

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
White House Special Files Collection  
Folder List

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65	3	n.d.	Report	California Congressional Districts Presidential Vote totals by district and winning margin. Prepared by F. Baker Wallace of the National Republican Congressional Committee. 2 pgs.
65	3	n.d.	Report	Report examining the 1962 California gubernatorial race between Edmund Brown and Richard Nixon. 18 pgs.
65	3	n.d.	Report	Report titled "State Chairmen's Press Conferences Compared." 3 pgs.
65	3	n.d.	Report	Report reviewing the Nixon for Governor Campaign programs, activities, and volunteer leadership throughout California. 21 pgs.
65	3	n.d.	Newspaper	New York Times article by Bill Becker titled "Nixon's campaign Is Called "Dirtiest."" 2 pgs. Not scanned.
65	3	01/10/1963	Memo	To Maurice Stans from Bob Finch Re: "Dissolution of Modern Nailing Services, Inc., through the Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee." 3 pgs.

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65	3	01/21/1963	Memo	To Richard Nixon from David Hunter re: "Statement of Vote by Congressional Districts." 7 pgs.

CALIFORNIA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

Presidential Vote - General Election - November 8, 1960

<u>District</u>	<u>NIXON</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>KENNEDY</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>NIXON</u> <u>Winning Margin</u>	<u>KENNEDY</u> <u>Winning Margin</u>
1	121,961	53.37	106,523	46.63	15,438	
2	86,528	48.37	92,357	51.63		5,829
3	113,577	45.31	137,109	54.69		23,532
4	97,282	48.85	101,872	51.15		4,590
5	45,719	32.29	95,862	67.71		50,143
6	101,673	45.75	120,599	54.25		18,926
7	68,908	47.17	77,162	52.83		8,254
8	114,064	44.93	139,815	55.07		25,741
9	104,570	51.83	97,154	48.17	7,416	
10	159,649	53.78	137,201	46.22	22,448	
11	78,654	51.81	73,157	48.19	5,497	
12	75,789	44.16	95,835	55.84		20,046
13	125,169	54.26	105,523	45.74	19,646	
14	89,247	50.99	85,766	49.01	3,481	
15	83,551	45.35	100,689	54.65		17,138
16	87,061	56.17	67,928	43.83	19,033	
17	151,825	49.06	154,077	51.94		12,252
18	101,728	53.57	88,170	46.43	13,558	
19	67,698	34.57	128,115	65.43		60,417
20	90,428	67.37	43,806	32.63	46,622	
21	171,548	54.64	142,403	45.36	29,145	
22	109,834	51.93	101,686	48.07	8,148	
23	89,720	42.09	123,463	57.91		33,743
24	77,870	54.10	66,065	45.90	11,805	
25	201,489	57.50	148,923	42.50	52,566	

<u>District</u>	<u>NIXON</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>KENNEDY</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>NIXON</u> <u>Winning Margin</u>	<u>KENNEDY</u> <u>Winning Margin</u>
26	68,084	31.41	148,682	68.59		80,598
27	99,481	52.26	90,888	47.74	8,593	
28	244,078	60.31	160,612	39.69	83,466	
29	76,461	56.03	59,996	43.97	16,465	
30	141,625	54.90	116,349	45.10	25,276	
TOTALS	3,259,722	50.27	3,224,099	49.73	35,623	

Note: No Republican candidates filed in the 3rd and 12th Districts for Congress.

PREPARED BY:

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**"In the final analysis, the politician has nothing to offer but his word."  
-- James Farley**

**Mr. Farley's thesis was abundantly evident in California during the 1962 gubernatorial contest between incumbent Governor Edmund G. Brown and former Vice President Richard Nixon.**

**The campaign problems of the two candidates were quite different. Both detractors and partisans agreed that Nixon had an international reputation and then noted he had carried California in his 1960 presidential campaign. Brown, by contrast, was regarded as totally state-oriented and, according to his own surveys, he was noted for indecision.**

**Louis Harris, in a poll sponsored by the Democrats, found in April 1961 that 65 percent of the California voters thought Brown was doing a poor job as Governor. If he were to be re-elected, he had two jobs and these formed a campaign strategy: (1) to convince Californians that he had made great accomplishments and, (2) to discredit the image of his probable opponent, Richard Nixon.**

**It is obvious, as will be shown below, that Democratic strategists had made a detailed study of the areas where Nixon was most vulnerable and quite understandably set about to capitalize on their findings.**

**Nixon, on the other hand, had to find the ways to make his international and national reputation an asset in the gubernatorial campaign. Apparently, he decided the best means of doing that was to offer a positive program for building a better California. Thus, in effect, his attacks on his opponent had to be designed as a way of saying, "Brown doesn't know how really to take hold of this problem and solve it."**

Having some of the same type of public attitude information available to him as did Brown, Nixon and his campaign workers seem to have decided that an attack, per se, may misfire when the target is regarded as a friendly but indecisive man.

In such a campaign, what then is the proper role of the press? If Nixon advanced a positive statement on a need in California and in passing slashed Brown, was he receiving fair coverage if the report of the occasion stressed the attack and suppressed the positive?

On the other hand, if Brown attacked Nixon's sincerity of interest in California and knowledge of its problems, would a report be fair if it buried the attack material in the more passive report of "the need to finish the water job in California?"

Here we must conclude that had news reports always concentrated on the attack material they would have been unfair to one candidate, and the converse would apply if the "positive" side of the campaign was stressed in all stories of both candidates.

Very likely, this was one of the things behind Nixon's remarks at his "last press conference." He might have been more exact had he not confined himself to the 1962 campaign, and no doubt in his own mind he had reference to his total career in California politics. For the well established facts are that since 1950 a well-calculated effort was made by California Democrats to raise doubts in the minds of the voters as to Nixon's "political morality." That was the theme of Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas' campaign

against him in 1950. It was revived and given new strength in the 1952 campaign in the furor that erupted over the disclosure that Nixon had supplemental support. In various ways, through cartoons, articles in liberal journals, etc., the image of Nixon as a tricky, opportunistic Red baiter was reinforced. That campaign then could be turned (as Mrs. Douglas had specifically mentioned) into the suggestion that Nixon had Fascist tendencies.

In March of 1961, the Los Angeles Times ran a series of articles examining a then little-known organization called the John Birch Society which they found to be a right wing extremist group with Fascist overtones. Among those congratulating the Times for its enterprise and joining in the general condemnation of the Society's methods was Richard Nixon. Governor Brown, on the other hand, in a press conference on March 21, 1961, professed no particular concern about the John Birch Society though he did ask Attorney General Mosk to look into it. Mosk subsequently made a report to the Governor in which he dismissed the organization as a collection of "old ladies in tennis shoes."

However, within seven months, President Kennedy had decided that the Birchers were a dangerous force in the nation. In a speech to the California Democratic Party in Los Angeles on November 18, 1961, Kennedy referred to the Society as follows:

" . . . The discordant voices of extremism are once again heard in the land. Men who are unwilling to face up to the danger from without are convinced that the real danger is from within.

