

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
White House Special Files Collection  
Folder List

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26	9	01/07/1969	Memo	Frank Lincoln to RN re: Howad Buhse. 1 pg.
26	9	01/07/1969	Memo	Ehrlichman to RN re: Inaugural Address Facilities. 1 pg.
26	9	01/10/1969	Memo	Safire to Haldeman re: Nixon Image Abroad. 9 pgs.
26	9	04/14/1969	Memo	The President to Ehrlichman re: Wisconsin Special Election. 1 pg.
26	9	04/03/1969	Memo	Woods to The President re: Frank Jorgensen. 1 pg.
26	9	06/20/1969	Memo	Ehrlichman to The President re: Nixon Institution of Human Affairs. 1 pg.

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26	9	06/23/1969	Letter	To Stets Coleman re: Lin Holton. 1 pg.
26	9	10/08/1969	Memo	Dent to The President re: Polls in the New York City Election. 1 pg.
26	9	11/20/1969	Memo	Dent to The President re: Republican Candidates Announcements. 1 pg.
26	9	12/05/1969	Memo	Dent to The President re: Buzz Lukens. 1 pg.
26	9	12/09/1969	Memo	Gordon Brownell to Harry Dent re: Brownie Reid. 1 pg.
26	9	02/18/1970	Memo	Dent to The President re: Bo Callaway. 1 pg.
26	9	02/25/1970	Memo	Dent to The President re: Morton, Shriver and the Governorship Battle in Maryland. 1 pg.

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26	9	04/03/1970	Memo	Dent to Staff Secretary re: Bob Lee. 1 pg.
26	9	11/16/1970	Memo	Chotiner to Higby re: Cliff Jones Letter. 2 pgs.
26	9	11/19/1970	Memo	Klein to The President re: Kit Bond Victory in Missouri. 1 pg.
26	9	01/12/1971	Letter	Jack Dreyfus to The President re: Thank You for Book. 1 pg.
26	9	05/06/1971	Memo	James Hughes to The President re: Don Nixon's use of the San Clemente Golf Course. 1 pg.
26	9	06/27/1969	Letter	Leo Cherne to John Mitchell re: Support for the Re-Election of President Nixon. 1 pg.
26	9	07/10/1972	Memo	From Harry Dent re: Recommended Telephone Call to Raymond Gary of Oklahoma. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
26	9	08/10/1972	Memo	From Henry Cashen re: Recommended Telephone Call to Mickey Mantle. 1 pg.
26	9	08/17/1972	Memo	From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to James Roosevelt. 1 pg.
26	9	08/17/1972	Memo	From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to William France. 1 pg.
26	9	08/26/1972	Other Document	Handwritten note from RN to Haldeman. 1 pg.
26	9	09/29/1972	Memo	Colson to The President re: Al Capp. 4 pgs.
26	9	09/20/1972	Letter	Billy Graham to The President re: Thank you for autographed picture. 1 pg.
26	9	10/05/1972	Memo	From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to Ithiel De Sola Pool 1 pg.

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26	9	10/05/1972	Memo	From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to William Jack Chow. 1 pg.
26	9	10/07/1972	Memo	From Clark MacGregor re: Recommended Telephone Call to Charles Ross. 1 pg.
26	9	10/13/1972	Memo	From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to Gene Autry. 1 pg.
26	9	10/13/1972	Memo	From Chuck Colson re: Recommended Telephone Call to George Hearst. 1 pg.
26	9	10/26/1972	Memo	From John Ehrlichman re: Recommended Telephone Call to Governor William Cahill. 1 pg.
26	9	11/21/1972	Memo	Dent to The President re: Mills Godwin. 1 pg.
26	9	03/04/1974	Memo	Buzhardt to The President re: Royalties Due Alvin Moscow. 5 pgs.

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26	9	03/14/1969	Memo	Ziegler to Butterfield re: President's Meeting with Paul Miller. 2 pgs.
26	9	10/26/1969	Memo	Dent to Haldeman re: 1970 Fund Raising Efforts. 2 pgs.
26	9	03/03/1970	Memo	Chotiner to The President's File re: Meeting with The President. 2 pgs.
26	9	05/05/1971	Memo	Haldeman to The President's File re: Meeting with Attorney General Mitchell and Lee Nunn. 1 pg.
26	9	07/11/1972	Memo	Colson to the President's File re: Meeting with John Connally, Clark MacGregor and Charles Colson. 5 pgs.
26	9	07/12/1972	Memo	Colson to The President re: Democrats for Nixon. 3 pgs.
26	9	07/13/1972	Memo	Haldeman to The President's File re: Dinner with John Connally. 1 pg.

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26	9	07/24/1972	Memo	Colson to The President re: Connally/Stans. 2 pgs.
26	9	08/14/1972	Memo	Dean to The President's File re: Execution of President and Mrs. Nixon's Estate Plan. 1 pg.
26	9	08/14/1972	Memo	Ziegler to The President's File re: Meeting with Bailey K Howard. 2 pgs.
26	9	03/20/1973	Memo	From George Bush to The President re: Meeting with Governors William Cahill and Linwood Holton. 1 pg.
26	9	05/15/1974	Memo	Dean Burch to The President's File re: Presidential Trip to Michigan. 2 pgs.
26	9	05/10/1974	Memo	Charles Wardell to Dean Burch re: Memorandum for the President's File. 1 pg.

MEMORANDUM

January 7, 1969

TO: R. N.  
FROM: Frank Lincoln

BUSINESS COUNCIL - Howard Buhse

Howard Buhse, as you know, is the managing partner at Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes. I know he would feel greatly honored to be named to the Business Council by you in due course.

Frank  
FBL, Jr.

cc: John N. Mitchell

~~Frank~~  
I know Buhse with  
Hornblower & Weeks  
& sure we could  
give him a place  
there would be  
an excellent man  
for any of your  
committees  
I'm sure  
we'll be  
happy to  
have him



To: President-elect Nixon

Date: January 7, 1969

From: John D. Ehrlichman

Subject: Inaugural Address Facilities

Will you want a rostrum to hold notes for your Inaugural  
Address?

*yes*

We will arrange for a clock on the platform visible to you  
whether you have a rostrum or not.

  
John D. Ehrlichman

JDE:sw

---

Ken C  
FYI

Haldeman from Safire

1/10/69

Re: Memo of November 20, 1968 - Nixon Image Abroad

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The portion of the memo dealing with the elements of the successful campaign strategy has been sent to Teddy White as you requested.

The other idea, suggesting that a trip abroad be taken by a top Nixon aide to explain this strategy to leading writers in Paris and London, was accomplished by Bob Ellsworth in late November.

G.

Found in Ken Cole's 1969 box of files.

H. Fulton  
Special Files Unit  
10/15/73

MEMORANDUM

January 9, 1969

TO: BILL SAFIRE

FROM: BOB HALDEMAN'S OFFICE

RE: Your memo of Nov 20, 1968 re Nixon Image Abroad

Please send a copy of your memo of November 20, 1968, to Teddy White and a note to this office confirming this has been accomplished.

KLOCH FROM SAFIRE

RE: NIXON IMAGE ABROAD

① - It - your should  
 get the  
 analysis  
 Kelly  
 Nov 20  
 RN  
 fyi  
 H  
 (5)

Intelligence Needed: a study of post-election clips and comments in London, Paris, Rome, Frankfurt-Bonn, Amsterdam, Tokyo, New Delhi.

The Reston column for [unclear] about European commentary on the [unclear] Nixon may be misinformed. Our own State Dept [unclear] could get files quickly, and private clip service [unclear] would do an analysis also. Gallup, too, does opinion polling overseas, and has affiliate arrangements with leading pollsters abroad. he could make these available to us.

Basic Line Needed

On Campaign Strategy: For use abroad and at home as well, we should develop a memorandum setting forth the wisdom of the 1968 campaign strategy.

This to nip in the bud a historical decision that we "almost blew it" or "stumbled in."

Should stress point that win was planned in a way that enables new Administration to govern.

Elements:

- 1) Choice of primary route to nomination was dangerous but laid to rest "loser" image for campaign;
- 2) Choice of Agnew was brilliant, as proven by results; a Tower or Reagan would have blown Ohio, Illinois, and possibly California while only picking Texas---and a Lindsay or Rockefeller would have blown all border states and Florida while only picking up Pennsylvania. Would have fallen short either way.
- 3) Though all pundits and polls thought Democratic party was hopelessly split after Chicago, we based strategy on (a) the likelihood of Ted Kennedy and Larry O'Brien swinging much disaffected Dem support in East back to Humphrey;

(b) the likelihood of ultimate if qualified McCarthy endorsement in final weeks;

(c) the ability of organized labor to cut 5% of Wallace 20% strength, swinging much of Ed. back to Humphrey (Wallace drop correctly and public predicted by Nixon);

In light of these strategic assumptions (which were the opposite of conventional wisdom at the time), we positioned ourselves to withstand the most powerful thrust of all: a bombing halt just before the election.

4) We knew the bombing halt was sure to come because:

(a) Johnson had done something similar before 1968 election, and knew he could override political timing charge;

(b) Humphrey campaign, starting at Salt Lake City speech, was geared wholly to anticipated peace vote swinging to him, explaining also the arms-control and nuclear proliferation treaty stress. Nothing could fully counter this Presidential move. Blunting it somewhat was (a) Nixon's emphasis on negotiating from strength and the security gap issue, and (b) total support of Johnson peace moves to the extent of publicly refusing to believe political motivation.

