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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 8, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN  
FROM: HERBERT G. KLEIN  
JEB S. MAGRUDER  
SUBJECT: Campaign 1972

This memorandum analyzes some areas on which this office might focus as we move toward November of 1972.

Now that the 1970 campaign wrap-up has ended, we would like to discuss in some depth the experiences we have had which would enable us effectively to explore alternative approaches to the forthcoming Presidential campaign. Decisions should be made now so that there is time to work organizationally in preparation for an effective campaign in 1972.

We will mainly concern ourselves in these recommendations with those areas in which we have had past experience; we shall suggest ways in which those areas might be further developed.

Naturally, our domestic and foreign policies, the state of the economy, the President's approach to the campaign, and the political operation will have a major impact on the outcome of the 1972 election. We do not plan to explore those areas in this memorandum, but rather will concentrate on the organizational support activities where we can be of most assistance.

We would view whatever activities we undertake as an extension of the President's office through you to the various sub-groups which will ultimately be involved in the campaign. There will be, in 1972, the

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Citizens groups, the RNC, the media and creative agencies, the Cabinet, etc., all of which could be reached by the President and your office normally through the mechanisms we would set up. We are fully aware of the need for keeping in the background and this would be done particularly prior to the convention. We believe our office has set a record for handling things in this way. Obviously, there will be occasions also when the President and his key political advisers will want to deal directly with any of the above.

If you approve general concepts as outlined below, we can further develop concrete, specific and detailed suggestions.

### ADVERTISING

Drawing on our experience in 1970, and spending a good deal of time in 1971 studying campaign advertising, we would gear up to handle all of the Presidential campaign advertising, including the print media; radio and television; brochures; direct mail, both by the use of mailings to our hundreds of opinion-leader mailing lists and specific voter mailings where appropriate. Again, this would mean working through a group set up at the National Committee or at the campaign headquarters, but it would best use the mechanisms we have set up during the past years. It would mean also that we would be consulting with outside experts we have built up a relationship with.

Our proposal here is that we use the first part of 1971 to look at a number of preferably small creative advertising agencies and also at various individuals involved in advertising (e.g.: media buyers, copy writers, and creative people). We would put together a number of various combinations of individuals and agencies who could handle a national campaign.

Then, in November of 1971, we would present the best of these various approaches and combinations to you and others you might select. A decision could be made at that time as to which approach we wanted to take.

The point here is that we would spend the necessary time to study all the various agencies and individuals -- for example, direct mail plays a greater role in each election and will probably be very big in 1972 due to criticism of and possible regulation of the use of television. We would

carefully study all the large direct mail houses in 1971 to find out what should be done in 1972. Obviously, the direct mail must be specifically targeted, both politically and as to residents within key geographical areas. This makes the mail house selection all the more important.

Such an experience in 1971 would enable us to put together Presidential radio and television advertising, campaign films of the President with certain candidates, radio tape endorsements, etc.

Therefore, we propose that we be given permission to commence such a study which will result in a presentation to you next fall of the best alternatives.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

### SCHEDULING

Again, drawing on our experience in 1970, the Scheduling Office would coordinate the political activities of (1) the First Family; (2) Cabinet members, Administration officials and key White House staff who would function as "surrogate candidates" as in 1968 and; (3) celebrities. This office would perform its customary job of filling requests for speakers, but it would also decide where our people ought to be, and then find forums for them to appear.

A list of 1972 key states would be developed as soon as possible and updated as often as necessary between now and the election. Appearances by Cabinet members and others would place emphasis on these key states immediately. Primary contacts in each state should be identified as soon as possible so that the head of the scheduling operation could initiate personal contact. The various state GOP and citizens organizations would be instructed to contact the scheduling office regarding VIP appearances.

We propose that we continue our efforts in scheduling the Cabinet and other Administration officials, stepping up our activities in January of 1972 to focus almost exclusively on the key states.

In the past, most of the speeches have been made in response to invitations. These are a good source, but we are compiling a list of national

association and organization conventions so that we may actively seek spots on the programs of those conventions which are advantageous to us. We also will seek information from the Cabinet officers regarding major invitations they turn down so the possibility of filling these could be reviewed. We are looking here at service clubs, fraternal organizations, labor unions, ethnic groups and others. We believe this office also can contribute more to suggestions as to possible Presidential appearances which again would be ones we would look for rather than waiting for invitations to come in.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

We propose further that we schedule celebrities and the First Family (not including, of course, the President) beginning in June of 1972. During 1971 we would set up our celebrities program drawing on our experience in 1970.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

Advance men, schedule coordinators, transportation coordinators, a pool of private aircraft, access to speechwriters, etc., will have to be available to the Scheduling Office in 1972 -- but not until then.

