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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


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February 19, 1971

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MAGRUDER
FROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN 
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR: PROSPECTS FOR '72

The attached analysis does not lend itself to any easy answers. I'll approach it on two fronts. First, assuming the theory is correct, what should we do to implement this suggestion? Second, is the theory correct?

If party alignment will control this election as well as major elections to follow, then we should embark immediately on the survey work which will tell us just how that party realignment could take place; i. e., what can we do to encourage people to change from Democrat or Independent to Republican registration?

If survey research and analysis can give us the way to achieve party realignment, I suggest we go in that direction. Given a good, sound analysis of how to go about the realignment, it would not be difficult to gear our political operation in that direction.

But! I don't think party alignment will determine the election of 1972. Moreover, our first concern is not party realignment or making the party strong, but to re-elect Richard Nixon. Winning that election will come through the conventional appeal to current Republicans; an appeal on the record to Independents; and an appeal to the disillusioned Democrats who feel their party has deserted them.

It is only after elections that major changes in party alignment take place. A case in point is FDR's victory in 1932. It was after the election that so many Americans turned away from the Republicans to the Democrats. And they turned away largely because of what they perceived Roosevelt doing for them. Hence, the huge realignment of Black voters who before had been Republican.

Thus, if any realignment is going to take place, it will take place only after Richard Nixon is re-elected and not before. It will take place only if there are factors which encourage that type of re-alignment; that is to say, if Republicans can demonstrate that they offer more to the Nation than do the Democrats. That will depend on issue-presentation and issue-resolution -- two processes which are just beginning.

So, what I am suggesting is that we keep our eye on the doughnut and not on the hole. There is going to be no great party realignment before the decade is over. It will be a slow process, barring historical aberrations. What we can do is communicate to the public, via the President, that his reforms and policies amount to the kind of fundamental change on which realignments are built. If we can communicate this, then we might be able to start the slow process of party realignment.

But the process is slow, and if we gear up an election based on the thesis of party alignment, we're going to lose sight of the real goal of 1972; that is, winning an election.

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ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: PROSPECTS FOR '72

Kevin Phillips postulates an emerging Republican majority while Scammon-Wattenberg insist that Democratic dominance is very much the continuing reality. Someone is wrong -- the question is who? and why?

How Americans have voted is well established and the literature analyzing past voting patterns is in general agreement. How Americans will vote is conjecture and the literature is divided. Trends can be established and theories developed, but in the final analysis the result is, at most, an educated guess, a guess which is necessarily predicated upon assumptions about the importance of identifiable shifts in the political behavior of key voting blocs. These assumptions, however, tend to ignore the dynamics of a continuing political process. It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify from raw statistical data and charted voting patterns how the political behavior of Americans will be influenced by future events -- which is to say that trends can be accelerated or reversed depending upon events only dimly perceived at the moment of analysis.

There are a number of variables that influence political behavior, and it is striking that most analysts tend to concentrate on only those that are statistically ascertainable: the demographic, political and historical variables that constitute the "social antecedents" of political behavior.

These variables can be identified with some precision and enable the analyst to determine how Americans have voted and are likely to vote, "all things remaining equal." However, there is a second category of variables that must be considered if the fundamental political question -- Why do Americans vote as they do? -- is to be answered, and these are the "attitudinal determinants" of political behavior: the attitudes of voters toward issues, candidates, and parties. If you can identify these attitudes, you can answer the crucial "Why?" question. Moreover, you can identify those factors most likely to determine whether all things will remain "equal." At this point, you can proceed to consider ways to change critical attitudes that will in turn change political behavior; a process of applying "programmed political stimuli." The name of the game, after all, is to change voting patterns, not record them.

The dynamics of this systematic analysis of political behavior is schematically set forth at Attachment A.

I. SOCIAL ANTECEDENTS

Voting blocs are identified by reference to demographic data. Thus, it is possible to speak of the middle-class Irish Catholic vote in New York City because empirically we can identify this bloc from the analysis of raw demographic data setting forth the economic level, ethnic origin, and religious tradition of voters in New York City. It is possible to cross-reference various demographic variables in order to determine the types of factors that influence voting behavior. By comparing voting habits of middle-class and working class Irish Catholics in New York City, we are fairly safe in attributing voting differences to economic background since the other variables are constant. We can also introduce additional variables such as education, sex, age, marital status. In such a fashion, it is possible to identify with some certainty the decisive factors that influence various courses of political behavior.

In addition to these types of demographic data, it is also possible to determine with some empirical certainty the established political patterns of particular groups such as the extent to which they identify with a party, the degree to which they are loyal to that party (their identity is fixed as opposed to temporary), and the degree to which they participate in the voting process (voter turnout). From this information it is possible to determine, for example, that Irish Catholics in New York City in 1900 identified with the Democratic Party, had a strong sense of

party loyalty (i. e., their allegiance did not shift perceptively from election to election), and had a high degree of process participation (i. e., they voted heavily). On the other hand, from similar types of information it is possible to determine that black voters in New York City in 1966 identified with the Democratic Party, were loyal to party, but had a low level of process participation.

To the demographic and political variables must be added a third set if a complete picture of the social antecedents of political behavior is to be established. These may be characterized as historical, economic, and societal. Normative as opposed to empirical, this data is more difficult to collect and analyze but it is no less important. Class consciousness, cultural tradition, peer group norms, or historical experience can be important factors in determining political behavior. It is difficult, for example, to account for the political behavior of the Eastern European Jewish community in New York City during the 1920s without reference to such factors. These normative variables cannot be determined from statistical tables published by the Census Bureau but must be determined by reference to less precise measuring devices.

