

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
25	5	7/2/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	Planning for the Re-Election of the President. Cover only scanned. 16 pgs.
25	5	7/5/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's projects. 87 pgs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102
By EP HRS, Date 5-23-82

PLANNING FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

**Citizens for the
Re-Election of
the President**

July 2, 1971

Copy 2.....

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: By

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER
E.O. 12065, 5/8/72, 8-102
3-23-80

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Magruder's Projects

The Attorney General has been pressing Magruder for action by the task forces. The result is a series of memoranda for the Attorney General which are attached as tabs and summarized:

1. The Place of Women in the 1972 Campaign

Rita Hauser argues that there is a new social and political awareness among women that will have to be tapped carefully to assure their support for the President. The recommendation, which the Attorney General has not acted upon, is that a separate women's organization within the campaign should not be created, but rather that a woman be appointed at the Deputy Campaign Manager level to carry the responsibilities justified by experience and ability regardless of gender (memorandum attached at Tab A).

Tom Benham of ORC reviewed the polling material available on "Women's Lib" and concluded that there is no political significance to the movement per se. He suggests directing the appeal to equal job opportunities rather than to the movement itself (memorandum attached at Tab B).

2. Young Voters for Nixon

Ken Rietz has been hired by the Attorney General to be Executive Director of Young Voters for Nixon. Rietz submitted a memorandum to Magruder who delivered it to the Attorney General (attached at Tab C). The Rietz memorandum relies on the Brock analysis for the President of the uses of young voters. As to decision items for the Attorney General, Rietz urges that: a) "Young Voters for Nixon" be the official title of the group; b) YVN be separate from the regular campaign organization, especially on the state level; c) YVN control the "overall thrust and policy of the Nixon youth movement", including YRs, New Generation for Nixon, etc.; d) YVN emphasize "first voters for Nixon" up to age 30; e) Senator Brock's ad hoc YVN advisory board of selected MCs under age 40 submit broad policy guidance for the National

campaign for young voters (members: Senators Brock and Weicker; Congressmen Steiger (Wisc.), Lujan (N.M.), Frey (Fla.), Pettis (Cal.), Beister (Pa.), Whitehurst (Va.).) Members of this board will set up regional boards of Governors, Mayors, etc., who may not all be Republicans; Brock's Advisory Boards will have a staff which will expand in the next few months; f) After November 1st, the larger staff will create First Voters for Nixon, which will be a targeted, high visibility registration drive among young voters based on public opinion surveys; g) A campaign plan will be submitted which will describe in detail the YVN programs and schedule including hiring and training staff (Nov.-Jan.); public activities including regional and state staffs and concentration on Nixon voters among school groups in the 21 target states (Feb.-April); tighten organizational structure around the identified Nixon voters (May-July); target mailing and campaign appeals to deliver the 500,000 young workers for Nixon (Aug.-Nov.).

3. Voter Registration

You asked Magruder to reconsider the decision about non-involvement with registration drives. (Memorandum attached at Tab D.) Magruder's response is the plan developed by Senator Brock and Ken Rietz. The plan, which the Attorney General approved Friday, suggests that the current Republican voter drives are of little value; that the Youth for Nixon Organization (Ken Rietz) will have to control our registration drive; and that after thorough planning the registration drive (First Voters for Nixon) will concentrate on target individuals in key states. The First Voters for Nixon would seek some publicity during the next four months while the organization work is being done. Brock and Rietz believe that any mass registration drive would work to the President's disadvantage. (Rietz' material also attached at Tab D.)

4. Mock Conventions

You asked for a description of the campaign's plans for mock conventions (memorandum attached at Tab E). Rietz prepared the memorandum attached at Tab F which Magruder gave to the Attorney General for consideration. Rietz urges a scheduled, organized series of conventions under his direction within Young Voters for Nixon. No specifics are offered as it is Rietz' view that organization cannot begin until this winter.

It is Finch's view that the interest in and number of mock conventions this year will be much lower because now youth has the vote and will channel its energies toward real voter participation instead of substitute politics.

5. Target Voter Strategy

The Delaware test of the target voter strategy is part of a Magruder memorandum on Research (Tab G) which has been submitted to the Attorney General. No decision by the Attorney General has been relayed to Magruder. The Research memorandum draws heavily on the RNC priority states list, which you reviewed in the key states memorandum of June 23rd. Additional points made include descriptions of successful examples of "rifle-shot communication with target voters . . . to augment the mass-media campaign". Magruder requests authority from the Attorney General to "(p)roceed with detailed development of the target voter strategy".

6. Democratic and Republican Contenders

Pat Buchanan is the Chairman of this Magruder task force, which has concluded that the current system of collecting data is adequate. This conclusion will be tested this week.

The Buchanan memorandum (attached at Tab H) is excellent, delightful reading. This summary does an injustice: a) Kennedy could have the nomination if he wants it; he will decide to run in December 1971 if he feels the President is a loser; there is a split of opinion as to whether Kennedy would be the most difficult candidate; his strengths are: Kennedy myth, rank and file Democrat support, and the best political operation; his weaknesses are: Chappaquiddick, too far left, anathema to South; b) Muskie could unite Democrats and is strong on new priorities issues, but he has politically bumbled the clean shot at the nomination, issues, and the center conservative Democrats; c) Humphrey is not considered the strongest opponent but has the party connections and politically accurate stand on economic issues, he is also a strong campaigner; his weaknesses include: old face, hemlock to New Left, weak in polls, and no appeal to youth; d) Jackson would be an excellent VP for Kennedy because he is a rallying point for Democratic conservatives; if Jackson were the Presidential nominee a fourth party would result; e) McCloskey should be ignored from the National level but pushed left to tarnish his ex-Marine, honest White Knight image; f) the result is attack all Democratic candidates and party leadership but keep the President aloof by either keeping the entire official family out of politics or by using the available Republican guns, except the President,

to hit the Democrats; g) The current research by the RNC and Mort Allin is adequate and our resources should be allocated to increasing the output of attacks by MONDAY, Dole, letters, and Colson's shop; h) Future activities to be considered include Walker advance men implemented difficulties for contenders, mid-week version on MONDAY, and full time use of Ken Khachigian as the White House Staff Man to handle the contenders' material; i) For the next six months, output should seek to exacerbate the Democratic rift by relying on the good RNC collection system and seeking methods of getting information into media; this would not require funds for staff from the campaign for now.

7. Mrs. Lombardi

Pursuant to a request after Mrs. Lombardi saw the President, Magruder has asked the Attorney General to include her on the Citizens for the Re-election of the President.

8. Businessmen for Nixon

Flanigan urges the Attorney General to accept Don Kendall as the head of Businessmen for Nixon. The Attorney General agreed and Kendall has assigned Deke De Loach (former assistant to Hoover) and Harvey Russell, black, to begin working immediately with Magruder. The plan is to have the businessmen's group primarily organization, issue, and recruitment oriented, instead of fund raising oriented. The businessmen's group should review 1968 and other campaign experience to prepare a formal recommendation for action for the Attorney General by August 31, 1971. (Memorandum attached at Tab I.)

9. Advertising

Magruder's memorandum for the Attorney General (attached at Tab J) recommends that the Citizens form their own advertising agency in Washington. He cites 1968 experience with Fuller Smith as the reason against hiring an independent agency with a Citizens campaign group within it. Magruder argues that no independent agency could guarantee full time performance by the best people in all related fields. Disadvantages to the creation of a new ad agency such as the simple logistics of setting up a \$20 million advertising agency are dismissed as being no different than what an independent agency would face. Assumptions based on the campaign spending legislation, 1968 experience, and fixed commission costs indicate that creation

of a new advertising agency would save \$1,200,000. Magruder requests authority to form the new agency and recruit an advertising director and creative director for consideration by the Attorney General. Magruder concludes by recommending target advertising that should be pre tested in the primaries.

10. Farm Vote Plan

Whitaker, as Chairman of the Farm Vote Task Force, submitted the most detailed, considered, solution-oriented proposal of any of the task forces. It is attached at Tab K. Whitaker's task force includes Bryce Harlow, Hyde Murray, Donald Brock (AA to Hardin), and Phil Campbell. Twenty-two recommendations for action are ready for decision by the Attorney General. Whitaker prepared a one page summary of the report which makes these points: a) Some non-political recommendations are being implemented now; b) positive and negative issues are identified with suggestions for effective utilization or response; c) poll information is needed and; d) better communication among Washington groups concerned about farmers is needed.

11. Planning Schedule for the Re-Election of the President

Bill Horton, of Fred Malek's staff, prepared the planning schedule for Magruder to deliver to the Attorney General today. Copy 2 of 12 is attached at Tab L. In chart form, all of the major decisions to be made by the Campaign Director are superimposed on the 17 month political calendar. Tab A of the schedule is a summary of the 15 task force principal planning activities. Subsequent tabs detail each of the major planning task forces and decision points.

Horton's analysis points out a severe weakness in the coordinated planning for the re-election of the President; that is, the lack of unified campaign - State of the Union - Budget approach aimed at November 7, 1972.

12. Brochure

Magruder directed the RNC to prepare a brochure which could be used to send to people who write to the White House, the Citizens, or the RNC asking what they can do to help re-elect the President. All who write in receive acknowledgements and are catalogued by Anne Higgins, Rob Odle, and Ed DeBolt, respectively. (Attached at Tab M is memorandum describing the system.)

The Attorney General quickly reviewed the brochure but deferred to you for any comments. The brochure has not been "staffed" to Safire, Moore, etc., because of reluctance to put White House Staff in the position of second-guessing the Attorney General's campaign operation. If you feel this would not be a problem, the brochure will be staffed this week. (Mock-up attached at Tab N.)

Recommendation:

That the brochure be staffed to Chapin, Safire, Moore, and Klein for comment.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Comment _____

GS:lm

CONFIDENTIAL

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: RITA HAUSER
JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: THE PLACE OF WOMEN IN THE 1972 CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize recent changes in the attitudes of many women and to recommend an organizational structure for the 1972 campaign which will be responsive to current concerns about their status in society.

Prior Voting Patterns

Women made up about 53% of the voting age population in 1968, and nearly 52% of those who claimed they voted in that Presidential election.¹

They have supported Presidential candidates in the following manner in recent elections, according to Gallup:

	<u>Percent of the Women's Vote</u>		
	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>AIP</u>
1960	51	49	-
1964	38	62	-
1968	43	45	12

(In 1968, the men supported President Nixon by a percentage margin of 43 - 41 - 16)

Current Attitudes of Women

A new social and political awareness has been developing among women, particularly in the last two years. Dr. Jean Spencer, Assistant to the Vice President, has summarized it well:

¹U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 192, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November, 1968," U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1969.

If there is a single concept which can encompass and express the concern of women today it is freedom of choice. From this concept the other specific issues derive: a rebellion against the assumption that the "woman's role" is only that of wife, mother and housewife; efforts to open doors now closed to women who want to or must pursue other roles, either in addition to or instead of the traditional role of wife and mother; efforts to end discrimination in education, including college admissions, fellowships and scholarships, admission to graduate and professional schools; efforts to end discrimination in employment, advancement, equal pay, overtime, maternity leave, day care; and efforts to end discrimination in returning to college or to work after raising a family--the "reentry" problem for the middle aged woman is serious.

A recent Harris Poll (Tab A) shows that about half of the women in America favor efforts to change the status of women in society. Because this is a relatively new issue, it is likely that the trend of this support will increase as the concept becomes more widely publicized and efforts at implementation become more organized. The support and opposition does not necessarily follow established voting patterns. For example, Black women and women under thirty, who gave a plurality to Humphrey in 1968, support it, as do college-educated women, who supported Nixon in 1968. Similarly, normally Republican categories such as White women and those over fifty do not support it, nor do women with eighth grade or less education, who tend to vote Democratic.

Campaign Strategy

This concern for more equal status is something which has become important enough to influence the political loyalties of many women. We feel it would be a mistake if the 1972 campaign were conducted without an awareness of these new sensitivities.

It was the unanimous feeling of those present at the first planning meeting for the women's vote in 1972 that there should not be a separate women's division with a women's chairman as has been done in the past. Women strongly desire to share responsibility side by side with men, rather than as a part of a women's auxiliary organization. Therefore, it was recommended that a woman be appointed at the level of Deputy Campaign Manager and that other women be given responsibilities within the functional staffs of the campaign organization, based on their experience and ability. From these positions, they would be

able to effectively coordinate activities to gain the women's vote and to supervise the organization of women volunteers.

If you approve of this organizational plan, we are prepared to submit names of qualified women for your consideration.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comments _____

5/20/71

Women Divided In Harris Poll

By Louis Harris

Recent efforts to change and strengthen the status of American women, such as women's liberation movements, have deeply divided women themselves. While 42 per cent favor such moves to equalize women with men, 43 per cent stand opposed.

The goals and principles of the organizations seeking actively to redress the sex balance are much more popular, however, than the tactics of protest which have been employed. A substantial 53 per cent of all women feel that "women who picket and participate in protests are setting a bad example for children." Nonetheless, a counterbalancing 62 per cent also feel that "if women don't speak up for themselves and confront men on their real problems, nothing will be done about these problems."

A national cross section of 1,600 women were probed in depth about their attitudes toward women and their problems.

"All in all, do you favor or oppose most of the efforts to strengthen and change women's status in society?"

	Favor %	Oppose %	Not Sure %
Total Women	42	43	15
By Marital Status			
Single	55	34	11
Married	40	49	11
Divorced, separated	63	27	9
Widowed	53	42	20
By Age			
Under 20	43	43	12
20-29	41	47	12
30 and over	37	45	17
By Education			
8th grade or less	38	53	23
High School	45	49	14
College	53	33	9
By Race			
White	39	46	15
Black	62	20	18

Clearly, the overall close division among women as a whole masks a much deeper division among different segments of the female population. Most resistant to changing women's status are older women, those with less education, whites, and married women. Proving most for change are black women, the young, and the best educated.

This segmentation of women into coalitions for "change" and "no change"

parallels the division among the entire public on issues such as the war in Vietnam, non-conformity among the young, and racial progress for blacks. Now the issue of women's role in society has been added to the list.

In order to get at women's attitudes in depth on the thrust of women's liberation and similar efforts, a series of six projective questions were put to the cross sections:

"Here are some statements people have made about activist women's groups. For each, please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree."

	Disagree %	Not Sure %	Agree %
Leaders of women's organizations are trying to turn women into men and that won't work.	62	27	11
"If women don't speak up for themselves and confront men on their real problems, nothing will be done about them."	62	29	9
"Women who picket and participate in protests are setting a bad example for children."	53	29	13
"Women are right to be unhappy with their role in American society, but wrong in the way they're protesting."	57	32	11
"It's women who have nothing better to do who are causing all the trouble."	47	43	10
"It's about time women protested the real injustices they've faced for years."	47	40	13

The results show a consistently close division between basic support and opposition to the drive to change women's status. The opponents outnumber the supporters of women's lib, but not by a large nor decisive margin.

