

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
25	3	7/27/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Magruder RE: suggestions from George Grassmuck. 3 pgs.
25	3	8/3/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Citizens/ White House Telephone Board. 2 pgs.
25	3	7/17/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Gavin Memorandum on Political Moods. 11 pgs.
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Handwritten notes on meetings over the campaign. 2 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Handwritten notes on the campaign. 3 pgs.
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Flanigan and Magruder to Haldeman RE: Simulation in the 1972 campaign. 12 pgs.
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to LR RE: ACC should be sent to Mel, Stephens, and this returned to me. 4 pgs.
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to LR RE: Memo sent by Strachan to Odle on Schollander. 3 pgs.
25	3	6/28/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Chapin to Magruder RE: Master Political Calendar. 1 pg.

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25	3	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex-Governors for Nixon. 6 pgs.
25	3	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder and Higby to Haldeman and Mitchell RE: Polling '72 Campaign. 5 pgs.
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Higby RE: Jeb Magruder's interest and plans for Schollander. 3 pgs.
25	3	6/29/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's Projects. 33 pgs.
25	3	6/9/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: A check with John Dean that the Citizen use of Bill Horton would casue no legal problem because "it is an isolated example." 2 pgs.

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25	3	6/4/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Democratic Contenders - RNC/Citizens Activities. 1 pg.
25	3	6/4/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: White House Staff Involvement in Citizens. 1 pg.
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Higby RE: Per Your Request. 3 pgs.
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Newsletter	"The Ordeal of the President or Will Richard Nixon Find True Happiness in 1972 by Jefferey Bell. 5 pgs.
25	3	5/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Higby RE: Magruder follow-up on Schollander. 1 pg.

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25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Bruce RE: Colson's awareness of his responsibility vis a vis ethnics. 1 pg.
25	3	5/25/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Kehrlie RE: A recent follow-up with Magruder on the ethnic situation at the RNC and at the Citizens. 6 pgs.
25	3	5/25/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Kehrlie RE: A recent follow-up with Magruder on the ethnic situation at the RNC and at the Citizens. 5 pgs.
25	3	4/28/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Political planning and mock conventions on college and high school campuses. 1 pg.
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Higby RE: Information and Strachen's attendance at meetings. 2 pgs.

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25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to G. RE: How will advise Buchanan. 5 pgs.
25	3	5/28/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to the Attorney General RE: Bryce Harlow reported sources indicateing Congressman Mills' running for the Presidency. 1 pg.
25	3	6/1/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Finch to the President RE: California Strategy (Action Memo P1214). 8 pgs.
25	3	5/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder and Higby to Haldeman RE: Polling Plan. 8 pgs.
25	3	5/28/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to the Attorney General RE: Compass Systems, Inc.. 1 pg.

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25	3	5/27/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: the Attorney General just called Magruder about the CSI-Finch matter. 9 pgs.
25	3	5/25/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Finch's Arrangement with Compass Systems, Inc.. 2 pgs.
25	3	5/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Magruder RE: Porter and Inadequate report on mock conventions. 1 pg.
25	3	5/19/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Porter to Strachan RE: Mock Conventions on College and High School Campuses. 3 pgs.
25	3	5/7/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Porter to Magruder RE: Meeting with Len Garment. 15 pgs.

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25	3	5/27/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's forwarded attached memo on the CSI -- Bob Finch matter. 6 pgs.
25	3	5/24/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: California and "cutting from the Right." 3 pgs.
25	3	5/7/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hoopes ro Strachan RE: Roger Ailes TV Consulting March 1971 Bill Payment. 32 pgs.
25	3		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to LR RE: reply to Mr. O'Leary and his letter. 1 pg.
25	3	4/30/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Betty - keep copy of attached notes and all. 5 pgs.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 304

Folder: 3 Campaign-June 29, 1971

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
77	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Magruder, 7-27-71
78	Return Private/Political Notes, "G → Beverly Cole..." 8-13-[71]
79	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-17-71
80	Return Private/Political Notes, "JSM, L, G..." 6-30-[71]
81	Return Private/Political Notes, "Alex - \$ for..." [7-21-71]
82	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 7-19-71
83	Return Private/Political Memo, Flanigan & Magruder to the AG & HRH, 7-15-[71]
84	Return Private/Political Note, Strachan to L.R., 7-2-[71]
85	Return Private/Political Note, Strachan to L.R., n.d.
86	Return Private/Political Memo, Chapin to Magruder, 6-28-71
87	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-23-71
88	Return Private/Political Memo, Magruder & Higby to Mitchell & HRH, 6-23-71
89	Return Private/Political Note, Strachan to Higby, 6-4-[71]
90	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-29-71
91	Return Private/Political Note, Strachan to HRH, 6-9-71
92	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-4-71
93	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-4-71
94	Return Private/Political Note, Strachan to Higby, 6-17-[71]
95	Return Private/Political "The Ordeal of the President," by Bell, n.d.
96	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Higby, 5-26-71
97	Return Private/Political Note, Strachan to Bruce, 6-4-[71]
98	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Kehrl, 5-25-71
99	Return Private/Political Memo, HRH to Strachan, 4-28-71
100	Return Private/Political Note, Strachan to Higby, 5-25-[71]

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 304

101	Return	Private/Political	Note, Higby to G [Strachan], n.d.
102	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Magruder to the A.G., 5-28-71
103	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Finch to the President, 6-1-71
104	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Magruder & Higby to the A.G. & HRH, 5-26-71
105	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Magruder to the A.G., 5-28-71
106	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Strachan to HRH, 5-27-71
107	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Strachan to HRH, 5-25-71
108	Return	Private/Political	Note, Higby to Magruder, 5-26-71
109	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Porter to Magruder, 5-7-71
110	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Strachan to HRH, 5-27-71
111	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Buchanan to HRH, 5-24-71
112	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Hoopes to Strachan, 5-7-71
113	Return	Private/Political	Note to G.S. 5-24-71]

~~TMO~~
July 27, 1971

JEB MAGRUDER

GORDON STRACHAN

~~WEEK~~
WED
July 28

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

The attached suggestion from George Grassmuck is really within your bailiwick.

The idea about "US-A-1" looks rather good to me, but of course, that is because I have no experience in the area.

Mr. Maldeman has not seen this suggestion, so would you let me know what you plan to do with it before you leave on Thursday.

Jy 29 - memo
by Odle


GS:lm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FOR: BOB HALDEMAN

Here is a 1972 RN campaign theme
as my junior high daughter sees it.
When you think about it, and recall
"Nixon's the One," this identifi-
cation of President with Quality
Country can well be hammered.

Please dispose as you wish.


George Grassmuck

7.23.71

US 9-1
NIXON

G.S.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Administratively Confidential

August 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT:

Citizens/White House Telephone Board

The White House operators report that approximately two-dozen calls are received each day asking for individuals who transferred from the White House Staff to Citizens. The group includes Jeb Magruder, Harry Flemming, Hugh Sloan, Rob Odle, and Bart Porter. The White House operators refer these calls by saying: "Mr. _____ can be reached at 333-0920".

Approximately one-dozen calls a day are placed by White House operators for the entire group at Citizens. The operators do not announce "White House" and just dial on the trunk lines.

Jeb Magruder has his old extension (2831) at his 1701 office. That extension is never released to incoming callers but White House Staff and Magruder use it to reach other other.

You will recall that you specifically directed Magruder and Odle to relinquish their "page-boys".

Recommendations:

1) That the White House operators continue to refer calls from the White House telephone board to the Citizens' number.

Approve H Disapprove _____ Comment _____

2) That the White House operators stop placing calls for the Citizens' operation.

Approve H Disapprove _____ Comment _____

3) That the Magruder four-digit White House lines be removed from the Citizens offices and from Magruder's home.

Approve H Disapprove _____ Comment _____

G → Mary Burns 8/5

Immediately
G → Haynes 8/5
" " 8/6
today

~~G → Beverly Cole → re "Senior Priv."~~
for numbers, etc. Cabinet of Pete.
- calls at night, numbers, LP

Done in JSM
presence 8/13

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Gavin Memorandum on
Political Moods

Frank Shakespeare forwarded Bill Gavin's very interesting memorandum on political moods. To summarize:

- 1) The New York Times - McNamara papers controversy will hurt the Nixon Administration because the public doesn't distinguish LBJ's duplicity from the wheeling and dealing of any Administration.
- 2) A politician has three things to work with: reason, passion, and imagination.
- 3) In the public's mind Nixon is eminently reasonable and reasoning; only Muskie among the Democrats is close in this, our strongest attribute. Although the public wants things to be thought through reason is politically dull.
- 4) Agnew represents passion (energy, comment, waves-making regardless of content). With Agnew, no one (including Wallace) can "out-passion" us. The problem is that the public is confused by Agnew as passion and Nixon as reason. The result is that the Administration doesn't project a definite image. This is to be contrasted with 1968 when the Republicans were a bit dull but solid. This confused image is a bad sign.
- 5) This Administration is wholly without imagination. There is no Peace Corps or Great Society, and even the six great goals of the New American Revolution are solid, reasonable, and prudent, but ~~un~~imaginative. Only Kennedy has imagination.
- 6) Nixon will be re-elected if Kennedy doesn't run. Agnew shouldn't be replaced because his passion pluses and minuses are already engraved on the public's mind.

- 7) The Administration should not try to build an image that appeals to the imagination because no one will believe it. Rather the Nixon Administration should run on stark, statistical appeals to reason. Television and other media appeals to reason. Television and other media should not be exciting as in 1968 or arty, "cinema-verite." Charts and figures not gimmicky media should be the Campaign 72 approach (Shakespeare agrees with this Gavin argument).
- 8) Approach youth as Americans not young Americans, because the Democrats already have the "youth issues" locked.
- 9) Gavin concludes: "Wouldn't it be ironic if the Nixon Administration was defeated because the Democrats were able to state that while they were for sane defense spending, they never meant we should be in second place as far as missile defense is concerned?"

Recommendation:

That Bill Gavin's memorandum be forwarded by you to:

The Attorney General 6/28 ~~Magruder~~ *Magruder*

John Ehrlichman 6/28 *Hullin*

✓ Dwight Chapin 6/28

Pat Buchanan 6/28

Ray Price 6/28

GS:elr



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON


DIRECTOR

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
H. R. Haldeman
The White House

These observations by Bill Gavin on political moods
in the United States are worth noting.

I am inclined to agree with Bill's thoughts on
television spot advertising in the 1972 campaign.



Frank Shakespeare

EYES ONLY

June 15, 1971

Covering Note

I wrote this memo before the disclosures in the Times. My feeling is that in the final analysis, the President will not benefit from these disclosures. I think the public will identify any Administration with the kind of wheeling-dealing that has been disclosed. I think Teddy will benefit, not because of any rational reason, but because people can project their fantasies of 1000% purity in government and a thousand-year peace unto Teddy. Our Administration and all respect for authority has been terribly damaged by these disclosures. Anyone who thinks this will be a partisan issue ("see what LBJ did?") is missing the point: the Times wants Americans to think that anyone connected with this war in any way is bad.

I know there is an argument that says we look better than the Democrats because LBJ has been caught in a lie. I don't agree. The public won't make the distinction. If I were LBJ, I'd go on nationwide television and make my case.


Bill Gavin

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

June 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Shakespeare

Some Thoughts on 1972

What, ultimately, does any politician have to work with? Three things: reason, passion and imagination. Even if he successfully mixes these three it won't assure him political success because events might go against him. But without these qualities, even events can't save him.

Looking coldbloodedly at 1972, how will the President appear to the voters insofar as these three qualities are concerned? And how will his opponent shape up?

1. Reason. It seems to me that this is our strong point. Nixon is in the public mind an eminently reasonable and reasoning man (two different attributes). There is not a Democrat who can match Nixon's reputation for thinking things through, sorting things out, balancing all things. Muskie comes close but there is nothing in his record that shows he can appeal to the voters as the candidate of pure reason.

Now this is all to the good. Contrary to what the pundits say, there is great comfort to be taken by the electorate from knowing that they can count on a certain kind of familiar--if dull--rational process in decision making. Nixon is perhaps the best example of the "reason-candidate." LBJ had everyone on the point of a nervous breakdown because no one knew what he was going to do next, i. e., everyone began to doubt his capacity for thinking things through.

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

But reason, politically speaking, is dull. It is good, but good only in that way that medicine is good. Reason is appreciated only when things are going wrong (JFK's much publicized discussions with wise men during the missile crisis proved to be as much help to him as the ultimate decision did; people knew things were "being thought through" and had confidence in Kennedy.)

The Nixon Administration has been marked by this: we are reasonable (we set reasonable goals--reorganization--and go about them in reasonable ways) but dull. Yet no one quite knows whether this is good or bad, as far as sizing up our chances for 1972. For the moment let's content ourselves with the facts: we are the first Administration in ten years to be almost universally thought of as one in which "thinking things through" is taken for granted. This quality of course works against us also: we are accused of balancing too many things, of trying to be too rational, of attempting to avoid needed risks, etc. But in any event, we are associated in the public mind with reason.

2. Passion. Passion, in this Administration means Agnew and Agnew means passion. The documentation of his arguments, the precise nature of his claims, the moderate speaking style with which he made them--all of these are as dust compared to the one single fact about the Vice President: he represents passion in this Administration.

Like all passion, the passion represented by Agnew is pure energy, i. e., in the public mind the content of his passion has become almost unimportant (even to his friends); what counts is that he is what he is, breaking the rules of political decorum, saying things, making waves, in short, making a passionate appeal to the passions of the public. Not to put too fine an edge on this thing, it can be said in a very real sense that Agnew's appeal is the appeal of the lover: it is direct, forceful, open, full of energy and rather unfocused.

Does anyone "out-passion" us? I think not. No one running for President can afford to take the chances Agnew has. He is the single most passionately discussed, admired, hated politician alive today, including Old George Corley Wallace.

But passion is too much for most people. Most of us can take it only in bits and pieces and Agnew has in three years made a mini-career out of it. He has, as they say, enflamed the hearts of the faithful.

Many questions arise: does the public distinguish the passionate politics of Agnew from the rational politics of Nixon? Does Agnew's style hurt or help or really have no affect on Nixon's image? It is difficult to say but my guess is that something entirely unexpected has happened: the public has become confused by the Agnew style in contrast with Nixon's style. The public simply doesn't know what to think. I'm not saying the public disagrees with his content; I'm saying it has completely forgotten his content. All they'll remember in 1972 about Agnew is a big cliché in which sound and fury make up the greatest part.

Thus, I think we are going into 1972 (no matter who is on the ticket as Vice President for us) with a paradoxical, but very real problem: the very quality lacked by Nixon in the eyes of most people is precisely that which Agnew has, but in such a way that people are not certain what to make of it all. Is Agnew, Nixon? Is Nixon, Agnew? This uncertainty about the image of the ticket is, in my mind, a danger. In 1968 everyone knew what the Republican ticket was: a bit dull, but solid. But now? Solidity of image (I'm not talking about programs) is gone. A bad sign.

3. Imagination. Here we have an Administration that has called for a revolution, that has called for revolutionary new systems of welfare, revenue sharing, etc. But in the public's mind it is an Administration wholly without imagination. I don't know why this should be so but I'm positive it is so. And here is where the danger lies. In order to win in 1972 a candidate is going to have to be reasonable, have mini-passion but also appeal to the imagination of the voters. We simply don't do that and we never have. Voters voted for us in 1968 not because they imagined what we were going to do but because they knew what we are going to do. After five years of LBJ, intellectual certainty became almost politically sexy. But now after four years of dull reason with eruptions of (Agnevian) passion ~~and~~ few if any appeals to the imagination (the Peace Corps was such an appeal, so in it's way was the Great Society) have been made. Even the six great goals have been sold as well-thought-out goals that can be reached through reason and prudence.

We are going into 1972 with absolutely no appeal to the imagination and there is, as far as I can see, no way out of it. No gimmick will suffice. Either you have it or you don't and we don't as far as imaginative appeal goes.

Now what does all this add up to? It means that we are in very big trouble as far as image is concerned. We will be the party of peace--but people expect peace.

The great strength we have, however, is that there is only one possible candidate who could appeal to the imagination of the voters, sweep through the words, add the logic and the record and hit them in the gut: Teddy. And he ain't running. If he does run, we are in a fight for our political future. No other Democrat has even the slightest chance of appealing to the fancies and fantasies of the public as does Teddy. We will win if he doesn't run.* Not because we are going to overwhelm the voters with our record or our charm (they are not really interested in either) but because we can out-reason all of them and none of them has that much more going for him as far as imagination is concerned. Passion could well be our undoing. But if this is so, it is already a political fact simply waiting to be recorded in November 1972. Thus, any attempt to remove Agnew in order to "clean-up" the ticket is fruitless. His pluses and minuses have already been engraved on the public's mind and have been associated with the entire "Administration-image." Replacing Agnew would, I think, solve nothing and probably harm our chances on the right.

What does this all add up to?

1. We should not attempt to build some kind of image that appeals to the imagination for the simple reason that no one will believe it. Any energy used during the campaign to make us look "exciting" is, to me, a waste. Thus television and other media should be used in a different way from 1968. Instead of the fast-moving, exciting "cinema-verite" technique in spots, we should make stark, statistical appeals based on documented facts. At first glance this seems to be disastrous, but I think our hope lies in sticking to what we do best (reason) and what we are identified with in the public mind. We can't turn our back on four years of reasoned, prudent progress and try to excite people with dreams of grandeur or majestic sweeping visions. An explanation of what I mean: the numbers of Americans that were in Vietnam when we came

*We can, of course, win if he does run, providing two things occur: (1) Chappaquiddick is engraved in the hearts of the voters and (2) the voters don't want fantasies. Both seem unlikely to occur.

in and numbers of how many there are when the campaign takes place: stark, unadorned, repeated over and over and over--this kind of thing will do more than a thousand arty camera angles.

2. Quite literally everything depends on the public mood. If the public is looking for excitement after four years of reasoned progress, than it is my feeling we are in big trouble and that there is little if anything we can do about it as far as a media campaign is concerned. They voted for us because they thought we were solid; we have been solid; we must run once more as the solid party.

3. Gimmicky media appeals to the youth vote simply are a waste of time. Our appeal to youth must be an appeal to their concerns as Americans, not as young Americans and I think the President should say this. The Democrats are starting out with a wide spread in youth registration and we can't get them by appealing to the "youth issues" that the Democrats already have tied up. Let the Democrats cozy up to "youth"; we will treat the new voters as Americans first, i. e., we will take them as seriously as they take themselves.

A final--and to me, frightening--point. History has been known to deal in ironies before. Wouldn't it be ironic if the Nixon Administration was defted because the Democrats were able to state that while they were for sane defense spending, they never meant we should be in second place as far as missile defense is concerned? And wouldn't it be ironic if the Democrats said that they could do better than we could in our own programs vis-a-vis China?

Ghastly thoughts.

Bill

Bill Gavin

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FU
7/5
JSM

July 1, 1971

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
by ELP Date 3-23-82

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
VIA: MR. GORDON STRACHAN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

Gordon Strachan asked that I put together my thoughts for you on Bill Gavin's memorandum of June 14. I think that Gavin has put together an interesting, intellectual piece on some of the ramifications of Administration activity to date and the prospects for the 1972 election. However, I sense that he is a little paranoid over Agnew. I do not know how hard his reasoning is on all of this; however, I think that the assumptions are, perhaps, a little simplistic.

I do not question that we have the President in a relatively good position in terms of the criteria of his being "reasonable". The quality of reason is at least a point where we can always build a very good case for President Nixon.

Regarding passion, I am not sure that the Administration does out-passion everyone. I think the passion of the Peace Movement or of the new left - let alone of the right - has the zeal that an Agnew does. Perhaps we have been wrong (I would imagine Gavin would agree) in letting Agnew out so far front and getting so controversial and diluting the passion which he could hold in constructive areas. On the other hand, who is to say that Agnew has not served his purpose. Gavin states that Agnew cannot be replaced since his replacement would probably harm our chances for a victory. I am not sure that this is true. To say that Agnew's pluses and minuses have already been engraved in the public's mind is a problem, but on the other hand, in the age of quick imagery, Agnew can be tempered quite a lot in the next several months - or at least we can alter those causes on which he goes out front. This may be necessary, anyway, if Gavin's statement is true, when he says, "I am not saying the public disagrees with his content; I am saying it has completely forgotten his content". I think we can get around the problem of Agnew's becoming a big cliché rather than being effective on key issues. He just needs to be programmed against the big issues, as do others here - as well as the President.

In terms of imagination, I would have to concur with a lot of what Gavin says. We have done a poor job of illustrating how imaginative the President has been even on those occasions when he has either shown by action or through policy a sense of imagination. I think that we are starting into 1972 with a lack of being able to communicate imagination but not necessarily an absolute lack of imaginative appeal. In other words, we have it if we can figure out how to exploit it without doing so in a gimmicky way.

I do agree that Teddy has the imaginative appeal and that if he runs, that will be a problem. However, I also believe that Kennedy can be beat. (I do not think that we should assume that we can beat all others since Teddy is the only Democrat with imagination and the other contenders lack it.)

I tend to agree with the conclusion offered by Gavin in terms of how we try to illustrate imagination. It can be done in a documentary sense and it can be done -- a lot of it -- by film. We can also use the forthcoming State of the Union and the other natural forms which will be coming along. We can remain solid and present ourselves as a solid Party perpetuating a solid country. It doesn't have to be gimmicky. We can hook into a transfer from a wartime to a peace time situation and make that exciting. We can talk about how the dollars that were spent on defense are going to be spent domestically. We can do it as a sound, reasoned and exciting way.

All in all, what I am saying is Gavin has sounded an alarm which we should be cognizant of if we are not already and those people determining positions and working on the selling of our programs should give some thought to what he says but not necessarily over-react.

6/30

JSM, L, G

Mrs. Vincent Lombardi - JSM to

① approach next Tues.

Frank Murphy - L suggest - doesn't see how

West Coast media, FMC Dir

JSM → AG re Lombardi/Murphy

② Pol Mtg - AG → 3 wks not held

Replaced summaries +
add orig's.
select it
Comm, etc.

- then GS to attend | H raise

JSM to take notes | after 3 wks

- JSM doubts AG will shoot G down

③ JSM problem w/ Flemming who

wants to deal directly w/ AG

so ~~AG can't~~ JSM can't feel G w/ Stinfo

- a problem, be/anti - WH

Flemming close to Marden/Kleinberg

④ Pol Org - Sr man - Kleinberg? Flemming #2

then w/ 4 regional men. Rumsfeld

- ⑤ H + AG to meet Fri/ cover polling?

⑥ Petersmeyer - probs - Maik - etc.

- Black + Elderly Vote / Mlg best - CAC

- Middle Am a prob be/ Porter won't get along.

- ⑦ Grantsmanship - Horton has completed
 - Gifford: pol uses of budget
 - Mailed to FU w/ Gifford?

⑧ ~~Fri~~ 7/7 all TFS Report

⑨ Horton - PERT - Chart - Fri

⑩ except Women's - Aug 1

RNC - WH not ~~agreed~~ squared away
at com - OK w/ RNC
AG sees Evans frequently
CWC/hyn - conflict
Budget
What can RNC do - old?,

A - Pol Org
Fund Raising
RNC Roll

he can consider
at time he
has

Who WH paying for RF trip to Cal
- check Heintzman
- Hendricks

- Re-program RF + Program Reins

↓
#000

started to approach
Mullaly
3/4 this in May
Biden
cup in
outside

Alex - \$ for fresh dinner + Present
\$ for Home Vesper Service
Swamy - \$ for Cts for activity
Huger + Delby.

G → Alex - covered in DC memo → H?

7/21

G → H re JSM → AG last
night that H to cover
w/ Dole that no chance

"I want it assured that
the con is to be in SD."

"I want H to make sure
Dole doesn't do anything
other than what AG instructed
to do (e.g. pick SD)."

Who H or AG to call Dole.

JSM, Udle + Flemming → Denver
Recep for RAC tonight.
Mtg w/ pol leaders.
memo re McWhorter

AG very comfortable w/ Rems

Rems - to be pol man.
L. to raise w/H series
AG has no probs w/ Rems
L to check 3 ad men w/
Daley, Scott,

Rems doing well on TF
RF not " " " "
CWC will not move or convene.
- G → Porter

ASI -
"still screwed up"
RF off hook

Put Hiernore - waffle
Wiley company proposal talk on 65
AG concerned
JSM → check but ? ← can't tell

Plan - Polling + Simul ← 1st | Flan

Harry Flemming ↔ to be replaced by Rems?
L + JSM scheme
"workman like job at 2nd level spot"
JSM concerned about Flan in Denver
similar to Sears + Ellsworth *
Senior pol to cut deals in the STs

All Decis paper - JSM directed to move
except in non recoverable area.

i Walker - 2 → JSM + floor?
Send memo to H Is Sue ~~over~~ translating?

JSM → Proc - strategy + implem,
no move -

JSM Bills - hard to justify → AG
Lashen + CWC - Tell it to Han
iG → Give it sign off as legit.
with function
Gchell / CWC or his own or
Lashen w/ H approval.

"Send to M" - AG decision
or WH(H) approval.

July 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Dole's Meeting with the
President - July 20, 1971

Magruder met with Senator Dole today to discuss the RNC Pre-Convention Committees. During the discussion Dole's interest in Chicago or Miami Beach as the convention site surfaced. Magruder is concerned that tomorrow the President may say "What city do you prefer?" Whereupon Dole will say Miami Beach and the carefully developed scenario to program San Diego as the RNC's choice will fall apart; and the President will be forced to push San Diego.

Concerning the Pre-Convention Committees, Dole, Magruder, Timmons and Odle reviewed the names. All names were cleared with Harry Dent, Lee Nunn, and Harry Flemming before being offered to Dole. The final set of recommendations is as follows:

Arrangements Committee

Chairman, Bob Dole, Kansas
Vice-Chairman, Dick Herman, Nebraska
Secretary, Mrs. Mildred K. Perkins, New Hampshire
Treasurer, Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, District of Columbia
General Counsel, Fred C. Scribner, Maine
Advisor to the Committee on Arrangements, Ray Bliss, Ohio

Two problems exist. First, Dole wants McDill Boyd as Vice-Chairman instead of Dick Herman. Dole may try to appeal the decision to the Attorney General tomorrow. The second problem concerns Fred Scribner as General Counsel. Your reservation about him was relayed to the Attorney General by Magruder. Timmons was also advised. However, Scribner is ex-officio general counsel of the Arrangements Committee by virtue of his role as general counsel of the RNC. The only way not to have him as counsel of the Arrangements Committee would be to remove him as counsel of the RNC, which no one appears ready to do at this

time. Other Committee offices are:

Subcommittee on Badges and Tickets: Harry Rosensweig, Arizona

Subcommittee on Housing: Bo Callaway, Georgia

Subcommittee on News Media Operations: McDill Boyd, Kansas

Subcommittee on Program Planning: Robert Flanigan, Colorado

Subcommittee on Transportation: L.E. Thomas, Florida

Ed Middleton of Kentucky is to be Chairman of the Contests Committee, and William Cramer of Florida is to be Chairman of the Rules Committee.

You will notice that Robert Stuart and Bud Wilkinson have been deleted from the list of assignments pursuant to your suggestion.

GS:dg

7/15

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PETER FLANIGAN
JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: SIMULATION IN THE 1972 CAMPAIGN

On Thursday, June 24, Mr. Gene Lindstrom discussed a proposal for the two-stage development of a simulation model for the 1972 Presidential campaign. The discussion was attended by Bob Finch, Peter Flanigan, Dave Derge, Jeb Magruder, Ed DeBolt (RNC), Gordon Strachan, Lance Tarrance (Census) and Bob Marik. The purpose of this memo is to summarize pertinent information relevant to simulation and to recommend a decision on Mr. Lindstrom's proposal.

Background - The Nature of Simulation

A simulation model is no more than a logical, detailed analysis of the electoral impact of voter opinions, as determined by survey polls. It links the attitudes of voter blocs to their size and geographical location and estimates what the outcome will be if the candidates are viewed in the light of certain major issues. When a campaign strategist evaluates the results of an issue poll, he is, in effect, performing a mental simulation. It is difficult, however, for the human mind to keep all of the pertinent data in the proper perspective.

For example, in a recent meeting of very knowledgeable, political people, about half felt that EMK would be the easiest Democrat to beat in 1972. The other half were more concerned about facing him than any other possible opponent. These people are all loyal to the President, see the same polls, the same news headlines, same (limited) grassroots feedback, but they came up with opposite results in a "mental election simulation". The computer simulation model would give an answer, one way or the other, that would be based on a logical step-by-step analysis of the data. One could take issue with the conclusions of the simulation model and be able to determine the exact point in the logical analysis where the difference

For example, in 1960, assuming that the religious issue was second to party affiliation in determining the vote, a Catholic Democrat had no trouble deciding which candidate to support. A Catholic Republican, on the other hand, felt some cross-pressures and would have been expected to break his traditional voting pattern in some proportion of cases. On the other hand, if a Protestant Democrat had run, instead of JFK, entirely different groups would have become the voters under cross-pressure.

It is possible, by the use of the high-speed capabilities of the computer, to estimate by calculation what the election outcome would be under a certain set of assumptions concerning the sensitive issues. The interesting capability of simulation, according to the 1960 experience, is that it can project reasonably well what the ambivalent voter will do, based on past patterns of attitude and behavior. Head-to-head polls early in the campaign merely measure this voter at various stages of indecision, and therefore only converge upon the eventual outcome as the election nears. They do not project, and do not claim to do so. Neither do they indicate the number of voters under cross-pressures.

