

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
White House Special Files Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
26	7	12/19/1970	Letter	Handwritten letter from Charles Morin. 2 pgs.
26	7	02/15/1968	Other Document	Program of speakers. 1 pg.
26	7	07/28/1968	Memo	Buchanan to RN re: Jeff Bell's Memo on Vietnam. 24 pgs.
26	7	12/02/1968	Letter	Woods to RN re: Elmer Bobst. 1 pg.
26	7	01/08/1969	Memo	Haldeman to Roy Ash re: Staffing the White House Memo. 44 pgs.

12/19/70

CHARLES H. MORIN

Bunny:

At this point I had just apologized for not making an initial statement in Latin - because of the educational background of the head table guests: "Do you realize that of the five speakers here tonight two didn't even go to Harvard?" Volpe said to Nixon - "Hey, that's us!" My son

Memo from

CHARLES H. MORIN

happened to take this  
shot at just that moment.  
The Pres. reached over after  
the speech, took my  
dinner program and  
wrote on it "Great job,  
Charlie from Dick Nixon!"  
The guy over Nixon's left  
shoulder is Sinclair  
Weeks. Over to my left  
were Saltmstall, Elliot  
Richardson.  
Again, thanks!

PROGRAM

Date: 2/15/68

*Great job Charlie  
you Dick Nixon*

JAMES I. F. MATTHEW

President, The Middlesex Club

CHARLES H. MORIN

The State We're In

HONORABLE LEVERETT SALTONSTALL

Presenting The Third Lincoln Medallion

HONORABLE ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON

The Lincoln Oration

HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN A. VOLPE

Greetings and Presentation of Mr. Nixon


HONORABLE RICHARD M. NIXON

Speaker of the Evening

MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

July 28, 1968



A) Could you give Jeff Bell's excellent memo a reading before our meeting at four.

B) I confess to a good degree of apprehension over this Vietnam thing. Some headlines are invariably going to say "Nixon Softens Viet Position" or Nixon Shifts Vietnam Position, or something akin to that. For instance, De-Americanization is a code word for a more doveish position than we now have---and it would be legitimate for a writer to say our new position is more doveish. My concern is this. The conservatives, led by Cliff White, might well raise hell on this Vietnam thing, saying RN is making a new "apertura a sinistra" that we are seeing the old Nixon swing to the left, once the right gives him the nomination---and I wonder what the reaction of Thurmond et al in the South will be. In short, I am wondering if our carving out a more doveish position---right now---might not anger some of our hawk delegates in the South---and generate enough erosion to jeopardize the nomination. I thought I should pass this along to you before getting together this afternoon.

Buchanan

July 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FROM BELL

Re: Vietnam

I. IS IT WORTH IT?

My own feeling is that the Vietnam intervention--assuming it is reasonably successfully concluded--will come to be regarded as one of the most important and influential enterprises this country has ever undertaken. For the moment, I am not making a judgment on the conduct of the war -- only on the beneficial effects the war has had on the Asian continent and beyond.

The extent to which non-communist Asia has been stabilized is remarkable. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have boom economies. The two island empires -- Indonesia and the Philippines -- have special administrative and economic problems, but in both nations promising leadership has emerged. Further south, Australia and New Zealand have repudiated their tacitly anti-Asian isolationism of the past and for the first time are taking a positive role in non-communist Asia.

The United States intervened on a large scale in Vietnam in 1965. Every one of the ten nations I have mentioned has endorsed that intervention as in its own national interest. Furthermore -- and this is the striking fact -- not a single one of these countries has had a change of government since 1965. That is a statement that can be made about no other region of the non-communist world.

Closer to the rim of communist Asia, the situation is more mixed-- but the political trends have been the same. Laos is under direct attack from Hanoi, and has lost considerable territory. But the originally neutralist government in Vientiane has broadened its political base, acquitted itself well against the indigenous Pathet Lao before Hanoi intervened in force, and has turned to the west in foreign policy. Burma, the only non-communist Asian nation with a rigidly socialist economy, is stagnant internally. On the other hand, its once idyllic relations with Peking have been suspended, and the military government is now taking a hard line against communist-backed ethnic guerrillas. The little-noticed 1966 elections in Cambodia returned a firmly anti-communist, pro-western majority-- so much so that Prince Sihanouk had to dismiss his new premier within a week. Since that election, Sihanouk has taken a noticeably harder line toward the communist-backed Khmer guerrillas, has issued a surprising number of attacks on Chinese expansionism, and has been considerably more muted in his criticism of U.S. intervention in Vietnam-- despite the substantial North Vietnamese and VC presence within his own borders. Economically, the trend in these beleaguered nations has been not toward Chinese ties and aid, but toward association with the promising new economic alliances, such as ASEAN, that have recently sprung up in non-communist Asia. Japan, not China, is emerging as the pan-Asian economic power-- the rich uncle and patron of emerging economies. This development was, to say the least, not widely predicted as recently as five years ago.

Five years ago, indeed, it was China that seemed to have the momentum. Newly divorced from Russia and on the verge of its own atomic era, China had already launched a bold and effective invasion of eastern India; its brand of communism was widely believed to be in the ascendant in the parties of the non-communist world; and its inroads into Africa and non-communist Asia, particularly Indonesia, seemed considerable. At home, the threat of a nationalist return had receded almost out of sight and the government seemed well entrenched and reasonably stable.

Today, the situation is radically changed. As a clique of ultra-Maoists has progressively tightened its hold on China's foreign relations, government after government has sent Chinese diplomats and advisers packing. Today, less than a dozen nations have normal diplomatic relations with Peking. A series of Peking-backed attempted coups have failed miserably in both Africa and Asia. The most notable instance was Indonesia, where an anti-communist counter-coup eventually ousted President Sukarno and decimated that nation's huge Communist Party, possibly beyond repair. Pro-Peking political parties have lost ground and leverage in democratic countries such as Japan and Ceylon. Most black African leaders, including Jomo Kenyatta, have called for the elimination of the Chinese presence from their continent, although China retains influence in Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville. Today, in Africa, Taiwan far outstrips Peking both in influence and in UN votes for seating.



At home, it is now clear that China is experiencing a full-fledged civil war. This is not the place to speculate on its meaning, or on the nature of the government that will eventually emerge--if one ever does. I do want to make two relevant points. First, the three-million-man Chinese Army is spread thin throughout the country trying to keep a semblance of order. Second, the Peking Government--which five years ago seemed the wave of the future--has been totally discredited in the eyes of the entire world, including in all probability its own citizens. Irresponsible and uncivilized in its foreign policy, it has forfeited at home the only virtue of totalitarianism--the ability to maintain order.

It is easy to argue that this development has nothing to do with the American presence in Vietnam, or the successful containment of China throughout the world--just as it has been argued that the Indonesian countercoup of 1965 had nothing to do with the large U.S. buildup in Vietnam earlier the same year. I realize that one event's following another does not establish a cause-and-effect relationship.

But there is such a thing as "tide in the affairs of men"--and nations. Nations in trouble at home often find themselves in trouble abroad--and vice-versa. It seems to me a reasonable conjecture that if North Vietnam had won the war in 1965, as it would have without the U.S. intervention, Peking would have gained enormous prestige,

at home and abroad, vis-a-vis not only the United States but the Soviet Union. In an area where "face" is still an important factor in any political equation, the Maoists might well have looked potent if not irresistible to their neighbors and--more important--the Chinese population, and tended to disarm internal opponents. The other point of view--that the strife in China would have occurred regardless of what happened in Vietnam--is tenable; but it is a historical fact that rapidly expanding nations rarely collapse overnight into widespread civil strife.

There is one other positive aspect of the war which is rarely mentioned by anyone, least of all our own government: the counterinsurgency techniques learned by the U.S. Army in Vietnam have proved extremely helpful in other parts of the world.

Take Bolivia. Che Guevara started out, initially, with a more favorable revolutionary situation than he and Castro had had in Cuba ten years before. The country was poorer, it had a pro-communist working class, its army was much smaller than Batista's. And yet a single battalion of the Bolivian Army--trained and advised by Vietnam-experienced U.S. Rangers--crushed the insurrection before it could get off the ground.

Admittedly, other factors were at play in Bolivia which hurt the guerrillas--e.g., land reform had taken place in an earlier non-communist revolution, and in Cuba Castro

and Guevara had successfully camouflaged the communist domination of their movement until they had won power.

But on balance, Guevara's revolt posed a significant and well-planned threat to the government. It is reasonable to believe that without the successful transfer and application of counterinsurgency techniques learned by our Army in Vietnam, Bolivia's government might have fallen.

Five years ago, Castroite guerrilla warfare seemed the wave of the future in Latin America. Today, most such movements have either been crushed, as in Venezuela and Bolivia, or successfully contained as in Guatemala and Colombia. The Latin governments have learned, with U.S. help, how to defeat "wars of national liberation" in their early stages, and fears of "new Castros" have largely receded. Some of the credit for this must go to our involvement in Vietnam.

