

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
32	31	09/30	Other Document	Hurbert Humphrey speech concerning his nomination as a Presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, 14 pgs.
32	31	n.d.	Other Document	List of Vice Presidential Staff (Humphrey), 2 pgs.
32	31	n.d.	Other Document	Responsibilities of Vice President Hurbert H. Humphrey, 2 pgs.
32	31	12/17/1968	Letter	From Hudson B. Drake to Haldeman, concerning the Vice President's staff, 2 pgs.
32	31	11/27/1968	Memo	From Haldeman to Ehrlichman, Chapin, Cole, and Higby, re: White House Communications, 1 pg.
32	31	12/02/1968	Memo	From Higby to Haldeman, re: Page Boys Unit, 1 pg.

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32	31	11/27/1968	Memo	From Stephen Bull to Nixon Staff, re: Telephone Usage, 2 pgs.
32	31	12/06/1968	Memo	From Flemming to Ehrlichman, concerning telephone communications, G.H. Dillon's business card attached, 1 pg + business card.
32	31	n.d.	Report	From Glenn Olds and Hal Booth to Frank Lindsay, Phil Areeda, and Ernest May, notes from their meeting on 09/05/1968, 1 pg.
32	31	08/15/1968	Letter	From Frank Lindsay to Nixon, 2 pgs.

Humphrey Sept. 30

Tonight I want to share with you my thoughts as a citizen and as a candidate for President of the United States.

I want to tell you what I think about great issues which I believe face this nation.

I want to talk with you about Vietnam, and about another great issue in the search for peace in the world -- the issue of stopping the threat of nuclear war.

After I have told you what I think, I want you to think.

And if you agree with me, I want you to help me.

For the past several weeks, I have tried to tell you what was in my heart and on my mind.

But sometimes that message has been drowned out by the voices of protesters and demonstrators.

I shall not let the violence and disorder of a noisy few deny me the right to speak or destroy the orderly democratic process.

I have paid for this television time this evening to tell you my story uninterrupted by noise...by protest...or by second-hand interpretation.

When I accepted the Democratic Party's nomination and platform, I said that the first reality that confronted this nation was the need for peace in Vietnam. x

I have pledged that my first priority as President shall be to end the war and obtain an honorable peace.

For the past four years, I have spoken my mind about Vietnam. Frankly and without reservation, in the Cabinet and in the National Security Council -- and directly to the President.

When the President has made his decisions, I have supported them.

He has been the Commander-in-Chief. It has been his job to decide. The choices have not been simple or easy.

President Johnson will continue -- until January 20, 1969, -- to make the decisions in Vietnam. The voice at the negotiating table must be his. I shall not compete with that voice. I shall cooperate and help.

We all pray that his efforts to find peace will succeed

But 112 days from now, there will be a new President -- a new Administration... and new advisers.

If there is no peace by then, it must be their ~~responsibility~~ responsibility to make a complete reassessment of the situation in Vietnam -- to see where we stand and to judge what we must do.

As I said in my acceptance speech:

The policies of tomorrow need not be limited by the policies of yesterday.

We must look to the future.

For neither vindication nor repudiation of our role in Vietnam will bring peace or be worthy of our country.

The American people have a right to know what I would doo -- if I am President -- after January 20, 1968, to keep my pledge to honorably end the war in Vietnam.

What are the chances for peace?

The end of thw war is not yet in sight. But our chances for peace are far better today than they were a year or even a month ago.

On March 31, the war took on an entirely new dimension.

On that date President Johnson by one courageous act removed the threat of bombing from 90 per cent of the people, and 78 per cent of the land area, of North Vietnam.

On that date, President Johnson sacrificed his own political career in order to bring negotiation that could lead to peace.

Until that time, the struggle was only on the battlefield.

Now, our negotiat ors are face to face across the table with negotiators from Vietnam.

A process has been set in course. And, lest that process be set back, our perseverance at the Conference table must be as great as our courage has been in the war.

There have been other changes during these past few months.

The original Vie tnam decision -- made by President Eisenhower -- was made for one basic reason.

President Eisenhower believed it was in our national int erest that Communist subversion and aggression should no succeed in Vietnam.