In 1960, the simulation "synthesized" individual states by assigning appropriate proportions of various voter categories from regional samples. This was done because there were not enough individuals polled in any one state to yield a sample of adequate size for statistical reliability. Thus, it was assumed that an upper-income Jewish urban Democrat in Boston was statistically similar in attitude and voter behavior to his counterpart in New York City, Philadelphia, Buffalo, etc. That assumption was good enough to allow the simulation model to predict electoral vote outcome about as accurately as it predicted total national popular vote, which was close enough to be useful.

In 1960, the simulation model told Kennedy that the religious issue would not hurt him; that the pro-JFK effect in the close industrial states would more than offset the anti-JFK effect in the Bible Belt and Deep South, where the Democrats frequently had a large margin to begin with. That turned out to be the case. Post-election analysis suggests that the net effect of the religious issue was to give Nixon 1.5 million added votes, but to give Kennedy 10 additional electoral votes.

Another interesting application, done after the election, showed a very different result if the campaign had centered on foreign policy rather than religion. Polls showed that the voters had substantially higher confidence in Nixon than in Kennedy for the conduct of foreign affairs. If Nixon had advocated a tough line toward Moscow, and if Kennedy had advocated a more conciliatory, negotiation-oriented approach (which was essentially the case with Quemoy-Matsu), and if foreign policy had become the dominant issue, the simulation showed Nixon receiving 54% of the popular vote, and winning every state outside of the South.

In 1964, the Democrats did not use the simulation group, but the group ran an election prediction on their own. On the basis of three key issues: civil rights, nuclear responsibility and social welfare, they predicted the LBJ landslide quite well, both nationally and state-by-state.

Analysis of Costs

Any cost estimate for a major project such as campaign simulation must be considered as approximate, at best. There is often a tendency to find that more effort is required to reach the objective than originally planned. However, there are also some considerations which may reduce the cash outlay indicated in Tabs B and C. If computer time can be made available, it would save \$7,000 in Stage I and \$80,000 in Stage II. The RNC is developing an adequate data base for other campaign requirements and will be able to provide the same to the simulation model at a savings of \$50,000. If Stage II is developed by a small, reliable group working together, rather than as isolated segments for security reasons, then the consultant effort to coordinate the project can be reduced by \$30,000. The net effect of all the reductions in projected cash expenditures

above is:	Original Proposal	Adjusted Proposal as Described Above
Phase I	\$ 35,000	\$ 28,000
Phase II	<u>350,000</u>	<u>190,000</u>
Total	\$385,000	\$218,000

Qualifications of the Key Personnel

Gene Lindstrom was one of the pioneers in TV network vote projection analysis. His work came to Kennedy's attention in 1960, and the Pool group asked him to join them in their simulation effort at that time, but he declined. He seems to be politically reliable and has kept abreast of developments in voter behavior analysis through the years. He has known Dave Derge since they were in graduate school together. A resume of Mr. Lindstrom's background is given in Tab D.

Dave Derge, who has recommended consideration of simulation for some time, might be required as the polling consultant to assure that survey designs are compatible with the model, as well as serving the major campaign strategy requirements.

Very little, if any, increase in polling costs would be expected, but proper design would be required by someone who understood the simulation model.

Important Considerations

There are two conditions which must be met before even the best simulation model would be of any use in the campaign. (1) The top decision makers must be disposed to use its analysis as one input in their formulation of strategy. Simulation cannot be justified at any other level. (2) The cost, which might run between \$250,000 and \$400,000, must be acceptable to achieve the capabilities described in this memo.

Recommendation

It is recommended that Stage I be funded at a cost of \$28,000 to \$35,000 to provide a model to illustrate the capabilities of simulation. This is recommended only on the condition that it would provide you with useful new information to further clarify the ultimate decision on developing the full scale three-person model for the campaign. If it is almost certain that a simulation model would not be used by the top campaign strategists no matter how well demonstrated, then Stage I should not be funded.

Fund Stage I for \$28,000 to \$35,000.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comments _____

Summary of the
Simulation Model Used by Kennedy in 1960

The following is a brief description of the concepts applied in the simulation model developed by Poll and associates for Kennedy in 1960.¹

At the outset, the voters are categorized into a matrix, or groupings, according to demographics and past voting behavior. For example,




Figure 1

The matrix in Figure 1 establishes 135 categories: 3 ethnic/religious categories x 3 political affiliations x 3 demographic patterns x 5 geographic regions.

For each voter category, attitudes on a wide range of issues are determined from past public opinion polls. For example, in the limited matrix of Figure 1, Northeastern urban Catholic Republicans may favor a hard line toward Moscow by 55% to 30%, with 15% undecided. That may have been determined from the results of fifteen different but related questions on several different polls carried out over the past few years. Basic attitudes do not seem to change drastically over time unless some polarizing event has occurred which puts the issue into new perspective.

The behavior of the voting population for a given campaign is determined by an analysis of cross-pressures on voters. That is, the ambivalent voter is defined as the one whose normal voting loyalties are in conflict with the perceived issues or candidate images of the particular campaign. It is the behavior of this voter who decides the outcome.

¹Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson and Samuel Popkin, Candidates, Issues and Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Elections, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1965)

Budget

Stage One

Model design and questionnaire development	15,000.00
Programming	10,000.00
Computer time	7,000.00 *
Travel	<u>3,000.00</u>
Total	\$ 35,000.00

Stage One

Model design and questionnaire development \$15,000.00

This includes generation of the logic, functional relationship of the components, and programming specifications of the test vehicle proposed for Stage One. The questions and questionnaire to be used in this test case will also be selected and framed. A minimum effort to accomplish this is twenty man weeks of professional effort.

Programming \$10,000.00

Flow charting, coding, debugging and documentation of the Stage One model will produce a running test vehicle of approximately 2000 computer instructions. Normal industry output suggests that this is estimated to be a 200 man day effort.

Computer Time \$ 7,000.00 *

Large scale computer time costs about \$600.00 per hour, and the Stage One model will require not more than 10 hours of computer time to produce results. An additional expense of approximately \$1000.00 for line charges, terminal costs, and other supplies is estimated.

Travel \$ 3,000.00

All technical work for Stage One will be executed in California, but six trips to the East have been budgeted at \$500.00 per trip. This includes the demonstration at the conclusion of Stage One.

*May not require cash outlay (See text memorandum).

Stage Two

Pre-campaign costs

Generalization of model	50,000.00
Data base design and construction	50,000.00*
Programming	75,000.00
Machine time and supplies	50,000.00*
Consultants	15,000.00*
Travel	20,000.00

Campaign costs

Consulting advice on use of the model	20,000.00
Machine time and supplies	30,000.00*
Travel	25,000.00
Consultants	15,000.00*

Total \$ 350,000.00

Stage Two

Pre-campaign costs

Generalization of Model \$50,000.00

The generalization of Stage One will require the testing of alternative solutions and the subsequent rejection of many hypotheses. This will include the redrafting of the questionnaire and periodic updating of the input system. Minimum professional effort spread over the time period between the end of Stage One and the beginning of the campaign will be sixty six man weeks.

Data base design and construction \$50,000.00

Data base design and construction is divided into two parts. The first, covering file organization and data structure within the data base will demand the greater part of the effort (and more than two-thirds of the cost). Once set, this skeleton will accept the accumulation of intelligence and information.

*May not require cash outlay (See text of memorandum).

necessary for reconstruction of the data base. Forty five man weeks of professional talent will be expended in this task spread between Stage One and the beginning of the campaign.

The second part, data base construction, will be performed by clerical and sub-professional people. This can be contained to less than three man years of work and will include library searching, census abstracting, encoding of information, and other clerical tasks associated with data collection.

Programming \$75,000.00

The final collection of programs and sub-programs combined together in the Stage Two simulation system will contain approximately 15,000 computer instructions. Based upon normal industry output for applications of this type, an estimate of 1500 man days of programming will be required for Stage Two.

Machine time and supplies \$50,000.00*

Seventy five hours of computer time at \$600.00 per hour and \$5,000.00 of other costs such as terminal charges, line costs and other charges and supplies associated with machine usage will be required to support Stage Two development.

Consultants \$15,000.00*

The use of consultants during the pre-campaign period will permit security surrounding the use and development of the model to be maintained within a small number of implementers and users. By segmenting the logic into functional blocks, experts with unique talents may complete specific tasks without exposure to the intent and form of the simulator. Seventy five professional days have been budgeted for this purpose.

Travel \$20,000.00

One major transcontinental trip per week between the end of Stage One and the start of the campaign has been budgeted. These trips include extensive travel to the field, meetings in Washington, training and demonstration sessions for the user, and other travel associated with the integration of the data base and model.

Campaign Costs

Consulting advice on use of the model \$20,000.00

From the convention through the election complete professional direction of the simulator and its use will be maintained. This

will include necessary modifications and updating the data base. Twenty five man weeks is budgeted for this purpose.

Machine time and supplies \$30,000.00*

Fifty hours of computer time is estimated for this period.

Travel \$25,000.00

Immediate liaison will be provided during the campaign by travel where necessary and upon demand. It is presumed that frequent field trips will be useful in maintaining the efficacy of the data base.

Consultants \$15,000.00*

Depending upon the changes to the Stage Two simulation system during the campaign, it may be necessary for the consultants who contributed logical modules to be recalled for modification of their work. Seventy five man days have been budgeted for this purpose.

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

Gordon:

Attached is the resume of Gene Lindstrom, who proposed the simulation model. Subsequent investigation strongly suggests that his price is high. Alan Greenspan, for example, thinks that such a model should cost no more than \$50,000 - \$100,000.

Bob Marik

↑
advised of Merrill
1.2 - 2 mil +
does not think
simulation worth it

EUGENE EMIL LINDSTROM

BORN: October 18, 1926, Seattle, Washington

MARITAL STATUS: Married Joyce Card September 8, 1951. Two children - Meredith Anne born August 31, 1956 and Jon Eric born September 12, 1959.

SCHOOLS: Educated in Seattle Public Schools through high school.
Seattle Pacific College 1947-1950, B.A.
University of Washington 1950-1952, M.A.
Stanford University 1952-1955, Ph.D.

MILITARY SERVICE: U.S. Army 1945-1947. Honorable discharge.

PROFESSIONAL CAREER: Joined IBM in July 1955 and am presently employed with this company. During 1955 I received training as a programmer.

- In 1956 was responsible for the prediction of the Presidential and other national elections on television. Developed the statistical model for prediction and directed six other programmers in the systems design and execution of the model on election night.

- Between 1957 and 1959 employed as a programmer for IBM in San Francisco. There I developed a computing program for locating ships at sea for the search and rescue mission of the Western Sea Frontier (U.S. Navy). During this period I also consulted on several statistical problems involving the use of large scale digital computers.

- In 1960 returned to New York to direct the Election Coverage program for IBM. In addition to the normal vote count and prediction, I helped to develop the use of a computer for the simulation of an electoral campaign. This work was judged sufficiently interesting to result in my being invited to Menton, France to participate in a UNESCO conference on the contributions of Mathematics to the Social Sciences. I also introduced the use of special precincts for early trend analysis during that election night coverage - called Voter Precinct Analysis (VPA) in the 1964 election coverage.

- In 1961 I returned to the General Products Division Laboratory in San Jose, California to form the Scientific Computing Department. For the next three

years as manager of that group, we worked on problems of laboratory interest. By the time I accepted my next assignment the group had grown to about 100 people.

- In 1964 I became the manager of the Programming Center in the Systems Development Division at San Jose. That work totally involved systems rather than applications programming. During the height of the effort I directed more than 200 people. We produced the basic software for the IBM 1130 and 1800 computers as well as all of the IBM 360 Assemblers and Report Generators. The Assembler mission was founded during this period.

- In 1968 I took a sabbatical to re-establish my technical abilities. During this year I did research on problems of storage hierarchy and systems performance, syntactic structures, and integrated data base systems. I was also the Technical Chairman for the Annual Programming Symposium for IBM. This meeting brings together the 500 most expert programmers in IBM for a conference on the computing sciences.

- Currently I am the manager of the Computer Science Department of the Advanced Systems Development Division of IBM in Los Gatos, California.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 7/2

TO: LR

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

~~acc should
be sent to
Mel Stephens +
this returned to me.
I think he is
in Colson's office
SENT~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: _____

TO: LR

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Make a copy
of this so that
I can forward
it to Stephens +
send original
to Bruce DONE
cc to Stephens?
who?

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1971

July 2

JS

*Let Stephen
have a copy of
this -*

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN
FROM: BART PORTER
SUBJECT: Action Items and Follow-up

Mad Stephen

Add

On June 25, 1971, a meeting was held in Counsellor Finch's office to discuss the 18-21 Year Old Vote. The following persons were present: Robert Finch, Bart Porter (Citizens Committee), Ken Rietz (Citizens Committee), Gordon Strachan (White House), Mort Allin (White House), Jon Rose (White House), Fred Slight (Republican National Committee), Michael Dively (Michigan Legislator), Bonnie Bradbeer (White House), T. Harding Jones (White House), David Keene (Vice President's Office).

Listed below are the items discussed together with the person responsible for follow-up and due dates:

- 1) Fred Slight agreed to find out how many states provide bounty payments for voter registration.
Due date: July 2
- 2) Harding Jones or Bonnie Bradbeer should investigate the possibility of having appropriate spokesmen meet with various youth groups coming through the White House with the hope of identifying those young persons who would be willing to work for the President in 1972.
Due date for implementation plan: July 6
- 3) ~~Harding Jones~~ agreed to check on the status of the number of states ratifying the 18 Year Old Vote Amendment.
Due date: ~~Immediately~~
- 4) Counsellor Finch requested that a survey be made to determine which states have legalized the 18 Year Old Vote and, of those, which have included the "Age of Majority" as a part of their program. Responsibility: Finch Staff
Due date: July 6

*PR from
Should be
on this to
write*

Handwritten mark

*Copies of
all these
for H*

5) Counsellor Finch recommended a think session on the Presidential role in youth vote effort and recommendations on "Age of Majority" issue.
Responsibility for developing session: Finch Staff
Due date for Plan: July 2

6) Counsellor Finch directed his staff to have weekly sessions, of no more than twelve at a time, to bring in both RNC and White House Interns for review. Ken Rietz and Fred Slight would participate and attempt to draw out and identify those interns who would be willing to work for the President in 1972.
Responsibility: Finch Staff
Due date for Plan: July 6

7) A general discussion was held regarding the Summer Interns in Washington and the best method of identifying potential workers for the campaign. Fred Slight agreed to identify in writing the seventeen Interns at the RNC and the Republican Summer Interns on Capitol Hill.

Harding Jones agreed to identify in writing the sixteen White House Interns and the 350 Summer Interns in the various departments and agencies.

Bonnie Bradbeer agreed to identify in writing the five staff holdovers from the White House Council on Youth.

Due date for all names to be submitted to Mr. Finch's office: July 9

8) Counsellor Finch directed that all Interns be identified and the above identification process be done but said to hold up on the Capitol Hill group for the present time. Fred Slight agreed to begin planning for a late summer reception by the RNC where all Interns would be invited and then given an opportunity to sign up for the 1972 campaign.
Due date for Plan: July 9

9) Ken Rietz delivered a memo on Mock Elections.

10) Ken Rietz delivered a memo on Voter Registration.

11) Ken Rietz delivered a memo on organization of Young Voters for Nixon.

12) Bonnie Bradbeer agreed to begin identifying groups such as the YMCA Youth Conference of Governors, Boys and Girls Nations, etc., to find out when these Youth groups were meeting, insuring that Administration speakers were in attendance, and obtaining names of the groups' officers and leaders for us to contact. This, according to Mort Allin, was a successful part of the 1968 election campaign.
Due date: July 9

13) Counsellor Finch discussed the possible use of the President on radio discussions during the summer. Mr. Finch expressed a desire to get together with several young Republican office holders, and Michael Dively said that he would send Mr. Finch a list of twelve legislators under twenty-five. Mr. Finch stated he was going to write a memo to the President suggesting his possible participation in these radio discussions.

All reports, plans, and lists are to be sent directly to Robert H. Finch, Counsellor to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: _____

TO: LR

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

I sent a memo
to Odle on
Schlander
give it to me
with this
attached

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 30, 1971

3:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROB ODLE
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT: Don Schollander

Obviously I was pleased to be able to spend a few minutes with Don Schollander the other day. I came away with the feeling that he would not be the right person to head any of our youth efforts. I do think he would be good in the young marrieds area and should be tied into some program at some point.

He is interested in his association with a new company and the prospects that that holds for him.

Don is not politically oriented. However, he is interested and undoubtedly over the next several months, his interest will grow.

I do not question in any way his loyalty to the President. However, I am concerned over his inability to articulate precisely why he is for President Nixon. Further, I was a little distressed when he said something to the effect that if he weren't for President Nixon he would probably be a McCloskey supporter.

The whole problem with Schollander is that we picked up on him through Jon Rose, he was a hot name because we know that he's a former youth celebrity and, therefore, we immediately rushed to the conclusion that we had a great front man for the youth field. I think that notion should be dispelled.

cc: Gordon Strachan

June 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ROBERT C. ODIA, JR.

SUBJECT:

GORDON STRACHAN

Re: memo for my suggestion of Mr. Schollander as a possible
choice for Nixon's Secretary.

I talked with Schollander for only half an hour yesterday,
but I was quite impressed. He is personable, articulate,
and respected by the number of young White House Staff members.

I have no doubts as to his organizational ability, but since
I am not looking at him as the first man and only man,
it should be too much of a problem.

My only concern is his loyalty to the President. On that, I
would like to confer to find out how he has known him for many
years.

GS:lm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JEB MAGRUDER

FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

When we met in the Roosevelt Room a couple of months ago, the subject of a master political calendar was discussed. It would be most helpful if I could get from you a copy of the master calendar which you have prepared. Obviously, in terms of coordination and general planning the calendar would be extremely helpful in terms of coordinating the President's calendar.

cc: Mr. Strachan

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

TO:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Lee Nunn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon

Colson asked Dent to consider developing a list of ex-Senators and ex-Governors who support the President.

Dent asked Lee Nunn to take over the project and sent a report to Colson, attached at Tab A.

Lee Nunn welcomed the task and is advising the Attorney General by the memorandum attached at Tab B. Nunn suggests that Bourke Michenlooper and Fred Rhodes (number two man at the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators group.

Lee Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing and organization.

GS:lm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHUCK COLSON

FROM: HARRY DENT 

Lee Nunn is taking over the project of organizing a committee of ex-senators for the President. He would like to make former Senator Bourke Hickenlooper the chairman. He says he has plenty of time on his hands and is in the Washington area all the time.

He also suggests we get together a committee of former governors..

Also, he is going to increase the list of former senators to include a number of others not mentioned in the memo.

If we want the ex-governors committee formed, we need to let him know that also.

✓cc: Bob Haldeman

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 11652, Section 6-102
By ep, date 3-23-72

Personal & Confidential

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM

FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN MITCHELL
FROM: LEE NUNN
SUBJECT: FORMER SENATORS, FORMER GOVERNORS FOR THE PRESIDENT

It has been suggested by the White House that the political apparatus should be visiting with former senators who could perhaps form a Senators for Nixon Re-election Committee. This could be done if you feel it advisable. It should be possible to form a similar committee of ex-governors.

Senator Hickenlooper would be a prospective organizer of the senators. Then, too, his former Director of the Republican Policy Committee, Fred Rhodes, No. 2 man at the Veterans Administration, might be helpful to such a project.

If you approve, what would be your thoughts on timing and organization?

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. WELLS

TO:

COLSON

SUBJECT:

Lee Hahn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon

Colson asked me to consider developing a list of ex-Senators and ex-Governors who support the President.

I asked Lee Hahn to take over the project and sent a report to Colson, attached at Tab A.

Lee Hahn released the task and is advising the Attorney General by the memoranda attached at Tab B. Hahn suggests that George Will (former) and Fred Rhodes (number two man at the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators group.

Lee Hahn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing and organization.

CS:ln

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

CORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Lee Nunn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon

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GS:lm

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Lee Nunn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon

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Lee Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing and organization.

GS:lm

June 23, 1971

✓ To AS
FYI
L.

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN N. MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: JEB MAGRUDER
L. HIGBY

SUBJECT: Polling -- '72 Campaign

While activities are taking place on several fronts with regard to polling in the '72 Campaign, it is clear to us that no complete and comprehensive program is yet underway. Basically today, four separate or somewhat detached polling operations are in existence:

1. The White House -- The White House has been conducting polling for the last two years for the President and has stockpiled a significant amount of information primarily from telephone polls but also from some field polls. In addition, it has been talking to Dave Derge and Opinion Research Corporation about possible polling plans for 1972 -- both plans have now been submitted. While they update slightly the '68 plan, they basically recommended the activities we had during that time.
2. Domestic Council -- The Domestic Council is now starting to do polling on its own on Domestic Issues. It did a Domestic Issues poll two months ago and is nearing completion of a final draft for a second poll on Family problems.
3. The Republican National Committee -- The National Committee has been exploring several polling alternatives and research proposals.

Somewhat in conjunction with the Citizen's Committee it is currently conducting a forty thousand dollar study in Delaware. In addition, at the request of the White House it worked with Dave Derge on a vendor's survey that determined the five most suitable pollsters for the '72 Campaign.

4. Citizen's Committee -- While it has directly sponsored no polls, it has joined with the RNC at looking at the potential results of the Delaware Study as a basis for proposing some new polling techniques for '72.

It is clear to us the first priority or need with regard to setting up our '72 polling operation is to establish some mechanism that can function as a focal point and clearing house for all polling operations now going on and as a repository for additional information that will be coming in probably independently from key states, etc., as we approach the Campaign.

It is our understanding that in discussions between Mr. Haldeman and the Attorney General -- general agreement has been reached that a three-man polling strategy board should be set up consisting of Haldeman, Mitchell and Flanigan. We recommend that this group be instituted immediately and that under it be established a working group (a modified version of the task force) to undertake the necessary tasks of control and coordination of all the various things that are being done and to produce an agreed upon plan for '72.

The working group would be Chaired by Peter Flanigan and have as its members Bob Marik and Jeb Magruder of the Citizen's Committee, Ed Harper, Ken Cole of the Domestic Council, Gordon Strachan and Larry Higby of the White House, and Ed Debolt of the RNC. This group would be charged with doing the following things in the order listed below:

- a. Coordinate all polling activities now and in the future.
- b. Develop a preliminary polling plan for 1972.
- c. Select a pollster.
- d. Devise an overall polling plan based on the selection of a final pollster, that includes coordinating the various elements of polling available.
- e. Select a consultant.
- f. Decide whether or not a simulation project is worth pursuing for 1972.

This group would work at coordinating all polling activities currently underway and contribute where feasible to the formulation of any future polls. It would be clearly understood, however, that distribution of any results, including distribution to the group, would be determined by the President or the Strategy Committee.

DISCUSSION:

As mentioned, a basic polling plan has already been devised through consultation with Dave Derge and Tom Benham of ORC, but there are several approaches and pollsters that still should be explored before any final decisions are reached.

In addition, the Citizen's Committee is in the process of developing a concept of key state polling with the idea of reaching on an individual basis, exclusively the "ambivalent" voter and the Republican voter determining his preference and reaching him through direct mail, precinct work, etc. Each of the major firms that would be asked to participate in bidding for our polling contract would be asked to explore the basic plans presented and determine whether or not it is cost-effective to pursue this concept.

As a by product of discussions with individual pollsters and the eventual final selection of a pollster, we will have talked to a number of independent operators as well as polling firms. This should give us a fair sampling of the field and enable us to select a consultant or polling staff man for 1972.

SIMULATION:

While very much in everybody's mind is still a questionable practice according to explanations we have received so far; therefore, high on the list of priorities of the working group would be to determine through consultation with various experts and professionals whether or not simulation can be a profitable undertaking for the '72 Campaign.

ACTION STEPS:

In order for this activity to get underway immediately, the working group should be convened this week with Peter Flanigan as Chairman. Agreement will need to be obtained for this from the Attorney General, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and Tom Evans or Bob Dole at the RNC. As soon as the group is set up it should undertake the following tasks:

1. Determine a basic polling plan.
2. Interview top five vendors as determined by recent RNC/Derge Vendor survey of all large firms in the country.
3. During the process of interviewing pollsters and reviewing proposals, try to
 - a. Select a consultant
 - b. Explore thoroughly and prepare a recommendation simulation.

4. Draw up a final polling plan recommendation using all coordinated resources available from the White House, Domestic Council, RNC and Citizen's Committee and costs to meet this plan.

5. Continue to review all polls before they are done to make sure that they meet if possible, parts of the plan as outlined.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the concept as outlined in this report and that we proceed immediately to initiate those action steps as outlined.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 6/4

TO: Larry Highby

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

- Jell mentioned his interest in and plans for Schollander this morning.
- Attached are copies of his letter and memo to the A G on the subject

June 2, 1971

Dear Don:

We were sorry you were unable to attend last week's meeting of our Citizens Committee, and I hope we will have another chance soon to get the Committee members together so that all of you will have an opportunity to get to know each other.

We would very much like you to come back here and visit with us at your convenience. I could fill you in on the Committee's activities, and there are a number of people here I would like you to meet and talk with. If it would facilitate arrangements, you could bring your wife along with you and maybe you will both get an opportunity to do some sightseeing.

Please give me a call at your earliest convenience so that we can make the necessary arrangements.

Sincerely,

JEB S. MAGRUDER

Mr. Donald A. Schollander
Director of Student Employment
Lewis & Clark College
Portland, Oregon 97219

bcc: Mr. Grodon Strachan

June 2, 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102
By EP Name, Date 6-23-71

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

As you know, Don Schollander is spoken of very highly as an articulate young man. He was unable to attend our first Citizens Committee meeting and, consequently, I have asked him to come to Washington so that we can visit with him and get to know him.

Because of his youth and athletic background, he would be a tremendous asset to the campaign. Therefore, while he is here, I would hope that you would be able to see him.

Set up an appointment when he is in town.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

JEB S. MAGRUDER

bcc: Mr. Gordon Strachan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Magruder's Projects

The Attorney General has been pressing Magruder for action by the task forces. The result is a series of memoranda for the Attorney General which are attached as tabs and summarized:

1. The Place of Women in the 1972 Campaign

Rita Hauser argues that there is a new social and political awareness among women that will have to be tapped carefully to assure their support for the President. The recommendation, which the Attorney General has not acted upon, is that a separate women's organization within the campaign should not be created, but rather that a woman be appointed at the Deputy Campaign Manager level to carry the responsibilities justified by experience and ability regardless of gender (memorandum attached at Tab A).

Tom Benham of ORC reviewed the polling material available on "Women's Lib" and concluded that there is no political significance to the movement per se. He suggests directing the appeal to equal job opportunities rather than to the movement itself (memorandum attached at Tab B).

2. Voter Registration

You asked Magruder to reconsider the decision about non-involvement with registration drives. (Memorandum attached at Tab C.) Magruder's response is the plan developed by Senator Brock and Ken Riets. The plan, which the Attorney General approved Friday, suggests that the current Republican voter drives are of little value; that the Youth for Nixon Organization (Ken Riets) will have to control our registration drive; and that after thorough planning the registration drive (First Voters for Nixon) will concentrate on target individuals in key states. The First Voters for Nixon would seek some publicity during the next four months while the organization work is being done. Brock and Riets believe that any mass registration drive would work to the President's disadvantage.

On a closely related subject, it is Counsellor Finch's view

that the President should take a highly publicized stand on the Vote-at-18 Amendment, which is expected to be ratified in the next two weeks.

3. Target Voter Strategy

The Delaware test of the target voter strategy is part of a Magruder memorandum on Research (Tab D) which has been submitted to the Attorney General. No decision by the Attorney General has been relayed to Magruder. The Research memorandum draws heavily on the RNC priority states list, which you reviewed in the key states memorandum of June 23rd. Additional points made include descriptions of successful examples of "rifle-shot communication with target voters . . . to augment the mass-media campaign". Magruder requests authority from the Attorney General to "(p)roceed with detailed development of the target voter strategy".

4. Brochure

Magruder directed the RNC to prepare a brochure which could be used to send to people who write to the White House, the Citizens, or the RNC asking what they can do to help re-elect the President. All who write in receive acknowledgements and are catalogued by Anne Higgins, Rob Odle, and Ed DeBolt, respectively. (See attachments at Tab E.)

The Attorney General quickly reviewed the brochure but deferred to you for any comments. The brochure has not been "staffed" to Safire, Moore, etc., because of reluctance to put White House Staff in the position of second-guessing the Attorney General's campaign operation. If you feel this would not be a problem, the brochure will be staffed this week.

Recommendation:

That the brochure be staffed to Chapin, Safire, Moore, and Klein after you have advised the Attorney General of the plan to have a White House Staff review of the brochure.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comment _____

If you approve, a suggested talking paper is attached at Tab F.

As you may know, the Attorney General will be leaving July 7th for three weeks in Europe. Magruder plans to have all task force reports to you and the Attorney General before that date.

CONFIDENTIAL

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: RITA HAUSER
JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: THE PLACE OF WOMEN IN THE 1972 CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize recent changes in the attitudes of many women and to recommend an organizational structure for the 1972 campaign which will be responsive to current concerns about their status in society.

Prior Voting Patterns

Women made up about 53% of the voting age population in 1968, and nearly 52% of those who claimed they voted in that Presidential election.¹

They have supported Presidential candidates in the following manner in recent elections, according to Gallup:

	<u>Percent of the Women's Vote</u>		
	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>AIP</u>
1960	51	49	-
1964	38	62	-
1968	43	45	12

(In 1968, the men supported President Nixon by a percentage margin of 43 - 41 - 16)

Current Attitudes of Women

A new social and political awareness has been developing among women, particularly in the last two years. Dr. Jean Spencer, Assistant to the Vice President, has summarized it well:

¹U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 192, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November, 1968," U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1969.

