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<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
7	85	6/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Chapin to Haldeman RE: memos related to the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10 pgs.
7	85	6/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Copy of a memo from Hallett to Haldeman RE: improving RN's public image. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT: 1972 Campaign Memoranda

In early June, you asked several staff members to respond to a memorandum from you concerning their views regarding the President's posture and various aspects of the campaign, as well as the opposition strategy between now and Election Day.

It is my understanding that you have read the memoranda which has been turned in. Further, it is my understanding that my assignment is to review the memoranda and give you my conclusions.

One point which I should make is that the next time I handle an assignment like this for you, I probably should not be requested to do a memorandum of my own on the same subject as those on which I am going to report. It is difficult to keep from falling into the trap of using the memoranda of other people to substantiate my own personal feelings, as well as to be unprejudiced as I read the other material.

Bryce Harlow and Bill Safire make two points which I feel should be guidelines for us. The key to both their points is naturally one of degree and also of timing. But we, especially you, should keep their thoughts in mind as guidelines as we move ahead - not that they are not already there!

BRYCE HARLOW: Through the years the President has been known as a politician first and a statesman second. The President's "Fort Knox" is deepening public belief that he is preoccupied not with political maneuverings and expediency but with paramount national concerns.

BILL SAFIRE: Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds. The President should not act so Presidential so as to be out of touch. Although fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, people are warmed by attention and evidences of humanity.

A. BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONS

1. The President is on the right track now in terms of his posture and should continue the same through the Convention period. The general conclusion of everyone and my recommendation, which I guess is an obvious fact, should be to keep the President on his pedestal and non-political. Our tendency toward too great aloofness can be tempered by meetings or events which are designed to prod Congress; make positive crowd stories via trips into the country; increase the number of official meetings – Cabinet, Domestic Council, NSC, Quadriad, etc. – all which show the President working against the problems of the people.

2. With Congress in session between the Conventions, meetings designed to highlight the President's initiatives and attempts to pressure for legislation should be highly visible. The greatest amount of time can be placed against continuing the positive aspects of his foreign policy -- however, this should not only be done in closed conferences with Kissinger in the office, but in ways which can be publicly recognized. To have the public believe that the positive foreign policy aspects of the China trip, Russia, SALT, etc. is still in the process of being put together, can work to our advantage.

3. When the gavel goes down on the Democratic Convention, the orchestrated attack on McGovern and his platform should begin. The attack is best made by third party forces and some of our lesser known surrogates up until the Republican Convention. A well-orchestrated and media-oriented indictment of the McGOVERN PLATFORM (contrasted to calling it the Democratic platform) should spin out of our platform hearings the week prior to our Convention. Television coverage of the Republican platform hearings should be equal in time allocated to the Democratic platform hearings. The networks must be monitored on this and we must make sure that enough news is cranked out daily so as to justify the equal time.

B. PRESIDENT - POST CONVENTION/KEY POINTS

1. The further we move the start of the campaign from mid-September toward the first of October, the better off we will be. Obviously, we can always start earlier if Republican Convention events so dictate.
2. Presidential campaign travel should escalate. Begin with long weekends - Friday, Saturday and perhaps Monday. Next add a half-day on a Wednesday and then at the maximum work a Wednesday evening to Saturday noon campaign with radio or TV on Sunday. When possible, always return to the White House over night.
3. Keep the President from making a hard, direct attack on McGovern, at least until late in the campaign. Be cognizant of the fact that it will look panicky if we attack at the end of the campaign unless it is done right. Use the Vice President as well as the surrogates for the hard attack. (PROBLEM: Everyone is counting on the surrogate operation. Will it work? Is it set up right? Should Whitaker be instructed to head it?)
4. During the campaign, attacking Congress can be one of the ways the President vents not being able to take on McGovern. The President's desire will be to attack so we will give him something to attack and that is Congress. Congress should be set up to represent much of what is wrong with McGovern.
5. Foreign policy should be laced throughout the campaign as a positive accomplishment as well as a reason not to change horses in the middle of the stream. If the tie can be made that the President has the same visionary desires in domestic policy as has been exemplified in his foreign policy, it could be the most effective way to handle the problem of an attack on the domestic front.
6. Serious consideration should be given to the idea of having five-minute or fifteen-minute Oval Office addresses. We might see if a five-minute live address could be a last minute substitute for one

of our five-minute network documentary buys. This would give us flexibility and heavy Presidential weight if needed in a crunch. It might also be a possibility on regional buys.