The next section in this memorandum is "Broadcast Scheduling". It is obvious that the person in charge of broadcast scheduling would work very closely with the Scheduling Office to make certain that every time an Administration official is sent out, that person would appear on local and/or regional radio and TV talk shows.

#### BROADCAST SCHEDULING AND LIAISON

As mentioned above, this "office" would work closely with the scheduling operation to place our traveling officials on TV. We have a good, updated card file on several hundred radio-TV talk shows, many of which were used during the campaign. We know which are cooperative and which have impact.

This office should also continue as the Administration contact point for all national television including the Sunday interview programs and late night talk shows. This avoids the problem of working at cross purposes within the Administration and gives us clout when attempting to get our

people on these shows. This will be available in 1972 when we want to get out our line each week.

Prime time special TV interviews have obvious impact. The 25 special prime time, half-hour regional shows we arranged in the 1970 campaign can be substantially increased now that we have a foundation of cooperative station management people to work with.

The group station approach for interviews should be continued. This was effective last time where we hit several key stations in a group set-up with a single interview. Westinghouse, Cox and RKO General, among others, were eager to cooperate and we can expand on this by working with the major groups which together comprise a formidable TV-radio network. We are now well plugged into the Washington bureaus of the groups which generate much material for their stations.

During the campaign we learned that there is a growing availability of top government officials to tape half-hour shows even in areas where there are no regular talk shows. These are important in smaller states which will have a major bearing on the election or in medium sized cities such as Springfield, Illinois and Sacramento, California.

Where the Vice President is concerned, city or state-wide TV hookups should be encouraged rather than giving a single station an exclusive. Most stations will cooperate on this and did in North Dakota and North Carolina.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

We want to stress here how important it is that the Scheduling Office, which would plan the travels of the Cabinet, Administration spokesmen, the First Family and celebrities, work closely with this "Broadcast Scheduling and Liaison" office. By itself, a scheduling office can have little effect -- but working in close harmony with the other people in our office who have expertise in print and broadcast journalism, our scheduling operation can operate as a traveling press office for the Cabinet member or celebrity on the road. For example, when the President travels, the Chapin-Walker tour office plans the trip and the Ziegler press office handles the media. It is important that when Administration

spokesmen ("surrogate candidates") travel, they can rely on this office to (1) find the correct forums and; (2) get them in the local and regional press and on local and regional TV. Unless we do a good job with the second category (which we can do from this office), finding the forums, getting the speakers, and advancing them means relatively little.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

Also, this broadcast operation can work closely with the developing Chapin-Walker tour office to assist in top notch TV coverage of all Presidential addresses and appearances. We would keep a video film library of Presidential speeches (especially on the stump) for possible rebroadcasts. This would be done through the Navy Labs as we have discussed in the past. Two top-flight Navy cameramen could accompany the President to insure high quality film. This type of preparation would protect against media coverage and presentations of non-Presidential quality.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

#### ATTACK AND RESPONSE DESK

This office will focus on keeping track of the opposition and providing assault material to keep them off balance. The success of such an operation depends on having, as soon as possible, the statements of the opposition. Once they come out (which we get from our research operation), we can get to work immediately on counterattacking through the scheduling operation: finding who is traveling, who has a forum, who can speak out. Additionally, in this connection, the Response Desk can move swiftly to get the Administration line out to all spokesmen and our people on the Hill (through Nofziger) so that everyone has an answer in case he's asked.

Now is not too soon to start compiling good, comprehensive fact sheets on specific policy areas, such as farm, the draft, manpower retraining, trade, etc. Comprehensive sheets on these topics can be used with good effect from now all the way to the campaign. The summer and fall of 1972 will be too late to get across the substantive correctness of the Administration's accomplishments.