With the Democratic strategy long anticipated, Nixon kept his cool in the final week as Johnson's move before his "Saigon ducks were in a row" made the political motivation apparent; despite pressure from Nixon aides, the candidate held to his long-planned strategy "trusting" that communist assurances were given and saying that Johnson did not realize that our allies would refuse to go along. Thus, on final weekend, Nixon was not impugning Johnson integrity (which would have backfired), only questioning President's diplomatic judgment and offering to help bring Saigon into line.

This remarkably cool decision under enormous pressure was the final key to Nixon's victory, allying him with peace efforts while underscoring his ability to be a better diplomat and bring peace quicker. And in the long run, it enabled Nixon to work closely with Johnson after the election to end the war; the post-election cooperation shattered precedent, helping Nixon in his first aim of bringing the nation together.

5) In this regard, throughout the campaign, Nixon refraining from the slashing personal attacks on either his opponent or the President. Strategic reason: (a) would have reinforced image of Nixon the Democrats were trying to recall (b) would have made governing later that much harder.

At the same time, Nixon stayed on the attack throughout, never being drawn into an attitude of "protecting his lead".

(6) Nixon introduced the technique of the "talking position paper"---a striking re-use of radio that had been dormant for thirty years. Enabled him to deal at length with specific issues without having to reduce enthusiasm of rally audiences. The planned

Democratic charge of "not dealing with the issues" it found itself with no place to go; at the end, reporters received two complete books with extensive Nixon positions proving his had been a campaign of substance.

7) The Nixon television technique, perfected in the primaries, was so successful it was copied by the Democrats. The regional panel, showing Nixon at his strongest answering questions, was ~~mirrored~~ imitated by Humphrey in the final stages. Same with the national telethon.

We had to concede an edge to the Democrats on their use of television spots, since personal attacks and emotional appeals about "trust" are a more effective use of the spot format than issue attacks. But we had to adapt our technique to our overall strategy.

8.) Another part of the overall strategy dealt with the "battleground states". The decision was made early to concentrate both time and money in California, Ohio, New Jersey, Illinois (four we won) and Michigan New York, Pennsylvania and Texas (which we lost, the last two narrowly.) Obviously, this strategy paid off; also, a less publicized but major effort was made in the border states, where the choice of Agnew was crucial, and a sweep was made there with the exception of a squeaker in Maryland.

Though the Democrats sought to charge a "Southern strategy" (which helped them solidify the Negro vote) the five Wallace states received little Nixon attention; the law and order issue, a stand against busing and the active support of Thurmond helped carry Virginia, the Carolinas and Florida. But a real "southern Strategy" with no hope of the Deep South would have been foolish.

On geography, the Nixon grand strategy achieved an important goal: a national rather than regional victory. Woodrow Wilson won while carrying only Ohio and New Hampshire in the East; Humphrey tried to win without the South and the West; Nixon took at least one major state in each section. (Jersey in the East, Florida and the Carolinas in the South, most of the midwest and most of the west, plus the border states.)

9) Nixon strategists recognized the Negro vote as a lost cause from the start, but the candidate never stopped pressing for "justice" with law and order, and developed the "black capitalism" concept, again aiming past the election toward effective government.

10) The strategic mistake should be admitted, since it was an error on the side of restraint and ~~admirable~~ decency. Muskie was vulnerable on several points.

counts--incidents involving the FIA, Billy Sol Estes, the TFI affair. Much more substantive than anything leveled against Agnew. But Nixon said no, which permitted the Democrats to build up Muskie into a major asset and helped their attack on Agnew by contrast.

11) If ideologically, Nixon occupied the middle from the start, gambling that he could in: keep the middle in a three way race large enough to win. Amazingly, the solid Nixon strength held at 42% throughout, assuming Gallup to be correct. He successfully fended off erosion from both sides, holding his bloc of independents and Republicans, finally picking up some extra support from Wallace protesters.

An Eastern Republican nominee, or a Nixon who adopted an all-out liberal stance, would have lost the East anyway as traditional Democratic strength came together, and ---worse for the nation---would have permitted Wallace to get one fourth to one third of the popular vote. Thus, the Nixon victory was a victory for the center, enough of a change to satisfy the non-racist rightist protesters, and indeed the only type of candidacy that could effectively govern the nation. (Walter Lippman and Stewart Alsop foresaw this.)

When you lose, the "if only" begins. But consider the "ifs" in the way the Nixon strategy turned out: He could never have won, if (a) he had neglected the primaries, (b) he had chosen a vice presidential nominee from either left or right (c) he had depended on the disaffection of vocally unhappy Democrats (d) he had launched a slashing attack on Johnson or Humphrey (e) he had neglected the thoughtful speeches and opened himself to the 'no substance' charge (f) he had spent more time in states either surely won or lost (g) he had adopted a regional or southern strategy, and most important at the end, if (f) he had panicked and blasted the President on a phony bombing halt.

One ~~misstep~~ misstep, and he could easily have lost; one strategic or tactical error, and the traditional Democratic majority plus the far right's breakaway would have meant a Humphrey victory. But Nixon moved straight ahead without stumbling once; that was the secret of the greatest comeback in modern political history.

Follow-Up to  
Selected Foreign Press:

We should begin now to open up channels to the foreign press stationed here. Some, like Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times, are bellwethers (and Brandon is charming to the Nixon staff but files unfriendly material.)

These men want personal interviews with Nixon, of course, but they can be satisfied with close attention by top Nixon staffers and a feeling that they have been chosen to get a look "inside".

We should select a half-dozen from key capitals and assign staffers to get across our message just before publication in the US of the first story on these lines.

Trip Abroad by  
Nixon Intimates:

A task force of three men known to be close to the President-elect should be sent to Europe. Announced purpose: fact-finding on respect for America and its present policies among non-governmental sources.

Composed of: an editor (a Klein or a Keogh or an editor or publisher who knows Nixon well who was not in the campaign); a financial man or economist; and somebody who was connected with USIA in the Eisenhower administration.

In the course of their fact-finding, they would hold press conferences and private meetings with journalists abroad, revealing what they know about Nixon the man and the way the American campaign was conducted---in the only way that enables the winner to govern.

This should be a non-diplomatic mission, and the task force should steer sharply away from questions to them about foreign policy. Of course, to avoid offense, they should set up their meetings with private individuals in consultation with our State Department and probably through the governments of the countries they visit.



Television Abroad:

Frank Underwood informs us that the USSR is preparing a half-hour documentary on the new President. We should say, this should be carefully viewed and appropriate comments given with all due attention to propriety.

I understand that our own campaign documentary is being thoroughly distributed abroad.

If we decide to cooperate to the extent of an interview with the President-elect with any or all of the US networks, provision should be made to make the interview simultaneously available to overseas networks.

Nixon philosophy abroad

We should get someone to work immediately on translating relevant portions of "Nixon on the Issues" and "Nixon Speaks Out" into French, Italian, German and Japanese.

These excerpts should then be mailed to a wide list of foreign editors with a letter from Zeigler introducing himself and opening a channel of answers to queries.

We should make a deal with a US publisher to publish a book of Nixon campaign speeches, with a new introduction and an epilogue to make it copyright-able. Proviso: quick translation and publication abroad in paperback form.

And while we're at it, we should write a new conclusion to "Six Crises" and have that translated and published around the world. By the time the translation is finished and type set, the Inaugural address will be delivered and can be included.

A Final Thought:


Between Christmas and Inauguration Day, Julie and David will be going on their honeymoon. Perhaps, after a week of idyllic privacy on some hideaway, they would be willing to make a tour of Europe. Impact: fantastic. And they would have the best and most natural reason to be travelling abroad.

APR 14 1969

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR John Ehrlichman  
FROM The President 

I am not satisfied by the report Sears made with regard to the Wisconsin special election. When I think that Ody Fish is probably the best State Chairman in the country, and when I think of all the other things we had going for us, it seems to me that despite the excuses that Laird did not make a speech, etc., etc., the White House staff was not really on the ball in watching this situation. Consequently, I want a shake up to take place where this is discussed with Rogers Morton, the House Campaign Committee and particularly some action is taken to see to it that the White House is better represented than it was in this instance by Sears on the "nuts and bolts."

I would like to have a memorandum prepared for me within a week indicating what action will be taken to handle such problems in the future. This election, plus the almost unbelievable waste of funds in Tennessee, is a very good lesson for us, but only if we do not sit back and read long memoranda indicating what went wrong without taking specific action to deal with the problem.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1969

TO: The President  
cc: Bob Haldeman

FROM: Rose Mary Woods

Frank Jorgensen called re the discussion you had had with him about getting busy in the Western States. He is concerned that in the Congressional races coming up we should be picking candidates soon and get going and he says he is willing, able and feels it is time to get going.

Also he said some day if there is some spot that the President really feels he could do a job - short term - he would even be glad to come back this way.

H  
How about getting  
him to work as 1 by  
Congressional races?

↑

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

JUNE 20, 1969

FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: NIXON INSTITUTION OF HUMAN AFFAIRS  
(WHITTIER COLLEGE)

Ed Morgan reports that Dr. Paul Smith officially retires from the Presidency of Whittier College September 1, 1969 and will assume the duties of Director of the Nixon Institution of Human Affairs and also Chancellor of Whittier College on that date.

