

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
 Contested Materials Collection  
 Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
45	14	12/16/1971	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	To: Robert H. Marik From: Arthur J. Finkelstein RE: Agreeing with the general conclusions of Roy Morey on his appraisal of the Catholic vote in the 1972 election. 2pgs
45	14	9/20/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: The President From: John Ehrlichman RE: "Catholic Vote and 1972." 1pg
45	14	1/6/1972	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: H.R. Haldeman From: Robert M. Teeter RE: "Catholic Vote." 3pgs
45	14	9/16/1971	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: Ken Cole, Ed Harper From: Roy Morey RE: "The Catholic Vote and 1972." 9pgs
45	14	9/16/1971	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: Ken Cole, Ed Harper From: Roy Morey RE: "The Catholic Vote and 1972." 9pgs
45	14	9/23/1971	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: John Ehrlichman, H.R. Haldeman, Charles Colson From: Pat Buchanan RE: Regarding Morey's "The Catholic Vote and 1972" memorandum. 7pgs

DIR ACTION SERVICES, INC.  
POLITICAL AND MARKET RESEARCH

*Done*  
*memo to know*  
*12/29*  
*goe must*  
*need*

212-490-0220  
914-WO 7-6240

P. O. BOX 635  
NYE, NEW YORK 10580

December 16, 1971

Dr. Robert H. Marik  
Committee for the Re-Election of the President  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Suite 272  
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Bob:

I agree with the general conclusions of Roy Morey on his appraisal of the Catholic vote in the 1972 election. Mr. Morey mentions briefly that more importantly than religious identification, one should ask economic status. This I feel, is a most salient observation.

The Catholic vote, like most ethnic votes we will deal with in the 1972 campaign, is one that is going through a behavioral voter shift. The motivation for this shift is not as Mr. Odle suggested, based upon religious positions, but rather those positions which correlate closely with the "Scammon-Wattenberg" social issues.

In New York State, for example, when abortion was listed along side other social issues, its impact in terms of voting behavior was virtually nil. I suggest that issues such as abortion, aid for Parochial schools and other provincial Catholic positions are deeply felt and motivating among a small, but vocal group of Catholics. However, these Catholics are by and large, very conservative in their political disposition anyway and their voting decision making will be based on other factors.

If the President were to take anti-Catholic positions, i.e., pro-abortion, anti-Parochial aid, etc., no doubt he would lose this group. However, if he were to make Catholic issues a major campaign thrust, the very real danger, as Mr. Morey points out, is of offending other groups which are necessary for an ultimate Republican coalition. In essence then, the Catholic voter must be perceived not as a Catholic, but rather as either an upper-income, middle-income or lower-income person and as an Irishman, an Italian or a Pole, etc..

I would suggest an essential agreement with Mr. Morey's position, i.e., that the President's stance on those issues which are primarily Catholic, be kept muted neither overtly pro nor overtly negative.

Finally, Mr. Odle suggests that Mr. Buckley appealed to Catholics as Catholics in his campaign and that it was the Italian Catholic vote more than anything else, that put him in the Senate. I feel that it was the case of Mr. Buckley's speaking to low-income and middle-income working Catholics as low-income, middle-income working people. It is also hard to overstate the significance that race had in the blue-collar Catholic sections of the inner cities. In fact, it is the middle-income Catholic voter who probably most personifies the "Scammon-Wattenberg" thesis.

I do, however, favor a Presidential visibility in such things as Knights of Columbus speeches, Italian feasts, meetings with Cardinals and other good will type actions, rather than in overt issue stances.

Sincerely,



Arthur J. Finkelstein

AJF:db

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

January 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102  
By Ingram NARS, Date 6-3-80

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT: CATHOLIC VOTE

This memorandum is in reply to your request for my thoughts on the Catholic vote.

While I think we should reserve any hard conclusions until our first wave of polling is completed in February, a few trends have emerged from studies we have done in the past, which I think allow us to make some tentative decisions. It is, however, a very difficult political issue because much of the evidence is conflicting. There are clearly cases in which Governors have helped themselves markedly by making overtures directly to the Catholic vote and other instances where other Governors in other states have either failed to help themselves or hurt themselves at the polls by attempting to appeal directly to Catholics.

All available data does, however, indicate that there has been a definite break in the traditional Democratic voting behavior of Catholics in suburban and, to a lesser extent urban areas. Catholics, in and around metropolitan areas, particularly in the north are clearly becoming more independent politically and splitting their ticket at an increasing rate. This trend is not apparent to any significant degree, however, in rural areas, the border states, or the south.

This trend appears to be primarily a result of Catholics becoming more upward mobile in the society and assuming increasingly middle class values, thereby, changing their political attitudes and voting behavior. Some of the reasons for this shift, in addition to the fact that many Catholics have improved their socio-economic status are that many urban Catholics have strong ethnic backgrounds and have remained in somewhat closed ethnic communities in the large cities until recently but have tended to leave these ethnic communities in the second or third generation as they moved up on the socio-economic scale. At this point, many of their ties to their ethnic group, including their traditional political attitudes and voting behavior, weakened.

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM

A second reason for the increasing political independence of Catholics is the erosion of the hitherto strong Catholic dogma, particularly among younger Catholic families. These two points - upward mobility and the diminishing importance of Catholicism *per se* - contribute to the increasing importance of newly attained social class and economic status in voting behavior.

At this same time, there may also be a group of Catholics who have retained their strong religious beliefs and who feel the Democratic party has moved away from them as it has become more liberal and their life-style has been threatened. These people have been primarily Democrats in the past but have always been basically conservative and held the traditional American values which many Democrats now appear to repudiate. This group tends to be lower end educationally and economically and also a group that has disliked Republicans fairly intensely for a long time. There was (in 1968) and is today some definite Wallace support among this group. Many of these voters now feel strongly cross pressured politically because their philosophical beliefs tend to push them more towards voting Republican but they have grown up disliking Republicans and formed fairly strong Democratic voting patterns. In my judgement, this group will be much harder for the President to attract than will the middle class upper end Catholics who have moved to the suburbs.