If there is a single concept which can encompass and express the concern of women today it is freedom of choice. From this concept the other specific issues derive: a rebellion against the assumption that the "woman's role" is only that of wife, mother and housewife; efforts to open doors now closed to women who want to or must pursue other roles, either in addition to or instead of the traditional role of wife and mother; efforts to end discrimination in education, including college admissions, fellowships and scholarships, admission to graduate and professional schools; efforts to end discrimination in employment, advancement, equal pay, overtime, maternity leave, day care; and efforts to end discrimination in returning to college or to work after raising a family--the "reentry" problem for the middle aged woman is serious.

A recent Harris Poll (Tab A) shows that about half of the women in America favor efforts to change the status of women in society. Because this is a relatively new issue, it is likely that the trend of this support will increase as the concept becomes more widely publicized and efforts at implementation become more organized. The support and opposition does not necessarily follow established voting patterns. For example, Black women and women under thirty, who gave a plurality to Humphrey in 1968, support it, as do college-educated women, who supported Nixon in 1968. Similarly, normally Republican categories such as White women and those over fifty do not support it, nor do women with eighth grade or less education, who tend to vote Democratic.

Campaign Strategy

This concern for more equal status is something which has become important enough to influence the political loyalties of many women. We feel it would be a mistake if the 1972 campaign were conducted without an awareness of these new sensitivities.

It was the unanimous feeling of those present at the first planning meeting for the women's vote in 1972 that there should not be a separate women's division with a women's chairman as has been done in the past. Women strongly desire to share responsibility side by side with men, rather than as a part of a women's auxiliary organization. Therefore, it was recommended that a woman be appointed at the level of Deputy Campaign Manager and that other women be given responsibilities within the functional staffs of the campaign organization, based on their experience and ability. From these positions, they would be

able to effectively coordinate activities to gain the women's vote and to supervise the organization of women volunteers.

If you approve of this organizational plan, we are prepared to submit names of qualified women for your consideration.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comments _____

5/22/71 Women Divided In Harris Poll

By Louis Harris

Recent efforts to change and strengthen the status of American women, such as women's liberation movements, have deeply divided women themselves. While 42 per cent favor such moves to equalize women with men, 43 per cent stand opposed.

The goals and principles of the organizations seeking actively to redress the sex balance are much more popular, however, than the tactics of protest which have been employed. A substantial 53 per cent of all women feel that "women who picket and participate in protests are setting a bad example for children." Nonetheless, a counterbalancing 62 per cent also feel that "if women don't speak up for themselves and confront men on their real problems, nothing will be done about these problems."

A national cross section of 1,600 women were probed in depth about their attitudes toward women and their problems.

"All in all, do you favor or oppose most of the efforts to strengthen and change women's status in society?"

	Favor %	Opp. %	Not Sure %
Total Women	42	43	15
By Marital Status			
Single	55	34	11
Married	43	49	14
Divorced, separated	63	24	9
Widowed	33	42	23
By Age			
Under 30	43	42	12
30-49	41	47	14
50 and over	37	45	17
By Education			
8th grade or less	34	59	23
High School	43	39	14
College	53	23	9
By Race			
White	27	45	15
Black	62	23	13

Clearly, the overall close division among women as a whole masks a much deeper division among different segments of the female population. Most resistant to changing women's status are older women, those with less education, whites, and married women. By any measure, the most resistant are black women, the young, and the best educated.

This opposition of women into candidates for "change" and "no change"

parallels the division among the entire public on issues such as the war in Vietnam, non-conformity among the young, and racial progress for blacks. Now the issue of women's role in society has been added to the list.

In order to get at women's attitudes in depth on the thrust of women's liberation and similar efforts, a series of six projective questions were put to the cross sections:

"Here are some statements people have made about activist women's groups. For each, please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree."

	Dis- Agree %	Not Sure %	Agree %
Leaders of women's organizations are trying to turn women into men and that won't work.	62	27	11
"If women can't speak up for themselves and confront men on their real problems, nothing will be done about them."	62	29	9
"Women who picket and participate in protests are setting a bad example for children."	53	29	13
"Women are right to be unhappy with their role in American society, but wrong in the way they're protesting."	57	32	11
"It's women who have nothing better to do who are causing all the trouble."	47	43	13
"It's usual that women protest the real injustices they've faced for years."	47	43	13

The results show a consistently close division between basic support and opposition to the drive to change women's status. The opponents outnumber the supporters of women's lib, but not by a large nor decisive margin.

Taken as a whole, it would appear that the recent outpouring of demonstrations and protests have struck a chord of pent-up frustration among women about the way they have fared in American life. But sizable numbers of women who are in sympathy with the objectives of the protest find it "undecided and unwarranted" to take part in activist demonstrations. The trends for a substantial woman's movement are there, but at the moment the most effective policy has yet to be discovered.

Survey conducted by Harris Research, Inc., for the Women's Liberation Movement.

MEMORANDUM: "WOMEN'S LIB" AS A POTENTIAL POLITICAL ISSUE

Thomas W. Benham
OPINION RESEARCH CORPORATION

"Women's lib" is an excellent example of how a highly vocal minority -- through astute use of the mass media -- can create the impression that it has a broad following. All of the survey evidence (by Gallup) indicates to the contrary.

The following are the ratings of "women's lib" by a nationwide sampling of college students using the Stapel Scalometer (a ten point rating scale). The "highly favorable" and "highly unfavorable" votes shown are the two extreme rankings on the ends of the scale.

Notice that as many women have a negative view of "women's lib" as have a favorable view. Surprisingly, "women's lib" has more appeal to the students in the low income groups than it does for those from the higher income brackets.

COLLEGE STUDENT RATINGS OF "WOMEN'S LIB"

	<u>Highly Favorable</u>	<u>Highly Unfavorable</u>
National	15%	23%
Male	10%	23%
Female	22%	23%
18 years and under	15%	23%
19 years	14%	26%
20 years	18%	22%
21 - 23 years	14%	18%
24 years and older	20%	14%
East	17%	20%
Midwest	15%	23%
South	17%	24%
West	8%	25%
\$15,000 and over	15%	23%
\$10,000 - \$14,999	12%	14%
\$7,000 - \$9,999	8%	23%
Under \$7,000	24%	16%

Here's how "women's lib" compares with other institutions and organizations tested.

FEMALE COLLEGE STUDENTS

	<u>Highly Favorable</u>	<u>Highly Unfavorable</u>
FBI	32%	13%
Women's Lib	22%	23%
Democratic party	19%	7%
CIA	16%	19%
Republican party	13%	15%
SDS	6%	37%
KKK	2%	80%

Perhaps another surprising finding is that on questions on how women are treated in this country, male and female views are more alike than different. Following are views of the adult population 18 and over.

Who gets the best break?

"In your opinion, do women in the U.S. get as good a break as men?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	65%	72%
No	35	38

Who has the easier life?

"Which do you think has the easier life in the U.S. today -- men or women?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Women	46%	49%
Men	30	46
No opinion	24	5

Who has the happier life?

"In general, how happy would you say you are -- very happy, fairly happy, or not happy?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Very happy	44%	42%
Fairly happy	46	49
Not happy	7	6
Don't know	3	3

Women business managers?

"Do you think women would run most businesses as well as men, or not?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	55%	45%
No	40	49
No opinion	5	6

Women in the executive suite?

"If a woman has the same ability as a man, does she have as good a chance to become the executive of a company, or not?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	39%	39%
No	54	56
No opinion	7	5

Women in politics?

However, women are more prejudiced against their sex as presidential material than are men, but have the same opinion on less affairs.

"If your party nominated a woman for President, would you vote for her if she qualified for the job?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	49%	58%
No	44	35
No opinion	7	7

"If your party nominated a woman to run for Congress from your district, would you vote for her if she were qualified?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	84%	83%
No	13	13
No opinion	3	4

Among the public as a whole there has been little change in acceptance of a woman president over the years.

	<u>Would vote for a qualified woman for President</u>
1958	52%
1967	57%
1969	54%

It seems clear from this it would be a good policy to steer clear of "women's lib" as a broad political issue. There does not seem to be any way to win. While the majority oppose militancy in favor of "women's lib", coming out politically against would raise a howl from a very loud and raucous minority. On the other hand, there does not seem to be justification for taking any favorable stand other than that which is consistent with civil rights legislation dealing with equal employment, equal pay, etc. The best political posture on "women's lib" would seem to be strictly hands off.

June 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM

KEN RIETZ

SUBJECT

New Voters Registration

Lots of organizations are getting into the new voter registration field. These include COPE, Common Cause, Youth Citizenship Fund, etc. Most of the organizations are either controlled by Democrats or conduct drives on a mass basis which favors the Democrat Party. Initial indicators are that the Republican Party is being out registered among new voters by anywhere from 2-1 to 7-1.

Several Republican organizations are presently active in the new voter registration field. They are:

Young Republican National Federation

First voter program. A new voter committee as part of the local YR Club conducts a program of identifying and registering new voters who lean toward the Republican Party. New voters drives are conducted in apartment houses and other multi-dwelling buildings where young working people live. To go with this program several items are available:

- 1) Apartment organization guide
- 2) A pamphlet with localized registration information
- 3) YR reward program which involves rewarding workers for registering a certain number of new voters.

This program, termed "Your Responsibility" is targeted at eight states:

Pennsylvania
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois

Connecticut
Florida
Kentucky
North Carolina

June 23, 1971

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12068, Section 6-102
By J Date 3-23-82

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

As you have requested enclosed is a program on new voter registration which was developed by Senator Brock, Ken Rietz, Bart Porter, and Bob Finch's office.

If you approve of this approach we will begin implementing it.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

JEB S. MAGRUDER

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM:

H.R. HALDEMAN

It is my understanding that no effort is currently being conducted to register people in the 18 to 21 year old age bracket for the upcoming campaign.

- This is an error that I think should be corrected at once. We should be setting up and, indeed, launching our effort now to register all of our youths in the 18 to 21 year old age bracket - this means many people that are not on college campuses.

Please get this decision reversed and our activity moving forward now.

cc: The Attorney General

College Republican National Committee

Project Open Door. This program involves canvassing campus dormitories. New voters are asked to identify themselves by party and those stating an interest in the Republican Party are assisted in registering to vote.

Republican Congressional Committee

Young Voters for a Republican Congress Task Force. This program is only in the planning stages and it will be at least a month before the plan is complete. It will be directed at target Congressional districts.

Conclusion: The above Republican programs are a fragmented part of overall party programs, and, as such, suffer from a lack of emphasis and look good on paper but have little impact in the field. In addition, they concentrate on new voters identified with the Republican Party. This fails to take into account the thousands of new voters who will support the President and not the Republican Party. Registration of Republican voters is not our objective, re-election of the President is.

If a major effort is to be made to register new voters who will vote for the President in 1972, the Young Voters for Nixon Committee will have to undertake it. Following are the options:

Option 1

Allow the programs to continue independently. This will give all the organizations involved something to do but the impact on the President's re-election campaign will be minimal.

Option 2

Allow the programs to continue but increase their funding and give them added stature by including them in the over-all Citizens campaign. While this might increase the active interest and prestige of the program the impact would still be minimal due to the diffusion of effort, coordination, and control.

Option 3

Create an over-all program within the Youth for Nixon campaign that included these efforts, as proposed by Senator Brock and his Congressional team. This seems the most logical and the most workable.

It would combine three programs which really are aimed in three different areas under one umbrella and allow maximum targeting. And, targeting is the key.

There is too little known about the first voter to move rapidly. The one assumption we can make is that as the war winds down the preference for the President among young people will increase. His opponent in 1972, however, is a key factor that cannot be adequately analyzed at this stage. Without thorough planning and organization, however, too many registrants today may become opponents next year. One great advantage provided by a carefully planned registration drive, lies in its ability to use registration assistance as an identification and motivation tool in gaining Nixon support.

We propose in the initial stages to confine our activity to the following states: Indiana, Iowa, Virginia, Florida, Tennessee, California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Ohio.

Under the Young Voters for Nixon program we would create a "First Voters for Nixon" committee. While its main thrust would be in those states, we would not discourage the program in any other state, although it would be carefully controlled.

In its initial stage (next 4 months), First Voters for Nixon (FVN) would receive publicity while the staff put the program together. A national chairman could be announced and state chairmen in the target states would be selected. The thrust would be "here are young people that support the President, have never-voted for a President before, want to vote for President Nixon, and want to help others who feel like they do to get registered." The emphasis would not be on changing minds but on organizing those who already support the President.

While this is going on publicly a careful analysis will be conducted privately. This state by state analysis in the states mentioned will show us where the pockets of potential strength are. Through public opinion surveys we can find out what age groups, occupational groups, education levels, etc., are most likely to support the President in '72. A lot of careful planning is necessary and the registration drives would not begin until this winter.

Let me repeat, we believe a mass registration drive in any given area works to the President's disadvantage. For maximum impact, and favorable results, a new voter registration drive must be carefully planned and carefully targeted.

The First Voters program should be formed as part of Young Voters for Nixon campaign. As part of the working committee now it will utilize Senator Brock, his regional advisory committee, and the headquarters staff to register new voters in key states. The aim will

be to register voters inclined to vote for President Nixon in 1972.

Agree _____

Disagree _____

Comment _____

TAB D

CONFIDENTIAL

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: DELAWARE TEST

As a first step in evaluating the proposed target voter strategy described in an earlier memo, the RNC is preparing to launch an extensive field test in Delaware. This memo is to describe the nature and purpose of the test to you, in advance of its inception.

The Delaware test will demonstrate and test several target voter techniques under controlled conditions and with careful provisions for evaluation of effectiveness. The test will take place during the period June-September, 1971. The budgeted cost of approximately \$40,000 will be borne by the RNC, which will also be responsible for overall management of the project through the direction of Ed DeBolt. The Citizens Committee and Mr. Haldeman's staff will participate in the planning and maintain close liaison with the field work as it progresses. The planned activities are designed to include the widest possible scope of coordinated research and target voter techniques:

Past Voting Behavior. By the end of June, a statewide, precinct-by-precinct vote profile analysis will be completed, using election data over the past ten years. The geographic location of hard-core Republicans, Democrats, and swing voters will be determined and displayed on maps.

Socio-Economic Data. The Census Bureau will produce the 1970 Fourth Count (demographic) data for Delaware in June, well ahead of the scheduled publication date for the remaining states. The RNC will combine that data with the vote profile analysis to further describe the various voting groups.

Public Opinion Surveys. Market Opinion Research (MOR) has taken quarterly polls in Delaware for the past ten years. The most recent poll will be completed in a week or two. All of that opinion data will be made available to the RNC, to describe the attitudes of the various voting groups.

Selection of Test Precincts. On the basis of the foregoing data, selection will be made of five weathervane precincts (typical of the voting patterns of the entire state), thirty test precincts (embodying a variety of specific voter groups) and thirty control precincts (closely similar to each of the test precincts). An in-depth canvass will commence in all 65 precincts on July 8. Approximately one hundred interviews will be carried out in each one (25% of total voting population). This will be done to obtain specific, detailed data on opinions on issues and the image of the President and how

the voter can best be informed. College students will be hired to carry out the interviews, under the supervision and training of Bob Teeter of MOR.

Target Voter Communications. Beginning on July 20, various programs of direct voter communication will be initiated in each of the thirty test precincts. The earlier precinct canvass will offer some guidance as to which types of media might be most appropriate in given areas, and which issues should be emphasized. The techniques will include direct mail, telephone banks, door-to-door personal visits, printed flyers, etc. Wherever possible, we will allow competent vendors to operate in separate precincts to demonstrate their capabilities. The purpose of the communication will be to change voter attitudes toward Administration programs and accomplishments and to improve the support for the President.

Evaluation. In September, all precincts will be re-canvassed to assess the impact of the campaign tests. The control precincts will serve to offset attitude changes that occur independently of the test activity. The survey sample will once again be 100 persons in each precinct: 50 from the original sample, and 50 new ones.

The results and the final report on the test will be completed before final plans are submitted for the 1972 campaign at the end of October.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: RESEARCH

The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the general direction of our current thinking on strategy for the 1972 campaign, for your information and comment. We are at the point in our planning process where a broad strategy should be agreed upon so that the specific plans can be initiated.

Target States

The national campaign can effectively be considered as 50 state campaigns, since electoral votes are determined in that manner, and since the field organization can best be coordinated on a state-by-state basis. Obviously, there are certain states that we are unlikely to win, and the investment of substantial resources there would not be productive. On the other hand, there are several states which we virtually must win at all costs and where we must put up the stiffest possible contest. These are the target states. A listing of these states, based on latest considerations of electoral size and probability of winning is given in Tab A. The top nine target states comprise 173 of the 270 electoral votes required for election.

Most of the target states can swing either way in a Presidential contest. In a close election, every vote would be of paramount importance in each state.

Target Voters

The 1972 election will be different from 1968 in at least two respects. The President is running on his record, rather than proposed actions on issues, and his image is well-known to the voters through extensive media coverage during his first term. Therefore, a campaign appearance of the President on television would not be expected to have the same impact it did in 1968. The voters have probably already made up their minds on whether to support or oppose the image they receive from television.

In some recent state elections, there has been evidence that certain techniques of direct, targeted, "rifle-shot" communications to voters can substantially augment a candidate's mass media image. These techniques use past voting data, socio-economic data and public opinion surveys to locate and identify the target voters: those voters who might vote either way, but who could be convinced to vote for one candidate if approached specifically on a certain issue. Highly refined techniques of telephone canvassing and targeted direct mail have proven to be very effective in influencing these voters. The general public is not accustomed to being involved

in the campaign process. A telephone call to discuss a particular concern, or a personalized, computer-typed letter discussing the candidate's stand on an issue important to them, brings a very positive reaction when done well. The response also allows a systematic identification of friendly voters to be contacted on election day.

There are several recent success stories which speak well for these target voter techniques. In California in 1970, Reagan concentrated such a program on ethnic precincts of San Francisco County. His vote percentage increased in that very liberal area, whereas it decreased almost everywhere else in California as compared to 1966. (Tab B) In New York, Rockefeller used a highly effective telephone canvassing technique to win 21 out of 29 target assembly districts in New York City, which ranged from 2-1 to 5-1 Democratic registration and where he was trailing by a substantial margin several months prior to the election. Extensive use was made of polls which identified the target, or pivotal voters. (Tab C)

In Minnesota in 1970, Humphrey refined the process to a high degree. It was widely acknowledged that much of the success of DFL candidates that year was due to their focus on identifying and communicating with the target voter. (Tab D)

In New Mexico, Anderson Carter, a relatively unknown rancher and oilman, defeated the heavily-favored incumbent Governor David Cargo for the Republican Senatorial nomination. The substantial shift in voter preference during the primary campaign was largely attributed to Carter's emphasis on a professionally managed direct mail campaign. The letters were produced by computer, addressed to specific individuals, and contained a message on an issue which was known to be of interest to the recipient. Cargo's mail, on the other hand, was of a very general, mass distribution type.

Recommendation

We propose that the planning for 1972 should emphasize rifle-shot communication with target voters in target states to augment the mass-media campaign. This will involve substantial preparation in utilizing public opinion surveys, census data and past voting data to identify the target voters and key issues, and in applying advanced telephone canvassing techniques and promotional direct mail to influence and deliver votes. Much of the development will be done in cooperation with the Research Division of the RNC, which has been pursuing similar ideas over the past several months. During the planning stage, specific proposals would be made to demonstrate and test each concept well before final decisions had to be made for the campaign.

Proceed with detailed development of the target voter strategy to augment the mass media and field operations planning.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

June 17, 1971

The following target states are the result of analysis of current statistical, socio-economic and survey data. The electoral vote totals of each section are noted and followed by a brief description of the reasons for their selections.

MUST STATES - 173 electoral votes

The Must states are defined as areas that statistically and historically support Nixon/Republican nominees. It appears that without all these states in our column, Nixon has little or no chance of being re-elected. Ohio and California, for instance, have never failed to be in the winning column if a Republican was victorious. The reasoning behind the statement, "If Nixon doesn't carry all of the Must States, he won't be elected President," is that if one of these states is not carried, there is little chance of finding a second or third priority state which would make up this loss more easily. Iowa is included because it is a vital media center for all of the midwest farm belt.

SECOND PRIORITY MUST STATES - 158 electoral votes

The Second Priority Must states represent those states that statistically have less chance of moving over to Nixon, but, none the less, are within striking distance. These states represent the next best opportunities in the large electoral category. It is necessary that some of these be moved into the win column for Nixon. Connecticut is included because of recent favorable election trends and because of advantageous media overlap with the New York-New Jersey-Pennsylvania area.

THIRD PRIORITY MUST STATES - 64 electoral votes

Third Priority Must states represent those areas that statistically Nixon can win. These are areas with smaller electoral vote totals, but about the same odds, as the Second Priority Must states. Nixon must win some of these.

PLUS STATES - 44 electoral votes

The Plus states are defined as those areas that traditionally support the Republican Party and Nixon. In 1972, given a favorable national atmosphere towards the President, we should do well in these states. They are also states that tend to be more single issue oriented. For example, if farmers are feeling fairly comfortable about Nixon and the agriculture policy of the Administration, the chances are that these areas will be in our column. If, on the other hand, the attitude toward Nixon and the agriculture policy is negative, there is very little that could outweigh this attitude.

The method of arriving at these target states included a ten year analysis of Presidential elections, an analysis of 1966, 1968 and 1970 Congressional, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial races, an analysis of polling trends of various regions in the country and state polls where available, RNC state issue files of the past year to see if there have been any major trends or shifts

in public opinion that have been evidenced in newspapers or other publications, as well as the reports of the RNC field staff.

It should be reiterated that this is the status of state priority selection as of June 15. This is not meant to be definitive, but only a device to serve the needs of those who must make early resource allocations on behalf of the effort to re-elect the President.

MUST

13 Indiana
 8 Iowa
 12 Virginia
 17 Florida
 10 Tennessee
 45 California
 26 Illinois
 17 New Jersey
25 Ohio
 173

3rd PRIORITY MUST

8 South Carolina
 9 Washington
 4 New Mexico
 3 Vermont
 4 Montana
 3 Nevada
 7 Colorado
 4 New Hampshire
 6 Oregon
 9 Kentucky
 3 Delaware
4 Maine
 64

2nd PRIORITY MUST

26 Texas
 12 Missouri
 10 Maryland
 13 North Carolina
 27 Pennsylvania
 41 New York
 11 Wisconsin
 8 Connecticut
10 Minnesota
 158

PLUS

5 Nebraska
 4 Idaho
 6 Arizona
 3 Wyoming
 7 Kansas
 4 Utah
 3 North Dakota
 8 Oklahoma
4 South Dakota
 44

NOW TO AN INTERESTING QUESTION. DID THE GOVERNOR HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE TO MASS MEDIA? IN 1966 RONALD REAGAN DEFEATED GOVERNOR PAT BROWN 57.6% TO 42.3%. IN 1970 GOVERNOR REAGAN DEFEATED JESS UNRUH 52.8% TO 45.1%.

IN 1970 GOVERNOR REAGAN DROPPED FROM HIS 1966 VICTORY MARGIN IN ALMOST EVERY COUNTY. POST ELECTION STUDIES (AND MOST OF CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCED CAMPAIGN WATCHERS) ATTRIBUTE A GREAT PORTION OF THIS DROP IN SUPPORT TO THE SEVERE AERO-SPACE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY UNEMPLOYMENT THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA. HOWEVER, SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY STANDS OUT AS AN EXCEPTION.

IN 1970 GOVERNOR REAGAN ACTUALLY INCREASED HIS PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE FROM 41.1% TO 43.4%, WHILE THE AVERAGE REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE VOTE IN SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY WAS DROPPING FROM 32.4% IN 1966 TO 29.2% IN 1970. THE GOVERNOR'S INCREASE CAN BE

EXPLAINED PARTIALLY BY A SPECIAL PRECINCT INDEX PRIORITY PROJECT THAT WAS UNDERTAKEN BY THE LOCAL REAGAN FORCES IN THE AREA. THE GROUP IDENTIFIED THE IRISH, ITALIAN AND CHINESE PRECINCTS FIRST. THEN, THEY UTILIZED A SERIES OF VOTE STATISTICS FOR PREVIOUS ELECTIONS TO IDENTIFY THOSE ETHNIC PRECINCTS WHICH HAD, IN THE PAST, INDICATED A PROPENSITY TO EITHER: VOTE FOR SOMETHING THE GOVERNOR SUPPORTED; OR, VOTE AGAINST SOMETHING THE GOVERNOR OPPOSED.

THE REAGAN GROUP THEN CONCENTRATED THEIR MESSAGES ON ALL OF THE NON-REPUBLICANS IN THE SELECTED PRIORITY PRECINCTS. THEY SENT TWO SPECIAL MESSAGES. ONE WAS A TABLOID THAT HAD BEEN USED THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA. THE SECOND PIECE CONTAINED A LETTER SIGNED BY LOCAL DEMOCRATS SUPPORTING GOVERNOR REAGAN.

THE RESULTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES:

IN THE NON-PRIORITY PRECINCTS IN THE PRIORITY PRECINCTS

GOVERNOR REAGAN	35.3%	50.3%
AVERAGE REPUBLICAN VOTE	<u>25.4%</u>	<u>32.0%</u>
REAGAN OVER AVERAGE REPUBLICAN VOTE	9.9%	17.3%

THE TOTAL COST OF THE PROJECT (WHICH SENT OUT TWO BULK MAILINGS TO 85,000 DEMOCRAT. HOUSEHOLDS CONTAINING 100,000 DEMOCRAT VOTERS) WAS APPROXIMATELY \$12,000.00. THAT'S A COST OF ABOUT 12¢ FOR THE TWO MESSAGES TO EACH VOTER -- OR ABOUT 6¢ FOR EACH MESSAGE.

The Marketing of Nelson Rockefeller

By Fred Powledge

“There was his incredibly competent staff, all that money, and the willingness to engage in a little deception here and there.”

There are some who would have you believe that Nelson Rockefeller got himself re-elected to office because he swung to the right. It's a satisfying thought for both the paranoids on the left and the self-pitying folk on the right. For the lefties, it confirms their suspicions that Rocky was an opportunistic closet fascist all the time; the rightists may revel in the belief that they've finally accumulated enough megavotes to bring the governor—a Rockefeller, no less—crawling for support.

Unfortunately, like most things, it isn't all that simple. Nelson Rockefeller was returned to office with a 716,061 plurality not because he swung to the right, but because he clung to the center. (It is, perhaps, of passing historical interest that the “center” this year may very well have been the “right” of a few years ago.) More importantly, Rockefeller was re-elected because he had the sense to determine what the center was and then to aim his campaign toward it, utilizing the most advanced hard- and software available, and utilizing it on a scale unprecedented in a state campaign.

That determination of what the center was, which Rockefeller made last May when his first campaign poll came in, had a lot to do with his victory, but it would have been just another poll without a few factors: The abysmally poor quality, as a candidate, of his major opponent, Arthur Goldberg; the built-in advantage of simply being governor in the first place; a mechanical operation that must have been one of the smoothest in history; the incredible loyalty and competence of his staff; all that money, and a willingness to engage in a little deception here and there.

Curiously enough, Nelson Rockefeller revealed very little of himself in the campaign. It was almost all mechanical—and, said some of his critics, the mechanics sometimes bordered on subliminal advertising.

Basil Paterson, Goldberg's running



mate and quite likely the only truly interesting candidate in the whole campaign, commented on this shortly before election day. “We used to talk about the banana republics and how they held elections,” he said, “and we talked about economic reprisals and threats. What does Rockefeller have to do with this? I say the desired product is the thing we look at, and the purpose sought is to get a vote which is

not exercised on the basis of the volition of the voters—be it by economic threats, be it by the gun, or be it by psychological techniques used to deprive the voter of his free choice.

“I say it comes down to the same thing. And that it will very quickly undermine the free election system. Nelson Rockefeller is not a menace in and of himself, but his techniques are a grave threat.”

Polls, as everyone knows, are essential to a successful political campaign. You do not hear a great deal about Rockefeller's polls, just as you do not hear much about the internal workings of his political life, because almost everybody who works for him has been there a good long time, since he first became governor a dozen years ago, and they all know the job is to win elections, not talk about it. Lloyd Free, the governor's consultant on polls, has been a friend of Rockefeller's for 30 years. Political writers seem to equate a quiet polling operation, such as Rockefeller's, with an extremely smooth and excellent one, and in this case they were right.*

The Rockefeller people also knew how to not let the polls get the better of them. The candidate himself spoke, during the campaign, of his dependence, not on all the technological gimmicks of campaigning, but on his “intuitive creative thinking.” Polls are nice for finding out what worries people; they are “guides on the emphasis that is placed on the solution of problems.” Rockefeller said one afternoon on a

*Shortly after the voting machines closed on November 5, as the Rockefeller party was assembling at brother Laurance's for dinner, Free was asked what the outcome would be. Rockefeller would win 55 per cent of the votes, he said. Someone turned on the TV set; CBS at that moment projected a Rockefeller win with 55 per cent of the vote. The candidate actually came in with 52.4 per cent.

"One of the big fears was that supporters would not vote, confident that Rocky would win but eager to watch a rich man sweat."

flight back to the city after an upstate swing. His campaign director, R. Burdell Bixby, a lawyer on leave from his \$25,000-a-year patronage job as head of the New York State Thruway Authority, agreed. Even a governor who reads the newspapers and watches TV, Bixby said, cannot know what bothers the people the most: "The polls tell us better than our instincts what it is the people are concerned about," he said.