In my view, then, there are three central reasons why the intervention has been beneficial both to the United States and the world: the stabilization of non-communist Asia, the successful containment of Peking and the partially resultant collapse of that government's authority at home and abroad, and the widely successful application of Vietnam's Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned to potentially revolutionary situations in other parts of the world. No doubt some of these benefits would remain even if the United States were to accept a less than honorable

settlement now. It is Herman Kahn's view, for example, that if the United States withdrew "the dominoes would probably stop at Thailand"--something which he says was probably not true in 1965. However, other benefits would quickly evaporate--including, possibly, the present moral weakness of Peking, and without question the belief of many world leaders that the United States is a nation which honors its commitments even when the going gets rough. The last consideration alone is enough for some hawks--the ones who say "We shouldn't have gone in, but now that we're there..." That view, in my opinion, is wrong and ignorant. If the commitment is morally untenable, or has served no significant national interest, then it ought to be abandoned. The truth is that the Vietnam intervention, however badly handled, has served the national interest, is continuing to serve it, and cannot be abandoned without serious negative consequences not only in Asia but around the world.

## II. WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

The history of American's involvement in South Vietnam is fairly familiar in its broad outlines: our support of Ngo Dinh Diem in his overthrow of the French-backed Emperor Bao Dai, Diem's suppression of the religious and localist sects and parties, the rapid economic expansion of the middle and late fifties, the beginnings of communist guerrilla activities in 1959-60, the Kennedy buildup of adviser and logistic support, Diem's conflict with the radical Buddhists, his resultant overthrow by the army with tacit U.S. backing, politicization of the army, the military deterioration and threat of total defeat in 1964-65, President Johnson's decision to try to save the situation by means of bombing and direct troop deployments, the steady increase of both the North Vietnamese and American presence in the South, the seeming U.S. gains of 1966-67, the reasonably successful elections of 1967, the Tet offensive and the resultant loss of morale both in Vietnam and (more important) the United States, the withdrawal of Johnson and the Paris peace talks. Running through all of the stages since 1965, of course, have been the avowed and probably sincere optimism of the administration and its military commanders, the failure of the administration to make a convincing case for the intervention, and the central belief that a process of killing the enemy, verified by body counts, would be enough to force Hanoi to accept a

compromise settlement short of victory.

The turning point--both for administration optimism and home-front morale--was the Tet offensive. In fairness, no one in the administration or the military had been maintaining that enemy strength was declining, or that enemy equipment and logistics had ceased to improve. On the contrary, it was widely realized that Hanoi's continually accelerating infiltration had more than made up for enemy losses in the south--and that the Soviet Union and China were providing arms and equipment of a quality and quantity previously unmatched, and outstripping our own weapons support of the South Vietnamese Army. In the year before Tet, arms caches of unprecedented size were being found as far south as the Delta.

What did shock our planners was that the VC were capable of moving on such a scale into the cities of South Vietnam--which had, except for isolated terrorist incidents, gone largely untouched by the war. Also shocking was the loss of life the enemy was apparently willing to accept to achieve what turned out to be a series of temporary occupations. In the United States, the Tet offensive was convincingly seized on by war critics as proof that the huge American investment in money and human life had failed to make a significant dent in VC strength.

In the year before Tet, I participated in about two dozen American-supported South Vietnamese Army (ARVN)

operations, eight of them at battalion level or below. In the vast majority of these operations, the enemy went to great pains to avoid direct contact. If a VC unit was detected, it would leave a squad behind to pin down the government soldiers while the main body got away. More often, the enemy would successfully disperse without a shot being fired.

Nor were the VC notably more offense-minded against government outposts and strong points. The number of VC-initiated incidents in our seven-province area declined markedly in the year before Tet. For a period of eight months, the enemy did not launch a single significant attack against an encamped ARVN battalion. This was in a fertile area with a population greater than that of Israel.

Some of this decline, particularly in the latter months, was undoubtedly attributable to the VC's desire to conserve their manpower in preparation for the coming urban offensive. But when a downward trend continues for much longer than a year, in an area without large American combat units, it is reasonable for government planners to assume that progress is being made. In the same area in 1964, several government battalions had been massacred and outposts fell like ripe apples.

Was all of this progress illusory? Not entirely. The 9th ARVN Division, to which I was attached, was now capable with American air support of vanquishing the enemy in any battle in which the two sides had comparable numbers of men. That continued to be the case throughout the entire country

even during Tet. Not a single government battalion was wiped out, and not a single squad is known to have gone over to the enemy. This had not been true in 1964.

But the progress was illusory in this sense: even while the military equation was improving, nothing was being done to ensure that the VC could not mass in force at will. Large tracts of territory were conceded to the enemy except during search-and-destroy operations, and other elements of authority--particularly roads--were abandoned at night. The 59-man Revolutionary Development teams concentrated on building pig-pens and town council buildings--often at the expense of hamlet security. And the enemy could, and did, mass for what might be called "little Tets"--the overpowering of a hamlet or village, and the killing of pro-government civilians, by concentration of brute force in a given area. When the enemy successfully occupied a government hamlet--usually for no more than part of a night--all new buildings and self-help projects--the symbols of government concern and aid--were systematically destroyed. Even in many villages that remained government-occupied and reasonably secure, there was no clear-cut police program for separating the hard-core VC from the rest of the residents.

Indeed, it was the lack of any concept of police action--treating the VC as the criminals and plunderers they are--that struck me repeatedly during my year in Vietnam. A division operation would sweep an area, and bring in a hundred VC suspects. They would be questioned and, in 99 cases out of 100--released. For the shocking fact is that



there are virtually no jails in South Vietnam. In my area, there was little photographing and no fingerprinting of suspects.

And yet, contrary to the accepted American myth that "you can't tell your enemies from your friends," there is little difficulty in learning through informants who the VC in a given area are, when a reasonable effort is made. On a visit to a remote province capital, I saw an American intelligence specialist leafing through a box of file cards. I asked him what he was doing. The answer: he was sorting out a list of every VC cadreman in every hamlet in the province. I asked him if this huge file was ever used. The answer: as far as he knew, no.

As Herman Kahn has pointed out, any rural society anywhere on earth is gossip-prone. Contrary to the situation in cities, in a village everyone knows who everyone else is and what he does. The more sparsely populated an area, the more detailed is the inhabitants' knowledge. And, also contrary to American mythology, most rural Vietnamese are quite open and talkative about who is VC and who isn't, unless it involves the safety of an immediate family member. Even in instances where the necessary information was readily available, no effort was being made to sort out the VC from the non-communist population and permanently separate the two groups. Even if someone had wanted to make the effort, confirmed VC would have to be shot en masse-- which is both morally unacceptable and so repugnant that

it could probably not be carried out without dehumanizing one's own soldiers--or sent a hundred miles north to Saigon--the location of the nearest large jail.

The lesson of the Tet offensive, then, was that a purely military improvement can keep you from losing, but that you can neither win the war, nor significantly retard enemy morale, nor have a policy that is explicable to the American taxpayers who must support the war, unless you move systematically against the VC infrastructure and expand the territory controlled--day and night--by the Government. President Johnson and General Westmoreland deserve credit for saving the military situation in 1965, thus making possible the significant extra-Vietnam gains I outlined in Part I. But both men have consistently failed to see that "body counts" and a hoped-for break in enemy morale are no substitute for a joint military-police program that produces a reasonable, checkable expansion in government authority, and which systematically separates the VC from the people. As the Hudson Institute planners have pointed out, the best way to break enemy morale is to proclaim and pursue a plan which can contain, isolate, and remove the enemy whether or not his morale breaks. Such a plan exists: Frank Armbruster's constantly expanding Ambush Belt, coupled with rear-echelon constabulary forces. Such a plan can be carried out, along with a number of concomitant reforms which are also available and spelled out in detail, without escalation and without significantly more ARVN and allied soldiers than

are now available. There is no reason to believe that any plan will go off without a hitch, but it is also true that once you have a plan you can make necessary adjustments to fit individual circumstances or unforeseen developments.

This may sound like some sort of magic plan. But-- based on my own experience in Vietnam--it is really nothing more than common sense. Nearly every successful counter-guerrilla plan--including our own in other countries at this moment--has been in large part a police plan. The use of police is both more sensible and more economical, by any measure. In Vietnam, General Westmoreland has failed to implement "lessons learned" that Army advisors are successfully implementing in other countries.

The greatest American myth about Vietnam is that everything has been tried. The truth is that almost nothing has been tried. President Johnson and General Westmoreland have consistently ignored evidence that the "attrition-pressure-ouch" theory of warfare is ineffective. Neither has acted decisively to restore the South Vietnamese police to the high level of planning they enjoyed before the military coup of 1963, when South Vietnam's generals abandoned Diem's extreme but potentially effective Strategic Hamlets program.