Taken as a whole, it would appear that the recent outpouring of demonstrations and protests have struck a chord of pent-up frustration among women about the way they have fared in American life. But sizable numbers of women who are in sympathy with the objectives of the protest find it "undignified and unwomanly" to take part in activist demonstrations. The troops for a substantial women's movement are there, but at the moment the most effective rallying cry has yet to be discovered.

© 1971 by Louis Harris
1000 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

MEMORANDUM: "WOMEN'S LIB" AS A POTENTIAL POLITICAL ISSUE

Thomas W. Benham
OPINION RESEARCH CORPORATION

"Women's lib" is an excellent example of how a highly vocal minority -- through astute use of the mass media -- can create the impression that it has a broad following. All of the survey evidence (by Gallup) indicates to the contrary.

The following are the ratings of "women's lib" by a nationwide sampling of college students using the Stapel Scalometer (a ten point rating scale). The "highly favorable" and "highly unfavorable" votes shown are the two extreme rankings on the ends of the scale.

Notice that as many women have a negative view of "women's lib" as have a favorable view. Surprisingly, "women's lib" has more appeal to the students in the low income groups than it does for those from the higher income brackets.

COLLEGE STUDENT RATINGS OF "WOMEN'S LIB"

	<u>Highly Favorable</u>	<u>Highly Unfavorable</u>
National	15%	23%
Male	10%	23%
Female	22%	23%
18 years and under	15%	23%
19 years	14%	26%
20 years	18%	22%
21 - 23 years	14%	18%
24 years and older	20%	14%
East	17%	20%
Midwest	15%	23%
South	17%	24%
West	8%	25%
\$15,000 and over	15%	23%
\$10,000 - \$14,999	12%	14%
\$7,000 - \$9,999	8%	23%
Under \$7,000	24%	16%

Here's how 'women's lib' compares with other institutions and organizations tested.

FEMALE COLLEGE STUDENTS

	<u>Highly Favorable</u>	<u>Highly Unfavorable</u>
FBI	32%	13%
Women's Lib	22%	23%
Democratic party	19%	7%
CIA	16%	19%
Republican party	13%	15%
SDS	6%	37%
KKK	2%	80%

Perhaps another surprising finding is that on questions on how women are treated in this country, male and female views are more alike than different. Following are views of the adult population 18 and over.

Who gets the best break?

"In your opinion, do women in the U.S. get as good a break as men?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	65%	72%
No	35	38

Who has the easier life?

"Which do you think has the easier life in the U.S. today -- men or women?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Women	46%	49%
Men	30	46
No opinion	24	5

Who has the happier life?

"In general, how happy would you say you are -- very happy, fairly happy, or not happy?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Very happy	44%	42%
Fairly happy	46	49
Not happy	7	6
Don't know	3	3

Women business managers?

"Do you think women would run most businesses as well as men, or not?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	55%	45%
No	40	49
No opinion	5	6

Women in the executive suite?

"If a woman has the same ability as a man, does she have as good a chance to become the executive of a company, or not?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	39%	39%
No	54	56
No opinion	7	5

Women in politics?

However, women are more prejudiced against their sex as presidential material than are men, but have the same opinion on less affairs.

"If your party nominated a woman for President, would you vote for her if she qualified for the job?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	49%	58%
No	44	35
No opinion	7	7

"If your party nominated a woman to run for Congress from your district, would you vote for her if she were qualified?"

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Yes	84%	83%
No	13	13
No opinion	3	4

Among the public as a whole there has been little change in acceptance of a woman president over the years.

	<u>Would vote for a qualified woman for President</u>
1958	52%
1967	57%
1969	54%

It seems clear from this it would be a good policy to steer clear of "women's lib" as a broad political issue. There does not seem to be any way to win. While the majority oppose militancy in favor of "women's lib"; coming out politically against would raise a howl from a very loud and raucous minority. On the other hand, there does not seem to be justification for taking any favorable stand other than that which is consistent with civil rights legislation dealing with equal employment, equal pay, etc. The best political posture on "women's lib" would seem to be strictly hands off.

June 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM

KEN RIETZ

SUBJECT

New Voters Registration

Lots of organizations are getting into the new voter registration field. These include COPE, Common Cause, Youth Citizenship Fund, etc. Most of the organizations are either controlled by Democrats or conduct drives on a mass basis which favors the Democrat Party. Initial indicators are that the Republican Party is being out registered among new voters by anywhere from 2-1 to 7-1.

Several Republican organizations are presently active in the new voter registration field. They are:

Young Republican National Federation

First voter program. A new voter committee as part of the local YR Club conducts a program of identifying and registering new voters who lean toward the Republican Party. New voters drives are conducted in apartment houses and other multi-dwelling buildings where young working people live. To go with this program several items are available:

- 1) Apartment organization guide
- 2) A pamphlet with localized registration information
- 3) YR reward program which involves rewarding workers for registering a certain number of new voters.

This program, termed "Your Responsibility" is targeted at eight states:

Pennsylvania
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois

Connecticut
Florida
Kentucky
North Carolina

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Enclosed is a memorandum to me from Ken Rietz regarding Young Voters for Nixon. If you approve, we will begin implementing this program.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

JEB S. MAGRUDER

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

June 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM

KEN RIETZ

SUBJECT

Young Voters for Nixon

As viewed by Senator Brock, the objective of the "Young Voters for Nixon" campaign is to "achieve the mobilization and coordination of more than 500,000 new workers for the President."

Senator Brock and I have met and discussed this program at length. You and the Attorney General have read his initial proposal. He describes the philosophy behind the Nixon movement as follows:

"The central fact of this circumstance is that the desire for participation and constructive activity overrides all other issues, both emotional and intellectual. It can be capitalized on to the advantage of not only the Republican party and its presidential nominee, but of the young people as well.

"Thus it is my contention, and deeply rooted conviction, that if our campaign not only asks for their help, but also allows these individuals to become involved in a meaningful way, it can expect a remarkable response. Let me stress again one additional factor: for every young person in college, there are two of his contemporaries either gainfully employed in a civilian occupation, serving in the military, or acting as a housewife. Even if we accept the major college political charts indicating tendencies away from our nominee -- and I would not for one minute do so if we act now to correct the condition -- the remaining base of 16 million non-college new voters offers a political opportunity of incredible magnitude."

We built a Brock youth movement in Tennessee because young people wanted to be involved and we gave them the opportunity. We can do the same thing in a Nixon youth movement. The purpose should not be to change their minds but to give them an organized avenue for expression and action. The emphasis should be on organizing the President's supporters among the nation's young people, getting them actively involved so the overall campaign takes on a young flavor, registering them, and getting them to the polls.

Here are some of the conclusions we have drawn and the time table we have established.

The title should be "Young Voters for Nixon". This says more than youth. It says vote, citizenship, activity, etc. Although they register little and vote less, young people are very proud of their new right to vote. They don't like to be called "youth", "young citizens", "young people", etc. Young voters is different. It shouldn't turn them off.

Agree _____ disagree _____

Comment _____

YVN should be separate but a part of the over-all re-election effort. Young people want their own thing and it should appear that they have it. This will be more true and have more effect at the state level than at the national level.

Agree _____ Disagree _____

Comment _____

While the program should include all similar Republican activities (Young Republican, College YR, New Generation for Nixon, etc.) it should have authority for the over-all thrust and policy of the Nixon youth movement. All other organizations should be folded into it. Most young voters will be attracted to a candidate not a political party. While the YR's can do a good job with younger Republicans, our job is to secure the support of a broad cross section of the young voters.

Agree _____ Disagree _____

Comment _____

The program should include voters up to age 30. They all consider themselves young and will identify with the program. The emphasis, however, should be on "first voters." These are young people who have never voted for a Presidential candidate, are presently 16 to 22 and on election day will be 18 to 24. The Census Bureau says there are 25,125,000 such voters or 18% of the entire population eligible to vote. (see chart attached.)

Agree _____ Disagree _____

Comment _____

Senator Brock has organized selected members of Congress below the age of 40 into an ad hoc Young Voters for Nixon (YVN) advisory board to offer broad policy guidance for the National campaign among young voters. The board members are:

- Senator Brock -- Tennessee
- Congressman Bill Steiger -- Wisconsin
- Congressman Lujan -- New Mexico
- Congressman Frenzel -- Minnesota
- Congressman Archer -- Texas
- Congressman Frey -- Florida
- Senator Weicker -- Connecticut
- Congressman Pettis -- California
- Congressman Beister -- Pennsylvania
- Congressman Whitehurst -- Virginia

Members of this board were selected on a regional basis. They will be asked to set up regional advisory boards which will be largely honorary but will give added emphasis to the program. Serving on these regional boards will be young State Legislators, State Governors, state officials, Mayors, City Councilmen, members of the Republican National Committee, etc. All of these people will be carefully selected and need not be all Republicans. An effort will be made, however, to include all Republican groups for better coordination.

Agree _____ Disagree _____

Comment _____

Senator Brock and the Advisory Board will appoint a limited staff prior to November, 1971.

July 1, 1971

Director
Special Assistant to the Director
Secretary

September 1, 1971

A second Special Assistant to the Director
A second secretary

Agree _____

Disagree _____

Comment _____

After November, 1971, additional staff will be added including an administrative assistant to the Director, a field man in each region, a field man in key states, more secretarial help, etc.

During this Phase I which will last until November of 1971, the staff will develop the basic outline of a national campaign and begin to develop preliminary state contact lists of Republican leaders, and through them, potential state youth leaders. Congressional interns will be utilized as much as possible to do the basic research necessary. It is expected that the Director will spend a good share of his time travelling in the later stages of this Phase.

Phase I will also include the introduction of the "First Voters for Nixon" program. This will be the YVN's introductory stage -- a targeted registration drive among young voters. We suggest this program be introduced in the "must" states -- Indiana, Iowa, Virginia, Florida, Tennessee, California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Ohio.

First voters would be the high visibility portion of YVN in the early stages and would involve appointing a national chairman, state chairmen, county chairmen, etc. It would allow YVN to be organized and active in an extremely necessary area and at the same time do a very important job.

Agree _____

Disagree _____

Comment _____

Within the target states the First Voters program would be carefully directed at Republican areas within the state and potential Nixon voters. This will take a lot of research on the part of our Washington staff. We feel it will also be necessary to conduct public opinion surveys to find out more about the attitudes of the non-college young voter.

Agree _____ Disagree _____

Comment _____

Following the preliminary planning stage, a campaign plan will be presented and initial decisions asked for. A brief discussion however, of each of the next stages is presented here.

Phase II would run from November through January, 1972, and would primarily be concerned with completion of the basic campaign plan and the employment and training of the remainder of the national and regional field staff required.

Phase III contains those months of February, March and April, 1972, during which time the campaign would begin to move into its public role. By the end of April, full state and regional staffing should be completed. At this point we can begin the young voter education and identification drives. The school phase of this program would concentrate on identifying positive and possible Nixon supporters among high schools, vocational schools, junior college and colleges, concentrating first, of course, on the 21 target states. Simultaneously the campaign among youth employed in the civilian work force and the military would proceed apace, with a drive to identify not only all potential Nixon supporters in this particular group, but to specifically enlist the young community leadership necessary to organize these groups and effectuate their voting strength.

Also during this period we would be in position, having completed the identification program on a community basis, to conduct a registration drive to maximize the registration of those voters who would tend to favor our campaign.

Phase IV would be concerned with a completion of our organizational structure at both the state, county and community level in order

to be prepared to go into the fall campaign. During these summer months of May, June, and July the primary emphasis would be upon organizational structure and upon the completion of our voter identification and registration programs among the employed youth. We hope that maximum attention will be focused on young voters' support of the President through carefully planned events at the National Convention.

Phase V is of course the climax effort to direct the total resources identified and organized up to this point toward the maximum vote turnout for President Nixon. By early October the education, identification and registration of all voting age youth should be completed as well as organization of these pro Nixon young people into campaign teams. During this time the direct mail program to both employed and college young people will reach its maximum, as will the organizational effort to direct the energies of this group towards constructive campaign activity which is coordinated with and complementary to the National Republican campaign and the campaign as it is conducted on a state and local basis.

The sum total of this effort is directed toward achieving a goal of 500,000 attractive, articulate, young workers for Nixon to be made available as a basic campaign team for the national campaign. They will not only work but receive attention and make President Nixon the young people's candidate.

Suggested Program Objectives and Projects

PURPOSE - Develop a national leadership team with the capacity to:

- 1) Train and lead regional state leaders.
- 2) Create a program which will excite and involve a significant portion of the 25,000,000 voters between 18 and 24.
- 3) Support and supplement the program of the national campaign.

GOALS - Involvement through organization and challenge of:

- 1) YVN teams in every state.
- 2) YVN organizations among the working and military.
- 3) YVN organizations in every high school.
- 4) YVN organizations in every college.
- 5) 500,000 young workers for Nixon in support of the regular campaign.

POTENTIAL PROJECTS:

- 1) National youth education drives.
- 2) National youth canvass.
- 3) National youth registration of pro-Nixon youth.
- 4) National youth voter turnout of pro-Nixon youth.
- 5) National hospital and nursing home registration of pro-Nixon aged (CARE program).
- 6) National absentee voter drive.
- 7) National bumper sticker, bill board, flyer campaign, etc.

8) National support program for the Nixon campaign in such areas as poll watchers, precinct workers, baby sitting, drivers, etc.

9) National "kinfolk" operation

10) National YVN newsletter

Suggested Job Description Summaries - by Groups

Employed Staff Planning Group - This group will begin work on the preliminary campaign design, begin contact with national, regional and state Republican and campaign leaders, develop lists of potential contacts by states, catalog information on all high schools, vocational schools, colleges, etc., form and staff the national advisory board, contact, employ and train regional staff.

National Advisory Board - This group will oversee the entire campaign, approve budgets, approve major staff appointments, approve major campaign themes, and act in a continuing advisory role to assist the national program staff.

National Staff - This group will conduct the national campaign, oversee and direct regional field activities, conduct fund raising when and where authorized by the National Nixon campaign, coordinate all activities with the National Nixon campaign manager, publish newsletter, design national youth campaign themes, etc.

Regional Staff - Under the direction of the National Director, this group will supervise and coordinate the activities of state organization within each region, implement programs as requested by the national staff, train and supervise state leaders.

State Staff - This group will have direct responsibility of implementation of the state youth program, coordination and cooperation with the state Nixon campaign, fund raising as authorized by the Nixon state campaign manager, organization of every high school, vocational school, and the college in the state young voter canvass, young voter registration drives, young voter vote drive, and such other programs as they are asked to implement.