Analysis of the social antecedents of political behavior is the necessary first step for a sophisticated understanding of American voting patterns, but for most students of the political process it is also the last step. The

vast majority of statistical analyses of political behavior are limited to answering the question, "How do Americans vote?" Of intellectual interest, it is of little practical value to the working politician because it postulates a situation in which it is possible to predict the outcome but not influence it. It is of little comfort to a working politician to know how an election will turn out (particularly if the indicators suggest it is going to work out to his disadvantage). What a candidate or his manager wants to know is not the How but the Why of American political behavior. If you can isolate those variables that determine voting patterns, you have a chance to alter those variables and thus influence political behavior. From the study of the social antecedents of political behavior it is possible to determine how Americans vote, and because they vote with such partisan regularity during time-frames of approximately 32 to 36 years each, it is not only possible to determine past performance but also future probability. To alter these voting patterns, however, it is necessary to learn why identifiable political groupings vote according to a particular pattern, and to learn why, you must identify the attitudinal determinants of political behavior.

II. ATTITUDINAL DETERMINANTS

Scammon & Wattenberg's "Dayton housewife" would be hard-pressed to explain rationally the motives, interests, and values that influence her

political behavior, yet only by reference to these attitudinal determinants is it possible to understand why she votes for Candidate X as opposed to Candidate Y.

There are three crucial elements in an election campaign: (1) issues, (2) candidates, and (3) parties. Voter attitudes toward these elements are largely determinative of election results and it is necessary to identify these attitudes if the question of why Americans vote as they do is to be answered.

A. ISSUES

The voter's attitude toward issues is largely the result of four variables: perception, intensity, volatility, and political characterization. A question of public policy is not a political issue unless the voters perceive it as one. The desirability of floridation does not become a political issue merely because a candidate chooses to discuss it; if the voters do not perceive it as an issue, do not regard it as a serious question of personal or public concern, it is a non-issue and of little influence in affecting voting patterns. On the other hand, the failure of a candidate to discuss a question does not rule out that question as an issue in the campaign. If the voter perceives the question of unemployment as an issue, the candidate who fails to address himself to that question does not eliminate the issue, he only avoids it.

The relative importance of an issue in a campaign is determined by the intensity with which the voter identifies it as an issue. Rural Yankees may regard abortion as a legitimate political issue, but not attach a great deal of importance to it. Urban Catholics, however, may attach a great deal of importance to it; for them it is a major issue. The difference in attitudes toward such an issue is analytically determinable by gauging the intensity of perception.

Some issues are highly controversial or volatile. The race question, for example, may be a slumbering issue of only minor importance until a ghetto riot breaks out and suddenly the issue is perceived with a high degree of intensity as a major factor in the campaign. The volatility of an issue is a red flag to a candidate to be on the alert for sudden developments that may turn a minor issue into a major one overnight.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the manner in which the voter politically characterizes an issue is a major attitudinal determinant of voting behavior. Unemployment, for example, is associated by many voters with the Republican Party. For such voters it is natural to support a Democrat in a campaign where unemployment is perceived to be a major issue.

Issues assume importance in a campaign in proportion to their influence on political behavior. The degree of this influence is largely explainable in terms of voter attitudes toward the issues, and thus a

candidate who seeks to influence political behavior must first be aware of what the voters perceive to be issues, how intense this perception is, and the degree to which the voter has politically characterized the issue as associated with a particular party.

B. CANDIDATES

The Dayton housewife's attitude toward a candidate is determined by her affective disposition toward him, her objective appraisal of him, and her association of him with the party or interests with which she identifies.

Affective disposition toward a candidate is simply the emotional response to a man. A good example, of course, is Jack Kennedy who had great emotional appeal to significant voting blocs. Affective disposition is a key attitudinal determinant of most behavioral patterns; how one "feels" about another is often determinative of what one "thinks" about him. Political attitudes are more often determined by emotional factors than democratic theory postulates, and it is therefore necessary for a political analyst to determine as precisely as possible the degree to which voting is influenced by emotional reaction to the candidates and what accounts for that reaction.

Objective appraisal of a candidate encompasses the rational, dispassionate assessment of the man; a feat that occurs with singular

irregularity. However it does occur, and it is important. It was particularly important for the President during the 1968 campaign when many voters who were not affectively disposed toward him were able (for reasons largely attributable to some of the variables outlined above) to objectively appraise him and render a substantively rational electoral judgment.

Of critical importance, particularly to a Republican candidate for national office, is the degree to which the voter associates the candidate as hostile to the party or interests with which the voter identifies. A voter who has a strong sense of loyalty to the Democratic Party is likely to be influenced in his attitude toward a Republican candidate merely because of the candidate's party label. Likewise, a voter who identifies his own interests with the welfare of farmers is likely to be influenced in his voting by his association of a candidate with urban interests. This associational determinant is important for it is not so much a judgment of the candidate as a man (either emotional or rational) as it is a judgment of the candidate as a representative. Attitudes toward a candidate, therefore, are determined at two levels of perception: that of man qua man and that of man qua symbol or representative.

C. PARTIES

The final significant electoral factor is party identification. Parties assume particular significance in our electoral system because of our historical experience with one party domination. Party loyalties, once set, tend to remain set. For this reason, party identification is perhaps the most important single determinant of voting behavior.

Beliefs and stereotypes about parties are a major attitudinal determinant of political behavior. In the South, Democratic loyalties remain strong because of the force of tradition and the stereotype of the GOP as the Party of Reconstruction (this is changing, of course, in national elections, but not too much in state and local elections). In working class neighborhoods, antagonism against the GOP is rooted in the belief that the Republicans are the Party of Big Business. These are powerful attitudinal determinants, rooted as they are in deeply held belief and well established stereotype.

A less emotional, and hence less decisive, attitudinal determinant is the degree to which the voter identifies party with issues and interests of importance to him. The South is the best example of this determinant at work, for although hostility to the GOP is traditionalized by stereotype, a perceptible shift in party loyalty has occurred as a result of voters identifying the Republican Party nationally with those issues and interests

of most importance to them. Party loyalties are firm, but not fixed, and they shift as issue/interest identification begins to overcome beliefs and stereotypes.