The Whittier people have written to you asking for a private conference to discuss two possible candidates to be the new President of Whittier College. Morgan has replied indicating that they should advise him of their candidates in advance.

\$250,000 has been raised for the Nixon Institution and an additional \$1 million for a new building is assured. They are incorporated in much the same way as the Stanford Hoover Library.

  
JOHN D. EHR LICHMAN

*Good  
I will take this  
to the  
President  
I will  
take care of our program  
I will  
take care of our program  
I will  
take care of our program  
I will  
take care of our program*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 23, 1969

Dear Stets:

I am very pleased to know that you are going to be helping Lin Holton in Virginia this year. You're the man to do the job, just as you did for us last year.

This will be an important contest and can have much to do with advancing the cause of two-party competition in the South.

In addition to this, Lin should have a great opportunity, and I consider him to be an outstanding candidate and a very good friend.

I told Harry Dent to keep in contact with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



*I thought you might like to read the letter you are supposed to have written me. Whether you like it or not your message will be on the line in this campaign. You can do a lot better it without being too openly in the arena. I think we should discuss it when you get back.*

Mr. Stets Coleman  
The Plains  
Virginia 22171

*Stets*

*July 8, 1969*

*P.S. - we used some money from*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The political polls in the New York City election present a confused picture. Most show Procaccino with a small lead, but one claims Lindsay is ahead slightly. My concern is that Marchi is rising and in doing so is taking votes away from Procaccino who stands the better chance of defeating Lindsay. The more Procaccino exposes himself publicly the more he drops. The more Marchi exposes himself, the more votes he picks up from Procaccino. The polls seem to show that Marchi has the least chance of winning.

Jim Allison, Deputy Chairman of the RNC, is very friendly with Lindsay's pollster. This man told Allison that Lindsay is slightly behind Procaccino and that his advice to Lindsay was to help Marchi take votes away from Procaccino. I am convinced this is why Evans-Novak, the New York Times, the New York Post, and Newsday are giving Marchi such good buildups. ) *right!*

Morton is going to New York later this month to attend a fund-raising dinner for Marchi in order to appease Jerry Milbank. I have warned him of my concern and have asked him to please look into this. I am also suggesting the same to Charlie McWhorter and Jerry Milbank.

*This explains why the Times is pushing Marchi!*

*Harry S. Dent*  
Harry S. Dent

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 20, 1969

*100/100*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bob Taft will announce for the U. S. Senate Friday. Governor Rhodes has already announced, and Buzz Lukens has told me he will announce in January. Governor Rhodes called the President the other day but the call was taken by the Vice President. He wanted the President to stop Taft from announcing. Of course, this would not have been wise. There is nothing we can do to stop the three-way race, and if we attempted to do anything we would become involved in a hot Ohio intra-Party battle.

A recent survey showed Taft scoring 43%, Rhodes 40%, and Lukens 20% against leading Democrats. Taft and Rhodes were running ahead of the Democrats with Lukens running behind. Lukens feels that in a three-way race he will win because there is no runoff.

Lee Nunn of the Senatorial Campaign Committee has been concerned about having Rhodes as our candidate all along, and is convinced that Taft will win the nomination and the general election. There is some question whether Life will hit the Governor again next year.

The Party will be a little short on the Governor's race. The Democrats are pushing Gilligan, the man Saxbe beat last year, to run for Governor but he may decide to go for the Senate in view of his interest in one-worldism. The State Chairman thinks Representative Chuck Whalen of Dayton might be the best candidate for Governor under these circumstances.

*Harry S. Dent*

Harry S. Dent

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Buzz Lukens came by to see me Thursday evening. In the course of the conversation he said he would not enter the U. S. Senate race and would help Bob Taft if the President asked him to do this - but, only if the President should ask him. He hates Rhodes and thinks Taft is dull. He wants to run and is seemingly convinced he can win if he gets the nomination.

Question: Do we give him the word to get out and help Taft, or leave him along altogether?

Get out \_\_\_\_\_

Leave Lukens alone                     

✓ We can't  
fight Rhodes  
(Lukens would so we told  
him to support Taft)

Harry S. Dent  
Harry S. Dent



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

DECEMBER 9, 1969

TO: HARRY S. DENT

FROM: GORDON S. BROWNELL *GSB*

You asked me to discreetly check with Conservative Party people in New York into the chances of their getting rid of Rep. Brownie Reid next fall.

I talked at length with Harry Middendorf, Bill's brother and Manhattan County Chairman for the Conservative Party. He will do some further checking, but I feel his initial report is accurate and complete as is.

Someone in the Conservative Party will definitely oppose Reid, but the party is weak in Westchester County where New York Times liberal Republicans predominate. Kevin Phillips brings this out in his book.

Middendorf feels, and I reluctantly agree, that Reid's strength is too broad and his past majorities too huge to hope for his premature demise.

*Let Kevin go*

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102  
By AMH NARS, Date 5/12/80

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


February 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

After talking with Bo Callaway Tuesday, I have become convinced that Bo can be talked into running for governor of Georgia. Phil Campbell thinks Bo would be the best bet with Congressman Fletcher Thompson being a close second. His idea of the best ticket would be Callaway for governor and Thompson for lieutenant governor, but this might entail the loss of Thompson's seat in Congress.


This is in response to the President's request for information on this race.

  
Harry S. Dent

✓  
Either would be excellent

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1970



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Morton, Shriver and the Governorship  
battle in Maryland.

Chairman Morton decided not to make the U. S. Senate race in Maryland for a number of reasons, but primarily because he did not feel he could win. We are now getting reports that he is not ruling out the possibility of running for Governor if Shriver, Mahoney and Mandel make the race in the Democrat primary. This would split up the Democrats, as per the Agnew race in 1966, giving the Republican candidate a better chance to win than usual. Mahoney, the perennial candidate, should take votes away from Mandel, rather than Shriver, and with no primary runoff, Shriver could emerge as the winner. Since he is a potential Presidential candidate for 1972, we might need to give some special attention to this Gubernatorial race.

*James*

The Vice President and Dent separately talked to Chairman Morton this morning, and found that he did not rule out the possibility. A survey Morton had conducted showed that the Governorship would be easier to take than Tydings' seat. He plans to run a new survey as soon as Shriver gets in.

If the President has any suggestions on this subject we need to know. We cannot afford to let Morton consider this one publicly and then back out at the last minute, making our candidate a second choice. The man most likely to run if Morton does not is Stan Blair. However, he will step aside for Morton.

*Harry S. Dent*  
Harry S. Dent  
Morton should do it if it breaks this way  
② This would increase our chances for the very long shot Senate candidate

①

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1970



TO: The Staff Secretary

FROM: Harry Dent **ASD**

With regard to the President's request that I have Bob Lee work on the GOP split in Florida, I have Bob Lee coming in to see me next Wednesday for this purpose and also to assign him some additional political chores. The prime problem we might have with Bob working on this is that he is aligned with the Kirk/Osborne side and very decidedly so. Nevertheless, he and I will try to figure out what all can be done to alleviate the situation as much as possible. Kirk is a sure winner over Eckerd for the Governor nomination, but the race between Congressman Cramer and Lt. Governor Osborne is very close. It might be best eventually to persuade Cramer to stay in the House and retain his leadership position.

*✓ JNA  
Harry - I believe we should  
do this - ~~that~~  
Try some exploring -  
if you can without  
causing too much commotion*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1970


FOR: LARRY HIGBY  
FROM: MURRAY CHOTINER

I am returning Cliff Jones' letter dated November 11, addressed to the President, and am not answering in my name since he refers to me in a complimentary fashion.

*with me*

Cliff discussed plans for 1972 and I have followed through by talking with Bob Kunzig and intend to discuss Pennsylvania organization with Senator Scott, George Bloom, Jack Jordan, and Dave Maxwell.

Perhaps the President would like to know that Pennsylvania appreciated the support given by the President, Julie and Tricia.



Enclosure


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date \_\_\_\_\_

To: *Clinton*

From: Larry Higby

*Lauree handle this  
and send it up  
to the President.*



*jjj*

**Republican State Committee  
of Pennsylvania**

P. O. BOX 1624, HARRISBURG 17105 • TELEPHONE (717) 234-4901

CLIFFORD L. JONES  
Chairman

November 11, 1970

MRS. PETER K. HONAMAN  
Vice Chairman

M. HARVEY TAYLOR  
Chairman Emeritus

The President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

PHILIP L. CORSON  
Treasurer

Dear President Nixon:

THOMAS B. McCABE  
National Committeeman

I am sorry that the Republican Party did not win the gubernatorial election in Pennsylvania. If anything, we are even more disappointed than you are.

MISS SARAH ANN STAUFFER  
National Committeewoman

MRS. LOUISE RUSSELL  
Secretary

Without your all-out support we could not even have made a battle. While our loss was large, the county in which you appeared, Lancaster County, did respond to our expectations, even to the extent of upsetting a Democrat incumbent legislator. This is a tribute to your efforts in that county.

MRS. CAROLINE SHAW TATOM  
Assistant Secretary

We most appreciated the support of your family. Julie and Tricia were just wonderful, and even better than their reputations.

The support you provided through the Vice-President helped immeasurably in fund-raising.