It was his judgment -- and the judgment of President Kennedy and President Johnson since then -- that if aggression

did succeed in Vietnam, there was a danger that we would become involved on a far more dangerous scale in a wider area of Southeast Asia.

While we have stood with our allies in Vietnam, several things have happened.

Other nations ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ of Southeast Asia -- given the time we have bought for them -- have strengthened themselves against any future subversion or aggression.

In South Vietnam itself, a constitution has been written -- elections have been held -- land reform and anti-corruption and refugee measures have been stepped up -- and the South Vietnamese army has increased its size and capacity, and improved its equipment, training and performance -- just as the Korean army did during the latter stages of the Korean war.

So -- in sharp contrast to a few months ago -- we see peace negotiations going on.

We see a stronger Southeast Asia.

We see a stronger Vietnam.

Those are the new circumstances which a new President will face in January.

In light of those circumstances -- and assuming no marked change in the present situation -- how would I proceed as President?

Let me first make clear what I would not do.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~to withdraw would not on~~
~~XXX~~

I would not undertake a unilateral withdrawal.

To withdraw would not only jeopardize the independence of South Vietnam and the safety of other Southeast Asian nations.

It would make meaningless the sacrifices we have already made.

It would be an open invitation to more violence -- more aggression -- more instability.

And it would, at this time of tension in Europe, cast doubt on the integrity of our word under treaty and alliance.

Peace would not be served by weakness or withdrawal.

Nor would I escalate the level of violence in either North or South Vietnam. We must seek to de-escalate.

The platform of my party says that the President should take reasonable risks to find peace in Vietnam. I shall do so.

North Vietnam, according to its own statement and those of others, has said it will proceed to prompt and good faith negotiations if we stop the present limited bombing of the north.

We must always think of the protection of our troops.

As President, I would be willing to stop the bombing of the North as an acceptable risk for peace because I believe it could lead to success in the negotiations and a shorter war. This would be the best protection for our troops.

In weighing that risk -- and before taking action -- I would place key importance on evidence -- direct or indirect, by deed or word -- of communist willingness to restore the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam.

If the government of North Vietnam were to show bad faith, I would reserve the right to resume the bombing.

Secondly, I would take the risk that the South Vietnamese would meet the obligations they say they are now ready to assume in their own self-defense.

I would move toward de-Americanization of the war.

I would sit down with the leaders of South Vietnam to set a specific timetable by which American forces could be systematically reduced while South Vietnamese forces took over more and more of the burden.

The schedule must be a realistic one -- one that would not weaken the overall allied defense posture. I am convinced such action would be as much in South Vietnam interest as in ours.

What I am proposing is that it should be basic to our policy in Vietnam that the South Vietnamese take over more and more of the defense of their own country.

That would be an immediate objective of the Humphrey-Muskie Administration as it sought to end the war.

If the South Vietnamese army maintains its present rate of improvement, I believe this will be possible next year -- without endangering either our remaining troops or the safety of South Vietnam.

I do not say this lightly. I have studied this matter carefully.

Third, I would propose once more an immediate cease-fire-- with United Nations or other international supervision and supervised withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam.

American troops are fighting in numbers in South Vietnam today only because North Vietnamese forces were sent to impose Hanoi's will on the South Vietnamese people by aggression.

We can agree to bring home our forces from South Vietnam, if the North Vietnamese agree to bring theirs home at the same time. ~~External~~ External forces assisting both sides could and should leave at the same time, and should not be replaced.

The ultimate key to an honorable solution must be free elections in South Vietnam -- with all people, including members of the National Liberation Front and other dissident groups, able to participate in those elections if they were willing to abide by peaceful processes.

That, too, would mean some risk.

But I have never feared the risk of one man, one vote. I say let the people speak. And accept their judgment, whatever it is.

The government of South Vietnam should not be imposed by force from Hanoi or by pressure from Washington. It should be freely chosen by all the South Vietnamese people.

--A stopping of the bombing of the North -- taking account of Hanoi's actions and assurances of prompt good faith negotiations and keeping the option of resuming that bombing if the communists show bad faith.

-- Careful, systematic reduction of American troops in South Vietnam -- a de-Americanization of the war -- turning over to the South Vietnamese Army a greater share of the defense of its own country.