While the data indicates that socio-economic status rather than religion are generally the most important determinants of voting behavior, the issue of aid to parochial schools is clearly one where Catholics vote primarily on the basis of their religion and one which appears to cut across most socio-economic lines. It is important to understand, however, that even though religion determines voting behavior, on this issue most Catholics see it strictly as an economic rather than religious ideological issue. The opposition to aid to parochial schools among non-Catholics however, is based largely on philosophical or ideological grounds. Politically, it clearly becomes a question of whether the President can pick up more Catholics than he will lose non-Catholics by proposing some type of aid to parochial schools.

Based on the data I have available, I think the President's appeal to this group of voters should be aimed at them as a social class rather than Catholics for two reasons. First, I think there is a strong possibility that he might lose more non-Catholics than he would pick up Catholics, by proposing some type of federal aid to parochial schools. This may be particularly true in several of the Border and Southern States that are

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM

important to us and where there is some definite anti-Catholic sentiment. Moreover, in many of the states with large Catholic populations where such a proposal would clearly help them or states that we have very little chance of carrying anyway, such as, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut and Michigan. The second reason is that there is a high probability that the President's opponent will be a Catholic and the preliminary returns on our first wave polls that Illinois, Wisconsin, Kentucky show Muskie having a very strong appeal to Catholics which I doubt could be loosened even if the President proposed some type of federal aid to parochial schools and Senator Muskie opposed it. While Kennedy's appeal to Catholics is somewhat less than Muskie's, particularly in Illinois, it is substantial in Wisconsin and Kentucky and it would probably not be changed on the issue of aid to parochial schools.

Summing up, I simply think that the potential payoff of such a position against either Muskie or Kennedy would be small in that risk of a net loss with non-Catholics is too great. The Catholics who are most available to the President are those who will vote on issues not related to their Catholicism and whose main concern is with insuring their security in their new social environment, which makes them most interested in the economic issues of inflation and unemployment. They are those who have or are just realizing the American dream and want desperately to protect their newfound status.

G H

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

September 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
FROM JOHN EHRLICHMAN  
SUBJECT Catholic Vote and 1972

Roy Morey of the Domestic Council staff has been systematically analyzing the various issues raised in our budget review, for instance, veterans, senior citizens, etc.

His most recent paper, attached, is on the Catholic vote and particularly the significance of the issue of aid to parochial schools.

Since his conclusions diverge from the course which we are following, I am forwarding it to you in its entirety with the expectation that you will wish to review it.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

KEN COLE  
ED HARPER

FROM:

ROY MOREY 

SUBJECT:

The Catholic Vote and 1972

This memo briefly outlines the voting behavior of Catholics in the 1960 election, the Catholic electorate today and political trade offs involved in attempting to woo the Catholic vote in 1972.

I. The Catholic Vote in 1960

Before discussing the Catholic vote in 1972, it is necessary to briefly review the 1960 election because it will be used as an historic referent -- especially if either Muskie or Kennedy is the Democratic nominee. The following is a list of major conclusions about the voting behavior of Catholics and the issue of Catholicism in the 1960 election:

1. There was a significant Catholic vote in 1960.

According to the Gallup poll Catholic support for a Democratic nominee increased from 51 percent in 1956, to 78 percent in 1960. Furthermore, 62 percent of the Catholics who voted for Eisenhower in 1956, actually voted for Kennedy in 1960. While only 3 percent of the Catholics who voted for Stevenson in 1956 switched to Nixon. This does not mean, however, that during the mid-1950s Catholics were leaving the Democratic Party only to return to the fold in 1960 when the Democrats offered a Catholic candidate. The Gallup results show that in the 1958 Congressional elections 75 percent of the Catholic voters supported Democratic candidates. The GOP appeal to Catholics

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL



in 1956 seemed to be more attributable to the magic of Ike, rather than a desertion from the Democratic Party. However, as will be pointed out later, the Democratic appeal to Catholics in 1960 may have been a high watermark not to be achieved again.

2. The Catholic vote alone was not sufficient for Kennedy's victory.

While it is true that there was a sizable shift in the Catholic vote toward Kennedy, there were other shifts in the electorate which indicate that in addition to the Catholic vote, Kennedy relied on increased Democratic votes among Blacks, Jews and other groups to win. Gallup reports that on a national basis, the votes of Jews increased from 75 percent to 81 percent Democratic over 1956 and the votes of Blacks from 61 percent to 68 percent. In 1960, Illinois and Texas together accounted for 51 electoral votes. Out of approximately 4.7 million votes cast in Illinois, Kennedy's margin of victory was only 8,858. A shift of 4,500 votes by any group -- Catholics, Blacks, Jews, etc, would have been enough to make the difference. In Texas, Kennedy's margin was 46,233 out of 2.3 million votes cast. Here again, a shift by as many as 25,000 Blacks, Catholics, Jews, etc, would have made the difference in carrying the state. The point is that the Catholic vote alone was not the single factor which gave Kennedy a victory in 1960.

3. The religious issue cut both ways in 1960.

While some Catholics swung to Kennedy, it is clear that Protestants who had formally voted Democratic swung away. The best estimates indicate that probably as much as 10 percent of the electorate shifted both ways on the religious issue and in terms of aggregate popular vote, the swing away from Kennedy because of his religious affiliation cost him 1.5 million votes or 2.3% of the total popular vote.