Murray Chotiner was a real bulwark. Without the type of support you provided there, we could not even have continued the campaign. We did indeed depend on you.

I have some thoughts about the election in 1972 which I would like to share with you, and I will do so first by talking to Murray Chotiner.

Sincerely,

Clifford L. Jones  
Chairman

*Murray has seen + followed through. Rome*

CLJ:jj


Cc: Murray Chotiner  
Jack Gleason

*H stand like LH a good one for future*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1970



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HERBERT G. KLEIN *H.K.*

One of our little noticed, but most important victories, was the election of Kit Bond in Missouri. It offers great promise in many ways. I thought you would be interested in seeing the attached clipping.

Attachment

*✓ A* <sup>*①*</sup> Lets put him on our list of people to build -  
*②* He should be exhibited as part of our Missouri operation.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: 4/28/71

TO: Jon Huntsman

FROM: BRUCE KEHRLI

For your files.

*JG*  
*Bruce with requests*  
*Have faith case of*  
*been taken care of*  
*(HNT + R. Wood)*  
*JP JG a B*

JACK J. DREYFUS, JR.  
2 BROADWAY  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10004

January 12, 1971

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for the beautiful copy of the book containing your speeches.

I hope you get a chance to visit Minot's Island this year. We have scraped a piece of land level so that a helicopter can land there.

In many ways the island might be ideal for you. It has a chip and putting green and also a tennis court. Ten minutes away, by boat, there is a nice little nine-hole golf course; on a busy day it has three players on it. Weather permitting, all meals can be outdoors. Steaks cooked on rocks are delicious; and clambakes are okay too.

I hope the coming year will be a wonderful one for you and your family.

Warmest regards,

Jack

*Answer - I would like him for one of our small divisions. If this is a good idea let's try it this summer (when it is good)*

The President  
The Whitehouse  
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 6, 1971



A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Arrangements have been made for Mr. and Mrs. Don Nixon and 14 of their guests to use your San Clemente golf course on Friday, the 7th of May. Following the golf game, they plan a dinner party at the San Clemente Inn.

*JDH*  
BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES D. HUGHES

*Good  
They can use the  
pool & dressing  
rooms if they  
like*

LEO CHERNE  
589 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

June 27, 1972

*N - you should read this attachment*

*At your dinner seeper dinner best  
arrangement is the Pool of her*

The Honorable John Mitchell  
Committee to Re-elect The President  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

Several days ago I had occasion to tell my good friend Leonard Hall that I've made the personal decision to identify myself with the efforts to re-elect President Nixon. Since I have been a life-long Democrat, I will undoubtedly associate myself with whatever committee is formed to express the views of other Democrats supporting the re-election of the President.

Solely for purposes of identification, let me say that I am Executive Director of The Research Institute of America, Inc., Chairman of the Board of The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, Chairman of the Board of The International Rescue Committee, and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Freedom House.

I am enclosing "A Statement of Concern" about the record of Senator George McGovern in which I have already joined. If it has not been brought to your attention, I feel certain that you will find it a significant document.

With my deep regards,

Sincerely,

LC:is  
Enclosure

cc: The Hon. Leonard Garment  
Miss Rose Mary Woods

*Dear Leo - Mitchell*

*Has sent me a copy of your letter to him of June 27.*

*I want you to know how deeply appinint your support coming as it does from a long Democrat who parts county about party -*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503  
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

July 10, 1972

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Former Democrat Governor  
Raymond Gary of Oklahoma  
O: 405/795-3327 R: 405/795-3280

RECOMMENDED BY: Harry S. Dent (Colson concurs)

PURPOSE: To thank him for the message he has sent through Dewey Bartlett indicating support for the President's re-election and to get his assessment of the political situation.

BACKGROUND: Dewey Bartlett, former Republican Governor now running for Senate, is convinced Gary can play major role in carrying Oklahoma for the President and Bartlett. Gary was Muskie man, but tells Bartlett privately he will support President. Gary is from a conservative part of the State (Madill) and is influential among Oklahoma's conservatives. The telephone call would do much to get Gary's support for the President and Bartlett out in the open.

TALKING POINTS:

1. Dewey Bartlett has told us of Gary's interest in the President's re-election.
2. What is Gary's assessment of the situation in the Democrat Party nationally?
3. What is Gary's assessment of the Oklahoma situation?

*A - no -  
for reasons we have discussed  
- a letter is ok - or  
possibly just refer to Connolly*

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... *7/12*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 10, 1972

*Vgtr*  
*7/12*

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO:

MICKEY MANTLE

RECOMMENDED BY:

HENRY C. CASHEN II *H22*

PURPOSE:

Yesterday, Mickey Mantle agreed to serve as a Chairman for Democrats For Nixon. As you know, Mantle is the former baseball great of the New York Yankees. He is currently a successful businessman in Dallas, Texas.

TALKING POINTS:

1. That you express your thanks for his support and indicate your optimism that he will be a tremendous asset in working with John Connally on the campaign.

*Ctr being prepared.*  
*7/12*

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

*✓*  
*See him*  
*if*

TO: James Roosevelt  
Beverly Hills, California

RECOMMENDED BY: Charles W. Colson

PURPOSE: To thank him for his public and active support of your re-election.

BACKGROUND: James Roosevelt, one of the co-chairmen of the Democrats for Nixon Committee, is going on big talk shows on the West Coast to blast McGovern. This was his idea and he has come to us for ammunition. The son of FDR in your camp is certainly impressive.

*Call out to be made in that office recently.*

- TALKING POINTS:
1. Thank him for his active support and help in your re-election.
  2. Mention your being pleased of his important efforts in your behalf on several of the West Coast talk shows.

August 17, 1972

*see him*

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: William H. G. France  
President, International Speedway Corporation  
Daytona Beach, Florida

RECOMMENDED BY: Charles W. Colson

PURPOSE: To thank him for his public and active support of your re-election.

*call out to be made in that WHGF & P met & checked records*

BACKGROUND: William H. G. France was the 1972 Chairman of the Florida State Democratic Delegation. He is now one of the co-chairmen of the Democrats for Nixon Committee. Although he was Wallace's key financial supporter, he can be very helpful to us now.

TALKING POINTS: 1. Thank him for his active support of your re-election.

August 17, 1972



(8-26-72)

H -

As you know we are to send watches to M. R. and those who secured the nomination. (The watch is probably for men - but it is ~~small~~ small enough for women too)

In addition I want a Certificate of appreciation to go to all who participated in the convention. Be generous in this - cover all speakers, presiders - musical organization + those who appeared at the Youth Rally + other events.

This may run to a hundred or so - but it is by far the easiest way for us to show appreciation, after all if we do it for other appearances we should do it for the convention -

In addition - will you give me the names of 5 or 6 who worked in arrangements + who deserve a call - even though they were not ~~of~~ publicized at the convention.

---

11 TO Certificate of appreciation

with grateful appreciation for {his} {her} contribution to the success of the 1972 membership national convention in (P)

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CHARLES COLSON *me*

SUBJECT: Al Capp

I thought you might like to see Al Capp's quick note to me about Ed Cox. Al is a very harsh critic, as you know.

Attachment

*Send to*

AL CAPP

September 22, 1972



LITL ABNER


Charles Colson  
Special Counsel to the President  
Executive Office Bldg., Rm.#182  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chuck,

A short note before I take off for London. A few nights ago, young Cox, the President's son-in-law, appeared on Boston TV. He gave an analysis of the reasons for the youth support of the President.

It was immensely effective. He has a sound, charming delivery, a fine mind, and every word carried conviction. I urge that you use him as much as possible during the campaign, he may be the best man you have on the road.

Best,



Al Capp

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 2, 1972

Dear Mr. Cox:

The President asked that the attached letter from Al Capp be forwarded to you for your information.

Sincerely,



Bruce A. Kehrli  
Staff Secretary

Mr. Edward F. Cox  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

AL CAPP

September 22, 1972



LIL ABNER


Charles Colson  
Special Counsel to the President  
Executive Office Bldg., Rm.#182  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chuck,

A short note before I take off for London. A few nights ago, young Cox, the President's son-in-law, appeared on Boston TV. He gave an analysis of the reasons for the youth support of the President.

It was immensely effective. He has a sound, charming delivery, a fine mind, and every word carried conviction. I urge that you use him as much as possible during the campaign, he may be the best man you have on the road.

Best,



Al Capp

BILLY GRAHAM

Montreat, N.C. 28757  
September 20, 1972

Dear Mr. President:

This is just a note to thank you for the autographed picture of us taken in California. I was delighted and honored to receive it. It is interesting that we have been friends for so many years and I only have two or three autographed pictures of you in that whole time. It is most thoughtful of you to send it.

Grady and I had a marvelous time at San Clemente. We met so many interesting people that we would have never otherwise met in a lifetime. Even Zsa Zsa Gabor said that she was one of my fans.

Things seem to be going well in the campaign. I personally think your strategy at the present time is correct. It is unfortunate that you have to battle your opponent and also at least two of the major networks. It is my judgment that McGovern is beginning to gain a little ground.

With warmest personal greetings, I am

Cordially yours,



The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

✓  
H-note

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

*W. J. C.*

*A*

TO: Ithiel De Sola Pool  
Chairman, Dept. of Political Science  
MIT

RECOMMENDED BY: Charles W. Colson *W*

PURPOSE: To thank him for his public and active support of your re-election.