Instead, the Army has operated on a "business-as-usual" basis. Battlefield promotions are rare--time in

*ambush  
held*

grade is still the overwhelming criterion for officer and NCO promotion. An officer who does an outstanding job gets neither promotion nor any incentive to stay on the job for more than a year. Too often, he is rotated before he has more than a few days to break in his replacement--or, in some cases, before his replacement arrives. This "business-as-usual" attitude--predicated, of course, on the assumption that victory or successful negotiation is right around the corner--is unlike any that has ever prevailed in the U.S. Army in time of war, and inexcusable in the fourth largest war we have ever fought.

And yet, in spite of the military and police failures I have mentioned above (and the list could continue, of course, for many more pages), the situation in South Vietnam is by no means bleak. A war has two sides, and although the United States has procrastinated and bungled, the insurgents have had their fiascos as well. Most interesting has been the VC's consistent failure to expand their base of popular support to anything approaching a majority of the population. These are the words of Takashi Oka, who is a critic both of Saigon and of the U.S. intervention, writing in the March 23 New Republic: "Even at this late date, neither city folk nor the rural peasantry actively prefer Communist to non-Communist rule. I am certain that if the Communists today really commanded the loyal adherence of the majority of South Vietnamese, we

would have seen long ago the kind of phenomena that heralded the final days of the Chiang Kai-Shek regime on the mainland of China: whole armies deserting to the Communists, well-known intellectuals, politicians, and professional leaders flocking to the Communist cause. No amount of American troops would suffice, in such a case, to turn the tide...The Communists have not won so far because they demonstrably lack the support of the majority of the population."

Moreover, the Tet offensive itself, shocking as it was to the prevailing administration theorists and to the nation that had half believed them, was by no means an unmixed military success. VC advance intelligence was decidedly spotty; many units were marooned in untenable positions. Advance objectives were chosen for their symbolic significance, rather than their military-political importance. In the area of the national palace, the VC assaulted the one spot that was heavily fortified instead of circling around to win more strategic objectives.

In all, the communists lost 12,000 weapons and an estimated 35,000 men. Who were they? In large part, they were men who could blend easily into the festive population without attracting too much attention: native southerners. How much of the eventual loss came from village and hamlet infrastructures, and to what extent the local infrastructures have been depleted as a result, is far from certain. If the infrastructure was badly damaged, however, the VC short-term strategy may tend to undermine long-term staying power. According to Beverly Deepe of

the Christian Science Monitor, for the first time more than half of the communist troops in the south are northerners who cannot be integrated into the infrastructure, and although the rate of infiltration continued high until recently, the quality of the replacements' training has declined. The loss of many of the most dedicated native VC--inevitable, given the Tet strategy--could well close off some of Hanoi's previous options.

Indeed, one of the chief critics of the Tet offensive has been none other than General Vo Nguyen Giap--the man knowingly cover-storied by Time as the architect of the operation. Several weeks after the offensive--before the profound psychological impact on the United States was clear--Giap gave a press conference in Prague to a number of communist journalists in which he attacked the whole concept of the operation and described as unacceptable the physical losses Hanoi had sustained. Admittedly, Vietnamese are a notoriously factional people, and Giap's pop-off could have been a human reaction to the fact that he is no longer at the center of war planning (most evidence indicates that he has been out since 1964 or 1965, when the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh won control of Hanoi's southern command). But it is interesting that not all of the North Vietnamese leaders are clear on the ultimate military meaning, and may help to account for Hanoi's readiness to go to Paris.

But perhaps the most surprising and encouraging post-Tet development has been the performance of the Thieu government. At long last, a national mobilization law has been signed which will raise South Vietnam's armed forces close to or past the million mark. The five-year term of service has been suspended for the duration. The draft now starts at 18, and no one under 33 is discharged. Corrupt or inefficient district and province chiefs are being dismissed at an amazing and unprecedented rate. The Revolutionary Development program has switched its emphasis from showy construction to hamlet security. The army, buoyed by its impressive performance during Tet and by our promise to upgrade ARVN equipment, has shown more inclination to pursue the enemy and the generals are keeping out of politics for the first time since 1963, although the election also had something to do with this.

It's gotten to the point where the New York Times--which does not usually let its news stories go against the grain of its editorials--today carried the front-page headline, "Saigon Is Building More Vital Regime."

President Thieu could not have done all this without help. And the help, surprisingly, is coming from South Vietnam's much-maligned but surprisingly large and well-trained middle class. Tet brought death and destruction into the previously placid and rapidly expanding cities for the first time on a large scale. The reaction has not, however, been despair or cowardice, but a new and wide-

spread determination to get down to the business of winning the war. The VC and NVA invasion of the cities made communist victory at the same moment more conceivable and less desirable. Whatever else it was or was not, the Tet offensive was not designed to win the popular majority the VC have never had, and may actually have reduced the solid minority they do have.

In summary, then, both sides have made serious errors and miscalculations. Neither side has ever had a tenable victory plan, the United States putting its hope in a VC "break in morale" and Hanoi counting on a 1954-like collapse in U.S. national determination. In my opinion, neither has yet occurred, although the Tet offensive may have brought either, or both, measurably closer. Given the improvement in Saigon's effectiveness, and assuming the U.S.'s continued commitment, there is no way the allies can lose unless China or Russia intervenes in force. If the U.S. withdraws, and Hanoi does not, Saigon will put up a much better fight than it did in 1964. As Herman Kahn has pointed out, South Vietnam has the second best army in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, however, Hanoi still has the best, and given continued Russian aid Hanoi and the VC could probably defeat Saigon and unite the country, if Saigon stood alone. If Hanoi withdraws and the VC continue to fight, my guess is that Saigon would win in a very brutal mop-up operation, with thousands of civilians dying unnecessarily. It is hard to exaggerate the hate non-communist and communist Vietnamese



feel for each other. The Vietnamese are a more ideological and less racist people than either the United States or Russia.

If, however, the participants remain the same and neither side escalates, the United States can win this war on the ground in South Vietnam and leave behind a viable, thriving government on the model of South Korea. Indeed, both the Hudson Institute and the Lilienthal study group see South Vietnam as potentially a very rich industrial nation, with growth rates even higher than Seoul's.

The United States and Saigon can combine to win or force an acceptable settlement by converting the "war of attrition" into a war for territory and population. This can be done by setting up a constantly expanding and interweaving network of ambush belts, and upgrading police operations to the coordinate status (equal, that is, with the military) that they deserve. With such a strategy, a President or his Defense Secretary would not have to set deadlines for the beginning of American withdrawal. The visible and checkable progress that would come would convince even hostile reporters that the momentum is with the Washington-Saigon alliance, and eventually win either an honorable settlement or a military/police victory in a war that has been vital to this country's interests from the beginning.

## III. WHAT SHOULD RN DO?

RN should support, as he always has, President Johnson's decision to intervene in force. However, he should spell out in more detail--as I have done in Part I of this paper--exactly why and how the war has served our national interest. This LBJ has never done and Hubert is not morally or mentally equipped to do. RN should explicitly endorse the concept of containment, and go into detail as to why, as in the case of Vietnam and China, containing an imperialist power tends to put great strains on that power's internal structure. RN should question why Hubert has repudiated containment at the precise time when it is showing dramatic effects, in Europe no less than Asia. RN should further emphasize, in the ringing tones of the New Candor, that a great nation must honor its difficult and costly commitments as well as the relatively painless ones. Finally--and this is where the Gut vote lives--he should say he is not one of those who believes 25,000 American soldiers have died in vain.

~~On the other hand, the Johnson-Westmoreland leadership should not get off lightly. RN should criticize the administration for failing to perceive the dimensions of the problem, and for failure to get down to the common-sense problem of systematically separating the VC from the non-communist majority of the population. Is this too subtle a point for voters to get? Somehow I don't think so. The Gut voter knows that when you have a criminal problem the police are supposed to handle it, and that the idea~~

is to put the crooks in jail. Why, when we are putting out \$30 billion a year, RN can ask, did the Johnson-Humphrey administration fail to build a single jail?

"Gradualism--fuel of wars" should continue to get its knocks, though perhaps not quite so frequently. RN should continue to oppose a coalition government, while keeping silence on what the administration should offer in Paris. Most important--and here again the New Candor comes into play--RN should hit the hard truth that you can't have a viable peace plan unless you also have a viable war plan. Hanoi will not give us reasonable terms until and unless we show them we are prepared to carry through to victory if they do not. Both Reagan and Wallace have received tremendous response whenever they have hit this theme, though it is true they are talking about escalation rather than a systematic plan to police the country mile by mile.

How much of the plan to reveal is a matter of national security as well as good politics, and I would agree with Whalen that we don't want to reveal too much of our hand, either to the Democrats or Hanoi. However, a reasonable outline will be sufficient to convince most voters that we know what we are doing, and that we really do have in mind a new approach which can win the war or force meaningful concessions.

