Richard Nixon Presidential Library Contested Materials Collection Folder List

Box Number	Folder Number	Document Date	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	Document Type	Document Description
1	13	7/26/1972		Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: organization on the 'anti-campaign.' 1pg.
1	13	7/23/1972		Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to RN RE: The Vice President and the Campaign. 4pgs.
1	13	7/12/1972		Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to RN RE: points worth noting through observations from a study of McGovern primary ads. 6pgs.

July 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

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PAT BUCHANAN

The letters operation which we helped put pogether two years ago, and which has functioned well, is in danger of becoming bureaucratized over at 1701. This is one instrument both Colson and I have used to move the "negative" on McGovern -- safely -- into the media. We had planned to continue using it in this fashion -- as we should; to have our people writing letters in support of revenue sharing is, in my view, a waste of a resource. That stuff is going to be decided on the Hill. The imperative thing is to make sure that the McGovern extremist material is being constantly put before the public, as the public view on McGovern is beginning to harden.

As an example, we had that bit from Von Hoffman, where Kimmelman was telling Polish jokes in his suite -- and were moving it to all papers via letters to the editor in cities with large Polish populations. This was halted by 1701 as "too negative." The point is that a) it was totally legitimate and b) the letters don't go out on 1701 stationery. In any event, the tendency to fold the letters operation into the overall strategy is not wise, because of the nature of letters, and because this should be a negative function. Negative letters are the most needed now, the most likely to get printed now, and the most important as McGovern's impression is hardening in the public mind.

We can use other sources to praise revenue sharing. But the letters operation should go back to what is was doing. This indicates, in my view, again, a need to get some organization and structure on the anti-campaign.

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Buchanan

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July 23, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (As Requested)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

SUBJECT: The Vice President and the Campaign

Because the Vice President remains, outside KN, the biggest gun we have, the Veep should be staffed up -- at least on the level of the 1970 campaign. Full plane, and gear and constant contact and communication with the White House and Re-Election Committee.

1. He will have to visit those states the President cannot visit, as of course the first responsibility.

2. However, as often as possible, the Vice President should be scheduled into those areas and among those groups -- that are the battleground in 1972. And that is <u>not</u> Republicans. We, by and large, have the South now. In the North, it is Catholic, ethnic, urban, Jewish, middle-income, working class Democrats who are the swing votes, the ones who will decide by how large a margin we will win this one, if we do win it.

Therefore, schedulers should look to Pulaski Day Parades, Columbus Day Parades (What about a WH function, along the lines of the St. Pat's Party), union halls, Knights of Columbus, Queens, PBA, and ethnic community meetings.

This is vital, in my judgment -- and we should schedule Dole and MacGregor into the GOP functions, using the Veep for those areas where he can do us the most good -- among the Wallace Democrats in the North, in places like Michigan and elsewhere.

3. The Vice President should have a set-piece speech, as the President had, and instead of an entire new text every day -- as in 1970 -- we should have a new "Ten Graphs" in each speech. This is one hell of a lot easier on speech writers, and gives us greater control of the material that the press runs.

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4. The Vice President should carry the fight to the opposition ticket, by and large ignoring Eagleton -- and zeroing in on McGovern. The Veep has the Assault Book. What is needed now more than anything is co-ordination of the attack strategy so that we don't pee away everything in the first weeks, and so that our strategies can be co-ordinated.

5. Frankly, we need better press relations between the Vice President and the national and local press; this might well require a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Veep's staff toward the traveling press. (We had good relations we thought, by and large, in the 1970 election.) Certainly, the Vice President should do something for the locals at each stop. And we ought, of course, to shelve for the campaign the broad anti-media attacks; unless a) it proves politically necessary in light of their shafting. We have the political dividents out of this -- our target is McGovern.

6. Contact on a regular basis between the President and the Vice President would be especially helpful -- not simply for moral purposes, but to review the success of failure of a given strategy and to maintain campaign flexibility.

7. We should, on the campaign trail, avoid I think, the epithet and make our charges -- based strictly on the record. So that McGovern is forced to respond to what he himself said -- not to what we called him. However, the extremism of the McGovern positions and statements, and the "elitism" of the New Left controllers of the Democratic Party remains an effective theme appealing to Democrats.

8. We should remember that the swing voters in this election are Democrats -- and strictly Republican appeals this fall are only useful for rallying the troops, nothing more. The "McGovernites" is right on the mark.

9. The situation of 1970 where the President's people were on board the Veep's plan -- at the Veep's invitation -- was a good one. Since the President is not going to be stumping, his top writing talent, or much of it, should be with the Vice President.