BACKGROUND: On October 4, 1972 Ithiel De Sola Pool was announced as another of the Vice Chairmen of Democrats for Nixon. He is a leading educator and comes from a prominent Jewish family. He was not invited to the September 22 dinner at the Connally ranch.

*Call not to be made. Ltr is in the mail.*

TALKING POINTS: 1. Thank him for his support.

*A*  
*out 17*

October 5, 1972

*2*

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

*no*  
*of course*  
*James*

TO:

William Jack Chow  
President  
San Francisco Civil Service Commission

RECOMMENDED BY:

Charles W. Colson *cc*

PURPOSE:

*Call will not be made.*

To thank him for his public and active support of your re-election.

BACKGROUND:

*1/2/72*

On October 4, 1972, William Jack Chow was named a Vice Chairman of Democrats for Nixon. He is President of the San Francisco Civil Service Commission and was named to this position by Mayor Joseph Alioto. Chow is a prominent Chinese-American. He was at the Connally dinner on September 22 but it was not known at the time that he would become (with Alioto's approval) a Vice Chairman for Democrats for Nixon.

TALKING POINTS:

1. Thank him for his support.

October 5, 1972



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... *h*

*not made*

RECOMMENDED PRESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE CALL

TO: / Charles D. Ross (Chuck)  
Campaign Director  
Ohio Committee for the Re-Election  
of the President

RECOMMENDED BY: Clark MacGregor *FM for CM (Colson concurs)*

PURPOSE: To personally thank Mr. Ross for his efforts  
as Campaign Manager

BACKGROUND: Ohio is a key state, and Mr. Ross has worked  
very hard and has made great inroads with  
typically democratic voting blocs.

TALKING POINTS:

1. I appreciate the tremendous effort you have  
put forth on behalf of my re-election.
2. I realize this is time-consuming and that it  
takes you away from your personal and business  
responsibilities.
3. Ohio is certainly a key state, and with your  
considerable efforts, I am confident we will win.
4. I would be interested in your analysis of the  
campaign in Ohio.

Date of Submission: October 7, 1972

Mr. Ross may be reached at 614-224-7411 (office)  
513-298-8072 (home)

*Call not made.*  
*TT*

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

*Handwritten mark*

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

*I saw him at J & J fruit stand*

TO: Gene Autry

RECOMMENDED BY: Charles W. Colson

PURPOSE: To thank him for his strong support

BACKGROUND:

*Call will not be made. A / Oct 17*

Gene Autry was one of your large contributors in 1968 and has continued his strong support and hard work for your re-election. He was not invited to the San Clemente celebrities reception. There has been no recorded Presidential contact with him within the last two months.

TALKING POINTS:

1. Express your appreciation for his continued support.
2. Ask him how he thinks the campaign is going.

October 13, 1972

THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN... *A*

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

*V* *Mr*  
*I called Bill*

TO: George Hearst, Jr.  
Publisher  
Los Angeles Herald-Examiner

RECOMMENDED BY: Charles W. Colson

PURPOSE: To thank him for his strong support

BACKGROUND: The Hearst newspapers have endorsed your candidacy for re-election. There has been no Presidential contact with George Hearst within the last two months.

*Call not made. (P did call Wm R. Hearst)*  
*A*

- TALKING POINTS:
1. Express your appreciation for his continued support.
  2. Ask him how he thinks the campaign is going.

October 13, 1972

*J. L. -*  
*[Signature]*

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... *A*

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

*Mark  
Ehrlichman  
(Colson concurs)*

TO

Governor William Cahill - New Jersey

RECOMMENDED BY

John Ehrlichman

BACKGROUND

Through inadvertance Governor Cahill was not mentioned or recognized at the Northeast Regional meeting at Governor Rockefeller's estate on Monday, October 23.

Since then the Governor has let it be known to a number of people of his personal distress because he was not given mention as the other Governor (Rockefeller) was.

*Call not made.  
Ehrlichman will  
call instead.  
A*

Governor Cahill has been working diligently in behalf of the Committee to Re-elect in New Jersey. New Jersey was a state carried last time and he is predicting that the President will carry it again handily, principally as a result of his work.

The Governor's daughter has been active in the President's campaign also

TALKING POINTS

1. Call to thank Governor Cahill for taking the trouble to come to the meeting at Tarrytown last Monday night.
2. Ask the Governor about standings in New Jersey at the present time.
3. Mention to him that it is improbable that your campaign would bring you to New Jersey before the election but mention how well saturated the New Jersey situation has been with the Vice President, your family and the surrogates and express gratitude for the strong support of the Cahill organization

October 26, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...  
X ✓

November 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HARRY S. DENT *ASD*

Republican friends of Senator Harry Byrd in Virginia have been working to get former Governor Mills Godwin to announce as a Republican candidate for Governor for the general election set November 1973. Our friends working on this matter informed me Senator Byrd has encouraged Godwin to run as a Republican and to announce within 45 days. Godwin reportedly wants to wait 2 or 3 months and see a poll and have a physical examination first.

I talked with Godwin the other day and let him know that we were very hopeful he would do this as a Republican, particularly since the Virginia Republican Party through its recent election of a new State Chairman has sent him an engraved invitation to do so. I also pointed out that with the election of Senator-elect Scott the Party is more likely now to soon consider nominating one of their own for the governorship that Lt. Gov. Henry Howell, the liberal, would win if Godwin runs as an Independent and the Republicans also nominate their candidate.

If Godwin makes this move, we can expect to have a Republican governor elected and a majority of the Virginia General Assembly come next November.

*I will do everything possible for Godwin*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 4, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: J. FRED BUZHARDT *JFB*  
SUBJECT: Royalties due Alvin Moscow

Mr. Moscow, through his agent, has asked for an accounting of royalties and payment of any additional sums due him.

As you may recall, your agreement with Mr. Moscow provided that he would receive \$20,000 plus 25% of additional income received by you from the rights granted to Doubleday & Co. in excess of the \$60,000 advance until that 25% equaled \$15,000. The agreement also provided that Mr. Moscow would be furnished copies of Doubleday's statement to you within ten days of receipt, until all sums due him had been paid. The \$20,000 obligation was fulfilled on December 20, 1962, and subsequently Mr. Moscow received royalty payments in the amount of \$2,439.87 on August 15, 1962 and \$467.29 on March 13, 1964.

At my request, Doubleday & Co. has provided a statement (Tab A) showing royalties earned through October 31, 1973. Based upon those figures, it would appear that an additional \$2,971.15 is due Mr. Moscow (See Tab B).

It is my recommendation that Frank DeMarco be instructed to issue a check in the above amount to Mr. Moscow and to furnish him with a copy of the latest statement from Doubleday & Co.

Approve *JFB* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Al - I must get this personal out of the legal office and into Alexander's hands -*

# DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.

SUMMARY  
ROYALTY STATEMENT

FOR THE 6 MONTHS ENDING 10/31/73

	DATE			
[ The Honorable Richard M. Nixon The White House Washington, D. C. 20500		SIX CRISES		
	From pub. thru 4/30/73	Royalty earned		90,679 06
	10/31/73	Royalty per statements		850 85
				91,529 91
	6/ 5/61	Advance	20,000.00	
	12/ 5/61	"	40,000.00	
	3/31/62	Indexing charge	140.00	
	3/16/62 thru 8/16/62	Promotion expense	7,309.39	
		Purchases	531.40	
	8/ 7/62 thru 8/17/73	Royalty payments	22,698.27	90,679 06
	Due		850 85	

COMPUTATION OF ROYALTIES DUE ALVIN MOSCOW

Royalties Earned to Date..... \$91,529.91

Less:

Advance on Royalty..... \$60,000  
Indexing..... 140  
Promotion Expense..... 7,309.39  
Purchases..... 531.40  
\$67,980.79

-67,980.79

Total Payments

\$23,549.12

Amount Due Mr. Moscow

Twenty-five percent of Royalty Payments

(25% x 23,549.12)..... \$ 5,887.28

Less:

Payment 8/15/62 ..... \$ 2,439.84  
Payment 3/13/64 ..... 476.29  
\$ 2,916.13

- 2,916.13

Total Due Moscow

\$ 2,971.15



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1974

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
FROM: DAVID C. HOOPES  
SUBJECT: Royalties due Alvin Moscow

Attached is Fred Buzhardt's recommendation of March 4 which the President approved that DeMarco be instructed to issue a check in the amount of \$2,971.15 to Mr. Moscow and that he be furnished with Doubleday's latest statement.

Please note that it was also requested that this personal matter be moved from the Counsel to the President's office in the White House to the Law Offices of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander. I have advised Buzhardt of this request and he will follow up with the appropriate action.

Thank you.

3/19


250 copies Willson retained by wife in first para.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 19, 1974

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
FROM: DAVID C. HOOPES   
SUBJECT: Royalties due Alvin Moscow

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Please note that it was also requested that this personal matter be moved from the Counsel to the President's office in the White House to the Law Offices of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander. I have advised Buzhardt of this request and he will follow up with the appropriate action.

Thank you.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 14, 1969

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102  
By MH HARS, Date 9/5/80

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR ALEX BUTTERFIELD

FROM: Ron Ziegler

Report on President's meeting with Paul Miller, MAR 14. (5:10pm)

Paul Miller, President of the Associated Press and President of Gannett Newspapers, is in town for the Gridiron dinner, and requested this meeting with the President.