"They look suspiciously at their neighbors and their leaders. They call for 'a man on horseback' because they do not trust the people. They find treason in our churches, in our highest court, in our treatment of water. They equate the Democratic

**Party with the welfare state, the welfare state with socialism, socialism with communism. . ."**

**--Public Papers of the President, p. 735**

Brown followed up this attack in a speech on January 8, 1962, to the National Press Club in Washington, D. C., but he went further. Through innuendo, he tied Richard Nixon directly to the organization:

**"You may well note that Mr. Nixon is not a John Birchler, and the evidence is that he is not.**

**"The real problem, however, is that he is not joining the fight against the ultra-right wing - although these extremists are a strong force in our state and in his party. . . Richard Nixon (is) in a position where he must choose between principle and opportunism. He has chosen the latter. He has stepped away from those who are fighting the political primitives, and he apparently wants their money and support.**

**"If I run, I want no support from either extreme (Birchers or Communists)."**

On February 20, 1962, Governor Brown said in his press conference that "the John Birch Society is a minor issue in this campaign." Nevertheless, he pursued the matter as though it were a major issue, and for good reason. Marianne Means, White House Correspondent, reported that Lou Harris had found in a survey of California voters that "85 percent of Californians not only disagree with far right ideas, but actively dislike such groups because they think them dangerous and crackpotty. Consequently, Brown is emboldened to step up his attacks on the far right." (San Francisco Examiner, 2/18/62)

Brown kept up a steady drum fire of attack during the primary and the fall campaign. He always mentioned the Birch Society effort to impeach Earl Warren and tied the Republican Party firmly to the extremist group by mentioning two Republican incumbent Congressmen (John Rousselot and Edgar Hiestand) who had admitted membership in the group. He called on Nixon



repeatedly to disavow these candidates. Nixon for his part had declared that "there is no place for a candidate on the Republican ticket who seeks or accepts the support" of the John Birch Society. In March, 1962, at a meeting of the Republican Assembly, a volunteer organization that has official status within the Republican Party, Nixon introduced a resolution categorically condemning the Birch Society and calling on all Republicans to disassociate themselves from it forthwith.

Nixon's action was politically courageous. His primary opponent, Joseph Shell, had the support of right wing Republicans and was making headway in his campaign. Nixon's action did not however gain him any advantage. Brown continued to flail away at the Birch Society always being careful to associate the group with the Republican Party and Nixon in particular. Press coverage of the Governor's remarks on the subject seldom mentioned Nixon's prior repudiation of the Society.

Thus, the questions were raised:

- (1) Was the press inadvertently perpetuating a false issue?
- (2) When political reporters feel that a campaign question has been asked by one candidate and answered by the other, does the reporter have any obligation to mention this in his coverage if the issue is raised a second and third time?

Recently a questionnaire was sent to California newspaper publishers asking these questions:

- (1) Do you expect a reporter to exercise his own judgment about which portion of a candidate's address is "newsworthy?"
- (2) Do you expect a reporter to reflect his own judgment on the legitimacy of an issue or charge raised by a candidate in the story the reporter writes?

With one exception, publishers answered the first question affirmatively. The only reservations made in answering this way were to suggest that the reporter should sometimes consult with the city editor on the question of newsworthiness.

Almost all publishers replied in the negative to the second question. However, the qualifying comments were of particular interest.

From the publisher of a paper which editorially supported Governor Brown:

"But I would expect the reporter to draw attention to any contrary fact, as for example -- if Mr. Nixon charges that Governor Brown has been soft on narcotics enforcement, and the reporter is aware these charges have been answered previously, I would expect him to insert a sentence to the effect, 'Governor Brown, in a speech last week in Podunk, denied Nixon's charges and pointed to \_\_\_\_\_ number of convictions.'"

From a paper which made no editorial endorsement:

"We do not expect a reporter to reflect his own judgment. . . We would expect him to select the important facts of a speech and present them as accurately as he can. Sometimes it is necessary for a reporter to explain certain assertions if ambiguities exist. If the explanations are irrelevant, the desk will excise them from the copy."

Although the Birch Society had no official status within the Republican Party, the California Democratic Clubs (CDC) have official status within that party and are a counterpart to the Republican Assembly. CDC clubs are chartered by the various Democratic County Committees and claim to be the volunteer arm of the Democratic Party. The CDC, in its annual state convention regularly enacts a long series of resolutions - many of which are embarrassing to the regular Democratic Party organization. In 1960, the CDC had passed resolutions calling for, among other things:

- Abolition of the House Un-American Activities Committee.
- Abolition of Red China to the U. N.
- Reduction of Military Expenditures.
- Repeal of Loyalty Oaths.
- Establishment of Police Review Boards.

The Democratic high command both in Sacramento and in Washington was so concerned about the "far out" tendencies of the CDC that they made certain that no such resolutions as those listed above were enacted in 1962. At that, a resolution condemning the Kennedy Administration's fallout shelter program was narrowly averted. The Young Democrats in their annual convention, however, did condemn the program.

Nixon attacked Brown for accepting support from the CDC. The Los Angeles Times explained to readers that the questionable CDC resolutions were enacted by "a handful of delegates. . . at two o'clock on a Sunday morning at the tag end of an exhausting convention day." The small number of delegates and their political points of view were not further identified except to say that they "knew their stuff - and what they wanted to put over. . ."

Brown felt it necessary to disavow the above mentioned resolutions but in doing so once more tied the John Birch Society to Nixon. Again, press coverage made no mention that Nixon had condemned the Birch Society nor did it mention that unlike the CDC the Birch Society had no status official or unofficial in the Republican Party.

To some, this raised the question of what is proper to explain to readers.

Following the primary election, Brown made a significant change in his campaign slogan. During the primary, his billboards proclaimed "Keep California First." When September rolled around, the slogan had been changed to read "The Man Californians Can Trust." The change in slogans was indicative of his campaign strategy.

In the fall of 1961, at the time Nixon announced his candidacy, Brown lagged 16 percentage points behind Nixon in the polls. (After his re-election, Brown admitted that at the time he was so discouraged that he had decided not to seek the nomination.) Other polls measuring opinion of his job performance underscored his pessimism.

Louis Harris reported Brown's job rating by the voters as follows:

	<u>April 1961</u>	<u>December 1961</u>
Positive	35%	40%
Negative	65%	60%

By August, 1962, Brown's rating showed 43% of those polled rated as positive while 57% had rated it negative. Impressive as this improvement was, it was a long way from assuring Brown's re-election. At the same time, Harris reported that Brown had managed to convince an increasing

number of voters that he had done a good job on water, highways and education. At the same time, he had managed to erode the widely held opinion that he was weak and indecisive.

As a result of his survey, Harris suggested that Brown should concentrate his fire on Nixon's sincerity, his presidential ambitions, lack of warmth, and, most important, the development of the suggestion of scandal. The one specifically suggested by Harris was a loan made by the Hughes Tool Company to Nixon's brother six years ago.

The Democrats lost little time in following through with the Harris observations at the Democratic State Convention held August 25 and 26, 1962. Roger Kent, the party chairman, and Eugene Wyman, the chairman-elect, held a press conference to charge that the John Birch Society was helping Richard Nixon to wage a "dirty campaign." Kent and Wyman displayed to newsmen an automobile bumper strip with the legend, "Is Brown Pink?" Wyman claimed that the bumper strips were "on sale at book stores which also peddle John Birch Society literature." Although he made no claim that Richard Nixon was connected directly or indirectly with this campaign material, Wyman commented that, "Bumear attacks such as this always seem to happen to people who run against Richard Nixon in California."

Wyman said that the Democrats were considering legal action to identify the maker of the bumper strip but he never did so. There was no further mention of the strips during the campaign. No effort was made by an enterprising reporter to check the veracity of Wyman's statements.

In passing, we might raise the question as to why the publishers who said the legitimacy of issues was in the province of editors never saw to it that editorials appeared questioning the relative degree of impropriety between "Leftish" insinuations against Brown and the "Reactionary" insinuations against Nixon.

During the course of the Democratic State Convention, Assemblyman Jerome Waldie, Democratic Caucus Chairman and floor leader, made a highly inflammatory speech in which he demanded that Nixon explain all of the circumstances surrounding a loan made to his brother by the Hughes Tool Company. It was typical of the oratory common to political conventions and not unlike those made by the Republican officials at their conventions during this period in which they attacked Brown.

At the same convention, Assembly Speaker Urah, acknowledged generalissimo of the Democratic organization, offered a resolution which would have barred Birchers and Communists from membership in the Democratic Party.

The Long Beach Independent headlined the story, "State Demos Split Over Birch, Reds."