10. I recognize the need to defend the President and his Administration, but what the press considers "news" is mually negative news, i.e., an "attack" rather than a flefense. And we must not allow McGovern to wwing over onto the offensive -- i.e., I would argue that the Vice President should be carrying the struggle to their ticket, rather than waiting for them to attack, and defending the President.

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In my view, whereas in 1968 it was relatively easy to scare the voters, with attacks on RN's economics and position on medicare, etc. -- that tactic on the part of the other side won't work today. Whether they agree with RN or not, very few Americans are "frightened" by the prospect of another RN term. The same cannot be said of McGovern! and this is the factor which opens up the possibility of a landslide. Thus, a campaign which continually raises specters about McGovern's extremism, and the crazyness of his ideas, is the only kind of campaign I think that can win us a major landslide. A defensive strategy, thus, does not commend itself to me -- especially for our biggest gun outside of the President. We ought to have other views on this.

11. We have to be wary of making George a Martyr. Mean-spiritedness has no place in this campaing; thus, it is important that the campaign staff not be tired and bitchy as the campaign heats up. The humor used should be light and needling -- not mean in character.

Again, on this score, though unfair, it is true that we have a smaller margin for error than the Democrats. The Veep can call McGovern a "fraud" and be excoriated for it -- McGovern can compare RN to Hitler and his policy in Vietnam to the "extermination of the Jews" and get away with it, without comment. Without tearing into our friends in the media. we have got to keep pointing this up.

12. Vitally important that we not allow a situation to develop, as in 1960 with RN or 1968 with the Veep, when the candiate and his traveling press werwat sword's point. Even if the press is shafting us, it is not to our advantage to conduct a Cold War with them -- when they are reporting what we say and do. In the fall, on the Vice President's plane, there should be some who will bring that "can of oil" when necessary, and will, in a good cause, eat a little crow and humble pie.

13. Essential that the Vice President, this fall, feel that he has the full confidence and support of the President, and regular backing. My view is that in 1968, when the Vice President was under attack, we would have done better by bringing him on to answer the charges against him. In 1962, we can be sure that the Vice President will be an issue -- the answer to this is to put him on the air, on national television, and to let him in his own calm way, with his own accents, answer the allegations that will be made against him. To show he does not have horns. We might even consider a visit to some campus -- or a youth confrontation on the tube -- for the campaign. As in 1952, a

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harsh and strident and unfair attack on a Vice President can be made to back-fire against its perpetrators.

Considering that one of the advantages of McGovern is that he may be perceived as the underdog, the anti-Establishment candidate, it might be good to get the Vice President into this role, and come fighting back fairly, against all these elements and institutions that are out to get him.

14. Lastly, the major appearance the Vice President -- the major national impression -- will come from his acceptance speech. This speech can do a tremendous job for him, and for us, in laying out the record of the Democratic ticket, in appealing to those Democrats who have bolted, and in leaving an impression of the Vice President before the country.

PJB would like to help put some of this together for the Vice President, and if the President suggested that, would be most helpful.

15. Recognizing that there are many within the White House and the Hill who are not exactly enthusiasts of the Vice President, word should go forth that this is a "team" effort, there should be no "background" knocking the Number Two man, who will be shouldering as RN did, much of the nasty workload of the party and the campaign. Nothing is more embittering than to pull off the wire some holier-thanthou statement from a fellow Republican, when - in the interests of the Administration -- we are throwing Goodell to the sharks. Even a word from RN to all involved that this is a team effort; that no good is served us or the Party by background back-stabbing, and thattthis is an all-for-one, one-for-all operation, would be beneficial in the campaign, I would think -- from the 1970 experience.

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Buchanan

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July 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

(THRU HRH)

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Observations from a study of the McGovern primary ads, TV, radio and press -- and the interesting McGovern biography. Points worth noting:

Despite the ideological liberalism of Mr. McGovern, there 1. is a clear conservative thrust to many of his issues ads -particularly those for "cleaning up the welfare mess," and relieving the property tax burden on the average citizen. The McGovern proposals to increase the welfare payments and folls, and the manifest inconsistency in proposing \$150 billion in new spending -- while appearing to be for a reduction in and redistribution of the tax burden are not present in these ads. Further, late in the primaries, his new "hard-line" on Israel was a major topic of his advertising. Could find nothing in the way of elitist, new left ad themes in McGovern's primary campaing. Amnesty, abortion, pot, soak-the-ridh, slash defense, \$1000-a-person were clearly not major themes. There are, however, several old-liberal approaches which he has pushed in his advertising. These include:

 a) Social Security benefits beginning at 62 years of age -a straight shot appeal to old folks, along traditional liberal Democratic lines.

b) An interesting emphasis on "occupational health and safety." For example, a number of TV spots focusing on how workers were losing life and limb in unsafe plants, and this was a serious problem. Imagineen this approach to be one with great appeal where McGovern is weak -- among production workers.