It is most useful for the individual candidates to receive material before or right after a given event. The RNC should use more phone contact

with the Senate races and utilize more greatly the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee's telex hookup. For the Presidential campaign, getting key information to speakers ahead of the event will be particularly important.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

In 1968, there were hundreds of requests by magazines and newspapers for statements or written interviews by the candidate. Working with the Keogh staff, the Response Desk should begin during late 1971 to gear up for the deluge of requests so that we may take proper advantage of them.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

#### REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE REORGANIZATION

Proposals relative to our liaison with the RNC will be forthcoming after the structure of the Committee under its new chairman has been determined. However, we should give consideration as to whether the research and communications departments at the RNC ought to be organized under the direction of a single head who would, in addition to reporting to the Republican National Chairman, develop a close relationship with this office. In other words, it might be useful to maintain the research and communications department at RNC while having someone in whom we have confidence oversee those two operations and undertake responsibility to see that they get the job done.

A consolidation of this nature would result in a greatly improved and more responsive RNC press operation, clipping and retrieval system and mailing system. Our having one person to make sure the job gets done will avoid the possibility of the two departments working at cross-purposes.

The proposal here is that we work with the new RNC chairman in suggesting the consolidation of the research and communications departments with an eye to improving the operations just described.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_



A separate memorandum, which was sent over earlier, outlines some of the thoughts with respect to National Committee publications and guidance of those publications by an editorial board made up of some of the creative White House staff members. There also is a need in this structure for someone of stature and press respect to be head of the press department of the National Committee.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

As you have previously approved, in connection with the research and retrieval systems, we would step up our efforts in collecting newspaper clippings and data on potential Democratic Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and also Democratic spokesmen such as Fulbright. We would go back and pick up old quotes and stay on the alert for new ones.

We found that the current research and retrieval operation at the RNC did not fill our current needs or the needs we expect to have in 1972. Too much time was spent on general clipping and too little in Democratic candidates' home states, e. g.: Maine. Consequently, we are currently working hard with the RNC to get their system moving and we will discuss with the new RNC chairman the need for a man with enough political savvy to run this operation. We will also focus on issues in addition to candidates.

The system we are aiming at is a full text retrieval computer system where the full text of the document is entered -- retrieval is then done by searching for key words which appear in the text. This can be done within the budgetary limits now set at the RNC -- we expect to have, within these limitations, the best system possible.

#### CITIZENS FOR NIXON/AGNEW

As the various Democratic candidates for the Presidency begin to set up "citizens for" organizations and offices, we should also. This should be done on a small scale during 1971 so that our massive citizens effort can be well underway in 1972. Just as the 1968 citizens operation got going much sooner than the 1960, the 1972 organization should be put together in 1971. We would begin by setting up a group of young people in their 20's and 30's in a Washington office building -- we would like to

take a hand in the recruitment of these people and direct them to some extent over the next few months. Each of them would be assigned a region of the country much as the Ellsworth-Kleindienst operation in 1968 assigned various people responsible for certain geographical sections. The purpose of this would be to find in each state the citizens group leaders with whom we would work in the 1972 campaign. Persons such as Charlie McWhorter could be utilized in this connection.

Ultimately, the purpose of the citizens operation would be to involve tens of thousands of people on behalf of the Nixon-Agnew ticket; hundreds of store fronts should be used throughout the country to enlist support for the President. Using this organization and the store fronts, we could begin to organize various ethnic and special interest groups to support the President (e. g.: Italians for Nixon).

Although we would, of necessity, have to finance the initial stages of the citizens operation, and also a Washington headquarters, the citizens operations throughout the country ought to be self-supporting. We would give them the ability to buy materials through a catalog of campaign materials which would be made available by the Washington headquarters.

Our proposal now is to set up in the early months of 1971 a small citizens operation in a Washington office building, manned by several young people who we would hire after consultation with Messrs. Chotiner, Dent, Finch, and Mitchell, the new Republican National Chairman, and whom-ever you might designate.

This office would work closely with Attorney General Mitchell if he is, as we assume, to be actively involved in the 1972 campaign. The finance people could also have offices with the citizens group, although the two operations would probably be kept separate as they were in 1968.

This office has worked with Mr. Mitchell and the others mentioned above in the 1970 campaign, and could continue this relationship very effectively in 1972. We would work on the organizational end of the citizens group -- the political dealings would be left to the political offices at the White House.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

We could recruit young people to work on the citizen's effort, in part, by our Administration officials who speak before the various Jaycee groups, YR's, and other youth-oriented organizations. This would have to be, of course, closely coordinated with whoever is selected as chairman of the overall citizens' effort.