The San Francisco Examiner headed the story, "Demos Battle Over Ban on Reds, Birchers."

The L. A. Times headline ran, "Nixon Asked to Explain Hughes Loan." The sub-head: "Democrat Demands Details of \$205,000 Aid to Brother."

The Times story led off with 13 inches of coverage for Waldie's remarks.

Then, in the continuation on page 10, there was a 7-1/2 inch report on the introduction, debate and defeat of the Unruh resolution.

Perhaps the most surprising thing about the L. A. Times coverage of the convention was the fact that the paper saw fit to print 23-1/2 inches of full text of Waldie's speech. This appeared on page 11. No other event at the convention received such full coverage from the Times. Indeed, it is not the custom of the paper even to print the full text of the U. S. President's speeches.

Governor Brown on August 30 denounced yet another automobile bumper strip reading, "Earl Warren Should Be Impeached." Like the aforementioned "Is Brown Pink?" sticker, this too was said to be appearing in Southern California. Brown, just as Wyman did, tied Nixon into the latest bumper strip by calling on him, "once and for all to take a definite stand on this type of political campaign."

Again, no effort was made by the press to determine whether such auto bumper strips were being distributed and, if so, by whom. The Governor's charge and innuendo was taken at face value.

The effect of the charge, of course, was to identify the Governor with former Governor and Chief Justice Earl Warren. Harris had observed in his August survey that "Chief Justice Warren is both a familiar and well-liked figure in California. . . We certainly can conclude that the Warren name is one that can help the Brown cause, and, in fact, in every move that Nixon makes to appease his smarting right wing, the invidious comparison can be drawn between the Nixon and Warren Types of Republicanism." (The son-

of the Chief Justice, Earl Warren, Jr., was campaigning very actively for Brown and the Chief Justice on his frequent visits to the state always managed to have his picture taken with the Governor.)

With the aforementioned accusations concerning automobile bumper strips, the way was cleared for later accusations that Nixon could not be trusted, that he was carrying the support of extreme right wingers, while Mr. Brown and his colleagues were representing to the California voters the only worthwhile values. Moreover, Nixon and his supporters never entered a denial that the statements of Wyman and Brown were inaccurate, distorted, or even questioned these innuendoes implicit in the Brown and Wyman remarks.

By mid-October, Brown and various Democratic spokesmen had been able to raise enough questions about Nixon's sincerity and integrity to make their final ploy successful.

On October 6, Nixon addressed a Republican State Central Committee meeting for approximately ten minutes. In all, Nixon spent about twenty minutes at the gathering. Among the observers at the meeting was Eugene Wyman, the Democratic State Chairman. During the course of the meeting, a pamphlet entitled California Dynasty of Communism by Karl Prussion was handed out to the various delegates by unidentified persons. The next day on the television program "Meet the Press" Nixon was questioned directly about the pamphlet which he repudiated without any qualifications.

The next day, Wyman in a press conference declared that Nixon had "indirect" responsibility for the Prussion pamphlet.



Two things in the pamphlet were singled out for attack by Eugene Wyman, Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee:

- (1) The pamphlet contained a cropped photo of Brown.
- (2) It purportedly misquoted Brown in his "welcome" to Khrushchev when the Premier visited California.

It was not the first time Brown's "welcome" had come under attack. However, it was never attacked by Nixon. On April 3, 1961, Thomas J. Anderson, a member of the John Birch Society's national council, said in Los Angeles (as reported by the L. A. Examiner):

"We should be trying Khrushchev - or the Governor of California, who told Khrushchev, 'We honor you; we salute you; we welcome you.'"

On April 12, 1961, the Sacramento Bee reported:

"He (Brown) scoffed at attacks made on him by officials of the Society because he welcomed Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to California."

When the Prussion pamphlet appeared, the purported welcome was remarkably similar to the one quoted by the Birch official:

"Premier Khrushchev, we who admire you, we who respect you, welcome you to California."

Thus, the type of quotation or misquotation was not new to Brown or his campaigners. What was needed seemed to be a link to Nixon, despite his repudiation of the pamphlet and the Birch Society. Wyman claimed that the pamphlet was being distributed in Republican headquarters. Prussion, the author, in a press conference of his own stated that he had received no orders from Republican organizations but that he had received an order for

1000 copies from the CDC. Prussion reiterated his offer to be sued on the contents which also appeared on the title page.

Wyman's real opportunity came when the Nixon organization at the late date of October 15 published and distributed a four-page leaflet entitled "Pat Brown and the CDC." Like the Prussion pamphlet, this too contained a cropped picture, one of which originally showed the Governor applauding a crippled child. Wyman thus undertook to convey the idea that both pieces of propaganda were sponsored by Nixon and represented the worst kind of smears. Additional attention was drawn to the whole matter by the denials issued by Nixon's campaign manager and subsequent legal steps that were taken to obtain court injunctions against further distribution of either piece of literature. Paralleling the charges and counter charges on the various pieces of campaign literature, the Hughes loan came in for increasing comment. Brown, while he had shied away from any discussion of this issue, became increasingly bold following his confrontation with Nixon at their only joint appearance. In addition, he directly accused Nixon of wanting to be a "dictator" and directly associated him with the Birch Society. Press coverage faithfully reported the Governor's accusations and editorially failed to question his exaggerated assertions of "wrong doing" on Nixon's part. The Governor was assisted by various Democratic spokesmen who either backed up his assertions or made new claims. While the press reported these faithfully, seldom were denials and counter accusations made by Republican spokesmen noted (see attached memo on state chairmen's press conferences).

In the course of the campaign Nixon had several obstacles aside from those already mentioned.

One was his familiarity with state problems. Here the press often made use of the innuendo.

"He rapped President Kennedy for failing to issue an executive order banning racial discrimination in federally assisted housing. . . But Nixon did not spell out his own position on the racial issue." (L. A. Times, 10/8/62)

The suggestion is obviously that Nixon himself lacked a firm position.

"With one exception, Nixon did not detail any specific programs he will propose to meet California's governmental problems. Instead, he said, he will continue his 'Blueprint for Progress' in a series of seven radio broadcasts on succeeding Sundays beginning September 23." (L. A. Times, 9/13/62)

The same innuendo was here used on a broader scale - he lacked any state programs.

"The GOP candidate, referring to unspecified state buildings, criticized what he termed 'state-built eyesores' and said there ought to be competitive bidding on architectural contracts." (L. A. Times, 10/15/62)

It would not be hard to stretch the remark "unspecified state buildings" to the point that you would doubt if Nixon had ever seen a state building.

"At each stop, Nixon relied on his 'basic' campaign speech, which deals with such issues as narcotics and law enforcement, taxes and the cost of government and jobs and pensions." (L. A. Times, 10/19/62)

Here there is the strong implication that Nixon had mastered only a few state matters and that he dwelled on them incessantly.

Five days later, the same innuendo again appeared in the L. A. Times:

"Nevertheless, the Republican candidate ran through his basic campaign speech, dealing with such subjects as government spending, taxes, jobs, and law enforcement."

Another area of campaign strategy involved proposed televised debates. Several things probably entered into the Nixon thinking on this matter. One certainly was the question of putting aside the argument of unfamiliarity with state problems.

Another was doubtless the knowledge that in at least one state election - New Jersey the year before - the refusal of one candidate to participate in debates weighed heavily against him on election day and perhaps lost the election for him.

Nixon had refused to join in any public debate during the primary because of his determination to wage his campaign against Brown rather than a fellow Republican.

Joe Shell, Nixon's opponent in the primary, had scored heavily on this decision of Nixon's and the press was filled with Shell's repeated challenges.

On top of it all was the near certainty that Brown was trying to duck the debates.

In the early days of the general election campaign, both Nixon and the Republican leaders bore down hard on the debates. Challenges and accusations were leveled at Brown by State Chairman Weinberger, Herb Klein, Nixon's press secretary, and others. Nixon, himself, raised the issue in press conferences.