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Medical care for everyone. This is one of the positive "liberal" programs, which McGovern emphasized in the primaries. Again, it is traditional Scammon-Wattenburg economic liberalism. Again, there is hardly a trace of what one might call social liberalism, or "radical chic" politics in the McGovern advertising campaign. And, clearly, our people should never cease making references to his "elitist" "radical chic" positions -- and focus on them, rather than leaving the debate to resolve around his more traditional "liberal" approaches.

d) A relatively hard-nosed approach on drugs.

OTHER APPROACHES

The KENNEDYS -- Mr. McGovern is clearly running on the coattails of two dead men, John and Robert Kennedy; his documentary is almost a Kennedy Documentary; his TV and radio spots make extensive use of the Kennedy endorsements of George McGovern as the "most decent man in the Senate." We can expect much of this in the fall.

PERSONALITY -- McGovern's campaign consistently contrasts Mr. McGovern as an honest, open, straight-forward, candid, consistent candidate -- with Mr. Nixon's Administration, which is portrayed as deceitful, closed, secretive, distrustful. This is clearly in the McGovern campaign judgment a winner for them -- and a loser for us. They focus upon the "personality" of the two candidates and the two campaigns, as much as upon any two issues. The need for us, again, in my judgment, is to move early to get out the record of both the McGovern waffles on positions, that McGovern compromises on principles, McGovern's nasty and vindictive attacks upon the President and his political adversaries. The press, which nails Mr. Agnew to the mast for his rugged rabtoric has allowed Mr. McGovern to get away with some of the more incredible statements in American politics. We have Mr. McGovern's cruel and nasty statements recorded, but these, along with his waffles and back-downs, have to be moved into the public record. As with Mr. Muskie, one of our problems is to contradict this idea that, whether you agree or disagree with McGovern, you "know where he stands," and you know he can be trusted.

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Other attributes the McGovern camp is playing up are such as "warmth, humanity, sympathy, compassion," and they are attempting to contrast them with a cold-blooded, super-efficient, rather heartless White House and President. Such as RN's visit to the flood-strikken areas of the country is most helpful as an antidote to this kind of approach. We could do more of the last.

Also, an openness, and a new accessibility to the press and public on the part of the President might, in my view, be helpful in working against this "inaccessibility" allegation that is part of the McGovern mode.

ISRAEL -- McGovern's extraordinary sensitivity on this issue is manifest in the 180-degree turnabout on the issue, and the astonishing hawkishness of his latest ads. He is vulnerable here; and the lession ds obvious that we ought to contineu to fuces upon his opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine, to measures to promote Israeli security, etc. He is vulnerable here; and aware of it.

POPULISM -- While "Professor McGovern" is a reppenentative of the "outs" against the "ins," the fighter against the "interests" for the common man who bears too much of the burden, while powerful corporations and institutions get off without paying their fair share. The clear need is, as stated in previous memos, to portray McGovern as a Candidate of the Elite, "Professor McGovern," the leader of the party of the PHds. and limousine liberals, whose elitist shock troops took over the party of the people, the "noise-makers" and the "exotic," the tiny minority who are imposing an asinine social policy of bussing on a country, eight-five percent of whose people do not want bussing.

There are few larger imperatives in our campaign than to move McGovern into the position of the Establishment Candidate -running against the candidate of Middle America. Crucial to our success this fall is to put McGovern in the bag with the "radical chic" and this message it seems to me, has to be impressed upon our speakers. If we allow him to be perceived as his ads, and previous campaigns portray him, we could have a serious problem.

