Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | No Date | Subject | Document Type | Document Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | 3 | 6/12/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From J. Curtis Herge to David N. Parker. Propsed Appearance By Sen. Scott At World Affairs Council Meetings. 1 pg. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/10/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Other Document | Handwritten Note. This document discusses a meeting with Jeb Magruder. 1 pg. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/10/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Malek's Analysis of the Campaign Organization. 8 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Mitchell Political Meeting -- June 7, 1972. 8 pgs. |

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | No Date | Subject | Document Type | Document Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | 3 | 6/9/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Women/Volunteer Program. 1 pg. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/26/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses Ed Nixon's Appearance at the Quadrennial Conference of African Methodist Episcopal Churches. 6 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/14/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Campaign Organization. 1 pg. |
| 33 | 3 | | ☑ | White House Staff | Newspaper | From Dwight Chapin. This document includes a articles: "Ike Greets 500 Top GOP Leaders at Farm," and "Ike Opens Campaign at Gettysburg Farm Rally." In addition "Republican Campaign 'Kick-Off." 5 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/16/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Chuck Colson to Fred Malek. This document discusses budget and advertising during campaign geared toward Catholics. 1 pg. |

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | No Date | Subject | Document Type | Document Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | 3 | 6/19/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From Alexander P. Butterfield to Rose Mary Woods. RE: Conversations with Taft Schreiber. 1 pg. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/16/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From Charles Colson to Jeb Magruder. This document discusses telegrams, letters, and travel and the costs. 4 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/20/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Newsletter | Wall Street Journal: "Uneasy Alliance: Now Organized Labor Faces Dilemma: What To Do About McGovern," by Byron E. Calame. 1 pg. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/20/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: New York Primary Returns. 2 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/20/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Further Study of Slogan "President Nixon. Now More Than Ever." 4 pgs. |

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | No Date | Subject | Document Type | Document Description |
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| 33 | 3 | 6/21/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: New York Primary. 2 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/15/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses an "interesting letter from Mundt's former assistant Bob McCaughey." 1 pg. |
| 33 | 3 | 5/26/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Letter | From Robert McCaughey to Harry S. Dent. This document discusses Senator McGovern and the primaries. 4 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/15/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Thoughts on Anti-McGovern Strategy. 3 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/13/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From Fred Malek to Bob Haldeman. "I thought you would be interested in the attached McGovern delegate count. 1 pg. |

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | No Date | Subject | Document Type | Document Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | 3 | 6/12/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Projected Democratic Delegate Count. 3 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/15/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From Ken Khachigan to Gordon Strachan. This document discusses questions for the Proxmire hearings. 9 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/15/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 9 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/12/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From L. Higby. This is a handwritten adminstrative memo. 1 pg. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Newspaper | Evening Star. "McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll." 1 pg. |

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | No Date | Subject | Document Type | Document Description |
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| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Bill Safire to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Some Lessons of the California Primary. 3 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: Analysis of Calfornia Primary. 3 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Ed Debolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey pm Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary. 4 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman. RE: California Primary. 3 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Jeb S. Magruder to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Impact of California Debates. 3 pgs. |

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | No Date | Subject | Document Type | Document Description |
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| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | White House Staff | Memo | From Richard Moore. This document discusses a field poll and the results. 2 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: Predications vs. Results in the California Democratic Primary. 4 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Robert H. Finch to the President. RE: Impact of the "Debates" on the Democratic Presidential Primary in California. 3 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Newspaper | The Washington Post. "Survey of California Voting- McGovern: New Constituency." 4 pgs. |
| 33 | 3 | 6/9/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Newspaper | The New York Times. "Times Survey: Defections in Party Face McGovern." 2 pgs. |

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | No Date | Subject | Document Type | Document Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | 3 | 6/8/1972 | ☐ | Campaign | Memo | From Pat Buchanan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses a field poll and McGovern and Humphrey. 1 pg. |

**Presidential Materials Review Board**

**Review on Contested Documents**

**Collection:** H. R. Haldeman
**Box Number:** 313

**Folder:** Campaign 22 Part II June 15-29, 1972 [Folder 1]

| Document | Disposition | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 59 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Herge to Parker, 6-12-72 |
| 60 | Return | Private/Political | Notes, "Pol posturing..." 6-10-[72] |
| 61 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-10-72 |
| 62 | Retain | Open | |
| 63 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-8-72 |
| 64 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Malek to HRH, 6-9-72 |
| 65 | Return | Private/Political | Note, Strachan to HRH, 6-26-72 |
| 66 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Higby to HRH, 6-14-72 |
| 67 | Return | Private/Political | Note, Chapin to H [HRH], n.d. |
| 68 | Retain | Open | |
| 69 | Retain | Open | |
| 70 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Colson to Malek, 6-16-72 |
| 71 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Butterfield to Woods, 6-19-72 |
| 72 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Colson to Magruder, 6-16-72 |
| 73 | Return | Private/Political | Clipping, "Uneasy Alliance," 6-20-72 |
| 74 | Retain | Open | |
| 75 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-20-72 |
| 76 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-20-72 |
| 77 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Teeter to HRH, 6-20-72 |
| 78 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Dent to the President, 6-21-72 |
| 79 | Return | Private/Political | Note, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-[72] |
| 80 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Higby to HRH, 6-15-72 |
| 81 | Return | Private/Political | Note, Malek to HRH, 6-13-72 |
| 82 | Return | Private/Political | Memo, Khachigian to Strachan, 6-15-72 |

**Presidential Materials Review Board**

**Review on Contested Documents**

**Collection:** H. R. Haldeman
**Box Number:** 313

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|---|---|---|---|
| 83 | Return | Private/Political | memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-72 |

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 12, 1972

1972 JUN 15 AM 7 53

FYI

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DAVID N. PARKER

FROM: J. CURTIS HERGE

SUBJECT: Proposed Appearances by Sen. Scott at World Affairs Council Meetings

In your memorandum of April 22, 1972, you reported that it has been strongly suggested that attention be paid to insuring that Senator Scott be scheduled to appear at various World Affairs Council Meetings.

Following the receipt of your memorandum, we determined the available dates of meetings in Los Angeles, New York and Chicago. The Senator would not accept any of our proposals, however, explaining that he would prefer to stay in the District until after the Senate adjourns at the end of June. There are no World Affairs Council meetings in July or August.

We are now working on the possibility of appearances by the Senator in September.

TOHS

X

6/10

Pd posturing of P-gen'l exercises by WHS ? Raise w/H.

Wants to meet w/JK; set mtg w/H

H has

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

175

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN G

SUBJECT: Malek's Analysis of the Campaign Organization

Unless ~~Malek discusses the campaign's serious organizational problems in tough, readable language. His comments on the disastrous field organization (Flemming, Mardian, et al) will not come as a surprise to you. Nor will the criticism of the surrogates operation be a surprise.~~ I agree with Malek that the direct mail, telephone and canvassing problems may be solvable because Bob Marik and Bob Morgan are basically capable managers.

The real problem, which Malek discusses at length in the Overall Direction and Priorities sections, is for a tough, hard-driving, ass-kicking manager. This may be the role Flanigan served in 1968. Colson is filling this void in some way on particular projects, but this is a structurally unsound arrangement. If there is a plan to shift Flanigan or equally senior, tough manager to the campaign, it should be done quickly. If there is no such plan, consider Malek. The Voter Bloc groups have been planned, staffed and can be run with little of Malek's time by Chuck Shearer. Occasional revisions (e.g. older voters) can be handled directly by Malek. I believe Malek has developed Mitchell's confidence and has the respect of the rest of the campaign organization. There will be obvious positioning problems by Magruder, Mardian, La Rue and others, but these problems will be nothing compared to the country's if McGovern wins.

Malek wants the job.

How do you know?

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

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Malek wants the job.

GS:car

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: FRED MALEK FM

SUBJECT: Campaign Organization

Per our discussion yesterday, attached is a paper on Campaign Organization. These are somewhat random, general, and hastily drawn; and I do not always propose solutions. Nevertheless, I believe the observations are valid.

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY



Copy 1 of 2

# CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS

This paper responds to your request for general problems I perceive in the campaign organization. It is divided into four sections: (a) Overall Direction, (b) Priorities, (c) Political Coordinators, and (d) Programs.

## OVERALL DIRECTION

To my mind, the greatest problem we are experiencing at 1701 is that we lack firm direction and consequently do not have a sense of urgency. There seems to be great complacency -- with many key people spending their time developing multitudes of programs, thinking about organization, and worst of all, plotting to improve their own positions. All the while, precious little is being done to actually put together the strongest possible organization in the States and get it mobilized in a constructive fashion. This is in marked contrast to the McGovern campaign to date which is full of young, energetic, results-oriented people who are focusing totally on organization matters, with considerable success.

The problem may well lie in our campaign leadership. Starting at the top, John Mitchell is a superb political strategist and a man of consistently sound and unflapable judgment. Moreover, he is a strong, firm, and objective decision-maker. However, he is not a charismatic, fast-moving ass-kicking, general manager who first gives firm direction and then pushes people relentlessly in that direction. Jeb Magruder, while a good program manager and organizer, is also not the hard-driving, fast-mover that is needed. In addition, the Political Coordinators are a mixed group and, as is outlined further below, do not provide the kind of leadership that is needed.

What 1701 really needs is a field management group or campaign manager under Mitchell who will for the most part forget about developing programs and concentrate their total efforts on field organization, starting with voter identification and registration. We need people who will travel the States, ask the tough questions, impact and energize the State Chairmen, kick them in their asses if needed, and make sure they are really moving on the right track. This kind of firm direction and operating leadership simply does not seem to be present.

The result is that each State Chairman is kind of doing his own thing, is resentful of direction from Washington, and is more or less building his own empire -- which may or may not be the best approach. The one thing that I am sure of, however, is that we are not organized or fast moving,

and are losing ground on registration and are incredibly weak in the field when compared with the McGovern organization.

This problem has in part been perceived, and we are now embarking on a major new registration drive which will be the top priority of the entire campaign organization. We intend to impart a real sense of urgency on this to try to shake people out of their complacency, and will attempt to mobilize our entire national and field organization for this registration drive. I think this will have a positive effect, but I wonder whether it is the only answer or whether it is enough to correct the major problems outlined above.

## OVERALL PRIORITIES

I sense that the campaign organization is failing to act according to priorities. This is a feeling on my part, and not as crisply defined as are problems in the political or program areas; but it could be an extremely important weakness.

Priorities seem to be well enough delineated in strategic terms -- the key states, constituent groups, etc. -- but the priorities do not appear to carry over into how people spend their time, or where energies are placed.

For example, everyone agrees that McGovern will be the opposition's candidate, and has shown surprising strength. However, we do not seem to be devoting sufficient resources to analyzing his strengths and weaknesses, and exploring his areas of vulnerability. One would think that this would be a top priority project -- but all that has surfaced thus far is a rather obvious one-page "analysis" that could have been prepared from reading the newspaper.

Another example is the State Chairman situation. We go to the trouble of carefully selecting the key states -- then several of them sit without activity for months becuase we do not follow through and name State Chairmen.

Part of the problem is that everyone seems to be going in 50 directions rather than selecting what is really important and pushing like hell on it. This is aggravated by the previously described lack of urgency at 1701. The attitude is that we have plenty of time, so there is no reason to hurry, work long hours, or otherwise extend ourselves. Consequently, there is no follow through on priorities -- no urgency to make things happen quickly.

POLITICAL COORDINATORS

The principal motivators of action in the field should be the five political coordinators. However, as was mentioned above, they are at best a mixed group.

Harry Flemming, in my opinion, is very weak. The slow progress in the development of the organization in the States is largely attributable to his poor performance when he was the sole head of the political division. Although his sphere of influence has been narrowed to the Southern States (plus New York), he remains a negative force on the overall campaign. Many persons still look to him as the "senior" political coordinator, and so his bad judgment affects more than just the Southern States (as if that were not enough). He seems to spend most of his time scheming and plotting on how to improve his position with Mitchell. He spends almost no time in the field.

Bob Mardian, who has the Western States, has proved a big disappointment. Our twice-weekly meetings with Mitchell and the political coordinators have become virtually non-productive, with Mardian and Flemming taking up the entire time with irrelevant verbal battles. Mardian seems intent on having the last word on every point, no matter how inane. Frankly, I do not see how Mitchell stands it. At least Mitchell has stopped Mardian from telling us "how we did it in Arizona in 1964 . . . ." Mardian does not seem to be a clear thinker or good manager. If you are concerned about Nofziger in California, I am doubly concerned about Mardian supervising Nofziger.

Don Mosiman has not really said or done enough for me to draw any firm conclusions about his performance at the campaign. However, he has been cooperative and industrious in his approach, and he appears adequate at this point. He has a really heavy load, being entrusted with key states like Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.

Al Kaupinen (New England) and Clayton Yeutter (Farm States) seem adequate enough for their present assignments, but I do not think they should be given any additional responsibilities.

To sum up, then, it is a pretty grim picture -- two out of the five political coordinators with over half the States are inadequate, in my opinion. As a result, the campaign has been woefully slow in naming State Chairmen --

key States such as Texas are still without Chairmen. In addition, there is no orderly flow of information to and from the States. Communications in the field are so fouled up that the Citizens Group Directors cannot even find out the background of the delegates to the Convention.

I really think that the best solution to this problem is the tough one -- fire Flemming and Mardian, and replace them with outstanding political managers if they can be found. Obviously, this has to be done as quickly as possible, but even at this late date it would be preferable to the alternative of letting them stay on and screw things up even more. I do not have any instant ideas of who could replace Flemming and Mardian, but my bet is that this could be solved inside of two weeks.

One more thought about the political division should be mentioned -- Mitchell seems to be relying increasingly on Fred La Rue for advice on how to handle the political coordinators. I think Fred is very astute politically, and is a good advisor to Mitchell. However, I think it would be a mistake to assume that the problems in the political divison could be solved by moving La Rue in over the existing political coordinators. Fred is a good advisor, but I do not think <u>anyone</u> could manage that crew.

## PROGRAMS

In my recent progress report on campaign activities, I concentrated on the problems in the Citizens area, and outlined what I planned to do about them. I also stated that I thought that Jeb was doing a good job, and I do. However, I have concerns about three of his areas: national voter contact programs, surrogates, and public relations. I discussed the understaffing of 1701 PR in the progress report, and it is being taken care of. The other two areas of concern are discussed briefly below.

1. <u>National Voter Contact Programs.</u> The national voter contact programs include direct mail, telephone operations, and door-to-door voter canvassing, all of which are based on computerized voter lists. If the computer tapes containing the various lists necessary for these programs are not accurate and are not received on time, none of these critical programs can be executed properly. In the test run in the California Primary, the computer tapes were neither completely accurate nor on time with resulting delays in the start up of the telephone banks, and delivery of the direct mail (up to three weeks late). While these deficiencies could be coped with in California, we could not expect to overcome similar problems in eleven key states simultaneously in October.

As a result of the poor showing of the national voter contact programs in the California primary, Bob Marik and Bob Morgan have undertaken an extensive review of their efforts. In the last week, they have changed the entire concept of the computer system from a single, centralized computer in Illinois to a decentralized system with a number of regional computer centers. They have also substantially redesigned the paper flow system in an attempt to make their information usable by the door-to-door canvassers, as well as by the telephone and direct mail programs. Finally, they have selected several new vendors to supply the lists to the computer centers.

These actions represent a fundamental change in the entire approach to the national voter contact programs. I agree with these changes, however, if the redesigned program does not work, we will not get another chance. In view of past performance, I continue to be concerned about this critical area. By the end of next week, Marik and Morgan should have a final revised program. I intend to analyze it carefully, and make further recommendations at that time.

2. Surrogates. As you know, the surrogate program has been unsatisfactory in several respects. The principal problem is that Bart Porter is weak, overly defensive, and in my opinion abrasive to work with. Moreover, he does not seem to be creative or a good planner, as shown by the fact that he has not yet pulled together a long-range plan, including identification of key media areas, which surrogates should be in these areas, with what frequency, etc. Some of the Citizens Group Directors have done this for their own surrogates, so there is no excuse for Porter not doing it for the major surrogates. John Whitaker is moving in on this situation now, and I am hopeful that he will be able to straighten it out.

* * *

I realize that this paper has been long on problems and short on specific solutions. However, if we can agree on the problems, I would think we will be able to find solutions.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN G

SUBJECT: Mitchell Political Meeting -- June 7, 1972

Mitchell met with Magruder, Malek, LaRue, Marik, and Teeter to discuss the political situation in light of McGovern's victories and situation June 6, 1972. Subjects discussed were:

1) Mitchell mentioned he just had had lunch with the Wednesday Senate Group (Percy and other liberal Republican Senators). Scott and Griffin attended. According to Mitchell there was general euphoria about a possible McGovern candidacy. Most believe McGovern at the top of the Democratic ticket could be very helpful to Republicans running for House and Senate seats.