The result was scant. At times it was buried in other stories. Once the L. A. Times ran a 6-inch story headlined "Candidates Exchange Debate Charges."

If anything, Brown fared better on the debate. On September 5, a 3-1/4 inch story was headlined, "Brown Gives Debate Terms."

The Republicans had released statements concerning the debates on September 3 (GOP National Committeeman and Woman), on September 7 and September 9.

Finally, there was the campaign issue of Communism and internal subversion. As has been noted, from the time of the Helen Gahagan Douglas campaign of 1950, there had been a conscientious effort made by Nixon's opponents to suggest that he was opportunistic in his use of this issue in any election. Understandably, this issue is of such magnitude in a campaign that it can only be seen in perspective if the dimensions of the issue are mentioned early and the discussion of the issue stays within those boundaries.

In the case of the 1962 campaign, Nixon repeatedly spelled out his attitude toward Communism during the primary campaign. On June 1, Nixon again summarized a four-point program for combating "the Communist menace in California." At every opportunity, Nixon tied his anti-Communist program directly to Governor Brown's failure to treat the matter as serious.

Nixon's program was duly reported in May and June 1962.

When in the final election, however, Nixon re-introduced the subject of Communist control, Brown attacked it as though it was brand new and a case of characteristic Red-baiting on the part of Mr. Nixon.

In spite of Nixon's frequent mentioning of the fact that he had outlined his program to combat Communism during the primary, the San Francisco or Los Angeles metropolitan dailies never reported the fact.

Curiously, Nixon would have been aided by the observation that this was not "new news." By not reporting the fact that he had outlined his program four months before, the press allowed Brown's innuendo to stand as fact: Nixon was opportunely grabbing a phony issue.

"A politician has nothing to offer but his word." In 1962, there was a culmination of a twelve-year campaign to cast doubt upon the word of one man. The campaign could not be viewed as an isolated happening nor could reporters treat it fairly without reference to what had gone before. Perhaps it is asking too much to ask reporters to reflect their full knowledge of personalities and issues in their reporting of a campaign, but there may be times when failure to report constitutes the gravest of challenges to the responsibilities of the press.

## STATE CHAIRMEN'S PRESS CONFERENCES COMPARED

In the course of the campaign, the two state leaders of their respective parties held press conferences to denounce activities of the opposite party and campaign. Two of these conferences were remarkable parallel in intent and content.

On October 18, Eugene Wyman called a press conference in Los Angeles at the Biltmore Hotel. At that time he denounced two publications that had appeared in the campaign: a booklet written by Karl Prussian called California Dynasty of Communism and a leaflet prepared by the "Democrats for Nixon" called Pat Brown and the CDC. During the conference, Wyman charged that both publications contained "cropped" photographs of Brown which were damaging to his campaign and which contributed to an overall smear against the Governor.

Nixon had repudiated the Prussian booklet as had Chairman Weinberger. Both ordered removal of copies from any GOP headquarters.

On November 1, Weinberger called a press conference of similar dimensions as Wyman's at the same hotel to file an extensive brief and complaint of violations of the Code of Fair Campaign Practices which Governor Brown had signed prior to the campaign. Twelve major violations were cited of the Brown campaign. Immediately following the press conference, the Brown campaign manager, Harry Lerner, stood outside the press conference passing

out a prepared statement by Brown in which he did not deny or challenge any of the charges of violations made against him. It was, therefore, regarded by the Brown people as the important occurrence in the campaign.

Now, a comparison of the press space <sup>that</sup> each press conference received is interesting. In the Los Angeles Times, Wyman's press conference was given a 27-inch 2-column story with a headline "Brown Picture Fakes Blamed on Nixon Aides," subhead, "Democrat Leader Wyman Charges Second Pamphlet Now Misrepresenting Governor." The L. A. Times on November 2 carried a 1-column, 8-inch report of the Weinberger press conference headlined, "Smear Claims Exchanged by Two Parties."

The New York Times on October 19 carried a 12-1/2 inch report of the Wyman press conference headlined, "Nixon's Campaign Is Called 'Dirtiest'." Story appeared on page one of the NYTimes.

On November 2 in the New York Times, the report of Weinberger's press conference was carried in an 8-inch story on page 8 headlined, "GOP Charges Brown Violates Fair Campaign Practices."

Further in this comparison of the New York Times handling of the press conferences, substantial detail was given to Wyman's specific charges concerning cropped photographs. The names of the pamphlets were mentioned and described. Concerning Mr. Weinberger's charges, the last paragraph



was the only one which dealt specifically with the violations, and is quoted as follows:

"Mr. Weinberger called attention to ten handbills or publications that he said were Democrat-inspired 'smears' of Mr. Nixon."

The L. B. Independent Press-Telegram, a newspaper supporting Governor Brown for re-election, treated the stories in one of the most flagrant violations of journalistic ethics that could have been recorded during the campaign. The paper carried a full report of Wyman's original press conference, and then on October 26 ran a 1/2 page reprint of the entire charge including photographs, treating it as though it was news of the day. Their news "peg" for running it the second time was, according to them, the fact that the Committee to Re-elect Brown had just released the cropped and un-cropped photographs. This was simply not true - they were circulated at the Wyman press conference and several newspapers ran them on October 19 including the L.A. Herald-Examiner.

In the Long Beach Independent Press Telegram, there was no report made of the Weinberger press conference.

**Introduction:**

The first responsibility of the Nixon for Governor campaign organization was to develop and make effective sound programs and activities for the promotion and election of the candidate. Except for the registration and get-out-the-vote effort, the campaign organization had primary responsibility for the success of its many programs.

The Republican State Central Committee and the individual Republican county central committees had primary responsibility for organizing and administering the Republican registration program and for getting-out-the Republican vote on election day. In these two areas, the Nixon campaign organization's responsibility was supplemental in nature.

The purpose of this report is to provide for the record a brief review of the Nixon campaign programs and activities and a listing of the volunteer leadership throughout the state who were instrumental in furthering these programs. In addition, and in order to make this file as complete as possible, the Report of Registration and Statement of Vote compiled by the Secretary of State and other printed material is included under appropriate tab headings.

**Organization:**

At the very outset, it was decided to run the campaign on a North-South basis with a steering committee composed of men from the two divisions to be responsible for coordinating the campaign effort statewide.

Prior to the appointment of the steering committee membership, a campaign chairman and finance chairman was appointed by the candidate for each division: In the North, it was Andrew Downey Orrick, Paul L. Davies, and Arthur J. Dolan (Davies and Dolan acted as Northern California Finance Co-Chairmen); and in the South, H. C. "Chad" McClellan and Maurice H. Stans.

The Statewide Steering Committee membership included Orrick, Davies, and Dolan from the North and McClellan, Stans, Valentine, and Minckler from the South. Bob Finch, as counsel for the campaign, was asked to sit in on all meetings of the committee.

To act as a campaign policy committee for the Southern California campaign, a so-called Southern California Policy Board was appointed consisting of McClellan, Stans, Edward R. Valentine, Robert L. Minckler, and Robert H. Finch. The function of the committee was to formulate and coordinate campaign and financial policy and review campaign operations. Sitting as ex-officio members of this committee at its weekly meetings were H. R. Haldeman, California Campaign Manager, and Herbert W. Kalmbach, Executive Director. The candidate was kept advised of the committee's decisions and met with the individual members thereof from time-to-time.