There were no substantive matters discussed in the meeting, and the tone of the meeting could be characterized as one of two old friends meeting briefly for a chat.

Following the important announcement of the ABM decision earlier in the day, the President was very relaxed. Mr. Miller and the President discussed:

Golf (The President indicated there was no time to play any more because it takes too much time out of the day)

Exercise (The President indicated he should exercise more but doesn't, again because of the time. The President said he really doesn't use the pool as much as people seem to indicate. He said he uses it only about three times a week, but he should exercise more.)

The President reminisced with Miller for awhile about a sailboat ride which he took with Miller some years ago. The President indicated that was one of the best times he has ever had.

Paul Miller invited the President to attend his annual pre-Gridiron luncheon and the President indicated he could not do so because of his meeting with the NAB today. The President in turn invited Paul Miller and his family to attend the Sunday church services.

Mr. Miller indicated that his father was a Minister and that he had attended the first church service in the White House and would enjoy attending this one very much.

The President said, when he learned that Mr. Miller's father is a Minister, "I didn't realize we came from such similar backgrounds. Although my father was not a Minister, my family is very religious. I remember I used to go to church four times on Sunday: to Sunday School, to church, and afternoon and evening. Then on Wednesday there was prayer meeting and always choir practice. So our backgrounds from that standpoint are similar."

During the meeting the President sat on the couch in a relaxed manner with his feet propped up on the circular coffee table.

Following the meeting Mr. Miller said to me how well he thought the President looked -- that he looked a little tired but not worn or strained.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 24, 1969

FOR: Bob Haldeman - THE PRESIDENT'S FILE  
FROM: Harry Dent

We need to give Jerry Milbank and Rogers Morton a decision as soon as possible on what participation may be expected of the President in the 1970 fund-raising efforts. In a meeting this morning the President committed to nothing. Before they entered he told me he had agreed to do the March 11 fund-raiser in Washington, but indicated this might be all he could do.

At the close of the meeting Milbank pulled out the attached schedule of ten fund-raisers done by Kennedy in 1961-1963. The President looked over the list carefully and remarked that Kennedy had a Democrat Congress and did not therefore have the problem that this President has.

Morton and Milbank have both indicated they might as well quit if they cannot get more than one appearance. This is how strongly they feel about the matter.

Attached is a copy of the briefing paper for the President if you want to look this over further.

The President expressed a strong interest in Elly Peterson's "Action Now" program, a partisan version of our Voluntary Action Program. He volunteered to write many letters for her, turning this over to me to execute. These would be form letters expressing his interest in getting Republicans to show an interest in people by doing volunteer work in the public interest. I will handle this.

Morton proposed to rearrange things at the Congressional Campaign Committee so that the National Committee would handle all new, or non-incumbent races, and the Campaign Committee would handle all incumbent races. The President liked the idea very much.

Mr. Haldeman

- 2 -

October 24, 1969

Milbank presented the President with his book of letters. If this is sent over to me I will take care of this.

Also, the question of whether Morton should run for the U. S. Senate was discussed. Morton suggested that Congressman Glenn Beall, Jr. run for the Senate and Stan Blair run for Governor. The President seemed to go along with the suggestion because he did not want to lose Morton as National Chairman.

Morton reported on the good job being done to lay the necessary plans for winning key state legislative seats in accord with earlier instructions from the President.

cc: Dwight Chapin  
Alex Butterfield /

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MAR 3, 1970

file

MEMORANDUM ~~OF~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT  
March 3, 1970

I. PARTICIPANTS

The President, Congressman Thomas Kleppe of North Dakota, Harry Dent and Murray Chotiner.

II. PURPOSE

To discuss the possibility of Congressman Kleppe becoming a candidate for the United States Senate from North Dakota this year.

III. DISCUSSION

Senator Quentin Burdick (D) is up for re-election this year. The filing deadline is July 23, 1970 and the Primary will be September first, 1970.

The State's two Congressional seats are held by Mark Andrews (R), First District and Tom Kleppe (R), Second District. Reapportionment will probably result in eliminating one Congressional District.

It is expected that Gov. William Guy (D) is expected to run for the one remaining Congressional seat in 1972.

Cong. Andrews (R) was reelected in 1968 by 71.9% of the vote and Cong. Kleppe was reelected that year by 51.9% of the vote.

North Dakota should be considered a Rep. State. Both legislative houses are overwhelmingly Republican; the Statewide 1968 results were Republican except for the governorship; Senator Milton Young (R) is exceedingly popular.

The Congressman stated he wanted to do everything possible to help the President but stated it would be an uphill fight, whereas he could win his Congressional seat without much trouble. His friends were urging him not to run for the Senate but to stay in the House.

The President pointed out that one's friends usually do that. He had experienced the same thing in California in 1950 when he was considering running for the Senate.

The President told Congressman Kleppe that he might just as well run for the big one since the probabilities were that one of the Congressional seats would be eliminated as a result of reapportionment.

At the conclusion of the conference, Harry Dent and Murray Chotiner met with the Congressman and further discussed the practical aspects of the Congressman entering the race for the U. S. Senate.

Subsequently, Congressman Kleppe announced his candidacy for the Senate.

Murray M. Chotiner



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~May 8,~~  
May 5, 1971

*Lee*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN *H.R.*

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Attorney General  
Mitchell and Mr. Lee Nunn on  
Wednesday, May 5, 1971

The purpose of this meeting was just for the President to chat with Lee Nunn informally and to thank him for taking on the important role he's agreed to assume in Mitchell's outside campaign organization.

The President opened the meeting by telling Mr. Nunn how much he appreciates the sacrifice he's making and the help that he will be providing.

Then there was some general discussion of the approach to political fund raising and to specific questions in individual states regarding political organization, personnel and problems.

After the meeting with the President, the Attorney General and I met at some length with Mr. Nunn to go into detail on the specific points that had been touched upon in the Presidential meeting and Nunn is set to follow-up on all of them.

EYES ONLY ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.....

July 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with John Connally, Clark McGregor and Charles Colson, July 11, 1972

Conclusions:

1. Connally honestly wants and needs a rest.
2. Despite whatever else he may say, he is keenly interested in his own future and I do not believe he is ruling out any options. He is very anxious to know what the President wants from him in the way of future assignments, and in my opinion would jump at the prospect of being on the ticket this year.
3. Understands fully the dilemma of Democrats for Nixon, is happy that we have not set up an organization, he does not want to be handed a "fait accompli" but at the same time realizes we need to get the organization set up and running immediately and agrees completely with the strategy of getting the Democratic endorsements now. In short, he totally understands the difficult situation we are in, but he is not ready to make his own decision.
4. If he assumes the chairmanship of Democrats for Nixon, he wants it to be a real campaign, well financed; he wants to play a major role and wants to be damn sure he has complete control in the areas for which he is responsible.

A more detailed summary of the meeting is attached.

  
Charles W. Colson

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

July 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with John Connally, Clark MacGregor  
and Charles Colson, July 11, 1972

MacGregor opened the session by explaining how he wants to take over the campaign, the things the President had discussed with him, the steps that he, MacGregor, was taking to reorganize the Committee to Re-Elect the President, the general situation politically around the country. He then discussed the importance of the Democrats for Nixon effort. MacGregor said he was very hopeful that John Connally would agree to be the head of our national effort in this area. I then explained all of the Democratic support we expected to get -- Teamsters, other major labor leaders (Connally expressed some surprise over some of the names), leading Jews, businessmen and politicians. Several times during the conversation, Connally came back to this point wanting to be sure we really had the people lined up that we said we did.

I explained the dilemma we were in, that we had good people ready to go, in fact eager to, but we were reluctant to create any organizational framework until we found out what interests Connally had in this area and obviously if Connally was interested in this area, we would not set up anything that didn't have his complete approval. He seemed very appreciative of this point and also said he understood the dilemma completely. He further said he felt it was important to move fast and to get Democrats defecting while their passions were aroused as they are now. In short, he felt we shouldn't wait, that we should move out immediately but also expressed appreciation for our not moving until he could be involved. I used the Paulucci example saying that we were holding him at bay, not accepting his \$1 million because we didn't know if Connally would want Paulucci involved.

We also discussed the difficulty of getting defections without having a place for the defectors to go. In the case of labor there is no problem. Unions can announce their own endorsements and their leadership can announce their personal endorsements. The same is true for politicians, like Rizzo. But someone not in a public office has an entirely different problem. I used the illustration of John Kenney, who was formerly Jackson's campaign treasurer, former Democratic National Committeeman from Washington, D. C. and former Under Secretary of the Navy. He wants to support Nixon but feels that it would be highly presumptuous to call a press conference to do so, that he, in effect, is just an ordinary citizen. If, however, he could announce as a member of the Board of Directors of Democrats for Nixon, there would be a plausible reason for a public statement. I also pointed out that in a few weeks Kenney might be taken in by McGovern, whereas today we have him. Hence the need to have an organized plan, people in place and an operation functioning.