This view was confirmed by Senator "Fritz" Hollings (D-S.C.) who is advising all candidates to run their own campaigns and to avoid McGovern. Mitchell is concerned about resulting complacency in the state organizations, as well as White House Staffers.

2) Mitchell asked the group to develop a political line emphasizing that either the Democratic Party or McGovern will have to modify policy positions; that Humphrey made a remarkable recovery; and that the election would be close because Republicans are a minority party. The statement is attached at Tab A and has been distributed pursuant to Mitchell's directions, to the White House Staff by Dent, the campaign committee by Magruder, and the Administration spokesmen by Bart Porter.

3) Mitchell is having a detailed precinct analysis of the Jewish, black, and chicano vote prepared by the campaign's demographer, Art Finkelstein;

4) Mitchell is directing a covert, well-financed program, headed by Democrats, to explain McGovern's "extreme positions" to labor, veterans, and Jewish voters. The goal is to keep the Democrats fighting for the nomination, though realizing McGovern has it, and hopefully acquiring these voting blocs in November;

5) Mitchell believes the substantive issue spokesmen (e.g. Laird and Rogers) can appropriately comment on the differences between the Administration's stands and McGovern's. However, he directed Magruder and Miller to meet with Tom Wilck and John Lofton to assure that Monday only comments on the Democrats, not on McGovern or Humphrey.

Why? This seems ridiculous

6) Mitchell directed the campaign to focus on McGovern on the big issues (national defense, welfare, and taxes). Mitchell believes [redacted] the 3 A's of Scott (acid, amnesty, and abortion) can be marginally effective in certain areas and among certain groups only.

wrong

I reviewed with Bob Marik the three previous meetings held before I was invited. They covered the Teeter First Wave polling analysis submitted to you on May 11, 1972. Marik had prepared a summary of the comments, which is attached at Tab B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

TO: WHITE HOUSE STAFF

FROM: HARRY S. DENT

Attached for your information is an assessment of the situation at the conclusion of the Presidential primaries. This statement should serve as your guidance for the campaign between now and the time that the Democrat nominee is finally selected or some new position develops.

ASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AT THE CONCLUSION OF PRIMARIES
BY JOHN N. MITCHELL, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

The Democrat Party appears to be approaching a crossroads. Although it is not certain that Sen. George McGovern will be the Democrat Party's Presidential nominee this year, the choices available to the National Convention are rapidly narrowing.

And if Senator McGovern is the nominee, one of two things is going to have to occur: either the Democrat Party is going to have to accept Senator McGovern's views on domestic, defense and foreign policy -- views which many Democrats find extreme -- or Senator McGovern is going to have to modify his views to conform with the mainstream of his party.

The seriousness with which many Democrats look upon Senator McGovern's positions is reflected in Senator Humphrey's strong finish in the California Primary. In the space of one week, Senator Humphrey reduced the McGovern lead from the 20 percent shown in a widely-read public opinion poll just a few days ago to the 5 percent which actually separated the two men when the votes were counted. If the primary had been held two or three days later, Senator Humphrey may well have won.

Again, although Senator McGovern ran an extememly expensive media campaign, a majority of California Democrats voted for someone else. Thus, the Democrat presidential nomination has by no means been decided.

In any case, no matter who the eventual nominee is, the Committee for the Re-election of the President is preparing a maximum effort on behalf of the President this fall. We must never lose sight of the fact that the Republican Party is a minority party and that a coalition of Republicans, Democrats and Independents will be needed to re-elect President Nixon in the general election, a goal we will reach.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 24, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROBERT TEETER

FROM: BOB MARIK

SUBJECT: Comments on the First Wave Analysis

This memorandum summarizes the important comments made by the Strategy Group in their discussion of your analysis of the first wave of polling. Although your mathematical analysis showed past party voting behavior to be a stronger variable than demographic grouping, it was still felt that the campaign strategy should be oriented to some degree around the important voter blocs. In particular, the idea was raised of seeking an appropriate sample of pivotal voter groups and tracking the attitudes of that group by monthly surveys up to the election. This information would be used to augment the state-by-state data which would be developed through the existing polling plan. Two groups which should be tracked in this manner are urban ethnics (potential shift to Nixon), and upper income White suburbanites (potential shift to McGovern).

In the statistical analysis, the Group also commented on the substantial variation of important factors among the states. For example, Party Type had 21% influence in California and only 6% in Ohio. The question was raised as to whether the nation-wide analysis is useful for strategy development or whether it would have to be approached state by state.

The Group was concerned that the questionnaire be framed in such a way that the important issues could be identified and their intensity measured perhaps more sharply in the first wave. In particular, the question was raised as to whether the apparent importance of busing in Florida and Michigan was accurately reflected in the first wave results. The analysis recommended that issues such as crime, drugs and unemployment should not be emphasized except to particular audiences and when we had an impressive story to tell. We will want to get into that strategy more deeply when the advertising program is developed in detail.

The feeling of the group was that the President's support among young voters might well be higher than was implied in your memo. This can be checked with the second wave results.

There was agreement that the ticket-splitter analysis should be done and would be useful as a tool to guide campaign strategy. There was disagreement with the statement that no special effort needs to be made to register older voters. Newly retired people are often transient and may well represent a fertile area for registration canvassing activities.

There was disagreement on the comment that registration drives among young voters should be stopped as we have discussed in detail in last week's meeting.

There was agreement with the point that we should attempt to build as large a lead as possible between now and the national conventions. Our activities should be geared to push McGovern to the left before he becomes well known to the voting public. The specific tactics need to be developed over the next few weeks.

It was mentioned that one important issue was general unrest. It would be useful if a clearer definition could be established of what is on the voters mind when they discuss the issue cluster of general unrest.

Finally, as we discussed over the telephone, it would be useful for us to devote a portion of a meeting in the near future to a presentation by you of the techniques used in the survey program and the significance of the information that is being obtained. With that background, our future discussions would be much more fruitful.

MEMORANDUM



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Fred X

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: FRED MALEK

SUBJECT: Women/Volunteer Program

In our telephone conversation yesterday you raised the fear that our Women's organization was oriented only toward Republicans rather than covering all women. I do not feel your point was adequately answered and want to take this opportunity to amplify.

In each State a woman co-chairman is being named. For the most part these women do have backgrounds of leadership in the Republican Party. However, to supplement this we are naming a National Advisory Group along with State Advisory Groups for women. For the most part these groups will be comprised of the best leadership we can attract from the various women's organizations from both the national and State levels.

Once attracted to our National and State Advisory Councils, these women leaders will then be used to politicize, as possible, their own organizations. This would include the selection of key people from within their organizations to work on the campaign, the recruitment of volunteers from within their organizations, and the communication to membership of the reasons for their support of the President. An example of the kind of person we are after is Ann Campbell who is the National President of the American Association of University Women. We are hoping that she will serve on the National Advisory Council. Likewise, we would hope to find certain State representatives from the American Association of University Women to serve on our various State Advisory Councils.

Both the national and State Advisory Councils should be put together within the month. I feel that this approach will enable us to go beyond the usual Republican organization, attract women of all political backgrounds, and utilize to the maximum possible the various women's organizations. Please let me know if you have any further thoughts or questions on this.

There are a lot better women's orgs than The AAUW in terms of good volunteer activists. Jr. League, etc. I still feel we have a very real problem in this area

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: June 26, 1972

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

You asked for a report on the Ed Nixon appearance at the African Methodist-Episcopal Church on June 21. Ed Nixon departed when 30 of the 4,000 rushed the platform. Bob Brown and Paul Jones (1701 black director of citizens) urged Ed Nixon to attend.

The report from Bart Porter to Magruder is attached.

Obviously a problem in character of Presidential invitations — here also — Report will be to you on Friday.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: WILLIAM E. MOELLER
HERBERT L. PORTER

WEM
Bart

SUBJECT: Ed Nixon's appearance at the Quadrennial Conference of African Methodist Episcopal Churches on June 21, 1972 in Dallas, Texas

1) The invitation to speak was originally sent to the President earlier this year from Bishop Decatur Ward Nichols of New York. Dave Parker regretted for the President in January and referred the invitation to this Committee.

How specifically was this handled.

2) On May 3, Curt Herge sent a note to Pat O'Donnell, with a copy of the letter of regret, telling him that Paul Jones believed the event was of "significant interest and value vis-a-vis the Black Community". Herge suggested that O'Donnell refer the invitation to Bob Brown at the White House for comment. Today, O'Donnell told me that his "office had called Brown -- Brown said it was being handled by 1701--- and we dropped it".

incredible.

3) As of June 13, Ed Nixon had been scheduled to do a Veterans Administration event in Austin, Texas. This event was set up in conjunction with Bill Rhatican's office at the White House. At the same time Herge was asking Sandy Cram to handle the Austin event, he gave her two or three other possible Texas events for Mr. Nixon's consideration. One of these was the subject event.

4) On June 13, Sandy Cram talked to Paul Jones who said that it would be a good event for Ed Nixon to do and recommended it. He told Sandy to call Bob Brown at the White House for his opinion.

5) On June 14, Sandy Cram contacted Bob Brown, while in Minnesota, who also recommended the event for Mr. Nixon.

6) On June 14, Sandy Cram talked to Bishop Nichols who stated that it would be "extremely appropriate" for Ed Nixon to deliver a message for the President at the Conference on June 21.

7) On June 14, the Scheduling Office transmitted all pertinent information relating to this event to the Tour Office.

8) On June 14, the Committee's Tour Office received the transmittal memorandum from the Scheduling Office. On that same date, the Tour Office decided that advancemen should cover the event. Two advancemen were scheduled.

No clearance of Presidential message?

9) The two advancemen, Robert Goodwin and Frank McGee, arrived in Dallas on Monday, June 19th, and called their key contact, Bishop Nichols.

10) On June 19, Ed Cowling, the Tour Office desk man handling this event, saw Art Amolsch to ensure that Mr. Nixon's speech was being prepared. Art agreed to prepare the remarks.

11) On June 20, Ed Cowling called Bob Brown to discuss Mr. Nixon's speech. Mr. Brown was not in his office. Ed Cowling left a message requesting him to call either Mr. Cowling or Art Amolsch regarding the speech. Later that day, Art Amolsch and Bob Brown discussed the speech. Bob Goodwin also spoke with Art Amolsch about the speech, conveying Bishop Nichols' wish that certain points be included in the speech. The speech was prepared late in the afternoon on June 20.

12) From the time the advancemen arrived in Dallas until the event, the lead advanceman, Bob Goodwin was in frequent contact with both Ed Cowling and Bishop Nichols. Goodwin did not foresee any problems with the event.

13) Mr. Nixon arrived in Dallas the evening of June 20th. On the following morning, Mr. Nixon met with Eric Johnsson, Chairman of the Texas Committee for the Re-election of the President. Mr. Nixon proceeded to the event on schedule and arrived at 11:30 a.m., escorted by Bob Goodwin. Mr. Nixon proceeded to a holding room where he was introduced to a number of the participating Bishops. A worship service had been in process since 10:00 a.m.

14) At approximately 11:45 a.m. Mr. Nixon was escorted to the dais where he was seated next to Mr. Nichols and other clergymen. The worship service was concluding when Bishop Nichols proceeded to the podium, at which point a group of fifteen individuals proceeded down the aisle. They were joined by another fifteen to twenty-five people who crowded in front of the speaking platform. There were cries of ' "No Nixon", "Have church" '. The Bishop had arisen to introduce Mr. Nixon.

Concurrently, Mr. Nixon, Bob Goodwin, Mr. Nixon's security element, two detectives, and two uniformed policemen decided that Mr. Nixon should leave the Conference. This was done, and Mr. Nixon proceeded directly to the airport for a plane to Austin.

Attached are two newspaper clippings relating to the incident, which support Ed Nixon's feeling that the cause of the disturbance was somehow related to the on-going church service. It is certainly not inconceivable, however, that the interruption was carefully planned, staged, and well-executed by a dissident element within the Conference to embarrass Bishop Nichols and/or Mr. Nixon.

No it is obvious.

✓ cc: Gordon Strachan

Attachment

The Dallas Morning News

LOCAL NEWS

Editorial Classified **** D

Thursday, June 22, 1972

# President's Kin Booed From Conference Dais

By HELEN FARMLEY

With clenched fists and cries of "No Nixon," "Have church," about 40 delegates to the African Methodist Episcopal General Conference stormed the Dallas Memorial Auditorium platform Wednesday and denied Edward Nixon the right to deliver a message from his brother, President Richard Nixon.

The protesters shouted, "Worship. Nixon has done nothing for us," as the President's brother, appearing at the invitation of the conference, departed from the stage without uttering a word.

The confrontation came during the opening worship service of the 39th quadrennial AME Conference which will continue through July 2. About 20,000 delegates and alternate delegates from throughout the United States, Africa and the West Indies are attending the sessions.

D. Ward Nichols, senior bishop of the denomination, told The Dallas News, "I apologize to the President for any seeming insult this might cause him.

"Various people in this country think and act differently. That's why we are living in America. We cannot control people's thoughts and ideas.

"I regret this happened. I am sorry."

Cited as leaders of the uprising were AME pastors Richard Stokes of New York and John Adams of Los Angeles, who for over six years was president of Paul Quinn College, an AME-supported school in Waco.

"I resent Nixon being brought here by the bishop (Nichols) who interrupted worship for political candidates," said Adams who, along with Stokes, is a candidate for election to the AME bishopric during conference elections.

Admitting he is against President Nixon's political philosophy, Adams accused the prelate of inviting a political candidate to speak to the conference in order "to receive some gratuity to be handed out.

"It is a desecration of worship," he charged. "The real issue at stake is that Nixon has made it perfectly clear he plans to manipulate the election without passion or concern for black folks."

Bishop Nichols told The News it is not unusual for political candidates or personalities to appear at the AME quadrennial meetings and he pointed out that Sen. Hubert Humphrey and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt had addressed previous sessions.

"It has been our custom for years to invite the President and governors to speak at our meetings," said Bishop Nichols. "It was not Nixon who was invited here, but the President of the United States and his words should have been heard whether we like him or don't like him."

Enraged delegates shout down Nixon.

# Church faction prevents talk by Nixon's brother

By MARTHA MAN
Religion Writer

A militant group of delegates to the African Methodist Episcopal Church General Conference refused Wednesday to let President Nixon's brother address the opening session at Memorial Auditorium.

"We resent the attempt to interrupt a religious worship service with politics," said Willie J. Nelson of Columbia, S.C.

"We will hear from Christ first and take our communion before we hear from the White House," he told The Times Herald.

About 25 delegates took command of the stage as soon as Edward Nixon was seated with Senior Bishop D. Ward Nichols.

During the commotion Nixon was ushered out a side door. A guard said he made no comment and looked "surprised."

Dr. Richard R. Stokes, a spokesman for the militant group, said, "We resent the political chicanery promulgated on this general conference by the senior bishop."

While the objectors said their major opposition centered on a political figure's interruption of a worship service, they also said they are against the political philosophy represented by Nixon.

They said they object to the Nixon administration's conservative politics, including an anti-busing stand on school desegregation. Separate but equal schools, which they contend Nixon is promoting, have been in existence "since the Dred Scott decision" more than 100 years ago.

Nixon had just stepped onto the stage prior to being introduced to delegates. From the back of the hall a stream of predominantly younger men moved up the center aisle, calling out "Let's worship." They were also shouting "No Nixon."

They stormed the platform, surrounded Bishop Nichols, and took over the microphones.

Nixon was hurriedly led out a side door.

The senior bishop announced Nixon would speak. But the protesters said it was not the bishop's place to set the program.

DALLAS TIMES HERALD, Wednesday, 21 June 1972

June 14, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: L. HIGBY

SUBJECT: Campaign Organization

Chuck Colson called suggesting you, Mitchell, and Colson get together to discuss some things that need to be done at the Campaign organization.

Apparently he discussed more than just the union bug thing with the President yesterday, according to our conversation last night.

He is currently having his staff run a check of what is being done at 1701. In addition, I am having Gordon Strachan do the same thing so we have a complete listing.

Should we set up a meeting?

Yes _____ No _____
(I strongly advise against such a meeting. L.)

LH:kb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE _____

TO: H

FROM: DWIGHT CHAPIN

| FYI_____ | PLEASE HANDLE_____ |
|---|---|

OTHER:

FYI
C

# Fe in Big GOP Rally at Ike's Farm

—Associated Press Wirephoto

RVEY'S SCENE—President Eisenhower holds his chin in Gr hand as he looks over the tent layout yesterday after- n on his Gettysburg farm. With him are Republican National Chairman Leonard Hall, left, and Vice President Nixon. The event marked his campaign kick-off. The President later addressed the assembly of campaign workers.

# Ike Greets 500 Top GOP Leaders at Farm

## *Campaign Kicked Off at Skull Session On Techniques in a Huge Brown Tent*

By INGRID JEWELL
Post-Gazette Staff Writer

GETTYSBURG, Pa., Sept. 12 — Dwight D. Eisenhower, Republican, today launched his campaign for re-election as President of the United States in the pleasant rolling pasture beside his white brick farm house near the Civil War battlefield.