In the North, similar committees were established and consisted of a Campaign Coordinating Committee, a Steering Committee, and a Policy Committee. Cap Weinberger, Joe Martin, and Ruth Watson were active in late 1961 in setting up the outlines of the campaign organization structure. William M. Spencer, Jr., was appointed Northern California

**Campaign Director in February of 1962. Edward Slevin, Executive Director of the Republican State Central Committee, acted as the Northern California administrative director in the latter months of the general election campaign.**

**In order to alert and enlist the support of those Californians who had evidenced partisanship on the candidate's behalf in prior elections, a statewide mailing was made to these Nixon supporters on November 6, 1961. Enclosed with a letter from the candidate was a pledge-of-support card and enlistment sheet to be filled out and returned to state headquarters. Those who signed up and made token donations of \$1.00 were mailed pins and membership cards as charter members of the Nixon for Governor Statewide Committee. State headquarters then mailed these names and addresses to the Nixon campaign chairmen in the county and community where each committee member resided. The local chairman was asked to follow through and place each volunteer in some position of responsibility and effectiveness in his organization.**

**Also, a Southern California Advisory Committee was organized during the primary campaign for the purpose of providing the candidate with the views of a score or more of his friends who had long been supporters and close associates throughout his political career. Ray Arbuthnot acted as Chairman and Harrison McCall as Statewide Coordinator of this committee. The membership roster is set forth in this report under an appropriate tab heading.**

Following the organization and appointment of the top campaign leadership in both divisions, first priority was then given to structuring the campaign in the fifty-eight counties of the state and to developing sound programs and activities to be implemented by the candidate and the campaign organization.

It was decided to include the following eleven counties in the Southern Division: Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Imperial, Riverside, San Bernardino, Inyo, Kern, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura. The other forty-seven counties in the state made up the Northern Division.

The appointment of each one of the county chairmen was the responsibility of the division campaign chairmen. The county chairman then had the responsibility to appoint his county campaign committee, the county finance chairman (by and with the consent of the division finance chairman), and the individual Nixon community chairmen throughout the county. There was no policy prohibiting co-chairmen at the county, division, or community level.

At the same time that the campaign volunteer leadership was being appointed, staff personnel was being recruited to administer the campaign programs and activities throughout the primary and general election campaigns. A very brief description of these programs and activities is set forth below for the sake of making the record complete:

(a) Candidate

The purpose of a campaign organization is to assist the

**candidate in merchandising his programs and personality to the electorate. And in accomplishing this objective, nothing is more important than the proper scheduling of the candidate's time and appearances. Therefore, as a matter of first priority, a scheduling committee was set up at the very outset of the campaign. This committee had the final responsibility for planning the candidate's time and for scheduling his appearances.**

**As an integral part of the scheduling of the candidate, an "advance" group was assembled which had the responsibility to plan in minute detail the routing and time-table that the candidate would follow at each one of his appearances anywhere in the state. It should be noted that scheduling and advance work was done not only for out-of-town trips but for local appearances as well. In point of fact, a major part of the office meetings and conferences held by the candidate were initiated and arranged for by the scheduling committee.**

**The candidate's staff included his personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods, two or three additional secretaries, and those assigned to his traveling group. Included within this latter group were the candidate's press secretary and tour manager. Those who made up the tour group were charged with the handling of the press, radio and television, and such other matters as might be expected to come up on the particular trip. A writer and technical personnel in the communications area were often part of the candidate's traveling group.**

**(b) Advertising**

Very early in the campaign, the decision was made to retain a single advertising agency to handle the preparation and placement of all advertising including literature and materials. After careful analysis of all factors involved, Hixson & Jorgensen, a Los Angeles agency, was so retained. Production itself was administratively handled through the campaign staff with the agency doing all design and layout.

To consult with the campaign manager in the development and programing of all advertising and public relations programs and to assist in the mapping of strategy and plans in the advertising area, a Public Relations Advisory Board was established with membership consisting of Ted Braun, Dick Moore, Bob Forward, Herb Klein, Bob Finch, Kai Jorgensen, Charles Farrington, and Bob Haldeman. Farrington, as staff public relations director, had the general assignment throughout the campaign of acting as liaison between the agency and the campaign organization itself.

Advertising programs included such diverse activities as planning campaign literature, billboard layout and showings, telethons, television and radio spots, literature, etc. It would not be possible to outline these programs in detail within the context of this report. Suffice it to say that a great many separate activities were carried on in this area under forced draft and with many talented and effective people assisting in the effort.

A few brief examples of what is meant by the foregoing need to be stated for one to appreciate the magnitude of effort and talent expended: For instance, the several regional telethons which were conducted around the state in the closing weeks of the general election campaign and the seven weeks of radiocasts required a great deal of coordinated work on the part of the research department, advertising, etc.

(c) Press Bureau

The campaign press bureau was under the overall direction of the press secretary, Herb Klein, who operated at the side of the candidate. Sandy Quinn acted as the staff press bureau director from the state campaign headquarters. In addition, staff personnel were employed to handle such everyday matters as press background and contact, special feature writing, attack and counter-attack writing, etc.

The overall purpose of the headquarters press bureau organization was to provide information and releases on the activities of the candidate and on all other phases of the campaign. General campaign activities and programs included all volunteer programs. Also, the bureau established such innovations as the radio-beeper service which furnished press copy to newspapers by telephone and a pre-recorded film release service furnished to television in advance of scheduled showings.

(d) Research Program

Immediately following the primary election, a Republican Research Center was established with offices on the eighth floor of



the Coast Federal Building in downtown Los Angeles. The purpose was to effect substantial economies in the campaigns of the several Republican state candidates and assure effective team work in the research area.

The implementation of this program resulted in making the State Central Committee responsible for research for all state candidates. The center itself was directed by Don Frey, Executive Director of Republican Associates. And all members of the Nixon research staff who had been operating as a separate campaign staff group in the primary were brought in as part of the Research Center personnel grouping.

The functions of the Center included serving all candidates with weekly fact sheets, a weekly wrap-up of major utterances, a speech fact book for pending conferences, and miscellaneous assignments. In addition, Frey and the Center staff received direct assignments from the major candidates, performed analyses and conducted voter surveys, rendered a press service, did investigative work, and helped to develop campaign literature which required substantial research involvement.

(e) Mail Office

An extensive campaign mail office operation was operative throughout the primary and general election campaigns. Under the direction of Lois G. Gaunt, all mail addressed to the candidate was initially handled by the mail office which was based on the seventh

**floor of the Coast Federal Building.**

**Requests for RN appearances were routed to the scheduling committee for handling. All other types of correspondence were handled by the mail office including extensive correspondence dealing with campaign issues and the candidate's position with respect thereto. Several staff members including typists assisted in the handling of campaign correspondence.**

**In order for correspondence to be handled expeditiously, it was mandatory that close coordination and cooperation should exist between the mail office and such related activities as the scheduling committee, candidate's personal staff group, research, etc. As a result of these efforts, all candidate's mail, whether in or out of state was handled throughout both campaigns in an orderly and businesslike manner.**

**(f) Miscellaneous**

**In addition to the foregoing, there were several additional programs which were treated in the overall as statewide in nature but which were administered separately by the two divisions. Included in this category were the minorities, veterans, and Democrats for Nixon programs.**

**Two minority groups were included in the minorities program, negroes and Mexican-Americans. Special programs were not set up for the Jewish group, the Japanese, etc. These latter groups were**

handled as part of the other programs and not as special and separate programs. There were Japanese-Americans for Nixon, Chinese-Americans for Nixon, etc., set up as part of the Contact program or as part of the special Nationalities program.

As for the negroes, Crispus A. Wright, a young Los Angeles attorney, was appointed a Vice Chairman of the Southern California campaign and was made responsible for developing and making effective a negro program throughout the Southern Division. Alice Leopold had like responsibility in the North.

Wright organized a committee of twenty-five leading negro citizens in the Metropolitan Los Angeles area and attempted to accentuate youth and to recruit additional members for his committee from the more aggressive and generally recognized leadership of the negro community, and thereby tried to avoid coming up with the same old perennials which the party's candidates had all too often chosen to carry their banners in this area in past campaigns. Alice Leopold attempted to do the same in the bay area.