Neither Bixby nor the governor nor any other campaign officials who were questioned seemed to have given much thought to the notion that, theoretically at least, you shouldn't need polls to find out what people were thinking. The civics books say that's what legislatures are for. But polls were used, and used well, and used early and often, although newspaper assertions that they were "almost continuous" were exaggerated. Free completed his first major poll in early May. It measured the voters' attitudes on practically everything: what they said they were concerned about; their feelings on taxes, abortion reform, spending for education, health and welfare; President Nixon; no-fault automobile insurance.

Although the Democrats had not yet picked Arthur Goldberg as their candidate, the governor's people felt Goldberg was the likely opponent, so much of the May poll was devoted to comparisons of the two men. What did they think Goldberg's image was? Rockefeller's? How much trust and confidence did they have in the two men? Did they feel that Goldberg didn't know much about state government? That Rockefeller had been in too long and was tired? "The idea," said Free after the election, "was to get a basic pattern in terms of images, trust and confidence, strengths and weaknesses, of the two guys all the way through."

The sample responded: plenty were angry with Rockefeller simply because he had been in the job and hadn't done enough, but "they did give him credit for trying hard and for having his heart in it," recalled Free. They liked Goldberg, and thought he was competent, but in the final analysis a lot of them liked Rockefeller better. Asked what they thought were the governor's major accomplishments, they listed education, highways, roads and bridges, health care and facilities, and transportation, in that order. Asked about areas in which the governor had done too little, they named narcotics first, higher taxes, crime, then various other categories such as housing and transportation.

A picture was emerging that would be valuable to any candidate, especially one who was inescapably joined to the previous twelve years. The picture was sufficiently encouraging to justify a campaign slogan that did not try to repudiate the record: "Rockefeller. He's done a lot. He'll do more."

But the May poll showed something else that was extremely helpful in guiding the strategists to the right voters. It picked out those who, at that point, thought of themselves as supporters of Rockefeller, a group that made up only 34 per cent of the total, and it told the strategists something about them: 95 per cent of them were white; 26 per cent were 60 or over and only 15 per cent were in the 21-to-29 age group; 41 per cent were Protestants, 46 per cent were Catholic, and 8 per cent were Jewish; 25 per cent were Democrats, 59 per cent were Republicans, and 15 per cent were independents; only a third of them lived in New York City, while 25 per cent lived in the city's suburban counties and 44 per cent lived upstate.

Joseph H. Boyd Jr., whose title is special assistant to the governor, a 32-year-old man with wavy blond hair who looks like a well-educated tent preacher without the attendant vices, went on leave in June to direct the mechanics of the campaign outside New York City. One of his big jobs was to make sure that the 34 per cent remained supporters of the governor. Boyd's biggest fear, as the campaign progressed and as a Rockefeller victory seemed more and more likely, was that the supporters either would not vote, out of apathy and a conviction that Rockefeller was going to win anyway, or that they would vote for Conservative Paul Adams, confident that Rocky would win but eager to watch a rich man sweat.

The poll also picked out those who considered themselves opponents of Rockefeller—44 per cent of the sample electorate. Ninety per cent of them turned out to be white; only 19 per cent were 60 years of age or older; 25 per cent were Protestants, 49 per cent Catholics, and 17 per cent Jewish; 52 per cent were Democrats, 19 per cent Republicans, and 20 per cent independents. Not surprisingly, 45 per cent of the opponents lived in New York City, while 17 per cent lived in the suburbs, and 38 per cent in the rest of upstate.

Fioravante G. Perrotta, former New York City Finance Administrator and unsuccessful candidate for City Controller on the Lindsay ticket, was placed

in charge of the New York City operation. His task was not so much to make sure the Republicans got to the polls as it was to make converts out of Democrats and independents. Perrotta set about getting endorsements for Rockefeller from prominent Democrats. He picked 29 key city assembly districts where the registration was anywhere from 2-to-1 to 5-to-1 Democratic, and he unleashed a roomful of telephone callers on them.

The poll also identified those in the center—not just the usual "undecided," but the 22 per cent who were, in the eyes of the Rockefeller people, the "Pivotals." Free devised a ladder-like affair on which those polled rated the candidates. If a respondent placed Rockefeller at or near the top of the ladder, in Position 10, there was no problem. If he was on the bottom, at 1, the voter (and those like him, whom he supposedly represented in the scientific survey) was not worth pursuing. But if a respondent rated Rockefeller at 5 or higher, and elsewhere in the poll did not express himself as "for" Rockefeller, then he was considered a Pivotal. Fair game.

The capture of the Pivotals was essential if Rockefeller was to be re-elected, his strategists reasoned. Re-election, back then in May, was not at all a sure thing; in fact, a question on the poll revealed that the incumbent was 11 percentage points behind Goldberg.

A quarter of the Pivotals were 60 years old or older. About a third of them had college educations, and 43 per cent had finished high school. Their income levels spanned several categories, but the largest group was in the \$10,000-and-over class. Thirty-five per cent were professional or business people; 28 per cent were manual laborers. A third were Protestants, a third were Catholics, and 27 per cent were Jewish. Half of the Pivotals lived in New York City, and they had lower incomes and less education and were more likely to be manual laborers than were the Pivotals upstate. The differences between the city Pivotals and the country Pivotals, said an aide, was "a constant problem. A large majority of the governor's supporters were outside the city, and half of the Pivotals, on the other hand, were in the city. So there was a constant problem of how to handle it so he didn't alienate those outside the city in order to go after those who were inside."

Rockefeller did his best, though, and in the process he maintained his hold on the center. For example: One day in

DESCRIPTION OF

early October, the candidate spoke at a coffee-and-Danish reception at a country club in Syracuse: nicely-dressed ladies and gentlemen, almost all of them white, smiling at the candidate, the candidate not only smiling back but going through his entire, and somewhat spastic, bit—winking, raising that eyebrow halfway off his head, winking some more. The governor told all those nice white folks that what we really needed was some radicalism. Well, modified radicalism.

"The great challenge of the future," he said, was whether we are "willing to make the adjustments in our institutions, and radical adjustments, to meet the problems of the day—to make our society today, and its institutions, relevant to the needs of the people." And then: "Government has got to be able to adapt itself to new conditions if we want to deal with these problems effectively. And if we don't, then I don't think our system is going to survive." He sounded like those earnest young Students for a Democratic Society of about five years ago. But all he offered his audience by way of radical adjustments were the traditional solutions of the right (and maybe, now, of the center): More policemen, special courts to handle narcotics crimes, more judges, more prisons.

A Rockefeller aide, looking back on it all, said, "I think he pursued the centrist course. And it did the trick." Free conducted two other major polls—one in early August and one in mid-September—and three smaller, "trial heat" polls to indicate the candidate's standing against Goldberg. And throughout the summer, the basic patterns stayed pretty much the same. The Pivotal shifted more and more to Rockefeller, undoubtedly because Rockefeller was shifting more and more to the Pivotal. Perhaps the finest piece of shifting—and one on which the intriguing details are missing—consisted of Rockefeller's aligning himself with the Conservative Senatorial candidate, James Buckley, without actually disowning his own party's offering, Charles Goodell.

And finally, on election day, when all the shifting was over, the Pivotal and the ones who were for the governor anyway went to the polls and elected him.

"We had ours," said Alton Marshall, the head of the campaign's "substantive group" and not on leave from his \$40,075-a-year post as secretary to the governor, "and the other side had theirs, and in the middle was a big gold-field. We had to go out and mine it."

The mining was hard work, of course. The Rockefeller Team (as all these pros on or not on leave from their state jobs

"Committees carried the word to 31 different white ethnic groups that Rocky cared."

were known)* and the Friends of the Rockefeller Team (as the thousands of volunteers and semi-pros were called) and such groups as the Associates of the Rockefeller Team (who were, according to the governor's ethnic-group specialist, the "so-called Jewish operation") could not just sit and wait for the polls to come in. The record had to be defined and defended, and the campaign machinery had to be tuned up.

"The first phase of the campaign was to be governor," said Alton Marshall, by which he meant Rockefeller "was active in gubernatorial projects," by which he meant Rockefeller suddenly started letting contracts for bridges, highways, and other nice things. Rockefeller also presided at a number of environmental forums and antidrug forums, meetings throughout the state at which citizens, largely irate ones, could actually complain to the governor himself. The governor was "identifying with good things that were happening in state government," said Marshall. "During this period, in the spring, it was Governor, not Candidate, Rockefeller."

By late June, Candidate, not Governor, Rockefeller had spent more than half a million dollars, even though he had no primary challenge and even though his Democratic opponent was only then being selected. (Because of loopholes in the election law, it would never be known how much he really had spent by the end of the campaign. Rockefeller people were projecting something like \$6 or \$7 million; anti-Rockefeller people were saying \$20 mil-

"It was traditional, one was assured, that the governor's secretary, his press officer, and his counsel stay on the state payroll during a campaign for re-election. Many others among the 580 permanent campaign workers were normally on the state payroll but took leaves of absence to work on the campaign. This raises several intriguing questions: if those workers are as efficient and competent as they appear during a campaign (and after one, too: on November 4, they were writing thank-you notes), how come the state machinery is not efficient and competent three and one-half years out of every four? If they had been working for the state last summer, rather than the candidate, would a person applying for a driver's license in Brooklyn in June have gotten it sooner than September? Are the taxpayers being deprived of these workers' talents 10 per cent of the time? If so, is this deprivation more than made up for by the saving on the workers' salaries? Should the saving maybe be continued on a permanent basis?"

lion; the best bet seemed to be around \$12 or \$15 million.) The campaign headquarters, an entire floor and then some at 575 Madison Avenue, had been rented back in February. The floor had previously been inhabited by the Wells, Rich, Greene advertising agency, and it was fitting that campaign director Bixby, a rather dry and straight man who nevertheless speaks of the "wholesale" and "retail" aspects of running a candidate, was to be ensconced in the office that once had belonged to Mary Wells.

The printing presses were turning, and by the end of the campaign they would have poured out something like 30 million pieces of printed matter, almost all of it with the reminder that the candidate had done a lot but was nevertheless capable of doing more. There was a 42-page discussion of everything from education to agriculture; handsome little brochures on what the governor had done for the Lower Hudson Valley Area, the Niagara Frontier, the Capital District, and the Central New York-Mohawk Valley Area (but not the New York City Area).

Folders were printed detailing what Rockefeller had done for and about the aging, the arts, businessmen, education, environment, health, higher education, labor, the mentally ill and retarded, and recreation. Campaign workers in each of eleven regions obtained lists of families with special interests and delivered the literature to them. (For instance, a friendly Republican on a county mental health organization might get a list of its members; each would get copies of "Rockefeller: He's Done a Lot. He'll Do More for the MENTALLY ILL." Special mailings were sent to every group for which a list could be obtained or manufactured: there were Travel Agents for Rockefeller; Chiropractors for Rockefeller (who were reminded that the governor had signed a law recognizing the profession and enlarging "the right and opportunity of the people of this State to consult a licensed and appropriate health practitioner of their own choice"). There were Osteopathic Physicians for the Rockefeller-Wilson Team, Nurses for Rockefeller, and the Veterans Committee for the Rockefeller-Wilson Team.

There was, of course, labor for Rockefeller, or *l'affaire Kiamesha Lake* (see *New York*, October 12, 1970), during which Rockefeller received the endorsement of what some termed the majority of those present at the state AFL-CIO convention, and after which it was common for news stories to simply say that

... By September, the timetable had him down as an all candidate.
The TV commercials shifted to head-and-shoulders shots. . . ."

he had "the backing of organized labor in New York State." The governor had been courting the building trades for years, and he frequently and proudly reported, after the convention, that he had the endorsement of "85 unions with membership of over 1.3 million." How the governor arrived at that figure is not exactly clear.*

The ethnic campaign was begun. Thirty-one different white ethnic groups were identified and committees were formed to get the word to each of them that Governor Rockefeller cared. The pitch to the ethnics was straight down the center: Drug addiction, crime in the streets, and education, both public and private. Some additional efforts were aimed at ethnic groups which the campaign staff believed had "special interests." For the Germans, the press releases and advertisements emphasized, in addition to the crime-dope-schools issues, Rockefeller's interest in recreation and parks because, as a staffer put it, "the Germans are very athletic and enjoy the out-of-doors."

One group for which mailing lists were difficult to find—but which were essential, according to the profile of the Pivotal that had been developed in May—where the oldsters. "Senior Citizens was an unusual thing," said Arthur Massolo, on leave as the governor's assistant appointments officer to run the ethnic and special-group show, "but somebody had a list—I wouldn't want to embarrass the company—a list of

**Victor Gotbaum, executive director of District 37, State, County, and Municipal Employees, and a supporter of Goldberg, said there was considerable application of the Rockefeller New Math and a general counting of people twice. In one of Rockefeller's own press releases, the candidate expressed his pleasure at receiving the support of 50,000 members of the International Union of Dolls, Toys, Playthings, Novelties, and Allied Products (some of whose members lived in the rest of the U.S. and in Canada), and attached to the release was a statement from the union itself which placed the membership at 20,000. Gotbaum felt that Rockefeller executed a deliberate and cynical plan of catering to the needs and desires of the building trades in order to get his "labor support." The governor, he said, "is a man with no ideology. He's not a guy who's turned his back on principle; he's never had any. This is where I differ with a lot of people. They talk about going from left to right as though he was a liberal, left-wing Republican. This is pure, arrant nonsense. Rockefeller is a tabula rasa; he's a clean slate. You can put anything on his table and if the moods of the times call for it, he'll eat it and digest it."*

senior citizens who frequented a certain means of transportation."

Massolo grinned impishly. He didn't want to give away the secret. "They ride in a certain way," he said. "Let's say a bus company. And they get a special rate. And there was a list of people who do that. Well, that means that these are active senior citizens. They're still moving around; they can vote; they can get to the polls. So therefore you send them a message. We sent them one of the booklets about the aging."

One ethnic group that was not discussed very much was the black New Yorker. If you asked a Team member about this, the reply was usually some thing like "Oh, I think Jackie Robinson's taking care of that." Some privately acknowledged that there was little sense in going after blacks since Basil Paterson was on the opposite ticket.

There was, however, some support of a more subtle nature for Rockefeller from the black community. Arthur Logan, a surgeon well respected both uptown and downtown in New York City, became one of several prominent black Democrats to support the governor. Victor Gotbaum, the anti-Rockefeller labor leader, said if there was one thing that really got him visceral, it was the specter of people like Dr. Logan supporting the governor. "And I know why he's supporting him," Gotbaum said.

Why?

"He's getting the promise of a hospital," said Gotbaum. "He's been looking for a community hospital, and I'm sure he's gotten a promise." He thought a moment. "Well," he added, "I guess it's legitimate."

Dr. Logan, asked about his support, said he was for Rockefeller because he seemed like the better candidate. There was another reason, he added: "There are individual projects which I'm interested in," he said, "which the governor has given his support to. For instance, a major new health-care complex in the West Harlem-Manhattanville area to serve the residents there, who are now without adequate facilities. I think Rockefeller is about to announce some very significant financial support—as an individual," he said. "In fact, I understand it will be \$2 million from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund."

There was, said Dr. Logan, no swap, no deal. The hospital "is a factor in my decision to vote for him," he said. "And on Wednesday after he's re-elected I'm going to go see him and say, 'Okay, you

won; now we're going to make you do the things you ought to do. You're free of the political imperatives now.'"

In August, Rockefeller became what his aides called a "combination governor and candidate," and the combination meshed so well it was often difficult to determine which one he was. The television and radio campaign started—30 separate TV ads and 15 radio messages. Phase One was known to the staff as The Record, which was "designed to show what this man's record is, how he had been innovative; that he cared; that he was interested in the problems that the people were interested in," according to Marshall. Some of the ads were so innovative themselves that Goldberg called them "grossly misleading." Actually, they were probably no worse than the average TV commercial. They were, however, noticeably devoid of recognizably black actors, except for one in which a black nurse brought a soft, pinkish newborn baby to a soft, pinkish white lady.

By September, Rockefeller's timetable had him down as "all candidate." The TV commercials shifted from little scenes of people doing great things, courtesy Nelson Rockefeller, to straight-on, head-and-shoulders shots of the candidate, talking about what he had done. At about this time, Fioravante Perrotta was making telephone calls all over the key Democrat-held assembly districts in the city; it was said, by someone in the operation, that there were about six former workers, male and female, of the late Robert Kennedy in the telephone boiler-room at 575 Madison, but their identities were kept secret.

Joe Boyd was heavily into his upstate campaign work. Operatives in the field were using telephones to call registered voters and ask them how they planned to vote. Some of them refused to say. Boyd, asked how he followed up those voters, said: "We go back to them and say we're an independent polling organization."

Wasn't that a bit deceptive?

"Well," said Boyd, and then he thought a while. "I think it's fair. You give a name. You say 'This is Joseph Boyd Canvassing' or something."

In late September and early October, the television campaign shifted from The Record to Pledges, and the Pledges seemed to have a great deal to do with crime in the streets, narcotics and the like. At about this time, the press became genuinely interested in the campaign, and every trip the governor made was watched closely by reporters, who

On election night, next to grinning Mario, spoke of law and order, but not together."

omed orders from their assignment s to leave the Goldberg campaign follow Rockefeller for a few days, ly because the accommodations e better and their luggage was sel- lost. There is something essen- y satisfying about stepping off a ate airplane and being handed an ope which contains the key to hotel room, a mimeographed list ll your fellow reporters' room num- , the address of the press room and Hospitality Room, and essential rmation on such items as Western on, the location of Xerox machines, s for room service, and the closing at the hotel bar.

helped, too, that Rockefeller had own private air force—a helicopter, runman Gulfstream 2 jet, and a -engined Fairchild which held two en people and a bar, which someone the decency and wisdom to open recisely 12:01 p.m. when the press aboard.

a addition to all the money, the air- es, the generally friendly press, and perquisites of office, Rockefeller also aided incalculably by the fact that ogistical people—the advance men, press officers, the on-the-road ad- s, and the people back at 575 Mad- who manned the "anchor desk," ng and relaying messages to the lidate, no matter where he might -were probably the best anywhere.

ost of them had been with the gov- r for a long time—since the guber- rial campaign of 1958, in many s, then through the campaigns of and 1966, the Presidential attempt 1968, and the Latin American trip 1969. The workers, especially the ad- e men—the people who get the idate from one stop to another, know who should shake his hand e, and how to keep him from hav- his picture taken with a local gang- -were like feisty young captains ng hard and bucking for major. though they whispered surrepti- ly into small radios in the manner e Secret Service, there was amaz- little confusion, because they had ed together so long and they had and complete devotion to Rocke- . Hugh Morrow, the governor's tor of communications (\$38,578 a , who occupied an office at 575 son during the campaign, was l how he kept in touch with his w communicators over at 22 West Street, in the governor's official . "We communicate by Mandarin

signals," he said. "We've been together a long time."

Joe Canzeri, whose code name on the little radios was Little Caesar, was the dean of the advance men on Rocke- feller's trips out of the city. Canzeri, who is 40 years old and who manages the governor's estate in Pocantico Hills during non-campaign periods, was in the hotel management field before he joined the Team. Any hotel should be so lucky. He made sure everything hap- pened at the right time and happened well. When the governor went bowling in Buffalo one night, Canzeri made sure —had made sure, a week before—that the alley had a pair of bowling shoes that would fit a man whose foot is 12 inches long in shoes. (Actually, Rocke- feller could have brought his own shoes, since he has his own bowling alley at the estate.)

Canzeri was wont to liken the cam- paign to show business. The advance men create the atmosphere, he said, and Rockefeller runs the show. "It's a very creative thing, I think," he said. "You're creating an event. You're creating the activity. You're creating the color, the background." Canzeri's watch is set five minutes fast, like a good bar- room's.

Late in October, just a few days be- fore the election itself, the campaign moved into the Attack phase. In the TV commercials, the attacking was carried out by defecting Democrats, not by Rockefeller; the governor did his part in public speeches. "We had an opponent," an aide explained, "who was not susceptible to being criticized as you would criticize other candidates." The polls were showing Rockefeller ahead, and it was further decided that any really tough tactics might back- fire. "However," said Alton Marshall, "you almost have to end up with some question of your opponent's credibility. People wouldn't want their soap opera to end without some suspense." So the television campaign ended with a series of questions for the undecided voter that were designed to attack Goldberg's credibility.

Then everybody started worrying. Joe Boyd was particularly worried about the polls that were being published that showed a clear Rockefeller victory. He feared the upstate Republicans would stay home or vote for Adams. On the Thursday before the election, 400,000 simulated telegrams (actually the print- out of a computer in California) began being received in Republican and inde- pendent mailboxes in upstate New

RESULTS OF TELEPHONE OPERATION →

York. The mailings, which were labeled "Telegram" (but which clearly were not, inasmuch as they contained a typographical errors and they were de- livered on time), said: "I NEED YOUR HELP. UNLESS YOU VOTE THIS TUES- DAY THE ORGANIZED DEMOCRAT PARTY OF NEW YORK CITY COULD TAKE OVER YOUR STATE GOVERNMENT. BUFFALO [OR ALBANY OF WATERTOWN] VOTES ARE VITAL. MALCOLM WILSON AND I NEED YOUR SUPPORT FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER."

Boyd's operation attempted 1,279,134 telephone calls to voters. Of that total 932,470 were completed. Boyd estimated that each household contained 2.4 voters. "So we probably reached more than 2 million voters," he said, reading the figures from a series of neat charts on his office wall.

Perrotta's New York City campaign was similarly successful. Of his 21 high-priority Democratic assembly dis- tricts, the ones that his batteries of telephone workers assaulted, he said afterward, "We banged hell out of them." Rockefeller took eight of those districts in Brooklyn to Goldberg's five, four to one in the Bronx, seven to two in Queens, and two to nothing in Staten Island. The center, the Pivotal, the 22 per cent, had swung.

Joe Boyd, asked afterward what had gone wrong, said he couldn't think of anything major. The successful candi- date, on election night, appeared at the Roosevelt next to the grinning Mario Procaccino. He spoke of law and order, but not in the same breath: that may be the mark of the center these days.

Alton Marshall, summarizing it all, urged a visitor to ferret out and read the speeches Rockefeller had made dur- ing the last days of the campaign. They weren't reported in the press, he said, but if someone took the trouble to com- pare them with the speeches Rocke- feller had made at the outset, they would reveal a "growth of philosophy," a tendency to express concern about social movement rather than building highways and buildings.

The Rockefeller Team had been justly criticized, Marshall continued, because it often had been guilty of emphasizing the roads and bridges and not paying enough attention to humanity, and the governor's speeches at the end of the campaign represented an attempt to rectify that error.

Somehow it just didn't seem worth- while to dig out those speeches. At the end of the campaign, with the ma- chinery all clicking smoothly, with the center and the Pivotal well in hand, it was easy for Rockefeller to exhibit a growth of philosophy, an interest in humanity. The polls were already in

Computing Democratic Winners in '72

By ALAN L. OTTEN

WASHINGTON — Many Democrats think they have found their 1972 victory weapon: The computer.

Sophisticated use of this weapon, more and more nearly perfected, can add an extra three, four or five percentage points to the Democratic vote total, whoever the nominee and they should be enough to win. Armed with dramatic examples from recent elections, the computer fans are out to sell it to the entire party as a vital tool, perhaps even more vital than television.

The computer helps in hundreds of different ways. It can identify voters who are likely to vote for Democrats. It can identify voters who are likely to vote for Republicans. It can identify voters who are likely to vote for independents. It can identify voters who are likely to vote for Democrats if they are not sure. It can identify voters who are likely to vote for Republicans if they are not sure. It can identify voters who are likely to vote for independents if they are not sure. It can identify voters who are likely to vote for Democrats if they are not sure. It can identify voters who are likely to vote for Republicans if they are not sure. It can identify voters who are likely to vote for independents if they are not sure.

Computers, of course, don't really do much that political organizations haven't long been doing with three-hole cards and other bits of paper. Simply said it far more quickly and efficiently. Nor is the political use of computers necessarily new; they have been so employed for almost a decade now, with their use rapidly spreading and growing more sophisticated.

Today's computer computers have been used in many ways. They have been used to identify voters who are likely to vote for Democrats. They have been used to identify voters who are likely to vote for Republicans. They have been used to identify voters who are likely to vote for independents. They have been used to identify voters who are likely to vote for Democrats if they are not sure. They have been used to identify voters who are likely to vote for Republicans if they are not sure. They have been used to identify voters who are likely to vote for independents if they are not sure.

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Politics and People

also reemphasized the governorship and several other statewide offices from the Republicans, picked up a Congressional seat and made unexpectedly large gains in both houses of the state legislature. Mr. Humphrey's strong coalition were generally credited less to his own efforts and more to the efforts of his staff.

The effort was coordinated by Valerine Norman, a woman who was hired by Mr. Humphrey's former secretary, the Negro and Christian and political scientist John Valerine. In fact, the effort was coordinated by Valerine Norman, a woman who was hired by Mr. Humphrey's former secretary, the Negro and Christian and political scientist John Valerine.

There were different points of view on and women, for obtaining maximum support from young children, for such as the case of the more than 25,000 children who were in the campaign manager Chester Tobey's hands. The technology was refined to the point where a paragraph about Mr. Cannon's record as a legislator could be used to identify voters who were likely to vote for him.

The Cannon computer also proved to be a check book of Democratic-inclined voters on election day, party workers kept track of the names and addresses of voters who were likely to vote for Cannon. The Cannon computer also proved to be a check book of Democratic-inclined voters on election day, party workers kept track of the names and addresses of voters who were likely to vote for Cannon.

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USE OF COMPUTER TO IDENTIFY TARGET VOTERS

INTEREST AMONG DEMOCRATS

100% REP. CLUES

100% REP. CLUES

100% REP. CLUES

100% REP. CLUES

100% REP. CLUES

100% REP. CLUES

TAB T

TALKING PAPER FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: Citizens Brochure

Magruder forwarded the mock-up of the brochure to be sent to people who write in offering assistance to re-elect the President.

Wouldn't it be helpful to have Dick Moore, Herb Klein, Bill Safire, and Dwight Chapin review the booklet?

GS:lm

June 28, 1971

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Date June 9, 1971

NOTE TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

A check with John Dean indicated that the Citizens use of Bill Horton would cause no legal problem because "it is an isolated example."

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Section 1-102
Pr. ~~82~~ , Date ~~3-23-82~~
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


June 3, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

FRED MALEK 

SUBJECT:

Staff Assistance to the
Citizens for the Reelection
of the President

At Jeb Magruder's request, my staff has been providing assistance in launching the Citizens for the Reelection of the President. The executive search team is assisting in recruiting. Bill Horton is helping in planning for the fifteen task forces and consolidating these plans into a single document for the Attorney General.

We are pleased to provide this type of assistance on a discreet basis. However, I wanted you to know of our involvement to keep you informed of our activities.

June 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT: Democratic Contenders - RNC/
Citizens Activities

Pat Buchanan is the Chairman of the Democratic contender Task Force. He reviews the work done by the RNC under the direction of Ed De Bolt. The most recent materials prepared by the RNC research staff are attached at Tab A. Summaries of the activities of each of the contenders is attached at Tab B.

The RNC group that monitors the contenders is led by Bob Chase, who personally researches Muskie. Other members of the RNC group are: Gary Bauer, a 25 year old third year law student at Georgetown who covers Kennedy and Humphrey; Jim Lexo, a Congressman Kemp campaign aide, who covers Wallace, Jackson, and Harris; and Diane Moore, a Penn State graduate, who covers Bayh, Hughes, and McGovern. On June 15 two more individuals will be added to the staff; one has a Masters in Political Science and the other was in charge of research in the Ohio gubernatorial campaign in 1970.

In addition to reviewing the RNC work, Pat Buchanan has prepared in depth strategy proposals on Muskie and Humphrey. He is currently working on one about Kennedy. Buchanan's task force project manager is Bob Marik. They have committed themselves to the Attorney General to have an in-depth proposal by the end of June.

GS:elr

June 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: White House Staff Involvement
in Citizens

A potentially difficult situation developed yesterday. Ehrlichman and Whitaker had been discussing with Bob Spitzer his role in assisting the Administration with farmers. The discussion had reached the point where Bryce Harlow was to call Spitzer and offer him a job at Citizens. Unfortunately, the plan was not discussed with the Attorney General. When Whitaker finally called the Attorney General, at Magruder's urging, Mitchell said that only he had authority to hire for Citizens and that the Spitzer matter would have to be put on hold.

Recommendation:

To prevent future difficulties between the White House Staff and the Attorney General, you should mention in the 8:15 meeting that matters concerning the Citizens should be cleared with the Attorney General, either directly or through Magruder.

Agree H. L Disagree _____

Comment _____

GS:elr

G → JGM 6/7 10⁰⁷
G → Tal Pap → H 6/10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date:

6/17

TO:

Larry Highby

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Per your request.

✓

May 26, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Mrs. Mitchell's Scheduling

Magruder reports that after extensive discussion with Dick Moore and the Attorney General, the decision was reached to have Mrs. Mitchell's scheduling handled by Jeb Magruder and Bart Porter at an office in the Citizens for the Re-election of the President suite.

Telephone requests come through a separate line, but the risk of discovery remains high because Magruder will be dealing with the TV networks and other newsmen. Also, Mrs. Mitchell stopped by the Citizens office last Friday to discuss several scheduling matters.

GS:lm

June 4, 1971

C
You are absolutely right!
H

Dear Jeb:

Besides all the problems we had with your scheduling Mrs. Mitchell to return on Air Force One from Oklahoma, I discover that we now have an incident which happened last night and is even more significant.