This, then, is a viable position for the rest of the campaign. By following this course, RN does not contradict anything he has said in the past, appeals to the patriotism of most Americans, hits the Johnson-Humphrey administration for its shortsighted handling of the problem, and--most important--by outlining a viable war plan, avoids the specter of "more of

the same" that we were having trouble avoiding before the Johnson dropout. This is an approach which can not only end the war, but help us end the present administration as well.

RN

*Set*

FOR RECEIVED  
 DEC 2 1968  
 Referred to: *list*  
 Answered: *the country* -- in

In talking with Elmer Bobst to ask him to give us the list of the ten best Chief Executive Officers he knows in the age bracket of 60--65, he said he would be glad to give some thought and come up with a list.

However, he did say that sometime he would like to have just a few minutes with you. Says he has not seen you to talk with you at all since the campaign began -- that he has been glad to talk with Stans, Tom Evans, Bob Finch and rmw but that he would like to just see you for a few minutes.

(FYI he has sent along some helpful suggestions on HEW/ Federal Trade Commission, etc. which have gone on to John Mitchell and Bob Finch).

It occurs to me that when you come back from California you might possibly have the time to see him late some afternoon or something for a few minutes. (He just wants to be able to say he has talked with you).

*OK - thought*  
*Monday - Dec 9*

RmWoods  
 12/2/68

*(call him now)*

*Done 12/2/68 OLC*

*Set for Dec 9 - at 4PM*

MEMORANDUM

76 6-11-1  
76 6-11

Ch  
Ash

TO: Roy Ash

FROM: H. R. Haldeman's Office

January 8, 1969

RE: Attached memo for Mr. Nixon dated November 4, 1968  
Subj: Staffing the White House

The attached memorandum for your evaluation per Ru's note.

encl.

MR. NIXON

*to Haldeman  
Read this again  
& particularly  
if we are  
advised to  
do it*

STAFFING THE WHITE HOUSE

1. Introduction: your office. The White House Office is your personal office and must be staffed and organized to meet your felt needs and work habits. Accordingly, you must appropriately discount advice from outsiders—such as the authors of this paper—who are unfamiliar with your tastes in staff work. For the same reason, we have not tried to frame a prospective organization table for your White House. Rather, we emphasize the tasks to be performed and recurrent dilemmas in meeting those needs. We discuss the following topics:

I. General issues

- 2. Hierarchy v. equal access
- 3. Staff qualities
- 4. Minimize specialized and exclusive jurisdictions
- 5. Permanent v. occasional staff
- 6. Staff v. Executive Office

*I also would  
do Ash's  
evaluation -*

II. Staffing needs

- 7. Task, not positions
- 8. Appointments
- 9. Press relations
- 10. Congressional liaison
- 11. Personnel advice
- 12. Staff secretary
- 13. Scientific advice
- 14. Man for minorities
- 15. National security staff
- 16. Policy and program assistance; troubleshooting and speechwriting

### **III. Staff Role Relative to That of Other Agencies**

- 17. Major issues won't stay in the departments**
- 18. Overloading the staff**
- 19. Equipping your staff for comprehensive policy formulation**
- 20. Alternatives to staff**
- 21. Staff-departmental relations generally**

### **IV. Addendum**

- 22. Forging a new team**
- 23. Healing national divisions**

### **Appendixes**



I.

General Issues

2. Hierarchy v. equal access. The Eisenhower staff was, as you know, headed by Governor Adams (and later by General Persons). Adams was "Chief of Staff" who "directed" other staff members and who "controlled" access to the President. In alleged contrast, members of the Kennedy staff enjoyed "equal status" and equal access to the President. In practical operation, the Eisenhower system permitted substantial uncontrolled access by senior staffers. Adams' responsibilities did not extend very far into the national security area. In this area, by contrast, Kennedy's Special Assistant, McGeorge Bundy, headed a significant staff and served as the primary channel to the President not only for the staff but also for the departments. And on the domestic side of the Kennedy White House, senior advisers doubtless enjoyed direct access on some matters, but Sorensen was clearly chief adviser on program and policy. Thus, both the Kennedy and Eisenhower systems mixed elements of hierarchy and diffused access. There remains, to be sure, a question of emphasis.

We advise against any formal chief of staff system, especially at the outset, for four reasons. First, unless that man knows you exceedingly well, his judgments rather than yours may settle too many matters. Second, he could become a troublesome bottleneck in the conduct of important public business. Third, if you keep arrangements fluid, you can impose some informal hierarchical order after observing your staff installed and operating in the White House; it would not be equally easy to demote a man you had appointed chief of staff. Fourth, a staff member can be more effective in dealing with the departments and the public when they suppose themselves to be only once removed from talking directly to the President.\*

---

\*The chief of staff approach also enjoys a less attractive public image. Contemporary mythology seems to favor the "do-it-all" President ready to grapple with every problem personally.

3. Staff qualities. (a) Generally. We do not presume to specify all the qualities useful for various staff functions.\* We do not elaborate the need for analytic ability, skepticism in the face of assured experts, enough concern and moral indignation to do what can be done, enough detachment to accept what cannot be done, independence of outlook and courage to disagree with you or with prevailing opinion but with enough team spirit to work harmoniously, the sense to know when to decide and when "to keep options open," understanding of government, and, of course, sound and balanced judgment. We comment specifically on several qualities and raise a few recurring questions.

(b) Generalists v. specialists. To cope with the diverse subject matters confronting the White House, you need generalists capable of operating efficiently across several fields with a presidential rather than a specialist's perspective. But you cannot tolerate amateurism or superficiality in your staff. A White House assistant must have sufficient expertness to understand fully the issues being debated within and among the departments. He must know enough of the substance and politics of an issue to perceive and react to the nuances of departmental drafts (statements, letters, legislation, press conference "answers," etc.) submitted for White House clearance or use. His understanding must be detailed enough to forestall those White House statements or instructions which greater knowledge might show to be unwise but which the departments implement as issued and without questioning.\*\* He must quickly perceive the

---

\*Nor do we belabor the characteristic staff tasks of (1) advising you, (2) briefing you on current intelligence, on other information, and names, (3) suggesting points or questions you may wish to raise with department heads or others, (4) briefing you on impending problems which have not yet reached the crisis stage, (5) serving as a general point of contact between the White House and the operating departments without usurping your power of decision but able to reflect your views and needs, and (6) listening to those you don't wish to hear. Other staff functions are discussed later in this paper.

\*\*It might seem paradoxical that many Presidential decisions on matters of general policy will not be immediately, fully, or effectively implemented in the departments. The text refers, however, to such specific matters as draft legislation, particular administrative decisions, or the content of particular statements. Cabinet members (and their assistants) will often implement such decisions without challenging them because they do not wish to "use up their capital" by disagreeing with "the White House" in "minor" matters.

substantive and political implications of any statement or course of action.\* And if you are not to be overwhelmed by departmental expertness, your staff must know enough of the specialities to be able to advise you. And it also helps, of course, if staff members have a reliable feel for congressional temperaments dealing with the specialities of greatest relevance to you.

The acquisition of such detailed command of substance obviously requires considerable time and energy. And, of course, a man's experience in a field is cumulative: the longer he operates on a subject matter, the greater will be his command. But no assistant should become so specialized that he loses your perspective.\*\*

(c) Mastery of government process. Your staff must develop an absolute mastery of governmental process. You ought not to have to think about how a decision is to be carried out or about the timing of its execution. You should be able to trust your staff to know and tell you whether something can't be done or whether it requires a different timing.

(d) Follow-through v. letting-go. The staff should understand its role in following-up your decisions. On the one hand, your assistant should satisfy himself that your decisions are being carried out. He should know if snarls develop and take steps to unsnarl the matter. But if he forgets that operating responsibilities lie in the departments, he will both overburden himself and impair departmental morale. Perhaps, follow-up should be the province of junior staff members who would have the time and who would not have sufficient status to appear to be running the departments from the White House.

---

\*Without belaboring the point, the staff assistant must appreciate, understand, know, or know where to learn about a prospective action's implications for various interest groups, meaning to overall program, probable costs, agencies involved, likely objections, probable public or world reaction, chances for congressional approval, and alternative routes to the same goal.

\*\*And to emphasize a point made later: no speciality should become so wide as to give an assistant the illusion of exclusive personal jurisdiction. See ¶4.

(e) Acute consciousness of staff role. Your assistants will and should have personal policy views, but an assistant cannot serve you well if you or your cabinet have any doubt about the accuracy in detail and emphasis of his reports to you or from you. Because his inquiries will often constitute your only basis for decision, carelessness or inaccuracy will cost you dearly. Because he will often be the conduit to or from your department heads, carelessness or inaccuracy can mislead you or your subordinates. And if your departmental officials lose confidence in his fidelity, they will seek to bypass him and either communicate directly with you or minimize White House communication altogether. You and they must have absolute confidence that a communication through your assistant is an almost perfect substitute for direct communication. This also implies that your assistants must clearly distinguish when they (1) speak for you, (2) predict your probable decisions, or (3) state their own views. In the past, many presidential assistants have been quite willing—consciously or not—to let the departments believe they were speaking for the President when they were in fact speaking for themselves. Obviously, the White House assistant should not be conducting his own policy on any issue.