Throughout the Southern and Northern division areas leading negroes were recruited to move out front in support of Dick Nixon's candidacy. Wright and Mrs. Leopold were in touch with this leadership group and coordinated their activities with the other general campaign programs. Largely as a result of Wright's leadership, more negro Nixon headquarters were opened in Los Angeles County in the 1962 election than were opened in the 1960 presidential campaign.

The Mexican-American program was organized in the South under the general direction of Art Sutton, who had represented Newsweek magazine in Mexico for several years and who had been very active in Mexican-American affairs in Los Angeles for some time immediately prior to the election. Sutton brought in Bob Carvajal as his staff man to travel throughout the Southern California area on behalf of this program. Throughout his period of employment, Carvajal remained a registered Democrat and a member of the Democratic State and Los Angeles County Central Committees.

Sutton, Carvajal, and the others who were especially active in the M-A program were helpful to the scheduling committee in arranging for several Nixon appearances in the general election campaign period. Of particular note was the candidate's appearances at the Mexican Independence Day parade in mid-September and at the East Side rally in mid-October.

As for the veterans, a top-level committee of acknowledged leaders was established early in the campaign and included representatives from each of the three largest veteran organizations. Representatives of the committee were present at all state conventions during the election year (including the national American Legion Convention in Las Vegas in early October) and had as their ongoing responsibility the continual contacting of all of the veteran groups throughout the state and selling them on the candidate and his views. The budget allotted this committee enabled the group to place a certain amount of campaign ads in the leading veteran publications.

**A Democrats for Nixon program was set up in the general campaign with headquarters at Wilshire and Flower Streets in downtown Los Angeles. Co-Chairmen were appointed and programs adopted. And the advertising firm of Bosell & Jacobs was retained to provide advertising and administrative requirements.**

**Several thousand registered Democrats became members of the committee and by their contributions underwrote extensive campaign advertising supporting Dick Nixon's candidacy. Many celebrities who were registered Democrats appeared on the several telethons.**

**Modest budgets were assigned to the minorities, veterans, and Democrats for Nixon programs and scheduling arranged for the candidate to meet with the leadership of each of these groups from time-to-time and to make appearances before large groups as seemed to be necessary and justified.**

**Southern California Campaign:**

**As stated earlier, the Southern California area was comprised of eleven counties. One of the eleven, Los Angeles County, was so extensive in terms of the percentage of the total vote of the state's electorate that it was arbitrarily divided into seven divisions -- each one of which was roughly equal to the others in number of population. It is of interest to note that each one of the Los Angeles County divisions was by itself larger in population than all but one or two of the other fifty-seven counties in the state.**

**Chad McClellan, as Southern California Campaign Chairman, proceeded to appoint county and division campaign chairmen at an early**

date and furnished each with a written outline of his responsibilities. Subject to the approval of Maury Stans, Southern California Finance Chairman, each county and division chairman was asked to appoint a finance chairman for his county or division. In addition, the county and division chairmen were urged to appoint Nixon campaign chairmen in each of the communities in their respective areas.

A community handbook was prepared (see tab) for the guidance of each community chairman in setting up his local Nixon committee and thereafter moving to implement specifically stated programs.

In the finance area, specific goal figures were hammered out by and between Chad McClellan and Maury Stans representing top campaign leadership and each one of the county and division chairmen. Once agreement had been reached, each chairman was expected to see to it that at least a minimum goal amount was contributed to the state-wide budget over and above the money required to meet local needs. To our knowledge this is the first time that such an approach in political fund raising had been so successfully accomplished in California political history. The total gross goal amount for the ten out-counties was \$170,000; and the final post-election report showed total gross receipts from these counties of \$182,690.35. The goal amount was thus exceeded by \$12,690.35. And, in addition, a total gross amount of \$89,141.35 was received from the seven divisions within Los Angeles County exclusive of monies received by the campaign from United Republican Finance, fund raising dinners, telethons, and direct contributions. Maury Stans' finance report states these results in detail.

Included in the various programs which were pushed by the Southern California campaign organization were what was known as the

**Field, Action, and Contact programs. In addition, considerable attention and effort was devoted to the Democrats for Nixon program, a veterans program, and two minorities programs.**

**The field program consisted mainly of the effort and drive necessary to insure the establishment of effective Nixon campaign committees in counties, divisions, and separate communities throughout the Southern California area. To assist the county and division chairmen, a field staff organization was established.**

**Such field activities as the establishment of campaign headquarters in every community and programs and activities to be carried on out of such headquarter locations were pushed throughout the campaign. Bumper sticker squads, literature drops and distribution, assistance in getting out crowds for rallies, etc., all were designated as functions of each Nixon community committee.**

**Also the field organization worked with the state and local central committee organizations to supplement the party's programs in the registration and get-out-the-vote programs. A great number of volunteers were recruited from the Nixon organization for work in the County's victory squad program on election day.**

**A Nixon volunteer, Bill Haight, was recruited and took on the responsibility for developing a poll-watchers program for November 6th. The Nixon organization supplied the names of many who worked in this program on election day.**

**A campaign speakers bureau was set up under the direction of**

**Chairman Pat Hillings. Carol Arth prepared a speakers bureau manual which was later distributed to all Nixon speakers and county division and community chairmen. A copy of the manual is included as part of this report.**

**The Action Program comprised several separate programs including Operation Telephone, Jewelry Sales, Friendly Democrat calls, Volunteers, etc., and were all conducted under the general direction of Mrs. Valley Knudsen, a Southern California Campaign Vice Chairman. A separate Action Program report has been received and is included in this report under an appropriate tab heading.**

**An indication of the degree of organization and follow through that was accomplished in the Operation Telephone program may be seen from the fact that the total number of telephone calls made to Republicans and friendly Democrats during the four day period ending on Saturday, November 3, 1962, exceeded by a substantial margin the number of calls made in the 1960 presidential election.**

**In addition to supplying the staff leadership for the five main sub-divisions in the Action Program, Carol Arth, the staff director for women's activities, was responsible for what was known as the "Key" program and for organizing and administering a monitor program.**

**The Key Program had as its objective the writing of letters to publishers, broadcasters, commentators, etc., to express appreciation for good Nixon coverage or to express dissatisfaction with unfair or**



biased coverage. And the objective of the monitor program was to systematically and continuously view all key radio and television commentators and newscasters and then to maintain an accurate file of their attitudes, approach, and presentation of all news and comments relative to the campaign.

As in the Action Program, the key and monitor programs were active throughout Southern California and were implemented by volunteer chairmen especially recruited and enlisted for this special work.

Also, a "friendly car" program was established whereby volunteers on a regularly scheduled basis were made available to meet and discuss issues of the campaign with voters who visited the headquarters.

Another project was the so-called special letter program. This involved sending personalized letters from the candidate to people throughout the state who had distinguished themselves by reason of some worthy act or accomplishment.

A "Contact" program was developed and pushed under the direction of John Vaughn, a Southern California Vice Chairman. In essence, the objective of this program was the establishment of Nixon committees with each committee to be tied to a particular interest whether by occupation, affiliation, or some other logical classification.

Lawyers for Nixon, Doctors for Nixon, Barbers for Nixon, etc., all were recruited into this program and were asked to recruit additional

membership principally by means of letter correspondence. A graphic idea of the magnitude of these mailings may be gained when it is known that a total of 519,600 letters were mailed by the Contact division. And this total number was mailed within a budgetary limit based on a proposed total mailing of 125,000 letters.

Also, a "Win" program was initiated as part of this program -- the object of which was to enlist Nixon supporters within particular companies. A Nixon chairman was appointed for the company who then appointed sub-chairmen in various departments and occupational groups of the company. These chairmen then enlisted Nixon support from their fellow employees.

In addition to the Contact and Win programs, several special committees were organized during the campaign to enlist additional support for the candidate. Three such special committees were the Nixon-Airs, Sportsmen for Nixon, and Nationalities for Nixon.