Evidently, you participated in setting up Mrs. Mitchell's press conference in Tulsa today. Foust has made the arrangements you requested and has a local person in charge of the press conference and I believe all is well.

The point is that from now on please do not contact the Advance Man direct. You should call either me or Ron Walker. Obviously, from time to time there are going to be special requests which we will be happy to handle for you. However, I believe that these requests should be related only to the President and involve only things that will make a difference to the President. I do not feel that it is our responsibility to take care of arranging press setups for Mrs. Mitchell. Since you and Bart have taken over the responsibilities of handling Mrs. Mitchell, then I suggest you make the proper arrangements or get someone to travel with Mrs. Mitchell who can take care of these details.

Believe me, I am trying to be very objective about this and am anticipating requests that you will have in the future. But our Advance Men will no longer concern themselves with arrangements other than for the President, the First Family, or special guests traveling with the President.

Regards.

Sincerely,

Dwight L. Chapin
Deputy Assistant
to the President

Mr. Jeb Magruder
Citizens for the Re-election of
the President
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

THE ORdeal OF THE PRESIDENT

or

Will Richard Nixon Find True Happiness in 1972

by Jeffrey Bell

These are hard times for Richard Nixon. The three major national pollsters—George Gallup, Louis Harris, and Oliver Quayle—show him tied with or trailing Sen. Edmund Muskie, his likely Democratic opponent, by as much as eight per cent. The economy is still sluggish. Doubts persist on his intentions in Indochina, among both hawks and doves. His proposals for a "new American revolution" got a week or so of good editorials, and virtually no response from either the public or Congress. Closely related to all these matters, and yet transcending them, is this: you cannot go anywhere in America, to intellectuals, to farmers, to hard-hats, to the South, to California, to liberals or conservatives, and hear an enthusiastic defense of the Nixon Presidency. There are no Nixonites.

There used to be. Nixon has never been a cult figure, but in both 1960 and 1968 there were areas—both geographical and sociological—where Nixon was assured of a warm welcome and overwhelming support against his Democratic opponents. Nixonite areas included the Farm Belt, the Ohio Valley, the Mountain states, and Southern California. Overwhelming Nixon constituencies included residents of small towns, middle-income professionals, and businessmen at virtually all levels. Nixon retains at least some support among all of these groups, but virtually none of the intense identification that brought the crowds in Cincinnati and Sioux City, and the unprecedented flood of money from executive suites everywhere.

This cannot be attributed wholly to the economy. Roosevelt and Eisenhower presided over much harder times than these, and it cost their parties heavily in such years as 1938 and 1958. But there was little or no diminution of enthusiasm among the groups that had supported the two men all along.

The 1970 Elections

The 1970 Senate elections illustrate the oddness of Nixon's present position. Republicans did well in the Northeast, which Nixon has never carried and where, for one reason or another, he was not the dominant issue of the campaign. But despite many seemingly vulnerable seats, Republicans made no gains in states which Nixon carried overwhelmingly in 1968, and where Republican Senate nominees identified themselves closely with him. These states included Florida, Indiana, North Dakota, Utah,

Wyoming, Nevada, and New Mexico. Reliable polls in North Dakota, Utah, and New Mexico showed Republican support dropping in the aftermath of Nixon's visits to aid local candidates. The two states which ousted Republican Senators for Democrats—Illinois and California—were the same two crucial states which put Nixon over the top on Election Night 1968.

This pattern was a profound break with electoral history. After a detailed survey of Republican administrations from Harding to Eisenhower, the late V.O. Key wrote in *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*: "Republicans picked up seats at the midterm chiefly in states in which their presidential candidate had shown extremely great strength at the preceding elections." Of the four states in which Republicans took Senate seats from the Democrats in 1970, the highest 1968 Nixon showing was the 45.2 per cent he received in Ohio. The Republicans' showing of 12 victories and 23 losses in the 1970 Senate elections was not an unusual performance for the party in



power at a midterm election. What was strikingly unusual was the party's dismal showing in states Nixon had swept two years before. The same configuration showed up in House and gubernatorial races.

Taken alone, the 1970 pattern strongly suggests that Nixon is in danger of losing his political base. Taken with other evidence, including his mediocre showing in polls against Muskie and the apathy and skepticism which seem to greet everything he says and does, suggestion approaches certainty: the President is in danger of alienating the voters who put him in office, without gaining anything in return.

A Conservative Base

In 1960 and 1968, Richard Nixon's support base was conservative. The delegates who chose him at the two Republican conventions were right of center almost to a man. In 1968, so were the major politicians who supported him, not to mention the bulk of his own staff. The states he carried—26 in 1960 and 32 in 1968—are, with three or four exceptions, states in which conservative voters clearly outnumber liberals, within the Republican Party as well as statewide. Newspapers and columnists who backed Nixon for nomination and election were all non-liberal, and most were conservative. In 1968, Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.) and Rep. Bradford Morse (R-Mass.) supported him for nomination and election. These endorsements by known liberals are memorable because they were virtually unique. With a handful of exceptions, no liberals have ever wanted Richard Nixon to be President of the United States. It is safe to say that few wish him to be re-elected now.


How could they wish otherwise? Nixon is an old antagonist. In 1954 he made speeches associating liberal Democrats with Communism that made Agnew's speeches pale by comparison. He convicted Hiss, defeated Mrs. Douglas, taunted Stevenson, stopped Rockefeller, and purged Goodell. More recently, he chose Agnew, Burger, and Blackmun for the most important posts he has ever had to fill. The liberal majority on the Supreme Court is eroding, and Nixon tried with all the resources of his Administration to do the same to the U. S. Senate. His domestic policies have been surprisingly liberal, his nuclear policy more dovish than Johnson's, and his appointments to positions below the Supreme Court more liberal than conservative. These policies and actions have won praise, one by one, from liberal

journalists and even some liberal politicians. But why should liberals support Nixon for re-election when by electing someone like Muskie, they can have all these things and liberal Supreme Court appointments, precipitate withdrawal from Vietnam, and the humiliation of a long-time foe to boot? It would be as if conservatives, in gratitude for a hard line on Vietnam, decided en masse to support Lyndon Johnson in a race with Ronald Reagan in 1968.

And yet more often than not, the Nixon Administration has acted as though it seriously expected to receive the gratitude and votes of liberals in 1972. In doing so, it has alienated large portions of the conservative base that nominated and elected Nixon in 1968. It may also have alienated anti-liberal voters it once seemed certain to pick up: the most recent Harris Survey found that a majority of the Wallace-leaning voters it interviewed would vote for Muskie should George Wallace decline to run.

So the most urgent problem facing Nixon strategists is not how to expand their narrow-victory base of 1968—but how to regain the enthusiasm of the base itself, and, ultimately, the full measure of its electoral support. Once the activist enthusiasm within the 1968 Nixon areas and constituencies has been mobilized, expansion of the base will be relatively easy. The 26 electoral votes of Texas would then be an inviting prize. So would the 44 electoral votes of the 1968 Wallace states, should the Alabama Governor decide not to run (as seems increasingly possible). More difficult against Muskie, but still quite possible, are the votes of conservative-trending Catholics in the Northeast and Great Lakes, registered Democrats who have given overwhelming support to right-of-center Republicans like Sen. James Buckley and Gov. Thomas Meskill of Connecticut. Even in the liberal Northeast, the only voters who have shown willingness to back Republican candidates to the right of Javits, Lindsay, and Case are precisely those who have no interest in Nixon's liberal initiatives.

By holding the states he won in 1968, and picking up the Wallace states and Texas should Wallace not run, Nixon would defeat Muskie in the Electoral College by 377 to 161. This is enough of a bulge for Nixon to survive the loss of 1968 Nixon states like Illinois, New Jersey, and Wisconsin where Muskie-Catholicism might be enough to tip the scales. Nixon could lose these states, and the five Wallace states and still win the election.



But it is silly to talk in these terms, much less of outside victory possibilities in New York and Connecticut, at a time when Nixon is in trouble in Iowa and Southern California. If he does not bounce back in conservative areas which backed him overwhelmingly even in 1960, he will not bounce back at all.

One footnote: it is with the conservative voters of the North and West that Nixon is in trouble, not those of the South. Nixon's southern policy, exemplified by the appointments of Haynsworth and Carswell and the effort to end the pugnaciously anti-Southern stance of the Federal Government in general, are the only aspects of Nixon's domestic policy that most conservatives approve without reservation. Nixon made promises to Southern conservatives, he made unimpeachably good-faith efforts to achieve them, and polls which show Nixon in trouble everywhere else show him with a wide lead in the South, and George Wallace fading. Mission accomplished - perhaps.

A Conservative Strategy

But nothing has been more harmful to the Nixon Administration than the tacit assumption that a conservative strategy and a Southern strategy are identical. The idea that the South is "conservative" and the North and West are "liberal" is a negation not only of the observable facts, but of the electoral arithmetic of Nixon's two national campaigns. In both of Nixon's elections, the vast majority of his electoral votes has been made possible by non-Southern conservative areas like the Farm Belt, the Mountain States, the Ohio Valley and Border areas, and Southern California. In most of the states which include these areas, specifically "Southern" outlooks and problems (like school integration) have had a far less important role or none at all. These voters want the Supreme Court to be more conservative, but they are far more interested in reducing welfare and social spending and the taxes that go with them. In many states, the tax revolt has even extended to the formerly sacrosanct area of education. What does the Republican Party, as embodied by the Nixon Administration and its congressional backers, have to offer these people?

- ✓ 1. A proposal for an unprecedented expansion of the public-welfare rolls.
- ✓ 2. Higher spending than ever before, with a substantial planned deficit embraced as a virtue.
- ✓ 3. Continuation and full funding, at least so far, of the most unpopular of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs.
- ✓ 4. Strategic defense cutbacks, also embraced as a virtue, which have singled out for special economic hardship some of the most pro-Nixon areas of past elections, including nationally pivotal Southern California.

The Republican Party has more to say to the South than ever before. But what does it have to say to the voters of the North and West who made possible the sweeping GOP gains of 1966 and the impressively broad-based Presidential victory of 1968?

Reduced casualty rates in Vietnam, and a hard line on law and order. The 1970 elections showed that these are not enough. Electorates are notoriously ungrateful to leaders who have successfully ended wars (cf. Churchill 1945, Truman and de Gaulle 1946, and Eisenhower 1954), and the Democrats have proven they can move with the times on law and order.

With the exception of these two, the Nixon Administration has deprived Republicans of every single issue they campaigned on in 1966 and 1968. Gone are the days when Republicans could excoriate big Government, high taxes, unbalanced budgets, welfare abuses, and Great Society scandal and profligacy. If Republican candidates tried to revert to these successful past themes now, they would be laughed out of the house.

President Nixon has found this to be agonizingly true in the matter of revenue-sharing. Here is a case where the Administration did attempt to return to the old themes of callous bureaucracy, big government, and local control. The political result? Evans and Novak report that, after the first flurry of favorable press reaction, revenue sharing "has... fallen flat as a political balloon. Congressmen returning home have found little appreciation of the political impact of revenue sharing. Further, people are asking how they can share in the revenue when there is no revenue to share." Whatever the merits of the President's proposals, they have little political credibility and are unlikely to gain much. How could it be otherwise when they were put forward in the same speech which boasted of a planned Federal deficit of eleven billion dollars?

To the American electorate, and not just conservatives, the Nixon Administration projects radical uncertainty if not outright schizophrenia. A special Nixon quirk which accentuates this impression is his tendency to clothe liberal policies in conservative rhetoric, and conservative policies in liberal rhetoric. Thus the Family Assistance Plan, a radical expansion of the present welfare apparatus into a guaranteed annual income, is presented as "workfare." Thus at the height of the American-backed invasion of Laos, Nixon informs a *New York Times* interviewer that he is a "Quaker pacifist" and that the United States will in all likelihood never again go to war. Such attempts to please everyone in fact please no one. Opponents of the policy in question are seldom reassured, and supporters begin to wonder if the Administration is really on their side.

Rhetoric will not be enough to win back Nixon's 1968 right-of-center base in the North and West. As the difficulties of revenue-sharing suggest, Nixon is nearing the point where even a substantive program cannot help, so long as it is yoked with seemingly contradictory ones in the spirit of "let's give one to the conservatives."

The Nixon Administration must present an integrated, programmatic, and unapologetic stance to the electorate. Since it is approximately 20 years too late for Nixon to present a consistent liberal stance, he must present a convincing conservative one. It does not have to be far-right to be successful, but it must

be clear that the Nixon focus is right of center, if he is to have any chance to regain his 1968 support base, much less expand it.

Available Options

With the President likely to be seeking re-election against a Left-liberal Democrat, there is an understandable tendency for Nixon strategists to assume conservatives on election day will have nowhere else to go. Perhaps, but conservative opinion makers could well have better things to do between now and then. It is very difficult to remember a President who was re-elected with no enthusiasm or sense of commitment on the part of his own supporters — perhaps the last was McKinley — and liberals will never generate any enthusiasm for Richard Nixon. In the present state of affairs, neither will conservatives, businessmen, farmers, aerospace workers, or anyone else.

Yes, Nixon must change his image. But as the 1970 elections and recent public-relations efforts have made clear, he can no longer change his image without also changing his policies.

It is not necessary to describe the various policy changes that would have a chance of regaining the President's conservative base. But a brief list might include:

The Conservative Program

1. Administration support for a "voucher system" to aid parents who want to send their children to private schools. The system would be too costly to institute at the Federal level at this time, but there is no reason why the President should not (a) endorse the principle; (b) encourage states and localities to enact voucher systems of their own; (c) introduce a voucher plan for the District of Columbia; and (d) funds permitting, move toward the principle of full tuition support by giving limited aid to private-school parents. This program would have considerable appeal to both conservatives and Catholics.


2. Radical simplification of the Federal income tax structure. A plan proposed by Dr. Milton Friedman would provide ending of most exemptions and loopholes, and a statutory provision that no one's tax rate shall be more than twice as much as anyone else's. This proposal would be a relief to everyone who dreads April 15, amount in effect to a tax reduction for the beleaguered middle class, and would end the deeply resented prevalence of very rich people who hire clever lawyers to avoid being taxed at all.

3. Whatever the fate of the Family Assistance Plan, a move away from cash benefits to welfare recipients who do not work. Under both the present AFDC system and FAP, it is possible for non-working families to receive cash incomes roughly comparable to those of working families. So long as this condition prevails, welfare payments will continue to skyrocket no matter how many "working poor" are added to the rolls. A family whose head is not working should receive most or all of its benefits through ticketed programs like Food Stamps, rather

than cash — until such time as the mother or father takes a job. Also desperately needed is a law prohibiting Federal welfare aid to states which define "children" as those under 21 years of age. The time has passed when New York City can justify giving money under Aid to Families With Dependent Children to "dependent children" old enough to enter the Army and vote.

4. A Presidential pledge to veto any appropriations for programs to be phased out under Special Revenue Sharing. If the Congress wants to continue such programs as Model Cities, Urban Renewal, the Job Corps, and the Appalachian Regional Commission, it should be clear that this will be possible only at the state or local level. This form of blackmail could end in one of two desirable results: (a) passage of Special Revenue Sharing; or (b) significant reductions in Federal spending and payrolls leaving open the possibility of tax reductions in 1972.

5. In the absence of an arms-limitation agreement before this fall, funding for major new strategic weapons systems in the 1972-73 budget. The President cannot wait forever to explain in detail to the American people the extent to which we are falling seriously behind the Soviet Union in this area, and the dangers ahead in the 1970's and 1980's should



we continue to stand still. With the problems stated, it is hard to imagine anything but overwhelming support from the American public — and possibly devastating political issue in 1972 should key Democrats balk.


These policy initiatives, taken together, would do much to give the Nixon Administration a d

tion and force which it now appears to lack, and would probably be enough to restore identification between the President and the predominantly right-of-center voters who provided most of his votes in 1960 and 1968, as well as expand his support among other key constituencies such as Catholics. However, the President may be heading for serious trouble on an issue—Vietnam—which has proven its capability to drown out all others.

This problem stems from the President's tendency to couch a policy which has been in its true aim anti-Communist in a dovish rhetoric of withdrawal. If the only aim of the United States is withdrawal and release of U.S. prisoners of war, then the invasions of Cambodia and Laos cannot be justified. Many doves have said this, and a large proportion of the American people (judging from reliable polls) share this view. Unless rhetoric and policy are brought into line, the Nixon "credibility gap" will continue to widen.

One way of reconciling policy with rhetoric, of course, is to change the policy to fit the rhetoric. Withdraw American troops at a more rapid rate, without leaving behind sufficient materiel and air power for the South Vietnamese to take up the slack; at Paris, inform Hanoi of our willingness to set a date for total withdrawal, contingent on return of prisoners of war; do little to fight McGovern-Hatfield or similar legislation in Congress. The scenario is familiar, and something like it has long been urged by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.

But it is too late for Nixon to exercise this option. He might have gotten away with it in the first half of 1969, but he could not now. The reason is simple: 20,000 American soldiers have died, and two risky invasions have been carried out, since Nixon took office. If it became absolutely clear to the American people that the central Nixon goal is withdrawal in deed as well as word, these lives will be seen as having been squandered for nothing. Here is what the Democratic Presidential nominee would inevitably say: "Like most Americans, I support the President in his Plan X for total withdrawal from Vietnam. This was a difficult decision for him to make, and he needs the support of a united country against the handful of superhawks here and in Southeast Asia who are crying 'sellout.' However, in assessing Mr. Nixon's four-year record of handling this war, I join with those who regard his performance as a tragic failure. If, as the President says now, his goal from the beginning has been one of total American withdrawal, how in the name of God can Cambodia, Laos, and the losses of the past three years, be justified? If the President had done in 1969 what he is doing now, nearly half the American dead in Vietnam would be alive. For his failure of courage then, not the difficult course he is following now, he must be rejected by the people." This argument, of course, is unanswerable, and hints of it have already appeared in the campaign rhetoric of the only two announced candidates for President, Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) and Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Cal.). If it becomes clear that the President is reversing his present responsible policy,



every editorialist, columnist, and politician—including many conservatives—will take up the same cry as indeed they should.

This option is closed off for the President as much as any could be. The President has no choice, morally or politically, but to continue in his present course of trying to save South Vietnam. But if he is to win political support for his policy, he must say candidly what it is that he is trying to do. For one thing, the release of U. S. prisoners of war must cease being his only rhetorical reason for projecting a "residual force" of American soldiers in South Vietnam. There is considerable sympathy for the prisoners, but no one seriously believes that their release could not be achieved, should the U.S. make clear to Hanoi that we are willing to get completely out by a certain date.

The President should instead make clear that, insofar as American soldiers will be in Indochina, they will be there to fulfill the pledges we have made to our ally. No other justification is possible—or believable. The American people will not accept the logic that twenty thousand soldiers needed to die in order to ransom several hundred prisoners of war.

Such a change in the Nixon rhetoric on Vietnam would be severely attacked by liberals, and it would by no means be greeted with delight among a majority of the war-weary American people. However, the pill could be sweetened by the pledge that the soldiers will all be volunteers, and that few will be in infantry combat. President Eisenhower's decision to leave 50,000 troops indefinitely in Korea was not a particularly popular one either, but it won at least the grudging acceptance of a majority of the American people. Nixon's political problem would be more difficult in America 1971, but two things about his position are clear: he cannot move toward a sellout, and he cannot continue to justify his war policy in the manner he is doing now.

If Richard Nixon does all the things suggested by this writer, he would not be assured of a second term. But the thrust of his Presidency would finally take on clear definition, and he would be assured of the enthusiasm of many whose enthusiasm he needs. At the very worst, he would be remembered as a President who believed deeply, attempted much, and went down fighting.

May 26, 1971

AS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LARRY HIGBY

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

As to your request about the Magruder follow-up on Don Schollander, I talked with Jeb this morning.

Magruder had invited Don Schollander to attend the private meeting of the Citizens for the Re-election of the President to be held today at the Hay Adams Hotel. Schollander had accepted, but John Rose called Schollander and advised him that it probably wasn't really necessary for him to come. Needless to say, Magruder was slightly upset.

Magruder had planned to talk with Schollander after his meeting with the President, but Rose squired him away. Magruder will talk to Rose and Schollander to centralize contact with Jeb so that Schollander is brought into the fold correctly.

I will follow-up with Magruder weekly on this matter.

*Very good
on the feet
articulate*

GS:ln

*B → J & M 6/2
requesting
written
proposal*

*The question is what is
Magruder's specific plan for
him . L.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6

Date: 6/4

TO: Bruce

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Discussion with L.
yesterday indicated that
Colson is aware of
his responsibility vis a
vis ethnics.
No extraordinary push
is required.

THANKS
B

May 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRUCE KEHLI

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

A recent follow-up check with Magruder on the ethnic situation at the RNC and at the Citizens disclosed the following:

1. Colson has been asked to take charge of ethnic activities for the Citizens Committee. This assignment has been cleared with the Attorney General.
2. Colson has yet to have a meeting of the Ethnic Group Task Force, but has assured Magruder that he will have such a meeting this week.
3. Lasso Passtor prevailed upon Colson to get a Presidential letter Friday which established the permanency of the Heritage group at the RNC. This letter was probably a mistake.
4. Magruder and Colson will keep the ethnic operation at the Citizens group separate from Passtor's generally unsuccessful activities at the RNC.

The net result is that pursuit of the ethnic vote has not been put on the front burner. However, Magruder will be periodically prodded to produce the type of recommendation necessary for submission to the Attorney General and Haldeman.

GS:lm

May 5, 1971



MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON

SUBJECT: Ethnic Operation at the Republican National Committee

The essence of the attached letter sent to us by Laszlo Pasztor is that his operation is being dismembered. While his operation has consisted of a director, 3 assistants, 1 secretary, 6 consultants, 4 special representatives on Mexican affairs, and he had requested 1 extra person and a 20 percent increase in his budget for 1971-72, he has been told that 75 percent of his permanent staff, all of the consultants, the complete Mexican-American project, and the total Catholic budget are to be eliminated.

*Good -
The RNC is
not the
place to do
this.*

As you know, they also plan to curtail Van Rensselaer's activities by eliminating his assistant, Ruth Groom, and taking away his secretary. Considering his age, effectiveness and the importance of senior citizens and the progress we are making in coming to grips with it, I have made a big issue of this with Tom Evans and believe I have it reversed. I am thus in a difficult position to immediately take up the cudgels on this one.

It seems to me that those who are doing the broad political planning for the coming 18 months might take another look at this decision.

George T. Bell

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *WC*
SUBJECT: Ethnic Operation in RNC

As you will see from the attached memo which George Bell has sent to me, the RNC is effectively curtailing the ethnic operation, particularly Mexican-American and Catholic.

It may be that Evans is dissatisfied with the way Laszlo Pasztor has been running the outfit. If that is the case, he should be replaced with someone more effective. In principle, however, curtailing it at this point in time would seem to me to be ill-advised. This is the time when we should be sending organizational people and field people in to cultivate ethnic groups.

While I recognize that most ethnics will not rally around the Republican Party banner, it is important to have political operatives on the Committee payroll working inside of these groups identifying key leaders, gathering intelligence and working with us on strategy.

One of the biggest problems we have had in ethnic areas is that we have no good means of communication. We deal, of course, through this office with all of the organized groups, which is excellent from a symbolic standpoint, but that really doesn't represent the masses. The vast majority of ethnic groups are totally disorganized. Hence, the only real political intelligence that we have gotten has been through Pasztor's operation and it is our best means of communication and access.

The same function could be undertaken by the citizens committee and if that is what is contemplated by reducing Pasztor's role, then I should not be concerned about this. This is not a time, however, to deemphasize the cultivating of ethnic groups. It should be done somewhere.

I recommend that you ask Evans for a full explanation of this and we should then decide whether the operation should be continued, where it should be continued and under whose direction.

I will be glad to see that it is properly organized from here if you want me to. We haven't done at all badly in this area substantively, and we have done a lot of cultivating of individuals and groups, but we need the apparatus to come in for a political kill at the right time.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1971


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SUBJECT: Ethnic Operation at the Republican
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George T. Bell

JSM

3/24

CWC in charge of
ethnics for ~~RT~~ Cts

JSM \Rightarrow Evans + agrees

CWC no time ~~to~~ to meet.

haslow convincing CWC into
get TR letter on
permanency of Heritage Gy.

So Fri. Evans \rightarrow TR letter \rightarrow AG
~~AG~~ AG going to host CWC.

JSM \rightarrow CWC forget haslow +
use at comm.

AG agrees CWC should
lead up ethnics operation.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
May 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRUCE KEHRLI

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

G

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G → JGM 6/3 - CUC cancelled 2 dates
mtgs
No G/L → CUC re getting it going
to
CUC on top of it

May 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON

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place to do
this.*

As you know, they also plan to curtail Van Rensselaer's activities by eliminating his assistant, Ruth Groom, and taking away his secretary. Considering his age, effectiveness and the importance of senior citizens and the progress we are making in coming to grips with it, I have made a big issue of this with Tom Evans and believe I have it reversed. I am thus in a difficult position to immediately take up the cudgels on this one.

It seems to me that those who are doing the broad political planning for the coming 18 months might take another look at this decision.

George T. Bell

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *CC*
SUBJECT: Ethnic Operation in RNC

As you will see from the attached memo which George Bell has sent to me, the RNC is effectively curtailing the ethnic operation, particularly Mexican-American and Catholic.

It may be that Evans is dissatisfied with the way Laszlo Pasztor has been running the outfit. If that is the case, he should be replaced with someone more effective. In principle, however, curtailing it at this point in time would seem to me to be ill-advised. This is the time when we should be sending organizational people and field people in to cultivate ethnic groups.

While I recognize that most ethnics will not rally around the Republican Party banner, it is important to have political operatives on the Committee payroll working inside of these groups identifying key leaders, gathering intelligence and working with us on strategy.

One of the biggest problems we have had in ethnic areas is that we have no good means of communication. We deal, of course, through this office with all of the organized groups, which is excellent from a symbolic standpoint, but that really doesn't represent the masses. The vast majority of ethnic groups are totally disorganized. Hence, the only real political intelligence that we have gotten has been through Pasztor's operation and it is our best means of communication and access.

The same function could be undertaken by the citizens committee and if that is what is contemplated by reducing Pasztor's role, then I should not be concerned about this. This is not a time, however, to deemphasize the cultivating of ethnic groups. It should be done somewhere.

I recommend that you ask Evans for a full explanation of this and we should then decide whether the operation should be continued, where it should be continued and under whose direction.

I will be glad to see that it is properly organized from here if you want me to. We haven't done at all badly in this area substantively, and we have done a lot of cultivating of individuals and groups, but we need the apparatus to come in for a political kill at the right time.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1971


MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON

SUBJECT: Ethnic Operation at the Republican
National Committee

The essence of the attached letter sent to us by Laszlo Pasztor is that his operation is being dismembered. While his operation has consisted of a director, 3 assistants, 1 secretary, 6 consultants, 4 special representatives on Mexican affairs, and he had requested 1 extra person and a 20 percent increase in his budget for 1971-72, he has been told that 75 percent of his permanent staff, all of the consultants, the complete Mexican-American project, and the total Catholic budget are to be eliminated.

As you know, they also plan to curtail Van Rensselaer's activities by eliminating his assistant, Ruth Groom, and taking away his secretary. Considering his age, effectiveness and the importance of senior citizens and the progress we are making in coming to grips with it, I have made a big issue of this with Tom Evans and believe I have it reversed. I am thus in a difficult position to immediately take up the cudgels on this one.

It seems to me that those who are doing the broad political planning for the coming 18 months might take another look at this decision.



George T. Bell

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKING
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102
By , Date 3-23-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : GORDON STRACHAN
FROM : H. R. HALDEMAN *H.*

JSM-
022.

In the long-range political planning be sure that they are thinking about the mock conventions on college and high school campuses and make sure that we are going to have a really good man in charge of our activities at mock conventions. We can't afford to lose these and it's very important that they be planned and programmed well in advance. We should know when they are going to be held. Some of them may even be starting this fall.

This is a long range item, but I'll be sending a number of such to you as time goes on and I assume you'll set up a system for stacking them up and getting them implemented at the appropriate times.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Strachan

Date: 5/25

TO: Larry Higley

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

- If I had this information I would have included it in my memo to H.
- Jeb is very reluctant to raise either my attendance at these meetings or reporting afterward with the AG.
- Should this be arranged in the H, AG, Magruder meeting?

CONFIDENTIAL

May 20, 1971

Ashton

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Last night the Attorney General met with Jeb Magruder, Harry Dent, Fred LaRue, Dick Kleindienst, and Lee Nunn. Magruder did not offer a description of the subjects covered but did say that Don Rumsfeld and Bryce Harlow would probably be added, and that Bob Finch would definitely not be included.

GS:dg *I want the report on the meeting to go to H. Hal-*

L.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: _____

To:

J

From:

L. Higby

How will advise

Buckley —

Plan of HRT now?

G. Telecon → Odde 6/1

G. Telecon → Buchanan 6/2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1971

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102
By EP, date 3-23-82

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT:

Buchanan's Memorandum on
Conservatives

Buchanan sent the attached memorandum (tab A) on the YAF move toward Reagan. Buchanan argues persuasively that any attack on the YAFs by the White House is counter-productive. He does not know the source of the attack.

The only project I know about involving our response to the YAF move was your request of the Attorney General on May 26. He asked Magruder to get the facts. Magruder had Rob Odle prepare a report (tab B) on the situation. Odle's report has no more information than Buchanan's. Both are trying to find out who in the Administration is urging the resignations from the YAF Advisory Board.

Buchanan and Odle agree that Reagan's written attack on the YAF move for a RR candidacy has solved the problem.