	Population of Voting Age (18 yrs. & Over)	Estimated Total of New Voters	% of Total Eligible to Vote
United States	139,563	25,125	18.0
Alabama	2,291	440	19.5
Alaska	193	29	15.0
Arizona	1,227	232	18.9
Arkansas	1,318	230	17.5
California	14,237	2,580	18.1
Colorado	1,532	319	20.8
Connecticut	2,117	343	16.2
Delaware	372	68	18.3
Dist. of Columbia	543	111	20.5
Florida	5,088	773	13.2
Georgia	3,111	354	11.4
Hawaii	528	91	17.2
Idaho	467	90	19.3
Illinois	7,563	1,321	17.4
Indiana	3,487	662	18.9
Iowa	1,887	347	18.3
Kansas	1,539	304	19.8
Kentucky	2,177	254	11.7
Louisiana	2,356	497	21.1
Maine	662	122	18.4
Maryland	2,715	478	17.6
Massachusetts	3,947	725	18.4
Michigan	5,875	1,127	19.1
Minnesota	2,523	478	18.9
Mississippi	1,412	297	21.0
Missouri	3,222	569	17.7
Montana	452	84	18.6
Nebraska	1,002	191	19.1
Nevada	356	54	15.2
New Hampshire	511	95	18.6
New Jersey	5,018	769	13.3
New Mexico	633	129	20.4
New York	12,714	2,101	16.5
North Carolina	3,493	750	21.5
North Dakota	398	83	20.9
Ohio	7,165	1,313	18.3
Oklahoma	1,791	325	18.1
Oregon	1,473	259	17.5
Pennsylvania	8,136	1,371	16.8
Rhode Island	671	135	20.1
South Carolina	1,715	391	22.7
South Dakota	430	88	20.4
Tennessee	2,710	511	18.8
Texas	7,589	1,490	19.6
Utah	674	154	22.8
Vermont	301	64	21.3
Virginia	3,232	645	19.9
Washington	2,381	460	19.2
West Virginia	1,175	217	18.3
Wisconsin	2,948	565	19.2
Wyoming	217	40	18.4

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JEB MACGRUDER

FROM:

H.R. HALDEMAN

It is my understanding that no effort is currently being conducted to register people in the 18 to 21 year old age bracket for the upcoming campaign.

• This is an error that I think should be corrected at once. We should be setting up and, indeed, launching our effort now to register all of our youths in the 18 to 21 year old age bracket - this means many people that are not on college campuses.

Please get this decision reversed and our activity moving forward now.

cc: The Attorney General

June 23, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

As you have requested enclosed is a program on new voter registration which was developed by Senator Brock, Ken Riets, Bart Porter, and Bob Finch's office.

If you approve of this approach we will begin implementing it.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

JEB S. MACRUDER

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

June 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM

KEN RIETZ

SUBJECT

New Voters Registration

Lots of organizations are getting into the new voter registration field. These include COPE, Common Cause, Youth Citizenship Fund, etc. Most of the organizations are either controlled by Democrats or conduct drives on a mass basis which favors the Democrat Party. Initial indicators are that the Republican Party is being out registered among new voters by anywhere from 2-1 to 7-1.

Several Republican organizations are presently active in the new voter registration field. They are:

Young Republican National Federation

First voter program. A new voter committee as part of the local YR Club conducts a program of identifying and registering new voters who lean toward the Republican Party. New voters drives are conducted in apartment houses and other multi-dwelling buildings where young working people live. To go with this program several items are available:

- 1) Apartment organization guide
- 2) A pamphlet with localized registration information
- 3) YR reward program which involves rewarding workers for registering a certain number of new voters.

This program, termed "Your Responsibility" is targeted at eight states:

Pennsylvania
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois

Connecticut
Florida
Kentucky
North Carolina

College Republican National Committee

Project Open Door. This program involves canvassing campus dormitories. New voters are asked to identify themselves by party and those stating an interest in the Republican Party are assisted in registering to vote.

Republican Congressional Committee

Young Voters for a Republican Congress Task Force. This program is only in the planning stages and it will be at least a month before the plan is complete. It will be directed at target Congressional districts.

Conclusion: The above Republican programs are a fragmented part of overall party programs, and, as such, suffer from a lack of emphasis and look good on paper but have little impact in the field. In addition, they concentrate on new voters identified with the Republican Party. This fails to take into account the thousands of new voters who will support the President and not the Republican Party. Registration of Republican voters is not our objective, re-election of the President is.

If a major effort is to be made to register new voters who will vote for the President in 1972, the Young Voters for Nixon Committee will have to undertake it. Following are the options:

Option 1

Allow the programs to continue independently. This will give all the organizations involved something to do but the impact on the President's re-election campaign will be minimal.

Option 2

Allow the programs to continue but increase their funding and give them added stature by including them in the over-all Citizens campaign. While this might increase the active interest and prestige of the program the impact would still be minimal due to the diffusion of effort, coordination, and control.

Option 3

Create an over-all program within the Youth for Nixon campaign that included these efforts, as proposed by Senator Brock and his Congressional team. This seems the most logical and the most workable.

It would combine three programs which really are aimed in three different areas under one umbrella and allow maximum targeting. And, targeting is the key.

There is too little known about the first voter to move rapidly. The one assumption we can make is that as the war winds down the preference for the President among young people will increase. His opponent in 1972, however, is a key factor that cannot be adequately analyzed at this stage. Without thorough planning and organization, however, too many registrants today may become opponents next year. One great advantage provided by a carefully planned registration drive, lies in its ability to use registration assistance as an identification and motivation tool in gaining Nixon support.

We propose in the initial stages to confine our activity to the following states: Indiana, Iowa, Virginia, Florida, Tennessee, California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Ohio.

Under the Young Voters for Nixon program we would create a "First Voters for Nixon" committee. While its main thrust would be in those states, we would not discourage the program in any other state, although it would be carefully controlled.

In its initial stage (next 4 months), First Voters for Nixon (FVN) would receive publicity while the staff put the program together. A national chairman could be announced and state chairmen in the target states would be selected. The thrust would be "here are young people that support the President, have never voted for a President before, want to vote for President Nixon, and want to help others who feel like they do to get registered." The emphasis would not be on changing minds but on organizing those who already support the President.

While this is going on publicly a careful analysis will be conducted privately. This state by state analysis in the states mentioned will show us where the pockets of potential strength are. Through public opinion surveys we can find out what age groups, occupational groups, education levels, etc., are most likely to support the President in '72. A lot of careful planning is necessary and the registration drives would not begin until this winter.

Let me repeat, we believe a mass registration drive in any given area works to the President's disadvantage. For maximum impact, and favorable results, a new voter registration drive must be carefully planned and carefully targeted.

The First Voters program should be formed as part of Young Voters for Nixon campaign. As part of the working committee now it will utilize Senator Brock, his regional advisory committee, and the headquarters staff to register new voters in key states. The aim will

be to register voters inclined to vote for President Nixon in 1972.

Agree _____

Disagree _____

Comment _____

April 28, 1971

7u 5/5
I need
#17489

MEMORANDUM FOR : GORDON STRACHAN

FROM : H. R. HALDEMAN

In the long-range political planning be sure that they are thinking about the mock conventions on college and high school campuses and make sure that we are going to have a really good man in charge of our activities at mock conventions. We can't afford to lose these and it's very important that they be planned and programmed well in advance. We should know when they are going to be held. Some of them may even be starting this fall.

This is a long range item, but I'll be sending a number of such to you as time goes on and I assume you'll set up a system for stacking them up and getting them implemented at the appropriate times.

HRH:pm

June 25, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Enclosed is a memorandum to me from Ken Rietz regarding Young Voters for Nixon. If you approve, we will begin implementing this program.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

JEB S. MAGRUDER

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

June 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM

KEN RIETZ

SUBJECT

Mock Elections

Mock elections can be a very valuable tool if handled properly. They help in the final stages of a campaign to provide momentum, to make it look like everyone is supporting the candidate. The keys are publicity and organization.

Mock elections should be handled locally under the direction of the national organization -- Young Voters for Nixon. A lot of planning is necessary so an early start is essential.

For maximum impact the elections in any one state should be scheduled with enough time between them to provide maximum press exposure. If the organization feels a particular mock election will be lost, it should be scheduled early so it can be followed by several victories. For the sake of credibility of the election series, it is not bad to lose one as long as it isn't the last one. All mock elections should take place in the six week period preceding the general election. Scheduling of each series should be handled state by state under the direction of YVN.

With more than a year to organize, a mock election series would be beneficial -- if we out organize our opposition. This means training next year and actively organizing during the summer of '72. The key is turnout. If we organize to get our vote out, we can win most of the series. In 1970, Senator Brock's record in mock elections on Tennessee campuses was: won 15, tied 1, and lost 1. His campaign was organized, Gore's was not.

Colleges where mock elections will be encouraged should be carefully selected. The college image or record in the past is not the only criteria. The potential for organization should be carefully weighed.

All mock elections should be sponsored by an "independent" organization, if possible. The first choice for such an organization is a non-partisan group which should have a legitimate interest in a

poll, such as student government, school newspaper, political science department, debate squad, etc. Second choice would be a non-partisan service group such as the Circle K Club, YMCA, a fraternity, etc. Third choice would be a bi-partisan poll sponsored jointly by Young Democrats and Young Republicans. Last choice, but still worthwhile, if all else fails, is a poll sponsored directly by Young Republicans.

The voting must be entirely optional, and not, for instance, at a school assembly where everyone must vote. By being better organized than the opposition, we can deliver more votes to a booth than they can.

We have more control this way. Mandatory voting means we have no control over who wins.

The key to the success of this program is being better organized than the opposition. Thus an early canvass (telephone or door-to-door) of the entire student body to identify candidate support is essential.

On election day, all precautions of a general election campaign should be taken -- poll watchers, telephone victory squads, literature squads, etc. If it looks like we'll win the election, advance publicity is desirable. Care should be taken, however, to count our votes before election day and prevent an embarrassing situation.

As part of the overall Young Voters for Nixon program, a carefully planned series of mock elections on selected campuses would be a big asset. It should be included in the overall campaign plan for YVN.

Agree _____

Disagree _____

Comment _____

CONFIDENTIAL

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: DELAWARE TEST

As a first step in evaluating the proposed target voter strategy described in an earlier memo, the RNC is preparing to launch an extensive field test in Delaware. This memo is to describe the nature and purpose of the test to you, in advance of its inception.

The Delaware test will demonstrate and test several target voter techniques under controlled conditions and with careful provisions for evaluation of effectiveness. The test will take place during the period June-September, 1971. The budgeted cost of approximately \$40,000 will be borne by the RNC, which will also be responsible for overall management of the project through the direction of Ed DeBolt. The Citizens Committee and Mr. Haldeman's staff will participate in the planning and maintain close liaison with the field work as it progresses. The planned activities are designed to include the widest possible scope of coordinated research and target voter techniques:

Past Voting Behavior. By the end of June, a statewide, precinct-by-precinct vote profile analysis will be completed, using election data over the past ten years. The geographic location of hard-core Republicans, Democrats, and swing voters will be determined and displayed on maps.

Socio-Economic Data. The Census Bureau will produce the 1970 Fourth Count (demographic) data for Delaware in June, well ahead of the scheduled publication date for the remaining states. The RNC will combine that data with the vote profile analysis to further describe the various voting groups.

Public Opinion Surveys. Market Opinion Research (MOR) has taken quarterly polls in Delaware for the past ten years. The most recent poll will be completed in a week or two. All of that opinion data will be made available to the RNC, to describe the attitudes of the various voting groups.

Selection of Test Precincts. On the basis of the foregoing data, selection will be made of five weathervane precincts (typical of the voting patterns of the entire state), thirty test precincts (embodying a variety of specific voter groups) and thirty control precincts (closely similar to each of the test precincts). An in-depth canvass will commence in all 65 precincts on July 8. Approximately one hundred interviews will be carried out in each one (25% of total voting population). This will be done to obtain specific, detailed data on opinions on issues and the image of the President and how

the voter can best be informed. College students will be hired to carry out the interviews, under the supervision and training of Bob Teeter of MOR.

Target Voter Communications. Beginning on July 20, various programs of direct voter communication will be initiated in each of the thirty test precincts. The earlier precinct canvass will offer some guidance as to which types of media might be most appropriate in given areas, and which issues should be emphasized. The techniques will include direct mail, telephone banks, door-to-door personal visits, printed flyers, etc. Wherever possible, we will allow competent vendors to operate in separate precincts to demonstrate their capabilities. The purpose of the communication will be to change voter attitudes toward Administration programs and accomplishments and to improve the support for the President.

Evaluation. In September, all precincts will be re-canvassed to assess the impact of the campaign tests. The control precincts will serve to offset attitude changes that occur independently of the test activity. The survey sample will once again be 100 persons in each precinct: 50 from the original sample, and 50 new ones.

The results and the final report on the test will be completed before final plans are submitted for the 1972 campaign at the end of October.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: RESEARCH

The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the general direction of our current thinking on strategy for the 1972 campaign, for your information and comment. We are at the point in our planning process where a broad strategy should be agreed upon so that the specific plans can be initiated.

Target States

The national campaign can effectively be considered as 50 state campaigns, since electoral votes are determined in that manner, and since the field organization can best be coordinated on a state-by-state basis. Obviously, there are certain states that we are unlikely to win, and the investment of substantial resources there would not be productive. On the other hand, there are several states which we virtually must win at all costs and where we must put up the stiffest possible contest. These are the target states. A listing of these states, based on latest considerations of electoral size and probability of winning is given in Tab A. The top nine target states comprise 173 of the 270 electoral votes required for election.

Most of the target states can swing either way in a Presidential contest. In a close election, every vote would be of paramount importance in each state.

Target Voters

The 1972 election will be different from 1968 in at least two respects. The President is running on his record, rather than proposed actions on issues, and his image is well-known to the voters through extensive media coverage during his first term. Therefore, a campaign appearance of the President on television would not be expected to have the same impact it did in 1968. The voters have probably already made up their minds on whether to support or oppose the image they receive from television.

In some recent state elections, there has been evidence that certain techniques of direct, targeted, "rifle-shot" communications to voters can substantially augment a candidate's mass media image. These techniques use past voting data, socio-economic data and public opinion surveys to locate and identify the target voters: those voters who might vote either way, but who could be convinced to vote for one candidate if approached specifically on a certain issue. Highly refined techniques of telephone canvassing and targeted direct mail have proven to be very effective in influencing these voters. The general public is not accustomed to being involved

in the campaign process. A telephone call to discuss a particular concern, or a personalized, computer-typed letter discussing the candidate's stand on an issue important to them, brings a very positive reaction when done well. The response also allows a systematic identification of friendly voters to be contacted on election day.