4. The net results of religious shifting favored Kennedy.

While Kennedy's Catholicism lost him popular votes, it still helped him more than it hurt him in the election. This is due to the fact that Catholics were disproportionately located in closely divided large electoral vote states. The best evaluation of the probable effect of the religious issue in 1960 is the MIT simulation project conducted by Pool, Abelson and Popkin (Candidates, Issues and Strategies, 1964). According to their calculation Kennedy lost, by the religious issue, the following states he otherwise would have won: Kentucky (10), Tennessee (11), Florida (10), Oklahoma (8), Montana (4), Idaho (4), Utah (4), California (32), Oregon (6), Virginia (12), and Washington (9). He won the following states he would have otherwise lost: Connecticut (32), New York (45), New Jersey (16), Pennsylvania (32), Illinois (27), and New Mexico (4). Hence, according to this best-fit simulation, Kennedy achieved a net gain of 22 electoral votes because of the religious issue.

On balance, it appears that Kennedy was hurt somewhat in the Southern and Border states and perhaps in the Midwest and Mountain states as well, but he more than made up for it in the Northern and Midwestern industrial states whose electoral votes were far larger.

According to a study that was done several years ago on Wisconsin, Democratic candidates for Congress in Wisconsin suffered defeat in close districts probably because of Protestant defection due to Kennedy's candidacy. This is interesting to keep in mind in a state which is over 33 percent Catholic.

The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan published a study several years ago which indicates that there was a net loss in the popular vote because of Kennedy's religious affiliation. The study estimated what was the "normal" votes of Catholics and Protestants for Democratic Presidential candidates and then calculated the 1960 divergence from this hypothetical norm, they concluded Kennedy lost about 2.2 % of the two party vote, with the largest portion of the

defections coming from the South. The two-edged nature of the religious issue is an important factor to keep in mind looking toward 1972.

II. The Catholic Vote Today

The 1960 election was atypical, because not only was there a Catholic candidate running, but Catholicism itself was an issue. In fact, the Kennedy forces found it profitable to make Catholicism an issue. According to an informal conversation with Lou Harris, the decision by Kennedy on how to handle the Catholic issue was based on key state polling. The decision seemed to be to lay out Catholicism in full view as an issue as a calculated risk to pick up Catholic votes in key electoral states, knowing full well that other states were not going to be picked up. This informed gamble paid off for Kennedy.

Today, the situation is substantially different. While it is true that Catholics are still more likely to vote Democratic than Protestants, they are less likely to vote as Catholics. A Gallup poll conducted in July, 1968, indicates that the voters' choice between McCarthy and Humphrey was not guided by religious affiliation of the candidate. In fact, it was slightly reversed. The religious affiliation of a candidate is simply far less important (including Catholic voters favoring Catholic candidates) than it was in 1960. In fact, Scammon and Wattenberg contend that "today Catholicism seems thoroughly dead as a political issue." There are several reasons for the decline in importance of the Catholic affiliation.

1. 1960 was billed as a test case and now that that hurdle has been cleared it is far less important in the minds of most Catholics. In analyzing voting behavior, one finds that a social factor like religion or ethnicity would become important temporarily during the political campaign and become relatively unimportant subsequently.

2. Group identification is politically important if it is in a group which has a bearing on social status -- such as race or ethnicity. Within recent years, religion has become far less important in determining social status than it once was; yet the same thing cannot be said for race and ethnicity. Poles, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-Americans maintain ethnic identification but do not necessarily look upon themselves as Polish-Catholics, Mexican-American Catholics, etc.
3. There has been considerable movement and economic mobility among Catholics in the past decade, and today most Catholics are middle income types who do not live in the central cities. As they have become more affluent and have moved to the suburbs, they tend to identify less with Catholicism as a political issue and more with general social and economic issues. For the ethnic blue collar Catholic who remains in the city, issues such as race, community control of the schools, crime and patriotism have largely replaced Catholicism as a major political issue.

While it is true today that blue collar and retired Catholics lean in the Democrat direction, one should not over look Goldwater's gains among city Catholics in New York and Nixon's gains among New York City Catholics and the ethnic Catholic Congressional District of Pucinski and Derwinski in Chicago. One may ask whether the voter is Catholic or Protestant, but of much greater significance is the question is the voter rich or poor, Black or White, employed or unemployed an urban or suburban dweller, etc.

### III. Issues of Interest to Catholics

The point has been made previously that in attempting to woo the Catholic vote, perhaps one need not appeal to Catholics as Catholics. In fact, as will be discussed in the next section, there are definite risks in attempting to woo Catholics as Catholics.

According to Tully Plessner, President of the Cambridge Marketing Group in New York, unpublished data he collected in June indicates that the major issues among Catholics are not related to Catholicism but rather to general economic and social conditions. Catholics seem to be more concerned with tax levels, tax increases and general problems in the environmental area. No doubt most of those interviewed do not live in the central city areas and these concerns would reflect a point made earlier about the movement and economic mobility of Catholics.

Who says so?

It could well be that the issue of aid to parochial schools is of concern to an increasing minority of Catholics who in fact have their children in Catholic schools. The issue of parochial aid is of greatest importance to inner-city dwellers and at the heart of their concern is the question of autonomy and community control of the schools and racial separation. The ethnic blue collar urban Catholics are on the firing line of the racial problems that plague our city cores. They believe in maintaining control of their schools, (parochial) as much as they believe in the virtues of a Catholic education.

There are numerous reasons why Catholic elementary schools are on the decline, and only some of these reasons relate to higher operating costs. Other important reasons for their decline include: a) movement of Catholic ethnic groups into suburbs that already had academically superior public schools, b) upward mobility, which places more emphasis on using family funds for college, c) elimination of Protestant biases in public schools, d) the loss of teaching clergy. The point is that the issues of greatest concern to most Catholics may not be strictly Catholic issues in nature such as aid to parochial schools.

Furthermore, the parochial aid issue is complicated and many Catholics may either contribute to the decline of these schools, or are relatively unconcerned about the problem. The same may be said for Catholic clergy. A 1970 Gallagher Presidents' Report Survey found that 35.4 percent of the active Roman Catholic priests affirm that the Church should discontinue or abandon its schools.

