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8	25	7/23/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Haldeman RE: the youth vote. 2 pgs.
8	25	6/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Haldeman RE: preparing RN's daughters for political questions. 2 pgs.
8	25	6/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Mitchell RE: the formulation of campaign strategies in light of McGovern's inevitable Democratic Party nomination. 3 pgs.
8	25	5/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Haldeman RE: Don Kendall's efforts to rally business figures behind RN. 2 pgs.

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8	25	8/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Haldeman RE: using newspaper editor Schurz during the campaign. 1 pg.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday - July 23, 1972
Camp David

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT *Am*

In studying the New York Times release of the Gallup Poll on youth one lesson comes through loud and clear -- it is imperative that we limit our registration efforts wherever possible, without announcing that that is our tactic, to the non-college youth. Of course, some registration of college youth on a very selective basis should be undertaken, but generally speaking we have to realize that there is about a two to one chance that college youth will vote for McGovern. There is about an even chance that the non-college youth will vote for us.

If a youth registration drive begins, pushed by the McGovern forces, every effort should be made to get them to direct that drive to non-college as well as to college youth. I know that our plan is to register youth selectively by finding out in advance which side they are on and then going forward in the registration. Here it is very important that the question asked not be on partisan terms. Over half of all youth list themselves as Independents rather than Republicans or Democrats. Consequently, it should simply be a question of asking whether they are for McGovern or Nixon and then registering those that are for Nixon.

Of course, it could be argued that the registration drive among youth, even non-college youth, is not one that we should undertake at all, since at the very best they would split 50-50. This is much poorer than the national average and much poorer than what we would do among older voters. However, to avoid the effect on older voters of our conceding the youth vote to McGovern, we need to make some effort in this area. Let us limit it to the target states, particularly

the big city areas and the down-state areas where we might pick up support and except for a token effort let us concentrate on non-college, blue collar youth, among ethnics and, of course, among those few that might lean to our side because of their background in a Republican family.

I emphasize again that the whole youth effort should be one that gets across the idea that youth will not overwhelmingly be in McGovern's pocket, that we have in the nation very substantial support among younger voters and that we are going to get more as they learn what the issues are. In fact, something can be gained by pointing out that we are concentrating on registering all youth and that the McGovern people are limiting themselves to the elite youth who have gone to college or are in colleges and universities.

Item N-8

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT



Julie and Tricia were asking me over the weekend what kind of answers they can give now that the Democratic nomination seems to be pretty much a foregone conclusion when asked their opinion on the man or his stands.

My advice off the top of my head was for them to decline to get into personalities, but to simply say that they didn't know much about it except that from listening to the debates and what Humphrey and other Democrats had said that it would appear that McGovern might have a problem in uniting his party.

What I want you to direct Buchanan to do is to figure out all the tough political questions that are likely to be put to Tricia and Julie when they appear on talk shows over the next few months and for him to prepare suggested answers for them which will keep them from getting involved personally, but which will avoid their appearing to be totally non-responsive when such a question is raised. It is vitally important, of course, that they not get headlines which indicates that the daughters of the President are attacking the Democratic nominee. The more off-hand, subtle kind of answer is what I have in mind. This is not generally Buchanan's approach, but I think if you explain it to him he will find ways to tackle the problem that could be very effective. I want you to look over the Q & A after he prepares it before sending it on to Tricia and Julie. This should be done before the end of this week because they are both going to be on shows next week and the week after, as I understand it. They have done extremely well winging it on their own on these political questions up to this point, although I realize they have had considerable help from the staff on substantive matters on

where do I stand on environment, welfare, etc. In view of the Moscow trip I told Julie and Tricia that if they were asked what the major issue of 1972 would be that they should respond that while the domestic issues were, of course, extremely important, that where the Presidency was concerned it would be their opinion that most young people, as well as other voters, would be primarily interested in which of the two candidates was best qualified to lead the United States in international affairs and to build on the great peace initiatives we have begun in China and the Soviet Union. In any event, I want some more intensive thinking done on how they should respond to such questions in the light of our recent Moscow trip, having in mind the fact that we want to keep them and all of our speakers talking about our issue which is international affairs, and except for domestic issues that have a real appeal like busing, amnesty and pot to stay off of the domestic issues.