-- An internationally supervised cease-fire -- and supervised withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam.

-- Free elections, including all people in South Vietnam willing to follow the peaceful process.

Those are risks I would take for peace.

I do not believe any of these risks would jeopardize our security or be contrary to our national interest.

There is, of course, no guarantee that all these things could be successfully done.

Certainly, none of them could be done if North Vietnam were to show bad faith.

But I believe there is a good chance these steps could be carried out.

I believe these steps could be undertaken with safety for our men in Vietnam.

As President, I would be dedicated to carrying them out -- as I would be dedicated to urging the government of South Vietnam to expedite all political, economic and social reforms essential to broadening popular participation, including high priority to land reform... more attention to the suffering of refugees ... and constant government pressure against inflation and corruption.

I believe all of these steps could lead to an honorable and lasting settlement serving both our own national interest and the interests of the independent nations of Southeast Asia.

We have learned a lesson from Vietnam.

The lesson is not that we should turn our ~~back~~ backs on Southeast Asia -- or on other nations or people in less familiar parts of the world neighborhood.

The lesson is, rather, that we should carefully define our goals and priorities... and within those goals and priorities, that we should formulate policies which will fit new American guidelines.

Applying the lesson of Vietnam, I would insist as President that we review other commitments made in other times... that we carefully decide what is, and is not, in our national interest.

I do not condemn any past commitment.

I do not judge the decisions of past presidents when, in good conscience, they made those decisions in what they thought were the interest of the American people.

But I do say, if I am President, I owe it to this nation to bring our men and resources in Vietnam back to America where we need them so badly....and to be sure we put first things first in the future.

Let me be clear: I do not counsel withdrawal from the world.

I do not swerve from international responsibility.

I only say that, as President, I would undertake a new strategy for peace in this world, based not on American omnipotence, but on American leadership -- not only military and economic, but moral.

That new strategy for peace would emphasize working through the United Nations... strengthening and maintaining our key alliances for mutual security particularly including NATO... supporting international peacekeeping machinery... and working with other nations to build new institutions and instruments for cooperation.

In a troubled and dangerous world, we should seek not to march alone, but to lead in such a way that others will wish to join us.

Even as we seek peace in Vietnam, we must for our security and well-being seek to halt and turn back the costly and ever more dangerous arms race.

Five nations now have nuclear bombs.

The United States and the Soviet Union already possess enough weapons to burn and destroy every human being on this earth.

Unless we stop the arms race... unless we stop 15 to 20 more nations from getting nuclear bombs and nuclear bomb technology within the next few years, this generation may be the last.

For 20 years, we have lived under the constant threat that some irresponsible action or even more great miscalculation could blow us all up in the wink of an eye.

There is danger that we have become so used to the idea that we no longer think it abnormal -- forgetting that our whole world structure depends for its stability on the precarious architecture of what Winston Churchill called the balance of terror.

This is no longer an adequate safeguard for peace.

There is a treaty now before the Senate which would stop the spread of nuclear weapons. That treaty must be ratified now.

If this nation cannot muster the courage to ratify this treaty -- a treaty which in no way endangers our national security, but adds to it by keeping these weapons out of the hands of a Nasser... a Castro... and many others -- there can be little hope for our future in this world.

We must ratify this treaty.

I also believe that we must have the courage -- while keeping our guard up and fulfilling our commitments to NATO -- to talk with the Soviet Union as soon as possible about a freeze and reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear missiles ~~systems~~ systems.

To escalate the nuclear missile arms race is to raise the level of danger and total destruction. It is costly, menacing, fearsome and offers no genuine defense.

Beyond that, if I am President, I shall take the initiative to find the way -- under carefully safe-guarded, mutually-acceptable international ^{to} inspection --/ reduce arms budgets and military expenditures systematically among all countries of the world.

Our country's military budget this year is 80 billion dollars.

It is an investment we have to make under existing circumstances. It protects our freedom.

But if we can work with other nations so that we ~~can~~ can all reduce our military expenditures together, with proper safe-guards and inspection, then, it will be a great day for humanity.

All of us will have moved further away from self-destruction. And all of us will have billions of dollars with which to help people live better lives.