There are several recent success stories which speak well for these target voter techniques. In California in 1970, Reagan concentrated such a program on ethnic precincts of San Francisco County. His vote percentage increased in that very liberal area, whereas it decreased almost everywhere else in California as compared to 1966. (Tab B) In New York, Rockefeller used a highly effective telephone canvassing technique to win 21 out of 29 target assembly districts in New York City, which ranged from 2-1 to 5-1 Democratic registration and where he was trailing by a substantial margin several months prior to the election. Extensive use was made of polls which identified the target, or pivotal voters. (Tab C)

In Minnesota in 1970, Humphrey refined the process to a high degree. It was widely acknowledged that much of the success of DFL candidates that year was due to their focus on identifying and communicating with the target voter. (Tab D)

In New Mexico, Anderson Carter, a relatively unknown rancher and oilman, defeated the heavily-favored incumbent Governor David Cargo for the Republican Senatorial nomination. The substantial shift in voter preference during the primary campaign was largely attributed to Carter's emphasis on a professionally managed direct mail campaign. The letters were produced by computer, addressed to specific individuals, and contained a message on an issue which was known to be of interest to the recipient. Cargo's mail, on the other hand, was of a very general, mass distribution type.

Recommendation

We propose that the planning for 1972 should emphasize rifle-shot communication with target voters in target states to augment the mass-media campaign. This will involve substantial preparation in utilizing public opinion surveys, census data and past voting data to identify the target voters and key issues, and in applying advanced telephone canvassing techniques and promotional direct mail to influence and deliver votes. Much of the development will be done in cooperation with the Research Division of the RNC, which has been pursuing similar ideas over the past several months. During the planning stage, specific proposals would be made to demonstrate and test each concept well before final decisions had to be made for the campaign.

Proceed with detailed development of the target voter strategy to augment the mass media and field operations planning.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

June 17, 1971

The following target states are the result of analysis of current statistical, socio-economic and survey data. The electoral vote totals of each section are noted and followed by a brief description of the reasons for their selections.

MUST STATES - 173 electoral votes

The Must states are defined as areas that statistically and historically support Nixon/Republican nominees. It appears that without all these states in our column, Nixon has little or no chance of being re-elected. Ohio and California, for instance, have never failed to be in the winning column if a Republican was victorious. The reasoning behind the statement, "If Nixon doesn't carry all of the Must States, he won't be elected President," is that if one of these states is not carried, there is little chance of finding a second or third priority state which would make up this loss more easily. Iowa is included because it is a vital media center for all of the midwest farm belt.

SECOND PRIORITY MUST STATES - 158 electoral votes

The Second Priority Must states represent those states that statistically have less chance of moving over to Nixon, but, none the less, are within striking distance. These states represent the next best opportunities in the large electoral category. It is necessary that some of these be moved into the win column for Nixon. Connecticut is included because of recent favorable election trends and because of advantageous media overlap with the New York-New Jersey-Pennsylvania area.

THIRD PRIORITY MUST STATES - 64 electoral votes

Third Priority Must states represent those areas that statistically Nixon can win. These are areas with smaller electoral vote totals, but about the same odds, as the Second Priority Must states. Nixon must win some of these.

PLUS STATES - 44 electoral votes

The Plus states are defined as those areas that traditionally support the Republican Party and Nixon. In 1972, given a favorable national atmosphere towards the President, we should do well in these states. They are also states that tend to be more single issue oriented. For example, if farmers are feeling fairly comfortable about Nixon and the agriculture policy of the Administration, the chances are that these areas will be in our column. If, on the other hand, the attitude toward Nixon and the agriculture policy is negative, there is very little that could outweigh this attitude.

The method of arriving at these target states included a ten year analysis of Presidential elections, an analysis of 1966, 1968 and 1970 Congressional, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial races, an analysis of polling trends of various regions in the country and state polls where available, RNC state issue files of the past year to see if there have been any major trends or shifts

MUST

13 Indiana
 8 Iowa
 12 Virginia
 17 Florida
 10 Tennessee
 45 California
 26 Illinois
 17 New Jersey
25 Ohio
 173

3rd PRIORITY MUST

8 South Carolina
 9 Washington
 4 New Mexico
 3 Vermont
 4 Montana
 3 Nevada
 7 Colorado
 4 New Hampshire
 6 Oregon
 9 Kentucky
 3 Delaware
4 Maine
 64

2nd PRIORITY MUST

26 Texas
 12 Missouri
 10 Maryland
 13 North Carolina
 27 Pennsylvania
 41 New York
 11 Wisconsin
 8 Connecticut
10 Minnesota
 158

PLUS

5 Nebraska
 4 Idaho
 6 Arizona
 3 Wyoming
 7 Kansas
 4 Utah
 3 North Dakota
 8 Oklahoma
4 South Dakota
 44

in public opinion that have been evidenced in newspapers or other publications, as well as the reports of the RNC field staff.

It should be reiterated that this is the status of state priority selection as of June 15. This is not meant to be definitive, but only a device to serve the needs of those who must make early resource allocations on behalf of the effort to re-elect the President.

Comments by Vincent P. Barabba, Chairman of the Board, DMI
on Reagan campaign

NOW TO AN INTERESTING QUESTION. DID THE GOVERNOR HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE TO MASS MEDIA? IN 1966 RONALD REAGAN DEFEATED GOVERNOR PAT BROWN 57.6% TO 42.3%. IN 1970 GOVERNOR REAGAN DEFEATED JESS UNRUH 52.8% TO 45.1%.

IN 1970 GOVERNOR REAGAN DROPPED FROM HIS 1966 VICTORY MARGIN IN ALMOST EVERY COUNTY. POST ELECTION STUDIES (AND MOST OF CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCED CAMPAIGN WATCHERS) ATTRIBUTE A GREAT PORTION OF THIS DROP IN SUPPORT TO THE SEVERE AERO-SPACE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY UNEMPLOYMENT THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA. HOWEVER, SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY STANDS OUT AS AN EXCEPTION.

IN 1970 GOVERNOR REAGAN ACTUALLY INCREASED HIS PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE FROM 41.1% TO 43.4%, WHILE THE AVERAGE REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE VOTE IN SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY WAS DROPPING FROM 32.4% IN 1966 TO 29.2% IN 1970. THE GOVERNOR'S INCREASE CAN BE

EXPLAINED PARTIALLY BY A SPECIAL PRECINCT INDEX PRIORITY PROJECT THAT WAS UNDERTAKEN BY THE LOCAL REAGAN FORCES IN THE AREA. THE GROUP IDENTIFIED THE IRISH, ITALIAN AND CHINESE PRECINCTS FIRST. THEN, THEY UTILIZED A SERIES OF VOTE STATISTICS FOR PREVIOUS ELECTIONS TO IDENTIFY THOSE ETHNIC PRECINCTS WHICH HAD, IN THE PAST, INDICATED A PROPENSITY TO EITHER: VOTE FOR SOMETHING THE GOVERNOR SUPPORTED; OR, VOTE AGAINST SOMETHING THE GOVERNOR OPPOSED.

THE REAGAN GROUP THEN CONCENTRATED THEIR MESSAGES ON ALL OF THE NON-REPUBLICANS IN THE SELECTED PRIORITY PRECINCTS. THEY SENT TWO SPECIAL MESSAGES. ONE WAS A TABLOID THAT HAD BEEN USED THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA. THE SECOND PIECE CONTAINED A LETTER SIGNED BY LOCAL DEMOCRATS SUPPORTING GOVERNOR REAGAN.

THE RESULTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES:

	<u>IN THE NON-PRIORITY PRECINCTS</u>	<u>IN THE PRIORITY PRECINCTS</u>
GOVERNOR REAGAN	35.3%	50.3%
AVERAGE REPUBLICAN VOTE	25.4%	32.0%
REAGAN OVER AVERAGE REPUBLICAN VOTE	9.9%	17.3%

THE TOTAL COST OF THE PROJECT (WHICH SENT OUT TWO BULK MAILINGS TO 85,000 DEMOCRAT HOUSEHOLDS CONTAINING 100,000 DEMOCRAT VOTERS) WAS APPROXIMATELY \$12,000.00. THAT'S A COST OF ABOUT 12¢ FOR THE TWO MESSAGES TO EACH VOTER -- OR ABOUT 6¢ FOR EACH MESSAGE.

The Marketing of Nelson Rockefeller

By Fred Powledge

“There was his incredibly competent staff, all that money, and the willingness to engage in a little deception here and there.”

There are some who would have you believe that Nelson Rockefeller got himself re-elected to office because he swung to the right. It's a satisfying thought for both the paranoids on the left and the self-pitying folk on the right. For the lefties, it confirms their suspicions that Rocky was an opportunistic closet fascist all the time; the rightists may revel in the belief that they've finally accumulated enough megavotes to bring the governor—a Rockefeller, no less—crawling for support.

Unfortunately, like most things, it isn't all that simple. Nelson Rockefeller was returned to office with a 716,061 plurality not because he swung to the right, but because he clung to the center. (It is, perhaps, of passing historical interest that the “center” this year may very well have been the “right” of a few years ago.) More importantly, Rockefeller was re-elected because he had the sense to determine what the center was and then to aim his campaign toward it, utilizing the most advanced hard- and software available, and utilizing it on a scale unprecedented in a state campaign.

That determination of what the center was, which Rockefeller made last May when his first campaign poll came in, had a lot to do with his victory, but it would have been just another poll without a few factors: The abysmally poor quality, as a candidate, of his major opponent, Arthur Goldberg; the built-in advantage of simply being governor in the first place; a mechanical operation that must have been one of the smoothest in history; the incredible loyalty and competence of his staff; all that money, and a willingness to engage in a little deception here and there.

Curiously enough, Nelson Rockefeller revealed very little of himself in the campaign. It was almost all mechanical—and, said some of his critics, the mechanics sometimes bordered on subliminal advertising.

Basil Paterson, Goldberg's running



mate and quite likely the only truly interesting candidate in the whole campaign, commented on this shortly before election day. “We used to talk about the banana republics and how they held elections,” he said, “and we talked about economic reprisals and threats. What does Rockefeller have to do with this? I say the desired product is the thing we look at, and the purpose sought is to get a vote which is

not exercised on the basis of the volition of the voters—be it by economic threats, be it by the gun, or be it by psychological techniques used to deprive the voter of his free choice.

“I say it comes down to the same thing. And that it will very quickly undermine the free election system. Nelson Rockefeller is not a menace in and of himself, but his techniques are a grave threat.”

Polls, as everyone knows, are essential to a successful political campaign. You do not hear a great deal about Rockefeller's polls, just as you do not hear much about the internal workings of his political life, because almost everybody who works for him has been there a good long time, since he first became governor a dozen years ago, and they all know the job is to win elections, not talk about it. Lloyd Free, the governor's consultant on polls, has been a friend of Rockefeller's for 30 years. Political writers seem to equate a quiet polling operation, such as Rockefeller's, with an extremely smooth and excellent one, and in this case they were right.*

The Rockefeller people also knew how to not let the polls get the better of them. The candidate himself spoke, during the campaign, of his dependence, not on all the technological gimmicks of campaigning, but on his “intuitive creative thinking.” Polls are nice for finding out what worries people; they are “guides on the emphasis that is placed on the solution of problems.” Rockefeller said one afternoon on a

*Shortly after the voting machines closed on November 5, as the Rockefeller party was assembling at brother Laurance's for dinner, Free was asked what the outcome would be. Rockefeller would win 55 per cent of the votes, he said. Someone turned on the TV set; CBS at that moment projected a Rockefeller win with 55 per cent of the vote. The candidate actually came in with 52.4 per cent.

“One of the big fears was that supporters would not vote, confident that Rocky would win but eager to watch a rich man sweat.”

flight back to the city after an upstate swing. His campaign director, R. Burdell Bixby, a lawyer on leave from his \$25,000-a-year patronage job as head of the New York State Thruway Authority, agreed. Even a governor who reads the newspapers and watches TV, Bixby said, cannot know what bothers the people the most: “The polls tell us better than our instincts what it is the people are concerned about,” he said.

Neither Bixby nor the governor nor any other campaign officials who were questioned seemed to have given much thought to the notion that, theoretically at least, you shouldn't need polls to find out what people were thinking. The civics books say that's what legislatures are for. But polls were used, and used well, and used early and often, although newspaper assertions that they were “almost continuous” were exaggerated. Free completed his first major poll in early May. It measured the voters' attitudes on practically everything: what they said they were concerned about; their feelings on taxes, abortion reform, spending for education, health and welfare; President Nixon; no-fault automobile insurance.

Although the Democrats had not yet picked Arthur Goldberg as their candidate, the governor's people felt Goldberg was the likely opponent. So much of the May poll was devoted to comparisons of the two men. What did they think Goldberg's image was? Rockefeller's? How much trust and confidence did they have in the two men? Did they feel that Goldberg didn't know much about state government? That Rockefeller had been in too long and was tired? “The idea,” said Free after the election, “was to get a basic pattern in terms of images, trust and confidence, strengths and weaknesses, of the two guys all the way through.”

The sample responded: plenty were angry with Rockefeller simply because he had been in the job and hadn't done enough, but “they did give him credit for trying hard and for having his heart in it,” recalled Free. They liked Goldberg, and thought he was competent, but in the final analysis a lot of them liked Rockefeller better. Asked what they thought were the governor's major accomplishments, they listed education, highways, roads and bridges, health care and facilities, and transportation, in that order. Asked about areas in which the governor had done too little, they named narcotics first, higher taxes, crime, then various other categories such as housing and transportation.

A picture was emerging that would be valuable to any candidate, especially one who was inescapably joined to the previous twelve years. The picture was sufficiently encouraging to justify a campaign slogan that did not try to repudiate the record: “Rockefeller. He's done a lot. He'll do more.”

But the May poll showed something else that was extremely helpful in guiding the strategists to the right voters. It picked out those who, at that point, thought of themselves as supporters of Rockefeller, a group that made up only 34 per cent of the total, and it told the strategists something about them: 95 per cent of them were white; 26 per cent were 60 or over and only 13 per cent were in the 21-to-29 age group; 41 per cent were Protestants, 46 per cent were Catholic, and 8 per cent were Jewish; 25 per cent were Democrats, 59 per cent were Republicans, and 15 per cent were independents; only a third of them lived in New York City, while 25 per cent lived in the city's suburban counties and 44 per cent lived upstate.

Joseph H. Boyd Jr., whose title is special assistant to the governor, a 32-year-old man with wavy blond hair who looks like a well-educated tent preacher without the attendant vices, went on leave in June to direct the mechanics of the campaign outside New York City. One of his big jobs was to make sure that the 34 per cent remained supporters of the governor. Boyd's biggest fear, as the campaign progressed and as a Rockefeller victory seemed more and more likely, was that the supporters either would not vote, out of apathy and a conviction that Rockefeller was going to win anyway, or that they would vote for Conservative Paul Adams, confident that Rocky would win but eager to watch a rich man sweat.