Finally, attitudes toward parties can be influenced by the susceptibility of voting blocs to organizational efforts. This statement is merely a verbal elaboration of the observable practice of systematic recruiting of people into the party through organizational techniques. Slow, tedious, and difficult, voter attitudes toward parties can be changed through conscious organizational efforts. However, of all the determinants of political behavior, organizational susceptibility is probably the least significant, at least in short-range terms.

III. PROGRAMMED POLITICAL STIMULI

To the working politician, the study of social antecedents and attitudinal determinants of political behavior is more than an intellectual exercise, an accounting of how and why Americans vote as they do; it is an indispensable prerequisite for a sophisticated campaign designed to change voting patterns by influencing political behavior.

From data setting forth the social antecedents of political behavior it is possible to determine who votes and how they vote. Such data is useful in identifying those groups which are most likely to support a candidate and, once identified, special attention can be devoted to them.

However, what a candidate really wants to know is how he can reach voters not already disposed to support him, which means he wants to know why people vote as they do and what can be done to change their initial disposition.

Attitudinal determinants of political behavior are the key to this vote-changing process: change attitudes and you change votes. Thus, a well managed campaign is one in which a conscious effort is made to alter attitudes by the application of programmed political stimuli.

If issues, candidates, and parties are the key elements in the election process and attitudes toward these elements are central to voting behavior, it is logical that the candidate's objective is to approach each element with an eye on its implications for voter attitudes. Issue development, candidate image, and party emphasis become the keys to electoral success.

A. ISSUES

The first step is to identify which issues are important to which voting blocs and how important they are to each. There are bound to be conflicts among voting blocs so that it becomes necessary to make a choice as to which bloc shall be appealed to on the basis of a particular issue. In making this choice, it may be that an issue important to Catholics can only be emphasized by alienating Southern Baptists; however, it may be

such alienation can be avoided by also emphasizing another issue important to Southern Baptists but of little interest to Catholics; that is, decisions on issue emphasis require more input than the attitude of contending blocs toward the single issue in question.

Some voting blocs will perceive an issue to be important which a candidate can not develop either because it will clearly cost him too much with other important blocs or because the candidate is in an inherently weak position on the issue. The best example of the latter case was the economy during the 1970 campaign; we had to avoid the issue because of the inherent weakness of our position. Knowing which issues to emphasize and which issues to avoid is often as important as knowing which issues should be developed in order to maximize strength among a particular segment of the voting population.

Once a decision is made to develop an issue, the question is whether it should be developed rhetorically or programmatically. This is a major consideration for an incumbent who is in a position to deliver programmatic solutions to issues.

Rhetoric is persuasive and profitable only when it addresses an issue of concern to the voters in a manner that is convincing and reassuring. Issue rhetoric must capture the aspirations of the electorate, must be

credible, and must hold promise of being translated into concrete results. Rhetoric is not a substitute for programmatic development of issues; it is a supplement, at most a holding action. Issue rhetoric must be distinguished from image rhetoric -- the latter implicitly involves nothing more than reassurance and confidence, while the former necessarily implies action and resolution of issues in dispute. Being able to determine when rhetoric is a sufficient response to the issue-oriented concern of the electorate is an art, not a science, and is most difficult. It is, however, also most important, particularly when a party realignment is in progress.

If political behavior is to be altered by influencing the attitudes of voters toward political issues, it is imperative that those issues be defined in reference to particular voting blocs, that the attitudes be identified, and that the response, rhetorical or programmatic, be of such force as to have a major impact on those attitudes. Some issues must and should be avoided, but not out of ignorance of the fact that some voters regard them as issues. Issue avoidance should be a calculated political decision based on an assessment that the candidate is inherently disadvantaged on a particular issue. This disadvantage can possibly be compensated for by development of another issue of equal

concern to the targeted voting bloc or by concentration on altering that bloc's attitude toward candidate or party; the value of a systematic analysis of the variables that influence political behavior is that it identifies a variety of ways by which voter attitudes can be changed.

B. CANDIDATE IMAGE

No one need tell a candidate that his image before the electorate is a decisive factor in election results. However, it does need to be emphasized that in terms of party realignment leading to one party domination of the political process, candidate image does not play as important a role as issue development and party emphasis. Lincoln and Roosevelt came and went, but the party they led remained in power long after they had disappeared from the political scene. Candidate image is most important in critical and deviant elections -- the former being exemplified by the critical victories of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and Roosevelt, the latter by the deviant victories of Harrison, Taylor, Cleveland, Wilson, and Eisenhower. Only history will tell if the Nixon victory was critical or deviant.

Leadership (or candidacy) is generally characterized as charismatic or institutional. The critical distinction between the two types may be simply the manner in which the leader is perceived by the public: either

emotionally or objectively, as an unusual man whose influence is independent of his institutional power or position, or as a more traditional figure whose influence is dependent upon his position in or his identity with the institutional order.

Although it is doubtful that charisma can be artificially created, there is reason to believe that it can be artificially enhanced; a rough diamond can be polished, but a leopard can't change its spots (to coin a phrase). The point, of course, is that a candidate whose appeal is essentially institutional cannot be repackaged and marketed as a charismatic leader without creating a credibility problem.

There is no reason to believe that charismatic leadership is inherently superior or more successful than institutional leadership. It is essentially a difference of style, of technique, and it is by results that history judges the success of leadership. A non-charismatic candidate who frets about the absence of such appeal often makes a serious mistake by attempting to project a pseudo-charismatic image at odds with a natural image popularly more credible and electorally more helpful. Who would have believed General Eisenhower in Camelot?

Image, presidential and otherwise, has been over-emphasized because misunderstood. In a stable political order characterized by a two party

system, image, unless overtly offensive, is essentially a neutral factor, less important in influencing political behavior than issues and party. The candidate of a majority party can normally rely upon the loyalty of his party members to carry him to victory; his only concern is that his image not jeopardize the existing electoral fidelity of this majority that identifies with his party. This was Lyndon Johnson's problem. He represented the dominant political party, and in the course of normal events, party loyalty should have been sufficient to guarantee his re-election. However, he projected a distinctly negative image that alienated members of his own party. Additionally (and perhaps more importantly) his handling of the issues (race and war) alienated many who had previously identified with his party. Lyndon Johnson didn't need charisma to win in 1964; he would have had to have charisma plus a bonus of good luck to win in 1968.