7. The hectic campaign day should be out. I agree and most others do on this point. Look at it this way. Take your 1968 memorandum -- advance it a notch -- and everything falls into place. Our tempo is firm, positive and rational. We can campaign four days running -- but it should be done in a new way (not like 1970). (I will work up some sample schedules to make the point on this.)
8. The regional campaign concept, as well as concentrating on special voter blocs, is of the greatest importance. Hallett makes an argument that we need to zero in on some target groups in the Northeast since the Northeast is key to a McGovern victory. Obviously, the Catholics, certain labor groups, the Polish community and perhaps the Jewish community, are all targets. The problem here is that we have no specific recommendations on how the President personally handles corraling these voters and we will have to move to a plan on this.
9. Bryce Harlow cautions on overexposure which I feel can also be a problem for us. It is his contention that virtually every appearance is a national event due to television. Again, this weighs into the structure of any given day and what events we do that are timed to make the evening news versus evening --type events. A key question here is at what point do we saturate and become overexposed? The other question would be at what point does McGovern become overexposed or is it impossible for him to become overexposed? To what extent remaining fairly unknown is McGovern helped?
10. The campaign should obviously take the President to each region and probably to all of our key States. A mix must be developed for the activity so as to start off in the early campaign period by utilizing some nonpolitical event opportunities in order to get into key locations.

C. GENERAL THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY, ISSUES, TIMING AND POINTS OF ATTACK

1. Realizing the credibility and wisdom in playing off our strong suit of foreign policy, I still see a need (as do several others) to engineer a play for the domestic area. There is absolutely no reason to let McGovern force us early on into a completely defense posture vis-a-vis domestic affairs. Perhaps the whole key to our domestic affairs attack is our pleading the case for getting the economy in order and stressing the merits of the President's economic policy and his courage in moving into his reordering of the economy. We can tie directly to what McGovern's policies would do to economic stability and taxation and make our charge about the "McGovern Market."
2. I like Rumsfeld's idea that we find ways to contrast Presidential actions with McGovern's rhetoric. The question becomes, "How?" We need to get some specifics here and it should be part of the follow-up to this memorandum.
3. I made a point in my original memorandum, and Buchanan made the same point (others alluded to it) of the critical timing in terms of launching our various attacks. We must make certain that by the middle of October we have some initiative left. I favor putting a lot of stock in our ability to react quickly enough to issue charges so as to have the public feel that we are actually on the offensive side and that it is McGovern who is trying to defend. As I stated before, this has got to tie in to Pete Dailey's operation, as well as with those who are monitoring the issues for you.
4. Safire makes the point about picking a villain to attack. This is the same concept that Connally expressed to the senior staff at Blair House about attacking straw enemies. We should take the straw enemies such as the bureaucracy, big spenders, perhaps Congress (I'm not sure on Congress), drug pushers, the abortionists, and others and start building them as giant enemies to the general public now. We can demagogue these enemies through our surrogates in order to insure that when the President takes them on in the heat of the campaign they represent more of a threat to our constituency than they do presently.

6.

5. Although others did not mention it specifically, I want to re-emphasize my point that we keep the debate on issues on the broadest possible range. A one-issue campaign such as law and order was in 1970 should be avoided since it does not play to our advantage. Credibility is the real danger here. The exception as stated before would be a foreign policy crisis.

6. Virtually everyone is on the "credibility or trust" attack which is expected. Everything we do beginning now should build credibility. We should have a credibility desk, people who are ginning up examples of how credible this Administration has been. We should put out front a President and an Administration that has done everything possible within our bounds. For what we have not succeeded on, we should blame Congress, the bureaucracy and people who would undermine what is in the best interests of the country. All the surrogates, in particular the Convention apparatus, our advertising, other world leaders, whatever we have should be used to build the President's credibility.

SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP POINTS

1. Between the two Conventions, the case between the Democratic platform and the Democrats' performance in Congress should be exploited. A plan should be developed by the Congressional Liaison Staff in conjunction with the Domestic Council Staff detailing activities designed to illustrate Congress' poor performance. The activity should be designed for the period between the Conventions and should assume that there will be very little Presidential time available for his participation.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

MacGREGOR SHOULD GET THE ACTION _____

MacGREGOR AND EHRlichMAN TO GET THE ACTION _____

HALDEMAN MEMORANDUM _____

PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM _____

2. The Domestic Council should be asked to come up with domestic related events during the period between the Conventions. These activities again should be ones which can be handled by people other than the President, as well as perhaps a couple of good recommendations for Presidential activity. These activities should concentrate on special voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts - in particular, taxation.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

DRAFT MEMO FOR HRH TO SEND EHRlichMAN _____

SHOULD BE PRESIDENTIAL MEMO TO EHRlichMAN _____

3. Ken Cole's memorandum states that the President "needs to rearticulate publicly his domestic philosophy -- what he stands for -- what he is for and against domestically." He states a little later, ".he needs to state his goals for the nation domestically and how we are going to get there." I am not sure that the President knows what his domestic philosophy is. It seems to me that we should have a paper drafted by the Domestic Council, in particular, by Ehrlichman or Cole, which does state what our domestic philosophy is at this time.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

4. It is suggested that perhaps the President consider a trip to Midway if all the indicators are right during the post-Democratic pre-Republican Conventions. The idea would be to dramatize troop cuts and meet with President Thieu.

CHECK IDEA WITH KISSINGER _____

DROP IDEA _____

OTHER _____

5. Colson has recommended that the President be in Washington between Conventions and do one or two highly visible domestic events, perhaps a veto or calling in some food chain retailers.