Recommendation:

That Buchanan and Odle try to get the source of the White House attack and stop it.

Agree H Disagree _____

Comment _____

Buchanan also says that the allegedly White House inspired idea that the Vice President be appointed to the Supreme Court to make room for Reagan as Veep should be squelched. I agree.

Recommendation:

That Buchanan should be given the responsibility to contact Conservatives and put a stop to this rumor.

Agree H Disagree _____ Comment _____

Recommendation:

May 29, 1971

That Buchanan should be given the responsibility to contact Conservatives and put a stop to this rumor.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Buchanan's Memorandum on
Conservatives

Buchanan sent the attached memorandum (tab A) on the YAF move toward Reagan. Buchanan argues persuasively that any attack on the YAFs by the White House is counter-productive. He does not know the source of the attack.

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Recommendation:

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Agree _____ Disagree _____

Comment _____

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Recommendation:

That Buchanan should be given the responsibility to contact Conservatives and put a stop to this rumor.

Agree _____ Disagree _____ Comment _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 28, 1971

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12065, SECTION 6-102

By EP, date 3-23-82

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

PAT BUCHANAN

SUBJECT:

CONSERVATIVES

We get reports that the White House is initiating efforts to have the YAF Advisory Board (following their RR endorsement) -- such as Tower who dropped off -- resign from the organization. Manuel Lujan is one such who has been approached by WH, allegedly, and asked to resign. He contacted YAF and told them. Suggest that we halt this operation, if it is ours and going on:

1. It is counter-productive; it makes this little organization look like a target of WH attack; and thus boosts their anti-Nixon credentials, and aids their fund-raising with Far Right. This is a way to give them publicity without doing them a bit of harm.

2. In the future, if we decide to go after them -- for attacking the President -- go after their funds; find out who their fund-raisers are, and then we can put the heat on them, where it hurts. But, more important:

3. Ronald Reagan has written a blistering four-page letter to YAF attacking the organization and its leaders as pea-brains; and threatening to call a press conference, calling them irresponsible, if they do not withdraw their endorsement of Reagan. YAF backed down from its Reagan endorsement one-half hour later.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Reagan letter as I understand it, tore into the YAF leadership, not only for endorsing Reagan, but for attacking RN's Vietnamization policy. In any event, Reagan -- with or without incitation from here -- has tramped all over the anti-Nixon effort in the right-wing college organizations, and killed it to date. If we did not inspire this, the President might take note of it -- it is a most helpful harbinger for the future.

More important right now, the conservatives -- all four top organizations -- had a major meeting in New York to discuss a call for a meeting either with the President or Dr. K. -- they are deeply distressed over the SALT talks, and the strategic arms budget in 1973 (FY). They are talking in terms of formal letters, demands for meetings, ultimata, -- and of possible public breaks with the Administration. They have come to me about how best to get their concerns across -- I don't think that anything will be done before we talk further. But from what I gather there is a genuine deep concern over US strategic posture.

Some one from the WH has contacted William F. Buckley with the suggestion for a Buckley column to the effect that conservatives should demand the Vice President's appointment to the Supreme Court -- to make room for Reagan. In strict confidence, Buckley has let it slip that the White House -- someone right next to the President apparently -- has suggested the flier. Buckley is to suggest that if the Veep is appointed to the Court, then that is an acceptable arrangement for conservatives.

Buckley is himself said to be convinced that the President's re-election is contingent on the dropping of the Vice President -- although I do not personally know this to be true.

In any event, if the report that the WH inspired Buckley to approach this subject is known to me, it is probably being bruited around conservative circles by now -- and could be an embarrassment if it leaked out.

CONFIDENTIAL

May 28, 1971

DESIGNED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
P.S. 11036, Section 6-102
By EF Date 3-13-82

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Bryce Harlow reported to me that very reliable sources within Congressman Mills' committee have indicated that the Congressman is serious in his efforts to run for the Presidency. He has committed himself to a nationwide campaign and will try to avoid being considered a southern candidate.

He will probably announce a new health bill that will fall somewhere between our bill and Kennedy's bill in an effort to take the initiative in that area and he is working with George Meany and will attempt to raise the issue of trade protectionism in the fall with full support of organized labor.

JEB S. MAGRUDER

JSM:ger
JSM Chron
JSM Dem/Rep Contenders

CONFIDENTIAL

June 1, 1971

file
Orig went to ARH
L

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BOB FINCH
RE: California Strategy (Action Memo P1214)

Factual Summary

1. The recent public and private polls taken in California which I have forwarded to you show that the Presidential race would be very close or that we would lose the State against any major Democratic contender at the present time. On the other hand, McCloskey has not exceeded 9% against the President among Republicans in any poll.
2. The California State Republican Central Committee and County Committees are in bad disrepair with generally a very poor quality of membership and leadership. Good talent has been absorbed into national and state government. Volunteer organizations are equally impotent and increasingly dominated by the far right.
3. Intense maneuvering vis-a-vis 1974 races (Governor and Senator) is going on by Reinecke, Younger, Flournoy in particular with a prejudicial effect in terms of fund raising, organizing and carrying the state for the President in 1972.
4. Against this background and the present vacuum of activities on behalf of the President, key members of the Governor's staff have been making contacts among corporate heads, party officials and prominent personalities in the following areas:
 - a. Seeking staff and speakers to support the Governor's welfare reform proposals as against the Administration.
 - b. Holmes Tuttle (after two meetings with the Governor) contacting prominent personalities with regard to serving on the Delegation.

Action items

- c. Calls from Bob Walker with prominent leaders saying "the Governor's office will run the campaign--Finch to have nothing to do with it" and discussions on his part as to who might be city and county chairmen in the Presidential campaign.

(Specific examples of the above with names, places and dates can be provided to support these contentions)

Recommendations

1. A decision should be made as soon as possible for a Nixon Advisory Committee headed by Firestone or someone else (clearly loyal to the President and acceptable to Reagan) to send out the broadest possible mailing for "Friends of Nixon" in California--getting people signed up with their indicated areas of interest and a chance to offer suggestions and comments. These lists are organized and ready to go and I believe the mailing should go forward immediately after the wedding. The Governor should be notified of the action just prior to the mailing but without any option to veto. This organizing committee should include the Governor and all appropriate elected Republican officials in California as well as the key "fat cats" and "movers and shakers." It should not include members of the White House staff or Cabinet from California. Wives of such key persons on the Federal payroll might be listed on the organizing committee.
2. The Governor in his key position as Chairman of the Delegation should be asked to submit some names he would like to have considered for the Delegation. At the same time, all other statewide officials should likewise be asked to submit names, i.e., Younger, Reinecke, Flournoy and Priest, as well as Congressmen, Monagan, Seantor Marler, State Chairman Livermore, Vice Chairman Luce and Ralph Rosedale, head of the County Chairmen's organization. These names could be considered for both Delegation and organizational purposes.

3. It should be made clear to Reagan and other key elected officials that he is not to head the Presidential campaign in California, even in a so-called honorary capacity. The President, in other words, will run his own campaign in his native state. If he is allowed to be "Honorary Chairman," his staff will take this as having the franchise for the whole campaign itself.
4. Movement should begin immediately following the mailing to put in place new blood as acting county and city Nixon chairmen, i.e. Russell Green, Forrest Shumway, etc.

Finch Role

In connection with his general campaign assignments, it should be made clear that Finch will have input in political decisions and campaign personnel affecting California. After discussion with the President, it has been concluded that since RHF is a possible 1974 candidate, he should not again serve as state chairman as the '74 implications would be counterproductive to the '72 effort. There have been discussions about Finch working with or chairing a small advisory strategy committee which I think from the standpoint of "overview" ought to be implemented as soon as possible. It would be anticipated that Finch would have a very important responsibility in helping select city and county chairmen which are the critical spots to be filled in carrying California.

Finch should campaign heavily and publicly, particularly between the convention and the election in California, as well as nationally, in those areas where he can be of assistance among youth, minorities, etc.

Present Status in California

We have a small beachhead operation tied to the Kalmbach law firm where John Flanigan is serving as a volunteer, working with various groups like Waller Taylor, George St. Johns, Fred Martin and others, in compiling lists, but without authority to take any definitive action at this time.

Immediate Recommendation

There should be a meeting as soon as possible with the President, Attorney General, H. R. Haldeman and Robert H. Finch to discuss.

If agreement along these lines is reached, another meeting with HPH, Kalmbach and RHF should be set for June 11 to implement.

Firestone will be here for Patricia's wedding and, if agreed, Mitchell could provide marching orders to Firestone and Kalmbach at that time.

cc: Attorney General
H. R. Haldeman

RHF:bk1

Pomona, Calif.
Progress-Bulletin
(Cir. D 40,063 - S 40,742).

APR 28 1971

Allen's P. C. B. Est. 1888

Reinecke Sketches Actions as Governor

WASHINGTON (UPI)—California's lieutenant governor promises frequent meetings with students if elected to the state's top office.

"If I were governor, I would try to have periodic—perhaps once-a-month—meetings with students," Lt. Gov. Ed Reinecke told a news conference this week.

"They know I am perfectly willing to talk about any subject."

Reinecke, 47, was picked by Gov. Ronald Reagan as his lieutenant governor and has become the Reagan Administration's chief ambassador and spokesman to California youth.

He hopes to succeed Rea-

gan who has declared he will not seek re-election in 1974.

The governor, he said, suffers from a "lack of communication" with students, partly because of security problems and partly because of a lack of time.

"The governor is a very compassionate man, even if he doesn't read that way," Reinecke said. "I have not been painted all one color, as the governor has."

Reinecke said he did not differ with Reagan philosophically but that he "might differ" on methods. As an example, he told of his activities on campuses.

In discussing his political chances, Reinecke said other potential Republican gubernatorial candidates are Houston Flournoy, state controller; Robert Finch, presidential adviser; and Evelle Younger, state attorney general.

He said that Younger was the "better financed," Flournoy the "biggest vote getter" and Finch the "most popular."

San Pedro, Calif.
News Pilot
(Cir. 6XW 15,514)

APR 27 1971

Allen's P. C. B. Est. 1888.

Reagan declines re-election

Reinecke 'bids' for governor's post

1170-34
WASHINGTON (UPI) — California's lieutenant governor promises frequent meetings with students if elected to the state's top office.

"If I were governor, I would try to have periodic — perhaps once-a-month-meetings with students," Lt. Gov. Ed Reinecke told a news conference Monday.

"They know I am perfectly willing to talk about any subject."

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He hopes to succeed Reagan who has declared he will not seek re-election in 1974.

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He said that Younger was the "better financed," Flournoy the "biggest vote getter" and Finch the "most popular."

Among Democrats, he mentioned Rep. Jerome R. Waldie who has announced he will run.

"And Sam is always there," Reinecke said, referring to Mayor Sam Yorty of Los Angeles.

~~Original~~
ACTION MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

LOG NO.: P1214

Date: December 30, 1970

Time: 2:00 p.m.

FOR ACTION: R. Finch

cc (for information):

RHF

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: January 5, 1971

Time: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT:

California Strategy

9/10

ACTION REQUESTED:

For Necessary Action

For Your Recommendations

Prepare Agenda and Brief

Draft Reply

For Your Comments

Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

John R. Brown III
Staff Secretary

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 30, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ROBERT FINCH

FROM:

JOHN R. BROWN III *JRB*

SUBJECT:

California Strategy

It was felt that your memo on California Strategy was an excellent analysis of the situation. It is requested that you follow through on the action items covered in your memo. In particular, it is requested that you report back on who is to be the individual to head-up our efforts in California.

Please submit a report on what actions are taken to comply with the above request.

Thank you.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
A. Butterfield

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

May 26, 1971

E.O. 12958, Section 6-102

By EP, Date 3-23-82

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER
LARRY HIGBY

SUBJECT: POLLING PLAN

Considerable attention is currently being devoted to planning for polling in the 1972 campaign. The White House survey activities will very soon begin to point to the campaign, the Citizens Committee has established a planning group, several vendors and consultants have submitted proposals, and the need for a sound, well-coordinated program has been recognized by all parties concerned.

Current Proposals

In November, Dr. David Derge submitted a comprehensive plan (Tab A). It has not been updated since that time. Peter Flanigan, Jeb Magruder and Bob Marik of the planning group had arranged to meet with Derge this week, but that was delayed by the tragic death of his wife.

Recently, Benham of ORC submitted detailed suggestions on target state and issue polling (Tab B). The proposals thus far lean toward the basic research plan of 1968. Some variations are offered on the "wave studies" (updated large field interviews), the "Instant Research" capability, and issue studies. The current ORC-telephone system for "Instant Research" could be altered slightly to fit campaign trends and still be able to deliver the information required. The Citizens Committee planning group will seek to develop other alternatives as well, so that advances in the state-of-the-art since 1968 will not be ignored in the final decision process.

A preliminary survey has been completed to identify the six most qualified polling vendors for use in the 1972 campaign (Tab C). Comprehensive proposals will be solicited from each of the six, both to identify alternative polling techniques and to have a sound basis for making the final selection.

Domestic Council Issue Studies

The Domestic Council's current Issue Study will be completed by the first week in June. The data will be able to be analyzed by geographical region and urban/suburban/rural populations, but it will not be divisible into target states. As we move closer to the campaign year, it will be increasingly important to have a data base and trend information by target state.

According to Ken Cole, two and perhaps three more in-depth studies are planned. These could be tuned to correspond with the Derge and Benham recommendations (November 1971, and May 1972). We could suggest that the November study cover the same basic areas that the current study is examining, to assure adequate trend information, but be designed to allow interpretation by target states. Additional issues that develop this summer and fall could also be included. The thrust of the May study, however, should be to particularly emphasize the key issues and swing voters in the battleground states. This information would be developed from the previous two studies. The latter two studies would then become the benchmarks to set guidelines for the campaign.

Trends of Voter Attitudes

The wave studies could be done as they were in 1968. The theory was that after field interviewing a large initial sample, certain individuals would be re-interviewed in a three wave series to assess the effect of statements and actions during the campaign. These wave studies concentrated on the key states. Other techniques for tracking voter attitudes over time may be evaluated during the planning phase in 1971.

The wave studies were supplemented by nationwide daily telephone surveys during the last six weeks of the campaign. Four-day updates based on the 1000 telephone samples flowed into campaign headquarters to reflect instant reactions. These telephone surveys could be the concluding series of the 12-20 "instant research" surveys mentioned earlier.

Battleground States

In the battleground states, we will be particularly interested in identifying and communicating with the ambivalent voters. The Citizens Committee is evaluating the use of census data and past voting patterns to locate important concentrations of these voters. A highly targeted polling program might then be used to supplement Domestic Council findings on the issues and attitudes that will most strongly determine their votes. Those findings would be the basis for campaign issue strategy as well as individual contacts through mail, telephone or personal visits by local campaign workers. Variations on this technique have been used effectively in several state elections, notably Reagan in 1970 in San Francisco County, with DMI as the vendor.

Within the next few weeks, a specific proposal will be made to test the concept in Delaware, in conjunction with the RNC. Delaware was chosen because it is small but contains representative urban, suburban and rural areas. That test, if approved, would identify the ambivalent voters, using past voting data, detailed by county or precinct, and early Fourth Count (demographic) data from the 1970 census. A baseline opinion survey in several selected precincts would determine voter attitudes toward the President and toward public issues. Half of the precincts would be held as control groups. In the other half, through various forms of direct communication, an effort will be made to create attitudes more favorable to the Administration. A subsequent poll would evaluate how successful the efforts had been. All of this experience would be extremely useful in drawing up detailed operating plans for the campaign.

Recommendations

To implement these suggestions and to clarify responsibility for further planning, you may want to consider two ideas which have been mentioned recently:

1. Focus all polling in one consultant, as was done with Dave Derge in 1968. He could in turn use only one vendor (ORC in 1968) or several vendors.

During the planning phase, the consultant could work jointly with Higby and Strachan in the White House and Magruder and Marik in the Citizens Committee. During the campaign, he could report to the yet-to-be-established Strategy Committee.

At the present time, information is being gathered on several new candidates for consultant, in order to broaden our options at the time of the final decision.

2. Concentrate the polling responsibility for the key states in the Citizens for the Re-election of the President. Many of their activities will have a need to know up-to-date survey data: advertising, direct mail, research, various voter blocs, etc. We will be able to best coordinate the design of the survey and the dissemination of the results if the consultant can work directly with the Citizens group on a day-to-day basis. This would include the November 1971 and May 1972 issues polls, the wave studies and the six week daily telephone surveys. The information would simultaneously be fed to the strategy committee by the consultant.

Mr. Haldeman would retain complete control of the 12-20 "instant research" aspect, and, of course, extract the information intended for the President's use only. He could feed the non-Presidential trend material to the strategy committee.

~~May 19, 1971~~ 5/22/71

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Attorney General
H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

John S. Magruder
Harry H. Gandy
~~GORDON STRACHAN~~

Simulation

SUBJECT:

Polling Plan

~~Before your meeting with the Attorney General, Magruder, and Strachan, it might be helpful to summarize the suggestions on polling for the 1972 Campaign.~~ Derge's November plan has not been updated, but

Benham at ORC submitted suggestions on May 5. Copies of the proposals are attached at tabs A and B respectively. All of the proposals recommend following the basic research plan of 1968. Some variations are offered on the wave ^{studies (repeated cross field interviews)} of large scale interviews, the "Instant Research" capability, and issue studies. The current ORC-telephone system for "Instant Research" could be altered slightly to fit campaign trends and still be able to deliver the information required. So this evaluation will focus on the "issue" and "wave" studies and suggest ~~possible vendors~~ *a mechanism for utilizing vendors.*

The Domestic Council's Issue Study will be completed by the first week in June. According to Cole, two and perhaps three more in depth studies are planned. These can be timed to correspond with the Derge and Benham recommendations (November, 1971, and May, 1972). I would suggest that the November study cover the same basic areas that the current study is examining, to assure adequate trend information.

Went to do

Additional issues that develop this summer and fall could also be included. The thrust of the ~~May~~ study, however, should concentrate on the key issues and swing voters in the battleground states.

This information would be developed from the previous two studies.

with studies
~~The May study~~ would then become the *general mechanism* to set guidelines for the Campaign.

The wave studies ~~could~~ be done as they were in 1968. The theory is that by field interviewing a large initial sample, certain individuals would be re-interviewed in a three wave series to assess the effect of statements and actions during the Campaign. These wave studies concentrated on the key states.

Other techniques for tracking voter attitudes over time may be evaluated during the planning phase in 1971.

The wave studies were supplemented by nationwide daily telephone surveys during the last 6 weeks of the campaign. Four-day updates based on the 1000 telephone samples flowed into campaign headquarters to reflect instant reactions. These telephone surveys could be the concluding series of the 12-20 "instant research" surveys suggested in paragraph 1 above.

you may want to consider

To implement these suggestions, ~~you have mentioned, but may want to~~ *ideas that you have mentioned recently:* give further thought to:

- ~~1. Focus all polling in one consultant. This would have two advantages. First, he could *either* use only one vendor (ORC alone in 1968) or use several vendors. This consultant could in turn report to the yet-to-be established Strategy Committee.~~

~~_____~~
~~_____~~

7
campaign spending legislation, for later disbursement to the vendors as they perform.

2. Concentrate the polling responsibility for the key states in the Citizens for the Re-election of the President. This would include the ^{Primer Poll} May 1971 issues poll, the wave studies and the final 6 week daily telephone surveys. The information would be fed to the strategy committee by the consultant. ^{But you} ~~We~~ ^{control} would retain control of the 12-20 "instant research" aspect, but could feed the non-Presidential trend material to the strategy committee.

In the battleground states, we will be particularly interested in identifying and communicating with the ambivalent voters. The planning study in the Citizens Committee is evaluating the use of census data and past voting patterns to locate important concentrations of these votes. A highly targeted polling program would then be used to identify the issues and attitudes that will most strongly determine their votes. Those findings would be the basis for individual contacts through mail, telephone or personal visits by local campaign workers. Variations on this technique have been used effectively in several state elections, notably Reagan in 1970 in San Francisco County, with DMI as the vendor.

Within the next few weeks, a specific proposal will be made to test the concept in Delaware, in conjunction with the RNC. That test, if approved, would identify the ambivalent voters, using past voting data, detailed by county or precinct, and early Fourth Court (demographic) data from the 1970 census. A baseline opinion survey in several selected precincts would determine voter attitudes toward the President and toward by public issues. Half of the precincts would be held as control groups. In the other half, through various forms of direct communication, an effort will be made to create attitudes more favorable to the Administration. A subsequent poll would evaluate how successful the efforts had been. All of this will be extremely useful in drawing up detailed operating plans for the campaign.

In 1968, Dave Derge served as the professional campaign advisor on polling . It might be appropriate to consider the same type of arrangement for 1972. Several new candidates should be evaluated, ~~At~~ at the same time, we are working closely with ^{Dr.} Derge to review 1968 activities and develop plans for this time.

A preliminary survey has been completed to identify the six most qualified polling vendors for use in the 1972 campaign (Tab __)

During this planning period, we intend to solicit comprehensive proposals from each of the six, both to expand our own thinking on applicable polling techniques and to have a sound basis for making the final selection.

May 23, 1971

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By Emp SRS, Date 3-23-82

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: Compass Systems, Inc.

I talked with Sam Wiley today regarding the California computer system. He is interested in assuming the responsibility for the remaining \$60,000 to keep this system operational. He will use University Computing Corp. as the legal entity on the leases but will do whatever we would like in signing over the rights for the system and the base file to us. He indicated he would like this to be considered as part of his campaign contribution and he has asked me to meet with him and his associates late next week to go over this in detail to be sure he is legally secure regarding this matter.

Having University Computing as the legal entity would tie-in very nicely with our computer operations at the SRC since UCC is their hardware source for all of their programs.

JEB S. MAGRUDER

JSM:ger
JSM Chron
JSM Computers, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN G

The Attorney General just called Magruder about the CSI - Finch matter. The Attorney General directed Magruder to:

1. Inform Finch that the Citizens will not sign the leases;
2. Pursue alternate means of financing; Magruder is to contact Perot and Wiley directly about their individual or joint investment in CSI;
3. Inform Tom Evans at the RNC that the leases are not to be signed.

Magruder thinks that the Attorney General would have accepted the system had adequate background work been done.

Magruder emphasizes that Finch is now in a real bind vis a vis his commitment to Put Livermore. Finch will probably be quite upset at this decision.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10:10 p. m.

LARRY:

Jeb Magruder called - said that
the AG has not reviewed the memo.
He has not signed the leases.

P.

H → G : get to JSM
immed. + say
don't sign until
direct order fr/AG
done
5/27
1105

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

HIGH PRIORITY

May 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

G

Jeb Magruder forwarded the attached memo on the CSI -- Bob Finch matter. The memo asked for the Attorney General's decision on signing the leases for \$60,000 that Finch had committed.

Magruder called this morning to say that Finch had talked to him and reported that the Attorney General had given Finch the O.K. for Magruder to sign the contract.

I know you talked to Finch on this matter this morning and thought you might be interested in this information.

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

May 26, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE LINKING
E.O. 12066, Section 6-102
By CP NAR, Date 3-23-82

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: Compass Systems, Inc. (CSI) - System for Voter Analysis
in California

THE SYSTEM

The Republicans in California have sought to prepare themselves for the very critical reapportionment legislation in 1971 by developing a sophisticated computer system for redistricting design and analysis. The key element in that system is an integrated data base, consisting of California census data and past voting behavior, both broken down by small geographic areas.

This integrated data base can be of significant value in identifying pro and anti-Administration voters, and particularly the ambivalent, or swing voters in the 1972 campaign. For this reason, the overall CSI program development is of interest to the Citizens Committee and the RNC. In fact, the RNC has been working closely with 18 or more target states to aid in redistricting and to compile valuable data for 1972.

With such information it will be possible to:

1. Rank precincts by Republican strength,
2. Locate concentrations of ticket-splitters,
3. Locate concentrations of voters with certain characteristics of age, education, income, race or ethnic background, etc., for decisions on how to communicate with these voters and what issues to emphasize,
4. Make decisions on location of campaign headquarters and branch locations, with reference to the availability of local volunteers, impact of organizational presences, etc., and

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Better interpret the significance of state polling resources, etc.

To have such information for target states reemphasizes the early planning concepts which are being developed in the Citizens Committee for research activity during the campaign.

BACKGROUND

The program was originally started with state funds in the summer of 1970, while Republicans controlled the State Legislature. When the control was lost at the end of 1970, it was continued on a more moderate, but very adequate, scale with private funds. The primary motivation of most state contributors, of course, was reapportionment. Recently, the Republican State Central Committee (Putnam Livermore, Chairman) appealed to Bob Finch for financial support to sustain the effort and Finch committed to find the funds to pay the equipment leases for 1971 (actually, the 10 months beginning January 1 and ending October 31, 1971). Bob Finch, in turn, has asked the Citizens Committee to sign the leases in question.

Both Bob Marik and Bart Porter think that the system can be helpful to the President's re-election effort in California in 1972. If the decision is to assume responsibility for the equipment leases, the Citizens Committee should obtain assurances from the California State Central Committee, in writing, that the data and the programs will be available for our use at any time between now and election day. Further discussions should be held, prior to signing, to cut the best possible deal for the Citizens Committee regarding the payment of fees, if any, for the actual reports to be run off for our use.

In the event that funding is not made available after October 31, 1971, to keep CSI afloat, the data base and the software required to run against it will be complete and the entire system can be run on any number of "time-shared" systems in California at a low cost. Therefore, we need not be concerned that they will "come to the well" a second time.

A detailed chronology of program funding is given at Tab A. A comparison of the CSI system to possible alternative methods of compiling a California data base is given at Tab B.


QUESTION

Should the Citizens Committee sign the leases in question, thereby incurring financial obligations of approximately \$60,000, to be paid out over five (5) months time, June through October 1971?

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comment _____



JEB S. MAGRUDER

CSI SYSTEM

Summary of Funding to Date

July, 1970 to December 31, 1970

State funds were provided through the California legislature (Bob Monagan). The amount is not known precisely, but is probably in the range of \$150,000. It was expended on computer leases, data collection from counties, and software development.

January 1, 1971 to mid-February, 1971

Bob Monagan, California Assembly Minority Leader, provided about \$35,000 from private sources.

Mid-February, 1971 to Present

Approximately \$119,000 was spent during this period, including funds provided by the State Central Committee, Mr. Monagan, Governor Reagan, Mr. Finch (\$12,000) and the RNC (\$25,000). It was spent on equipment leases and software development, primarily.

Present Funding Requirements

Present funding requirements are approximately \$70,000 in computer hardware leases through October 31, 1971. Of that amount, Mr. Finch is thought to have \$10,000 available. Other operating costs to complete the data base and software programs are projected to be \$60,000. There is a firm commitment for \$20,000 from sources within the state, and the State Central Committee is confident that they can raise the remaining \$40,000.

CSI SYSTEM

Comparison to Other Alternatives Available to the RNC or the Citizens' Committee

The CSI system will include an integrated data base made up of census data at the smallest applicable geographic subdivision and past voter performance at the precinct level.

1. Cost

CSI: \$60,000 Citizens' Committee funds, as currently proposed by Mr. Finch.

Alternative: More than \$60,000 to produce an adequate data base without coordination with the state organization, according to the RNC.

2. Quality

The CSI system is probably superior to any system that would be developed through an alternative means. The CSI system will include the voting results for important state referenda over the past years and local races, such as mayoralty campaigns. Statewide survey information will also be included, as well as surveys within assembly districts.

3. Time Schedule

It is unlikely that any new effort could achieve any sort of data base as soon as the current CSI effort could be completed and proofed for errors.

Display of Data in Graphical Form

The CSI system has the capability of displaying demographic and voter data for the same geographic subdivisions in very clear, color-coded computer maps. Alternative systems would probably use less sophisticated computer mapping techniques which would yield less readable documents. In addition, the matching of voter precincts and census tracts would have to be done by hand. That is acceptable for smaller states, but very difficult for a large, populous state like California.

In summary, the CSI data maps would probably be found useful by campaign decision-makers. Other computer maps of the state very likely would not. These maps, when properly designed and read, can locate the ambivalent voter and lead to decisions on how to communicate with him.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



May 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT: Finch's Arrangements with
Compass Systems, Inc.

Last December Bart Porter went to California on Finch's behalf to assess Compass Systems, Inc. Porter submitted a memorandum to Finch on December 11, 1970, which recommended that \$700,000 should be accumulated to take over CSI. You reviewed this proposal in a meeting in your office with Finch and Porter. You decided that \$700,000 should not be appropriated but that Perot or Sam Wiley should be encouraged to take over CSI. Neither did, and the project languished in Finch's office for five months. Severe problems developed while Finch was in Europe.

Jeb Magruder and Bart Porter went to Finch's office last Wednesday to discuss the 18-20 year old vote task force. Finch instead gave Magruder equipment leases to cover the operation of CSI from January 1 to October 31, 1971. The leases provided for the payment of \$83,000 and were to be signed by Magruder on behalf of the Citizen's Committee. Magruder, not suprisingly, said to let me check with the Attorney General before signing. Magruder and Porter saw the Attorney General on Friday. The Attorney General asked for time to "review the bidding" and this information was relayed to Finch by Porter. Magruder is to prepare a statement of the facts for the Attorney General on Wednesday, May 26. This decision may be delayed until Friday, May 28, depending on the Attorney General's schedule.

It turns out that the pressure on Finch to come up with the money is fairly severe because:

1. Finch committed himself to Put Livermore to cover the \$83,000 for leases for January 1 to October 31, 1971.
2. Put Livermore, on the basis of this assurance, took CSI under his wing by raising and authorizing the expenditure of \$120,000. Another \$40,000 is to be raised by Livermore.