Dressed in brown tweed coat and whipcord trousers, he looked the smiling country squire as he greeted the 500 top party leaders at a skull session on campaign techniques.

**Meeting in Huge Tent**

The meeting was held in a huge brown tent with its sides rolled up to admit a bit of sunshine and some warm wind. But there the carnival atmosphere ended.

It was a work session. It was not a haranguing of potential voters. It was a meeting to plot a course of action by which voters at later meetings can be wooed.

Present were the National Committee members from all the states, the Republican state chairmen and leaders of Citizens for Eisenhower, Youth for Eisenhower and Young Republican clubs.

**Duff Welcomes Visitors**

Pennsylvania's Senator, James H. Duff, a candidate for re-election, was the enthusiastic master of ceremonies. He welcomed the visitors with his usual bluff heartiness and paid tribute to the President whose leadership all present believe will pull their party to victory.

Senator Duff told the assemblage that "just over this hill" Abraham Lincoln delivered his immortal address dedicating the field as a national cemetery.

He likened President Eisenhower to Lincoln in that both have been "emancipators of Americans."

**He recalled that Eisenhower is the only citizen of Pennsylvania who has been a Republican President of the United States.**

After the speeches, the crowd was treated to a fine country picnic supper. Catered by a hotel in Gettysburg, the menu included fried chicken Adams County style," cold roast beef, cold baked ham, baked beans, swiss cheese, potato salad, tomatoes, pickled eggs and beets, ice cream and cake.

(Continued on Page 4, Col. 4)

# Ike Opens Campaign at Gettysburg Farm

DETROIT, MICH., TIMES
Circ. D. 414,942 S. 563,95

SEP 4

## He Urges Crusade to Win Millions Of Voters to Republican Banners; Nixon and Hall Blast Democrats

(Continued from Page 1)

He said he wanted to answer a question that many people have been putting to him, and then declared:

**"Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel fine."**

In calling for a new crusade to lead the party to victory in November, Eisenhower referred to it—as he did in accepting the nomination in San Francisco—as the party of the future. He said it is best suited for the management of the American Government.

### Get Voters Registered

Eisenhower, as well as those who spoke ahead of him in reporting on the party's outlook, placed much emphasis on need for getting voters registered and to the polls.

"We want the decision of America, not the decision of the minority," the President declared, rapping his knuckles against the lectern.

That touched off another big round of applause and [illegible] the kick-off talk in advance of its delivery to upwards of 500 campaign workers from all over the United States.

They included leaders of the regular Republican organization, groups pledged to woo the independent voters, and officials of organizations called Democrats for Eisenhower and Youth for Eisenhower.

Eisenhower, who came to the revival style campaign tent from his nearby country home, placed great emphasis on what he called the need for getting Republican supporters registered to vote and to the polls next November 6.

"I think our fundamental effort," he declared, "should be this: every Republican, every Independent, every discerning Democrat, every thinking citizen regardless of his past or present political record can, should, must be persuaded to vote Republican on November 6."

He added that "this year's entire campaign will be an appalling exercise in futility if during its course we should get people to the boiling point, brimming with enthusiasm and zeal, only to find out on election day that they cannot vote because their names are not registered on the polling books."

Then he said: "Crusades without ballots are like soldiers without bullets."

Eisenhower also urged that his campaign leaders "write it no cowards, no state as hopeless, for victory is the product of a nationwide effort."

HELP THEMSELVES—President and Mrs. Eisenhower serve themselves at a buffet supper which climaxed a rally under a huge tent on the Eisenhower Gettysburg farm yesterday. The President spears a Pennsylvania-type pickled egg as Mrs. Eisenhower carries her plate along the buffet table. About 500 persons attended the rally.

## Adlai Calls Hoodwink

WASHINGTON, Sept. 4 (U.P.)—Republican National Chairman Hall accused Adlai Stevenson today of trying to "hoodwink" the American people with "glib distortions and misstatements."

Hall issued a statement in reply to Stevenson's charges in Detroit that the Democratic campaign of the Republicans is handicapping the war in Korea.

### VERY HAPPY

Hall asserted:

"I am extremely happy that Adlai Stevenson finally has accepted the philosophy of Republican free enterprise which the nation is practicing.

"I am astonished, however, that on the very day when government announced on a time record peak of employment and wages are worth that Mr. Stevenson is wrong about 60 odd times.

### IS SO WORKIN'

"When Americans are working at good jobs, earning more and enjoying more of the good things of life for themselves and their families than ever before in history.

"The American people are not as gullible as Mr. Stevenson presumes. He won't hoodwink them with glib distortions and misstatements."

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—Associated Press Wirephoto

**PRESIDENT EISENHOWER**
*Tilting soft drink bottle.*

campaign leaders assembled here from all parts of the United States.

Nixon told the party leaders:

"I believe that the re-election of President Eisenhower and a Republican Congress and Senate is the business here before us."

The Vice President then went into the question of whether or not—and how—the Republicans should reply to Democratic campaign attacks.

**Correct the Record**

"Where Democrats commit distortion or misstatement" Nixon said, "it is our responsibility to correct the record."

With Mrs. Eisenhower and Mrs. Nixon on the platform with him, the President got another laugh with an allusion to the victory the Democrats scored in the Maine election Monday.

**Eisenhower said the Republicans "have a great party" with "people working all the way from Los Angeles to Maine."**

**Then he caught himself and said with a chuckle regarding his mention of Maine: "That's a bad word."**

Before the speaking program started, Eisenhower wandered happily among his guests, shaking many hands and calling greetings to old friends.

After the speech Eisenhower was all but mobbed by the surge of Republican workers to the platform.

The President was introduced by Senator Duff, Republican, Pa., who is facing a tough re-election battle, as [illegible]

**Same Campaign Theme**

Eisenhower's farm on the historic Civil War battlefield is located just 40 miles from Harrisburg, Pa., where Adlai E. Stevenson, the Democratic presidential nominee, will launch his campaign officially tomorrow night. Stevenson, however, has been criss-crossing the country for more than two weeks spraying criticism at both Eisenhower and his administration.

In calling today for a great crusade, Eisenhower set forth the same campaign theme he sounded four years ago.

He outlined a four-fold objective for the party:

1. "To arouse in the American people a consciousness of all that is at stake in this election, of their responsibility and their ability in making sure we stay on the straight road of prosperity, progress and peace."

2. "To generate in them (the American people) the conviction that our party, the party of the future, is best fitted for the management of our government — because of its principles and record and the candidates it presents for office from village to national level."

3. "To ignite in them a zeal to make converts among their neighbors, to be themselves active workers for the Republican Party and builders of the American future."

4. "To fortify their determination that they will register in time to get others to register; to vote themselves and persuade others to vote."

The President went on to say that if the leaders do these things they can "change a campaign into a crusade; a platform into a cause that rallies millions to your standard. And you won't have to worry about marginal districts."

[illegible] jobs, enjoying more and more of the good things of life for themselves and their families than ever before in history.

"The American people are not as gullible as Mr. Stevenson presumes. He won't hoodwink them with glib distortions and misstatements."

## [illegible]iling Over Again

From now until November, politics will be the steady fare of the people who will be called upon to make their decision in the elections early in the month. The campaigns are getting under way early.

President Eisenhower has launched the Republican drive with a meeting at his Gettysburg farm, where 500 of the top people in the party heard him warn against complacency and indolence. He pointed out that the opposition appeared to be registering more people than his own party and he called upon the leaders to pass the word down through the ranks to step up their grassroots activity.

Leonard Hall, Republican national chairman, has reintroduced the issue of loyalty in the campaign by referring to the case of Alger Hiss. This may be the forerunner of the blows to be struck on behalf of the GOP cause later, although the President himself has expressed his distaste at such tactics. Efforts by Hall to label any party as a "party of treason" is likely to backfire, as the President well knows.

The Democratic standard bearers continue their barnstorming tour of the country, seeking perhaps to emulate the tactics of Harry Truman in his successful campaign of 1948. Mr. Stevenson has disclosed that the main force of the attack will be directed against Vice President Nixon, which may be an unwise piece of strategy.

The new Constitution party, composed of those who are dissatisfied with the proposals of both the major parties, is now holding its convention, having already selected its candidates for President and vice president. This group favors states rights, abolition of the income tax and many other proposals that have not been included in the platform of either the Democratic or Republican parties. Constitution party leaders hope to throw the presidential selection into the House of Representatives and thus achieve some purpose, the nature of which is not exactly clear at this time.

The next few weeks will bring some mighty electioneering and a good deal of confusion, but it is all part of the system.

A Pennsylvania Picnic Supper

catered by

Hotel Gettysburg, Gettyburg, Pa.

## Buffet

Fried Chicken, Adams County Style

Home Baked Beans

Celery Hearts and Pickles

Cold Roast Beef

Cold Baked Ham

Sweitzer Cheese

Potato Salad

Coleslaw

Home Grown Tomatoes

Pickled Eggs

Pickled Beets

G.O.P. Ice Cream and Cake  Coffee  Assorted Rolls

# REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN "KICK-OFF"

AT THE

EISENHOWER FARM

GETTYSBURG, PA.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1956

H

EYES ONLY

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: FRED MALEK

FROM: CHUCK COLSON

Can you tell me what the budget figures are for advertising during the campaign in Catholic and/or ethnic newspapers? I would like very much to know how much money we have to play with here as we think about the kinds of ads we will want to run in the Catholic press around the country. Tom Melady has been in to talk to me and has a plan working with Lasslo Pasztor which I would like a copy of when you get it. WhatTTom is talking about fits in very well with the suggestions I talked to you about in the outside Catholic committee which simply advertises on behalf of Catholic issues but in the process, of course, involves where the President stands vis a vis his opponents on those issues. I would like to know how much latitude we have in terms of money for direct mail and what capacity Donnelly will have to break Catholics out in the ten key states for a major mailing during the campaign.

We should also consider in our advertising budget for Catholics the New York Daily News which would have a special Catholics for Nixon or Catholics for something type ad in the campaign. We should also determine what newspapers in other major urban areas are read most frequently by Catholics. It is clear in New York that it is the Daily News. I am not sure in Chicago or in other areas of high Catholic concentration.

cc: Balzano

Mike:

I would like you to work with Rhatican and/or Ken Clawson and do some checking around and find out in the 7 or 8 major metropolitan areas which newspaper in that particular city is most widely read by Catholics. I know that data is maintained on this and probably the ad agencies can give it to us. I would check with the November Group across the street first, as a matter of fact, because the Standard Rate and Data Tables usually show demographic breakdowns of readership for the benefit of advertisers.

CWC

June 19, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MISS ROSE MARY WOODS

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Taft Schreiber

I just talked to Taft Schreiber, who reported how successful the Saturday gathering of celebrities was. He said that Mrs. Nixon was absolutely tremendous, that everyone had a wonderful time and that some great photographs were taken. He went on to say -- and he wanted this relayed to you -- that the Zsa Zsa issue was easily handled and caused no problems.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

H

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER

FROM: CHARLES COLSON

You may recall at the time of the May 8th support efforts, we sent Andre LeTendre to Chicago to run an operation there with his key men that would generate telegrams and letters around the country. Simply to refresh your recollection, we took Andre off the Commerce Department payroll on one day and had him on the Committee payroll the next.

I indicated at that time that his expenses would have to be covered, that I could get Dave Bradshaw's law firm to pick up the tab, but that we would have to reimburse him.

Enclosed is the first letter I have received from Dave. There will be a subsequent one which will include the telephone call and telegram bill which could run a few thousand dollars.

As I remember, I said that I thought the total tab would be somewhere between $2,000 and $5,000. I mentioned this also to Haldeman in a meeting in his office on the day that we dispatched LeTendre and Bob indicated that that would be worth doing.

In view of the fact that Dave is Clem Stone's son-in-law, I think we ought to handle this with some dispatch and also the ensuing bill when it comes in. Don't worry about this one; it can very easily be gotten back to us several times over if we need to go back to the well with Clem Stone.

Let me know if there is any problem with this.

BRADSHAW
SPERANZA
VEVERKA
& BRUMLIK

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

David E. Bradshaw
Carmen V. Speranza
Donald J. Veverka
Donald J. Brumlik
Edward S. Jackson
Richard L. Weiss
Gary H. Rieman
Gary C. Pileski
Of Counsel
William Brumlik

Thirtieth Floor
230 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 372-3665

Washington Office
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 223-5950
CABLE BRADLAW

June 13, 1972

PERSONAL & ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Charles W. Colson
Special Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chuck:

Enclosed are two bills which are self-explanatory as to what they cover. The phone bill has not yet come in. Would you please have a check issued to Don Brumlik and forward it to our Chicago office, as these people are beginning to give us a little trouble on these two bills.

It was my intention to send them all to you at one time but I would appreciate having these two processed at this time.

Very sincerely yours,

Dave

David E. Bradshaw

DEB/mk
Enclosures

NO. 24 SM. SMALL

# HEBARD STORAGE WAREHOUSES, INC.

6331-33 BROADWAY
CHICAGO, ILL. 60626
TELEPHONE ROgers Park 4-0282

MR. DONALD J. BRUMLIK
RM. 2900 - 230 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60601

MAY 18, 1972

1972

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| May | 8 | TO Moving from 1439 S. Michigan Avenue to 230 N. Michigan Avenue - | | |
| | | 5/8 - 1 Van 2 Men 2¼ Hrs. Loading & Travel Time | 99 | 00 |
| | | 5/9 - 1 Van 2 Men 1-3/4 Hrs. Unloading & Travel Time | 67 | 00 |
| | | | 166 | 00 |

NO. 24 SM. SNALL

# HEBARD STORAGE WAREHOUSES, INC.

6331-33 BROADWAY
CHICAGO, ILL. 60626
TELEPHONE ROgers Park 4-0282

MR. DONALD J. BRUMLIK
RM. 2900 - 230 N. Michigan Avenue
~~Chicago, Illinois 60601~~

May 18, 1972

| 1972 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| May | 18 | TO Moving from 230 N. Michigan Avenue to 1439 S. Michigan Avenue - | |
| | | 1 Van 2 Men - 1¼ Hrs. Loading & Travel Time | 63 00 |
| | | 1 Van 2 Men - 1-3/4 Hrs. Unloading & Travel Time | 91 00 |
| | | | 154 00 |

WALL STREET JOURNAL
JUNE 20, 1972

# *Uneasy Alliance*

# Now Organized Labor Faces Dilemma: What To Do About McGovern

## Unions Likely to Endorse Senator if He Is Picked But Won't Give Their All

## 'Labor Bet on Losing Horse'

By Byron E. Calame
*Staff Reporter of* The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON—George McGovern's surge toward the Democratic presidential nomination is bringing the AFL-CIO to an agonizing political crossroads.

If the South Dakotan wins the party prize as expected, the federation could decide to team up with his "new politics" of youth and reform and do its all to defeat President Nixon this fall.

Or the union combine could shun the McGovern drive for the White House, figuring it will fail. Labor and other old-line regulars might then pick up the pieces and put the Democratic Party back in the old mold.

Most likely is a choice somewhere in between. It now seems probable that the AFL-CIO, plus the independent United Auto Workers, will swallow its misgivings and endorse Sen. McGovern if he's nominated. If he moves toward the middle of the road, the federation might also vow a maximum effort to elect him. But the words could be little more than words. In fact, the Committee on Political Education, the AFL-CIO's political arm, is considering pouring most of its money and manpower into congressional races rather than the presidential contest. In any case, "some of us might just sit on our hands," warns the president of one major union.

Yesterday, following his return from a European trip, AFL-CIO chief George Meany began huddling with strategists to ponder the course ahead. The formal decisions, however, won't be made till some time after the Democratic convention ends in mid-July. The presidents of the AFL-CIO's 117 affiliates will meet Aug. 30 in Chicago to decide on endorsing the Democratic nominee, whether he's Sen. McGovern or someone else.

**Backing the Wrong Horse**

The path chosen by the leaders of the 13.5-million-member AFL-CIO could influence the 1972 elections, for labor's money and manpower have been essential to Democratic presidential campaigns for three decades. This year COPE expects to raise and spend—in behalf of labor's political favorites—more money than it has ever doled out before.

At this point, AFL-CIO leaders, whose distaste for the South Dakotan has been ill-concealed, aren't quite conceding the nomination to Sen. McGovern; some still cling to hopes that Edward Kennedy might run and snatch the prize away. Yet there's no evidence of any significant AFL-CIO effort now to deny Mr. McGovern the nomination.

Such an attempt would probably be doomed anyway. For labor's traditional influence over the Democratic presidential choice has clearly evaporated this spring. "Labor will probably have less clout in Miami than at any Democratic convention since 1932," says one union strategist.