HAVE COLSON DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS _____

DROP _____

6. Ken Clawson has recommended that in the post-Convention period the President spend a week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional, and local Party officials to give them marching orders. He feels it should be kept a closed affair and that we should let the press speculate. Should this idea be checked out with other political types?

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

CHECK MITCHELL FIRST _____

7. Buchanan and Haig both make the point, as well as Chapin, that we should not shoot every one of our cannons at once. We need to dribble out our material so that McGovern is kept on the defensive. Who is in charge of developing the release schedule for the issue material? Is there any action which should be taken on this front or is it under control?

COMMENT: _____

8. Rumsfeld says we should enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric. I would like to ask Rumsfeld for some specific ways of doing this -- examples or techniques of how he would go about it.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

9. Clawson raises a point which many others mention in terms of the problem of the economy and unemployment figures. He says historically the Democrats lived from these issues. He proposes creating an almost separate, well-staffed, well-financed internal group whose job would be to solely create an image of economic well-being in the country. He goes on to advocate a counterattack mechanism on the economy to be headed by Colson in collaboration with Mitchell. Should we put this together? Under Colson?

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

COLSON SHOULD CHECK MITCHELL _____

COLSON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH SHULTZ _____

DROP IT _____

10. Buchanan in his original memorandum on the McGovern attack, as well as Ray Price, suggested we nail McGovern early on his radicalism. I assume that you and the Attorney General are signing off on the action memorandum which Buchanan sent in.

YES _____ NO _____ OTHER _____

11. Colson's memorandum had several specific items regarding things that should be hit in the domestic area and action that the President could take or meetings which could be held, etc. It was his May 17th memorandum which was an addendum to the memorandum which I am addressing myself to. I assume that you will act independently on that memorandum.

YES _____ NO _____

12. Do you agree that we should set up some villains -- bureaucracy, big spenders, abortionists, and perhaps a couple of others and start building them as straw enemies now? We can work up speech material and other facts which the surrogates can start cranking into their talks.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

13. In regard to the credibility and trust issue, do you concur that our surrogates, our Convention apparatus, and everyone should be mobilized in order to plug continually the credibility of the President?

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

HAVE BUCHANAN DEVELOP SPECIFICS THAT CAN ACT AS SPEECH INSERTS _____

HAVE PRICE AND SPEECH WRITERS DEVELOP SPECIFICS _____

14. Clawson feels that with the media our strategy must be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The Administration officials must ask publicly the hard questions since the media will not. Should we draft for our surrogates a series of questions which they can start asking about McGovern currently? We can update and move it along as the campaign escalates. Our first step would be to do questions which can be asked prior to the Democratic Convention.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

HAVE BUCHANAN DO IT _____

BUCHANAN SHOULD DO IT AND MITCHELL SHOULD APPROVE _____

OTHER _____

15. Colson advocates our contriving adverse polls to let the American people know that this election is a real test and that Nixon does not have it won. He feels we need to clearly find a way to scare the hell out of people at the prospect of McGovern's candidacy. He also wants to start a "real hatchet operation".

Should Colson go ahead with this?:

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

WITH MITCHELL'S APPROVAL ONLY _____

OTHER _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

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DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By EMP Date 10-2-80

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

DOUGLAS HALLETT

SUBJECT:

Your Memo of June 12.

The following is in response to the four questions raised in your June 12 memorandum:

1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues -- particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conventions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a barrio; take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour -- i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc. in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as possible, do an address on incomes vs. services strategy before a prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform, sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The President should also do something on the human and personal side -- perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation spas.

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EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2.

The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months. Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presidential. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically governmental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then, offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side. The over-all theme -- which can be related to our foreign policy and the Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed, sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly anti-governmental.

2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip -- the 1970 one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he comes back, his campaign pace should not be much, if any, faster than his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken. The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or statement tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues. The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be met with no less than 200,000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,

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the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented (one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute "Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-hour conversations -- one of the President with common people (a veteran, a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc.) and one with a group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids. Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices, education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversation leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural, peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i. e. Nixon and Jews -- and negative -- i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment -- spots should be used by front groups in particular areas.

The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others, but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968. Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested substantive speeches -- can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's -- and that that conception of change is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.

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EYES ONLY

4.

3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while maintaining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberals care about words more than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while expanding his base into the center -- but the psychological posture will not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues -- amnesty, defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very carefully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about abortion can only help McGovern by making us seem silly for relying on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there, nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges -- i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. -- should be even more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's \$110,000 home, etc. -- should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially Eastern Establishment liberalism.

On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues, welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation, through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral vote count. And since it is possible -- and since it is the only possible way he could win -- we should worry about countering McGovern's potential

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appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no choice but to vote for us -- and whose support can be reinforced by the kinds of covert operation suggested above.

Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsible, positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either irresponsible and counter-productive -- his defense budget -- or that they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our surrogate speakers.

It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i. e. Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The temptation, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community and sect efforts, to be positive -- and to keep it that way we have to be especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to embody change and we cannot do that if we are demagoguing -- the media, McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of demagoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establishment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only basis on which he can possibly win.

EYES ONLY

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