3. Put Livermore sent Darrell Wolde to Finch's office Friday to pick up the executed leases. Wolde will apparently wait in Washington until the leases are signed.

4. Due to John Rowe's urging the RNC put \$25,000 into CSI. The California Republican State Central Committee now owns a CSI data base as a result of this investment. It is unclear who authorized this expenditure but it is viewed as part of the Finch transaction.

5. Of the original \$83,000 commitment, \$12,000 has been paid (\$10,000 from Finch, source unknown; \$2,000 from Livermore). Finch apparently has another \$10,000 for the project.

The result is that the balance due is \$60,352 and Finch has stated that whether the Attorney General authorizes the expenditure or not, Finch will stand by his cash commitment to Livermore.

As to the merits of the system, no recommendation will be made to the Attorney General by Magruder. Rather, Magruder will emphasize that the system could be very helpful in California, but that its application to a national campaign has not been evaluated. Similarly, no one has examined the reasons why in December the System cost \$700,000 whereas today \$60,350 could keep it going until October 31, 1971.

RECOMMENDATION:

There has been no detailed White House evaluation of the System since December. In that six months the cost has dropped to one-tenth of the original proposal. Before \$60,000 is appropriated, Bob Marik, Magruder's project manager for the Research Task Force, should submit a written description of the capabilities of CSI to you and the Attorney General.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comment _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date:

5/26/77

To:

Magruder —

From:

L. Higby

What kind of
game is Porter
playing. This is terrible.

L

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date:

5/26

TO:

Larry Higby

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

- This is the inadequate report on Mock Conventions that you asked for.
- Pushing Porter yielded little because he will be out for two weeks with an operation.
- I'll get back on Magruder for something substantive

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

May 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN
FROM: BART PORTER **B.**
SUBJECT: Mock Conventions on College and High
School Campuses

Per your memorandum to Jeb Magruder of May 6, attached is the excerpt from Mort Allin's report which deals with mock elections.

Current thinking is to plan a mock election for someplace in New Hampshire prior to the primary in March, 1972. This would be followed by additional mock elections in late spring and early summer, to build toward the convention. The final report from the 18-20 Year Old Task Force will include a more detailed calendar and strategy.

Attachment

III. Initial Programs

A. Mock Conventions

Intense investigation into the personnel and scenario of five major mock conventions was begun early (Notre Dame, Purdue, Washington and Lee, Ohio University, and Vanderbilt) and a field trip to the first four was undertaken by the director in the first week of February. Depending upon the state, our contacts, and the likely publicity, all mock convention groups who contacted the youth division (over 100 high schools and colleges in the end) were sent Nixon speeches and biographies as well as buttons, posters and bumper stickers. Cooperation from the Nixon for President Committee in supplying literature and campaign materials helped greatly in this endeavor. A Mock Convention Handbook was printed and distributed upon request. Thus, while general assistance was given to schools throughout the country, the five mentioned were determined to be strategic because of past reputations or anticipated news coverage.

The Washington and Lee Mock Convention sought again to be the most realistic and authentic of the college conventions. A conscientious effort was made by the students to reflect accurately the sentiments of the delegates in the states they represented. Because of this, the victory there was more significant than elsewhere. However, the Nixon effort might still have failed had it not been for very capable students working on RN's behalf at the convention. These students were cultivated early and extensive supplies as well as funds (\$300 direct grant) were provided in addition to bi-weekly phone calls.

RECOMMENDATIONS: AS IT IS THE CUSTOM TO ALTERNATE PARTIES OR CHOOSE THE PARTY WITH THE MOST HEAVILY-CONTESTED RACE (USUALLY THE PARTY OUT OF POWER) MOST MPCs IN '72 WILL PROBABLY BE DEMOCRAT. (Mock Conventions)

HOWEVER, IN THE EARLY FALL OF 1971 AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO FIND STUDENT LEADERS AND YRS ON THOSE CAMPUSES HOLDING REPUBLICAN OR BI-PARTISAN MOCK CONVENTIONS. HAVE THEM TAKE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL DETAILS ON THEIR CAMPUS: DELEGATE SELECTION, COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, ETC. THEY SHOULD STRIVE TO MAKE THEIR CONVENTION A FORECAST OF THE ACTUAL PARTY CONVENTIONS RATHER THAN MERELY A TEST OF THE STUDENTS' OWN PREFERENCES. IF THIS CAN BE DONE, CONVENTION OUTCOMES WILL BE MORE PREDICTABLE AND CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY VALUE CAN BE GAINED FROM THE RESULTS. ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM USE OF LOCAL AND STATEWIDE PUBLICITY. BE PREPARED TO SUPPLY NEEDED MATERIALS-- BALLOONS, POSTERS, LITERATURE. A STAFFER SHOULD VISIT THE MAJOR CAMPUSES AT LEAST ONCE TO TALK WITH KEY ORGANIZERS. OFTENTIMES THEY NEED BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT OTHER CONVENTIONS, BOTH REAL AND MOCK, TO GENERATE IDEAS AND GIVE THEM A FIRM GRASP OF THE ACTUAL PROCEDURES. RN SHOULD TRY TO SPEAK AT THOSE CAMPUSES WITH MAJOR

MOCK CONVENTIONS DURING THE SPRING AND FALL OF 1971 AND EARLY WINTER OF 1972.

THE NATURAL TENDENCY WILL BE FOR THE YRS TO BE ENTIRELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE EVENTS, SINCE THEY WILL HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR THE PARTY FOR FOUR YEARS. CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO ADD NEW PEOPLE-- DEMOCRATS AND INDEPENDENTS--TO BROADEN THE BASE OF SUPPORT AND NOT TO BECOME TIED DOWN BY SOME YR GROUPS WHICH MAY BE INEFFECTIVE.

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

May 7, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MAGRUDER
FROM: BART PORTER *BP*

During our meeting with Len Garment today, the following was agreed upon:

1. Len agreed to begin thinking about advertising strategy and together with Porter begin contacting various people on the task force. These people are Pat Buchanan, Dwight Chapin, Cliff Miller, Dick Moore, Ray Price, and Frank Shakespeare.

2. Porter agreed to copy Magruder's campaign file on advertising and give to Len Garment.

3. Porter agreed to send Len Garment the information Magruder has dealing with pending campaign reform legislation.

~~X~~ 4. Porter agreed to remind Magruder to call Ruth Jones.

5. Porter agreed to begin gathering up old campaign film clips going back to the 1968 primaries. Garment suggested I contact John Shlaes who handled advertising logistics in 1968.

6. Porter agreed to contact Dr. Ed David to discuss recent techniques on behavioral and attitudinal research as it might relate to upcoming campaign. Porter will ask that Dr. David contact Len Garment directly.

~~X~~ 7. Magruder agreed to gather together all polling information and deliver to Garment for review.

8. Magruder agreed to begin contacting appropriate people on the advertising task force to discuss our advertising logistics for the campaign.

9. Magruder suggested that Van Shumway be added to the task force group.
10. Garment suggested that Ed Morgan be added to the task force group.
11. Garment was given a copy of the Ailes report.

In addition, I contacted Mark Goode yesterday and inquired about the status of the project to improve the quality of the Navy film crews filming of the President. Mark indicated that the quality of the film had improved dramatically over the past 2-3 months since he has been on board. However, he admitted that he has not had much opportunity to review the films during the last 2 months. He informed me that he has a request in for equipment that will allow him to review films in his office in that the facilities in the family theater are inadequate for his, and I would presume our, purposes. These films are available for viewing on 1 or 2 hours notice.

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102
By DP, Date 3-23-82

May 17, 1971

TO: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: BOB MARIK *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: RESEARCH-MEETING WITH PETER FLANIGAN

At our meeting today, the following points were discussed:

1. Polling Vendors. I gave Peter a copy of Dave Derge's memo on the first vendor survey. Peter leans strongly to the concept of one field polling vendor and one telephone survey vendor (recommendation C in the memo). This eliminates the necessity to manage several vendors in parallel operations and assures better consistency in trend data. He feels that we should further evaluate the potential vendors by letting them perform in battleground states (Derge's recommendation D). We did not have a chance to discuss the recommendations that Tully Plesser is preparing. *F.U. 5/26 - Delroyd*
2. Polling Expert. Peter feels that we should definitely have an expert in the field, such as Dave Derge, working between the campaign organization and the survey vendors. He wants to look at other possibilities besides Derge before a firm commitment is made. Lance Tarrance has given me two names which I will research further. *Bruce Merrill
Walt Reeves*
3. Past Polling Activities. Peter is going to set up a meeting with Derge, to review the polling activity in 1968, as well as to discuss plans for 1972. He has asked for a summary from Larry Higby of Haldeman's private polling activity (not content), and I will gather the public polling summaries.
4. Overall Research Plan. We briefly discussed the overall system which I had drafted, as well as the RNC plans to do a pilot study in Delaware. Peter has copies of both the research plan and Dick Richards' write-up of the Delaware project. He thought that the idea of testing some techniques in Kentucky may have merit. *5/26 - proposal*
5. Neighbors for Nixon. I told Peter that we had talked to Dick Richards and that you had contacted Alan Peterson for a summary of 1968 activities.
6. Next Meeting. If possible, the Derge meeting will take place next week. If not, Peter and I will meet to discuss the overall project further, after he has had a chance to digest the written material I left with him.

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DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102
By SP, date 3-23-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM:

BOB MARIK 

SUBJECT:

RESEARCH

I had an excellent meeting with Marty Anderson on Friday, and I thought you might find these notes of interest.

Research Activity in 1968 - Contenders and Issues

In 1968, the research function under Marty included opposition candidates and issue positions. Peter Flanigan and Dave Derge did the polling separately. In opposition research, each candidate's position on the issues was determined and compared to the President. Where stands were similar, the issue was usually down-played. The differences were emphasized, particularly where it was clear that the opponent came down on the wrong side.

In issue research, a policy position was developed and presented to the President for approval. When adopted, it became the basis for statements, speeches, etc. Speechwriting was very close to issue research. Marty Anderson, Alan Greenspan (domestic policy) and Dick Allen (foreign policy) probably spent 80% of their time on research and 20% on speechwriting. Pat Buchanan and Ray Price spent about 10% on research and 90% on writing. However, those writing the speeches had been involved in the development of the issue. Marty feels that the present separation of issue/policy development and speech writing has led to some rather sterile, boiler-plate speeches, and that we should guard against that in the campaign.

Issue Research in 1972

Although many issues and programs have been established through the Administration record of the first term, there should be an effort to develop new issues and policies for the campaign. We should not be solely limited to defending existing programs.

Polls

A weak point in 1968 was that the results of the polls were tightly held. There was almost no interaction--either in terms of question input or opinion results--between the polling people and those developing the issues. Our current efforts in this regard are obviously in the right direction, and it is very important that they succeed.

Network of Experts

In 1968, Marty set up a network of outside experts who could be reached at any time for a reaction or input on a given subject. In 1970, the network was mainly of people inside the government. We need to set up a similar network for '72, but not too early because people might have been shifted to different responsibilities by the time the campaign is in full gear.

The quality of the people in the network of experts and the research staff is all-important, because success depends on being able to react quickly and effectively to unexpected events. There will, for example, most likely be instances where people in the bureaucracy tip the opposition candidate or the press on some subtle flaw in Administration legislation.

The Director of Research must have a small group of people who know exactly whom to call in the network in case of any fast-breaking issue. To call the wrong person is sometimes worse than not reacting at all. The research staff must also be able to understand very quickly what constitutes a hot issue, so that reaction and response are properly triggered.

We must avoid the appearance that the White House staff is running the campaign, as well as any other indication that it is being supported in part at government expense.

Communications to the Field

In communicating with the campaign party in the field, one often does not realize how hectic things are on the plane. Marty solved the research liaison problem when he traveled with the campaign party by setting a high priority on keeping in contact with his cohorts back at the headquarters. If someone on the plane does not make time for it, it is almost impossible to keep the research information flowing to and from the field.

The 1970 Campaign

In 1970 on the campaign with Agnew, the major problem was knowing the personalities, issues, and other conditions in each state so that the speech content would be appropriate. The advance information could have been better. This time, it would be advisable to compile data from the states: polls, issues, personalities, etc.

They had a very good communications system to the plane which enabled them to get important information several hours ahead of the accompanying press corps, who generally had to wait until landing.

Documenting Past Experience

The experience of past campaigns will be invaluable in '72. Some straightforward logistical items will almost certainly be done incorrectly at first if the new people are given no guidance. Apparently the Advance Men, under Ehrlichman, is the only area for which past experience has been written up in detail. It would require, in most cases, a major effort on the part of the key people in '68 to record their successful procedures and organizations. Adequate motivation would only come if Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell were to contact each one and

ask him to prepare a notebook as a part of a compilation of the total '68 campaign, for planning in '72. One or two isolated notebooks would be of little value in the absence of the others.

Computers

Computers have not been used effectively in past campaigns. In terms of issues and contenders, the important thing is the content of current speeches and statements, rather than instant retrieval of past records. The time lag in finding a past reference is rarely a decisive factor, whereas bad judgment during the campaign often is.

Computers may have been used to process data from polls, but apparently not for processing demographic data. It is usually too hectic during the campaign to make a sophisticated computer program work effectively. However, if a couple of knowledgeable people could be left alone to do it, and if the decision makers in the campaign were disposed to use the output material, it might be worthwhile to do. Kevin Phillips did some good things in '68.

Organization Structure

Marty sees a great danger in isolating various aspects of the campaign in individual organizational "cells". In '68 they were all together in one building in New York. When they expanded beyond that, they went across the street. He is apprehensive of the apparent trend in '72 to keep the nucleus small and have the functioning units spread around town. The enthusiasm of the campaign workers is not as great and they do not work so hard.

It is very important to achieve maximum integration of all the functions. In '68 there were about 40-50 people in the "main body" of the campaign. He anticipates more in '72, if only because of the complexity of having a President travel around the country.

General

When the '72 campaign plans have been drafted, they should be reviewed by the appropriate people from the '68 and '70 campaigns so that past errors are not designed in again. General plans are very important, but most critical is to get the right people to staff the organization.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JEB MAGRUDER

FROM: PETER FLANIGAN

As the campaign progresses you will soon want to form a Businessmen's Committee for the Re-election of the President. Don Kendall would, in my mind, be the ideal individual to form this committee. He's young, vigorous, deeply committed to the President and part of the top business community.

I checked this idea with John Mitchell who agrees Kendall is the proper guy to be head of the Businessmen's Committee. Kendall is ready, willing and able. So unless I hear differently from you I will assume that when the time comes you will go to Kendall.

May 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: BOB MARIK
SUBJECT: THE ELDERLY VOTE

Following our conversation with Len Garment on Wednesday, I met with Bernard Van Rensselaer at the RNC to initiate work on the position paper that we are to develop. Our extended conversation covered the following major points.

Senior citizens are becoming increasingly politically active as a means of influencing public policy in areas of their concern. There are at present four major lobby groups for senior citizens which claim a membership of several million people. These groups are staffed by very capable people and issue regular newsletters to their members to keep them informed of government activity on pertinent issues.

For the first two years of this administration very little was done to curry the favor of these voters. For example, the President had promised in 1968, to appoint an advisor on aging to the White House staff. That has not been done. The top contact in the Executive branch is the Administration on Aging (AOA), which is an agency buried deep within HEW. Recently, several events have taken place reversing this trend.

(1) Earlier budget cuts for AOA were restored, and additional funds added beyond that. This prevented the closing of many Old Age Centers very important to the elderly.

(2) A task force was appointed by the Secretary of HEW to consider raising AOA within HEW.

(3) Last Friday the President met for an hour with representatives of the four groups of senior citizens. They had an opportunity to exchange views on important issues. Indications are that the President created considerable good will even among those who do not completely subscribe to his policies.

Van has been working with Len Garment and George Bell in developing recommendations for the White House. He feels that two additional things need to be done within the next few weeks to consolidate the President's position with these voters. One, the White House should issue a major position paper on programs for the aging. This is a matter which now rests between OMB and Len Garment. Two, the President should make a major address to a large gathering of senior citizens. One possibility would be a meeting in Chicago of the National Association of Retired Persons, in late June.

With regard to the Citizens Committee, Van suggested that a qualified person be designated soon to head the campaign activity for senior citizens. He recommends Howard Webber in Pompano Beach, Florida. Howard is a retired executive of Kaiser Industries and before that was an executive in General Tire and Rubber. He is in his mid-60's and in excellent health, although he has recently undergone a successful double cataract operation. He has a great deal of energy, is very articulate, has good political instincts, and has done organizational work before. In 1969 and 1970, he was chairman of the senior citizens section of the Florida State Republican Committee. He did a good job in coordinating with the leaders of senior citizens in that state. He also, incidently, works well with Van. I suggest that we call him and ask him to come up to Washington at our expense for a planning meeting on the elderly voters as a means to get to know him. He might continue to work in the planning phase and then take over direction of the effort during the campaign. If he turned out to be the right man, it would be useful for him to begin early to establish a network of contacts and campaign workers within the four major groups and within important geographical areas. A man like this would undoubtedly be able and willing to devote a great deal of time to the effort, and the results could be a great benefit.

As the next step in developing the position paper for our campaign planning, Van's office will schedule a meeting to include him, Brad Patterson, George Bell, and myself for early next week. In the meantime they are compiling some useful documents which will bring me up to date on issues involving the elderly.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12066, Section 6-102
By JH Date 3-23-82
May 20, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Attached is a report on each of the Presidential candidates' Washington offices.

This brings up the question as to whether it would be appropriate for us to have an organized system of contact with these individual offices. If you feel it would be appropriate, I am sure we can arrange this activity.

JEB S. MAGRUDER

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

JSM:ger
JSM Chron
JSM Demo/Rep Contenders

McCLOSKEY HEADQUARTERS - 328 Pennsylvania Ave., SE

This is a "storefront" operation, in an older three-storied building that was formerly a real estate office.

There are no signs other than a few bumper stickers and photos taped to the inside of the store window.

Casual visitor can't tell whether upper two floors are being used for McCloskey operation.

Ground floor is one large open area. No switchboard in sight. Old desks and tables. Three young men (20-25) and one middle-aged (45) woman in sight.

Have bumper stickers, buttons, some literature available. Handing out form asking for volunteer help.

A few bumper stickers and photos of McCloskey are taped to the walls, but the most prominent wall decor is a colorful cartoon poster of the President, captioned "He Kept our Boys Out of Northern Ireland."

Really a rather seedy looking setup.

McGOVERN HEADQUARTERS - 410 First Street, SE

Headquarters is on the ground floor of a two-story building just one block from the Republican National Committee. The building is either new or newly remodeled. There are no windows facing the street, and no signs other than bumper stickers on the front door.

The second floor is occupied by the stenographic reporting firm of Ward and Paul, who also seem to use part of the ground floor, probably for printing and mailing services that will be shared by the McGovern people.

The inner door, leading from a tiny entryway into the McGovern offices, has elaborate anti-burglar devices attached.

The casual visitor finds an older woman processing some incoming mail (checks attached) at a receptionist's desk. No PBX is evident, but there's a small Callmaster unit on her desk.

The receptionist's area opens onto another, larger room (about 20 x 30') that appears ready to be used for volunteers in stuffing, mailing, etc. A couple of large McGovern banners, and a big American flag, are prominently displayed.

A hallway runs from the receptionist's area towards the rear of the building, but there's no way of seeing what's back there.

Bumper stickers and buttons (in red, white, or blue) are offered at the receptionist's desk.

Overall impression is of neatness and businesslike.

HUGHES HEADQUARTERS - 41 Ivy Street, SE

This operation is in a detached brick three-story house directly opposite the Rotunda Restaurant. The house is typically Capitol Hill ... smallish, somewhat run down.

The casual visitor finds three or four young people (25 or thereabouts) working amid organized confusion in what used to be the living room. This is the only room to be seen without going upstairs or through a doorway that enters the back of the house.

Several desks and card tables. A rack holding bumper stickers and pins (for sale at 30¢ and 20¢ each) and a variety of literature. No PBX in view. Six button phones only.

Several large banners offer "Hughes, the man to consider in '72." Prominently displayed is a poster-sized photo of President Nixon with his lips pursed. The poster's caption reads "War is Heck."

There is no real sign on the outside of the building. A couple of Hughes bumper stickers are posted on the windows.

This operation seems informal, somewhat ricky-ticky, but gives an impression of organization.

BAYH HEADQUARTERS - 1225 - 19th Street, NW

The offices are in suite 502 of this building, which used to house the International Club on the ground floor. The defunct National Communications Club was here, too, in the same space.

The "International Institute for Environmental Affairs" is in the office next door to the Bayh Committee, and a Dana Orwick and Thomas W. Wilson Jr. are listed in Suite 501.

The Bayh Committee is listed on the building directory, and a couple of bumper stickers and "have a nice day" posters decorate the clear-glass entryway to the fifth floor offices.

The reception area is smallish ... about 10 x 15'. A young woman mans a newer vertical-type switchboard, and visitors are asked to wait on a couple of sofas. Magazines and lamps give the reception area an atmosphere like a doctor's office. There is virtually nothing to see from this office.

Bumper stickers are available, but a request brought only one, and that one had to be brought out by another worker.

The overall impression is "spare, but not bare." It's a businesslike atmosphere.

Interesting to note: Suite 706 is listed to a Ken Reitz, who is probably ex of the RNC.

MUSKIE HEADQUARTERS - 1660 L Street, NW

The Muskie operation is in suites 1004-5 of this office building in downtown Washington. The "Muskie Committee" is listed on the building directory, but not on the door into the tenth-floor office.

The casual visitor finds a bare reception room manned by a young (20ish) girl at an old-style switchboard. This room is shared by a couple of cabinets of telephone gear, a teleprinter (news ticker), a few boxes of books and assorted junk. A picket sign, crudely hand-lettered "Muskie Staff for Peace" rests against one wall. The room is about 12 x 22' in size. A hallway leads towards offices to the rear.

A couple of "Muskie/72" and "Muskie/Maine" bumper stickers are on the news ticker, but the visitor is told that these are manufacturers' samples only, and that stickers and buttons haven't been ordered yet. "Probably, as soon as the Senator announces."

The feeling is one of tooling-up.

Circumstances prevented checking the building directory for possibly interesting firm and individual names.

HIGH PRIORITY

May 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

Job Magruder forwarded the attached memo on the CSI -- Bob Finch matter. The memo asked for the Attorney General's decision on signing the leases for \$60,000 that Finch had committed.

Magruder called this morning to say that Finch had talked to him and reported that the Attorney General had given Finch the O. K. for Magruder to sign the contract.

I know you talked to Finch on this matter this morning and thought you might be interested in this information.

GS:lm

May 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Finch's Arrangements with
Compass Systems, Inc.

Last December Bart Porter went to California on Finch's behalf to assess Compass Systems, Inc. Porter submitted a memorandum to Finch on December 11, 1970, which recommended that \$700,000 should be accumulated to take over CSI. You reviewed this proposal in a meeting in your office with Finch and Porter. You decided that \$700,000 should not be appropriated but that Perot or Sam Wiley should be encouraged to take over CSI. Neither did, and the project languished in Finch's office for five months. Severe problems developed while Finch was in Europe.

Job Magruder and Bart Porter went to Finch's office last Wednesday to discuss the 18-20 year old vote task force. Finch instead gave Magruder equipment leases to cover the operation of CSI from January 1 to October 31, 1971. The leases provided for the payment of \$63,000 and were to be signed by Magruder on behalf of the Citizens Committee. Magruder, not surprisingly, said to let me check with the Attorney General before signing. Magruder and Porter saw the Attorney General on Friday. The Attorney General asked for time to "review the bidding" and this information was relayed to Finch by Porter. Magruder is to prepare a statement of the facts for the Attorney General on Wednesday, May 26. This decision may be delayed until Friday, May 28, depending on the Attorney General's schedule.

It turns out that the pressure on Finch to come up with the money is fairly severe because:

1. Finch committed himself to Pat Livermore to cover the \$63,000 for leases for January 1 to October 31, 1971.
2. Pat Livermore, on the basis of this assurance, took CSI under his wing by raising and authorizing the expenditure of \$120,000. Another \$40,000 is to be raised by Livermore.

3. Put Livermore sent Darrell Woide to Finch's office Friday to pick up the executed leases. Woide will apparently wait in Washington until the leases are signed.

4. Due to John Rowe's urging the RNC put \$25,000 into CSI. The California Republican State Central Committee now owns a CSI data base as a result of this investment. It is unclear who authorized this expenditure but it is viewed as part of the Finch transaction.

5. Of the original \$83,000 commitment, \$12,000 has been paid (\$10,000 from Finch, source unknown; \$2,000 from Livermore). Finch apparently has another \$10,000 for the project.

The result is that the balance due is \$60,352 and Finch has stated that whether the Attorney General authorizes the expenditure or not, Finch will stand by his cash commitment to Livermore.

As to the merits of the system, no recommendation will be made to the Attorney General by Magruder. Rather, Magruder will emphasize that the system could be very helpful in California, but that its application to a national campaign has not been evaluated. Similarly, no one has examined the reasons why in December the System cost \$700,000 whereas today \$60,000 could keep it going until October 31, 1971.

RECOMMENDATION:

There has been no detailed White House evaluation of the System since December. In that six months the cost has dropped to one-tenth of the original proposal. Before \$60,000 is appropriated, Bob Marik, Magruder's project manager for the Research Task Force, should submit a written description of the capabilities of CSI to you and the Attorney General.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Comment _____

HLP 5/24

Dec - HLP → Cal for Finch, ded
report on Compass Systems
Inc →

12/11/70 HLP → Finch

① find funds

H - cc? ② appt comm

③ take over CSI

HLP → H's office H + Finch
review 700,000

H → we don't have " so
how about Perot + Sam
Wiley to invest in CSI

Finch → Wiley + Porter meets
~~Wiley~~ Univ Comp Company

Jan Wiley → Wash + Finch's off,
left back away

HLP - out of it til last 5/19

HLP + JSM → Finch re 18-21/70

Finch tells about Cal per

Pat Hivermore, Chm Cal Reparty
- taken CSI under wing +
control

- raised 120,000 + spent it
raise 40 + into CSI

Finch → Hivermore - " Ill commit
to Equip leases bet. Jan 17
\$ 85,000 10/31

of 83, 12 paid; 10 by RF +
2 by Pat Lavinore + RF
has 10 more from unknown

sources
\$60,352 left

RF on Thur - leases → HLP, so
let comm can sign

RF → JSM + says talked to AG,
who knew nada.

JSM + HLP → AG on Fri +
AG → "review bidding"

JSM - Porter + Maulk,
Ed De Bolt + Rowe
to get facts on Thur.

HLP - Fri → Grassmuck + Finch
Finch, buys review.

when AG decides or
not, RF made commit
+ he will pull it up.

Darrell Wolde, back for Lavinore
5/24 (to pick up leases; at mtg
Maulk, De Bolt, John Rowe,
2 hrs. Grassmuck, Wolde

Wed morning HLP + Maulk will prepare
facts + paper for AG @ great
merit to system + recommend buy system

RNC → John Rowe \$25,000 RNC in
mem Cal per completed data base
file in CSI, Rep St Gen Com
in Cal own's data base file.

Livermore upset w/ RF brief of \$+ commit

G → Hoopes on 10 G last Fri

G → JSM ^{2nd} cc - mem re Pol Counsel

Recommend - signal value for
RN to get Cal.

60,000 - Cal

Ravels broke when RF in Europe
Grassmuck admits he dropped ball

Grassmuck - Brown (John) → Finish
no confid "it has been noted that"
things we discussed should
be FU

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Whoever is running California for us should take a look into this lady and whatever outfit she is with. This kind of cutting from the Right, can do the same kind of damage to the President in '72 that the Shell defections did in 1962.

Concerned
Californians
Against
Nixon

2301 PACIFIC AVENUE, SUITE 6
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

April 12, 1971

Richard M. Nixon
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Nixon:

Public opinion polls show your popularity to be waning. We submit that this is not due to your conduct of the Vietnam war-- although there are probably a great many people who are disheartened by this no-win war--but because of your politically unnecessary "turn to the left", which is evidenced by your "keynesian" deficit budget, welfare expansion, national health insurance proposal, and other welfarist actions.

Enclosed are a few samples of the first in a series of election materials which will soon be widely distributed in California to help insure that this state's electoral votes do not go to you in 1972. While this may indeed result in the election of a Democrat president (barring the emergence of a conservative Republican candidate), we feel that the long range good of the two-party system in general, and the Republican party in particular, will be well served by your retirement from office for the following reasons:

1) A clearly conservative majority of Democrats and Republicans elected you in 1968 on the basis of your clearly conservative election platform. You have betrayed this majority with the result that conservatives of both parties will be reluctant to vote for real Republicans in the future.

2) The presence of a Republican neo-socialist in the White House is having a paralyzing effect upon many conservatives such as Barry Goldwater and others who would ordinarily oppose in principle welfarist schemes such as yours, had they been proposed by a Democrat. You, as a fellow Republican, have preempted their commitment to principle by appealing to "party loyalty".

3) The fact that you have cloaked your liberal/socialist proposals in conservative rhetoric clearly indicates that you yourself recognize that the majority of the electorate is in fact conservative. This therefore indicates that your turn to the left is not based upon "pragmatic" political expediency, but instead on a self-serving desire to earn for yourself a niche in the history books as a "social reformer" in the tradition of FDR. This desire will have to be satisfied at your own expense, not at that of the taxpayers.