(f) Anonymity. Your staff will be much in demand as speech makers and as sources for the press. Most members of the Eisenhower staff maintained relative anonymity. Although a few gave speeches, most did not. And their press contacts were mainly "not for attribution." By contrast, some members of the Kennedy staff gave themselves considerable prominence during their White House service. Public statements by staff members can give the public a satisfying glimpse of your establishment. Discussions with staff and quotations by name (including descriptions of intra-White House activities) make the press both happy and sympathetic.

We believe, however, that staff anonymity is the wiser course. There have been cases where a publicized staff member has exaggerated his role. And to demonstrate that he was a knowledgeable insider, he revealed more than was appropriate. Even worse, he may have begun to think—in his outside or inside statements—of his position and appearance rather than the President's. This possibility compromised his internal role, both with the President and with the departments. Cabinet officers did not trust

the White House man who got in the papers and therefore attempted more frequently to deal directly with the President. Lastly, the newsworthy staffer caused resentment among his quieter colleagues or imitation by those who were insecure.

✓ Several steps are available to reduce staff publicity. If you wish to make your staff available to the press, you can make clear your objection to personal publicity for staffers. As for outside speeches, your staff will have enough work without them, although speeches usually do little harm (except that partisan speeches may reduce a staff member's usefulness for certain purposes). Unless you tell them otherwise, they may feel a reluctant "duty" to show the White House flag at political and other gatherings. Our main point is this: if you object to publicity for your staff, you should establish early ground rules.

(g) Devil's advocacy. We cannot emphasize too strongly the need for effective devil's advocacy within your staff. Although you do not want your staff to oppose your will, every leader needs advisers willing and able to perceive and to marshal lucidly the considerations opposed to a favored course of action. Similarly the departments, close advisers, and staff itself will at times be clear and even unanimous in a recommendation to you. Again, you want to know the best case to the contrary.\* We are not suggesting an all-purpose advocate or a formal devil's advocate procedure on every issue. Rather, we urge the importance of having advisers accustomed to perceiving and worrying about "the other side" of any problem they consider.

4. Minimize exclusive jurisdictions. (a) The problem: We suggested above that you need advisers who are expert in various areas. Some specialization within your staff is therefore inevitable. But the adviser with an exclusive subject matter jurisdiction presents three serious problems: First, his outlook may become parochial with the result that you will have to coordinate his views with other sources. He will

---

\*Many Presidents have suffered because their advisers gave them only one side of a problem or—which is the same thing—stated the opposing considerations in a weak or conclusionary way. This fault is not always conscious. More often, the recommending official has either failed to perceive the opposite factors or has not had the time or occasion to think about the "other side" except in clichés.

thus fail to give you what you need: advice based on the full range of factors that you must consider. You need advisers with an outlook as broad as your own: foreign and domestic, ideals and reality, merits and politics, international and congressional. The specialized adviser will not be forced to have that outlook. Second, he may come to resent intrusions into his domain from other staff members who may thus be discouraged from contributing or questioning in his area. Third, there may be no other staff members sufficiently knowledgeable to exchange views with him or to challenge his views or his advice to you.

Can you minimize these concerns without undue sacrifice of efficiency and convenience? We note several ways to expand staff perspective beyond particular specialties, to deprive any specialist of the illusion that he owns a whole policy area, and to broaden and deepen staff competence in important areas.

(b) Duplicating assignments. Many writers have praised the duplicated assignments they saw in the Roosevelt staff. It is said that FDR often gave the same assignment to different persons working competitively. This procedure does not seem a wise way to get the multiple sources of information, analysis, and recommendation that would protect you from undue dependence upon a single adviser.\*

(c) Shared, overlapping, or shifting "jurisdictions"—but with clear action responsibilities—can protect you from the worse dangers of broad and exclusive jurisdictions. For example, you might have several senior advisers working in the national security area.\*\* One could carry international economic affairs in his portfolio. Another might have total responsibility for Vietnam matters (so long as that remains an

---

\*The President who would digest the independent output of duplicating advisers could gain greater mastery of the problem and greater awareness of the alternatives. But duplicating assignments can be inefficient in a triple sense. First, it requires more of the President's time, and energy used in one way is not available for other matters. Second, first-rate talent for any job is always scarce, as is the time of those your men consult. You may not have talented men to spare. Third, the analyst who knows his work is being duplicated elsewhere may be tempted to bypass the hard questions, to ignore the counter-considerations, and otherwise to do less well than he does when he has primary responsibility.

\*\*Our separate memorandum on National Security Organization discusses this matter in more detail.

overwhelming issue). A third might oversee the remainder of Asia and other areas. Their respective responsibilities would be relatively clear and not duplicative. Each would be broadly current. They could profitably talk to one another. And, on difficult matters, you could have the benefit of different perspectives. Of course, there is the danger that dividing their responsibilities would reduce the likelihood that either would share your own government-wide perspective. Alternatively, you might shift assignments within your staff from time to time. You would thus equip each of your senior staff in diverse areas and thus put them in a position to advise you on difficult subjects.

By dividing or shifting responsibilities, you could get diverse analyses and diverse advice within your own staff. And the staff would be better able to meet the demands upon it. The workload in each area will vary greatly from time to time. Staffers of broad competence and experience could give part of their time to their regular duties and simultaneously move from one task to another as domestic or international crises demand. Loads within the staff can be balanced more readily if each staff member were competent in several areas.

There is, of course, some question of efficiency. Subdividing the national security or the domestic welfare areas will necessitate additional coordination of work. To shift assignments thrusts an adviser into the time-consuming task of learning anew about an area already mastered by one adviser. Obviously, however, any staff arrangement that could have saved Kennedy from the Bay of Pigs or Johnson from unsuccessful escalation in Vietnam would have been far more efficient for the President and the nation notwithstanding an "efficiency expert's" conventional notions. Still, you may prefer to have a relatively small number of senior advisers, each with a relatively broad jurisdiction. There is no guarantee that subdividing and overlapping jurisdictions would help at all or help any more than simpler remedies.

(d) Broadening your advisers' outlook. Subdividing one job into two (or more) relatively clear pieces for two advisers permits each to carry some different responsibility as well. Advisers shifted around among jobs will bring more diversified experience to each. Specialists can be given occasional "educational" assignments in

other spheres. A domestic man, for example, might coordinate a foreign policy speech; a national security expert might clear an appointment to a regulatory agency. Such devices could help give each adviser a greater awareness of your total responsibilities. Ideally, your advisers' outlook should be as catholic as your own. A foreign relations advisor, for example, should bring congressional or domestic political factors into his thinking and recommendations before he comes to you. You want assurance that all your responsibilities are reflected in the advice that comes to you. This is more likely to occur the more diverse is each specialized adviser's exposure to your many diverse responsibilities. Hopefully, such exposure would be deep enough to save each more or less specialized adviser from the dangers of amateurism in the field he understands less well.\*

(e) Effective intra-staff communication can achieve many of the virtues discussed above and with far less complexity: Issues realized to be tough or important should not be discussed exclusively between you and your main adviser on that issue, but should be discussed among the staff. Such intra-staff discussion can coordinate the work of each, bring the full range of staff interests (that is, your interests) to bear, and subject major proposals to the questions and challenges of fresh perspective or merely different perspectives. The virtue is clear, but implementation is not easy.

The most obvious forum for facilitating such an interchange is the frequent staff meeting over which you preside.\*\* A brief statement by each adviser on his immediate

---

\*There is always the danger that an adviser admonished to ground his advice in all the relevant factors will incorrectly appraise or give undue weight to that which he understands less well. We know some academics, for example, who, in their zeal to make their substantive recommendations realistic, give far more weight to supposed political considerations than the professional politician would.

\*\*Peripheral or junior staff members may be too numerous for inclusion; if not, they could often contribute in a valuable way, either directly at the meeting or indirectly to their seniors after the meeting.



key concerns\* would be useful for many purposes including internal coordination. But, of course, time will be insufficient for full statements, and much less for full discussion. And a staff member without full data or previous analysis may hesitate to challenge or even to question another in your presence. Nevertheless, the meeting at least exposes all to current issues and thus creates the opportunity for later intra-staff discussion. Even so, your more senior advisers, overworked as they be, will not relish challenges from their colleagues nor have the time necessary to inform them. They will do so only if you make it happen. In staff meetings or otherwise, for example, you might ask other staff members for their views on the "expert's" statement or problem. This would induce staff members to discuss their important problems with their colleagues outside the meeting.\*\*

Staff meetings can serve another purpose, if you wish it. By participating in the discussion, you can permit your staff to gain a better insight into what's on your mind and what moves or troubles you. The better they understand you, the better they can assist you.