IV. Conclusions, Strategic Implications and Trade Offs

Since in the minds of many, winning the Catholic vote is translated to a position on the question of aid to parochial schools, many of the points in this section are related to that issue. The point should not be lost, however, that one can woo Catholics without favoring public aid to parochial schools. One should recognize that most Catholics may not rank the plight of parochial schools as an issue of major concern to them, and that religious identification as a significant political variable has declined in recent years.

1. The parochial school aid question is a two-edged sword. While it may be possible to pick up a few votes among urban Catholics, one stands the risk of alienating Protestant voters. On the national level, one must remember that two out of every three voters are Protestants and the proportion would be much higher in most of our key states (see Tab A).

In Illinois and Michigan, for example, this is a sensitive issue which cuts both ways. The strength of the GOP in Illinois is in the largely Protestant suburbs and out-state vote. In Michigan last year, Governor Milliken pushed through the Legislature a program for aid to non-public schools. This gained him a few Catholic votes in Detroit, and probably lost him more among Protestant out-state Republicans. The school aid program he favored was overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum vote.

Where the parochial aid issue may mean the most, that is among urban blue collar and largely ethnic Catholics, we are least apt to attract strongly committed Democrats. In the case of a few areas in Chicago, if we win these types, it may be for reasons other than parochial aid, anyway.

The most heavily Catholic states like Massachusetts and Rhode Island, went for Al Smith in 1928, Hubert Humphrey in 1968, and no doubt will go Democratic once again in 1972 regardless of the President's

position on aid to parochial schools.

2. Even if a Catholic is nominated by the Democrats one must recognize that religious identification appeal is not constant for all candidates. According to Tulley Plessner, Edward Kennedy has a considerably stronger appeal among Catholics as a Catholic than does Muskie, despite the fact that they are both Catholics. The point here is that part of the strategy of wooing the Catholic vote must depend upon the Democrat opponent. If the opponent is Muskie, his Catholic appeal per se, will be a reduced factor. Jackson is a Presbyterian and the indications are clear that Lindsay might have a difficult time pulling the urban Catholic vote no matter what he does.
3. One may not have to agree with Scammon and Wattenberg that Catholicism as an issue is dead, but the fact is that 1960 was a high watermark in the history of the importance of this issue. In its decline, it probably still lingers in the minds and hearts of anti-Catholic Protestants more than it does among Catholics. If so, we must look carefully at the Protestant strength found in most of our key states.
4. The parochial aid issue may not be that important in the minds of most Catholics. There are approximately 4 million Catholic children enrolled in Catholic schools, and almost twice that number (approximately 7,788,000) enrolled in public schools.
5. There are other appeals on general social and economic issues which may be more significant to Catholics than an appeal on parochial aid. These include taxes, crime, basic values, patriotism, and equality of opportunity. Obviously in many areas, there is a significant overlap between ethnic and religious affiliation. Ethnic identification is much the stronger and this should be kept in mind in making an appeal. The same could be said for Spanish-speaking Americans in Florida, Texas and California.

6. By coming down too hard on the issue of aid to parochial schools, not only do we run the risk of alienating Protestant voters, but more directly we could alienate the well organized and active 1.8 million public school teachers in this country. The President's recent statement on Catholic aid drew extremely negative responses from not only the NEA but others involved in public education as well.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

KEN COLE  
ED HARPER

FROM:

ROY MOREY 

SUBJECT:

The Catholic Vote and 1972

This memo briefly outlines the voting behavior of Catholics in the 1960 election, the Catholic electorate today and political trade offs involved in attempting to woo the Catholic vote in 1972.

I. The Catholic Vote in 1960

Before discussing the Catholic vote in 1972, it is necessary to briefly review the 1960 election because it will be used as an historic referent -- especially if either Muskie or Kennedy is the Democratic nominee. The following is a list of major conclusions about the voting behavior of Catholics and the issue of Catholicism in the 1960 election:

1. There was a significant Catholic vote in 1960.

According to the Gallup poll Catholic support for a Democratic nominee increased from 51 percent in 1956, to 78 percent in 1960. Furthermore, 62 percent of the Catholics who voted for Eisenhower in 1956, actually voted for Kennedy in 1960. While only 3 percent of the Catholics who voted for Stevenson in 1956 switched to Nixon. This does not mean, however, that during the mid-1950s Catholics were leaving the Democratic Party only to return to the fold in 1960 when the Democrats offered a Catholic candidate. The Gallup results show that in the 1958 Congressional elections 75 percent of the Catholic voters supported Democratic candidates. The GOP appeal to Catholics

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

in 1956 seemed to be more attributable to the magic of Ike, rather than a desertion from the Democratic Party. However, as will be pointed out later, the Democratic appeal to Catholics in 1960 may have been a high watermark not to be achieved again.

2. The Catholic vote alone was not sufficient for Kennedy's victory.

While it is true that there was a sizable shift in the Catholic vote toward Kennedy, there were other shifts in the electorate which indicate that in addition to the Catholic vote, Kennedy relied on increased Democratic votes among Blacks, Jews and other groups to win. Gallup reports that on a national basis, the votes of Jews increased from 75 percent to 81 percent Democratic over 1956 and the votes of Blacks from 61 percent to 68 percent. In 1960, Illinois and Texas together accounted for 51 electoral votes. Out of approximately 4.7 million votes cast in Illinois, Kennedy's margin of victory was only 8,858. A shift of 4,500 votes by any group -- Catholics, Blacks, Jews, etc, would have been enough to make the difference. In Texas, Kennedy's margin was 46,233 out of 2.3 million votes cast. Here again, a shift by as many as 25,000 Blacks, Catholics, Jews, etc, would have made the difference in carrying the state. The point is that the Catholic vote alone was not the single factor which gave Kennedy a victory in 1960.

3. The religious issue cut both ways in 1960.

While some Catholics swung to Kennedy, it is clear that Protestants who had formally voted Democratic swung away. The best estimates indicate that probably as much as 10 percent of the electorate shifted both ways on the religious issue and in terms of aggregate popular vote, the swing away from Kennedy because of his religious affiliation cost him 1.5 million votes or 2.3% of the total popular vote.