The poll also picked out those who considered themselves opponents of Rockefeller—44 per cent of the sample electorate. Ninety per cent of them turned out to be white; only 19 per cent were 60 years of age or older; 25 per cent were Protestants, 49 per cent Catholics, and 17 per cent Jewish; 52 per cent were Democrats, 19 per cent Republicans, and 20 per cent independents. Not surprisingly, 45 per cent of the opponents lived in New York City, while 17 per cent lived in the suburbs, and 38 per cent in the rest of upstate.

Fioravante G. Perrotta, former New York City Finance Administrator and unsuccessful candidate for City Controller on the Lindsay ticket, was placed

in charge of the New York City operation. His task was not so much to make sure the Republicans got to the polls as it was to make converts out of Democrats and independents. Perrotta set about getting endorsements for Rockefeller from prominent Democrats. He picked 29 key city assembly districts where the registration was anywhere from 2-to-1 to 5-to-1 Democratic, and he unleashed a roomful of telephone callers on them.

The poll also identified those in the center—not just the usual “undecided,” but the 22 per cent who were, in the eyes of the Rockefeller people, the “Pivotals.” Free devised a ladder-like affair on which those polled rated the candidates. If a respondent placed Rockefeller at or near the top of the ladder, in Position 10, there was no problem. If he was on the bottom, at 1, the voter (and those like him, whom he supposedly represented in the scientific survey) was not worth pursuing. But if a respondent rated Rockefeller at 5 or higher, and elsewhere in the poll did not express himself as “for” Rockefeller, then he was considered a Pivotal. Fair game.

The capture of the Pivotals was essential if Rockefeller was to be re-elected, his strategists reasoned. Re-election, back then in May, was not at all a sure thing; in fact, a question on the poll revealed that the incumbent was 11 percentage points behind Goldberg.

A quarter of the Pivotals were 60 years old or older. About a third of them had college educations, and 45 per cent had finished high school. Their income levels spanned several categories, but the largest group was in the \$10,000-and-over class. Thirty-five per cent were professional or business people; 28 per cent were manual laborers. A third were Protestants, a third were Catholics, and 27 per cent were Jewish. Half of the Pivotals lived in New York City, and they had lower incomes and less education and were more likely to be manual laborers than were the Pivotals upstate. The differences between the city Pivotals and the country Pivotals, said an aide, was “a constant problem. A large majority of the governor's supporters were outside the city, and half of the Pivotals, on the other hand, were in the city. So there was a constant problem of how to handle it so he didn't alienate those outside the city in order to go after those who were inside.”

Rockefeller did his best, though, and in the process he maintained his hold on the center. For example: One day in

EARLY
VOTER
ATTITUDE
POLL

DESCRIPTION OF
OPPONENTS

early October, the candidate spoke at a coffee-and-Danish reception at a country club in Syracuse: nicely-dressed ladies and gentlemen, almost all of them white, smiling at the candidate, the candidate not only smiling back but going through his entire, and somewhat spastic, bit—winking, raising that eyebrow halfway off his head, winking some more. The governor told all these nice white folks that what we really needed was some radicalism. Well, modified radicalism.

"The great challenge of the future," he said, was whether we are "willing to make the adjustments in our institutions, and radical adjustments, to meet the problems of the day—to make our society today, and its institutions, relevant to the needs of the people." And then: "Government has got to be able to adapt itself to new conditions if we want to deal with these problems effectively. And if we don't, then I don't think our system is going to survive." He sounded like those earnest young Students for a Democratic Society of about five years ago. But all he offered his audience by way of radical adjustments were the traditional solutions of the right (and maybe, now, of the center): More policemen, special courts to handle narcotics crimes, more judges, more prisons.

A Rockefeller aide, looking back on it all, said, "I think he pursued the centrist course. And it did the trick." Free conducted two other major polls—one in early August and one in mid-September—and three smaller, "trial heat" polls to indicate the candidate's standing against Goldberg. And throughout the summer, the basic patterns stayed pretty much the same. The Pivotalists shifted more and more to Rockefeller, undoubtedly because Rockefeller was shifting more and more to the Pivotalists. Perhaps the finest piece of shifting—and one on which the intriguing details are missing—consisted of Rockefeller's aligning himself with the Conservative Senatorial candidate, James Buckley, without actually disowning his own party's offering, Charles Goodell.

And finally, on election day, when all the shifting was over, the Pivotalists and the ones who were for the governor anyway went to the polls and elected him.

"We had ours," said Alton Marshall, the head of the campaign's "substantive group" and not on leave from his \$40,075-a-year post as secretary to the governor, "and the other side had theirs, and in the middle was a big gold-field. We had to go out and mine it."

The mining was hard work, of course. The Rockefeller Team (as all those pros on or not on leave from their state jobs

"Committees carried the word to 31 different white ethnic groups that Rocky cared."

were known)* and the Friends of the Rockefeller Team (as the thousands of volunteers and semi-pros were called) and such groups as the Associates of the Rockefeller Team (who were, according to the governor's ethnic-group specialist, the "so-called Jewish operation") could not just sit and wait for the polls to come in. The record had to be defined and defended, and the campaign machinery had to be tuned up.

"The first phase of the campaign was to be governor," said Alton Marshall, by which he meant Rockefeller "was active in gubernatorial projects," by which he meant Rockefeller suddenly started letting contracts for bridges, highways, and other nice things. Rockefeller also presided at a number of environmental forums and antidrug forums, meetings throughout the state at which citizens, largely irate ones, could actually complain to the governor himself. The governor was "identifying with good things that were happening in state government," said Marshall. "During this period, in the spring, it was Governor, not Candidate, Rockefeller."

By late June, Candidate, not Governor, Rockefeller had spent more than half a million dollars, even though he had no primary challenge and even though his Democratic opponent was only then being selected. (Because of loopholes in the election law, it would never be known how much he really had spent by the end of the campaign. Rockefeller people were projecting something like \$6 or \$7 million; anti-Rockefeller people were saying \$20 mil-

**It was traditional, one was assured, that the governor's secretary, his press officer, and his counsel stay on the state payroll during a campaign for re-election. Many others among the 380 permanent campaign workers were normally on the state payroll but took leaves of absence to work on the campaign. This raises several intriguing questions: if those workers are as efficient and competent as they appear during a campaign (and after one, too: on November 4, they were writing thank-you notes), how come the state machinery is not efficient and competent three and one-half years out of every four? If they had been working for the state last summer, rather than the candidate, would a person applying for a driver's license in Brooklyn in June have gotten it sooner than September? Are the taxpayers being deprived of these workers' talents 10 per cent of the time? If so, is this deprivation more than made up for by the saving on the workers' salaries? Should the saving maybe be continued on a permanent basis?*

lion; the best bet seemed to be around \$12 or \$15 million.) The campaign headquarters, an entire floor and then some at 575 Madison Avenue, had been rented back in February. The floor had previously been inhabited by the Wells, Rich, Greene advertising agency, and it was fitting that campaign director Bixby, a rather dry and straight man who nevertheless speaks of the "wholesale" and "retail" aspects of running a candidate, was to be ensconced in the office that once had belonged to Mary Wells.

The printing presses were turning, and by the end of the campaign they would have poured out something like 30 million pieces of printed matter, almost all of it with the reminder that the candidate had done a lot but was nevertheless capable of doing more. There was a 42-page discussion of everything from education to agriculture; handsome little brochures on what the governor had done for the Lower Hudson Valley Area, the Niagara Frontier, the Capital District, and the Central New York-Mohawk Valley Area (but not the New York City Area).

Folders were printed detailing what Rockefeller had done for and about the aging, the arts, businessmen, education, environment, health, higher education, labor, the mentally ill and retarded, and recreation. Campaign workers in each of eleven regions obtained lists of families with special interests and delivered the literature to them. (For instance, a friendly Republican on a county mental health organization might get a list of its members; each would get copies of "Rockefeller: He's Done a Lot. He'll Do More for the MENTALLY ILL." Special mailings were sent to every group for which a list could be obtained or manufactured: there were Travel Agents for Rockefeller; Chiropractors for Rockefeller (who were reminded that the governor had signed a law recognizing the profession and enlarging "the right and opportunity of the people of this State to consult a licensed and appropriate health practitioner of their own choice"). There were Osteopathic Physicians for the Rockefeller-Wilson Team, Nurses for Rockefeller, and the Veterans Committee for the Rockefeller-Wilson Team.

There was, of course, labor for Rockefeller, or *l'affaire Kiamasha Lake* (see *New York*, October 12, 1970), during which Rockefeller received the endorsement of what some termed the majority of those present at the state AFL-CIO convention, and after which it was common for news stories to simply say that

“... By September, the timetable had him down as ‘all candidate.’ The TV commercials shifted to head-and-shoulders shots. . . .”

he had “the backing of organized labor in New York State.” The governor had been courting the building trades for years, and he frequently and proudly reported, after the convention, that he had the endorsement of “85 unions with membership of over 1.3 million.” How the governor arrived at that figure is not exactly clear.*

The ethnic campaign was begun. Thirty-one different white ethnic groups were identified and committees were formed to get the word to each of them that Governor Rockefeller cared. The pitch to the ethnics was straight down the center: Drug addiction, crime in the streets, and education, both public and private. Some additional efforts were aimed at ethnic groups which the campaign staff believed had “special interests.” For the Germans, the press releases and advertisements emphasized, in addition to the crime-dope-schools issues, Rockefeller’s interest in recreation and parks because, as a staffer put it, “the Germans are very athletic and enjoy the out-of-doors.”

One group for which mailing lists were difficult to find—but which were essential, according to the profile of the Pivotal that had been developed in May—where the oldsters. “Senior Citizens was an unusual thing,” said Arthur Massolo, on leave as the governor’s assistant appointments officer to run the ethnic and special-group show, “but somebody had a list—I wouldn’t want to embarrass the company—a list of

**Victor Gotbaum, executive director of District 57, State, County, and Municipal Employees, and a supporter of Goldberg, said there was considerable application of the Rockefeller New Math and a general counting of people twice. In one of Rockefeller’s own press releases, the candidate expressed his pleasure at receiving the support of 50,000 members of the International Union of Dolls, Toys, Playthings, Novelties, and Allied Products (some of whose members lived in the rest of the U.S. and in Canada), and attached to the release was a statement from the union itself which placed the membership at 20,000. Gotbaum felt that Rockefeller executed a deliberate and cynical plan of catering to the needs and desires of the building trades in order to get his “labor support.” The governor, he said, “is a man with no ideology. He’s not a guy who’s turned his back on principle; he’s never had any. This is where I differ with a lot of people. They talk about going from left to right as though he was a liberal, left-wing Republican. This is pure, arrant nonsense. Rockefeller is a tabula rasa; he’s a clean slate. You can out anything on his table and if the mood of the times call for it, he’ll eat it and digest it.”*

senior citizens who frequented a certain means of transportation.”

Massolo grinned impishly. He didn’t want to give away the secret. “They ride in a certain way,” he said. “Let’s say a bus company. And they get a special rate. And there was a list of people who do that. Well, that means that these are active senior citizens. They’re still moving around; they can vote; they can get to the polls. So therefore you send them a message. We sent them one of the booklets about the aging.”

One ethnic group that was not discussed very much was the black New Yorker. If you asked a Team member about this, the reply was usually some thing like “Oh, I think Jackie Robinson’s taking care of that.” Some privately acknowledged that there was little sense in going after blacks since Basil Paterson was on the opposite ticket.

There was, however, some support of a more subtle nature for Rockefeller from the black community. Arthur Logan, a surgeon well respected both uptown and downtown in New York City, became one of several prominent black Democrats to support the governor. Victor Gotbaum, the anti-Rockefeller labor leader, said if there was one thing that really got him visceral, it was the specter of people like Dr. Logan supporting the governor. “And I know why he’s supporting him,” Gotbaum said.

Why?

“He’s getting the promise of a hospital,” said Gotbaum. “He’s been looking for a community hospital, and I’m sure he’s gotten a promise.” He thought a moment. “Well,” he added, “I guess it’s legitimate.”

Dr. Logan, asked about his support, said he was for Rockefeller because he seemed like the better candidate. There was another reason, he added: “There are individual projects which I’m interested in,” he said, “which the governor has given his support to. For instance, a major new health-care complex in the West Harlem-Manhattanville area to serve the residents there, who are now without adequate facilities. I think Rockefeller is about to announce some very significant financial support—as an individual,” he said. “In fact, I understand it will be \$2 million from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.”

There was, said Dr. Logan, no swap, no deal. The hospital “is a factor in my decision to vote for him,” he said. “And on Wednesday after he’s re-elected I’m going to go see him and say, ‘Okay, you

won; now we’re going to make you do the things you ought to do. You’re free of the political imperatives now.’”

In August, Rockefeller became what his aides called a “combination governor and candidate,” and the combination meshed so well it was often difficult to determine which one he was. The television and radio campaign started—50 separate TV ads and 15 radio messages. Phase One was known to the staff as The Record, which was “designed to show what this man’s record is, how he had been innovative; that he cared; that he was interested in the problems that the people were interested in,” according to Marshall. Some of the ads were so innovative themselves that Goldberg called them “grossly misleading.” Actually, they were probably no worse than the average TV commercial. They were, however, noticeably devoid of recognizably black actors, except for one in which a black nurse brought a soft, pinkish newborn baby to a soft, pinkish white lady.

By September, Rockefeller’s timetable had him down as “all candidate.” The TV commercials shifted from little scenes of people doing great things, courtesy Nelson Rockefeller, to straight-on, head-and-shoulders shots of the candidate, talking about what he had done. At about this time, Fioravante Perrotta was making telephone calls all over the key Democrat-held assembly districts in the city; it was said, by someone in the operation, that there were about six former workers, male and female, of the late Robert Kennedy in the telephone boiler-room at 575 Madison, but their identities were kept secret.

Joe Boyd was heavily into his upstate campaign work. Operatives in the field were using telephones to call registered voters and ask them how they planned to vote. Some of them refused to say. Boyd, asked how he followed up those voters, said: “We go back to them and say we’re an independent polling organization.”

Wasn’t that a bit deceptive?

“Well,” said Boyd, and then he thought a while. “I think it’s fair. You give a name. You say ‘This is Joseph Boyd Canvassing’ or something.”