"When you get right down to it, labor bet on a losing horse," one observer says, noting the strong preference for Sens. Hubert Humphrey and Edmund Muskie shown by several labor leaders during the primaries. Moreover, though the AFL-CIO set out to get up to 600 union members elected as delegates under the party's new reform rules, it is winding up with only about 350. Few union men were on McGovern primary slates, and his campaign workers proved better organized to vie for delegates in many nonprimary states.

**A Movement Divided**

Actually, labor's leadership is far from united in its political leanings. The Teamsters union, which is the nation's largest union (and which is still outside the AFL-CIO), isn't likely to endorse any Democratic presidential candidate. Secretary-Treasurer Emil Mazey and several other high officials of the UAW, the other big independent union, favor Sen. McGovern. Within the AFL-CIO, President A. F. Grospiron of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers has endorsed the South Dakotan. But I. W. Abel, head of the Steelworkers, is reported urging his favorite, Sen. Humphrey, to "hang tough."

The rank-and-file seems even more widely divided. A recent Machinists Union poll showed 32% of its members favored Sen. Humphrey, 26% Gov. George Wallace and 21% Sen. McGovern. Pro-Wallace sentiment runs strong in some other unions, especially in places where the school-busing issue is sizzling.

Sen. McGovern hopes to turn labor's divisions to his advantage, and he has begun trying to build bridges to his critics. He attempted unsuccessfully to reach Mr. Meany by phone in Europe, and as of yesterday he was seeking to line up a meeting with him before the convention. The McGovern forces have made overtures to John Henning, the president of the California State AFL-CIO who backed Sen. Hum-

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN G

SUBJECT: New York Primary Returns

The President's name is not on the New York ballot.

Democratic candidates' names do not appear on the New York ballot. Instead, delegates which are not legally bound to a particular candidate are selected. McGovern's delegates are expected to win over 200 of the 248 delegates available today. An additional 30 will be selected this weekend by the State Democratic Committee.

The New York City polls are open from 3 p.m. to 10 p.m.; polls are open in the rest of the state between 12 noon and 9 p.m. CBS and NBC will not have announced shows on the results. Only spot announcements are scheduled on NBC.

Harry Dent will prepare a one page summary of the results for the President. This summary will be on your desk at 7:45 a.m. for you to decide whether it should go to the President.

X

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

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Harry Dent will prepare a one page summary of the results for the President. This summary will be on your desk at 7:45 a.m. for you to decide whether it should go to the President.

GS/jb

In the New York Primary today there are contested races for 11 delegate slots and 10 alternate slots. These are the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 16th districts. In addition, in Congressman Dowd's district there are 3 people vying for the 2 delegate slots. These races merely reflect an intra-party battle. To the best of our knowledge, all delegates and alternates in New York are committed to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Harry S. Dent

SUBJECT: New York Primary

McGovern appears to be coming out of New York with roughly 240 delegates.

UPI reports McGovern with at least 218 based on yesterday's vote, and another 20 this Saturday when the State Party selects 30 at-large delegates. McGovern delegates are running ahead in 215 races tallied out of 237 in which he is entered.

New York observers report surprise at the number of McGovern election day workers in New York City and some of the larger up-state cities. Turnout was strong in the city and light elsewhere.

State Chairman Lanigan expects all GOP delegates for the President with perhaps one or two exceptions.

Highlights of Congressional Primaries:

14th: Rooney, J. (winner - close)
Lowenstein, A.

Rooney, with some help from us, had too much muscle.

20th: Ryan, William (winner - 2 to 1)
Abzug, B.

Ryan, backed by regular Democrat organization and Labor, was known to be ill (reportedly cancer). Abzug on the attack generated sympathy vote for Ryan.

22nd: Bingham, J. (winner)
Scheuer, J.

A more respected, statesmanlike Bingham was preferred over the brash, pushy Scheuer. Two-thirds of the district was Bingham's from before.

Celler, E.
Holtzman, E. (winner - very close)

A surprise win by young, attractive district leader (lady). Most think age issue hurt Celler. Celler can run in November on Liberal line.

Delaney, J. (winner - big)
Manton, T.

Delaney's strong showing in heartland of Democrats, blue-collar country could be a good sign. Manton was backed by McGovern Democrat County Chairman (Troy), with statewide influence. Delaney had GOP and Conservative endorsements.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN G

On June 7 you asked that the suggested campaign slogan (President Nixon - Now More Than Ever) be tested to determine if Dent's concern -- it may be too sophisticated for the average man -- was correct.

The results of the group sessions conducted by Teeter's Market Opinion Research is attached. The research concludes that the slogan is understandable and not too sophisticated.

Dailey hopes to review the results with Mitchell today and receive final approval for the slogan.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

**MEMORANDUM** June 20, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT: Further Study of Slogan "President Nixon. Now more than ever."

We were requested to conduct further research on the slogan, "President Nixon. Now more than ever." to determine whether the slogan was understandable and not too sophisticated in the context of other competing slogans. To study this question two group sessions were conducted in Detroit with ticket-splitters, over 35 years of age, with middle incomes, and non-college. At each session we discussed several slogans including those used by McGovern and Wallace in the primaries. This memorandum will outline the results of the research.

In both of the groups the slogan was understood to refer to unfinished work in progress. The groups pictured the President's past record and looked to the future. This slogan embodied the concept of "help him finish the job." The slogan was not interpreted by anyone as anti-McGovern.

The statement also contained a sense of urgency not perceived with the other slogans. The use of the word "now" seemed to express this urgency. Also, the slogan had a certain emotional appeal which the other slogans did not seem to possess. In discussing the slogans, both groups stated that the words "we need" Nixon were mentally added to the phrase "Now more than ever."

Each group responded favorably to the various ways the slogan was presented for banners, buttons, and bumper stickers except the groups did not like the manner of execution for the outdoor billboard proposal. With regard to the materials, the groups readily understood the connection between the contraction "Nixon. Now" with the longer version. The shortness of "Nixon. Now" has very strong appeal to lower middle class ticket-splitters. They view it as simple, direct, and easy to understand. Regarding the outdoor proposal, the groups did not like the use of a black background and the reproduction of the President's picture. Apparently because of the color and the picture the groups felt the outdoor proposal portrayed the President as sinister. Nevertheless, the concept of using the slogan in the outdoor medium was readily accepted.

In general, the groups responded well to the slogan, "Now more than ever." Every person in the group seemed to be able to give the statement some personal meaning. The slogan did clearly communicate its message. It is important to note that the participants generally ranked the slogan between the other alternatives studied. Our earlier study showed that "Now more than ever." ranked behind the statement, "Help him finish the job." Comparatively, however, the slogan under consideration expressed more urgency and emotional appeal and also clearly embodied the concept of "finish the job." If other ideas which convey the unfinished job are merged with "Now more than ever," the result should be a powerful communication device. To answer the original question raised, we see no reason to reject the slogan as not being understandable and too sophisticated.

SELECTED VERBATIM COMMENTS

It has emotional appeal.

We need him more than ever.

He's done a good job before and things aren't getting any better, so we still need him.

He's been good and we still need him to finish the job.

We need him more now than we needed him before.

He's started so many things and he would like to follow through.

It's perfectly clear. It's not a complete thought, but its clear.

It starts you thinking more. Starts your imagination thinking over things he has done, has not done, will do, or will not do . . . of his past record.

I like the word "now" because we need to take action now.

It means we need him more than ever. He ain't going to do anything in the next four years anyway.

I think there's more in it than "now more than ever" because there are the things . . . that he's planning for the future and why change horses in the middle of the stream when the trouble's still there.

We do need him if he will finish the job he started.

I think that's assuring. Its saying stick with what you know. You don't know what you're going to get if you don't have Nixon. I think its reassuring in that way, -- that we know what we have and can go from there.

Really, it doesn't matter too much to me what the slogan is. The name -- when I see the name I conjure up my own thoughts about what the man is, what he has done, what he stands for. Any slogan that's put after his name or any other name, really doesn't mean that much to me because the old saying "paper lies still, you can put anything on it."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 6/15

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

An interesting letter from Mundt's former assistant, Bob McCaughey, who says from experience, McGovern will be a formidable opponent. Dent gave a copy to Magruder for Mitchell.

2405 Gaither Street
Hillcrest Heights, Md. 20031
May 26, 1972

Mr. Harry S. Dent
Special Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

In following the papers, I note that Senator McGovern seems close to sweeping Democrat Primaries and seems to have the Democrat nomination within his grasp.

I further noted in a Sunday Washington Post story that the political advisers at the Committee to Re-Elect the President are now picking McGovern as the Democrat opponent for the President.

Perhaps the news story was loose with the facts but I was disturbed by the implication that the Committee to Re-Elect the President was gleeful at the prospect of McGovern as an opponent for the President in the Fall. I have also been disturbed by columnist opinion and the editorial in the Wall Street Journal to the effect that the nomination of McGovern would be 1964 in reverse.

Harry, I hope that is true. However, my political intuition cautions me and my political history of knowledge of McGovern leads me to the conclusion that McGovern can be very formidable in the political arena.

The Republicans of South Dakota have been trying to place McGovern in the political grave since 1954. We have found it difficult. Only once -- 1960 -- when he challenged Senator Mundt has he been detoured from his disciplined formula for getting himself elected President. Even that

defeat barely slowed him down since he came right back in 1962 to win a United States Senate contest. In fact, Harry, President Nixon as the candidate in 1960 carried South Dakota by over 50,000 votes and yet Senator Mundt only defeated McGovern by a little over 15,000 votes.

McGovern is a great believer in effective organization and to me that has been his success in South Dakota and the 1972 primaries.

He has absolutely no integrity and will say or do anything to help him achieve his goals.

To cover the lack of integrity he wraps the mantle of the cloth of the church around him because of the background of a minister father and his own days as a lay Methodist preacher. He makes it impossible to challenge his integrity or that he has any of the weaknesses of man. In fact, in all the campaigns in South Dakota, he always created the impression his opponent was an alcoholic while he was above such activity -- and we could not break the image, much as we tried.

McGovern in every campaign always cried "smear." He would claim it came about through his opponents' staff, or literature, or that friends of the opponent were starting whispering campaigns and yet he would say his opponent was not the type of person to engage in a smear campaign. Again, the "Mr. Nice" and "Mr. Clean" approach.

I note he is already conditioning the voters of California to the charge he is being smeared by Humphrey's friends but not by Humphrey.

McGovern will take any position on any issue that will help him in his quest for votes. He gets on both sides of every issue and then proceeds to sell his "positions."

McGovern is ruthless. He will do anything to win. The Methodist minister son approach is purely a facade. If it helps him achieve a goal, he would trample his best friend to achieve his goal.

His ideas sound kooky to you and me, but in the changing political climate in which we live he does seem to have reception as being different (and he is). He is an advocate of change and that is what brought him success in South Dakota.

Finally, Harry, he will have "instant" precinct workers. The college supporters of his will work. They will roam the precincts and dedicate their spare time to his success. In South Dakota on weekends, they would be a hundred miles or more from their campus doing door-to-door surveys or distributing literature. When election day came, his "volunteers" had done the job. The Republican "volunteers" not as dedicated had only done the average job of tabulating to get out the vote, and he was successful. Only in 1960, when I set up Mundt for Senate precinct workers did we turn back his challenge.

Thus, Harry, you can hopefully understand my words of caution on the potential dangers of McGovern as a candidate.

His: (a) money from dedicated liberals;

(b) lack of basic integrity;

(c) ability to twist every issue to meet his criteria;

(d) seemingly ability to portray himself as the guy in the white hat;

(e) organizational ability plus those "instant" precinct workers;

(f) mental toughness and discipline to do whatever must be done to win;

plus many other political attributes could make him formidable. At the beginning of his Presidential campaign effort, I was one of those who believed he would be out of it by now -- but he isn't. For that reason, I just felt that as one who knows McGovern; has been involved in campaigns against him since 1954; that I should pass along to you my assessment of the potential of George McGovern -- if, he, in fact, becomes the Democrat nominee at their convention.

Sincerely,

Robert L. McCaughey

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



June 15, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: L. HIGBY

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Anti-McGovern Strategy

The attached would indicate strongly that we should move out in trying to pin McGovern with his radical stance. All indications now are that McGovern has the nomination. With "34%" of the public still having not made up their mind's where to place McGovern on a liberal/conservative scale, it would appear that we have an opportunity to appropriately position him now.

I know this is one of the basic strategy decisions that you, Mitchell, Ehrlichman, et al, are trying to resolve, but would urge that we move now to make sure McGovern is clearly identified and tied with his programs.

One of the primary arguments over at the Committee, as I understand it, against this is that the Democrats will be doing a good enough job of tearing McGovern up over the next month. I believe, however, that the obligation falls to us to look at where the Democrats are failing to clearly pin McGovern and move our own people on these areas. This should be done on the specific basis that Buchanan recommends, namely, doing the reasoned, well-constructed, precisely thought out and factually correct argument -- not the shrill, scathing attacks. We don't want to shoot our guns all at once, but establish a trend or a focus. These attacks should not be done by White House people, but other Administration spokesmen and our Hill spokesmen.

Below I have listed an admittedly incomplete statement of the pros and cons on the subject:

Pro

-- People haven't made up their minds on McGovern -- they don't know him. (We are trying to get the demographics here.)

-- Make clear where he stands now rather than having to correct or discredit a more favorable public impression, particularly after the Convention.

-- Make him work at changing his position rather than appearing lilly white and pure.

Con

-- Escalates the Campaign too soon.

-- Puts McGovern against the Administration and [redacted] of the Democratic party.

-- Gives him time to back off the issues.

I believe the pros outweigh the cons and would suggest that we start programming Colson, Buchanan, and 1701 to move as is suggested above.

**The Gallup Poll** *For Release: Saturday, June 17, 1972*

# GOP Succeeding in Pinning 'Radical' Label on McGovern?

*By George Gallup*



PRINCETON, N. J., June 16 — Well aware that elections are won in the vital center of the political spectrum, GOP strategists are seeking to pin the label of "radical" on Sen. George McGovern.

A special nationwide survey reveals that McGovern is viewed as somewhat more to the left of where the average voter places himself than is Sen. Hubert Humphrey, one of McGovern's chief rivals for the Democratic nomination.

About one voter in five (18 per cent) *of those who express an opinion* label McGovern as "very liberal," compared to 11 per cent of those with views who use this category to describe Humphrey's political ideology.

Of significance, however, is the fact that, at the time of the survey, as many as a third of all voters interviewed (34 per cent) had not yet made up their minds where to place McGovern on the liberal-conservative scale. This proportion is more than double the percentage of voters who had not made up their minds on how to classify Humphrey.

**Target Group For McGovern**

Obviously the large bloc of voters who have not crystallized their thinking as to McGovern's political philosophy are a target group for the South Dakota Senator in the period leading up to the convention (and later, if he wins the nomination) — that is, if he seeks to win more votes from the political center of the electorate.

The survey findings reported today show Sen. Henry Jackson — of the six candidates tested — to be the candidate whose perceived ideological profile comes closest to that of the nation's voters. However, it is important to bear in mind that two out of three voters are unable to classify Jackson.

Humphrey is positioned slightly to the left of where the average voter positions himself, followed by Muskie who is still farther to the left, and then McGovern.

President Nixon's profile is appreciably more conservative than the average for all voters, a fact that could assume significance during the election campaign.

**Three in Ten Says Wallace Is 'Liberal'**

Gov. George Wallace is viewed as considerably to the right of where the average voter places himself. However, evidence that Wallace has a "populist" image in some quarters is seen in the surprising finding that three voters in ten with views describe the Alabama Governor as either "fairly liberal" or "very liberal."

**Details Of Survey**

A total of 1556 adults were interviewed in person in the survey, which was conducted in more than 300 scientifically selected localities across the nation during the period April 21-24.

Survey respondents were asked the following question about themselves and six leading presidential candidates:

*How would you describe (yourself/name of candidate) — as very conservative, fairly conservative, middle-of-the-road, fairly liberal, or very liberal?*

Following are the results, percentaged on those expressing an opinion:

**Liberal - Conservative Scale (Percentaged excluding those undecided)**

| | *Very Cons.* | *Fair. Cons.* | *Mid-Road* | *Fair. Lib.* | *Very Lib.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % | % | % | % | % |
| McGovern | 7 | 20 | 23 | 32 | 18 |
| Humphrey | 7 | 19 | 40 | 23 | 11 |
| Muskie | 5 | 23 | 31 | 31 | 10 |
| Jackson | 11 | 29 | 34 | 17 | 9 |
| YOURSELF | 15 | 24 | 34 | 19 | 8 |
| Wallace | 34 | 19 | 16 | 12 | 19 |
| Nixon | 21 | 35 | 27 | 11 | 6 |

Following are the percentages of those who are undecided:

| | |
|---|---|
| All voters | 4% |
| McGovern | 34 |
| Humphrey | 14 |
| Muskie | 25 |
| Jackson | 65 |
| Wallace | 23 |
| Nixon | 10 |

*It is important to note that the views of Democrats regarding the political philosophy of the candidates tested closely parallel the views of all persons reached in the survey.*

**Little Change In Voters' Position**

The political philosophy of the electorate appears to have changed very little over the last 12 months, with the percentages in each survey leaning to the conservative side. The following table (with the undecided vote included) shows the comparison:

**How Voters Describe Themselves:**

| | *Spring, 1971* | *Spring, 1972* |
|---|---|---|
| Very conservative | 11 | 14 |
| Fairly conservative | 28 | 23 |
| Middle-of-road | 29 | 33 |
| Fairly liberal | 19 | 18 |
| Very liberal | 7 | 8 |
| No opinion | 6 | 4 |
| | 100% | 100% |

## *Coming Sunday!*

***1972 — Year of the GOP's 'Catholic Strategy?'***

## HAVE CATHOLICS MOVED INTO THE GOP COLUMN?

In 1968 GOP strategists talked about the party's "Southern strategy." They are now calling 1972 the year of the "Catholic strategy."