Since it would be difficult to get the more experienced political operatives for a full year-and-a-half, these young people could lay the necessary groundwork so that the 1972 Nixon field operation would be ready in the spring of 1972 for the more experienced types (as in 1968, Sears, McWhorter, Kleindienst and Ellsworth) to take over.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

#### WHITE HOUSE-RNC COMMUNICATION

We will explore with WHCA and other people with technical know-how the various telephonic and electronic devices which would provide better White House-RNC communication so that paper could be transmitted back and forth more quickly than by messenger.

#### PRINT MEDIA LIAISON

With the addition of Van Shumway to the staff, our office will have the ability to get our line out in the print media as the Broadcast Liaison shop gets it on the air. Shumway can spend 1971 getting to know every key reporter, bureau chief, and columnist in Washington -- whereas Mr. Klein is the best person to get out our line to these people, his time is naturally limited and Shumway can assist him in this connection. Then, when a campaign game plan calls for getting a line in print, we can draw upon our contacts and move swiftly to plant our line -- just as our project managers move quickly in their fields. Also, we can use this concept to quickly plant leaks.

This work would be, of course, augmented by the National Committee staff and further developed in special interest areas by the citizens organization.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

POLLING

We propose to continue coordination of the polling and simulation activities between now and November of 1972 with the exception of the "quickie" telephone surveys which have been conducted directly from your office.

Between now and June of 1972, we would plan approximately six to eight field polls (perhaps four polls in 1971 and three in the first six months of 1972). Then, in the remainder of 1972, quickie telephone surveys as appropriate. In the fall of 1971, we would want to plan for the spring of 1972, and probably poll on a closer time cycle, with concentration perhaps on the key states.

These polls would continually check the President's image and also issues as they come into play. We would also move ahead with the simulation experiments as outlined in Mr. Magruder's memorandum to you dated July 9, 1970.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

CONVENTION

Although we do not, of course, expect a challenge to the President's nomination at the Republican National Convention in 1972, we nevertheless ought to be prepared for any eventuality which might create a floor fight either on the nomination of the President or the Vice President, or on any issue or platform plank before the convention. This means, during early 1972, that we should prepare extensive background data on each delegate and alternate to the convention as they are selected beginning in New Hampshire. The person who kept these records for the President in 1968 is, as you know, on the staff in this office and could supervise the collection of similar data in 1972 -- the records could be housed at either the RNC or the citizens headquarters. In 1968 we had the most extensive records in American political history and we should do no less in 1972 in order to control what happens on the convention floor.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

Furthermore, we can work with others involved in the campaign to make certain we have the proper communications equipment in the President's hotel command center, the convention hall trailer, etc. At least one person on this staff was actively involved in this area in 1968.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

Lastly, because the Presidential Press Secretary will not arrive at the convention until the President arrives, this office can take the lead in establishing a Press center at the convention which is operative as soon as the first reporter arrives at the convention city. Naturally, this Press Center would work closely with the press officers of the RNC and the citizens. Herb Klein could act as the spokesman at the Center and Ron Ziegler, of course, would use the Center when he arrived with the President.

The Press center would depend on the National Committee for the routine logistical work, as in the past. When purely partisan announcements or statements are necessary, RNC or citizens personnel could make them.

In 1968, we gained a major foothold by moving more rapidly in press activities than any other candidate which gave us the advantage of constantly making news. We must make certain we are prepared to do this again in 1972. This is particularly important in a convention where, presumably, there will not be a challenge to the President's or Vice President's nomination and where the reporters will be left to make up their own stories, which inevitably will be based on divisiveness.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

There is also a major need for coordinated activity to streamline the entire convention. We believe this office could make major inputs into this area in matters ranging from the problem of press on the floor of the convention hall to the best use of television. There needs to be considerably more input from others with creative ideas in Keogh's shop and from the political operatives.

We do not believe this convention should be an Atlantic City "Kingmaking" operation, but should be designed to hold TV audiences which we want to reach. This has never been accomplished since TV began at this type of convention. The National Committee has a study regarding the convention problem and we will look at it as a basic, continuing activity perhaps headed by you so that we can examine the whole problem.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_