I think the materials prepared for them so far have probably put a little too much emphasis on the environment, welfare reform, revenue sharing, etc. These are good, safe things to talk about but they are relatively dull and will become rather irrelevant as the campaign heats up.

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN MITCHELL

FROM THE PRESIDENT



This memorandum is for your information and guidance, and the contents and observations should only be used on your own and not attributed to me since some rather sensitive political matters are contained in it.

In talking to John Connally he has decided within the last two weeks that McGovern will probably be nominated.

As you know, it has been his thought all along that Kennedy would inevitably pick up the marbles at the crucial time just before or during the Convention.

However, from a number of sources it is becoming apparent that a last-ditch effort may be made by Kennedy to try to have a deadlock so that Kennedy could still get the nomination.

This seems unlikely in view of his decision to get rid of his Secret Service, but on the other hand that might just be a ploy for the purpose of playing that game. There is no question but that there has been and probably still is a deal between Kennedy and Mills. In fact, from sources that I believe are absolutely reliable, Mills desperately wants to go on the ticket with anybody, including McGovern. This, incidentally, I think would be a great mistake on the part of whoever is at the top of the ticket because I think Mills is a shrewd operator in the House and a lousy national candidate.

In talking to Connally he made one point very strongly with which I totally agree. To put it in perspective it is necessary for me to point out that one of the major mistakes we made in 1960 was to allow Republicans, particularly in the Southern states, to control the Nixon organization and also to be out front in the Nixon effort. Their interest, of course, was to use the Presidential campaign for the purpose of building the Republican Party in their states. This was particularly true in Texas and

some of the other critical states in the South which we lost. It was also a national phenomenon. We avoided it in a state like California only because Bob Finch was totally aware of the California problems and saw to it that we ran a campaign that did not cut out the Independents and Democrats.

Connally's admonition is that as we see the inevitability now of a McGovern nomination we must "leave the door open" for Democrats and Independents not only to join us but to have positions of real leadership in the Nixon campaign. I can't emphasize too strongly how much I agree with his position. You will get squeals of outrage from the National Committee and from State Chairmen, but we must remember that if the Republican Party, weak as it is, is to be rebuilt it cannot be done so at the expense of risking losing the Presidential election. The time to do it will be after the election.

Every state is to be examined with a merciless and impartial eye as to what people in that state we need in order to carry it. Generally speaking, you will find that what we need are prominent Democrats and Independents who will join our cause and if possible who will take positions of leadership in it.

In California one of the reasons we probably have less of a chance in 1972 than we had in 1960 or in 1968 is the fact that Reagan and the regular Republicans will insist on running the campaign. This will make it a walking disaster and the same is true of Texas and all the Southern States as well as some of the other states, including states like Pennsylvania where we need prominent Democrats. For example, Rizzo is infinitely more important to us in Pennsylvania than Scott or Schweiker. Ways have got to be found to allow Rizzo to be out in front if he is willing to do so.

The purpose of this memo is simply to make sure that an examination is made of the state's situation with only one view in mind -- what men and women can do us the most good in getting us the votes we need -- the votes of Independents and Democrats? Always have in mind that only 24 percent of the people in the last Gallup Poll were willing to admit that they were Republicans. With this kind of a base, putting Republicans out in front, is simply asking for suicide. This does not mean that the Republican organization should be cut out -- it does mean that we should avoid identifying too closely with Republican

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candidates who are weaker than we are or with Republican organizations that are in ill repute. It does mean that whenever we can get Independents or Democrats to take a lead role this could make the difference between winning or losing the state and even possibly the election.