Have Catholics responded to Nixon's statements on aid to parochial schools and abortions?

A majority of Catholics in every presidential election of the last two decades — including Eisenhower's sweeps in 1952 and 1956 — have voted the Democratic ticket.

What has been the shift among Catholics — and Protestants — since the 1968 election, as determined by recent Gallup Poll trial heats?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1972

Note for Bob Haldeman -

I thought you would be interested in the attached McGovern delegate count.

Fred Malek

Attachment

6/13
RT

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM June 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: ROBERT H. MARIK

SUBJECT: Projected Democratic Delegate Count

Attached at (Tab A) is an updated projection of delegate strength of the leading contenders for the Democratic nomination. For comparison, the most recent National Observer estimate is also attached at (Tab B). Our estimate gives McGovern 1361 delegates -- the National Observer projects 1382 1/2 delegates for him. In either case, he looks extremely close to the required 1509 delegates need on the first ballot.

TAB A

## PROJECTED COUNT OF DEMOCRATIC DELEGATES BY STATE

| States | Delegate Votes | Leaning or Committed to: Muskie | Humphrey | McGovern | Wallace | Others or Uncommitted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NEW ENGLAND** | | | | | | |
| Maine | 20 | 20 | — | — | — | — |
| * Vermont | 12 | 3 | — | 9 | — | — |
| New Hampshire | 18 | 13-1/2 | — | 4-1/2 | — | — |
| Massachusetts | 102 | — | — | 102 | — | — |
| * Rhode Island | 22 | — | — | 22 | — | — |
| * Connecticut | 51 | — | 18 | 33 | — | — |
| TOTAL | 225 | 36-1/2 | 18 | 170-1/2 | 0 | 0 |
| **MIDDLE ATLANTIC** | | | | | | |
| New York | 278 | — | 25 | 230 | — | 23 |
| * New Jersey | 109 | — | 10 | 71 | — | 28 |
| Pennsylvania | 182 | 28 | 82 | 58 | 2 | 12 |
| Delaware | 13 | — | 7 | 6 | — | — |
| Maryland | 53 | — | 6 | 6 | 41 | — |
| West Virginia | 35 | — | 20 | 7 | 11 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 670 | 31 | 150 | 378 | 43 | 68 |
| **SOUTH** | | | | | | |
| * Virginia | 53 | 1 | 4 | 28 | — | 20 |
| North Carolina | 64 | — | — | — | 37 | 27 |
| South Carolina | 32 | — | — | — | — | 32 |
| Georgia | 53 | — | — | 4 | — | 49 |
| Florida | 81 | — | 6 | — | 75 | — |
| Alabama | 37 | — | — | — | 34 | 3 |
| Mississippi | 25 | — | — | — | — | 25 |
| Louisiana | 44 | — | 22 | 10 | 12 | 0 |
| Arkansas | 27 | — | — | — | — | 27 |
| Tennessee | 49 | — | — | — | 49 | — |
| Texas | 130 | — | 50 | 35 | 40 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 595 | 1 | 82 | 77 | 247 | 188 |
| **PLAINS** | | | | | | |
| North Dakota | 14 | — | 3 | 11 | — | — |
| South Dakota | 17 | — | — | 17 | — | — |
| Nebraska | 24 | — | 7 | 15 | — | 2 |
| Kansas | 35 | — | 5 | 30 | — | — |
| * Oklahoma | 39 | — | 0 | 13 | 0 | 26 |
| TOTAL | 129 | 0 | 15 | 86 | 0 | 28 |
| **MIDWEST** | | | | | | |
| * Kentucky | 47 | — | 25 | 15 | 2 | 5 |
| Ohio | 153 | — | 79 | 61 | — | 13 |
| Indiana | 76 | — | 55 | — | 21 | — |
| Illinois | 170 | 59 | — | 13 | — | 98 |
| Michigan | 132 | — | 27 | 38 | 67 | — |
| Wisconsin | 67 | — | 13 | 54 | — | — |
| Minnesota | 64 | — | 33 | 19 | — | 12 |
| Iowa | 46 | 18 | — | 18 | — | 10 |
| * Missouri | 73 | — | 0 | 12 | — | 61 |
| TOTAL: | 828 | 77 | 232 | 230 | 90 | 199 |
| **MOUNTAIN** | | | | | | |
| * Montana | 17 | — | 5 | 12 | — | — |
| * Wyoming | 11 | — | 4 | 7 | — | — |
| * Colorado | 36 | — | 10 | 26 | — | — |
| * New Mexico | 18 | — | 0 | 10 | 8 | — |
| Arizona | 25 | 9 | 1 | 6 | — | 9 |
| * Nevada | 11 | — | 3 | 6 | — | 2 |
| * Utah | 19 | — | 5 | 14 | — | — |
| Idaho | 17 | 3 | 1 | 7 | — | 6 |
| TOTAL | 154 | 12 | 29 | 88 | 8 | 17 |
| **PACIFIC** | | | | | | |
| California | 271 | — | — | 271 | — | — |
| Oregon | 34 | — | — | 34 | — | — |
| Washington | 52 | — | — | 18 | — | 44 |
| Alaska | 10 | — | — | 4 | — | 6 |
| Hawaii | 17 | — | — | 4 | — | 13 |
| TOTAL: | 384 | 0 | 0 | 321 | 0 | 63 |
| **OTHER** | | | | | | |
| District of Columbia | 15 | — | — | — | — | 15 |
| * Puerto Rico | 7 | — | — | 7 | — | — |
| Virgin Islands | 3 | — | — | — | — | 3 |
| Canal Zone | 3 | — | — | 2.5 | — | .5 |
| Guam | 3 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1 | — | 0 |
| TOTAL | 31 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 10.5 | 0 | 18.5 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 3016 | 158 | 527.5 | 1301 | 388 | 641.5 |

# *Round Four in Observer's Democratic Delegate Count*

TAB B

| States | Delegate Votes | Leaning or Committed to: McGovern | Humphrey | Wallace | Muskie | Others or Uncommitted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NEW ENGLAND** | | | | | | |
| Maine | 20 | — | — | — | 20 | — |
| Vermont | 12 | 9 | — | — | 3 | — |
| New Hampshire | 18 | 4½ | — | — | 13½ | — |
| Massachusetts | 102 | 102 | — | — | — | — |
| Rhode Island | 22 | 22 | — | — | — | — |
| Connecticut | 51 | 27 | — | — | — | 24 |
| TOTAL | 225 | 164½ | 0 | 0 | 36½ | 24 |
| **MIDDLE ATLANTIC** | | | | | | |
| New York | 278 | 245 | — | — | — | 33 |
| New Jersey | 109 | 74 | 10 | — | — | 25 |
| Pennsylvania | 182 | 54 | 74 | 2 | 40 | 12 |
| Delaware | 13 | 7 | — | — | — | 6 |
| Maryland | 53 | 6 | 6 | 41 | — | — |
| West Virginia | 35 | 7 | 20 | — | 4 | 4 |
| TOTAL | 670 | 393 | 110 | 43 | 44 | 80 |
| **SOUTH** | | | | | | |
| Virginia | 53 | 25 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 12 |
| North Carolina | 64 | — | — | 37 | — | 27 |
| South Carolina | 32 | 2 | 16 | 6 | 3 | 5 |
| Georgia | 53 | 8 | — | — | — | 45 |
| Florida | 81 | — | 6 | 75 | — | — |
| Alabama | 37 | 5 | — | 29 | — | 3 |
| Mississippi | 25 | 14 | 10 | — | — | 1 |
| Louisiana | 44 | 9 | — | 3 | — | 32 |
| Arkansas | 27 | — | — | — | — | 27 |
| Tennessee | 49 | — | — | 49 | — | — |
| Texas | 130 | 45 | 20 | 47 | — | 18 |
| TOTAL | 595 | 108 | 62 | 248 | 7 | 170 |
| **MIDWEST** | | | | | | |
| Kentucky | 47 | 10 | — | — | — | 37 |
| Ohio | 153 | 61 | 79 | — | — | 13 |
| Indiana | 76 | — | 55 | 21 | — | — |
| Illinois | 170 | 15 | — | — | 62 | 93 |
| Michigan | 132 | 38 | 27 | 67 | — | — |
| Wisconsin | 67 | 54 | 13 | — | — | — |
| Minnesota | 64 | 19 | 33 | — | — | 12 |
| Iowa | 46 | 18 | — | — | 18 | 10 |
| Missouri | 73 | 12 | — | — | — | 61 |
| TOTAL | 828 | 227 | 207 | 88 | 80 | 226 |
| **PLAINS** | | | | | | |
| North Dakota | 14 | 11 | 3 | — | — | — |
| South Dakota | 17 | 17 | — | — | — | — |
| Nebraska | 24 | 20 | 4 | — | — | — |
| Kansas | 35 | 13 | — | — | — | 22 |
| Oklahoma | 39 | 10 | — | — | — | 29 |
| TOTAL | 129 | 71 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 51 |
| **MOUNTAIN** | | | | | | |
| Montana | 17 | 5 | 6 | — | 6 | — |
| Wyoming | 11 | 4½ | — | — | — | 6½ |
| Colorado | 36 | 26 | 1 | — | — | 9 |
| New Mexico | 18 | 10 | — | 8 | — | — |
| Arizona | 25 | 10 | 2 | — | 9 | 4 |
| Nevada | 11 | 5½ | 3 | — | — | 2½ |
| Utah | 19 | 16 | — | — | 1 | 2 |
| Idaho | 17 | 10 | 1 | — | 2 | 4 |
| TOTAL | 154 | 87 | 13 | 8 | 18 | 28 |
| **PACIFIC** | | | | | | |
| California | 271 | 271 | — | — | — | — |
| Oregon | 34 | 34 | — | — | — | — |
| Washington | 52 | 8 | — | — | — | 44 |
| Alaska | 10 | 5½ | 4½ | — | — | — |
| Hawaii | 17 | 2 | — | — | — | 15 |
| TOTAL | 384 | 320½ | 4½ | 0 | 0 | 59 |
| **OTHER** | | | | | | |
| District of Columbia | 15 | — | — | — | — | 15 |
| Puerto Rico | 7 | 5 | — | — | — | 2 |
| Virgin Islands | 3 | 3 | — | — | — | — |
| Canal Zone | 3 | 2½ | — | — | — | ½ |
| Guam | 3 | 1 | 1 | — | 1 | — |
| TOTAL | 31 | 11½ | 1 | 0 | 1 | 17½ |
| GRAND TOTAL | 3,016 | 1,420½ | 425 | 387 | 175 | 608½ |

NEEDED TO NOMINATE: 1,509

COMPILED BY BRUCE BIOSIAT

X

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN

FROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN

McG Testimony Qu'ts

Here are some questions that we worked up for the Proxmire hearings tomorrow. Congressional liaison is taking them up to the Hill to put them in the hands of our people.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BILL TIMMONS

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Here are the questions for the Proxmire hearings tomorrow. We consider this an unusual opportunity to skewer McGovern on national television.

Per our agreement, can you get these up to Percy, Conable and Clarance Brown as soon as possible and encourage them to take out after McGovern? We especially think that Percy would want to get him on the Israel thing and believe he should be encouraged by us to do so.

The questions are in two sets -- one which is full of the statistical information for back-up and the other which breaks it down more rhetorically.

Thanks.

QUESTIONS FOR GEORGE MC GOVERN ON HIS DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

-- Are you at all concerned, Senator, that your recommended cuts in active duty force levels from 2.5 million to 1.7 million would bring us to levels lower than the days preceding Pearl Harbor?

-- You have proposed, and let me be specific, that we cut Naval personnel from 605, 000 to 401, 000; that we cut American warships by more than half -- from 700 vessels to 341; that naval air squadrons be cut by 80% (according to Senator Humphrey); that we cut the number of attack aircraft carriers from 15 to 6 -- and leaving only 130 escort vessels with "no further construction." Please tell me what President Johnson could have done during the 1967 Six-day War in the Middle East if he had, at best, one or two attack carriers to deploy during that crisis?

-- Senator, you plan on cutting the U. S. Marine Corps, one of our proudest fighting arms, by more than half, from 140, 000 to 67, 000. With what credibility could President Eisenhower have acted during the 1958 Lebanese Crisis with these Marine Corps levels so drastically low?

-- As for the Air Force, Senator, you have suggested we cut its personnel almost in half -- from 753, 000 to 476, 000. You want to cut the number of U. S. fighter Interceptors in half. You want to halt at once the development of a new bomber, the B-1, for the Air Force. You want to cut all production of the new F-14 and F-15 fighter planes.

And finally you want to retire two-thirds of the American bomber force, cutting it from 600 down to 200 B-52s and F-111s. What kind of deterrence is it to let the world know that we are willing to cut these forces unilaterally without any promise of reduction by any other nation?

-- In your desire to cut the Defense budget by $32 billion, just where are you going to put the millions of people who will be put out of work? I hear that you will promise them compensation at 80% of their previous salary during a reconversion period. Can you tell me how many people you know who prefer 80% of their present income to 100%?

-- In Europe, I must say Senator, your suggestions would have alarming and potentially drastic results. You advocate removing over 50% of our European troops, from 310,000 to 130,000 -- from 4 1/2 to 2 divisions. No mutual force reduction would be required on the part of the Soviet Union. What effect is this going to have on our NATO allies? Are you going to simply give up all military advantage in Western Europe? How would John F. Kennedy have dealt with the Berlin crisis with the mere handful of forces you would plan to provide?

-- Why do you persist in acting unilaterally? Have you decided that we no longer have any enemies? Do you feel the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was a benign act of a benevolent despot?

-- As you know, the President was recently able to negotiate an arms agreement with the Soviet Union. It is acknowledged that he was able to do this only because he bargained from a position of strength. Yet, you would cut crucial U.S. R. & D. from $8 billion to $5.5 billion; you would cut the number of deliverable strategic weapons from 5700 down to 3500; halt the deployment of multiple warheads on American Minutemen and Polaris submarines (MIRV); halt all development or deployment of an American missile defense (ABM); halt all programs to modernize and protect the Minuteman sites. You would do all this without one requirement of quid pro quo from the Soviet Union. The Soviets would need not lift a finger or make one concession to win this strategic reduction. I confess, Senator, that your proposal absolutely scares the hell out of me -- in effect you are proposing to strip our superiority in strategic arms not down to parity but to inferiority -- to a position where we could lie absolutely helpless in a troubled world.

-- I have heard you say, Senator, that you are not concerned about these reductions because we would still have a nuclear deterrent. I don't agree with you, but even granting that, in effect you are saying that the next war will be fought with nuclear arms. By cutting so drastically our conventional forces, you bring us nearer to nuclear war. There are a number of circumstances where we could deploy conventional weaponry (the middle east being one) without beginning a nuclear war -- yet your actions would make a nuclear war much more possible. Are you at all concerned about this?

-- What do we tell our allies when they ask about America's commitment? What do we tell Israel when they ask us if we have a plane to combat the MIG 23? Do we say, "Don't worry, President McGovern will provide outdated aircraft?" Do we tell our friends in Israel that they can be taken over with the use of sophisticated Soviet Weaponry?

QUESTIONS FOR GEORGE MC GOVERN ON HIS DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

-- By drastic cuts in conventional arms in machinery and artillery, Senator, aren't you forcing the U. S. to return to the discredited Cold War strategy of massive retaliation in the event of Soviet thrust in the Middle East or Berlin. Isn't that a dangerous strategy at best?

-- Would not your drastic cuts in the U. S. Sixth Fleet not only leave bare the southern flank of NATO, but jeopardize seri ously the security of Israel to whom we have made commitments? What I am asking, Senator, is if you make these tremendous slashes in both the size and strength of the Sixth Fleet, which is our Mediterranean and Middle East deterrent, aren't you in effect, sir, leaving the question of the future of the security of Israel almost exclusively in the hands of the Soviet Politburo?

-- Under your proposal for the Sixth Fleet, how could Mr. Nixon have responded to the Jordanian crisis of 1970, how could Johnson have responded to the crisis of the six-day war, how could Eisenhower have responded to the Lebanese crisis, especially in light of the enormous buildup of Soviet ships and subs in the Med. since that time?