Nixon-Airs. Approximately 150 airline stewardesses from all major airlines serving the West Coast were recruited and enlisted into a special committee called Airline Nixon-Airs. The announcement of the formation of this committee resulted in a great amount of publicity throughout the Nation and such was reported in all media. Each Nixon-Air wore a special "Pat Red" uniform (manufactured for the campaign at cost by Miss Pat of California). They did such work as appearing at all telethons, passing out literature at rallies, and making plant and factory tours where they passed out free coffee and literature including bumper stickers to union members.

**Sportsmen for Nixon.** Over 100 nationally and internationally known athletes were recruited and enlisted as members of the Sports Advisory Committee. This group then provided speakers for rallies, made telethon appearances, and worked as members of the Victory Squad on election day. They also produced a fine Sports brochure and letter which was mailed to a carefully selected list of 35,000 sports fans.

**Nationalities for Nixon.** Leaders of 32 ethnic groups formed this committee which had as its function that of disseminating information among the foreign born and first generation nationality groups supporting the candidacy of Richard Nixon. The committee raised its own funds and purchased ads in their own foreign language newspapers and on foreign language radio stations.

**Northern California Campaign:**

There were forty-seven counties assigned to the Northern California Campaign Division. In total registration, this division represented approximately forty percent (40%) of the total electorate in the state. As was stated earlier, Cap Weinberger, Joe Martin, and Ruth Watson were the ones who did most of the pre-campaign planning for this division.

Following his appointment as Northern California Campaign Chairman, Downey Orrick proceeded to appoint area and county chairmen for his division. The appointment of area chairmen (an "area" usually comprised three or more counties) was decided upon as a matter of necessity owing to the great distances and number of counties as compared to the Southern California Division. Each county

chairman was then asked to appoint a county finance chairman and community Nixon chairmen.

The community handbook previously referred to was distributed to each community chairman as an aid in the setting up of local campaign committees and as a guide to thereafter working to accomplish the goals and programs set forth therein.

In the finance area, as is shown in the Stans report, there was relatively little attempt made to assess and recover from the counties outside of the bay area any amount of campaign contributions to support statewide budgetary programs. Fund raising was handled primarily through United Republican Finance in San Francisco. As against a goal figure of \$440,000.00 for the state finance budget, Northern California contributed a total of \$244,439.64.

Organizationally, the Northern California campaign was divided into two broad divisions: campaign and contact. The campaign division under the direction of Jim Halley concerned itself primarily with seeing to it that effective Nixon chairmen were appointed in all areas, counties, and communities. The contact division was involved primarily with a "Contact" and "Win" program. In addition, a speakers bureau, press bureau, labor and minorities committee (Alice Leopold), and a scheduling committee were established. This latter committee was set up to facilitate close coordination with the scheduling committee in Los Angeles.

Bill Spencer as Northern California Campaign Director had overall responsibility for managing the Northern California Division

under the Chairman, Downey Orrick. Later, Ed Slevin was made responsible for the administrative direction of the division under the Chairman's direction. Ruth Watson worked closely with Jim Halley in the Campaign division.

Generally, the programs pushed in Northern California were the same as were pushed in Southern California. The emphasis, however, varied from program to program. For example, the "Win" program was developed to a greater extent in the North than in the South while the reverse was true for the "Contact" program.

Conclusion:

The 1962 Nixon for Governor campaign is now part of California political history. As stated earlier, the purpose of this report is to briefly review for the record the organization and programs of the campaign; the analysis of reasons why the result obtained must be done by others. Even so, certain observations are pertinent. Under a separate tab heading is a copy of a report dealing with the matter of press coverage during the campaign.

So long as the Democrats in California maintain their present 3-2 registration edge, it is mandatory that general party unity and solidarity be present in general election campaigns if the Republican candidates are to have any chance for success at all. An expression of views from all factions should be encouraged in the primary period; however, once the candidates have been nominated, all should then join in their support. Disunity in a general

**election campaign is a luxury the party can't afford.**

**Also, of necessity, the campaign organizations must be able to have confidence in the excellence and effectiveness of the formal party organizations -- the state and county central committees and their basic responsibility for improving the party's registration percentage, for getting out the party vote on election day, and for wholeheartedly supporting the Republican candidates. Effective political organization is a year-around job, and to leave the task of registration and getting-out-the-vote to the various campaign organizations is to place an intolerable burden on machinery designed primarily to concern itself with the election of a candidate.**

**By virtue of the 1962 election result, the Democrats now have the opportunity to further consolidate their position in this state and thus increase the likelihood of iron-clad machine and boss rule. Unruh and the others are effective political operators; to deny this is to deny success. The Republican task is to do a better job of selling a superior product. This calls for top-grade leadership and organization -- and a willingness on the part of the various factions to indulge in some give and take in the course of combining behind their candidates in one unified force for victory.**

January 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Maurice Stans  
FROM: Bob Finch  
RE: Dissolution of Modern Mailing Services, Inc., through the Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee

A. Background of the Corporation

In the course of the 1960 Presidential campaign (pre and post convention) the Nixon office established a sizable mail facility in downtown Washington, D. C.

At the outset this was financed by the Folger Research Committee; later by the Nixon Volunteers and finally by the Republican National Committee itself.

Apart from payroll and the expense of mailings themselves, title to, or equity in certain equipment was established over the period involved. This included 8 Friden Flexowriters, machine stands, tape and selectator readers, etc.

As of the time Nixon left Washington there were still over 25,000 pieces of mail yet to be handled and it was obvious that the level of correspondence would remain at a high level no matter what personal course Nixon decided to pursue.

Accordingly, it was determined to set up a mail office in Los Angeles (to be financed by Folger) and as well our equipment, and two trained persons. On the 8 flexowriters alone, a savings of about \$16,000 was achieved in this way. Other equipment, such as the Autopen, had been purchased in Washington, D. C. and could not have been resold except at a considerable loss.

As to the mailing lists which had been developed over the years in Mr. Nixon's office and during the 1960 campaign it was felt advisable to also send this to the west coast. During the campaign it had been put on a Scriptomatic card system, and had grown to include about 430,000 names nationally. Politically it was not appropriate to let this list get out of control. Commercially, it was not feasible to let it lie idle since it rapidly becomes out of date. And from Mr. Nixon's standpoint, it seemed desirable to have it available for use in whatever party leadership role he decided to undertake.

Because a large volume of overhead is inherent in such a mechanical operation, an effort was made to establish Modern Mailing Service as a commercial enterprise so that income from commercial sales could help defray the overhead. It could not be said, however, that the operation has

ever functioned strictly as a commercial business - first, because political work always had priority and commercial work would be shunted aside for it; and second, because in order to meet rush political orders, it was necessary to maintain on the payroll personnel sufficient to handle rush work which would have been scheduled differently in a purely business operation.

One hundred shares of stock were issued. Ninety of these were held in trust by William Stover for those of us who, for political reasons, had advanced capital to the corporation. In addition, a \$38,000 loan was obtained from Union Bank, cosigned by Volk, Taylor, Stover and Finch which was to be repaid after the election. The other ten shares were sold, as an incentive, to the man who was hired as a salesman to promote commercial business.

From February to June of 1961 the organization's total activity and payroll was connected with Richard Nixon's activities and correspondence. The corporation began business formally on June 1, 1961 and ceased operations on December 31, 1962. During this time it had total sales of \$136,303.83, of which \$90,182.76, or two-thirds, was billing for political work, most of this being for Mr. Nixon. Some quasi-political work, such as a national mailing on the lists promoting Mr. Nixon's "Six Crisis" was accomplished at a loss.

In the final months of the general election of 1962, the lists of 1960 national contributors were mailed seeking financial aid for the Nixon Gubernatorial campaign. These mailings were successful and resulted in approximately \$80,000 in out of state contributions at cost only.

It goes without saying that no dividends were ever paid at any time to any shareholder, nor any interest paid on any monies advanced to the corporation from time to time by any party.