The American people must choose the one man they believe can best face these great issues.

I would hope that Mr. Nixon, Mr. Wallace and I could express our views on Vietnam not only individually, but on the same public platform.

I call for this because - - on the basis of our past records and past careers -- there are great differences between our policies and programs.

Those view of Governor Wallace which I have seen reported indicate that he would sharply escalate the war.

Mr. Nixon's past record reveals his probably future policies.

In 1954--at the time of the French defeat at Dienbienphu -- he advocated American armed intervention in Vietnam in aid of French colonialism. It was necessary for President Eisenhower to repudiate his proposal.

Since then , he has taken a line on Vietnam policy which I believe could lead to greater escalation of the war.

In January of this year, Mr. Nixon described as "bunk" the idea that free elections in South Vietnam were of importance.

In February of this year, when questioned about the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam, Mr. Nixon said that a general "has to take the position that he cannot rule out the use of nuclear weapons in extreme situations that might develop."

Since then, he has indicated he has a plan to end the war in Vietnam, but will not disclose it until he becomes President.

If he has such a plan, he has an obligation to so inform President Johnson and the American people.

Few days ago, the Republican Vice Presidential Nominee said there is not now and never has been a Nixon-Agnew plan for peace in Vietnam. It was, he said, a ploy to "maintain suspense." And then he said: "Isn't that the way campaigns are run?" I think we need some answers about this from Mr. Nixon

Mr. Nixon's public record shows, also, consistent opposition to measures for nuclear arms control.

He attacked Adlai Stevenson and myself for advocating a nuclear test ban treaty -- a treaty to stop radioactive fallout from poisoning and crippling people the world over. He called our plan "a cruel hoax." We can be thankful that President Kennedy and the Congress did not follow his advice.

Today, he is asking for delay of ratification of a treaty carefully negotiated over several years and signed by 80 nations -- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

I speak plainly: I do not believe the American Presidency can afford a return to leadership which would increase tension in the world... which would, on the basis of past statements, escalate the Vietnam war... and which would turn the clock back on progress that has been made at great sacrifice to bring the great powers of the world into a saner relationship in this nuclear age.

On the great issues of Vietnam...of the arms race...and of human rights in America -- I have clear differences with Mr. Nixon and Mr. Wallace.

I call on both of these men to join me in open debate before the American people.

Let us put our ideas before the people. Let us offer ourselves for their judgment -- as men and as leaders.

Let us appear together -- in front of the same audiences or on the same television screens, and at the same time, to give the people a choice.

We must not let a President be elected by the size of his advertising budget.

We cannot let a President be elected without having met the issues before the people.

I am willing to put myself -- myself...my programs...my capacity for leadership before the American people for their judgment.

I ask the Republican nominee and the third party candidate to do the same.

I ask, before Election Day that we be heard together as you have heard me alone tonight.

I appeal to the people -- as citizens of a nation whose compassion and sense of decency and fair play have made it what Lincoln called "the last best hope on earth."

I appeal to you as a person who wants his children to grow up in that kind of country.

I appeal to you to express and vote your hopes and not your hates.

I intend, in these five weeks, to wage a vigorous...tireless...and forthright campaign for the Presidency.

I shall not spare myself, or those who will stand with me. I have prepared myself. I know the problems facing this nation.

I do not shrink from those problems.

I challenge them.

They were made by men. I believe they can be solved by men. If you will give me your confidence and support, together we shall build a better America.

END TEXT

VICE PRESIDENTIAL STAFF

Executive Office Building

* Has regular personal contact with VP

1. Vi Williams VP personal secretary
2. Marsha Shephard VP traveling secretary
3. Virginia Reception and mail handling
4. Ashton VP personal matters
5. Col. Dick Hunt Handles Vietnam mail
--Military Ass't to VP
6. Julia Hunt's secretary
7. John Reilly Foreign Affairs advisor
8. Donna Cunningham Secretary to Reilly
9. Doug Bennet Domestic matters, speeches idea man, generalist
10. Mary X Bennet's secretary (left)
11. *Bill Welsh Legislation, programs, personnel & general
--Administrative Ass't operations, key advisor
12. Mary X Typist (left)
13. Suzanne Welsh's personal secretary & answers mail
14. Monica Welsh's Girl Friday & receptionist
15. Edith Moore Mail, typing & filing
16. Jim Sasser Facilities, cars & office supplies
17. Karen Sasser's secretary
18. Barbara Ramsey VP appointments secretary
19. *Bill Connell Political relations & strategist; key advisor
-- Exec. Ass't.
20. Eiler Raunholt Connell's Ass't.
21. Gloria Connell secretary