In late September and early October, the television campaign shifted from The Record to Pledges, and the Pledges seemed to have a great deal to do with crime in the streets, narcotics and the like. At about this time, the press became genuinely interested in the campaign, and every trip the governor made was watched closely by reporters, who

"On election night, next to grinning Mario, he spoke of law and order, but not together."

welcomed orders from their assignment desks to leave the Goldberg campaign and follow Rockefeller for a few days, simply because the accommodations were better and their luggage was seldom lost. There is something essentially satisfying about stepping off a private airplane and being handed an envelope which contains the key to your hotel room, a mimeographed list of all your fellow reporters' room numbers, the address of the press room and the Hospitality Room, and essential information on such items as Western Union, the location of Xerox machines, hours for room service, and the closing time at the hotel bar.

It helped, too, that Rockefeller had his own private air force—a helicopter, a Grumman Gulfstream 2 jet, and a twin-engined Fairchild which held two dozen people and a bar, which someone had the decency and wisdom to open at precisely 12:01 p.m. when the press was aboard.

In addition to all the money, the airplanes, the generally friendly press, and the perquisites of office, Rockefeller also was aided incalculably by the fact that his logistical people—the advance men, the press officers, the on-the-road advisers, and the people back at 575 Madison who manned the "anchor desk," taking and relaying messages to the candidate, no matter where he might be—were probably the best anywhere.

Most of them had been with the governor for a long time—since the gubernatorial campaign of 1958, in many cases, then through the campaigns of 1962 and 1966, the Presidential attempt in 1968, and the Latin American trip in 1969. The workers, especially the advance men—the people who get the candidate from one stop to another, who know who should shake his hand where, and how to keep him from having his picture taken with a local gangster—were like feisty young captains working hard and bucking for major.

Although they whispered surreptitiously into small radios in the manner of the Secret Service, there was amazingly little confusion, because they had worked together so long and they had utter and complete devotion to Rockefeller. Hugh Morrow, the governor's director of communications (\$58,578 a year), who occupied an office at 575 Madison during the campaign, was asked how he kept in touch with his fellow communicators over at 22 West 55th Street, in the governor's official office. "We communicate by Mandarin

signals," he said. "We've been together a long time."

Joe Canzeri, whose code name on the little radios was Little Caesar, was the dean of the advance men on Rockefeller's trips out of the city. Canzeri, who is 40 years old and who manages the governor's estate in Pocantico Hills during non-campaign periods, was in the hotel management field before he joined the Team. Any hotel should be so lucky. He made sure everything happened at the right time and happened well. When the governor went bowling in Buffalo one night, Canzeri made sure—had made sure, a week before—that the alley had a pair of bowling shoes that would fit a man whose foot is 12 inches long in shoes. (Actually, Rockefeller could have brought his own shoes, since he has his own bowling alley at the estate.)

Canzeri was wont to liken the campaign to show business. The advance men create the atmosphere, he said, and Rockefeller runs the show. "It's a very creative thing, I think," he said. "You're creating an event. You're creating the activity. You're creating the color, the background." Canzeri's watch is set five minutes fast, like a good bar-room's.

Late in October, just a few days before the election itself, the campaign moved into the Attack phase. In the TV commercials, the attacking was carried out by defecting Democrats, not by Rockefeller; the governor did his part in public speeches. "We had an opponent," an aide explained, "who was not susceptible to being criticized as you would criticize other candidates." The polls were showing Rockefeller ahead, and it was further decided that any really tough tactics might backfire. "However," said Alton Marshall, "you almost have to end up with some question of your opponent's credibility. People wouldn't want their soap opera to end without some suspense." So the television campaign ended with a series of questions for the undecided voter that were designed to attack Goldberg's credibility.

Then everybody started worrying. Joe Boyd was particularly worried about the polls that were being published that showed a clear Rockefeller victory. He feared the upstate Republicans would stay home or vote for Adams. On the Thursday before the election, 400,000 simulated telegrams (actually the print-out of a computer in California) began being received in Republican and independent mailboxes in upstate New

York. The mailings, which were labeled "Telegram" (but which clearly were not, inasmuch as they contained no typographical errors and they were delivered on time), said: "I NEED YOUR HELP. UNLESS YOU VOTE THIS TUESDAY THE ORGANIZED DEMOCRAT PARTY OF NEW YORK CITY COULD TAKE OVER YOUR STATE GOVERNMENT. BUFFALO [OF ALBANY OF WATERTOWN] VOTES ARE VITAL. MALCOLM WILSON AND I NEED YOUR SUPPORT FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT. GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER."

Boyd's operation attempted 1,279,104 telephone calls to voters. Of that total, 952,470 were completed. Boyd estimated that each household contained 2.2 voters. "So we probably reached more than 2 million voters," he said, reading the figures from a series of neat charts on his office wall.

Perrotta's New York City campaign was similarly successful. Of his 24 high-priority Democratic assembly districts, the ones that his batteries of telephone workers assaulted, he said afterward, "We banged hell out of them." Rockefeller took eight of those districts in Brooklyn to Goldberg's five; four to one in the Bronx, seven to two in Queens, and two to nothing in Staten Island. The center, the Pivotal, the 22 per cent, had swung.

Joe Boyd, asked afterward what had gone wrong, said he couldn't think of anything major. The successful candidate, on election night, appeared at the Roosevelt next to the grinning Mario Procaccino. He spoke of law and order, but not in the same breath; that may be the mark of the center these days.

Alton Marshall, summarizing it all, urged a visitor to ferret out and read the speeches Rockefeller had made during the last days of the campaign. They weren't reported in the press, he said, but if someone took the trouble to compare them with the speeches Rockefeller had made at the outset, they would reveal a "growth of philosophy," a tendency to express concern about social movement rather than building highways and buildings.

The Rockefeller Team had been justly criticized, Marshall continued, because it often had been guilty of emphasizing the roads and bridges and not paying enough attention to humanity, and the governor's speeches at the end of the campaign represented an attempt to rectify that error.

Somehow it just didn't seem worthwhile to dig out those speeches. At the end of the campaign, with the machinery all clicking smoothly, with the center and the Pivotal well in hand, it was easy for Rockefeller to exhibit a growth of philosophy, an interest in humanity. The polls were already in, and

RESULTS
OF
TELEPHONE
OPERATION
→

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

July 2, 1971

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
12021 333-0920

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT: Democratic & Republican Contenders

Attached is a report on the current status of our tracking of the Democratic and Republican contenders. You will note that the planning committee, under Pat Buchanan, feels that adequate work is being done in collecting the data. The emphasis must be on using the information effectively, particularly in this pre-campaign period. Since this does not require a major change in resources or personnel assignments, we will proceed along those lines unless you disagree with the conclusions reached in the memorandum.

GENERAL ANALYSIS

Our prevailing judgment at this time is that if Edward M. Kennedy wants the Democratic Nomination in 1972, he can win it; that he will make his final decision around the turn of the year; that the crucial factor in that decision will be his judgment as to whether or not the President can be defeated. If he feels the President is a loser, he will run. If the President appears strong, he will hang back for 1976 -- and possibly act in a fashion as to assist the President's chance for re-election.

If Kennedy hangs back, the group is divided as to whether Muskie or Humphrey would prevail at the convention. Humphrey seen as seriously damaged by the McNamara Papers.

Group divided further over who would be the most difficult candidate for RN. Some feel Kennedy would be an ideal opponent -- others feel Kennedy, because of charisma, myth, enthusiasm, would be the most difficult. No one mentioned Humphrey as the strongest of the three. One felt that Muskie did not have it upstairs to successfully traverse a Presidential campaign. Thus we should favor his nomination.

Group believed that it was still too early to make flat predictions.

CANDIDATES

KENNEDY -- Great strength among young, poor, black. The only Democrat who can generate great enthusiasm. Good support in labor movement, among lower-income Catholics. Charisma, the Repository of the Kennedy Myth, Good Campaigner. Strongest appeal to 18-21 year-old vote. Looks to bosses in the Northern Cities like a winner. Strongest among rank-and-file Democrats by Gallup Poll. Not likely to drop in coming months. His political operation is among the best. He can generate more and better publicity than any of the others.

Weaknesses: Chappaquiddick. Impression of immaturity and irresponsibility to many. Too far left; too associated with hippies and radicals. Not considered a heavy-weight either by party pros or fellow Senators. Anathema to the South. Too much of a left-winger; too jet set for Middle America. Would generate as much vehement opposition on Right as support on the Left.

MUSKIE -- Could unite Democrats. Strongest in polls of party leaders, and among Independents. Has non-partisan, non-political image. Strong on environment and "new priorities." Ideal compromise candidate, and current front-runner. Has general appearance of solid, responsible, able Senator who arouses no great emotion, but no great animosity. Odds-on-favorite in the early primaries.

Weaknesses: Indecisive, fumbling has cost him clean shot at unopposed nomination. Excessive appeasement of the radical left has alienated center-conservative Democratic support. Painted as intellectually and politically timid by both Democrats and GOP. Not very astute politically in handling of issues. Growing impression he is not presidential timber. No real enthusiasm behind him. As he lives by the polls, so he may perish by the polls.

HUMPHREY -- Excellent party connections, a good party man. Ran close in 1968 with LBJ albatross around his neck. Has risen in party polls. Centrist Democrat. Good on bread and butter issues, economics; positioned almost ideally on the issues for the Democratic Party. Good anti-Republican campaigner. Ebulient and likeable. Gets good publicity. Strong with the Democratic women.

Weaknesses: Old Face. Hemlock to the Gene McCarthy Left after 1968 -- his nomination, again, in 1972 would risk a party split, and possible third or fourth party. Despised by intellectual far left. No real enthusiasm for his nomination. Weak in the polls against the President. Would bring nothing to a Democratic ticket other than its basic traditional New Deal strengths. Would be perhaps one Democratic candidate who would keep the newly enfranchised young home in droves. Difficult to see how he can win major primaries -- even the late ones, Oregon and California. Removes Vietnam as an issue to use against Republicans.

JACKSON -- Strong with South, strong with labor, strong with conservative Democrats, with Jewish voters and money, with big labor and aerospace and defense contractors. Only Democrat hard-liner on Soviets and Defense Policy -- presents clear alternative to new isolationist sentiment. Choice not an echo. Anti-radical rhetoric. Has money backing, good support in Senate. Highly regarded, ~~tremendous victory record~~ in Washington -- 85 percent. Law and order man. Rallying point for Democratic conservatives. Ideal Vice Presidential Candidate for Edward M. Kennedy, if party divided over Kennedy nomination.

Weaknesses: Nomination would surely sunder Democratic Party. Would generate Fourth Party candidate as in 1948. Party too far left to nominate him now. No national recognition. Needs to go the primary route -- will lose in New Hampshire, a chance in Florida and Oregon -- but can't win the big ones. Again, less likely a potential nominee than a potential Vice Presidential nominee.

MCCLOSKEY -- What the ex-Marine has going for him is a general impression of solid, ex-Marine, honest, tough-minded, anti-war, candid, likely to capitalize on the anti-Nixon sentiment within the Party on the Left. Strategy against him should be, in our view, ignore him at the National level -- and publicize in Republican circles every far-out position, and statement, and appearance. To tarnish

his image as a selfless white knight. Anything that can be seen as moving him out on the left fringe diminishes the degree of Republican votes he can possibly win.

GENERAL STRATEGY

-- Attacks should not focus on any single Democrat. All should be hit now, and hard -- as attacks coming in mid-or late 1972 will be seen as wholly political, thus less credible, less newsworthy than attacks in 1971.

-- President should stay utterly aloof from political attacks.

-- The Democratic Party as an entity should be denigrated, as so irresponsible, such a disaster in the sixties, as not to be entrusted with national leadership again. Thus, Clifford, Harriman, O'Brien, and all potential candidates become fair game.

-- Public should not be allowed to forget the record of the LBJ Administration, of HHH's role, of EMK's background, of Muskie's bumbblings.

Disagreement was expressed over who should do the attacking.

One view, strongly held, is that American people are fed up with politics per se, and politicians, and if RN's official family, i. e. Vice President, White House Staff, or Cabinet, engage in partisan warfare, this reflects on the President as a politician -- and detracts

from him. Other view is that while President must stay aloof, the deficiency of Republican guns argues that we have to use what we have, i. e. the Vice President, occasionally Cabinet members, the RNC Chairman, the RNC, the Republican leadership -- and any Republicans we can find on Capitol Hill to carry the attack to the Democrats.

General concurrence that the press and media tend to tolerate more partisan and malicious assault on part of Democrats, which they would charge off to dirty politics on part of Republicans.

INVENTORY OF RESOURCES

Research Resources

-- RNC is keeping on-going in-depth files on all potential Democratic contenders, plus McCloskey, Gardner, Lindsay and Wallace. This material filed in data bank instant retrieval system.

-- Mort Allin News Summary, contains files of all major Democratic candidates, major comments and stories from 50 major newspapers.

-- RNC runs monthly digest of each potential candidate listing outstanding developments, etc.

Without going into further depth, we have more than enough political research, and filing going on. Any future allocation of resources should be away from research, and into production. In short, a diminution of input, and an increase in output. What is needed

now is not more personnel to squirrel away little nuggets for the winter -- but rather analysts, writers and producers, who can translate the daily grist into daily news copy.

OUTPUT RESOURCES

-- Monday has a high degree of credibility with the press; has been successful in moving anti-Democratic propaganda into the national media, i.e., the Muskie temper, the Muskie indecisiveness, the McGovern front for Kennedy, the Gardner operation. Each week there should be one or more major political news stories coming out of Monday.

-- Senator Dole, and the Vice President have carried the attack in recent months, Senator Dole especially. Our objective is to provide more raw material and convince more of our people on the Hill, in the Cabinet, and in the party nationally to use it. To this end, Ken Khachigian has been put on full time for solely this purpose. His job broadly outlined will be to daily view the incoming research materials, and to provide a daily diet of political attack material for party people -- great and small.

-- The letters to the editor operation out of the RNC will be tied in directly with this operation, bringing out more attack material

-- The Colson Shop, primarily, and less so than the Klein shop, can move out materials that we find in our research operations -- and that need to be moved now.

-- Schedules of the primary candidates, especially, will be gathered -- and of McCloskey -- so that suitable arrival ceremonies can occasionally be prepared, issue-rated by Walker's advance men.

-- Some raw data of significant importance -- such as the Godfrey Sperling article detailing control of McGovern operation by EMK types -- should be moved unadulterated to national political reporters. We will have either a covert or open operation on this later out of RNC to make sure political columnists are not missing first-rate anti-opposition material.

-- Discussion to be held with RNC to consider a mid-week abbreviated Monday version, which might well be called Watch on the Potomac, or some such, which would give insider accurate information on Democrats, etc.

-- Consideration being given to development of possible anti-opposition ads -- but this is still in the planning process.

-- Because we feel that need to have direct access to government sources of information, we have determined that Ken Khachigian, who is the first new full time man hired for this specific operation should stay in the White House complex -- not move outside.