(f) Titles. We suggest that you give your staff unspecific titles. There is no reason not to use the traditional titles—Special Counsel, Appointments Secretary, and Press Secretary—but we would call an adviser simply "Special Assistant" and assign him, say, to national security affairs rather than designating him "Special Assistant for National Security Affairs." Specific titles have the disadvantage of tending to freeze assignments and to confer exclusive jurisdictions. General rather than specific titles lessen this problem. If you want to rank your staff, you can do so without regard

---

\*We include national security matters, notwithstanding concern for the proper protection of classified information. If you want their advice, your staff would have the requisite "need to know." Usually, discussions within your staff should not be restricted by undue concern for security. Persons not deserving your trust should not be on your staff.

\*\*Another vehicle for assuring careful and thoughtful participation by your staff "in each other's jurisdiction" is the informal lunch or end-of-day conversation in which you seek from the staff a probing exchange either on immediate action issues or on evolving policy in important areas.

to titles which do not, in any event, communicate very much. But if you award the Special Assistant title sparingly, there would be need for some secondary title—such as Administrative Assistant or Deputy Special Assistant; Associate or Assistant Special Counsel, for example, have frequently been used. In any event, distinctly junior members of the staff can be given a lesser title.

5. Permanent or occasional staff. Your staff need not be so large as to include every competence required for White House work. You can get temporary staff assistance by borrowing departmental personnel\* or by enlisting outside experts, organizers, or doers. In addition to consultants or task forces, you should consider using men outside your regular staff for "White House" jobs for which your regular staff lacks the time or expertness—perhaps preparing a message for Congress, handling a delicate organizational or personnel problem for you, sifting through complex and varied proposals in some area, or advising you on some interdepartmental controversy not readily solvable in the usual ways.

We recognize that such temporary assistants will not be used very often. You will feel less comfortable with them than with your familiar advisers. The temporary assistant not widely known to enjoy your confidence cannot easily do jobs requiring such recognition. Nor can you always afford the time for orienting him to your advisers and to the rest of the Government. Nevertheless, the utility and availability of temporary assistants is worth remembering.

6. Staff v. Executive Office. Instead of attempting to build great depth and breadth in your immediate staff, you can provide your White House with back-up resources in the Budget Bureau and in the Council of Economic Advisers. These agencies have competent professional staffs, Presidential rather than departmental outlook and loyalty, and flexible procedures that permit your staff to use their personnel without channeling everything through the Director or Chairman. We do not pause on the many

---

\*Officials borrowed from the departments will acquire and carry back to their agencies a better understanding of and identification with presidential perspectives. And they will be especially useful departmental contacts for your regular staff.

variations. We do urge you to open your White House with a small staff. You could then draw upon the Executive Office for back-up work and upon temporary assistance elsewhere when required. If these steps prove inadequate, you can expand your immediate staff later.\*

In particular, the Budget Bureau's top staff is exceptionally well-informed on the size, location, and activities of our intelligence agencies. And beyond the usual accounting functions, it can translate program changes into budget changes and otherwise identify the long-run financial and program implications of immediate proposals. It has long served to coordinate agency views on enacted legislation awaiting presidential signature. It has long cleared and coordinated agency legislative proposals or agency responses to congressional queries on pending bills. Beyond this, the Bureau is capable of serving you as a general adviser on government programs. It has the outlook and resources to identify and help appraise alternatives to proposed programs, to harmonize new proposals with each other and with existing programs, to identify and help trim the unessential or weaker elements of a proposal and to appraise the financial and organizational implications of new programs. And Budget may be the place to develop some central capacity for program evaluation. The Executive Branch does not now do enough to evaluate the effectiveness of its many programs. And the limited evaluations that are undertaken are usually conducted by the operating agency with certain vested interests in the program. We can sum this up with the conclusion that effective use of the Bureau will improve your decision-making resources and enable your staff to function more efficiently.

In addition, the Bureau may be your best source of information and advice on governmental organization. The Bureau's capacities in this area, which have atrophied in recent years, should be revived. Budget's abilities are primarily analytical: it can isolate bottlenecks, overlapping programs, and waste; it can identify the best bureaucratic methods and agencies for handling various types of actions. But we understand

---

\*We add as an appendix Richard Neustadt's unpublished paper on Roosevelt's White House and Budget Bureau. Although we would not paint the Roosevelt White House in such appealing terms, the concise discussion is valuable for its suggestive insights.

that its creative talents are less impressive; it is probably not now the best source for extensive reorganization schemes to correct the difficulties it sees. Because the need for careful thinking about reorganization is so clear, it seems prudent for you to press Budget to improve its capacity here or to find the needed talents elsewhere.

## II.

### Staffing Needs

7. Tasks, not positions. We have not tried to write job descriptions for hypothetical appointees because, as we have already argued, the best staff is one characterized by fluidity, flexibility, and multi-competence rather than permanence, exclusive assignments, or undue specialization. The point is worth reiterating here because there are several forces promoting rigidity and inhibiting your ability to use your staff as you might wish. The departments may automatically call upon your staff in the mode of the Johnson Administration and thus effectively assign work to your staff without your conscious choice. That fourteen White House positions are statutorily defined and assigned varying salaries might imply assignments, hierarchies, or relationships not necessarily consistent with your needs. Furthermore, members of your campaign and transition staffs carried over into your White House may automatically carry forward their prior roles and relationships notwithstanding your vastly different requirements. You must anticipate and adjust for these institutional factors if your staff operation is to be determined by our needs not by custom or bureaucratic inertia.

We cannot tell you your needs. Much will depend on how you organize the rest of the Government. And, of course, much depends on the particular men you appoint. The tasks can be divided in various ways; each does not necessarily require one full-time man. Some may require more. Others may be full-time for one man but divided among several men. In general, each task listed is one that has to be performed, but how it is to be performed is a question only you can answer.

We list the major tasks that have to be performed in your White House, with minimum comment unless there are problems. We proceed not in the order of importance but according to ease of definition.

8. Appointments. Keeping your calendar is the task. He should also have time for other tasks. The title of "Secretary" is traditional.

9. Press relations. Your Press Secretary is your spokesman to and liaison with the press. He will also be one of your advisers on public relations.

10. Congressional liaison. Eisenhower and Kennedy had a substantial congressional relations staff to lobby for administration measures, to help formulate administration strategy for winning its desires from Congress, and to advise in administration policy-making on what Congress is or is not likely to do. Secondly, this staff serves legislators—both leaders and others—as a conduit to the President and thereby acquires congressional intelligence while maintaining goodwill without unduly burdening the President personally. Related to the goodwill operation, both Eisenhower and Kennedy had one or two men whose primary role was to accommodate legislators of both parties in non-policy matters (e.g., arranging the “special” White House tour for constituents).\*

11. Personnel advice. (a) In the personnel area, you have three distinct needs: (1) recruitment of and advice on presidential appointments to significant policy positions, including those in the judiciary and regulatory commissions; (2) processing of other presidential appointments to such positions as postmasters, sinecures, or honorific posts without content or pay; and (3) advice on government personnel policy affecting the career services. Although the second and third functions must not be combined in one man, many other combinations are possible. We turn now to the problem as it will appear after the initial appointments of November 1968 through about April 1969. How can you approach these matters over the remainder of your term?

---

\*There are at least two disadvantages to having a congressional liaison staff in the White House. First, legislators will try to obtain special services from your staff and to use it to put pressure on you. The very existence of the staff will generate in the White House a substantial volume of time-consuming correspondence that, absent the staff, would be handled in the departments. Secondly, the departments will see the staff as a crutch relieving them of the responsibility or need to do their own lobbying (etc.). These disadvantages are real but they can be lessened, though not overcome, if your staff resolves at the outset to use the departmental machinery as much as possible and to avoid servicing legislators except insofar as necessary for your objectives.

(b) Although the best approach to making significant appointments is not entirely clear to us, we note five points bearing on the solution. First, it is never wise to depend exclusively on one source—regardless of his quality—for personnel recommendations. Second, personnel recommendations should be exposed to the criticism, comments, or counter-suggestions of your principal staff. Affirmative encouragement from you is needed to overcome your advisers' natural hesitation to "intrude" on the "jurisdiction" of other advisers. Third, however diverse the advice, you could give one man responsibility for receiving names, sifting out the best by preliminary screening, and simply "remembering" promising names otherwise lost. Fourth, to be useful, this "remembering" must be highly selective. The job must therefore be done by (or under the supervision of) a man willing to evaluate and reject and whose judgments are valued by you and your other close advisers. The potential appointee files maintained by Mr. Macy for President Johnson may be too mechanical, massive, and unselective for this purpose. The process must be attuned to you and to your desires. Fifth, we question whether a person of the highest quality would take this as a full-time job. We suggest that a trusted senior adviser with other responsibilities undertake this task with the aid of a junior staff member who would not only gather information and help in the sifting process but who would also be readily available to consult with departmental officials.

