Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Folder List

Box Number	Folder Number	Document Date	No Date	Subject	Document Type	Document Description
7	44	5/1/1972	☐	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Strachan RE: R.W. Apple and Tom Weicker. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg.
7	44	5/4/1972	☐	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Haldeman RE: scheduling problems. 3 pgs.

H
FU
5/10
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 1, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN

FROM: L. HIGBY L

The fact that you reported that Gallup has been under extreme pressure not to conduct its Chappaquiddick anniversary poll this year and that R. W. Apple and Tom Weicker have been pushing this, should cause us to do something to hit them. Perhaps the best way to handle this would be some anonymous letters to Apple and Weicker with copies to the editors of the TIMES. It might be good for them to know that others are aware of their activities and also, of course, we can play on the angle here of biased journalism, etc., by this and the public's right to know all.

yes - as loyal Rem, AP + Wic agents of FMK
Pulitzer Paper

FU a/ Rems

Betty Knowland -
5/15 Parade
Topic
Personality

drafts to Weicker + Apple

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 4, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: L. HIGBY

SUBJECT: Surrogate Scheduling

In a memorandum (Tab A) to Colson and Magruder, you requested that they work out the problems surrounding our scheduling of surrogate candidates for the period between now and the election to assure that the President's interest in maximum utilization of surrogates takes place.

BACKGROUND

Magruder and Colson have been unable to agree upon a satisfactory solution to this problem. Their lack of agreement is primarily a territorial dispute, centering around who will be the contact point for certain surrogates.

Magruder maintains that it is highly desirable to have one contact point and that contact point should be the Committee at 1701. He believes this is true for everyone except Mel Laird and Secretary Rogers, who should continue to be programmed by the White House. He cites the fact that Mitchell has sent a letter to all our surrogate candidates (including Cabinet Officers) indicating that 1701 is to be the contact point. Allowing Pat O'Donnell of Colson's operation to continue scheduling Cabinet Officers or other Administration representatives, is not a good solution. His position paper is attached at Tab B and is not worth reading.

Colson, on the other hand, feels that the White House should continue to schedule Administration spokesmen as long as possible -- that the more we can do from the White House in scheduling spokesmen, the better impact these spokesmen will have.

Essentially, it's a battle for control rather than a logical argument on what is really best for the President.

Colson's draft position paper is attached at Tab C with my notations and is reasonably close to being the best arrangement from the President's standpoint. It does, however, suggest a continuing split operation, something that you wanted to try and avoid, but proposes continual coordination which should minimize the hazards of a split operation. As a general rule, a speaker will always have greater impact when he is viewed as an Administration or White House spokesman, rather than as a partisan-political speaker. The only exception to this would be at the times when he is speaking at partisan events.

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION

Assuming a split operation is desirable, there is, nonetheless, the need for a central control and someone who is clearly acting as a director of the overall operation. The central point of control in the final analysis has to be first of all the President, and then 1701. Political considerations must take priority the majority of the time. This does not mean, however, that White House input should not be included and the suggested strategy board that is included in Howard's memorandum probably can adequately fill this requirement. The implied weak point in the Colson plan is his continuing control of O'Donnell. If there is to be a coordinated effort, O'Donnell must be part of that coordinated effort. He can't be given counter-instructions by Colson. Therefore, while O'Donnell may in fact remain under Colson, he will actually have to work out all his plans in coordination with and with the approval of 1701 and the master scheduling operation.

The Director slot -- O'Donnell isn't heavy enough to do this and neither is anyone who is currently working over at 1701. My suggested solution here is one that we've discussed before, John Whitaker. John's role would be to act as an overseer for the operation to meet with the different scheduling people involved each day to make sure everything is on track. He would be able to make decisions but would not be put in the position of having to spend full time on this. He should be able to continue his duties in the Agricultural and Enviornmental areas for the Domestic Council. This gives John, as we've discussed, a link to the Campaign. He's someone the President would trust and would also have Mitchell's confidence. I've mentioned this idea casually to Magruder and he thinks it is sensational and knows Mitchell would buy it. I assume Colson would react in a similar manner.

Most of the other points mentioned in Dick Howard's memorandum are okay and can be worked out. Setting the line will be taken care of, hopefully, on a day-to-day basis through your political meeting.

The one other area that needs to be tightened-up is the handling of invitations that are Presidential turndowns. Obviously these can't be handled at 1701. They are almost inevitably for non-partisan forums and even if they are partisan forums, they should be handled as if they were non-partisan to keep us above the battle. The schedule group that Whitaker is in charge of probably should meet to consider these and how best to fulfill them. They should not be turned wholesale over to 1701. A White House invitation can't be responded to by our political apparatus as you have already indicated.

I would hope that when you meet with Ehrlichman and Mitchell you can get them to agree upon the Howard paper as modified herein. I would suggest you send a copy of it up to John before the meeting with my notations on it.

You also might want to discuss the Whitaker idea with Ehrlichman ahead of time so that the two of you are on the same track when you talk to Mitchell.

Attachments