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE OPERATION FOR THE NEXT
SIX MONTHS

a) Focus not on stock-piling material but on moving it into the media -- on output, rather than input. We don't want to wind up in November of 1972 with 100,000 unused anti-Democratic documents in a super retrieval system.

b) Maintain as guiding political principle that our great hope for 1972 lies in maintaining or exacerbating the deep Democratic rift between the elite, chic, New Left, intellectual avant garde, isolationist, bell-bottomed environmentalist, new priorities types on the one hand -- and the hard hat, Dick Daley, Holy Name Society, ethnic, blue collar, Knights of Columbus, NYPD, Queens Democrats on the other.

The liberal Democrats should be pinioned to their hippie supporters. The Humphrey Democrats should be reminded of how they were the fellows who escalated and cheered the war from its inception.

c) Get as much anti-Democratic material into the media as possible. Eschew the ridiculous and wild as counter-productive.

Finally, we have a strong team at the RNC which has not always been the case; we have some national spokesmen who can take the

political attack effectively, which was not always the case in the last decade -- and we have some tempting targets. As of now -- we see no need for any appropriations from Nixon for President Fund -- we can handle it right now with what we have.

If and when we feel we need more people -- writers and analysts basically -- we will come around.

(There may be a necessity to establish an outside direct mail group to columnists, editorial writers, and political writers -- in order to get all our negative propaganda into their hands.)

Buchanan

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

July 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: BUSINESSMEN FOR NIXON - 1972

Following Peter Flanigan's suggestion that Don Kendall of Pepsico head our businessmen for Nixon operation in 1972, and your approval of Kendall, Rob Odle and I met with him and agreed on the following:

1. Kendall will take an active role in leading the Businessmen for Nixon effort. He has made two of his key aides, Deke De Loach (former assistant to J. Edgar Hoover) and Harvey Russell (who is Black) available immediately to assist him.
2. Kendall, De Loach, Russell, and Odle will work together during the course of the summer to put together a suggested course of procedure for Businessmen which will be submitted to you for approval in the Fall.
3. De Loach, Russell, and Odle will spend an hour with Messrs. Colson and Flanigan next week to get their thoughts as to what this suggested course of procedure should include.
4. The preliminary guidelines under which the operation will function and under which the set of recommendations will be written are as follows:
 - A. Businessmen will be self-supporting and will raise enough funds to finance its own operations -- but probably no more. It should be relatively easy for it to raise enough money to keep it financially afloat and this would not detract from our regular fund raising efforts.

B. Businessmen will probably not emerge primarily as a finance or fund raising operation as similar groups have in the past. It will probably not undertake to solicit funds from businessmen for the campaign's "general fund." Rather, the main purpose of the organization will be to recruit as many businessmen as possible to work for the President's re-election -- from the smallest rural general store owner to the largest industrialist.

C. Businessmen will blend into the 1972 version of United Citizens for Nixon-Agnew as a major component of the national "Cit Com" operation. Any other business groups (e.g.: "Barbers for Nixon," "Retailers for Nixon," etc.) will fall under the Businessmen operation which in turn will fall under the national "Cit Com."

Attached is a copy of a paper which was prepared for Messrs. De Loach and Russell to orient them as to our thinking in regard to this operation. (The attachments to which the paper refers are not included because of their volume).

JEB S. MAGRUDER

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1971

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

Attached are three documents which may be of help to you --

- 1) A proposal outlining how the entire national "Citizens for. . ." campaign might operate in 1972.
- 2) An analysis of the 1968 Citizens effort.
- 3) A suggested strategy for the farm vote in 1972 -- which is roughly comparable to the initial manner in which a businessmen's strategy might be recommended.

What we should begin to do now --

A study should be made of what form a businessmen's effort might take in 1972. The objective of this study would be to develop recommended and detailed proposals for approval regarding the 1972 businessmen's committee. The study should be completed by August 31, 1971.

Drawing on the experience of the businessmen's effort in 1968 and the experience of other businessmen's committees in past campaigns, this study will chart the ways in which businessmen throughout the country can be recruited for the 1972 effort. Lists must be drawn up of the various sub-committees which should be formed and the individuals who might chair and run these committees. Also, recommendations for state committees should be put together, with emphasis at the beginning on key states and states with early primaries.

The study should also examine various issues which can or will be raised in the campaign and find ways in which to key these issues to various groups and geographical areas.

Also, the study must work closely with the Field Organization and finance people to make certain that leaders in each state are utilized in the proper area of the campaign.

What areas might be considered in the study --

- 1) The issues which are of concern to businessmen and and to which we should be responsive. (E.g.: the Administration opposes tax credits. Are most businessmen for them? If so, what is our posture?)
- 2) Can we tack on questions to surveys being conducted by businessmen to determine feelings of businessmen and people in general on issues of concern to us? (E.g.: if Pepsi is doing a poll of attitudes toward soft drinks, can other questions be added?)
- 3) Catalog positions the President has taken on business issues and develop suggestions as to how to exploit them.
- 4) Survey business leaders to find out who is on our side, and who needs "friendly persuasion."
- 5) How can business mailing lists be obtained in 1971 and how can they be properly utilized in 1972?
- 6) How can the NAB be properly utilized? How can the various trade associations be used?
- 7) "Businessmen" should be self-supporting -- but not raise so much money that it would compete with the Finance operations. How would this be worked out?
- 8) The projected structure of the businessmen's effort: a suggested national chairman, executive director, officers, sub-group chairmen, state chairmen, metro chairmen, etc. A suggested budget. A time frame for each activity.

Having surveyed these and other areas, a preliminary version of the entire operating plan could be submitted for approval on September 1, 1971.

MAKING PAPER FOR THE BROTHERLY SOCIETY

RE: Citizens Brochure

Magruder forwarded the mock-up of the brochure to be sent to people who write in offering assistance to re-elect the President.

Wouldn't it be helpful to have Dick Moore, Herb Klein, Bill Safire, and Dwight Chapin review the booklet?

GS:lm

June 28, 1971

June 30, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: Advertising

This initial paper on our advertising effort will deal with the type of organization most suitable for our needs, the changes that the campaign spending bill might place on this activity, and some general thoughts on the state of the art at the present time.

Organizationally there are three options open: (1) form our own agency in Washington; (2) hire a large full-service agency; or (3) hire a large full-service agency and create our own campaign group within it, as was done in 1968.

The advantages of option one are numerous:

1. Because we would control all the hiring, salaries, etc., we could hire the highest caliber people who are loyal to the President, and we could be sure they spent all of their time on the Nixon re-election effort. This is not true of any other option. Under no other arrangement would we have complete control over who worked on our account. Even if we hired the most creative agency in the country and its top creative man is loyal to the President, we could not be sure that he spent all his time working on the re-election effort. By creating our own agency, however, we could secure that same individual under the "anchor and loan" program and put him to work full-time. This seems to be the best means of assembling the most talent on a full-time basis.
2. We would have direct control over our advertising efforts. Because we would know the people involved, there would be none of the usual agency excuses on delays, unused media buys, etc. Mistakes would still be made but we would have much tighter control.
3. The agency could be based in Washington rather than New York so that the campaign would have a direct relationship with the agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Savings could amount to as much as \$1,200,000. This savings is the difference between what we would pay in commissions to an outside agency and what we would have to pay for our own agency. However, additional placement or production costs incurred by an inside agency might possibly reduce this projected savings. This will be especially true if we target the media effort carefully. We should attempt to regionalize the production and placement as much as possible. At this point cost savings should not be considered as heavily as the other points raised.

The disadvantages are:

1. The simple logistics problem of setting up a 15 to 20 million dollar agency in a short period of time. (However, even a major agency would be faced with the same kind of need for expansion on receiving the account.)
2. The problem of being able to recruit sufficient talented personnel and have them based in Washington.

With respect to option two, to hire a large agency and have it perform effectively will be very difficult. The agency would have to be based in New York or Chicago which would create logistics problems. Of the large agencies we would have very few to choose from, if any, because (1) some do not take political accounts; (2) some are run by Democrats; (3) some have been recently reorganized and would not be suitable for us; and, (4) all agencies would have difficulty putting their best people on our account because of their political affiliations (a discreet inquiry was made of a large conservative agency whose top management is completely loyal to the President and they indicated they could not handle the account because of this reason).

The third option speaks for itself. This is what was done in 1968. It was not satisfactory to either the agency or the Nixon people installed in the agency. We should not repeat that same mistake. Our people did the work while Fuller, Smith and Ross made a big profit and provided bad service.

To set up our own agency we would recommend an organization and time frame similar to Tab A. You will note on the chart that a skeleton team would begin work in November, December, and January. This team would remain stable through the primaries. In July we would begin building the final team which would remain until election day. If we spend \$20,000,000 in media our commissions to an agency would be \$3,000,000. As you can see at Tab A, our total cost for salaries and overhead would be \$1,816,000, or an approximate savings of \$1,200,000. The \$20,000,000 figure is a comparison with 1968. If we spend less than the \$20,000,000 in media we can have a proportionate reduction in salaries and overhead.

Recommendation

Considering all of these options, it is our recommendation that we form our own agency.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

If we form our own agency the most important problem we face is to hire the right advertising director and creative director. If we find the right individuals for these positions it should be relatively simple for them to fill the other positions. Both these positions will be difficult to fill since they should be filled by the best in their respective fields. Both these individuals should be picked by late summer so they can begin assembling the team that would begin working in November.

Recommendation

That we begin to identify these two individuals for your consideration.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

The campaign spending bill could probably affect our activities to some extent, although not as much as was felt earlier. If the bill passes, the probability is that we will have a 5¢ limit on television and a 5¢ limit on print with some possibility that they will be interchangeable. This is based on 140,000,000 voters which would give us approximately \$7,000,000 for each activity in the general election.

It is estimated that we spent approximately \$10,000,000 on television and radio during the last general election. It is difficult to estimate the print expenditures since much of that was done by local committees, but in determining the maximum effort that could possibly be done in all 50 states for newspapers, magazines, and billboards, it would be difficult to spend more than \$6,000,000 and, since many states are not as important as others, our print figures should be much less.

If the bill passes it will probably be appropriate to centralize and control all of our campaign advertising. If we are limited to \$7,000,000 in television we should be able to live within those limits by proper selection of messages and time slots.

In our initial planning it has become apparent that our advertising effort should be targeted as specifically as possible. With an incumbent President the need for identification of a candidate is much less important. With the time we have to prepare for the campaign we should be able to make buys on a more regional and state basis which will give us more favorable rates. We should also have the opportunity to use the primaries,

and the intervening time between the primaries and general campaign to pretest much of what we do in this area. At the same time, by forming our own agency we will have the option of using the best available outside talent where it is appropriate. If we are going to do a documentary, our own agency could decide who was best in the field and contract with him for that documentary. A large agency would have an established relationship with a documentary producer and this producer might not be the best in the field. It is generally felt that one of our greatest advantages over the Democrats is that we have this period in which to direct our efforts toward November 7, 1972, rather than having to worry about the primaries and the convention as the other candidates in the Democratic Party must do. If we do our initial planning work effectively this should accrue to our advantage and allow us to program the campaign much more effectively.

JEB S. MAGRUDER

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1971

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: Preliminary Plan for Maximizing
the 1972 Farm Vote

Attached is the preliminary plan for maximizing the 1972 Farm Vote as put together by the Farm Vote Task Force. John Whitaker is the Chairman of this task force. The report makes twenty-two recommendations for your consideration. In addition, it itemizes major issues and gives an analysis of key states where the farm vote will probably be significant.

A brief discussion for a preliminary budget is also contained in this report.

June 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR 1972 FARM VOTE

SUMMARY

In a sense, the campaign is already in progress and the recommendations contained are being implemented to some extent now. However, absolutely no recommendations that could be interpreted as political campaigning will be implemented without approval. The enclosed report indicates:

- Key advisors who have assisted in drawing up this plan;
- A list of key people who should be consulted in ever-expanding groups as we move toward the election;
- Itemizes major issues we should push as Administration accomplishments as well as those issues where we are most vulnerable, and issues for possible development in the months ahead;
- Recommendation for poll information among farmers;
- Recommendations on better communications at the White House, USDA, RNC, in Congress and in a proposed "farm division" of the citizen's operation;
- Recommendations on key people at the state level who might fit into the "farm division" of the citizen's organization;
- Analysis of key states where the "farm vote" is judged to be significant;
- Budget data (1968) for a farmer's division with the citizen's group.

The report makes 22 recommendations.

- TAB A Forthcoming local, regional and national farm events requiring Secretary Hardin or Presidential telegram
- TAB B Key USDA local contacts to help select state-wide organization members
- TAB C USDA analysis of key farm target states
- TAB D States with 1/3 plus rural vote
- TAB E USDA analysis of Wallace vote
- TAB F Polling information
- TAB G Budget information - 1968 Citizen's Farm group

TASK FORCE WHO DREW UP THIS PLAN

Bryce Harlow - Proctor and Gamble

Hyde Murray - Minority Counsel - House Agriculture Committee

Donald Brock - AA to Secretary Hardin

Phil Campbell - Under Secretary of Agriculture

Clarence Palmby - Assistant Secretary for International Affairs and
Commodity Programs - Department of Agriculture

Richard Lyng - Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Consumer
Services - Department of Agriculture

William Galbraith - Deputy Under Secretary for Congressional Relations
Department of Agriculture

John Whitaker, Ken Khachigian and Bart Porter - White House

Whitaker held a separate meeting to get Roger Fleming's (American
Farm Bureau Federation) view. The recommendations of the task force
follow.

RECOMMENDATION #1

The Task Force should be expanded very soon to include:

Bob Spitzer - Murphy Products Company, Head of Citizen's Farmers
in '68

Bill Taggart - Legislative Assistant to Senator Dole

Claude Gifford - Director of Information, Department of Agriculture.
Former Editor of the Farm Journal, the major farm
publication.

Don Waring - Legislative Assistant to Senator Hruska

George Hanson - Former Idaho Congressman, now Deputy Administrator at Department of Agriculture

Odin Langen - Former Minnesota Congressman, now Administrator of Packers and Stockyards Agency, Department of Agriculture

Richard Ashworth - Assistant to Under Secretary Phil Campbell, Department of Agriculture

David Hamil, Administrator, REA, Department of Agriculture

James Smith - Administrator, Farmers Home Administration, Department of Agriculture

John Coffee - Administrative Assistant to Congressman Page Belcher

Steve Adams - Legislative Assistant to Congressman Bob Michaels

(the latter two men are "Aggies", a Hill Administrative Assistant group from rural Congressional districts)

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #2

That there be a once-a-month session, beginning in July, 1971, led by Bryce Harlow and Secretary Hardin with a key group of Congressmen and Senators. In this meeting, we should seek to draw out their constructive ideas for consideration in a campaign plan.