Routine Presidential appointments must also be handled at the White House for two reasons. There is no other satisfactory location. And the political troubles of choosing one name rather than another might as well be made by your staff with your interests and outlook. The task requires charm, finesse, and infinite attention to the details of political debit-credit balancing, clearances and checks. Although your man must be of sufficient standing to absorb the political heat from the national committee and elsewhere, the usual work need not be done by a senior adviser.\* Nor should it be handled

---

\* This job could compromise an adviser's other responsibilities. Kennedy's first assignment for O'Brien included both patronage and congressional relations. Later abandoned, this combination would have interfered with the liaison job which is full-time and which cannot afford the ill-will of rejecting legislators' nominees.

by the same junior staff member discussed in (b). One man with both jobs might be tempted to shade his judgments of quality in order to relieve the pressure of the many politicians "on his back."

(c) Advice on the general issues of personnel management within the Executive Branch is not so urgent as to require personal White House Staff. It could be sought from the Civil Service Commission or from the Budget Bureau. At least as a provisional measure, we suggest that you charge the Budget Bureau with responsibility to advise you—through your general program and policy staff—on personnel management. We do not envisage the Budget Bureau as a competitor of the Civil Service Commission but as the home of a larger task. It would oversee personnel policy for the civil, military, and foreign services (and any other personnel systems). Admittedly, Budget does not now have the capacity to undertake this assignment. But since the task is important and Budget its most obvious locus, it seems wise to charge Budget with this responsibility and to expand its capacity to carry it out.

12. "Staff Secretary?" (a) As visualized by the original Hoover Commission and as performed by General Goodpaster (as one of his jobs) for President Eisenhower, the Staff Secretary was an important focal point for much White House staff work. On the President's behalf he kept track of documents requiring action, of assignments requiring execution, of decisions reached in Cabinet meetings, legislative leaders' meetings, and elsewhere. He facilitated the work of everybody else. He was not a competitor but a watcher of others' doings—keeping lines straight, untangling snarls, watching deadlines, checking on performance. As such, the Staff Secretary associated very closely with the White House Executive Clerk, Bill Hopkins, and acted for the President as a supervisor of the Clerk and of White House logistical and administrative services generally. With the assistance of Hopkins and another, Goodpaster was not overly burdened by the paper-processions and administrative service aspects of this job.\*

---

\* This paragraph is taken almost verbatim from Richard Neustadt's unpublished memorandum of December 23, 1960.



(b) The exact character and time demands of this job cannot be defined precisely. Although General Goodpaster was not burdened with cabinet secretariat duties, he gave most of his time to national security matters. The point is that this cluster of functions might be a full-time job for one man or, with appropriate assistance, a part-time responsibility for a staff member with other functions.

(c) The Cabinet Secretary was a separate position in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy White House. The title is a nice one with some prestige and might be useful for that purpose.\* But we note emphatically these two points: First, no matter how you plan to use your "Cabinet" as a collective body, you will not need a full time Cabinet Secretary. You need a cabinet secretariat even less. Second, the position once created tends to generate needless work unless you clearly load any Cabinet Secretary with other demanding duties.

13. Scientific advice. (a) For advice in scientific and technical matters, you can draw upon the President's Science Advisory Committee and your Special Assistant for Science and Technology. The former is composed of seventeen non-governmental members—many of whom devote considerable time to committee work. Although positions on the Committee are filled by Presidential appointment, we recommend that you continue the practice of treating this body as a regular, professional, and continuing organization whose membership does not automatically change with the Administration. At any rate, the terms of about one-third of the members expire in the coming January-February; you can thus alter the Committee's composition or outlook as you think best.

(b) You should continue the practice of appointing a distinguished scientist to your staff. To decide the kind of adviser you want, consider Eisenhower's Kistiakowsky and Kennedy's Wiesner. Kistiakowsky tried to be an objective consultant who did not take sides in controversies and who limited himself to enumerating for Eisenhower the arguments for and against all sides. Wiesner was an advocate who argued vigorously for the programs and policies he favored. While this distinction is not peculiar to advice in the scientific realm, a Chief Executive might well need a more neutral adviser in these unfamiliar technical areas.

---

\* Our memorandum on national security apparatus suggests one use for this title.

Whichever model you follow, we note the reasons for appointing a Science Adviser, for they bear on the kind of man you need: the Eisenhower-Kennedy-experiences suggest that such a man can help you in several ways.

(c) First, he can help you and your other advisers analyze and understand complex technical questions in the weapons, space, disarmament, drug, mining, agriculture, and other fields.\* At the very least, he is an independent source of expertness that is not confined by special departmental interests. This fact together with your confidence can permit him, when you wish it, to "arbitrate" technical departmental disputes. For example, the 1959 controversy between Agriculture and HEW over tolerable safe levels of certain insecticides could only be settled satisfactorily—both on the merits and on the terms of public confidence about safety—with the aid of distinguished outside experts assembled by the Science Adviser. This illustration makes the further point that a respected Science Adviser gives you efficient access to many other scientists. Thus, you get not only the special knowledge of your appointee but also a means for tapping the best of the American scientific community.

Second, an adviser like Kistiakowsky or Wiesner is not only a distinguished scientist; he is also a distinguished thinker whose insights, perceptions, reactions, and judgments can illuminate non-scientific issues when you and your senior advisers choose to consult with him. This is not to say that you must accept his advice; nor that you should formally give him a general charter. We do, however, suggest that if you treat him as a general member of your senior staff, your principal program-policy advisers are likely to discuss a broad range of matters with him to the extent that it proves useful in fact. (Regardless of his political or partisan orthodoxy, a first-rate appointee will have trustworthy discretion.)

(e) Third, in recruiting other scientific talent for the Government, the right Adviser can assist you in two ways. He should be a valuable source of names and appraisals.

---

\* An Adviser drawn from the academic community, as prior appointees have been, would also have expertness on some aspects of higher education. On occasion, this expertness can also be valuable to your White House.

In addition, he can help attract others into your Administration. Even when he does not, personally seek to persuade another to serve, his very presence in the White House assures the "scientific community" of your respect for them and helps gain their respect for your Administration.

(f) Fourth, your Adviser would, of course, qualify as a genuine "intellectual." In addition, however, your two predecessors had resident academics in the White House, presumably in the hope of generating a sympathetic chronicle and a bridge to "intellectuals" at large. The first function is unsure (compare Schlesinger with Goldman), and the second silly. You reach "intellectuals" not by having a special communicator for that purpose, but by the actions and statements of your Administration. Of course, academics should not be neglected in your operating and staff appointments throughout the government. They frequently make good "communicators" in addition to doing a concrete government job. And their use in task forces (etc.) is both an effective and easy way to impress "intellectuals" and useful on the merits.

14. "A man for minorities"? These words embrace two interrelated ideas.

(a) Past Presidents have sometimes had a contact point for organized "minority" groups of, say, Negroes, Lithuanians, or women. He or she received communications and thus took the heat from such groups, advised policy-makers on the probable group reactions to Administration measures, composed and dispatched Presidential greeting on appropriate occasions, and frequently served as Administration spokesman to such groups. We are not persuaded that you need this service, but we are not competent to advise on this question.

(b) Some past Administrations have felt the need to include on the White House staff a Negro or a woman in order to negate any appearance of discrimination, to symbolize the opposite, and also to serve the "contact man" functions. But mere symbolism may not work. No likely appointment will please militants. And there may be no credit at all for a transparent symbol. Even worse, the appointee without a genuine task of substance is a potential source of dissatisfaction that could later hurt you. A Negro, a woman, or hyphenated American could obviously fill any staff need real enough to be filled by a "WASP."

15. National security apparatus. The extent and depth of your personal national security staff depends upon the effectiveness of the departments and, in particular, upon whether you can improve State's responsiveness to your needs. At the least, however, you will need one or more special assistants to advise you on these matters and to serve as your staff channel from and to State, Defense, CIA, and related agencies.\*

16. Policy and program assistance; troubleshooting; speechwriting. (a) This final catch-all category is at the core of your White House, especially on the domestic side. Although we can list some of the components separately, the blanket category reflects five facts. First, several men are required for these jobs. Second, each man will do some of each task. As we shall shortly show, no strict separation of function or subject matter is possible. Third, the efforts of these men must somehow be coordinated. Fourth, the ways of allocating tasks are infinite. Your allocation must take account of the particular talents of the people you want in your White House as well as your own preferences in staff organization. Fifth and as usual, what you need in the White House depends upon what you've got in the departments and the Budget Bureau.

(b) This core operation can be defined by subject matter and by function. The subjects of White House concern are easily described: everything. You can be confronted with every matter that is or might be within government competence and, in your role of moral leadership, with many non-governmental matters. The range of major domestic issues likely to confront you in 1969—from "black power", air pollution, tax policy, welfare systems, to criminal procedure, to name a few—hints at the varied competences your staff will need.

---

\* Staffing needs in this area are discussed in detail in our memorandum on national security apparatus.