-- Would not your unilateral cuts in American forces in Western Europe remove any incentive for equal cuts on the part of the Soviets? In other words, Senator, if we agree to remove more than half our troops without any quid pro quo from the Soviets, wouldn't this simply alter the balance of power drastically in their favor?

--Senator, in recommending that we should withdraw all forces from Thailand, are you recommending a unilateral abrogation of our treaty commitment?

-- Senator, do you think the President could have negotiated the SALT agreement at Moscow without the critical bargaining chip of the ABM? What then would we have had to offer to the Russians in exchange for controls on their offensive weapons?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : BRUCE KEHRLI

FROM : LARRY HIGBY

Please make sure you follow up on those talking papers that Haldeman discussed with the different individuals prior to departure from here. If you could, forward a report on what's happening with regard to them in the courier.

Gordon should have a political summary prepared for Haldeman upon return. He'll have been out of the play in this area for a couple of weeks, and we need to bring him up to date. Also, you should probably be brought up to date there too.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN G

SUBJECT: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California

Question:

The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote.

Conclusion:

The Hart Survey in the Post found that 53% of the Democrats saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and 30% of McGovern's voters thought he won.

Finch, Colson, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter, Buchanan, and Harper/Morey believe the debates increased Humphrey's vote total. Moore disagrees.

Analysis:

Humphrey increased his position from 26 to 40% because the debates enabled him to drive home his points on jobs and McGovern's fuzzy welfare proposals and Defense cuts (Finch, Dent, Buchanan).

The debates and resultant media coverage "scared hell out of Jews" (Safire). Although the debates may not have had a large audience, the California media began emphasizing Humphrey's attack (Magruder, Dent, Buchanan).

The debates enabled Humphrey to shift the undecideds to his column by hitting McGovern on his "extreme" positions. However, the debates did not cut into McGovern's fairly constant 45% total (Agree: Teeter, Buchanan, Safire, Yankelovich; Disagree: Finch, Hart).

Whether the Field poll was wrong to start with was also considered. Finch, Colson, and Moore believe Field was wrong. Buchanan says the Field poll was not wrong and he has reason to believe McGovern's lead may have been larger.

A more detailed analysis is attached as well as the original memoranda from Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter, Buchanan, and Harper/Morey. Also attached are newspaper reports of the Hart and Yankelovich surveys.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN G

SUBJECT: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California

The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote. Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Buchanan, Teeter and Harper/Morey submitted analyses (attached). Their summarized comments should be considered in light of the Hart Survey which found that 53% of the Democrats saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and 30% of McGovern's voters thought he won. The Hart and Yankelovich surveys are also attached.

Finch believes:

1. The Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest. In the past, Field has traditionally "over sampled" in the northern part of the state. But, there is no question that approximately two weeks prior to the election, McGovern had a clear lead probably -- 10 points -- over Humphrey and this was fortified by unlimited money and a superb organization. Even if the Field poll was taken at face value, it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey -- an unheard of phenomena.

2. While Humphrey was clearly "up tight and on edge" in the first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home

his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions taken by the S outh Dakota Senator.

3. In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air. He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner of War issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.

4. The third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course endorsed HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black Community on which Humphrey had been relying.

5. Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he "wrang" the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on Defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics, although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.

Dent believes:

1. Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially welfare and Defense spending, made the Democrat primary closer in California than expected.

2. Dent notes that the Hart Survey minimized the impact of the HHH atacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the closing days.

3. Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's positions on Defense and welfare cost him votes. One in five found the debates important in voting, the majority of these going to HHH. The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce Defense spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed disapproval here.

4. An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out of the black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black and brown vote.

Safire believes:

1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 -- the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash, however -- newsmags and columnists -- we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.

2. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the Middle East. I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate because he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown.

3. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern keyword. Fifteen percent of the California Democratic voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had their first close look at him. Why? My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed off his positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be; no longer a virgin.

Buchanan believes:

1. The Field poll was not wrong. He has it from a source that the Field poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was larger than twenty points.

2. Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on Defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare give aways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many people to convince 300,000 to come his way. This I believe explains it coupled with:

(a) The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical; and

(b) The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers of national Democrats calling McGovern an extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.

3. What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40% in a week -- so, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or, did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of them?

Teeter believes:

1. There was not a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey, rather, there were a large number of voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the Campaign and temporarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern Campaign. When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique and relatively unknown commodity and the fact this Campaign was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the undecided category. The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.

2. The debates seemed to sharpen the focus on several of McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions. This contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.

Colson believes:

1. The debates had a very significant effect, but both candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect, while Colson had thought McGovern came out better because of his "good guy" image, Colson now believes Humphrey scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.

2. The Field Poll was off, as was the ABC poll. McGovern did not have a twenty point lead a week before the Primary. He peaked early plus the fact that the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly, in the third debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issues and Colson suspects that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate, the debates had a significant effect.

Magruder and LaRue believe:

1. Although neither the public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied the least advantageous position in the political arena -- that of being on the defense. He spent the next several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little, if any, paid commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.

2. The second debate in prime time, presented Humphrey in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the economic impact the McGovern Defense cut would have on the working man of California. Again the results of the debate were a toss-up, but the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack.

3. The Yankelovich survey reveals that one out of five voters considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey. More voters voted against McGovern than against Humphrey. One-fourth of the voters preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent. Senator Humphrey received one-half of these votes while Senator McGovern received one-third. The survey also states that 40% of Humphrey's vote would go to the President on November 7, while 40% would shift to McGovern and 20% is undecided.

Moore believes:

1. The debates by themselves were not a major factor accounting for the difference between the Field poll and the final results.

2. Other reasons for the Humphrey increase include:

   (a) The Field poll itself generated over-confidence by McGovern workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.

   (b) McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure for New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously

indicating over-confidence and taking California for granted.

(c) As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a knack for a strong finish. On the last two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down the state with good T. V. coverage, while McGovern was absent.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

All believe the debates increased Humphrey's vote total. The old rule -- if ahead, don't debate -- applies. As to specific recommendations:

1. Finch urges no attempt to label McGovern a "flaming radical", rather argue he's naive, otherwise his soft-spoken T. V. manner will destroy the label;

2. Dent suggests a "drip, drip" campaign on McGovern's stands without Presidential involvement;

3. Safire suggests a general appeal to Jews and a specific attack on McGovern's honesty by distributing his WALL STREET JOURNAL ad to students;

4. Buchanan implies we should follow Humphrey's example and scare the hell out of the voters;

In addition to the debates, the other reasons for the Humphrey/McGovern results are:

1. McGovern peaked too soon and left California for New Mexico and Houston indicating he took California for granted;

2. Polls gave Humphrey sympathy and hard-working labor types;

3. Proposition 9's (environment) two-one loss brought out Humphrey voters.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 6/12

To : HS

From : L. Higby

The memo should be clear on the basis of issues or theories, not people — How many basic viewpoints are there?

L.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

From my knowledge only these can explain the precipitate McGovern drop of fifteen points:

a) The Field Poll was wrong; I discount this -- as I have it from a source that the Field Poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was larger than twenty points.

b) Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare giveaways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency, and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many people to convince 300,000 to come his way. This I believe explains it coupled with:

1. The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical; and
2. The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers of national Democrats calling GM an extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.

What needs to be remembered is that for most of the nation, George McGovern is someone they have become aware of for two weeks at least, two months at most. First impressions are favorable -- but they are not firm impressions.

What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40% in a week -- So, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats, and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of them.

Buchanan

# McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll

By JACK ROSENTHAL
New York Times News Service

LOS ANGELES — Substantial voter displeasure with his positions on defense spending reductions and welfare reform appeared to have cut deeply into Sen. George McGovern's margin of victory in Tuesday's California presidential primary.

This was the major conclusion of a survey of 570 Democratic voters as they left the polls in 11 counties. The survey was conducted by the New York Times and Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., a major social and market research concern.

The McGovern positions became a focus of attack from his principal rival, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, notably in three nationally televised debates before the election.

**Proposal Ridiculed**

In those debates, Humphrey sharply assailed his South Dakota opponent's call for a reduction in defense spending to $55 billion and ridiculed his proposal to grant a $1,000 allowance to every needy American.

As the debates began, the statewide California poll conducted by Mervin D. Field reported that McGovern held a 20-point margin over Humphrey. In the final election returns, McGovern came out 5 points ahead, totaling 45 percent of the Democratic vote.

Field blamed "voter volatility" yesterday for the discrepancy. He told United Press International the undecided voters, who were listed at 13 percent in the poll a week before the primary, probably had decided on Humphrey.

Field also said the poll, taken a week before the primary, "created an unprecedented impact on the campaign itself. We have not witnessed in the 26 years we have been polling in this state anything like the attention it received in the media."

**One in Five**

The Times-Yankelovich survey suggested that one voter in five found the debates important in deciding which candidate to vote for. The majority of these voters turned to Humphrey. This appears to have raised the Minnesotan's proportion of the vote by several percentage points.

The debates appeared to be unimportant, however, compared with the substance. And the single most damaging substantive point for McGovern, according to the survey, was his proposal to recalculate—and sharply reduce—the nation's defense budget.

Among all voters, more than a third expressed strong disagreement with this proposal. Among those who voted for candidates other than McGovern, the disapproval rate rose to two-thirds.

EVENING STAR -- 6/8/72

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: BILL SAFIRE

SUBJECT: Some Lessons of the California Primary

1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than, say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 -- the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash, however -- newsmags and columnists -- we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.

2. Shirley Chisholm turned out to be Humphrey's spoiler. Her 5% could have made the difference for Humphrey. HHH broke even with the blacks who did not vote for Shirley, but I think he would have gotten most of hers.

3. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the Mideast. We should study closely what HHH did with the Jews in California the last two weeks; I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate because he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown. This could be enormously significant in New York, Illinois and California, not only in fundraising but in vote patterns, and is a subject we should do a lot of thinking about. A

survey of the Jewish vote in the California primary -- depth stuff -- would be money well spent.

4. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern key-word. Fifteen per cent of the California Democratic voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had their first close look at him. Why?

My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed off his positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be. No longer a virgin.

I would like us to exploit both these leads. Our tendency will be to neglect the latter, figuring the radicals will never vote for us, and concentrate on showing the centrist Democrat that he's in the hands of leftists. This would be missing a good bet, because a large part of his enthusiasm comes from the kids, and a large part of his basic appeal comes from "honesty" -- if we can dramatize and ridicule the McGovern Shift, we can erode both enthusiasm and honesty.

One specific way right now: Have the Youth Division of the Commitee for the Re-Election of the President prepare this cheap flyer: a full-sized reprint of the May 22 Wall Street Journal McGovern ad, in which he shows he's not really a threat to free enterprise and says that besides, Congress would never pass his proposals. Fold it in quarters and headline it: "Here is McGovern's Special Message to Wall Street: Not to Worry." Then, in the margins around the re-printed ad, write in the McGovern quotes that sharply conflict with what is said in the ad, complete with red arrows between the two. Message on the back: "Maybe now Wall Street will trust McGovern -- but now, can you trust him?" Distribute heavily on campus and in areas where the Democratic left is strongest. Best, of course, would be to have some other Democratic candidate do this, but that is unlikely to happen, and it is too good a shot to miss.

Then we could use something like this to illustrate the point about "disenchantment" (that's a liberal vogue word, associated with F. Scott Fitzgerald, and can hang around McGovern's neck like an

albatross) -- with something to peg it to, the media will go for it in a big way, because it is perfect for the next swing of the pendulum: the story about maybe George ain't the man he's cracked up to be. We could help that along, taking the offensive on "credibility."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HARRY S. DENT HSD

SUBJECT: Analysis of California Primary

Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially welfare and defense spending, appear to have made the Democrat primary results closer in California than projected by polls and writers. This conclusion is based on contacts with California leaders, newsmen, and a review of polls in The New York Times (Yankelovich) and the Washington Post (Hart) and a telephone poll (attached) taken by the RNC.

Most feel the Field Poll has never been too accurate. It showed a 20-point lead. McGovern claimed his poll showed 16.

Field himself told UPI his poll caused HHH to "get off his dime and hit harder." He thinks the 13% undecided went for HHH.

The RNC poll of 112 Democrats concluded the debates had a minimal impact for HHH, but those who were undecided tended to go more for HHH.

The Hart poll minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the closing days. One of 3 voters said they decided on their candidate in the last 3 weeks. HHH carried these 5-4.

Some 53% of the Demo voters said they watched 1 of 3 debates. They split on who won--16% HHH, 17% McGovern, and 20% said even. The rest didn't watch. Of HHH voters, 30% said he won and of McGovern's, 30% said he won.

Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's positions on defense and welfare cost him votes. One in 5 found the debates important

in voting, the majority of these going for HHH. Yankelovich says this raised HHH's vote by several points.

The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce defense spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed disapproval here. Among those voting for someone other than McGovern, the disapproval rate rose to 2/3.

HHH hit heavy with full page newspaper ads the last week. Put Livermore thought these attacks were effective. Tom Reed and Lyn Nofziger agree, especially Nofziger.

Newsmen who feel HHH hurt McGovern are Kevin Phillips, Bob Novak, and Bob Semple.

An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out on the black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black and brown vote.

Novak suggested at the Governors' Conference that the GOP begin a steady "drip, drip" campaign against McGovern's extremism and keep it going til election day.

Contacts with other Californians confirm the view that HHH's attacks helped.

The HHH attacks were not alone in closing the reported big gap. Here are other factors:

1) McGovern peaked too soon.

2) Polls gave sympathy to HHH and caused labor and others to work harder. They did a better "get out the vote" job than McGovern's people, who did a good canvas job.

3) The President's trips hurt McGovern, and HHH acted and

talked like the President.

4) Proposition 9's 2-1 loss brought out people opposed to leftist extremism.

5) California isn't as liberal overall as McGovern.

6) McGovern left for trips to New Mexico and Houston on Monday.

RECOMMENDATION: That we begin to have surrogates, et al, begin the "drip, drip" plan suggested by Novak, without Presidential involvement. The first TV debate film should be properly edited and used.

Republican
National
Committee.

June 8, 1972

To: Harry Dent

From: Ed DeBolt

Re: Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary

As you requested this morning, the RNC Political/Research Division has attempted to measure the effect of the tactics employed by Hubert Humphrey in the televised McGovern-Humphrey debates.

During the day several hundred homes in the San Gabriel, San Fernando Valley area around Los Angeles were selected at random and contacted. The results were as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Number of registered Democrats contacted | 112 |
| Number voting | 77 |
| Number that did not view at least one debate | 51 |
| Number influenced by debates | 3 |

Due to the time factor the questionnaire had to be brief and the sample selected at random. However, in general our survey indicated that most voters had made their decisions prior to the debates and that the debates by themselves had little impact on the outcomes.

Undertaking a project of this magnitude required the virtual shutdown of the Research/Political Division for the entire workday.

The results of the survey and an analysis follow.

RNC RESEARCH DIVISION
JUNE 8, 1972

# DEBATE SURVEY: ANALYSIS

A special telephone survey of Los Angeles County voters conducted on June 8, 1972, revealed the Humphrey-McGovern debates had a minimal effect upon the vote preferences of those surveyed. Results of the poll indicated that only 61 of those surveyed even watched any of the debates and of those that did only 3 said these debates influenced their final choice. (These results are hardly surprising considering that Neilsen ratings showed that a Marcus Welby rerun and Cannon outdrew the second debate among television viewers. As a campaign worker stated after one of the debates, "The loudest noise in California tonight was the clicking of television sets to other channels.")

In a survey taken by the Field Corporation at the end of May, Humphrey was trailing McGovern by 20% (McGovern had 46% to Humphrey's 26%). If the debates did not significantly contribute to Humphrey's gain in the last week of the campaign, then one must ask what factors did contribute to the Minnesota Senator's late surge. First, some overconfidence among the McGovern forces was evident during the latter days of the campaign. McGovern left California for two days during this period to make visits to New Mexico (which held its primary on the same day as California) and Houston, Texas, where he met with several Democratic governors. Second, Humphrey probably picked up approximately an additional 2% of the vote through Mayor Yorty's endorsement (whose final vote was about 2% below his showing in the Field poll). HHH may also have been aided by the complicated write-in procedure of the California primary, thus driving a few Wallace voters into the Humphrey camp.

Finally, if the Field poll is accurate, the bulk of Humphrey's gain in the final days of the campaign must have come from undecided voters. According to the Field survey, many of these undecideds were elderly and black -- groups where Humphrey has traditionally enjoyed strong support. Their final decision to vote for Humphrey appears to be more a product of their traditional loyalties than of the influence of Humphrey's campaign, particularly his strong attacks against George McGovern. (Nor does our survey indicate that Humphrey's blasts at McGovern played a decisive role in securing the votes of our respondents who voted for Humphrey, since many of them (29) had decided to vote for him early in the campaign before the initiation of Humphrey's attack strategy). As is so often the case, many of the undecided voters appear to have gone with their traditional favorite (Humphrey) on election day, after having experienced some doubt over their choice when confronted with McGovern's relatively "new" face and, perhaps, Humphrey's aggressive attacks upon the South Dakota Senator.