4. The net results of religious shifting favored Kennedy.

While Kennedy's Catholicism lost him popular votes, it still helped him more than it hurt him in the election. This is due to the fact that Catholics were disproportionately located in closely divided large electoral vote states. The best evaluation of the probable effect of the religious issue in 1960 is the MIT simulation project conducted by Pool, Abelson and Popkin (Candidates, Issues and Strategies, 1964). According to their calculation Kennedy lost, by the religious issue, the following states he otherwise would have won: Kentucky (10), Tennessee (11), Florida (10), Oklahoma (8), Montana (4), Idaho (4), Utah (4), California (32), Oregon (6), Virginia (12), and Washington (9). He won the following states he would have otherwise lost: Connecticut (32), New York (45), New Jersey (16), Pennsylvania (32), Illinois (27), and New Mexico (4). Hence, according to this best-fit simulation, Kennedy achieved a net gain of 22 electoral votes because of the religious issue.

On balance, it appears that Kennedy was hurt somewhat in the Southern and Border states and perhaps in the Midwest and Mountain states as well, but he more than made up for it in the Northern and Midwestern industrial states whose electoral votes were far larger.

According to a study that was done several years ago on Wisconsin, Democratic candidates for Congress in Wisconsin suffered defeat in close districts probably because of Protestant defection due to Kennedy's candidacy. This is interesting to keep in mind in a state which is over 33 percent Catholic.

The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan published a study several years ago which indicates that there was a net loss in the popular vote because of Kennedy's religious affiliation. The study estimated what was the "normal" votes of Catholics and Protestants for Democratic Presidential candidates and then calculated the 1960 divergence from this hypothetical norm, they concluded Kennedy lost about 2.2 % of the two party vote, with the largest portion of the

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

defections coming from the South. The two-edged nature of the religious issue is an important factor to keep in mind looking toward 1972.

## II. The Catholic Vote Today

The 1960 election was atypical, because not only was there a Catholic candidate running, but Catholicism itself was an issue. In fact, the Kennedy forces found it profitable to make Catholicism an issue. According to an informal conversation with Lou Harris, the decision by Kennedy on how to handle the Catholic issue was based on key state polling. The decision seemed to be to lay out Catholicism in full view as an issue as a calculated risk to pick up Catholic votes in key electoral states, knowing full well that other states were not going to be picked up. This informed gamble paid off for Kennedy.

Today, the situation is substantially different. While it is true that Catholics are still more likely to vote Democratic than Protestants, they are less likely to vote as Catholics. A Gallup poll conducted in July, 1968, indicates that the voters' choice between McCarthy and Humphrey was not guided by religious affiliation of the candidate. In fact, it was slightly reversed. The religious affiliation of a candidate is simply far less important (including Catholic voters favoring Catholic candidates) than it was in 1960. In fact, Scammon and Wattenberg contend that "today Catholicism seems thoroughly dead as a political issue." There are several reasons for the decline in importance of the Catholic affiliation.

1. 1960 was billed as a test case and now that that hurdle has been cleared it is far less important in the minds of most Catholics. In analyzing voting behavior, one finds that a social factor like religion or ethnicity would become important temporarily during the political campaign and become relatively unimportant subsequently.

2. Group identification is politically important if it is in a group which has a bearing on social status -- such as race or ethnicity. Within recent years, religion has become far less important in determining social status than it once was; yet the same thing cannot be said for race and ethnicity. Poles, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-Americans maintain ethnic identification but do not necessarily look upon themselves as Polish-Catholics, Mexican-American Catholics, etc.
3. There has been considerable movement and economic mobility among Catholics in the past decade, and today most Catholics are middle income types who do not live in the central cities. As they have become more affluent and have moved to the suburbs, they tend to identify less with Catholicism as a political issue and more with general social and economic issues. For the ethnic blue collar Catholic who remains in the city, issues such as race, community control of the schools, crime and patriotism have largely replaced Catholicism as a major political issue.

While it is true today that blue collar and retired Catholics lean in the Democrat direction, one should not over look Goldwater's gains among city Catholics in New York and Nixon's gains among New York City Catholics and the ethnic Catholic Congressional District of Pucinski and Derwinski in Chicago. One may ask whether the voter is Catholic or Protestant, but of much greater significance is the question is the voter rich or poor, Black or White, employed or unemployed an urban or suburban dweller, etc.

### III. Issues of Interest to Catholics

The point has been made previously that in attempting to woo the Catholic vote, perhaps one need not appeal to Catholics as Catholics. In fact, as will be discussed in the next section, there are definite risks in attempting to woo Catholics as Catholics.

According to Tully Plessner, President of the Cambridge Marketing Group in New York, unpublished data he collected in June indicates that the major issues among Catholics are not related to Catholicism but rather to general economic and social conditions. Catholics seem to be more concerned with tax levels, tax increases and general problems in the environmental area. No doubt most of those interviewed do not live in the central city areas and these concerns would reflect a point made earlier about the movement and economic mobility of Catholics.

It could well be that the issue of aid to parochial schools is of concern to an increasing minority of Catholics who in fact have their children in Catholic schools. The issue of parochial aid is of greatest importance to inner-city dwellers and at the heart of their concern is the question of autonomy and community control of the schools and racial separation. The ethnic blue collar urban Catholics are on the firing line of the racial problems that plague our city cores. They believe in maintaining control of their schools, (parochial) as much as they believe in the virtues of a Catholic education.

There are numerous reasons why Catholic elementary schools are on the decline, and only some of these reasons relate to higher operating costs. Other important reasons for their decline include: a) movement of Catholic ethnic groups into suburbs that already had academically superior public schools, b) upward mobility, which places more emphasis on using family funds for college, c) elimination of Protestant biases in public schools, d) the loss of teaching clergy. The point is that the issues of greatest concern to most Catholics may not be strictly Catholic issues in nature such as aid to parochial schools.