Clark talked about his conversation with Dwayne Andreas, the fact that the Democrats operation was as important as anything we would have in the campaign and that in his judgment, a view he was sure the President shared, that Connally was the only man who could do this. At a number of points in the conversation, Connally kept saying, "Are we sure there isn't anyone else who could do this?". He several times expressed concern over his need to begin making money again, his plans to go back to the law firm, but to retain sufficient personal freedom to be able to campaign, the need to maintain an apartment in Washington and, as he put it a myriad of other mundane details. He also said that if he were to take the operation over, he would want to run it himself; he had not gotten where he is in life by allowing other people to make mistakes for him. If mistakes are made, it would be because Connally made it on his own behalf. He indicated that he would want to assume full responsibility for the South and the Southwest, would want to handle money, advertising and organization. He felt the effort would demand at least \$2 to \$3 million and MacGregor assured him those funds would be available.

At several points in the conversation, Connally asked what kind of campaign the President wanted. MacGregor spent a considerable amount of time explaining this, the gist of which was the President, in MacGregor's view, would not start campaigning until Halloween, that he would concentrate on being President, using the advantages of the office and letting surrogates handle the heavy load of campaigning. Connally kept asking

who would attack McGovern. I didn't make the point that Connally would be the best man for fear of turning Connally off. I did make the point that we would be hitting very hard on the issues, that we would not be attacking McGovern personally, but cutting his positions hard and all of our speakers would have to assume responsibility for this.

At 3 or 4 times during the meeting, Connally said, "When I do this..." or "The way I am going to run this is...". At several points I thought he was on the verge of saying yes. Needless to say, neither Clark nor I put it to him that hard to force an answer. At the end of the meeting, he said he never made decisions when he was tired and that therefore he didn't feel he could make a decision until he had had a little rest. He agreed, however, with the point that MacGregor and I made that the best time for a press conference would be Friday or Saturday, immediately following his meeting with the President.

I made the point at least twice that it was my idea to raise the issue with Connally simply because I felt we were under enormous time pressures, but I realized full well that the discussion should have taken place exclusively between the President and Connally. Each time I raised it, Connally demured and said he did not stand on protocol and in some ways preferred it this way because he could talk frankly and kick around the pros and cons. He also said he was glad to have time to think it through. I told him that we were frankly jumping the gun simply because we were getting so many urgent appeals from Democrats and we didn't want to accept support until after it had been discussed with Connally, but at the same time not lose it by delaying. He agreed with both points.

After MacGregor left, I deliberately stayed behind for a few minutes and said to Connally that I personally had very warm feelings for him, that I had no idea what his interests were in the future, but I didn't think anything that Clark or I were suggesting would in any way hurt Connally in the future; that in my opinion, a very historic political re-alignment was taking place, that Nixon was building a new coalition. The point I made was that whatever his interests are in the future, I felt it would not be detrimental to be part of the effort to build a new political

alliance, which I felt we had the opportunity to do this year. Connally said he had no personal ambitions of any kind but that he agreed with my analysis that we are on the verge of a massive change in political allegiances around the country and that the President could very well be the architect of a new majority in this country. He then asked me what the President meant in his last press conference when he said that he had another assignment for Connally in mind. I told him that I had never discussed that question with the President and that I didn't know, but that I knew for a fact that the President thought that Connally was one of the very few people who would have the courage to do the things that had to be done in the Government and I thought his remark that Connally was able to do anything in Government was very significant and reflected how highly the President regarded Connally. Connally said he thought the remark was very important; he had read the President's press conference very carefully, particularly the remarks about the Vice Presidency. He then said that, "Of course the President has no choice with respect to Agnew. I assume the reason he went through the answers he did was to get back at Agnew because he was still mad at the comment that Agnew made about a Democrat not running on a Republican ticket." I told Connally I had no idea, that this was one subject I had never discussed with the President, that a President always has all of his options open, especially this President, but that since the subject had never come up when I was present, I really couldn't cast any light on it. I simply said again how highly the President regards Connally and that whatever the President said, I am sure he said with great deliberatness. Several times Connally commented about the specific language the President used in his last press conference with regard to the Vice Presidency. Connally said he might like to talk to me again today, but in any event he would be in touch before leaving the city and that he would want to do anything that the President wanted him to do to be of help in getting the President re-elected which he felt was the most important thing he could do. I haven't the slightest doubt but that Connally was fishing with respect to what I could tell him on his future and in my opinion he is greatly interested personally in his own future, specifically this year.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

July 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *WC*  
SUBJECT: Democrats for Nixon

During your meeting with John Connally, you might wish to get into the question of Democrats for Nixon and Connally's role. Needless to say, he is a virtually unanimous choice to head the organization if he will do so. Clark McGregor and I opened this question yesterday. We didn't conclude anything but we discussed the question thoroughly (separate detailed memo is attached).

We have been moving ahead, as you know, with efforts to recruit a number of prominent Democrats. We have done so because in the immediate aftermath of the Convention the anti-McGovern feelings will be the strongest and we can build momentum during this period, creating the public impression of a wholesale defection from McGovern. We have proceeded in the knowledge, however, that John Connally likes to do things his way and that he might resent some of the efforts we have made since he in effect was not running the show. We have, therefore, been walking a tightrope.

What we would like to come out of your meeting with Connally is his ratification of what we have done to date and his willingness to in effect take over what we have gotten started. Alternatively, we need a green light to go ahead with our next best choices to head at least for now the Democrats' effort.

All of the endorsements that we have sought thus far have been of individuals. Jen0 Paulucci went a little further than we had asked and formed a Committee of Concerned Democrats and Independents with 7 other members. We want to fold it into Democrats for Nixon on the assumption that Connally approves; if Connally does object, we can, of course, keep it independent but this will give us some problems with Paulucci, who is sensitive to being in a subordinate position.

Paulucci, like Dwayne Andreas, expects Connally to run a national operation; if, in fact, we ask Paulucci, Andreas and their friends to be part of something other than the National Democrats for Nixon effort. I fear they may feel we are downgrading their importance. Andreas has a list of prominent former Humphrey supporters that he wants to recruit immediately but once again he feels the need to find the mechanism to bring them in. Max Fisher has at least a dozen prominent Jewish Democrats that want to be folded into our organization. Once again, we need a place for them to come.

We have also picked up the endorsement and/or commitment to endorse of several labor leaders. In addition to the Teamsters, we have Calhoon, Gleason, Ken Lyons, Mike May, Brennan, quite likely Rademacher and a series of lesser lights, principally state level leaders.

Rizzo will be announcing soon as will Lausche. Smathers and Jack March are working through the lists of former Members of Congress. We have a bloc of former Jackson supporters headed by John Kenney who will announce, but who would like to talk to Connally first. Balzano has a group of reasonably prominent ethnics who can either be folded into Democrats for Nixon or become part of the ethnic apparatus.

We have done nothing in terms of organization structure because once again, knowing Connally's personality, we have not wanted to jump the gun on him. We would like to get the organization established, set up a national office, have Connally announce its existence and, of course, his chairmanship as soon as possible. This will be the invitation to disaffected Democrats whom we have not sought but who are looking for a place to come.

It is the recommendation of McGregor, Mitchell and I that Connally move as soon as possible so that he can become the catalyst we need. A series of individual endorsements over the next two weeks is fine but none of them will have the national impact of an announcement of a national organization opening followed by a daily announcement of new recruits.

On the organization side, we have hired two young men, temporarily running the effort out of an improvised office. One is a young Washington PR man, former aide to Sargent Shriver by the name of Mickey Gardner. I am very impressed with what I have seen of him so far and would hope he would meet with Connally's approval. He has given up his PR job and is available to us through the campaign. We also have John O'Neill, a first year law student from Texas, for the next two months. (He made something of a national name debating John Kerry.) To run the operation here, it is



my strong recommendation that we bring in Mike Monroney, Jr. as the principal chief, day to day operative. Gardner and O'Neill would work for him. I have known Monroney for many years. Connally knows his father. Monroney is 45, ran for Congress in Maryland and lost, is a life-long Democrat, but conservative and a Jackson supporter. He is prepared to fold up his own business to spend full time, but needless to say, is unwilling to make that move without knowing he has Connally's blessing. Mike also would like for personal reasons to have Connally talk to his father, Former Senator Monroney. Monroney's feeling is that a call from Connally would make his father more understanding of Mike's desire to join the campaign and, more importantly, it will also result in his father joining Democrats for Nixon as well. Monroney, Sr. was very highly regarded by his colleagues and this would be a very significant defection.

I have not attempted in the foregoing to enumerate all of the potential Democratic defections that we believe we have. We believe prominent sitting Democrats in Congress will work for us even if quietly or perhaps will permit their associates to be involved in our effort (as is the case with Rooney and Delaney). We also believe parts of the Daley operation will support us publicly. We have enormous possibilities on Wall Street. We have some Democratic political leaders like Esposito. We have former Democratic office holders like Governor Gary of Oklahoma and Governor McNair of South Carolina.

The problem in a nutshell is that we cannot move out and really do the aggressive job we need to until we staff an operation and give people a committee to join. We cannot set up the committee and staff the operation until we know where we stand with Connally; hence, we are really very much in limbo at the very time when we should be actively and publicly bringing Democrats into the fold.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File*

July 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

FROM : H.R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT : Dinner With John Connally  
July 13, 1972 at  
La Casa Pacifica

This dinner was to review with Connally the plans for putting together a Democrats for Nixon organization, and primarily to enlist Connally as the key man in doing this.

Connally has some reluctance because of time and personal problems, but indicated that he would do everything in his power to be of help to the President and that if this was the best role for him, he would work out a way to do it.