Candidate image is only one of three factors that influences political behavior, and it should be considered in this limited scope. That is, it ought to be considered in reference to the precise ways in which it can alter political attitudes.

Affective disposition or emotion is the principal determinant of attitudes toward a candidate and where this element is identified, steps must be taken to deal with it. The "Tricky Dick" image, for example,

was such a problem. Having identified it as a problem, it was not difficult to take positive steps designed to dispell the image.

An overlooked "image" problem relates to the manner in which key voting blocs identify a candidate with interests they deem contrary to their own. Thus, Lithuanians who believe a candidate is too soft on the Soviets can be reassured by a statement to the contrary, an appearance at an event of major interest to the Lithuanian community, or by other gestures designed to correct the image. Likewise, union members who believe a candidate is too closely associated with management can be reassured by steps which are "image corrective" in nature.

Image is more than what comes across on a television screen. It is principally a matter of perception by members of key voting blocs, and a particular image that is favorable with one bloc may not be with another. It is necessary therefore to identify existing image problems and take steps to correct them. Generally they can be corrected without generating a new image problem with another voting bloc.

Although mass communications have tended to nationalize many social and political attitudes, they have not eliminated all attitudinal distinctions. As long as different political blocs with different views and attitudes exist (that is, as long as America remains a pluralistic society), there will be differences of image perception among the public, and no national candidate can be satisfied with projecting a strictly "national" image.

C. PARTY EMPHIASIS

In early August of 1968, it was widely believed that it was worthless to consider past voting patterns as an indicator of future political behavior because events were proceeding at such a rapid pace with such unexpected results that voter attitudes were influenced only by the latest political stimuli. At the same time, however, some skeptics were suggesting in the face of polls showing Nixon with an overwhelming lead that by election day traditional voting habits would begin to assert themselves, that party loyalty would once again prove to be the most decisive (but not necessarily the only decisive) determinant of voting behavior.

It is now generally recognized that this skeptical view was the most practical and most accurate one. In the final weeks of the campaign disillusioned Democrats who had toyed with the idea of voting for Wallace or for Nixon returned to the ranks of their party. This was particularly true of blue collar workers and others subject to the influence of organized labor.

In spite of the rapidity of social and political change, in spite of the obvious dissatisfaction with their party, its candidates, and its position on the issues, large numbers of Democrats decided in the final days of the campaign to stay with their party. A persuasive case can be made that the

remarkable thing about 1968 was not the number of Democrats who bolted, but the number who stayed aboard what had all the appearances of a sinking ship. One can and must conjecture about what would have happened to the Wallace vote if the Governor had pulled out, but one would be naive in the course of doing so to discount the likelihood that traditional party loyalty would have been the decisive factor in its distribution.

The point, of course, is that identification with party is and always has been the principal determinant of political behavior. We identify some elections as "deviant" because of their conspicuousness as exceptions to the pattern of political control by a dominant party. Until Woodrow Wilson's successful bid for re-election, no minority party was able to elect its candidate to the Presidency for two successive terms. Cleveland might have accomplished this feat if his electoral vote in 1888 had reflected his popular vote and he was elected to a second term in 1892. However, it is often overlooked by casual students of this period that the Democrats were by the mid-80s rapidly becoming the majority party; were it not for the Depression of 1893 and the seizure of the party by the populists in 1896, the Democrats very likely would have become the dominant party while Franklin D. Roosevelt was still a school boy. The election of 1896 was a critical one for the GOP.

Without taking exception to Kevin Phillips analysis, candor requires the observation that the most discouraging aspect of the prospects for the 1972 election is the fact that available evidence suggests that the GOP remains, by a substantial margin, the minority party. Our posture much more clearly parallels that of Woodrow Wilson in 1916 than it does Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936. For this reason, the attitude of voters toward party will be critically important in 1972 and a fundamental and crucial decision will have to be made about the degree to which the Republican Party will be emphasized as the vehicle through which the aspirations of the electorate can be realized.

This will be a difficult decision because a major party alignment is not achieved by virtue of personalities. Ike didn't do it and the President can't do it. If a realignment of the sort that Kevin postulates is to take place, it must occur as the result of a conscious decision by the voters that their interests are most clearly served by the Republican as opposed to the Democratic Party and the President must run as a standard bearer and not on his own. If, however, it is clear that we are not in the process of such a realignment (or that we are not yet far enough along in the process for it to be finally consummated in 1972), the President's identification with the GOP may prove to be a disadvantage.

The dilemma we face is not simply one of gauging the degree of voter identification with the Republican Party. If we assume that we are in a 1916-type situation in which party should be de-emphasized and adopt that course, we may in the process retard what could be a significant shift in party realignment. On the other hand, if we assume that we are in a 1936-type position in which we can move in for the kill and establish GOP domination, we may jeopardize the President's re-election chances if we are wrong.

What is required, therefore, is some precise study and analysis of voter attitudes toward party. To be helpful, this study and analysis must be centered on special voting blocs in special parts of the country. Gallup polls which purport to show the party breakdown nation-wide are not very helpful. What we are interested in is party attitudes among critical voting blocs whose support is imperative for a party realignment to take place. National shifts are interesting, but not particularly important. Critical elections occur in key geographical areas among key voting blocs; if they shift, it won't be long before others follow.

It is not enough, of course, to identify present attitudes toward party. What is required is to identify what can be done to change these attitudes. This process relates almost exclusively to the development and presentation of issues. Ike carried Michigan and Virginia; the former because of

personality, the latter because of issues. Only Virginia represents an example of party realignment favorable to the GOP, and it should be remembered that over the long-term only issue/interest identification can permanently overcome party stereotypes -- which is to say that candidate image may elect a President, but issues establish dominant party control.