Furthermore, the parochial aid issue is complicated and many Catholics may either contribute to the decline of these schools, or are relatively unconcerned about the problem. The same may be said for Catholic clergy. A 1970 Gallagher Presidents' Report Survey found that 35.4 percent of the active Roman Catholic priests affirm that the Church should discontinue or abandon its schools.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Conclusions, Strategic Implications and Trade Offs

Since in the minds of many, winning the Catholic vote is translated to a position on the question of aid to parochial schools, many of the points in this section are related to that issue. The point should not be lost, however, that one can woo Catholics without favoring public aid to parochial schools. One should recognize that most Catholics may not rank the plight of parochial schools as an issue of major concern to them, and that religious identification as a significant political variable has declined in recent years.

1. The parochial school aid question is a two-edged sword. While it may be possible to pick up a few votes among urban Catholics, one stands the risk of alienating Protestant voters. On the national level, one must remember that two out of every three voters are Protestants and the proportion would be much higher in most of our key states (see Tab A).

In Illinois and Michigan, for example, this is a sensitive issue which cuts both ways. The strength of the GOP in Illinois is in the largely Protestant suburbs and out-state vote. In Michigan last year, Governor Milliken pushed through the Legislature a program for aid to non-public schools. This gained him a few Catholic votes in Detroit, and probably lost him more among Protestant out-state Republicans. The school aid program he favored was overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum vote.

Where the parochial aid issue may mean the most, that is among urban blue collar and largely ethnic Catholics, we are least apt to attract strongly committed Democrats. In the case of a few areas in Chicago, if we win these types, it may be for reasons other than parochial aid, anyway.

The most heavily Catholic states like Massachusetts and Rhode Island, went for Al Smith in 1928, Hubert Humphrey in 1968, and no doubt will go Democratic once again in 1972 regardless of the President's

position on aid to parochial schools.

2. Even if a Catholic is nominated by the Democrats one must recognize that religious identification appeal is not constant for all candidates. According to Tulley Plessner, Edward Kennedy has a considerably stronger appeal among Catholics as a Catholic than does Muskie, despite the fact that they are both Catholics. The point here is that part of the strategy of wooing the Catholic vote must depend upon the Democrat opponent. If the opponent is Muskie, his Catholic appeal per se, will be a reduced factor. Jackson is a Presbyterian and the indications are clear that Lindsay might have a difficult time pulling the urban Catholic vote no matter what he does.
3. One may not have to agree with Scammon and Wattenberg that Catholicism as an issue is dead, but the fact is that 1960 was a high watermark in the history of the importance of this issue. In its decline, it probably still lingers in the minds and hearts of anti-Catholic Protestants more than it does among Catholics. If so, we must look carefully at the Protestant strength found in most of our key states.
4. The parochial aid issue may not be that important in the minds of most Catholics. There are approximately 4 million Catholic children enrolled in Catholic schools, and almost twice that number (approximately 7,788,000) enrolled in public schools.
5. There are other appeals on general social and economic issues which may be more significant to Catholics than an appeal on parochial aid. These include taxes, crime, basic values, patriotism, and equality of opportunity. Obviously in many areas, there is a significant overlap between ethnic and religious affiliation. Ethnic identification is much the stronger and this should be kept in mind in making an appeal. The same could be said for Spanish-speaking Americans in Florida, Texas and California.



6. By coming down too hard on the issue of aid to parochial schools, not only do we run the risk of alienating Protestant voters, but more directly we could alienate the well organized and active 1.8 million public school teachers in this country. The President's recent statement on Catholic aid drew extremely negative responses from not only the NEA but others involved in public education as well.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1971

*If I had to choose  
between the extremes -  
Buchanan vs Morey -  
I would choose full  
time no trouble. I hope  
Pat's views (perhaps sent only  
fried down) will get through to  
the policy types - they could  
make the difference.*

MEMORANDUM TO: John Ehrlichman  
H. R. Haldeman  
Charles Colson  
  
FROM: Pat Buchanan

While this memorandum, for stylistic and obvious reasons, is not sent to the President -- would hope that the dissenting views herein expressed, would be gotten to him -- before he makes any decision upon the rather remarkable document I have in hand entitled, "The Catholic Vote and 1972." For if we are making scheduling, budget and political decisions on the basis of this remorseless nonsense, then we are going to have to count upon a Chicago repeat to be back in 1972.

Points that come up after only a rapid reading of the Morey memorandum:

1. Nowhere does one see proper recognition of the hard political fact that while there are six million Jews in this country, 22,000,000 blacks -- there are some 46,000,000 Catholic. Not only are the Catholic by far the hugest bloc of available Democratic votes to win for us -- they, by Mr. Morey's statistics, the easiest to convert.
2. Here is another hard political fact that does not emerge: If the President could raise himself from say 25 percent of the Catholic vote to 40 percent of the Catholic vote -- that would be worth more in terms of absolute vote than if the President went from 0 percent of the Jewish vote to 100 percent.

Since Catholic Democrats are more numerous and easier to win over than black Democrats and Jewish Democrats, clearly this is where our emphasis should be placed.

3. Morey contends that "Catholicism" is no longer so binding a factor as it once was in 1960 -- with JFK. That is precisely our point. We are not asking that the President throw in with the mackerel snappers, convert and become a daily communicant. We are saying that since "Catholicism," per se, "religious affiliation," is less important than it was in 1960, RN has a far better chance in 1972 of taking away Catholic voters from a Catholic candidate, i. e., (Muskie). Indeed, much of Morey's analysis, analyzed properly, makes a strong case for going after that Catholic vote.

4. Says Morey, things other than Catholicism are more important to Catholics. He mentions ethnicity; we don't disagree with that. We endorse it one hundred percent. The President should go after the Catholic vote in a multi-faceted approach. By endorsing the aspirations of ethnics (Italians, Poles, Irish, Slovaks); by appointing conspicuous ethnics to top visible federal posts, by his Middle America appeal, in addition to aiding the schools in which so many of them believe and in which millions upon millions of Catholics and ethnics have placed their children.