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| 22. Caroline | Receptionist/clerk |
| 23. Neal Peterson | Indian Affairs; misc. light jobs |
| 24. *Ted Van Dyk | Basically public relations, final speech authority and idea man; key advisor |
| 25. Terry Edwards | Van Dyk Secretary |
| 26. John Stewart | Overall councils; coordinator & speech writer |
| 27. Mary X | Secretary |

Capitol

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| 28. Edna Raunholt | Chief clerk type & mail distribution center |
| 29. Julius Cahn | |
| 30. Carroll | |
| 31. Dave Gartner | VP's personal valet & agriculture advisor |
| 32. Dukes Ofield | |
| 33. Norm Sherman | Press secretary |
| 34. Sandy | Secretary |

Add some 3 or 4 John & Mary Does

RESPONSIBILITIES OF VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

A. Constitutional Responsibilities

1. In the case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office, the Vice President succeeds to the office of President.
2. The Vice President presides over the Senate as its President, and in the case of a tie vote, may cast the deciding ballot. The Vice President receives an annual appropriation for clerks (\$245,528), with which he may hire any number and type of staff assistants that he desires. As the Presiding officer of the Senate, the Vice President signs bills for transmittal to the President, and designates the Senate membership on conference committees.

B. Responsibilities Assigned By Statute or Executive Order

1. Legislative Branch
 - a. Appoints members to various joint commissions (they currently number approximately 30) as provided by law.
 - b. Member, Joint Commission for Extension of the United States Capitol.
2. Executive Branch
 - a. Member, National Security Council
 - b. Chairman, National Aeronautics and Space Council (Four Council members. The Executive Secretary is Edward C. Welsh.)
 - c. Honorary Chairman, National Advisory Council of the Office of Economic Opportunity. (Fifteen Council members, including the regular chairman.)
 - d. Chairman, The Peace Corps National Advisory Council. (Twenty-two Council members.)
 - e. Member, Board of Regents, Smithsonian Institution.
 - f. Chairman, President's Council on Physical Fitness. (Eleven Council members. Administrator is John P. Wilbern.)
 - g. Chairman, Presidents' Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty. (Ten regular Council members and one ex-officio member. The Executive Director is Edward C. Crafts.)
 - h. Chairman of Presidents' Council on Youth Opportunity. (Twelve Council members. The Executive Director is Gerald M. Christenson.)
 - i. Chairman, National Council on Indian Opportunity. (Seven Council members. The Executive Director is William Carmack.)
 - j. Chairman, National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development. (Eight Council members and six observers. Executive Secretary is Edward Wenk.) This Council expires in June 1969.

C. Responsibilities Assigned Informally By The President

1. A regular member and participant in all Cabinet meetings (by custom and tradition).
2. The President's liaison to local government officials.
3. The President's liaison to the Plans for Progress organization (P for P is a private group composed of industry representatives that undertake to employ the hard-core unemployed.
4. Chairman, President's Cabinet Task Force on Travel USA. (Twelve Task Force Members. This Task Force has been inactive for the last two years.)

¹In entries under Paragraph B-2 where reference is made to the number of Council or Task Force members, the Vice President as Council Chairman is not included in the total.

file V.P.

December 17, 1968

Dear Bob:

Enclosed are the write-ups you requested on an expedited basis.

As I mentioned to Larry today, I don't have all the dope on all the people. The reason, simply enough, is that when I came aboard on 9/5, they were already in a "campaign mode." What I have tried to do is determine what their usual (or pre-campaign) spot was on the Vice President's staff.

For those people on Enclosure (1) with no function noted, I will dig it up and phone it to Larry as soon as possible.