There was a detailed discussion of various personal matters relating to Connally's position in the campaign and in the future. It was a very pleasant and productive meeting.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

July 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: CHARLES COLSON   
SUBJECT: Connally/Stans

I am sorry to report to you on an unfortunate incident involving Connally as to which you should be advised and perhaps call Connally if you feel it is warranted.

Last week MacGregor asked to meet with Connally and myself to be sure we were thoroughly coordinated -- a necessary thing to do obviously. We decided to include Stans because under the new statute, Connally cannot spend funds without Stans' permission. Obviously fund raising and expenditures have to be closely coordinated because of the inevitable competition for the same sources, the need for initial funding by Stans as well as the strict statutory ceilings.

In the meeting we had this afternoon (after your visit with Connally), Stans became very difficult; he seemed very unhappy over the whole Democrats for Nixon effort. He said that he was already getting money from Democrats and obviously any funds Connally raised would be "in competition" with his efforts. He further said that he had an obligation to raise \$40 million and that anything Connally needed would be in excess of that and he didn't think he could raise it. MacGregor said that he would gladly reduce his budget to make room for Connally's needs. I made the point that Connally would have to be assured of a budget of at least \$3 million (since Connally had told me over the weekend he didn't want to launch an effort unless he was assured of funding of at least that amount).

Connally became visibly angry during the lunch especially when Stans said that if Connally raised more money than his "budgeted" figure, he would have to turn it over to Stans. During the lunch Connally said

## EYES ONLY

2.

he wasn't sure he wanted to embark on the Democrats for Nixon effort at all and Stans allowed as to how he wished the President could find another fund raiser. Despite frequent attempts by MacGregor and me to keep it under control, the atmosphere was distinctly hostile.

After the lunch, I assured Connally that the candidate's views on this would prevail and that I knew exactly how you felt about it and that he shouldn't worry about Stans. I urged him to leave it in my hands. He said that he didn't ask for this job and that while he had no trouble at all dealing with MacGregor or myself, that it was best to find out right from the beginning where he stood. He said attitudes were very important to him, that he thought Stans had a very negative attitude and really acted as if Connally was an "intruder and competitor". I said again that I knew where the President stood and Connally said that isn't good enough. He said, "The President has to let his people know where he stands. Obviously Stans doesn't have the word."

I assured Connally that I would see that Stans did understand the President's views and Connally said, "Well, I will have to see for myself". He said he was unable now to agree to announce Democrats for Nixon on August 1. (Yesterday he had decided that would be the date.)

I think Connally was putting on a little show for everyone involved. He is a very sensitive fellow and Stans can indeed be rather dour when it comes to discussing campaign funds. Also, Maury is very tired and under a lot of pressure.

Connally, unfortunately, will have to work with Stans; under the new statute, complete autonomy is impossible. I assured Connally that he would be spared anything like this in the future and that Jacobson, Connally's counsel, could handle it. He said he didn't want Jacobson "subjected" to this either.

Under the circumstances, MacGregor and I think it may be important for you to tell Connally that we have reported to you on the lunch and that he can be assured that there will be no problem, that the budget matters have been determined by you, that autonomy is to be maintained and that if he can't deal with Stans, he can work through MacGregor and me exclusively. Clark and I will simply have to handle Maury.


*(Clark, Chuck + I all agree you should  
not contact Stans. We'll handle him.  
H.)*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

FROM: JOHN W. DEAN, III 

SUBJECT: Execution of President and Mrs. Nixon's  
Estate Plan  
Monday, August 14, 1972  
2:49 PM

PARTICIPANTS: The First Lady  
John H. Alexander, Firm of Mudge Rose  
Guthrie and Alexander  
Richard S. Ritzel, Firm of Mudge Rose  
Guthrie and Alexander  
H. R. Haldeman  
John D. Ehrlichman  
Alexander P. Butterfield  
John Ratchford  
John W. Dean, III

The President and Mrs. Nixon met with John H. Alexander and Richard S. Ritzel, both of the law firm of Mudge Rose Guthrie and Alexander, to review and sign their wills and the three trust instruments comprising their estate plan. H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman also signed certain of the documents. Alexander Butterfield witnessed the signings and John Ratchford notarized them. Throughout the meeting, the mood was light and informal.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*W*

August 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

FROM: RONALD L. ZIEGLER *RZ*

SUBJECT: President's meeting with Bailey K. Howard  
Monday, August 14, 1972  
12:00 noon

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Bailey K. Howard  
Ronald L. Ziegler

Bailey K. Howard opened the conversation by saying that in 1968 he and his publications supported President Nixon, and that he wanted to do so again in 1972. Noting the fact that he has retired from full-time participation in his job and has moved to a new home on Mulholland Drive in Southern California, Bailey Howard said he had time to volunteer to the 1972 re-election effort.

He proposed that he take the month of September and a part of October to solicit endorsements from weekly and other smaller daily newspapers in key states. Specifically Howard suggested that he send a series of three letters prepared on the robotype machine to editors and publishers of smaller publications in the key states. He also indicated his interest to visit various papers to solicit their editorial support.


What he has in mind is a personal effort centered around direct mail and individual contact, and he is looking to Herb Klein and the MacGregor organization for assistance in preparing materials.

In the course of the conversation Howard asked the President on which key states did the President want him to concentrate. The President said New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Texas, Missouri and Ohio. Also to overlap into Indiana, Wisconsin, and New Jersey.

Howard also pointed out that he would like to place a \$100 ad in many of the weekly papers in the key states, and also he is prepared to contribute \$20,000 of his money in this effort, splitting the cost with the MacGregor Committee.

The President requested that we provide materials to Bailey Howard and said, "None of those thick books -- give him the thick book; that is all right. But boil the material down for Bailey Howard to edit into his own words. Give him only a few pages on the main issues." Klein can discuss this with Bailey Howard, the President said.

Howard made the point that he wanted to devote his full time to this and would do so at his own expense. But he wanted assistance in preparing three letters that could be sent to daily newspapers throughout the country.



Republican  
National  
Committee.

March 20, 1973

George Bush, Chairman

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GEORGE BUSH

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GOVERNORS WILLIAM T. CAHILL AND  
LINWOOD HOLTON - TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 1973

Ken Cole, George Bush sat in on this meeting. Cahill had been pressing for a meeting to get the President as fully committed as possible in his re-election campaign. The President told Cahill that he could not get involved in a primary, stating that Sandman was a good supporter of the President's and that he, the President, had other commitments around the country that were difficult, such as California and Illinois. Thus it would be more difficult if he endorsed. Governor Cahill readily understood this, as did Holton. The mood was generally friendly. Cahill was most understanding about the non-endorsement and was pleased with the President's suggested formula as to announcement. Cahill was going to announce his candidacy the next day, and the President said it would be fine to say that he had seen the President, that the President was not going to involve himself in a primary, that the President appreciated the work Cahill had done for him as Chairman of his campaign, and that there was good cooperation between Cahill and the White House. The atmosphere was favorable. Later Holton reported that he was very pleased with the way the meeting had gone. Cahill did not press, as I had feared, for a Presidential endorsement in the primary.




THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

FROM: DEAN BURCH 

SUBJECT: Presidential Trip to the Michigan 8th C. D.

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
George Bush  
Bryce Harlow (see note)  
Dean Burch

Immediately following the Republican Leadership Meeting on Tuesday, April 2, 1974, the President asked those listed above to step into the Oval Office for a discussion of his proposed campaign trip to Michigan's 8th Congressional District in behalf of James Sparling, Republican candidate in a special election to fill the vacancy created by Rep. James Harvey's accession to the Federal bench. The election was scheduled for April 16, and the trip was tentatively set for April 10, 1974.

By way of background, an invitation from Sparling had issued on March 20 or 21; Bush proposed a campaign visit in conversation during the Republican Gala in D. C. on March 27; and Bush and Burch had reviewed recent poll data in Chicago on March 29 at a Midwest Regional GOP meeting. The poll showed Sparling trailing Traxler, the Democratic candidate, by about 9 points.

On April 1, 1974, Sparling began hedging his invitation and said he didn't want the President to campaign for him, simply to "meet the

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people" and "address the issues". During this brief meeting, the President observed that he was going to get blamed for a Sparling defeat in any case, that the candidate was "ten points back" and that, if he made the trip, he might be able to cut that gap by several points. On balance, the President thought it would be worth the risk. The other participants agreed and the April 10 date was tentatively set.

NOTE: I do not recall that Harlow took part in this meeting and believe that he did not. He was, in any case, opposed to the trip.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEAN BURCH  
FROM: CHARLES W. B. WARDELL, III *cw*  
SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President's File

Please prepare a Memorandum for the President's File on his meeting with George Bush, Mr. Haig, Mr. Harlow and you on Tuesday, April 2, 1974 at 10:40 a. m.

DATE DUE: Forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of this memorandum.

Thank you.

November 15, 1969

Dear Stets:

You must surely be as pleased as I am by our November 4 victories in Virginia and also in New Jersey and elsewhere. A couple of days ago I tried to reach you by telephone to tell you how much I appreciated the very generous help you gave to Lin Holton's campaign. Without you, Holton would not have had the financial assistance he needed.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Mr. J. D. Statson Coleman

The Plains, Virginia 22171

RN:Melencamp:emu