IV. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

The above discussion suggests a conceptual framework for the analysis of political behavior for the purpose of altering voting patterns. It presupposes that the variables that determine political behavior can be identified and, once identified, influenced. It is not a mysterious process but merely the systemization of what every practicing politician attempts to do intuitively. It calls for the application of modern technology and advanced political theory to the practical problems of a Presidential campaign.

Demographic and voting statistics are readily available and, in machine readable form, can easily be handled by computers. From such data sophisticated analysts can readily identify significant attitudinal determinants of political behavior that can be influenced by programmed political stimuli.

The significant advantage of this type of program is that it provides more precise and reliable information upon which to base sound political decisions; it elevates the "hunch" to a fact. There is no substitute for good political judgment -- which means that the crucial element in any process of political analysis is the analyst -- but the quality of analysis also depends upon the quality of the information upon which it is based. Give a good analyst good information and you are ahead of the game. We can be, if we choose to be.

TYPES OF VARIABLES RELEVANT TO THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR



KLK

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How Americans have voted is well established and the literature analyzing past voting patterns is in general agreement. How Americans will vote is conjecture and the literature is divided. Trends can be established and theories developed, but in the final analysis the result is, at most, an educated guess, a guess which is necessarily predicated upon assumptions about the importance of identifiable shifts in the political behavior of key voting blocs. These assumptions, however, tend to ignore the dynamics of a continuing political process. It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify from raw statistical data and charted voting patterns how the political behavior of Americans will be influenced by future events -- which is to say that trends can be accelerated or reversed depending upon events only dimly perceived at the moment of analysis.

There are a number of variables that influence political behavior, and it is striking that most analysts tend to concentrate on only those that are statistically ascertainable: the demographic, political and historical variables that constitute the "social antecedents" of political behavior.

These variables can be identified with some precision and enable the analyst to determine how Americans have voted and are likely to vote, "all things remaining equal." However, there is a second category of variables that must be considered if the fundamental political question -- Why do Americans vote as they do? -- is to be answered, and these are the "attitudinal determinants" of political behavior: the attitudes of voters toward issues, candidates, and parties. If you can identify these attitudes, you can answer the crucial "Why?" question. Moreover, you can identify those factors most likely to determine whether all things will remain "equal." At this point, you can proceed to consider ways to change critical attitudes that will in turn change political behavior; a process of applying "programmed political stimuli." The name of the game, after all, is to change voting patterns, not record them.

The dynamics of this systematic analysis of political behavior is schematically set forth at Attachment A.

I. SOCIAL ANTECEDENTS

Voting blocs are identified by reference to demographic data. Thus, it is possible to speak of the middle-class Irish Catholic vote in New York City because empirically we can identify this bloc from the analysis of raw demographic data setting forth the economic level, ethnic origin, and religious tradition of voters in New York City. It is possible to cross-reference various demographic variables in order to determine the types of factors that influence voting behavior. By comparing voting habits of middle-class and working class Irish Catholics in New York City, we are fairly safe in attributing voting differences to economic background since the other variables are constant. We can also introduce additional variables such as education, sex, age, marital status. In such a fashion, it is possible to identify with some certainty the decisive factors that influence various courses of political behavior.

In addition to these types of demographic data, it is also possible to determine with some empirical certainty the established political patterns of particular groups such as the extent to which they identify with a party, the degree to which they are loyal to that party (their identity is fixed as opposed to temporary), and the degree to which they participate in the voting process (voter turnout). From this information it is possible to determine, for example, that Irish Catholics in New York City in 1900 identified with the Democratic Party, had a strong sense of

party loyalty (i. e., their allegiance did not shift perceptively from election to election), and had a high degree of process participation (i. e., they voted heavily). On the other hand, from similar types of information it is possible to determine that black voters in New York City in 1966 identified with the Democratic Party, were loyal to party, but had a low level of process participation.

To the demographic and political variables must be added a third set if a complete picture of the social antecedents of political behavior is to be established. These may be characterized as historical, economic, and societal. Normative as opposed to empirical, this data is more difficult to collect and analyze but it is no less important. Class consciousness, cultural tradition, peer group norms, or historical experience can be important factors in determining political behavior. It is difficult, for example, to account for the political behavior of the Eastern European Jewish community in New York City during the 1920s without reference to such factors. These normative variables cannot be determined from statistical tables published by the Census Bureau but must be determined by reference to less precise measuring devices.

Analysis of the social antecedents of political behavior is the necessary first step for a sophisticated understanding of American voting patterns, but for most students of the political process it is also the last step. The

vast majority of statistical analyses of political behavior are limited to answering the question, "How do Americans vote?" Of intellectual interest, it is of little practical value to the working politician because it postulates a situation in which it is possible to predict the outcome but not influence it. It is of little comfort to a working politician to know how an election will turn out (particularly if the indicators suggest it is going to work out to his disadvantage). What a candidate or his manager wants to know is not the How but the Why of American political behavior. If you can isolate those variables that determine voting patterns, you have a chance to alter those variables and thus influence political behavior. From the study of the social antecedents of political behavior it is possible to determine how Americans vote, and because they vote with such partisan regularity during time-frames of approximately 32 to 36 years each, it is not only possible to determine past performance but also future probability. To alter these voting patterns, however, it is necessary to learn why identifiable political groupings vote according to a particular pattern, and to learn why, you must identify the attitudinal determinants of political behavior.

II. ATTITUDINAL DETERMINANTS

Scammon & Wattenberg's "Dayton housewife" would be hard-pressed to explain rationally the motives, interests, and values that influence her

political behavior, yet only by reference to these attitudinal determinants is it possible to understand why she votes for Candidate X as opposed to Candidate Y.

There are three crucial elements in an election campaign: (1) issues, (2) candidates, and (3) parties. Voter attitudes toward these elements are largely determinative of election results and it is necessary to identify these attitudes if the question of why Americans vote as they do is to be answered.