I. Senate Agriculture Committee

Jack Miller (Iowa)
Milton Young (N. D.)
Bob Dole (Kan)

George Aiken (Vt.)
Carl Curtis (Neb)
Henry Bellmon (Okla)

II. Senate Agriculture Appropriations Sub-Committee

Roman Hruska (Neb)
J. Caleb Boggs (Del)

Milton Young (N. D.)
Hiram Fong (Hawaii)

III. House Agriculture Committee

Page Belcher (Okla)	John Zwach (Minn)
Charles Teague (Calif)	Robert Price (Texas)
William Wampler (Va)	Keith Sebelius (Kan)
George Goodling (Pa)	Wilmer Mizell (N. C.)
Clarence Miller (Ohio)	Paul Findley (Ill)
Robert Matthias (Calif)	John Kyl (Iowa)
Wiley Mayne (Iowa)	J. Kenneth Robinson (Va)

IV. House Agricultural Appropriations Sub-Committee

Mark Andrews (N. D.)
Robert Michel (Ill)
William Scherle (Iowa)

V. Other Members

Gerald Ford (Mich)	Ancher Nelson (Minn)
Leslie Arends (Ill)	John Myers (Ind)
John Anderson (Ill)	H. R. Gross (Iowa)
John Rhodes (Ariz)	Frank Bow (Ohio)
Barber Conable (N. Y.)	Delbert Latta (Ohio)
Vernon Thomson (Wis)	Durward Hall (Mo)
Albert Quie (Minn)	Robert Stafford (Vt)

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #3

That the RNC get a fulltime farm specialist: Followup - Harlow is discussing with Senators Dole and Bellmon on a very preliminary basis. The Task Force recommends this as essential to get farm information out to the regular party structure even though there is some duplication of effort hiring a farm man to lead the citizen's operation.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #4

That Dr. Robert Spitzer be hired fulltime August 1971 to November 1972 for campaign organization. His objective would be to work fulltime on political and PR aspects of farmers and agri-business community. He should be on the road almost continuously making speeches. His title is under negotiation.

Budget

August '71 - November '72 (inclusive) @ \$2,500 per month (\$30,000 per year), plus \$1,000 per month travel, plus secretary @ \$1,000 per month = \$72,000

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #5

That a fulltime White House "advisor" on Agriculture to the President be hired. The President has this under consideration.

ISSUES

(No specific recommendations are made in this section in the sense that no major "nuts and bolts" political organization decisions are needed at this time) Major issues and media plan content to focus positive farm issues in primary election states can be prepared by this Task Force as advice to the overall campaign chairman.

PRIORITY ISSUES

Farm-oriented campaign literature and general media plan should never lose sight of the fact that the major national issues -- peace in Southeast Asia, and an upswing economy -- are overriding and these themes, plus others, set in the national campaign, should be the highest priority even before farm audiences. All polling information places these issues over farm-oriented issues, even among farmers (at least this is the "conventional" wisdom, unless polls of farmers in depth tell us otherwise).

ADMINISTRATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The campaign may focus around a few major farm issues -- it is risky to lock in to early. For the time being, they can be classified into:

1. Positive Administration accomplishments;
2. Accomplishments, but for selective audiences;
3. Negative or defensive positions;
4. Issues that might be developed during the coming year.

I. Positive Administration Accomplishments

a. Farm prices should be good, even if they are, the Task Force feels the Administration should not brag about it -- farmers read this as political "puff" -- they know prices are good. Instead of talking how well off they are, talk in terms of how the Administration is helping.

b. Farm income -- all-time high realized net per farm was \$5,437 per farm in 1969 -- it slipped to \$5,392 in 1970 and is projected at \$5,320 in 1971. Forecast with many uncertainties is up moderately over 1971 -- not much chance of making 1969 high again by the late Summer of 1972. The issue must be watched carefully as we proceed into the Spring of 1972.

c. The Administration has increased farm credit on all fronts beyond the Kennedy/Johnson years.

(1) farm operating loans increased in FY '72 by \$140 million from \$210 million in FY '71 to \$350 million in FY '72

(2) an increase of \$100 million in FY '71 and \$111 million in FY '72 in the insured loan program to build water and sewer systems in rural areas.

(3) the Administration was there to help farmers when the devastating southwest drought of 1971 occurred. (Play this issue by ear)

d. The Soil Conservation manpower budget was increased by \$12 million to an all-time high and small watershed grants were increased by \$28 million to an all-time high of \$105 million in FY '72 so that 75 new projects could be started. The loan program was quadrupled to help local communities finance their share of these projects.

e. Major new funding of research on plant and livestock disease (corn blight, cattle ticks, etc.)

f. Farm exports at all-time high of \$7.6 million in FY '71.

g. Opening grain export market sales to Eastern Bloc and Mainland China by rescinding the requirement that 50% of the grain be shipped in American bottoms. Be careful - it may not be enough trade to affect price -- in hard core conservative areas, trade with Communist countries a strong negative.

h. Passage of Telephone Bank Bill.

i. Increase on REA loans.

j. Price supports for milk at 85% of parity.

k. School milk

l. Stopped bureaucratic meddling on farm truck driving age limits.

m. Restricted feedlot pollution permits to few large operators -- would not allow Federal harassment of the small farmer with a permit program.

- n. Careful watch and ample R&D funds for corn blight problem.
- o. Never (so far) vetoed a farm bill.

II. Accomplishments or questionable value as political issues with farmers or for use with selective audiences

a. Agriculture Act of 1970 -- if it turns sour, it should be plugged as bi-partisan. In any event, the key theme is that the Act gives farmers more freedom to plant, not "straight jacket" control of farmers called for by Democrats.

- b. Food for needy recipients increased.
- c. Nutrition education program increased.
- d. Migratory labor housing loans authorized.

(Items b, c, d: Task Force feels these accomplishments should be plugged before city and welfare audiences. Items b and c can be "plus" in rural areas if coupled with the thought that these programs "keep the poor and build your market")

III. Negative issues to be played down

- a. Government reorganization.
- b. Pollution permit program.
- c. Pesticides.

IV. Major Policy Issues that might be developed during the coming year

- a. Farm labor bill.
- b. Rural community development revenue sharing.
- c. Sisk Bill
- d. Special milk program.
- e. Screw worm work in Mexico
- f. Peanuts and tobacco.

g. Agricultural attaches to staff U.S. embassies in Eastern Europe to give farmers feeling we have salesmen at our new market frontiers.

h. Presidential appointment of a roving "Agricultural Ambassador." Specific responsibilities: negotiate in GATT an end to the "citrus war"; protect U.S. agricultural interests during EEC's expected enlargement; exert all possible influence worldwide for reduction of existing trade barriers and against imposition of new barriers. Farmers worry about protectionist tendencies.

i. PL 480 - 1972 budget.

j. Imports of beef and dairy products.

k. Possibility of increasing FHA loans from \$700 million to \$750 million in Spring of 1972.

l. Develop theme of right-off-the-leader's-hip of the Farmer's Union -- discredit them as being politicians, not farm leaders.

m. Dissolve the "Cement of the Coalition" by inferring that it is a politically controlled alliance.

A key policy question that must be developed is to decide which of the above issues should be emphasized in the campaign on the theory that the farm media plan should focus on as few issues as possible which are played hard, never losing sight of the fact that war and peace and the pocketbook issue (assuming they turn out favorable) should be pushed hard in the media plan since they are overriding in rural America compared to specific farm issues.

COMMUNICATIONS

RECOMMENDATION #6

Claude Gifford, new Director of Office of Information, USDA, and former Editor of the Farm Journal, take firm control of communications -- overall for the campaign. That an advisory committee consist of Claude Gifford, Bob Spitzer (for the citizens), Bryce Harlow (overall tone), Hyde Murray (for the Hill), and John Whitaker (for the White House) all working with Gifford and keyed in with overall campaign policy.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #7

Claude Gifford assume control of USDA radio spotmaster so positive news is flowing everyday - repeat - every day. Spotmaster must be upgraded by high fidelity tapes placed in many cities in key farm states and "must-win-to-win" key states even if farm vote in those key states is small. This way, radio stations can phone at less cost to get news on their stations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #8

Claude Gifford supply each week to rural GOP Congressmen and Senators rural news for Hill newsletters. Hyde Murray in the House, Don Waring and Bill Taggart in the Senate and Bill Galbraith in USDA have additional responsibility to make sure the Congressmen and Senators get the information out. A rigid systematic followup is necessary to make sure the newsletters get out.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #9

That the same information supplied by Claude Gifford to the Hill be supplied to (a) the Bob Spitzer operation for selective farm citizens publications, (b) to the RNC "farm desk", and (c) to Ken Khachigian for mailings done by Herb Klein to editors.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #10

That Hyde Murray lead, supported by Bill Taggart, Don Waring and Bill Galbraith to take special responsibility for working with RNC to assure that weekly key Congressmen and Senators use the RNC radio taping facilities to get the material from Claude Gifford's operation. When and if we get an RNC farm man, that responsibility moves to him.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #11

Don Brock organize a speaker's bureau including top USDA people, White House Farmer, and Bob Spitzer so that we blanket the key states and make effective use of TV and radio. There are two guiding principles to make this work: (1) don't passively accept invitations that come in the mail, but instead, decide where the target states are and build your own events, and (2) don't give so much emphasis to the speech made because, what is more important, is the time taken at the location to do the radio and TV and some hand-holding and stroking with key people as we move to select the top movers and shakers in each state to build a national farm political organization.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #12

Very systematically: (1) every farm event (See Tab A) unless it is national or regional, should be covered by a letter or telegram from Secretary Hardin, (2) every national and selective regional meeting merits a telegram from the President. USDA should send, where Presidential telegrams are required (at least two week's notice is required to research the event), a memo to Miss Eliska Hasek, (Executive Office Building, Room 117, phone 456-2108) with copy to John Whitaker indicating (1) proposed draft telegram, and (2) who it should be sent to with proper address and phone number to make sure the telegram is read at the event, and (3) besides the draft message, Eliska Hasek needs a memo giving background on the event and what should be stressed, so she has a better "feel" for the event and can change the wording of the draft if she so chooses. Responsibility for action: Claude Gifford.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #13

Secretary Hardin should attempt to "break through" into the national media. This is admittedly hard to do because of the national press lack of interest in rural America. Recommendations: (1) more press conferences, (2) background individual meetings with farm editors of Time, Newsweek, etc. and (3) same with Washington farm bureau AP and UPI men. The "White House Farmer" when appointed, should do the same. Because of the "break through" problem with the Washington press corps, Secretary Hardin should hit key out-of-town media centers with press conferences (Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, Dallas, etc.)

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #14

Farm belt "briefings - salutes" - regional event - featuring Secretary Hardin, Senator Dole and select members of the Cabinet like Secretary Stans on rural development, Ambassador Dave Kennedy and Pete Peterson on farm exports for well staged regional events. These should be well advanced. Responsibility: Claude Gifford

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #15

Claude Gifford should develop "the farm speech", i. e., the basic themes all our speakers should develop and use now. Secretary Hardin should write all Cabinet officers giving them just one paragraph loaded with farm themes that they can work into their speeches.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #16

By June 1972, Claude Gifford should have prepared a series of questions and answers to be used for requests from farm publications for Presidential replies that can be printed in their magazines. These Q&As will need to be cleared by Ray Price at the White House before publication.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #17

A group to monitor Democratic Presidential candidate's farm statements. Responsibility:

John Foltz - Congressional Relations, Department of Agriculture
Patrick Breheney - Legislative Asst to Congressman Scherle
Garry Madsen - Legislative Asst to Congressman Findley
Bill Taggart - Legislative Asst to Senator Dole

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

RECOMMENDATION #18

The farm vote task force should defer to the overall campaign organization on the question of whether the farm campaign should be organized under a citizen's umbrella. It was called "The National Nixon Agriculture and Food Committee" in '68. This has the advantage of better budget control, pooling of administrative costs for other efforts (ethnic, doctors, etc.) but there is a growing concern that a citizen's group is really not "in" -- not part of the real decision-making process in a campaign. Yet of course, the main advantage is that the citizen's organization attracts Democrats and Independents. The key question can probably be resolved with an outstanding public figure name to run the citizen's group who must be kept in close proximity to the campaign chairman and more important, show periodic publicized contact with the President so that he is "in". In a similar manner, the citizen farmer's chairmen need periodic direct and highly publicized contact with the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #19

As in '68, the citizen's farm group should solicit members who are farmers and agri-businessmen. All major commodities should be represented like cotton, wheat, soybeans, peanuts, etc., but under an umbrella so that no one special commodity interest gets a predominant position and tries to force a public position good only for that particular commodity but bad for an overall position.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #20

Selection of state leaders should not occur for some time, but an intensive culling of potential candidates should begin now. Bob Spitzer should take the lead assisted by Phil Campbell and Clarence Palmby. Tab B are USDA Farm Home Administration or Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Service state leaders who can be of assistance on consultation in selecting the key leaders. Emphasis needed here to assure that no state leader is picked without approval of overall campaign directors. Tab B also contains state leaders recommended by the Farm Bureau.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #21

- a. The farm citizen's group should operate in all 50 states.
- b. The national organization will give direction and a firm guide-
line on the target states and when they are named, additional emphasis
on delivering the vote in those states will be given by the entire citizen's
group including the farm section.
- c. Tab C lists the 20 top "farm" states in terms of (1) payments
to producers, and (2) by cash receipts. These are obviously target
states for the citizen's farm effort combined with the 31 states (Tab D)
where the rural vote is one-third or more of the state's population.
Tab E is a Wallace vote analysis which is rather speculative at this point.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION #22

Tab F contains the most current poll information on farm attitudes
available. It is simply information with a small sample. We recommend
a poll of farmers only even at this early date on the chance that some
corrective action could be taken on an issue, not apparent to the task
force. The task force should consult with ORC on the kind of questions
that should be asked. Tab F also contains maps indicating key cash
crops by states. Possibly some key farm states should be polled in
depth.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

BUDGET

(No recommendation)

We defer at this time on a firm recommendation on a citizen's farmers budget. As indicated in Tab G, Bob Spitzer submitted a proposed budget of \$1,700,000 at Mission Bay in August of 1969. We do not know what he got for a budget, nor do we have knowledge of actually what was spent, although the accounting indicates \$88,696.77 was spent. Tom Evans, Executive Director of the '68 Citizen's operation, feels this figure is suspect. The Spitzer Committee evidently raised only \$1,660.26. Bob Spitzer's preliminary recommendation on a '72 budget is included in Tab G. He also indicates the operation actually spent \$69,607.60 in advertising space (less staff and the tabloid) and suggests for 1972:

Farm paper advertising	\$500,000
Farm audience radio	484,000
Farm audience TV	<u>1,200,000</u>
	\$2,184,000

It seems pointless for this task force to make budget recommendations until all task forces have reported and an overall analysis of priority spending against anticipated fund raising can be made.