My recommendation is now and has been that the Administration -- in placing minority members in visible jobs -- stop concentrating on the "media's minorities" (Blacks, Mexican Americans, Spanish-speaking) which are tough to crack, almost solid Democratic -- and begin focusing on the large ethnic minorities (Irish, Italians, Poles, Slovaks, etc.), the big minorities where the President's name is not a dirty word, where the President's personal beliefs and political actions are more consistent with their own.

When we begin to recognize and act on the idea that there are as many Italian-Americans in the Bronx as there are Black Americans in Harlem, we will better begin to serve the President's interests.

As noted in previous memoranda, and proved by Senator Buckley in New York, there are more "Queens Democrats" than there are "Harlem Democrats" and they are a hell of a lot easier for a Republican to get.

5. Morey contends that Blacks and Jews and Catholics won for JFK -- but that is like comparing tangerines to grapefruits to watermelons. One can say that the "Maltese-Americans" won it for Kennedy. The crucial points are a) the size of the bloc and b) the winnability of the bloc. On both counts any politician will tell you the Catholics are where the ducks are.

6. Morey contends there is a trade-off, that aid to Catholic schools will alienate some Protestants. No one denies this. We may lose some votes. But where is there recognition of these points. Just as 1) pro-Catholicism on the part of voters diminished since 1960 -- so, too, has anti-Catholicism. 2) Aid to Catholic schools will no longer kill a candidate in Protestant areas -- as is clearly evident from the fact that perhaps a dozen states in the last decade moved that route. 3) Look closely at the trade-off. Are Protestants, traditionally anti-Catholic, going to vote against Richard Nixon for some indirect assistance to parochial schools -- and then turn around and vote for a Catholic Ed Muskie. Hardly. Many of them will not like it. But very few will go the full route. Morey mentions Milliken gaining votes among Michigan Catholics, and losing them among upstate Protestants for coming out for parochial aid. Without any statistics I question that. For this reason. I can't believe that a reactionary Protestant will vote against

Milliken for aiding Catholic schools -- when the choice is to turn around and vote for a long-haired Jewish liberal Democrat, which Milliken ran against.

In short, our Protestant supporters will be angry, many of them, with this kind of aid, but fewer than ever before, and the overwhelming majority not so angry as to desert a middle-of-the-road Republican for a Catholic liberal Democrat.

A phrase used around here recently is appropriate. The WASPS have "nowhere else to go."

7. Where in this entire memo is recognition of the problem this creates for the other side -- the Democrats. That party is divided between Establishment liberals and increasingly militant blacks on the one hand -- and Roman Catholics on the other, for a simple view. The Jim Buckley Democrats versus the New York Times Democrats if you will.

When RN comes out for aid to parochial schools, this will drive a wedge right down the Middle of the Democratic Party. The same is true of abortion; the same is true of hard-line anti-pornography laws. For those most against aid to Catholic schools, most for abortion, and an end to all censorship are the New York Times Democrats. And those most violently for aid to Catholic schools and against abortion and dirty books, are the Jim Buckley Catholic Democrats.

Rockefeller, in coming out for parochial aid, has recognized this. In 1970 he won over Catholic Democrats in greater numbers than ever -- while his upstate Protestants grumbled about aid to Catholic schools, but they "had no place else to go."

8. Morey mentions that "a Gallup Poll conducted in July 1968 indicates that the voter's choice between McCarthy and Humphrey was not guided by religious affiliation of the candidate. In fact it was slightly reversed."

This shows an utter lack of understanding of the Catholic Community and the Catholic issue -- as we see it.

Of course, rank-and-file Catholics did not go for McCarthy. The reason has nothing to do with his religion -- everything to do with his style. McCarthy is an upper middle class liberal, who hobnobs with radical kids, who writes poetry, a post-Vatican II peacenik, snobbish, ecumaniac who apes the Harvard Wasps. Your average lower middle and middle income

Catholic cannot identify with McCarthy and the Beautiful People; they are not Gene McCarthy men, they are Dick Daley men. The fellows who join the K. of C., who make mass and communion every morning, who go on retreats, who join the Holy Name Society, who fight against abortion in their legislatures, who send their kids to Catholic schools, who work on assembly lines and live in Polish, Irish, Italian and Catholic communities or who have headed to the suburbs -- these are the majority of Catholics; they are where our votes are.

Morey's statistics on Catholic clergy uninterested in Catholic schools repeats the same error. The one-third of priests who are not interested in Catholic schools probably contain the one hundred percent of Catholic clergy who either endorse or "understand" what the Berrigan boys were trying to do. What I am saying is that there is a deep division in the Catholic community. We should be working the Catholic social conservatives -- the clear majority.

As for the Catholic liberals, who ape the Wasp upper East Side liberals -- like Southern liberals, they are the worst kind. Converts to liberalism, and to "right thinking", they outdo the New York Times in their fanaticism for their "New faith."

9. Morey contends that Catholic schools do not seem a really strong issue among Catholics. How can one say that? Surely, among some Catholics who have "made it" the importance of Catholic schools has diminished. But among those Catholics who deeply believe in their schools, among those who send 5,000,000 of their children to Catholic schools, a "religious education" is a burning issue, and in an age of "permissiveness" bound to stay a burning issue. Why do I say this? Common sense I think tells us that when Catholic pressure in the 1960s can bring Protestant legislatures in state after state to vote aid for their schools that shows interest, concern and power. Secondly, running the Catholic school system in an "extra tax" upon Catholics of -- one estimates runs -- five billion dollars a year. Any group willing to pony up an extra five billion in taxes, to educate its children a different way from the free public schools is a group whose interests ought to be reckoned with.