A. ISSUES

The voter's attitude toward issues is largely the result of four variables: perception, intensity, volatility, and political characterization. A question of public policy is not a political issue unless the voter's perceive it as one. The desirability of floridation does not become a political issue merely because a candidate chooses to discuss it; if the voters do not perceive it as an issue, do not regard it as a serious question of personal or public concern, it is a non-issue and of little influence in affecting voting patterns. On the other hand, the failure of a candidate to discuss a question does not rule out that question as an issue in the campaign. If the voter perceives the question of unemployment as an issue, the candidate who fails to address himself to that question does not eliminate the issue, he only avoids it.

The relative importance of an issue in a campaign is determined by the intensity with which the voter identifies it as an issue. Rural Yankees may regard abortion as a legitimate political issue, but not attach a great deal of importance to it. Urban Catholics, however, may attach a great deal of importance to it; for them it is a major issue. The difference in attitudes toward such an issue is analytically determinable by gauging the intensity of perception.

Some issues are highly controversial or volatile. The race question, for example, may be a slumbering issue of only minor importance until a ghetto riot breaks out and suddenly the issue is perceived with a high degree of intensity as a major factor in the campaign. The volatility of an issue is a red flag to a candidate to be on the alert for sudden developments that may turn a minor issue into a major one overnight.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the manner in which the voter politically characterizes an issue is a major attitudinal determinant of voting behavior. Unemployment, for example, is associated by many voters with the Republican Party. For such voters it is natural to support a Democrat in a campaign where unemployment is perceived to be a major issue.

Issues assume importance in a campaign in proportion to their influence on political behavior. The degree of this influence is largely explainable in terms of voter attitudes toward the issues, and thus a

candidate who seeks to influence political behavior must first be aware of what the voters perceive to be issues, how intense this perception is, and the degree to which the voter has politically characterized the issue as associated with a particular party.

B. CANDIDATES

The Dayton housewife's attitude toward a candidate is determined by her affective disposition toward him, her objective appraisal of him, and her association of him with the party or interests with which she identifies.

Affective disposition toward a candidate is simply the emotional response to a man. A good example, of course, is Jack Kennedy who had great emotional appeal to significant voting blocs. Affective disposition is a key attitudinal determinant of most behavioral patterns; how one "feels" about another is often determinative of what one "thinks" about him. Political attitudes are more often determined by emotional factors than democratic theory postulates, and it is therefore necessary for a political analyst to determine as precisely as possible the degree to which voting is influenced by emotional reaction to the candidates and what accounts for that reaction.

Objective appraisal of a candidate encompasses the rational, dispassionate assessment of the man; a feat that occurs with singular

irregularity. However it does occur, and it is important. It was particularly important for the President during the 1968 campaign when many voters who were not affectively disposed toward him were able (for reasons largely attributable to some of the variables outlined above) to objectively appraise him and render a substantively rational electoral judgment.

Of critical importance, particularly to a Republican candidate for national office, is the degree to which the voter associates the candidate as hostile to the party or interests with which the voter identifies. A voter who has a strong sense of loyalty to the Democratic Party is likely to be influenced in his attitude toward a Republican candidate merely because of the candidate's party label. Likewise, a voter who identifies his own interests with the welfare of farmers is likely to be influenced in his voting by his association of a candidate with urban interests. This associational determinant is important for it is not so much a judgment of the candidate as a man (either emotional or rational) as it is a judgment of the candidate as a representative. Attitudes toward a candidate, therefore, are determined at two levels of perception: that of man qua man and that of man qua symbol or representative.

C. PARTIES

The final significant electoral factor is party identification. Parties assume particular significance in our electoral system because of our historical experience with one party domination. Party loyalties, once set, tend to remain set. For this reason, party identification is perhaps the most important single determinant of voting behavior.

Beliefs and stereotypes about parties are a major attitudinal determinant of political behavior. In the South, Democratic loyalties remain strong because of the force of tradition and the stereotype of the GOP as the Party of Reconstruction (this is changing, of course, in national elections, but not too much in state and local elections). In working class neighborhoods, antagonism against the GOP is rooted in the belief that the Republicans are the Party of Big Business. These are powerful attitudinal determinants, rooted as they are in deeply held belief and well established stereotype.

A less emotional, and hence less decisive, attitudinal determinant is the degree to which the voter identifies party with issues and interests of importance to him. The South is the best example of this determinant at work, for although hostility to the GOP is traditionalized by stereotype, a perceptible shift in party loyalty has occurred as a result of voters identifying the Republican Party nationally with those issues and interests

of most importance to them. Party loyalties are firm, but not fixed, and they shift as issue/interest identification begins to overcome beliefs and stereotypes.

Finally, attitudes toward parties can be influenced by the susceptibility of voting blocs to organizational efforts. This statement is merely a verbal elaboration of the observable practice of systematic recruiting of people into the party through organizational techniques. Slow, tedious, and difficult, voter attitudes toward parties can be changed through conscious organizational efforts. However, of all the determinants of political behavior, organizational susceptibility is probably the least significant, at least in short-range terms.

III. PROGRAMMED POLITICAL STIMULI

To the working politician, the study of social antecedents and attitudinal determinants of political behavior is more than an intellectual exercise, an accounting of how and why Americans vote as they do; it is an indispensable prerequisite for a sophisticated campaign designed to change voting patterns by influencing political behavior.

From data setting forth the social antecedents of political behavior it is possible to determine who votes and how they vote. Such data is useful in identifying those groups which are most likely to support a candidate and, once identified, special attention can be devoted to them.

However, what a candidate really wants to know is how he can reach voters not already disposed to support him, which means he wants to know why people vote as they do and what can be done to change their initial disposition.

Attitudinal determinants of political behavior are the key to this vote-changing process: change attitudes and you change votes. Thus, a well managed campaign is one in which a conscious effort is made to alter attitudes by the application of programmed political stimuli.