## CONCLUSION

The television debates were viewed by a relatively small percentage of the Democrat voters in the state and even fewer have cited it as a decisive factor in their final decision. It is more likely that other factors i.e. overconfidence by McGovern forces, a cut-back on spending in the closing days by the McGoverr campaign, etc., resulted in Humphrey gaining ground while McGovern held the 45% attributed to him by the Field Corporation poll a week before the election.

# DEBATE SURVEY RESULT

Date of Survey: June 8, 1972
Actual Democratic turnout: 72%
True percentage of Democrats in L.A. County (excluding city) = 57%

I. Question: Are you a registered Democrat?

| | Yes | No |
|---|---|---|
| Total | 112 (53%) | 98 (47%) |

( If a registered Democrat, ask following question )

II. Question: Did you vote in the recent California Democratic primary?

| | Yes | No |
|---|---|---|
| Total | 77 (68%) | 35 (32%) |

( If answer is yes, ask following questions)

III. Question: For whom did you vote in the Democratic primary?

| | Total |
|---|---|
| Humphrey | 33 |
| McGovern | 29 |
| Wallace | 5 |
| Other | 10 |

IV. Question: When did you make up your mind to vote for the Democrat candidate of your choice ... a month or more ago; two weeks ago; or one week ago?

| | Humphrey Supporters | McGovern Supporters | Wallace Supporters |
|---|---|---|---|
| One month or more | 25 | 14 | 4 |
| Two weeks | 4 | 11 | 1 |
| One week or less | 4 | 3 | 0 |

V. Question: Did you watch all, some, or none of the debates between the Democrat candidates?

| | Total |
|---|---|
| All 3 | 9 |
| 1 - 2 | 33 |
| None | 35 |

VI. Question: Did the debates between the Democratic candidates affect your decision in voting in the California primary?

| | Humphrey Voters | McGovern Voters |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 1 | 2 |
| No | 32 | 27 |

Total registered voters in L.A. county (excluding city): 3,223,825

Total registered Democrats - 1,863,216

Republicans-1,145,172

Unidentified- 215,437

Sample

N = 210 Women = (D) = 73

D = 112 Men = (D) = 49

R = 75

I = 23

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM June 8, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT: California Primary

This memorandum will outline my observations with regard to the effect of the Humphrey-McGovern debates on the apparent shift of voters to Humphrey late in the campaign. My thoughts are largely based on what I have gleaned from the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the CBS polls and not on any data which I have collected or had a chance to analyze. The following are the important points:

1. I doubt that there was a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey, rather I suspect there were a large number of voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the campaign and temporarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern campaign. When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique, and relatively unknown commodity and the fact his campaign was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the undecided category. This is a phenomenon I have seen in other elections where a new "rising star" was running against an older, well-known established political figure. The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.

2. The debates also seemed to sharpen the focus on several of McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions. Apparently many of these views were unpopular with the Humphrey voters (older voters, blue collar workers, and Jews). This probably contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.

3. McGovern outspent Humphrey in the media by a considerable margin, while the debates and subsequent reporting of them probably comprised a large proportion of Humphrey's total media exposure. This exposure came shortly after the Field poll was conducted and at the time when the shift back to Humphrey was occurring.

4. While I have not had a chance to study the turnout figures, the active business-labor campaign against the environmental proposition may have caused some disproportionate turnout of people who were against the proposition and who were largely Humphrey voters. This is supported by the Yankelovich survey which found that a large majority of Humphrey's total vote voted against the proposition while a large majority of McGovern supporters voted for it.

5. The Field poll may have had some effect itself in giving Humphrey some underdog votes while causing some apathy among McGovern supporters, although I doubt that this effect was very great.

We will, of course, pick up primary vote on the California study which we are starting next week which should give us some insight into the nature of the Humphrey and McGovern support.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: CHARLES COLSON

SUBJECT: California Primary

I believe the debates had a very significant effect. As I indicated in earlier memoranda, both candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect, while I had thought McGovern came out the better because of his "good guy" image, it is now apparent to me that Humphrey scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.

I am sure that the Field poll was off, as was the ABC poll and that McGovern did not have a 20 point lead a week before the primary. On the other hand, I suspect he had better than the 5 point margin by which he won. He peaked early plus the fact the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly in the 3rd debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issue and I would suspect that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate that that would have had a significant effect. I think Humphrey also scored very well not only in the debates but in his general campaign on the aerospace and jobs issue. My reports from labor sources indicate Humphrey was finally beginning to gain momentum in the closing days on thatissue with the blue collar workers.

The New York Times' Yankelovich survey today is very revealing on this point (attached).

Committee for the Re-election of the President

**MEMORANDUM**

June 8, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: Impact of California Debates

Background

The California debate between McGovern and Humphrey served as a much needed forum for Humphrey to sharpen the issues between the two candidates. Although the first debate did not have a large viewing audience, it served as an opportunity for Humphrey to put McGovern on the defensive concerning his stand on reducing defense spending to $55 million and welfare reform to grant a $1000 allowance to all needy Americans. Although neither the public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied the least advantageous position in the political arena - that of being on the defensive. He spent the next several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little if any paid commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.

The second debate, viewed in prime time, presented Humphrey in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the economic impact the McGovern defense cut would have on the working man of California. In order to dramatize his point, Humphrey asked McGovern "What do you plan to do with the air bases in California - make them into golf links?" Again the results of the debate were a toss-up. But the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack. Humphrey continued to campaign furiously throughout California receiving good press coverage with the attacks.

The third debate was generally a wash-out because, with five participants, neither major candidate was allowed enough time to hit the issues. Yorty may have offered an added dimension by attacking McGovern. Humphrey once again surprised McGovern by challenging him alone to a fourth debate.

Analysis

The Hart Survey shows that 53% of the Democratic voters watched at least one debate. As previously stated, the public on the surface did not perceive either candidate as the clear cut winner. The Hart Survey pointed out that 17% thought McGovern won, 16% thought Humphrey won, 20% felt that it was a stand off, and the remainder had no opinion. 30% of the Humphrey voters thought that Humphrey had won the debates while 30% of the McGovern voters thought that McGovern had won the debates.

The most revealing clue of the Hart Survey was one out of three voters decided for whom they would vote during the last three weeks (many during the debates). Of those voters, 5 to 4 voted for Humphrey.

The Yanklevich Survey revealed that 1 out of 5 voters considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey.

The Yanklevich Survey also indicated that more voters voted against McGovern than against Humphrey. One fourth of the voters preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent. Senator Humphrey received one half of these votes while Senator McGovern received one third. It is very probable that the debates triggered many of these negative opinions because Humphrey for the first time was able to show the weaknesses in McGovern's programs.

Conclusion

It is our feeling that the debates served to put McGovern on the defensive and to dampen the momentum of his well-organized and well-financed campaign. McGovern probably peaked several days before the election. It is difficult however, to determine how much they contributed to Humphrey's surge on Election Day. Other important factors were present:

1. The impact of the California poll may have spurred Humphrey workers and caused complacency in the McGovern camp.

2. McGovern's get-out-the-vote activity was not as well coordinated as the voter identification canvass.

3. Proposition 9 on the California ballot was a pro-ecology issue. Most McGovern supporters were pro-9 and Humphrey supporters anti-9. Whitaker and Baxter spent over one million dollars in an anti Proposition 9 P.R. campaign. This may have brought much of the latent Humphrey support to the polls.

4. Humphrey campaigned much harder in the last days, while McGovern went to New Mexico and to Houston to the Governor's conference.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

(Dictated by phone from Los Angeles)

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~GORDON STRACHAN~~ H

FROM: RICHARD MOORE

Seems unlikely that debates by themselves were major factor in difference between field poll and final results. Field poll was taken May 30 and 31 and released June 1. Poll consisted of 857 completed phone calls to self-identified Democratic voters.

Note, however, that first debate where Humphrey was on the attack and generally considered most effective had already taken place when poll was taken and second debate took place May 30 when poll was half completed. Only the third debate which included Yorty and Shirley Chissom took place completely after poll. Incidentally, Los Angeles audience ratings were 12% for first debate, 13% for second and only 6% for third debate. Ratings in other California cities probably somewhat higher but still each debate was probably not seen by 80% of the voters. Reasons given by various observers here for difference between the 20% McGovern lead and actual difference of only 5% include the following:

1. Poll itself generated over confidence by McGovern workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.

2. McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure for New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously indicating over confidence and taking California for granted.

3. As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a knack for a strong finish. On last two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down State with good TV coverage while McGovern was absent.

4. Nofziger reports that Al Barkan,political person from COPE,came into State during last two weeks and the labor effort appears to have been effective in closing days particularly in Los Angeles County which Humphrey carried.

Proposition 9 which lost by 2 to 1, attracted non-liberal voters who might not otherwise have voted.

Finally, many suggest that although field poll may be defective in commerical marketing, it has spotty record in political poll and was probably wrong to begin with.

My total impression is that debates did help by generating word of mouth of Humphrey's hard hitting attack and the important factor was McGovern's departure.

Incidentally, Los Angeles Times attributes Congressman Schmitz' defeat entirely to his opposition to the President's China and Russia initiatives which is very encouraging news from Orange County.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: ED HARPER

FROM: ROY D. MOREY

SUBJECT: Predictions vs. Results in the California Democratic Primary

Five days prior to the election, Mervin Field, Director of the syndicated California poll, found that as of May 30 - 31 McGovern was favored by 46 percent of the state's Democrats to Humphrey's 26 percent. The final vote in the California primary indicates McGovern with 44.2 percent, Humphrey with 39.2 percent, Wallace with a 6.0 percent write-in and Chisolm with 4.4 percent. Before analyzing reasons for Humphrey's better than predicted showing, lets first look at the primary results.

The Results

Counties in which McGovern was particularly strong included (results in thousands) Alameda (120-69), Marin (24-9), Sacramento (62-48), San Diego (90-74), San Francisco (82-49), San Mateo (52-38) and Santa Clara (95-60).

Humphrey's major strength was in Los Angeles County (553-472) but he made a respectable showing in districts including Orange (83-70), San Bernadeno (43-35), and Ventura (25-20).

Significant sources of McGovern's strength were identified by Hart Research Associates. Their figures show that while Humphrey had been running as a two to one favorite among blue collar workers in previous primaries, McGovern captured their vote by 46% to 38%. In addition, Humphrey showed a decline among Black voters from 72% in the April Pennsylvania primary to 34% in California. McGovern's popularity among the Blacks increased over the same period from 13% to 36%.

The data also demonstrates that urban voters feel that McGovern is a better candidate by a margin of more than two to one; less than two months ago, Humphrey held the advantage by similar margin. Humphrey seems to have increased his suburban strength (29% up to 43%) at the expense of core city support.

Humphrey did well among the elderly (taking California's senior set by a two to one margin) slightly less than half his voters classify themselves as conservatives, accounting perhaps in part for his strength in surburban Los Angeles County.

McGovern on the other hand captured more than 70% of the 18 to 24 year old vote, and among liberals and professionals - executives he ran two to one ahead of Humphrey. In previous primaries, McGovern had been finding consistently stronger support among women; in California he did 15% better among the men than did Humphrey, and only 3% better among the women.

A Last Minute Shift?

There have been a number of explanations advanced for the better than predicted Humphrey showing: The McGovern decision to leave the state the day before the election; a last minute sympathy vote for Humphrey; McGovern's position on the issues as exposed in the television debates and elsewhere finally caught up with him. While there is insufficient data to assess each of these theories, there is some evidence which should cast doubt on the significance of the television debates in influencing voter decisions.

It may be argued that the debates and issues and positions exposed in the debates account for the diminution of McGovern strength during the final days of the campaign. This is a plausible theory, but difficult to support. Only a little over half of the California Democrats (53%) watched any of the three debates. Among those three watched, there was a mixed reaction on the outcome -- 16% thought Humphrey came out ahead, 17% said McGovern was the winner, and 20% thought the debate produced a stand-off. In short, there does not seem to be much evidence to suggest that the debate played an important role in either insuring a McGovern victory or in decreasing his winning margin.

There are several factors which are useful in attempting to account for the better than predicted Humphrey showing. First is the matter of voter volatility in primary elections in general, and the California

primary in particular. It has been demonstrated elsewhere that public opinion polling is a more risky enterprise in primary rather than general elections.

More important, however, in explaining the apparent shift toward Humphrey in the final days is the undecided vote. A week before the election, the undecided vote was 13% in the Mervin Field poll and most of this went to Humphrey on election day. This was especially true among older voters who made up a majority of the undecided group. The Hart poll conducted for the Washington Post indicates that as much as a third of the voters did not make up their minds until the last three weeks of the campaign and that Humphrey picked up most of these late deciders.

In addition, there were early Wallace supporters who eventually decided to forego a write-in and vote for either McGovern or Humphrey. Humphrey picked up more of these nominal Wallace supporters than did McGovern.

Weighing the Results

In assessing the results of the California Democratic primary, one should keep in mind the size and composition of the electorate. Only 67% of California's 5.1 million Democrats turned out for this election as compared with the 73% turn out in the 1968 contest between Kennedy and Hartke.

We cannot assume that the 67% who turned out constitute a representative microcosm of the entire California Democratic electorate. As Austin Ranney reports in the current issue of the American Political Science Review, the make up of the electorate in primary elections differs from the voters who turn out for general elections. The Ranney data indicates that the primary voters tend to be more affluent, better educated, with an over all higher socio-economic background. They also tend to be more ideologically committed. Although there were a few voter group reversals for McGovern from his experience in other states, the fact remains that his support in California tended to be from those who are more likely to turn out for a primary election.

Among voters with incomes over $15,000 he did as well as he has in other states. McGovern out polled Humphrey among the better educated and professional groups and he gained two out of three votes among those who classified themselves as liberals.

The VN war and the state of the economy (including unemployment) were the major issues on the minds of both McGovern and Humphrey supporters. Hence, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between the two based upon positions taken on the issues. Humphrey supporters felt he is committed to ending the war and favor his stand on equality for Blacks and tax reform. McGovern supporters tended to mention withdrawal from VN, a guaranteed minimal income for the poor and his stand on tax reform. The distinction drawn in voter's minds seem to be more a matter of style than substance.

Judging from the success McGovern had with the more affluent and professional groups, there does not seem to be much evidence to support the contention that those with incomes above $15,000 were scared into the Humphrey camp by talk of McGovern's income redistribution scheme.

This year, the primaries have given voters an opportunity to express their feelings of discontent and concern. This is reflected in the successes of both McGovern and Wallace. However, the voter will have to make a considerably different kind of decision in the general election. In the final analysis he is called upon to pass judgment on whom he thinks should be entrusted with the responsibility of the Presidency.

cc: Bradford Rich

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH

SUBJECT: Impact of the "Debates" on the Democratic Presidential Primary in California

The question has been raised as to whether the three "debates" were in large part responsible for Humphrey's highly improved showing on June 6 in California.

Having watched all three "exercises" and having been in California on and off throughout the period involved, the answer is unequivocally: Yes!

Two points need to be made before a discussion of the debates themselves. First, the Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest. As you know, in the past Field has traditionally "over-sampled" in the northern part of the state. But there is no question but that at a point approximately two weeks prior to the election McGovern had a clear lead probably somewhere in the magnitude of 10 percentage points over Humphrey,* and this was fortified by unlimited money and a superb organization. Even if you accepted the Field poll at face value, it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey--an unheard phenomena.

The following comments relate only to the first two debates since the third discussion, which included Yorty, Chisholm, and a Wallace representative, must be treated separately.

While Humphrey was clearly "up-tight and on edge" in the first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions taken by the South Dakota Senator.

In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air. He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner-of-War issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.

In my opinion, the third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course, endorsed HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility, picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black community on which Humphrey had been relying.

It seems to me that Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he wrang the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.

As the Los Angeles Times reported:

> McGovern ran up big margins in San Francisco, Alameda and Santa Clara counties, among others, and this more than made up for the beating he took from Humphrey in Los Angeles, Orange and San Bernardino counties.
>
> McGovern cut into Humphrey's strength in the black communities but preliminary figures showed he did not do as well as expected with Mexican-Americans nor with some suburban voters.
>
> A check of three predominantly Jewish precincts -- No. 2236 on Beverly Blvd., No. 2230 on N. Crescent Heights and No. 2226 on Stanley Ave. -- covering different economic groups showed Humphrey winning by a comfortable 20 percentage points -- 58% to 38%.
>
> A check of blue-collar precincts in South Gate, Bell Gardens and Bellflower showed Humphrey beating McGovern 54% to 33%.