The McGovern strategy is becoming very clear now that he believes that he has the nomination wrapped up. His going to the Governors' Conference for the purpose of "clarifying his stand on amnesty, marijuana, abortion and welfare is a case in point. I know there are those who will say that he can't get away with it any more than Goldwater was able to get away with it when he tried to enlist Republican Governors in Cleveland in 1964. There are two very significant differences. McGovern is more clear and less principled than Goldwater and will say anything in order to win. And second, McGovern will have about 100 percent support from the media in his effort to clean himself up so that he can beat us in the final. This points up the necessity at this time to get Democrats and Independents, not Republicans, to nail McGovern on the left side of the road which his record so clearly identifies him with. We must remember our experience in 1970. We thought that with people like Adlai Stevenson, Burdick, Moss, et al and their total record of permissiveness, anti-defense, anti-law enforcement, a good hard-hitting supporter on our side could win. What happened was that people like Stevenson ended up riding in police cars and wearing American flags and the media, of course, completely refused to point up their hypocrisy in making the change. We are going to be up against exactly the same problem with the media in this case and every possible effort must be made to develop a program now to counteract this obvious tactic which is being developed.

[Item N-107]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

I was distressed to learn from Don Kendall that in his trying to get Business Chairmen for us in the various States, he had struck out in city after city after going down the list of names that he received from people on the White House staff, the Campaign Committee, and from other sources. He said that he had to date called 12 business leaders in San Francisco and not one of them would agree to serve as the Nixon Chairman. He said that he had also had some difficulty in Los Angeles although he had finally come up with a name. Only through Connally's intervention was he able to get Clement to take the job in Texas.

As I have already told you, Kendall's reaction of course was that, immediately after the election we had to spend more time romancing the business community and developing a group of them to support us. I told him that, if I looked back over my calendar for the last three years, that businessmen probably took two-thirds of my time when we figured my appearances before Chambers of Commerce, NAB, the Business Council, and the terribly boring series of meetings I have had with business advisors and consultants on a number of issues.

I told Don that we have to realize that the old establishment just like the old establishment in the university community and in the media simply weren't going to be with us and that we had to build a new establishment. I told him that we needed people like himself, Bob Abplanalp, Mulcahy and others who, though they don't fit socially with the business elite, have real character. There are simply bound to be a number of people around the country who will fit this category. Stans probably knows some of them because he had to build a whole new group of contributors when he went through the last campaign. I would also imagine that the wire and letter response to the May 8 speech might prove very useful in getting some names for Kendall to approach.

What I am sure of is that what we have been doing to date with the business community is altogether wrong. When I think that we have had the likes of Irwin Miller in to Blair House meetings and when I look over the lists as I sometimes do of those who are invited to such meetings, I find that even our most conservative people on the White House staff inevitably go to the so-called business elite when they want to get support for some of our policies.

I want you to have a really tough talk with Flanigan and Ehrlichman on this subject and eventually, as a result of your discussions, perhaps we can give Kendall some help in attempting to develop this new group on the business side. Malek, of course, could be helpful in such a discussion and Stans, also, from time to time.

In sum, what I am trying to say in this memo is that we have been striking out over and over again in attempting to enlist business support for our policies due to the fact that we have been talking to the wrong audience. The business elite, if anything, has less guts than the labor elite or the farm elite. What we have to do is to find those few people in the business community who have some reputation as being successful in business but who haven't been taken in by the idea that they must only attach themselves to "fashionable" causes.

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT



I want you to follow through to see if we can get the editor from Maryland -- Schurz -- who was formerly on the San Francisco Examiner to come with us on some sort of basis during the campaign. Unless he turns out to be a nut I think he could be extremely effective. He has the ability that Klein lacked of really seeing how the press jobs us. One assignment you might give him is to check up on photo editors, the wire services primarily and less importantly of some of the major papers. He strongly believes that photo editors do us in more effectively than some of the managing editors. In any event, follow up and see if we can find a place for him, provided he is willing to come.