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VIETNAM -- McGovern's approach is that he is the one man in the country, who has been "right from the start," about this miserable, horrible war. This should be confronted, not ignored, and surely, not conceded. These are three basic approaches, some of them not complementary, if not consistent:

a) McGovern has been a waffler on the war; he voted for the Gulf of Tokin in 1964, against its repeal in 1966, for appropriations for the conflict throughout the early and mid-sixties, and only voted to get out -- after a Republican had come intto clean up the mess McGovern's Presidential choices (JFK, LBJ, HHH) had made of the situation. His bitter attacks on RN thus come not from principle but from the effort to pick up partisan dividends from undercutting an American President typing to get us out of a war into which he voted us.

b) McGovern has repeatedly made predictions as to what the enemy would do if we made concessions -- and every single McGovern promise and prediction has been wrong. Nobody had a worse record on Veitnam in terms of understanding the enemy than McGovern.

c) McGovern's attacks on the President who is now honorably ending American involvement in this war are not something to be proud of -- they rank among the most shameful episodes in American history. While President Nixon sought courageously to exgridate America from this conflict -- with his two objectives, American honor intact, and our commitment not defaulted --McGovern badgered and sabotaged this courageous effort every step of the way.

Again, our people should <u>not</u> concede the war is immoral, should <u>not</u> concede that McGovem was right, but we are right too, and we are trying to end it as best we can. We should challenge him on this issue, on many grounds. We should confront his claim -<u>not</u> co-opt it, by saying: "Well, we are against the war, too, and we are trying to do our best to end it."

McGovern should be conceded nothing on Vietnam. He is a backstabber who would go "begging" to Hanoi -- and abandon our prisoners to the enemy, without any guarantee we would ever get them back. We should view his positions, not with disagreement, but with contempt.

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THE STRENGTH & WEAKNESS OF GEORGE MCGOVERN THE MAN --From reading <u>McGovern</u>, a most interesting and sympathetic biography, and observing the man, the following becomes clear. McGovern's great strength and great weakness lies in H s personality; he is a minister in hiw own right and a minister's son; he is a True Believer, his is the "Passionate State of Mind;" he sees issues in moral terms, not simply mistaken versus wise, but evil versus good. At the same time he is extraordinarily ambitious -unlike Goldwater, Frankly, he bears striking similarities to our present Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Mr. Romney. Thus it is that McGovern can both shift positions and express a righteous faith in his new position to match his faith and fanaticism in expressing his old.

Thus, it is that McGovern can compare RN with Hitler and his bombing policy with extermination of the Hews -- and still believe in his own mind that Mr. Agnew is the "demagogue" who says horrible things. McGovern's self-righteousness can be a great strength -he has a preacher's appeal; against us his is the appeal of a man who believes deeply in a "faith" against the man who is the quintessence of the pragmatist.

His weakness is, again the weakness of Romney -- he is, not unlikely to state and re-state his convictions about RN being like Hitler, when pressed on the question, rather than backing off. In a pressure situation, he will fall back upon the "Gospel" of the left, rather than frame some non-committal neutral response. Very probably, he will be more sensitive, more likely to move to outrage, with the suggestion that he is a waffler, a hypocrite, than against the blanket charge he is a radical. Indeed, his campaigns have shown that he is extremely effective in combating the charge that he is a "radical"; he has been at his most effective against the straight-on smear attack and his worst defeat -- to Karl Mundt -came when his zealotry and hatred of Karl Mundt got the better of him.

This analysis of McGovern's character reinforces my belief that our best attack against him is not the heavy-handed direct charge that he is a radical and extremist, not a shouting denunciatory approach -- but repeatedly elevating his wild positions, his slanderous statements about the President, and <u>suggesting and pointing to</u> his radicalism and extremism without raging against it. No meat ax; the scalpel is to be preferred.

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Keep his positions and statements in front of the public, but a posture of humor, of incredulity about the wildness of his positions, of indignation and justified anger at the character of his slanders of the President and other decent, good men will, in my view, be far more effective than for us to think up another new way to call McGovern a jackass every morning. What McGovern the radical has going for himis something which Jim Buckley had going for him -- when you look at the guy on the tube and listen to him, it is hard to accept him as a radical. We have the media which will be helping him clean up his past for this election; and our job is to consistently, and insistently, get that past on the public record -- and make McGovern defend or talk about that record and, hopefully, hysterically denounce us as SOBs, which his sense of moral worth and righteousness is fully capable of leading him to do.

WAR HERO -- Look for Guggenheim, his documentary man, and his ad campaign, and his statements, to appeal to his lost constituency by focusing heavily upon his war record as a bomber pilot; and one will find, I would think, that the national media will help out with regular reminders that George McGovern was a medal-winning bomber pilot in the war against Nazi Germany, and thus can hardly be considered a woolly-headed peacenik. McGovern has expressed consternation that the press was constantly referring to "War Hero McCloskey" and not to "War Hero McGovern." Their documentary also focuses heavily on his war record.

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