McGovern staffers said the decision to go into the three televised "debates" with Humphrey cut into campaign time which had been allocated to the blue-collar areas.

As for the black vote, a check of four key precincts -- two in the Watts area and two in Willowbrook -- showed almost a dead-even split between the candidates.

The final point to me would be that care must be utilized in not having our people attempt to characterize McGovern as a "flaming radical." Rather, it can be argued that he is terribly naive (i.e., his position on hoping that North Vietnam would release our Prisoners-of-War once we left), and totally unrealistic about fiscal matters. In other words, his positions are "extreme" or "far out." The reason this is important is that he does come across on television as a plausible, soft-spoken, trustworthy sort of a man from the mid-West and this appearance belies the gross stupidity of some of his statements and programs.

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| | Charles Kerch prediction (week of May 28) | Actual results | Field Poll (May 30-31) |
|---|---|---|---|
| McGovern | 54% | 45% | 46% |
| Humphrey | 26% | 40% | 26% |
| Wallace | 9% | 5% | 8% |
| Muskie | 4% | 2% | 1% |
| Chisholm | 3% | 4% | 2% |
| Yorty | 2% | 1% | 1% |
| Jackson | 2% | 1% | 1% |

THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972

**Survey of California Voting**

# *McGovern: New Constituency*

By Haynes Johnson
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, June 7 — Although George McGovern did not win the California primary by the landslide the pollsters had projected, Democratic voters in the nation's largest state handed him another kind of victory: for the first time this year he has emerged as the candidate with the most broadly based constituency.

In other primaries his strength was concentrated among young voters, affluent suburbanites and liberals. McGovern basically held that constituency yesterday, and ran significantly better among voters who previously had been the strongest supporters of his opponent, Hubert Humphrey.

These voters who had formed the nucleus of the Humphrey strength in other contests—the blacks, the poor, the urban dwellers, the blue-collar workers, the ethnics—deserted him in California.

The most striking evidence of McGovern's broader appeal came in two voting groups, the blacks and the blue-collar workers. In previous primaries Humphrey had been getting anywhere from 70 to 80 per cent of the black vote.

Humphrey also had been running about 2-to-1 ahead of McGovern among blue-collar workers.

A survey by Hart Research Associates conducted for The Washington Post showed Humphrey actually losing the black vote by 2 percentage points in California and running behind McGovern among blue-collar workers by a 46 per cent to 38 per cent margin.

(McGovern's principal pollster, Pat Caddell, estimated that McGovern took 47 or 48 per cent of the state's black vote to 43 per cent for Humphrey and that he picked up 57 per cent of the Chicano vote, 20 points ahead of Humphrey. But Caddell said Humphrey seemed to have won the Jewish vote by 18 to 20 per cent and to have won the blue-collar vote by 2 or 3 per cent.)

The Hart survey, of 847 voters in 26 counties throughout the state, also turned up other evidence of McGovern's increasing acceptance among diverse elements of registered Democrats. Mexican-Americans voted for Mc-

MCGOVERN BROADENS CONSTITUENCY

Govern by 61 to 31 per cent for Humphrey.

Among voters with family incomes under $7,000 a year, the two major contenders evenly divided the field. Previously in the Pennsylvania, Ohio and Maryland primaries the Hart Post survey showed Humphrey running anywhere from 2-to-1 to 3-to-1 over McGovern in that category.

Finally, Humphrey's standing among urban voters plummeted in California. In California the urban vote represents one-third of the potential Democratic electorate. Yesterday Humphrey took only 27 per cent of that vote. In Pennsylvania, by contrast, he had held 45 per cent of the urban vote and in Ohio he took 53 per cent.

McGovern's margin rose from 23 per cent of the urban vote in Pennsylvania to 52 per cent in California.

**Suburban Vote Divided**

The key to the closeness of the California vote ironically lies in the one area that had been the bastion for George McGovern: the suburbs. The two candidates divided that vote yesterday. And in California this group makes up nearly half of the Democratic electorate.

In Pennsylvania, Humphrey had carried 29 per cent of the suburban vote to McGovern's 45. In California, Humphrey captured 43 per cent of the suburban vote while McGovern won 41 per cent.

Humphrey's strength was concentrated in one major area—sprawling Los Angeles County.

A reading of the California returns thus clearly shows how successful McGovern has been in establishing himself as a candidate with wide political appeal. His California standing has to be measured against the time, only three months ago, when he was largely regarded as a one-issue candidate who could not rise above 7 per cent in the national polls.

What is intriguing about California—and unanswerable at this stage—is how the polls erred so badly here.

McGovern came into election day seemingly headed for a landslide victory. The respected California Poll conducted by Mervin Field showed him ahead by 20 percentage points. But as they have demonstrated all year in the privacy of the voting booth, citizens refused to be catalogued in advance of the election.

**Various Theories Offered**

There are any number of theories being advanced to explain the far-better Humphrey final vote: that the intensely personal nature of his campaigning against the odds spurred a last-minute sympathy vote: that McGovern's position on specific issues, including income redistribution and cuts in defense spending, cast new doubt on his candidacy; that the television debates caused a significant switch to Humphrey.

None of these can be verified with any accuracy. They remain theories.

The Hart survey data does, however, give clues to what was taking place as the election approached. Voters were asked when they made up their minds to support either Humphrey or McGovern. One out of three voters said they decided on their candidate within the last three weeks. Of those voters, Humphrey beat McGovern by a 5-to-4 margin.

In other words, people who were undecided tended to be more influenced by Humphrey than McGovern in the closing days of the election.

The television debates are less conclusive.

Some 53 per cent of all Democratic voters in the state, representing well over a million persons, said they had watched at least one of the three TV encounters. But despite such wide exposure, neither candidate received a clear signal of support based on the way he came over the set

When asked which candidate was the winner, the citizens responded this way:

Sixteen per cent of all Democratic voters thought Humphrey came out ahead.

Seventeen per cent said McGovern.

Twenty per cent thought the debates were a standoff.

And the remainder didn't watch.

The same kind of inconclusive breakdown came among those who voted for either McGovern or Humphrey.

Of those who backed Humphrey on Tuesday, only 30 per cent thought he was a clear-cut winner in the debates. Of those who voted for McGovern, the same figure of 30 per cent gave their man the clear edge.

**Marked by Bitterness**

The Hart results do cast light on another element of critical importance to not only Humphrey and McGovern, but to their party's chances against Richard Nixon in the fall. This campaign was marked by a current of bitterness, sometimes muted, sometimes flaring into the open, between the two senators who have been long-time friends in Washington.

On election day, that bitterness was most notably expressed by the Humphrey voters. Almost half of those who voted for Humphrey said they would support Mr Nixon if McGovern is the Democratic nominee in November. Among McGovern's supporters, however, two out of three said they would back Humphrey if he wins the Democratic nomination next month in Miami Beach.

But a full 10 per cent of the McGovern voters said they would not participate at all in the presidential election if the choices are the same as four years ago —another Humphrey-Nixon match.

Implicit in these findings is a potentially perilous situation facing the Democratic Party. They raise the prospect of a party so badly divided that the Republicans could be returned to office as a result.

On the surface that is comforting news for the President and his party. But a careful qualification has to be added to that equation.

In trial heats among Democratic voters yesterday, both Humphrey and McGovern scored substantial victories when pitted face-to-face against Mr. Nixon. The figure for Humphrey was 68 per cent to Mr. Nixon's 21 per cent. McGovern topped the President by 66 to 28 per cent.

**Findings Confirmed**

These confirm the findings of other published polls this week that showed McGovern beating Mr. Nixon among all California voters. Simply put, this means that the President has problems in California, the largest state and a state that he carried in both 1960 and 1968.

Another way of looking at the relative strength of the President in his native state can be seen in examining the issues cited by the voters. In California, as in other states, the war ranks as the greatest concern of most voters. But close behind that is another problem. To a striking degree California voters yesterday singled out the problems of unemployment and job security as being of paramount importance.

In other states, the issues of inflation or taxes ranked high, but the California voters were saying yesterday that their economic problems are more acute and more demanding of solution.

These two concerns, the war and the economy, will probably dominate the actual presidential campaign.

When it comes to distinguishing between the two leading Democratic candidates, there is little in voter responses to distinguish them. A majority of the Humphrey voters said they thought he would honorably end the war. Only two other issues were strongly associated with Humphrey in their minds. These were his positions on full equality for blacks and on tax reform.

For McGovern, two out of three of his supporters mentioned his call for immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. And almost half cited his stand on guaranteeing a minimum income for the poor. About 40 per cent mentioned his tax reform proposals.

The voters seemed to perceive the men in different ways. McGovern supporters were more inclined to stress his stand on specific issues than his personal qualities, while the Humphrey backers spoke more about their man's personality, his speaking ability, his warmth and sincerity.

**Support of Elderly**

In only one segment of the voting population did Humphrey maintain the strength he has demonstrated in other primaries. Voters aged 65 and over, and those who are retired, gave him a lopsided 2-to-1 margin over McGovern.

His California constituency was marked by another aspect. Slightly less than half of his voters classified themselves as conservatives. That perhaps, explains his strong showing among Los Angeles County suburban voters. In California, and particularly Southern California, the makeup of the suburbs differs from those in other sections of the country. Here, the suburban voter generally is more conservative.

McGovern maintained his position among young voters, liberals, the more affluent and among professional groups.

In California, as in other primaries, he took better than 70 per cent of voters between the ages of 18 and 24. With voters earning more than $15,000 a year, he did as well in California as in other states.

Among voters classifying themselves as liberals, McGovern received two out of three of the ballots cast. In the professional-executive category of voters, McGovern received a clear-cut majority, running more than 2-to-1 ahead of Humphrey.

In a political season of contradictions and confusion, these elements among the voters remained constant factors. There was one group in the California electorate, though, that defied the standards set in other primaries.

McGovern had been doing consistently better among women voters all across the country. The Hart survey yesterday turned up yet another contradiction to the political norm.

In California George McGovern ran significantly better among men than women, holding a 15-point spread over Humphrey among men but only 3 per cent among women.

Whether that is an indication of further change in a changing electorate or merely a quirk of California no one can say. Even the pollsters won't venture an opinion of why that is so.

*This story is based on interviews conducted for The Washington Post by Hart Research Associates of Washington. The company interviewed 847 California voters in 26 of the state's 58 counties. These voters represent 92 per cent of the potential Democratic electorate in California. The voters were contacted immediately after they cast their ballots in Tuesday's presidential primary election. The purpose of the interviews was to determine why people voted as they did and to determine the kind and depth of support the major Democratic candidates enjoyed. This is the last of a series of similar voter surveys carried out for The Post by Hart Research on the 1972 presidential primary elections.*

# 4-Primary Record of Rivals' Strength

By a Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, June 7—The changing nature of the McGovern-Humphrey constituencies is shown in the following table, based on voter surveys conducted in four presidential primaries by Hart Research Associates for The Washington Post.

| | Pennsylvania April 25 % | Ohio May 2 % | Maryland May 16 % | California June 6 % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Urban Voters** | | | | |
| Humphrey | 45 | 53 | 48 | 27 |
| McGovern | 23 | 34 | 13 | 52 |
| **Suburban Voters** | | | | |
| Humphrey | 29 | 33 | 22 | 43 |
| McGovern | 45 | 49 | 37 | 41 |
| **Blue-Collar Workers** | | | | |
| Humphrey | 43 | 54 | 33 | 38 |
| McGovern | 19 | 35 | 16 | 46 |
| **Blacks** | | | | |
| Humphrey | 72 | 80 | 67 | 34 |
| McGovern | 13 | 16 | 12 | 36 |
| **Low-Income Voters** | | | | |
| Humphrey | 44 | 59 | 34 | 42 |
| McGovern | 20 | 32 | 12 | 42 |

THE NEW YORK TIMES
Friday, June 9, 1972

# *Times Survey: Defections In Party Face McGovern*

By JACK ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, June 8 — A striking proportion of voters who supported Senator Hubert H. Humphrey in California said in a survey that if Senator George McGovern won the Democratic nomination, they would abandon their party and vote for President Nixon in November.

According to a cross-section survey conducted on primary day here by The New York Times and Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., about 40 per cent of Humphrey voters say they would defect to the President in a Nixon-McGovern race.

Another 40 per cent say they would stand by Mr. McGovern as the Democratic nominee. The remainder are undecided or say they would not vote.

The 40 per cent defection rate is equivalent to the loss of one out of every six California Democrats (Mr. Humphrey got 40 per cent of the vote in the Democratic primary Tuesday). It is significantly higher than the rate measured in any of the four previous primary election surveys conducted by The Times and the Yankelovich research concern.

The California survey was of a scientific sampling of 570 voters in 11 counties who were interviewed as they left the polls. The total included an oversampling of 56 black voters.

The Humphrey defection rate contrasted markedly with that among McGovern voters. If Senator Humphrey should win the nomination, fewer than 20 per cent of the McGovern vot-

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
Friday, June 9, 1972

# Times Study: Defections Face McGovern

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

ers say they would defect to the President.

The high Humphrey defection rate mirrored a series of signs of relative conservatism among the Minnesota Senator's supporters. The survey indicated they were less concerned about the Vietnam war and more sympathetic to Gov. George C. Wallace of Alabama than were McGovern voters.

And, the survey indicated, Senator Humphrey's comparatively conservative positions won him growing support as the California campaign drew to a close.

### Young Support McGovern

Senator McGovern won gathering support from younger voters in the closing days of the campaign. His support among first-time voters, aged 18 to 24, jumped to its highest level of any of the five surveys.

The California survey showed that the South Dakotan won about three-fourths of this large bloc. Translated into total votes, that would mean he won about 425,000 of an estimated 580,000 youth votes. His total margin of victory over Senator Humphrey in California was about 175,000.

Meanwhile, however, Senator Humphrey appeared to make offsetting gains among voters who were not youths. His net gain of about 20 per cent in this category was twice that of Senator McGovern.

These gains among more conservative and older voters appear to reflect Senator Humphrey's sharp attacks on McGovern proposals as verging on reckless and radical.

Further, the showing of late Humphrey gains parallels previous findings of The Times/Yankelovich Survey. These indicated that Senator Humphrey had cut into a potentially large McGovern victory margin with his attacks. These were made, notably, in three nationally televised debates prior to the election.

A week before the election, the statewide California Poll reported a 20-point McGovern lead. In the final returns, Senator McGovern won by a 45-to-40 per cent margin.

Another sign of the comparative conservatism of Humphrey voters was the finding that less than half think any Democrat can defeat President Nixon. By contrast, two-thirds of McGovern voters think so. Among all California Democratic voters, only a little over half are optimistic about November.

The rise from primary to primary in the number of Humphrey voters who would not support Senator McGovern parallels the increasing attention paid to the South Dakotan's proposals.

These include restructuring the defense budget and reducing it substantially to $55-billion, and replacing the present welfare system with a $1,000-per-person allowance for the poor.

In the Florida primary, 25 per cent of Humphrey voters said they would prefer Mr. Nixon to Senator McGovern in November. In Wisconsin the figure was 29 per cent; in Pennsylvania, 34 per cent, and in Michigan, 22 per cent.

### Other Survey Findings

Among other findings of the California survey were the following:

¶Senator McGovern strongly improved his showing among voting blocs formerly dominated by Senator Humphrey—blacks, older adults and blue collar voters. But these McGovern gains were somewhat offset by Humphrey gains among younger adults and white-collar workers.

¶The two men appeared to divide the black and the Mexican-American vote about equally.

¶As elsewhere, Senator McGovern virtually monopolized the ant-Vietnam war vote while Senator Humphrey was the choice of most voters concerned about experience in government.

¶On economic issues, which played an important role in Senator McGovern's Wisconsin victory, the two men appeared to divide about evenly.

For example, slightly more voters concerned about inflation favored Senator McGovern. Slightly more concerned about high property taxes favored Hum-

¶On economic issues, which played an important role in Senator McGovern's Wisconsin victory, the two men appeared to divide about evenly. For example, slightly more voters concerned about inflation favored Senator McGovern. Slightly more concerned about high property taxes favored Senator Humphrey.

¶An almost exactly equal proportion—two-thirds—of the voters surveyed said they would support either Senator McGovern or Senator Humphrey against President Nixon in the November general election.

¶If Senator Humphrey were nominated, however, one young voter in 10 said he would decide not to vote at all. About one voter in six was a young first-time voter, aged 18 to 24.

¶California Democrats appeared polarized when it came to Governor Wallace, a write-in candidate here. About half thought his views should at least be given a place in the Democratic platform. At the same time, the other half, favored ignoring—or even denouncing—him.

¶Had Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts been a candidate, he might have narrowly won the California primary, drawing almost equal numbers away from Senators McGovern and Humphrey. Allowing for statistical error the three men would have run within three percentage points of each other, according to the survey.

¶In California, as in previous Times/Yankelovich surveys, the Vietnam war was the most important public issue. It was cited by two-thirds of the voters. As elsewhere, Senator McGovern won heavy support from those concerned about the war.