10. Catholic schools as an issue can be compared with "gun control" and "aid to Israel." It is an issue on which a minority of Americans, i. e. conservative Catholics, are so deeply concerned that their votes can be switched on that issue along. For the majority who may disagree, it is not a "voting issue."

Thus, while eighty percent of the people favor gun control, if you come out too strong for it, you win next to nothing, but you have ten or fifteen percent of the electorate working night and day to see you defeated. (See: Joe Tydings, circa 1970, and Joe Clark, circa 1968)

11. In 1960 because he could not lose the Catholic vote; it was in his pocket, it had "no place else to go," JFK could come out against aid to Catholic schools -- working the Protestant side of the street. That was where the ducks were for him. Quite naturally, ours are over there, in the Catholic community.

12. Just look at Muskie himself, and his tergiversations over the Catholic issue. He waffles on abortion; he has refused to speak out on Catholic schools; he has a split party; and the more we force these "splitting" issues the better for the President.

13. The final argument against aid to Catholic schools is that it drew "extremely negative responses" from the NEA, and "others involved in public education", that could "well alienate 1.8 million public school teachers. For Christ sake, anti-Catholic public schools teachers are not the President's constituent; as for the NEA, and its lobby they have made an avocation of cutting the President's throat. We are Never going to get people like that -- why should we be solicitous about offending them if it can get us votes elsewhere.

Indeed, the fact that it would "frost" the NEA is one of the more appealing arguments for going ahead with aid to parochial schools.

14. When we move on aid to parochial schools, it can be done through the mechanism of vouchers and tax credits, which is the least offensive to everyone, and most acceptable. Which would minimize any losses -- and we could through the Catholic media and Catholic outlets, maximize the gain. If the President can go up 15 percent among Catholics, that would be worth more than getting 100 percent of the Jewish vote, and worth more than going from ten percent to forty percent among blacks.

Any my view is that it is one hell of a lot easier thing to do, because conservative Republicans, i. e., James Buckley, have shown that it is a realistic political alliance. Morey supports this point by indicating Goldwater's gains among Catholics in New York.

15. Finally, there is a potential, latent majority out there -- available for the President which we have failed to put together. It consists of the President's WASP and white-collar conservative base -- added to it Southern Protestants and Northern, Midwestern and Western Catholics. Morey is right in that parochial school aid alone will not win it for us.

When that is put together, not everyone in that coalition will agree on every issue -- but they will agree on enough. Southern Protestants will not like aid to Northern Catholic schools -- but the bonds that hold that coalition together will be stronger than those forcing it apart. (Indeed, Roosevelt's coalition of Southern whites plus Southern blacks had far more inconsistencies than our potential coalition has).

And Morey is right in that we ought not to rely on one appeal -- whether it be aid to parochial schools or what. It should be multi-faceted; it has to be. A mixture of social conservatism, which is a majority view nationally, plus economic assistance and visibility appointments and, for the Democrats who are willing to go half-way with the President, not the Democrats who detest him. Thus, instead of sending the orders out to all our agencies -- hire blacks and women -- the order should go out -- hire ethnic Catholics' preferable women, for visible posts. One example: Italian Americans, unlike blacks, have never had a Supreme Court member -- they are deeply concerned with their "criminal" image; they do not dislike the President. Give those fellows the "Jewish seat" or the "black seat" on the Court when it becomes available.

Regrettably, neither our budget or our political emphasis seems to me to reflect these realities.

True, there will be losses from this kind of strategy. Josiah Lee Auspitz will be very angry with us. But the Republican Party is a last-place ball club; living in Washington, one can understand that. To win we have to make "trade-offs." To come out of the cellar we may have to give up Frank Howard. One should recall that recently a poll showed that Independents have passed Republican -- and we are now only 22 percent of the vote. One reason why can be found sitting in the Legislative Leadership meeting -- and looking at all those WASPs.

If the GOP is to become a national majority party it will be because of fellows like Cahill in New Jersey and Volpe in Mass., who hold our base -- and add to it the Catholics who were Democratic from time immemorial.

There is a clear potential majority out there. The President could be the new Roosevelt, who put it together, or he could be the last of the liberal Presidents. But to put it together requires a "leap in the dark," it means "pushing our skiff from the shore alone;" it means telling John Chancellor and the New York Times that, no, we have not done anything for the blacks this week, but we have named a Pole to the Cabinet and an Italian Catholic to the Supreme Court.

In an oversimplified way, the reason the President is at 42 percent of whatever it is that we have not broken out of our minority base. In my heretical view, we are never, never going to do it with public relations. The President is not Eisenhower; he did not lead the armies ashore against Hitler's Europe. We are not going to build any new majorities on the Nixon personality, or the admitted Nixon personal political skill. We need to do it with issues and budget dollars, and we are not.

Let us assume that, for one, RN tubed OEO the day he took office, and had spent the \$5 billion we have wasted on that pit since then -- on providing tax credits for non-public schools. That is just one example. From here it does not appear we have a political "strategy" which is being imposed upon the bureaucrats and budget makers; the latter seem more responsive to media pressure than the imperatives of the President's and the party's long run political interests.

If there must be unemployment to halt inflation, why are Southern California aerospace workers unemployed -- instead of liberal school teachers, social workers and poverty concessionaires. These latter aren't for us anyway. Instead of buying off media hostility, that massive Federal budget should have bought us by now a new majority, should have bought new friends for Richard Nixon, should have bought him a place in the history books as the Republican who got it all together.

Chesterton once wrote in defense of his faith, that "It cannot really be said that Christianity has failed; because it cannot really be said that Christianity has been tried." The quote may be off; but is apposite. The new Republican Majority in this country is not a disproven myth; it has not seriously been tried.

P. S. We are not doing the President any favors by sending in to him, uncriticized, memorandum on politics of the vapidty of the document that came to me. I know the affection for Kevin Phillips is well contained in the West Wing; but he is a genius of sorts; and the White House might well hire him for one week -- his political agency -- on a confidential basis -- to assess the labors of the Morey team.