Once the Republican Party is reaffirmed as the logical political vehicle for conservatives the two-party system of the United States will once again become meaningful. To this end

STOP SOCIALISM

DUMP NIXON '72

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1971

FU
5/19
H Oopes
orig

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GORDON STRACHAN

FROM:

DAVID C. HOOPES *DS*

RE:

Roger Ailes TV Consulting
March 1971 Bill Payment

You asked whether payment had been made to Roger Ailes for television consulting during March 1971.

We are advised that a check for \$378.25 was made payable on April 9, 1971 to R.E.A. Productions, Inc. for television research and consulting performed during March 1971 by Roger Ailes, representing \$250.00 in fees and \$128.25 in expenses.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~G~~ → Date 5/14

NOTE TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

- Ailes prepared the attached report on the use of TV by LBJ
- The report is weak but interesting passages have been marked.
- Magruder has not received any comments from the AG on the report.

TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN N. MITCHELL

FROM: ROGER E. AILES

DATE: MARCH 1, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

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INTRODUCTION

Richard Nixon will be the second President to run for re-election since television became the primary means of communication with the electorate. This report ignores Eisenhower's use of TV; although it could be argued that he was faced with a similar problem. The Nixon-Kennedy debates really were the turning point of political TV.

A President today has a unique problem. He cannot afford not to use TV but it seems if he uses it too much or in the wrong way it will work against him.

This report is confined to the Johnson television appearances between November, 1963 and November, 1964. It represents a compilation of articles from several newspapers, and magazines during that period. It also includes major books from the Johnson era and "facts/feelings" from conversations with people who were involved and remembered the 1964 Presidential election.

The following is a chronological list of the televised appearances of Lyndon B. Johnson made between November, 1963 and November, 1964. For the first two months in office, the President made ten appearances: 5 each month. There was no regularity in his appearances. In his first ten months in office no month had more than five televised appearances, some months he appeared only twice, and some not at all. In October of 1964, just before the election, however, the number of appearances increased to eleven and three of these announcements were campaign oriented. The other eight were news events where the President thought he could cash in on some free publicity. With the exception of two or three, the rest seem inane and unnecessary as news events but very pertinent to the campaign strategy--the theory seemed to be "the President is hard at work", and if you don't believe it just turn on your television and see him.

PRESIDENTIAL APPEARANCES TELEVISED 1963-1964

11-22-63 On assasination of J. F. Kennedy

11-23-63 Proclamation #3561 National Day of Mourning

11-26-63 Remarks on the Alliance For Progress

11-27-63 Address Before Joint Session of Congress

11-28-63 President's Thanksgiving Day Address to Nation

12-4-63 Remarks at a meeting with AFL-CIO Executive Council

12-17-63 Address before U.N. General Assembly

12-20-63 Remarks upon signing the Radification of the Chamizal Convention

12-22-63 Remarks at a Candlelight Memorial Service for J. F. Kennedy

12-22-63 Remarks at the Lighting of the National Xmas Tree

1-8-64 Annual State of the Union Message

1-21-64 Radio and television remarks on Reopening the Geneva Disarmament Conference

1-28-64 Remarks on introducing Attorney General to press following his return from Asia and London

3-1-64 Remark recorded for opening of Red Cross Campaign

3-16-64 Interview with major broadcasters

4-3-64 Remarks on 15th Annual Anniversary of NATO

4-3-64 Appointment of Robert B. Anderson

4-9-64 Radio-television statement announcing a Moratorium in the Labor Dispute

4-22-64 Opening the World's Fair

4-22-64 Remarks at the American Pavillion

7-2-64 Radio-TV remarks upon signing Civil Rights Act

7-30-64 Selection of a Vice Presidential Candidate

8-4-64 Radio-TV report following renewed aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin

8-5-64 Dedication of Communications Center

8-26-64 Before National Convention recommending Hubert H. Humphrey as Vice President

8-27-64 National Committee upon accepting nomination

9-18-64 Remarks to the President's Advisory Council on Federal Reports

9-18-64 Remarks to members of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference

10-7-64 Statement by the President at the beginning of a campaign trip (The choice is yours...)

10-15-64 Report on Test Ban Treaty

10-16-64 Report after meeting Russian Ambassador

10-18-64 Radio-TV report of recent events in Russia, China, and Great Britain

10-20-64 Remarks following Cabinet meeting

10-23-64 Remarks after further study of the Report of the Council on Pennsylvania Avenue

10-23-64 Congratulating U.S. Olympic Team

10-23-64 Remarks on the U.N.'s 19th Anniversary

11-2-64 Radio-TV remarks on Election Eve

11-4-64 Radio-TV remark at close of Election Day-- Election Victory

SPECIFIC CAMPAIGN ANNOUNCEMENTS TELEVISED 1963-64

8-26-64 Choice of Hubert Humphrey as running-mate

10-7-64 Remarks in Cadillac Square, Detroit

10-24-64 Remarks on River Front, Memphis Airport
Rally

11-2-64 Remarks at Rally at Houston, Sam Houston
High School, Pasadena, Texas

A unique situation appeared in 1964. It was the first year in which a President in office could use television as a campaign tool and only the second time TV was used to at least part of it's potential. The facts were not only evident to the Democrats and to the Republicans but the broadcasters as well.

Frank Stanton of CBS approached the F.C.C. with the question of Presidential News conferences during the campaign. Would he have to give equal time to the other candidates if the President has a press conference? The F.C.C. voted yes by a 4-3 margin. They consider a Presidential news conference neither a bona fide news interview nor an on-the-spot news event so far as the equal time law is concerned. The networks asked for a suspension of Section 315 for the duration of the campaign which was denied by the commission. The ruling doesn't apply to the re-broadcast of portions of news conferences in regularly scheduled news programs. The criteria for a bona fide news conference is that it be regularly scheduled, arranged and controlled by the networks or individual stations. The commission feels that the press could cover speeches and news conferences without showing them in whole and bring the equal time factor into play.

On October 18, the President made a network appearance and the F.C.C. denied Senator Goldwater's appeal for equal time. The attorneys for Mr. Goldwater took the Commission to court and the court also ruled against them. The F.C.C. considered the President's address "an act of office", which was exempt from the 315 Section. Their ruling went back to a 1956 precedent when Eisenhower held a conference on the Suez crisis.

In answer to Goldwater's demands to the networks for equal time, ABC vice-president, Mortimer Weinback, said the essence of the Fairness Doctrine is for the public to be informed, "Not the right of the candidate or his spokesman to be heard".

NBC's vice-president for news, William R. McAndrew, noted that the network had already given Dean Burch (GOP National Chairman) time to reply to Johnson. NBC gave Mr. Burch 15 minutes "in the spirit of Fairness" after it had denied Senator Goldwater's initial request for equal time.

(423)
The whole matter of Section 315 is rather ambiguous. The F.C.C., despite their bona fide double talk, judged each Presidential news appearance by its content. Today there is more of a tendency to discount content and consider the amount of exposure the President receives.

Section 315 was also the cause of an increase in campaign costs. The candidates, not having the canon suspended as in 1960, did not have free coverage and had to buy almost all their time. President Johnson received some as President. The campaign spending for network time in 1964 is almost double that in 1960. This is partly attributable to Section 315 and partly due to the medium coming into its own as a campaign device.

Don Meany, presently Vice President of News for NBC indicated to our researcher that "everything Nixon does" on TV will probably be subject to equal time once the Democrats endorse a candidate for 1972.

The Johnson administration was one of the most secretive in the history of the office. The White House was unwilling to give numbers on the size of its staff and exact head counts were difficult to obtain since many of the lower level aides were paid by another agency while working exclusively for the White House. A good guess is that Johnson had ten special assistants with about 30 men helping them. Often these younger aides were very able men, chosen on political ability.

When Johnson took office he kept many of Kennedy's key men besides massing a staff of aides from his home state. Apparently, Bill Moyers was the organizer of the 1964 campaign, and architect of the brutal television attack on Goldwater. Moyers directed all campaign speechwriting efforts, such as hiring writers and making assignments. He also helped shape the campaign issues. He, Richard Goodman, Horace Busby, Douglas Cater and Willard Wirtz (although kept secret because of fear of bad publicity from the press) were the inside government speech writers. Mr. Johnson also had a standby staff of speech writers outside the government. James Reston and Walter Lippman were sought out at times for advice.

Larry O'Brien, veteran from the Kennedy administration, acted as a high level political agent. He would arrange confidential meetings in which he could take measure of the political situation.

Moyers was given a free hand in the television offensive because both he and the President had the same goal--not only defeating Goldwater, but to destroy him and everything he stood for.

An anti-campaign staff was composed of Myer Feldman, *Daniel P. Moynihan, Lenard Marks, Tyler Able, James Sudquist, Hyman Bookbinder, D. B. Hardeman, Myer Rashish, Tom Finney and John Sharon--whose job it was to embarrass the Republicans and get under Goldwater's skin.

Part of this movement was to make sure that wherever and whenever Goldwater spoke he was bracketed by anti-Goldwater speakers. They also used letter columns in local newspapers written by a Republican for Johnson who was usually a prominent business man in that town. These letters were calculated to be published the day the Goldwater caravan came to town.

This practice was also used to some extent by the GOP in the scheduling of their television spots. Director of the Republican advertising and public relations, L. Richard Guylay, would not comment on reports that the GOP planned to buy time around Johnson programs and spots, other than to say that it was under study and they will "if they can".¹ Goldwater had an effective way of receiving information on such things as when Johnson bought time. Both campaigns appeared to have good intelligence within the enemy camp.

* In early February 1971, Ailes contacted Moynihan at Harvard. He told Professor Moynihan he was doing some research on "the Presidential use of TV in 1964" and "how it might apply in the future". Moynihan told Ailes, "Yes," he would cooperate but would need a few days to think back over events. Moynihan promised to contact Ailes on the succeeding Monday. This never happened and at the time this report was completed Ailes has been unsuccessful in recontacting Moynihan, although several phone calls have been placed.

1. Broadcasting Magazine, August 24, 1964.

The anti-campaign (toward Goldwater) was accompanied by the campaign for Johnson. This campaign, or what seemed to be the lack of one, is summed up in the steady stream of advice that poured in from *John Connally in Texas. Johnson should sit tight in Washington making periodic TV shots to remind the voters that the man behind the big desk was taking good care of the country. The plans would be a President too busy being President to go out and shake hands.

Although Johnson was secretive about any and all campaign plans, he made this statement on September 5, 1964.

"We have a job to do here and we are going to try to do that first. When, as, and if we can, we will make as many appearances as we think we can without neglecting the interests of the Nation...But just where I will be at some certain day in October I can't determine and I don't want to announce because then you'll have me cancelling and adjusting my plans, things of that kind. That makes more of a story than my appearance would make, or maybe what I had to say would make".¹

* Ailes made no attempt to contact Connally but this might be helpful.

1. The Exercise of Power, Robert Novak and Rowland Evans.

Johnson did poorly at formal press conferences. He tried everything from contact lens, make-up to electronic prompters. Nothing worked except not to hold them at all. Pierre Salinger's departure on March 18, 1964, to run for Senator, increased Johnson's freedom to attempt to manipulate the press corps as though it were a commodity for sale with personal favors in return for favorable stories.

"The important corollary of the proposition was that Johnson could generate favorable stories by the simple expedient of courting influential reporters and feeding appropriately pro-Johnson tidbits and background information".¹

This plan failed. Still the stories about the man who drives 90 mph while drinking beer appeared. This bad publicity hurt and angered Johnson. The press was not going to sacrifice their integrity for walks around the Ranch and refreshments at the end of the walks. Johnson liked news men around him. He enjoyed the feeling of being followed about but intensely disliked any criticism by the press and showed it. The public became as aware of his sensitivity as the actual bad publicity.

On January 19, 1964, in reply to the accusation by Edward F. Ryan, President of the Radio Television News Directors Association that there was not one formal news conference since he took office Mr. Johnson said:

"You may be sure that we will make full use of television in the months ahead and television will be permitted to cover some of our press conferences. We would be interested in any suggestions you have in making more effective use of television and radio".²

But still we should realize that any adjustments would first have to suit Johnson before they could benefit anyone else. Lacking the charisma that Kennedy had, Johnson never mastered the press or the press conference.

1. The Exercise of Power, Robert Novak and Rowland Evans.
2. New York Times, January 19, 1964.

Bill Moyers hired Doyle, Dane and Burnbach to develop the TV campaign and prepare specific presentations for him to accept or reject. The Democrats' \$4 million TV offensive was divided into three phases.

First, they took Goldwater's weakest stand, knocked him down and kept him there. This was done with "the daisy girl"--and the threat of nuclear war. Moyers wanted, as he once put it, to put the noose of nuclear irresponsibility around Goldwater's neck. He did just that. The spot was only used once despite Republican claims that it ran throughout the campaign. It only needed to run once and its impact ran for the rest of the campaign--not counting the free publicity it received. (Moyers said later, that he never showed it to Johnson before it was aired; if it did backfire Johnson could have disclaimed it and Moyers was prepared to take the rap for it.)

Next came another little girl eating an ice cream cone while her mother explains about fallout, atomic bombs, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. She says that ice cream cones used to be poisoned with strontium-90 but weren't anymore, that they had better elect President Johnson, because "there's a man who wants to be President and if he's elected they might start testing all over again".

The use of the title "President" Johnson is an interesting point here. By giving him that title it gives the feeling of greatness that Goldwater doesn't have. It puts Johnson in the same category as Washington, Lincoln and Kennedy.

Another of the 1964 TV spots pictured a social security card being torn in two while an announcer says, "Goldwater (Note that no title is given him.) has said he would change the system. Even his running mate admits that the voluntary plan would wreck your social security". Here, too, we can see the subtle influence in the phrase "wreck your social security". Moyers also stressed regional use of TV spots. More effective use of TV spots was made in another commercial based on a Goldwater remark. He once said that it might be just as well if the eastern seaboard were sawed off and allowed to float out to sea. They filmed a plywood map being sawed in half and floating out to sea. It was as if Goldwater had written the copy. Moyers liked this spot so much that he authorized it to be shown once nationally.

In one spot intended for the South, there was an auctioneer on top of a dam--selling the TVA, as Goldwater once suggested.

One proposed spot was to show a klansman saying "I like Barry Goldwater, I like the way he thinks". There was no evidence that this spot was ever shown on network or local television.

Bill Moyers achieved his goal; Goldwater was on the run and spent much of the rest of the campaign trying to deny the heavy accusations placed on him. Johnson joined the honored ranks of Avis, Volkswagen and Cracker Jacks-diamonds in the advertising setting.

A last point should be noted when viewing the Democratic campaign spots. Nowhere is there a mention of Hubert Humphrey. When questioned about this notable omission, Doyle, Dane and Burnbach account executive, James Graham, said, "We just don't feel that people vote for Vice-Presidential candidates. We're selling the President of the United States."

In reaction to the anti-Goldwater spots Thurston B Morton complained bitterly to the Senate. He said that Johnson was trying to win the election by scaring the wits out of children in order to pressure their parents into voting for him.

Many formal complaints were filed with the Fair Campaign Practices Committee by Republicans and Democrats alike. The Democratic National Committee removed the objectionable spots (The Daisy Girl and The Ice Cream Cone) but never publicly acknowledged doing so.

Both candidates used fear as a means of carrying the issues home. Johnson used the fear of nuclear war, fallout from testing and loss of social security as his weapon. Goldwater used the fear of a totally immoral society as his tool against the Democratic Administration. A film called "Choice" was produced by the Mothers For a Moral America--an outgrowth of Citizens For Goldwater-Miller--expressly for this purpose. They commissioned a Los Angeles advertising agency to make it for \$65,000, in addition to \$35,000 paid to NBC for time on a Friday afternoon when it was to be shown to millions of housewives. The film stressed juvenile delinquency, crime, moral degeneration, narcotics; and the facts that women are afraid to walk on the streets at night, parents fearful for their children's safety, husbands for their wives. Russell Walton, a Goldwater aide, said,

"Arouse them, take this latent anger and concern which now exists, build it up, and subtly turn and focus it on the man who drives 90 miles an hour with a beer can in his hands and pulls the ears of beagles, and leave them charged up to the point where they will want to go out and do something about it".¹
Vote for Goldwater.

But the film never hit the air. About two weeks before the election Dick Tuck, a Johnson spy, got a print of the film and showed it to the press, as well as Democratic leaders. So much clamor was raised that the Fair Campaign Practices Committee challenged the GOP to avow the film or scrap it. Goldwater saw it and at the last minute repudiated it as "racist".

The GOP hired Erwin, Wasey Ruthrauff and Ryan to handle their advertising. Edward Nellor, Director of Radio and Television for the GOP National Committee wanted spots longer, fewer, and directed to more specific audiences. Their aim was to hit a predominately female group and generally older, small town audiences. They planned to stress Goldwater's strong facial characteristics in their TV ads.

Director of GOP advertising and public relations, L. Richard Guylay, wanted to rely very heavily on TV because it is Goldwater's medium. "We think it isn't Johnson's that's our premise". He was correct and Johnson knew it. Johnson's face never appeared in any of his campaign spots. Although he was shown in some, he always appeared in the midst of a cheering throng or giving a speech to thousands at a rally.

Since Johnson was not going to come out of his protective shell, the GOP was going to bait, buy, scare, dare and shame him out. Everyone¹ was for a network debate except Johnson and his staff. Network head, Frank Stanton, made his desire for a debate evident through speeches and articles. In one article published in the Times Magazine on January 19, 1964 he said that he doesn't believe that television can make or break a candidate, but that it can just "unmask" a synthetic person. He went on to say,

"It has been said that President Johnson may suffer unfavorably in comparison with Mr. Kennedy's debate appearances in 1960. His advisers have been reported as urging him not to give his lesser-known opponent the opportunity to debate with him".

Johnson's stand was evident eight months before the primary--he would not debate. Johnson would hedge whenever the topic of televised debate was mentioned. His answer was always a very vague "We'll cross that bridge when we come to it". Experienced politicians regard it as the height of folly for a political figure, holding a national office, to build up an opponent by agreeing to debate. The established official can only lose according to this view and has nothing to gain.²

1. Gallup indicated that 71% of the American people were in favor of debates, compared with 20% against.
2. U. S. News and World Report, September 21, 1964.

This was obvious to both candidates. Goldwater tried to shame Johnson in to debating by offering to pay all production and air costs--about \$500,000. In this move, Mr. Goldwater won if he accepted and won if he declined, but Johnson did not budge from the foot of his debate bridge.

In final desperation, Goldwater published a series of pamphlets called "The Debate That Never Was". Printed like a railroad schedule, it gave quotes on specific issues from each candidate.

Although the GOP was highly critical of Johnson's refraining from debating, there was no mention of Goldwater's earlier refusal to debate Rockefeller and Scranton.

Goldwater did not want any old debate--he wanted HIS TYPE OF DEBATE. Knowing what happened to Nixon in 1960, Goldwater issued this statement,

"There might be some risk in exposing the President to public debate. His office is the world's most powerful and most responsible and some slip on his part could have an important bearing on our relations with other nations. But this consideration must be balanced against the people's need, and the President's own responsibility in the area of public information. Sensible ground rules should be adopted. Pre-taping is one possibility and prior agreement on the subjects to be discussed is another."

Although he reversed the order of his stipulations the inference is still clear; if a unsuitable topic is mentioned it would be edited from the tape.

In 1960, the FCC suspended Section 315 on the recommendation of the Senate. This suspension promoted the debates since there was no equal time factor involved with the networks. There is some thought that Johnson had the Senate vote against the suspension in 1964 to not only hinder the debates but practically eliminate them as a campaign tool.

Sometime between 10:50 and 11:00pm on Monday, September 7, 1964 the first television spot for the 1964 campaign was aired. The cost was \$30,000, but before election night the political parties will have spent \$35 million including both nominating and general election campaigns. During the general election period, total network and station charges were \$24.6 million. This constituted an increase of 73% over 1960 and 150% over 1956; of course, basic rates in network and station during this period were increased some. In 1964, 73% of charges by television stations were for spots. Network charges for Presidential political broadcasts were \$3.25 million in 1956, \$3. million in 1960, and \$3.925 million in 1964.¹ Each party spent about \$1. million in 4 weeks before the election. In a last attempt to draw votes the Democrats contacted sales managers of 4,400 local radio stations to sell Election Day spots to local Democratic groups. Each manager received a tape with an hourly countdown with the time left to vote for Democratic candidates. The networks estimated as of the week before the election the GOP invested 20% more on the three TV networks than the Democrats. The final totals on network time published by Broadcasting Magazine on November 9, 1964 are as follows:

<u>Democrats</u>	\$1,901,800	for	13 hours	25 mins
<u>Republicans</u>	\$2,145,000	for	17 hours	5 mins

The Republicans spent the majority of their money in daytime programming and thus received more time for their money but probably lower ratings and less male voters.

1. The drop in cost in 1960 due to the Great Debate.

GOPDemocrats

CBS--\$650,000	4 hrs 10 mins	\$820,000	4 hrs 35 mins
ABC--\$380,000	2 hrs 45 mins	\$586,000	4 hrs 55 mins
NBC--\$1,115,000	10 hrs 10 mins	\$495,000	3 hrs 55 mins

Republicans stressed longer TV announcements than Democrats. They featured at least five prime time network half hours in addition to scattering 32 five-minute spots all over network schedules. No network :60's were planned, but the party was in at least 131 selected markets with spot TV promotion of both national and local tickets. The Democrats, on the other hand, mixed spots and five-minute segments on the networks but held off scheduling longer buys except for an hour on Election Eve (NBC). Spots were used locally as well. Most of Goldwater's half hours were bought for 9:30pm EST. There were no live network appearances by Goldwater. When a spokesman was asked why the Senator was allowed to appear live statewide but not nationally he said it was thought that it would not be good for Mr. Goldwater's image in the Northeast if he appeared in "an arm-waving rally-type" of format.¹

Both parties tailored their approach to the needs of specific areas. Johnson used his Civil Rights Bill as a vote-getter in the North, while feeling secure in the South and Southwest. Johnson opened his tent and let everyone in. Although a Democrat, he wooed business. Although a Southerner, he wooed Blacks, liberals and civil rights groups. Although a business executive himself, he wooed labor. He tried to have something for everybody--he was indeed the politician's politician.

1. Broadcasting Magazine, October 5, 1964.

SUMMARY

In 1964 there was little doubt in anyone's mind that Johnson would win the election. He had a full house with aces and he played the hand well. His hand-picked staff was good and more importantly, they were dedicated and loyal to Johnson. Apparently, they would take the rap for him whenever he would ask. He felt, and likely so, that it is practically impossible to unseat a President in a time of prosperity.

As President he had all the "built-in" campaign advantages, and as President he had the power to make news and shape events. Goldwater had none of these advantages. He also was riding on the sympathy from Kennedy's assassination. Goldwater had to manage his campaign single-handedly. The GOP was sharply divided in support of its own candidate. The press lined up early and strongly behind Johnson. In fact, Goldwater claimed that reporters who travelled with him were the only ones who were fair, that the commentators and columnists were responsible for ruthless and unbased attacks on him.¹ Whether it was because they sincerely disliked Goldwater or because of the hostility reporters received at the GOP convention is unknown.² In any event, Goldwater did not get favorable or even fair press.

The President through acts such as increasing government income by reducing the income tax, generated approval of the people. In a survey published in Newsweek on August 31, 1964, Johnson led JFK in public approval in most key areas polled. Of course, that was just two months prior to Johnson's election in 1964. The Johnson Plan was evident long before the primary. It would be a stay-at-home campaign. For a while there seemed to be two rival groups of Presidential aides. One group favored exposure

1. Broadcasting Magazine, November 2, 1964.
2. Saturday Review, August 3, 1964, Robert Lewis Shayon reported how there was an air of hostility towards newsmen at the GOP convention. Pro-Goldwater delegates made unfriendly remarks to reporters and jostled them.

of the President, the other containment of public exposure. Advisers counselling containment hypothesized that Johnson, so much bigger than life, simply could not be digested whole by the American public. He had to be dispersed in small pieces--at generally formal occasions with carefully written speeches, carefully rehearsed television appearances and rare press conferences. The opposing group believed that Johnson's charm and exhuberance must be brought to the public. They wanted to keep the gentle down-home image but lose the beer-drinking, fast-driving Texan image. Both groups had one thing in common and that was the style of baloney they fed the President about his public appearances. In fact, "Johnson was not bigger than life and simply could not be digested" but his television image was so bad that when he appeared before the public the entire staff was upset about it. As for charm and exhuberance, he had none, at least none that could be transmitted on airwaves. Looking back we see that he followed the theory of containment primarily.

Johnson rode in on a wave of horror of the November 22 pent-up emotions from the assassination. These emotions were released with the Johnson campaign. The American people suddenly let loose with a love of Presidents which happened to be Johnson. This was no reflection on him, he just happened to be in the right place at the right time. The public, filled with shame and guilt, wanted to soothe their ailing consciences by putting someone close to their loved-one in the White House. 1964 was a bumper year for JFK pens, half-dollars, persian rugs, throw pillows, memorial libraries, streets space centers and schools. Finally, the public achieved their goal, the JFK memorial President, Lyndon B. Johnson.

Johnson wielded the Presidential power effectively; he managed to postpone the Bobby Baker issue until after the election. When the Senate was voting on Section 315 and Johnson didn't want to appear in a TV debate the Senate voted not to suspend the rule. No one could defeat Johnson in 1964. The last factor must be considered in why Johnson had to be elected. It is the question of whether televised election predictions effected the voter turn-out or in fact, whether the predictions very close to the election effected the turn-out. Did more people vote for Johnson because they wanted to be on a winning team? Did fewer people vote for Goldwater--the lost cause? The answers to both questions

are probably yes to some extent. How much is not known, but certainly they are a factor in the Johnson landslide. The following are some composite thoughts on the approach to the 1972 election by President Nixon:

1. A secret media committee should be put together very early to discuss and determine strategy for the 1972 elections. An assessment of our media strength in individual states should be made early also.

2. Hopefully it will be possible to put President Nixon's opponent on the defensive quickly. This is generally tough for an incumbent President and some careful thought has to be given to this.

3. A documentary film of Nixon's accomplishments which can be fed to news and possibly aired as a special to signal the kick-off of the campaign might be very useful. A strategy for handling the debate challenge should be determined, outlined and stuck to.

4. It would be helpful to get some information within enemy camps early and set up feeds of information.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FU
5/15

April 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN
FROM: L. HIGBY

Will you please follow-up on the attached note from Ailes. I talked to Bob and he indicated that this project should be paid for by John Mitchell, so if an invoice comes in to Huntsman or someone, make sure it is forwarded over to Mitchell for payment.

Attachment

Telecon → Huntsman 4/5 - sent to
Carson Howells of; will be
pulled + sent to Magruder
→ Magruder advised 4/5
5/4 - JGM - he will FU w/ Huntsman
5/



ROGER AILES & ASSOCIATES, INC. 888 Eighth Avenue, Suite 7F New York, New York 10019

212-765-3022

March 25, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

Washed out pay

RECEIVED BY THE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
E.O. 12958-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-102
By SP2, 100-223-82

Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Chief of Staff
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bob:

This is just to let you know that I submitted the research project requested by John Mitchell. The report is rather lengthy and covers the Presidential use of television in the 1964 election. As I explained, I had to hire some outside research help to keep my name out of it as much as possible.

My Company has submitted an invoice this week covering that research and some of my time compiling it. The invoice just states "TV Research Project for H. R. Haldeman". I did not know who sees the invoices or whether you would want anyone to know I had done a report specifically for the Attorney General. This way if anybody asks, you will know what it's all about.

Best regards,

Roger
ROGER E. AILES
President

REA:hjs

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: _____

TO: LR

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Magruder sent
a copy of their
letter to Mr. O'Leary
to us. Pls attach
it to this package
file

5-24

GS:

Do you have the O'Leary letter to be filed
with this??

yes

Betty - keep
copy of attached
notes + all
FU 1 wk

Apr. 30, 1971

~~FU 5/10~~
~~5/11~~

FU



~~5/13~~
5/17

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 4/23

TO: *Feb Magueta*
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

- Someone seeking a campaign staff job.
- Will you contact him on H's behalf and see what you think?
- Thank you

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: _____

TO: G.S.

FROM: BRUCE KEHRLI

What do we do with
this?

Please Draft appropriate
response.

B

Mr. Stephen E. O'Leary
134-25 Franklin Avenue #606
Flushing, New York 11355
April 20, 1971

Mr. R. H. Haldeman
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Haldeman:


Please let me re-introduce myself by refreshing your memory of when and where we met. It was in Los Angeles in March of 1968, and I was applying for a summer job with JWT. Unfortunately, nothing worked out at that time; but I did end up with JWT in New York, where I have been working since July of 1969.

I am writing to you because I would like to work on President Nixon's campaign staff for 1972. I have a great deal of respect for President Nixon as an individual, and I admire his determination and conviction. For these reasons, I would like to see him re-elected in 1972. However, I sincerely feel that he and his programs are severely misunderstood by most young people today; and I would personally like to work to see this corrected.


Beyond this, I have always had a desire to be involved in politics, but my real feelings go deeper than that. I really want to do something for mankind, to feel that I have personally contributed to helping people. I realize this can't be achieved by wishing hard, but that it takes commitment and lots of it to get anything worthwhile accomplished. I see politics as the best channel for these commitments because government is and will continue to be the focal point of decisions directly affecting all people.

These two statements summarize my reasons for wanting a position on the campaign staff. I would like very much to pursue this with you in person, and I would appreciate an opportunity to speak with you in Washington if at all possible.

Sincerely,


Stephen E. O'Leary

Mr. Stephen E. O'Leary
134-25 Franklin Avenue #606
Flushing, New York 11355



Mr. R. H. Haldeman
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500