

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
1	12	6/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: ideas in the Rose memo. 2pgs.
1	12	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Buchanan RE: explanation of McGovern's drop of fifteen points. 1pg.

June 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN (Per Higby)
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Some of the ideas in the Rose memorandum are good ones; others, in my judgment, are not.

First, Packard and his friends will be with us anyway. They have a "vested interest" in arms production; their group will be viewed in the press as the "Military-Industrial Complex -- West." Having millions in profits tied up in military spending, they are hardly the ones to make the case for us.

Second, the union folks should be gotten the message; and the ideas of the UCLA computers running out a print of jobs to be lost under the McGovern budget is excellent -- but keep the Captains of Industry away from it. We have them. We want the workers. As for the UCLA thing, Rose should get in touch with Ken, as well already have defense cranking out something -- and this could be used as the basis to be run through the computer.

Third, am not too concerned about the Post-Convention thing here -- as McGovern has already been hurt in Southern California. The arguments have already been made -- we can expand on them credibly since HHH did the spadework.

Fourth, any analysis should not be restricted to Southern California. But should include defense plants all over the United States, name them and the number of workers, etc. Rose should get together with Ken Khachigian on this -- this is one of the ideas we had in our original memorandum.

Fifth, am against the "transition colloquium" idea. All this says is that we agree with McGovern -- but he is going too far. Our case ought to be that "no jobs" are going to be lost under RN; we don't need any conferences to indicate that just a few will be changed. Our argument is

that McGovern is a madman on defense, would strip us naked, and throw thousands out on the street in the process -- and this chatter about us being against defense spending, too, at this point in time does not strengthen, but weaken, our presentation and makes George look less rather than more radical.

Buchanan

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

From my knowledge only these can explain the precipitate McGovern drop of fifteen points:

a) The Field Poll was wrong; I discount this -- as I have it from a source that the Field Poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was larger than twenty points.

b) Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare giveaways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency, and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many people to convince 300,000 to come his way. This I believe explains it coupled with:

1. The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical; and
2. The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers of national Democrats calling GM and extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.

What needs to be remembered is that for most of the nation, George McGovern is someone they have become aware of for two weeks at least, two months at most. First impressions are favorable -- but they are not firm impressions.

What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40% in a week -- So, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats, and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of them.

Buchanan