At the present time the corporation is insolvent, its business having been continued because of the political campaigns far beyond the point where a purely commercial enterprise would have ceased. The corporation's suppliers and principal creditors have extended their credit because of sympathy with the primary function of the corporation, and consequently bankruptcy or some form of arrangement with the creditors would appear highly undesirable.

The purpose of this memo is to discuss the propriety of an arrangement whereby the Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee would underwrite the dissolution of Modern Mailing Services, Inc., and the payment of its obligations. The effect of such action on three groups should be considered: (1) The Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee and its principals; (2) Modern Mailing Services shareholders, and (3) Modern Mailing Services creditors.



**B. Legality from standpoint of the Nixon for Governor Campaign Wind-Up Committee:**

This committee is essentially a trust and the question which should be considered is whether the committee's payment of Modern Mailing Services' obligations would conform with the purposes for which the committee was established.

Three factors would appear to justify this action by the committee:

1. The benefit which the Nixon campaign has derived from the corporation and the fact, as indicated by the sales figures above, that the corporation was for all intents and purposes an arm of the campaign. This benefit was both one of convenience in having a facility available for crash work and financial in that an ordinary business would have charged considerable more for much of the work which had to be done at night and on a rush basis.
2. The fact that credit has been extended to the corporation by sympathetic businesses because of the campaign involvement, so that the reputation of the campaign is involved.
3. The fact that the purposes and objectives of the company, particularly with respect to the mailing list, have been coincidental with those of the Nixon organization. The retention of the mailing list with the cost involved in doing so, was predicated primarily upon the hope of winning, just as was the entire campaign effort. In the event of victory, the list and rest of the mailing facility would have been invaluable to Mr. Nixon in exercising his responsibilities as a leading political figure.

The above factors would appear sufficient to justify the proposed action by the Wind-Up Committee.

**C. Modern Mailing Services, Inc.'s Shareholders**

The action is legally competent so long as a majority of the corporate shareholders have consented to the transfer of the corporate assets to the committee. This is obviously no problem.

**D. Effect on the Corporation's Creditors**

This is primarily a practical matter. While creditors might ordinarily be reluctant to stand by as an insolvent debtor corporation transferred its assets, the same factors which motivated them to extend their credit in the first place now prevent them from intervening. They know that they will be better off as a result of the contemplated action, and as long as they are paid off fairly promptly will certainly raise no objections.

MEMORANDUM

January 21, 1963

To: RN

From: David Hunter

Subject: Statement of Vote by Congressional Districts

1st Congressional District:

Miller (Dem. )	100,962
Clausen (Rep. )	97,949
Brown	100,969
Nixon	100,755

2nd C. D. :

Johnson (Dem. )	106,239
Nagel (Rep. )	58,150
Brown	93,261
Nixon	72,040

3rd C. D. :

Moss (Dem. )	138,257
Geo. Smith (Rep. )	46,510
Brown	115,462
Nixon	71,788

4th C. D. :

Leggett (Dem. )	55,563
Honsinger (Rep. )	42,762
Brown	58,099
Nixon	42,567

5th C. D. :

Shelley (Dem. )	64,493
Charles (Rep. )	15,670
Brown	64,458
Nixon	29,022

6th C. D. :

O'Connell (Dem. )	74, 429
Mailliard (Rep. )	105, 762
Brown	115, 840
Nixon	78, 143

7th C. D. :

Cohelan (Dem. )	86, 215
Cantando (Rep. )	47, 409
Brown	82, 361
Nixon	59, 642

8th C. D. :

Miller (Dem. )	97, 014
Petersen (Rep. )	36, 810
Brown	83, 032
Nixon	57, 437

9th C. D. :

Edwards (Dem. )	79, 616
Donovan (Rep. )	41, 104
Brown	76, 132
Nixon	50, 734

10th C. D. :

Thurber (Dem. )	68, 885
Gubser (Rep. )	106, 419
Brown	86, 485
Nixon	90, 738

11th C. D. :

Keller (Dem. )	61, 623
Younger (Rep. )	101, 963
Brown	90, 464
Nixon	82, 115

12th C. D. :

Stewart (Dem. )	47, 576
Talcott (Rep. )	75, 424
Brown	60, 792
Nixon	65, 045

13th C. D. :

Holgate (Dem. )	45, 746
Teague (Rep. )	84, 743
Brown	68, 201
Nixon	64 720

14th C. D. :

Weidner (Dem. )	58, 369
Baldwin (Rep. )	99, 040
Brown	91, 150
Nixon	71, 192

15th C. D. :

McFall (Dem. )	97, 322
Young (Rep. )	41, 726
Brown	73, 707
Nixon	68, 564

16th C. D. :

Sisk (Dem. )	108, 339
Selland (Rep. )	42, 401
Brown	90, 020
Nixon	63, 185

17th C. D. :

King (Dem. )	74, 964
Bruinema (Rep. )	36, 663
Brown	70, 529
Nixon	44, 945

18th C. D. :

Hagen (Dem. )	91,684
Arnett (Rep. )	64,037
Brown	82,021
Nixon	74,369

19th C. D. :

Holifield (Dem. )	78,436
Ramsay (Rep. )	48,976
Brown	70,133
Nixon	61,303

20th C. D. :

Mayer (Dem. )	49,850
Smith, H. Allen (Rep. )	119,938
Brown	64,501
Nixon	114,343

21st C. D. :

Hawkins (Dem. )	73,465
Smith, Herman (Rep. )	13,371
Brown	86,905
Nixon	15,190

22nd C. D. :

Corman (Dem. )	75,294
Foote (Rep. )	65,087
Brown	71,116
Nixon	73,056

23rd C. D. :

Doyle (Dem. )	83,269
Clawson (Rep. )	46,488
Brown	74,099
Nixon	61,416

24th C. D. :

Mellon (Dem.)	50,970
Lipscomb (Rep.)	120,884
Brown	62,526
Nixon	117,897

25th C. D. :

Cameron (Dem.)	62,371
Rousselot (Rep.)	53,961
Brown	64,738
Nixon	55,540

26th C. D. :

Roosevelt (Dem.)	112,162
Belts (Rep.)	52,063
Brown	110,429
Nixon	60,542

27th C. D. :

Burkhalter (Dem.)	66,979
Hiestand (Rep.)	61,538
Brown	70,583
Nixon	61,760

28th C. D. :

Felixson (Dem.)	91,305
Bell (Rep.)	162,233
Brown	112,675
Nixon	151,135

29th C. D. :

Brown, Geo. (Dem.)	73,740
Richardson (Rep.)	58,760
Brown	80,267
Nixon	61,170

30th C. D. :

Roybal	69,008
McDonough	53,104
Brown	78,859
Nixon	51,041

31st C. D. :

Wilson, Chas. (Dem.)	76,631
Hahn (Rep.)	70,154
Brown	90,096
Nixon	66,135

32nd C. D. :

Johovich (Dem.)	47,917
Hosmer	115,915
Brown	84,268
Nixon	84,630

33rd C. D. :

Sheppard (Dem.)	96,192
Thomas (Rep.)	66,764
Brown	88,437
Nixon	80,054

34th C. D. :

Hanna (Dem.)	90,758
Geier (Rep.)	71,478
Brown	76,521
Nixon	88,034

35th C. D. :

Shamsky (Dem.)	61,395
Utt (Rep.)	133,737
Brown	62,494
Nixon	132,831

36th C. D. :

Godfrey (Dem. )	56,637
Wilson, Bob (Rep. )	91,626
Brown	59,908
Nixon	83,596

37th C. D. :

Deerlin (Dem. )	63,821
Wilson, Dick (Rep. )	60,460
Brown	62,764
Nixon	59,954

38th C. D. :

Saund (Dem. )	54,022
Martin (Rep. )	68,583
Brown	58,498
Nixon	66,197