenson, Burdick EX Moss, et al and their total record of permissiveness, anti-defense, anti-law enforcement, a good hard-hitting supporter on our side could win. What happened was that people like Stevenson ended up riding in police cars and wearing American flage and the media, of course, completely refused to point up their hypocrisy in making the change. We are going to be up against exactly the same problem

with the media in this case and every possible effort must be made to develop a program now to counteract this obvious tactic which is being developed.