If issues, candidates, and parties are the key elements in the election process and attitudes toward these elements are central to voting behavior, it is logical that the candidate's objective is to approach each element with an eye on its implications for voter attitudes. Issue development, candidate image, and party emphasis become the keys to electoral success.

A. ISSUES

The first step is to identify which issues are important to which voting blocs and how important they are to each. There are bound to be conflicts among voting blocs so that it becomes necessary to make a choice as to which bloc shall be appealed to on the basis of a particular issue. In making this choice, it may be that an issue important to Catholics can only be emphasized by alienating Southern Baptists; however, it may be

such alienation can be avoided by also emphasizing another issue important to Southern Baptists but of little interest to Catholics; that is, decisions on issue emphasis require more input than the attitude of contending blocs toward the single issue in question.

Some voting blocs will perceive an issue to be important which a candidate can not develop either because it will clearly cost him too much with other important blocs or because the candidate is in an inherently weak position on the issue. The best example of the latter case was the economy during the 1970 campaign; we had to avoid the issue because of the inherent weakness of our position. Knowing which issues to emphasize and which issues to avoid is often as important as knowing which issues should be developed in order to maximize strength among a particular segment of the voting population.

Once a decision is made to develop an issue, the question is whether it should be developed rhetorically or programmatically. This is a major consideration for an incumbent who is in a position to deliver programmatic solutions to issues.

Rhetoric is persuasive and profitable only when it addresses an issue of concern to the voters in a manner that is convincing and reassuring. Issue rhetoric must capture the aspirations of the electorate, must be

credible, and must hold promise of being translated into concrete results. Rhetoric is not a substitute for programmatic development of issues; it is a supplement, at most a holding action. Issue rhetoric must be distinguished from image rhetoric -- the latter implicitly involves nothing more than reassurance and confidence, while the former necessarily implies action and resolution of issues in dispute. Being able to determine when rhetoric is a sufficient response to the issue-oriented concern of the electorate is an art, not a science, and is most difficult. It is, however, also most important, particularly when a party realignment is in progress.

If political behavior is to be altered by influencing the attitudes of voters toward political issues, it is imperative that those issues be defined in reference to particular voting blocs, that the attitudes be identified, and that the response, rhetorical or programmatic, be of such force as to have a major impact on those attitudes. Some issues must and should be avoided, but not out of ignorance of the fact that some voters regard them as issues. Issue avoidance should be a calculated political decision based on an assessment that the candidate is inherently disadvantaged on a particular issue. This disadvantage can possibly be compensated for by development of another issue of equal

concern to the targeted voting bloc or by concentration on altering that bloc's attitude toward candidate or party; the value of a systematic analysis of the variables that influence political behavior is that it identifies a variety of ways by which voter attitudes can be changed.

B. CANDIDATE IMAGE

No one need tell a candidate that his image before the electorate is a decisive factor in election results. However, it does need to be emphasized that in terms of party realignment leading to one party domination of the political process, candidate image does not play as important a role as issue development and party emphasis. Lincoln and Roosevelt came and went, but the party they led remained in power long after they had disappeared from the political scene. Candidate image is most important in critical and deviant elections -- the former being exemplified by the critical victories of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and Roosevelt, the latter by the deviant victories of Harrison, Taylor, Cleveland, Wilson, and Eisenhower. Only history will tell if the Nixon victory was critical or deviant.

Leadership (or candidacy) is generally characterized as charismatic or institutional. The critical distinction between the two types may be simply the manner in which the leader is perceived by the public: either

emotionally or objectively, as an unusual man whose influence is independent of his institutional power or position, or as a more traditional figure whose influence is dependent upon his position in or his identity with the institutional order.

Although it is doubtful that charisma can be artificially created, there is reason to believe that it can be artificially enhanced; a rough diamond can be polished, but a leopard can't change its spots (to coin a phrase). The point, of course, is that a candidate whose appeal is essentially institutional cannot be repackaged and marketed as a charismatic leader without creating a credibility problem.

There is no reason to believe that charismatic leadership is inherently superior or more successful than institutional leadership. It is essentially a difference of style, of technique, and it is by results that history judges the success of leadership. A non-charismatic candidate who frets about the absence of such appeal often makes a serious mistake by attempting to project a pseudo-charismatic image at odds with a natural image popularly more credible and electorally more helpful. Who would have believed General Eisenhower in Camelot?

Image, presidential and otherwise, has been over-emphasized because misunderstood. In a stable political order characterized by a two party

system, image, unless overtly offensive, is essentially a neutral factor, less important in influencing political behavior than issues and party. The candidate of a majority party can normally rely upon the loyalty of his party members to carry him to victory; his only concern is that his image not jeopardize the existing electoral fidelity of this majority that identifies with his party. This was Lyndon Johnson's problem. He represented the dominant political party, and in the course of normal events, party loyalty should have been sufficient to guarantee his re-election. However, he projected a distinctly negative image that alienated members of his own party. Additionally (and perhaps more importantly) his handling of the issues (race and war) alienated many who had previously identified with his party. Lyndon Johnson didn't need charisma to win in 1964; he would have had to have charisma plus a bonus of good luck to win in 1968.

Candidate image is only one of three factors that influences political behavior, and it should be considered in this limited scope. That is, it ought to be considered in reference to the precise ways in which it can alter political attitudes.

Affective disposition or emotion is the principal determinant of attitudes toward a candidate and where this element is identified, steps must be taken to deal with it. The "Tricky Dick" image, for example,

was such a problem. Having identified it as a problem, it was not difficult to take positive steps designed to dispell the image.