I would like to make a few general observations based on my real experience on the job and my industry experience vis-a-vis HHH's overall organizational setup:

- 1) He has no chief of staff type to head up a very heterogenous mix of activities and people...widely dispersed physically, unconcerned with what's going on next door and often inclined to put their own twist on something in derogation of other programs, policies or activities. This can be traced many times to lousy communications, organization or reliance on a personal rapport with HHH.
- 2) There is absolutely nothing in writing resembling either a functional or personnel organization scheme, information flow, policy coordination or action follow-up. This is not to say that everything should or must be proceduralized, but it is a little weird when no one can give you an answer or when you get diametrically opposed answers from responsible staff members.
- 3) Too many people and most of them drones.
- 4) Nobody admits to working for anyone else -- they all work directly for HHH.
- 5) Job roles, missions and relationships are undefined and not understood; duplicative and cumbersome office filing and procedure and a strong penchant for stacking papers, books, mail and various other items on desks such that no wood is showing...Reminds one of a Goodwill store.

Enclosure (2) is fairly straight forward.

I might also add that much the same comments in this letter apply to the White House operation, and not just because of LBJ's lameduck situation.. It's always been that way according to a number of key staffers.

Give me a buzz if you need anything else.

Regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Hudson".

Hudson B. Drake

Home: 202/244-6349

Office: 202/225-5595

MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: JOHN EHRLICHMAN
DWIGHT CHAPIN
KEN COLE
LARRY HIGBY

FROM: BOB HALDEMAN

RE: WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS

*This is copy
has been
distributed*

As a back-up to the present White House communications network, RN has requested that one of our staff be available as duty officer at all times. He would assist the White House board and RN in communications and other matters as needed.

To facilitate this request I am asking you to become one of the people available for duty officer. Ninety percent of the time I will assume this role and be in a position to be in communication with the White House board. If for some reason, however, I am unavailable, the board will contact one of you and request that you assume the role.

During that time you should be able to be reached on a continuing basis by the board should RN or the White House board require assistance.

Thank you for your cooperation.



MEMORANDUM

December 2, 1968

TO: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: LARRY HIGBY
RE: PAGE BOY UNITS

The White House Signal Corps is now investigating small page boy units that will simply signal, causing you to phone into a switchboard.

These will be smaller than the present page boys, but will not be as small as you had requested. They are now requesting Motorola to attempt to design a truly miniaturized receiver to fit your purposes.

More details when available.

HRW
Bull file

TO: Nixon Staff

FROM: Stephen Bull

RE: TELEPHONE USAGE

November 27, 1968

In order to best utilize the communications facilities provided us, the following points are offered regarding the use of the WHCA (White House Communications Agency) lines.

BACKGROUND

WHCA is a joint military agency under the Defense Communications Agency. Operators are military personnel assigned to this detail as a tour of duty. The telephone installers, however, are employees of the N.Y. Telephone Co. Requests for installation of phones should come to me, and I will direct the requests to the WHCA Trip Officer, who will then place specific installation orders with N.Y. Telephone.

RECEIVING CALLS

1. In order for you to receive calls you must keep the switchboard appraised of your location at all times. The WHCA operators maintain listings of each Staff member so that incoming calls can reach you. However, if you leave your desk for any significant period of time without advising the operator where you can be reached the operator will either waste a great deal of time tracking you down or the call may miss you completely. Most likely both will occur. In view of this, for your benefit please follow these guidelines:

a) Insure that the telephone operator knows the primary lines on which you can be reached.

b) When leaving your phone unattended for more than a few minutes, advise the operator of your temporary location. If you will be unable to receive calls at your temporary location, so inform the operator, who can subsequently advise the party calling you when to try again.

c) Insure that the telephone operator knows your residence location and telephone number.

d) Should your position be such that you might need to be reached at any time or place, you should constantly keep the operator appraised of your location, e.g. the location of the restaurant where you are dining and the approximate time of arrival and departure at the restaurant.

2. The incoming N.Y. telephone (Signal) number is 421-3100.

PLACING CALLS

1. Local Calls - In nearly every case, the telephone instrument in your office contains WHCA lines and straight business lines. These business lines are entirely separate from the WHCA operation. For local calls, where you know the telephone number, you can just dial directly on the business line. If you do not have time, do not know the number, etc., ask the WHCA operator for the party you want and he will connect you. Please provide as much information as possible, e.g. "This is Mr. Smith. I would like Mr. Jones at ABC Corporation in N.Y.C. I think they're located on Park Avenue."

2. Long Distance Calls - You should try to place all toll calls through the WHCA operator for one very good reason: we do not pay for toll calls through WHCA, whereas we do on the business lines. As with local calls, provide the operator with as much information as possible.

3. Inter-Office Calls - Lift WHCA line and ask the operator for the party to whom you wish to speak. No extension numbers are necessary.

GENERAL

1. The bells and lights on the phones are powered by the 110 volt current in each room. In some of the newer rooms in the Hotel Pierre all the current in the room is controlled by a single wall switch. It is possible that on bright days you might not be using electric lights and possibly might have the electricity turned off. If this happens your phone will not ring.

2. To report a line out of order, advise the WHCA operator. He will request repair service for either the WHCA or business lines.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

RICHARD M. NIXON

WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: John Ehrlichman

FROM: Harry Flemming

I've been contacted by George Dillon, who is the telephone communications manager at the White House. He would like to talk to whoever has been assigned the responsibility of telephone communications for the incoming White House Staff. His business card is attached.



G. H. DILLON

ACCOUNTS MANAGER - THE WHITE HOUSE
THE CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC
TELEPHONE COMPANY

392-2074

file - office

TO HRH

[Handwritten signature]

To: Frank Lindsay, Phil Areeda, and Ernest May
From: Glenn Olds and Hal Booth
Subject: Notes from our meeting of September 5, 1968

We discussed the fourfold analysis of the paper to RN of August 15; i.e. (1) Personnel, (2) Substantive Program, (3) Government Organization (4) Transitional Arrangements, with action referral under each as follows:

- (1) Personnel:
 - (a) Move forward immediately in identification of outstanding people from the several sources discussed.
 - (b) Booth to confer with Lindsay's aid to avoid duplication and aim at coordination
 - (c) Cambridge group to work at "qualitative" criteria, and attention to the vehicle and process of screening;
 - (d) Detail optional profiles with consequences in pivotal areas, (Ex: a "policy making" or administrative" Sec. of State)
 - (e) Identify the 50 "toughest", not necessarily the most prestigious, positions.
 - (f) Identify the "structure of consent", as well as the "structure of authority or power" in the executive branch
 - (g) Identify the top civil servants in all departments;
- (2) Substantive programs:
 - (a) Suggestions of substance or procedure re: translating policy into legislative program
 - (b) Assess policy options re: existing or proposed programs.
- (3) Governmental Organization:
 - (a) Consider small staff for program design independent of bureau or department
 - (b) Identify omni-competent people for major integrating of ideas and policy to give coherence and focus to the initial phases of a new administration.
 - (c) Identify organization "hang ups", pitfalls, and conversely, resources and structures available for use in implementation.
- (4) Transitional arrangements:
 - (a) Suggest special qualities required for the key liason person;
 - (b) Identify the person enjoying R.N.'s absolute confidence & public trust to monitor the process of transition as Clark Clifford did for Kennedy;
 - (c) Develop detailed information on nature, scale and calendar of this process.

1968

The Honorable Richard M.
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Dick:

You will probably recall that in January, I told you of the problems of transition in administration which Phil and I have had under way since we have had meetings with past transitions, including Goodmaster and Mac Bundy, files and studies relative to another.

The attached memoranda from this study. It is a project which might be done before the end of the year and to make it more effective during the next year and assist you, and would be as to specific transition

During our conversation you would welcome some early (younger men) which the are filling its roster of app think we might be helpful are beginning a modest of that you will also ask of and time.

Specifically, we hope in:

- identifying key p-

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
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August 15, 1968

could rejoin us later. I think you know my own background, which included work for Haruch at the U.N., the Herter Committee and ECA, the CIA, and the management consulting firm of McKinsey and Company before becoming head of Ittek.

If you would like to discuss any part of the transition problem at any time during the next few weeks, we will be glad to try to meet with you at any time and place you suggest.

Sincerely,



FAL:dac

Attachment