An overlooked "image" problem relates to the manner in which key voting blocs identify a candidate with interests they deem contrary to their own. Thus, Lithuanians who believe a candidate is too soft on the Soviets can be reassured by a statement to the contrary, an appearance at an event of major interest to the Lithuanian community, or by other gestures designed to correct the image. Likewise, union members who believe a candidate is too closely associated with management can be reassured by steps which are "image corrective" in nature.

eg. Blacks
Image is more than what comes across on a television screen. It is principally a matter of perception by members of key voting blocs, and a particular image that is favorable with one bloc may not be with another. It is necessary therefore to identify existing image problems and take steps to correct them. Generally they can be corrected without generating a new image problem with another voting bloc.

Although mass communications have tended to nationalize many social and political attitudes, they have not eliminated all attitudinal distinctions. As long as different political blocs with different views and attitudes exist (that is, as long as America remains a pluralistic society), there will be differences of image perception among the public, and no national candidate can be satisfied with projecting a strictly "national" image.

C. PARTY EMPHASIS

In early August of 1968, it was widely believed that it was worthless to consider past voting patterns as an indicator of future political behavior because events were proceeding at such a rapid pace with such unexpected results that voter attitudes were influenced only by the latest political stimuli. At the same time, however, some skeptics were suggesting in the face of polls showing Nixon with an overwhelming lead that by election day traditional voting habits would begin to assert themselves, that party loyalty would once again prove to be the most decisive (but not necessarily the only decisive) determinant of voting behavior.

It is now generally recognized that this skeptical view was the most practical and most accurate one. In the final weeks of the campaign disillusioned Democrats who had toyed with the idea of voting for Wallace or for Nixon returned to the ranks of their party. This was particularly true of blue collar workers and others subject to the influence of organized labor.

In spite of the rapidity of social and political change, in spite of the obvious dissatisfaction with their party, its candidates, and its position on the issues, large numbers of Democrats decided in the final days of the campaign to stay with their party. A persuasive case can be made that the

remarkable thing about 1968 was not the number of Democrats who bolted, but the number who stayed aboard what had all the appearances of a sinking ship. One can and must conjecture about what would have happened to the Wallace vote if the Governor had pulled out, but one would be naive in the course of doing so to discount the likelihood that traditional party loyalty would have been the decisive factor in its distribution.

The point, of course, is that identification with party is and always has been the principal determinant of political behavior. We identify some elections as "deviant" because of their conspicuousness as exceptions to the pattern of political control by a dominant party. Until Woodrow Wilson's successful bid for re-election, no minority party was able to elect its candidate to the Presidency for two successive terms. Cleveland might have accomplished this feat if his electoral vote in 1888 had reflected his popular vote and he was elected to a second term in 1892. However, it is often overlooked by casual students of this period that the Democrats were by the mid-80s rapidly becoming the majority party; were it not for the Depression of 1893 and the seizure of the party by the populists in 1896, the Democrats very likely would have become the dominant party while Franklin D. Roosevelt was still a school boy. The election of 1896 was a critical one for the GOP.

Without taking exception to Kevin Phillips analysis, candor requires the observation that the most discouraging aspect of the prospects for the 1972 election is the fact that available evidence suggests that the GOP remains, by a substantial margin, the minority party. Our posture much more clearly parallels that of Woodrow Wilson in 1916 than it does Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936. For this reason, the attitude of voters toward party will be critically important in 1972 and a fundamental and crucial decision will have to be made about the degree to which the Republican Party will be emphasized as the vehicle through which the aspirations of the electorate can be realized.

This will be a difficult decision because a major party alignment is not achieved by virtue of personalities. Ike didn't do it and the President can't do it. If a realignment of the sort that Kevin postulates is to take place, it must occur as the result of a conscious decision by the voters that their interests are most clearly served by the Republican as opposed to the Democratic Party and the President must run as a standard bearer and not on his own. If, however, it is clear that we are not in the process of such a realignment (or that we are not yet far enough along in the process for it to be finally consummated in 1972), the President's identification with the GOP may prove to be a disadvantage.

The dilemma we face is not simply one of gauging the degree of voter identification with the Republican Party. If we assume that we are in a 1916-type situation in which party should be de-emphasized and adopt that course, we may in the process retard what could be a significant shift in party realignment. On the other hand, if we assume that we are in a 1936-type position in which we can move in for the kill and establish GOP domination, we may jeopardize the President's re-election chances if we are wrong.

What is required, therefore, is some precise study and analysis of voter attitudes toward party. To be helpful, this study and analysis must be centered on special voting blocs in special parts of the country. Gallup polls which purport to show the party breakdown nation-wide are not very helpful. What we are interested in is party attitudes among critical voting blocs whose support is imperative for a party realignment to take place. National shifts are interesting, but not particularly important. Critical elections occur in key geographical areas among key voting blocs; if they shift, it won't be long before others follow.

It is not enough, of course, to identify present attitudes toward party. What is required is to identify what can be done to change these attitudes. This process relates almost exclusively to the development and presentation of issues. Ike carried Michigan and Virginia; the former because of

personality, the latter because of issues. Only Virginia represents an example of party realignment favorable to the GOP, and it should be remembered that over the long-term only issue/interest identification can permanently overcome party stereotypes -- which is to say that candidate image may elect a President, but issues establish dominant party control.

IV. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

The above discussion suggests a conceptual framework for the analysis of political behavior for the purpose of altering voting patterns. It presupposes that the variables that determine political behavior can be identified and, once identified, influenced. It is not a mysterious process but merely the systemization of what every practicing politician attempts to do intuitively. It calls for the application of modern technology and advanced political theory to the practical problems of a Presidential campaign.

Demographic and voting statistics are readily available and, in machine readable form, can easily be handled by computers. From such data sophisticated analysts can readily identify significant attitudinal determinants of political behavior that can be influenced by programmed political stimuli.

The significant advantage of this type of program is that it provides more precise and reliable information upon which to base sound political decisions; it elevates the "hunch" to a fact. There is no substitute for good political judgment — which means that the crucial element in any process of political analysis is the analyst — but the quality of analysis also depends upon the quality of the information upon which it is based. Give a good analyst good information and you are ahead of the game. We can be, if we choose to be.

TYPES OF VARIABLES RELEVANT TO THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

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