(c) Cutting across subject matter lines are your functions which require staff assistance. Outside of the national security area, you need assistance to deal with at least the following matters:

-Signing or vetoing legislation

*Bum?* ✓  
-Preparing the federal budget, Economic Report, State of the Union message, other Congressional messages, speeches (to inform, placate, or inspire), and correspondence

*Bum?* ✓  
-Formulating a legislative program, getting it enacted; resisting undesirable legislation

*Erubum?* ✓  
-Formally approving or disapproving certain formal recommendations from independent agencies or executive departments. For this and other tasks, you need legal advice.

-Answering diverse questions on public (press conferences) or private (visits and letters) occasions

-Responding appropriately to congressional investigations or requests or to congressional or private criticisms or complaints

-Leading and managing the Executive Branch by

✓  
--Inspiring them, instructing them, and otherwise overcoming the inertia of particular agencies or people

--Settling the questions that need to be settled if the government is to move forward

--Unsnarling action-stopping tangles

--Resolving interdepartmental controversies

-Appointing, organizing and directing task forces and handling their reports\*

✓  
-Forestalling or correcting scandals, faux pas, etc.

(d) This combination of tasks and subject matters has been handled in several ways. For President Eisenhower, Adams was Chief of Staff and thus the coordinator of all these operations (and some other operations already mentioned). Kennedy had no announced staff chief, but Sorenson was de facto chief on the domestic side for program, policy, government operation, and speech-message writing. Under Eisenhower, this mass of functions occupied about six men full-time and had the part time efforts of three or four congressional liaison specialists and several others whose main duties were those of paragraphs 8-14. Under Johnson, several senior staff men have developed personal staffs of younger general-purpose men without access to the President and who do not seem to participate even indirectly in the general run of Presidential business.

(e) These tasks are manageable if you can keep your staff exceedingly small and fully coordinated internally. Whether you can do this depends upon your approach to the general issues discussed at the outset and in the next part.

---

\* This cannot be done in the departments when the subject matter cuts across agency lines, when departmental inertia or resistance must be overcome, or when effective recruitment requires White House prestige.

### III

#### Staff Role Relative to that of Other Agencies

17. Major issues won't stay in the departments. Most past Presidents hoped that agency heads would implement and create on their own and thus relieve the White House of all issues except questions of major policy. But many problems simply won't stay at the departmental level. Many details of policy have become White House concerns and will continue to do so for seven reasons.

(a) First, even excellent agency heads—and not all of them will turn out well—will not do what you would want if you had the opportunity to consider the matter. They will sometimes suffer from inertia. More often, there will be a failure of imagination within the agency. Even more frequently, the agency's judgment will be infected by the parochial outlook of its constituency (including, of course, its appropriations and substantive congressional committees and its "clients" and other special interest groups concerned with it).

(b) Second, many of the hardest domestic welfare-urban-labor-education problems require new thinking and planning that cuts across existing departmental lines. The departments often tend to define problems according to their capacity to deal with them—education grants by HEW, transportation to jobs by DOT, housing by HUD, etc.—and not according to the broader presidential perspective. In addition, the resources for imaginative thinking are few indeed. The resulting dispersal of responsibility and resources means that many important jobs simply won't be done at the departmental level.

(c) Third, overlapping responsibilities inevitably generate interagency conflicts—both in planning policy and in implementing it—which the relevant secretaries are

unable or unwilling to resolve.\* Resolution will often depend upon White House mediation, arbitration, or command.

(d) Fourth, the several agencies are always competing for limited budget resources. With the aid of staff and Budget, you must make the allocation. And to decide upon the priority you wish to give a department's proposal, you must appraise that proposal and its constituent parts in the light of its objectives, probable success, and alternative approaches. There is no other way.\*\*

(e) Fifth, even apart from budgetary decisions, your speeches, your messages, your letters, and your press conferences will inevitably require you to address yourself in some depth to various matters of policy. Furthermore, the Administration's legislative program and major messages carry your name and determine your reputation both now and later. Even if you were prepared to endorse a Secretary's proposal out of confidence in him, you cannot escape careful consideration of each major proposal. You cannot afford to overlook the institutional biases that will affect every agency's proposals. You must not only resolve interagency policy differences, but you will also want assurance that your Administration's proposals and arguments are reasonably consistent in logic and outlook. More than that, you also face a question of priorities. Public support cannot always be generated for many different proposals simultaneously. Serious legislative activity cannot be expected simultaneously on every proposal. And, of course, you must take care not to alienate unduly with one proposal someone whose aid you need at the very same time for another proposal. Again, therefore, you cannot

---

\* Each Secretary may never learn of the conflict which his subordinates are unwilling to settle. Even if he does learn of it, he may be persuaded by his staff in the light of his agency's institutional interests. And even if he is not fully persuaded, he may hesitate to "surrender" and thus lose the needed respect of his subordinates. Finally, the secretary may feel an obligation to "protect" the office and to pass it "undiminished" to his successor. (Presidents usually feel that impulse—with, of course, greater justification by reference to the Constitutional allocation of powers.)

\*\* We reject without argument the possibility of deferring the allocation to Congress in the first instance. We similarly reject historical formulas, arbitrary percentages, or interagency log-rolling as a means for allocating resources within the Executive Branch.



leave the agencies to formulate your legislative program without close involvement at the top.

(f) Sixth, "leaving the details and minor issues to the departments" is both mandatory and customary. But such formulae leave much to the White House because the general formulations of grand policy—the kind that are easily enunciated—are seldom helpful. Before concrete application, many general formulations simply lack intelligible content. Indeed, general policy is less the father of decision than the result of concrete steps. In short, the major questions that cannot be resolved elsewhere are enough to require a substantial White House apparatus.

(g) Seventh and unhappily, you will be pressed to resolve or react to "flaps" that are intrinsically trivial or that could be handled just as well (that is, with no greater risk of failure) by a Cabinet member. A legislator will write you and expect a White House reply. The media will seek a reaction. The press conference seems to demand it. We believe that you could refer many such matters to the departments with the sympathetic understanding of the public and even of the immediately affected groups if you insist that the department head sees that such questions and complaints are handled with finesse and concern and not in the usual bureaucratic way.

(h) The moral: your staff will, inevitably and at the minimum, bear heavy burdens and serious responsibilities. You thus require men of great talents efficiently organized. Later we amplify our comments about organization. Next, however, we note that current staff systems may not be capable of bearing the additional loads being placed upon them.

18. Overloading the staff. We understand that President Johnson's staff has been subject to enormous strains. Although some can be attributed to personality factors, many stem from operational necessities and organizational shortcomings. We note some of these strains and ask whether your staff is likely to bear similar loads.

(a) The volume of federal domestic programs has increased over the last decade. White House business in the area has increased accordingly. This is not a transient phenomenon.

(b) International affairs have consumed a very large share of President Johnson's time. Consequently, domestic aides worked with ill-defined parameters but could not settle anything in a way that would foreclose the President's options. You will probably not be equally preoccupied for so sustained a period with a single international issue. But there will continue to be a succession of complex international and national security problems clamoring for White House attention.

(c) The staff is peculiarly subject to assignments from the President who naturally gives problems, questions and various tasks to the men he sees constantly, trusts, and feels comfortable with. This always happens, but you can be sensitive to your staff's load and time for completion. You can encourage them to use the departments and outsiders for tasks that need not be done immediately in the White House.

(d) The staff has played a key and comprehensive role in policy-program formulation, almost to the exclusion of the departments. The White House appointed and supervised numerous task forces and received and processed the resulting product, even in areas where departmental jurisdiction was clear. We are left with the impression that the White House has been unresponsive to departmental initiatives and has attempted to run the government single-handedly. You need not do the same—at least not on the same scale. But the underlying problem is not transient.

(e) Your staff will have to take the lead in planning policy and supervising its implementation wherever the departmental mechanism fails to do so adequately. And the unfortunate fact is that departmental mechanisms often are inadequate. The ability of the federal government to respond to urban-welfare-employment-environment problems is compromised by inherent complexity, overwhelming magnitude, elusive answers, and the diffusion of federal responsibility and power among many departments and agencies.\* This means that you must either (1) get such problems approached more effectively outside the White House or (2) organize your staff to handle them.

---

\* Even if some federal responsibilities could be transferred to the states, the techniques of transfer need close attention and much will remain of federal interest in any event.

19. Equipping your staff for comprehensive policy formulation. As one answer to deficiencies elsewhere in the executive establishment, you could create high-level program staffs in the White House or elsewhere in the Executive Office. Let us make clear that we are not organizational experts. We do no more than to suggest that you ask your experts to consider the idea of a creative central staff for program planning to focus not on all areas simultaneously but on selected areas of greatest substantive difficulty or departmental deficiency. There are several general approaches.

(a) You could supplement your general purpose staff with program advisers who would be your in-house experts in various substantive fields. They could be senior staff members with the usual combination of substantive and troubleshooting responsibilities. (They might in turn need junior staff to assist them, but such additions need not themselves be part of the White House Office.) In effect, this would add several senior advisers with special substantive responsibilities in particular fields. A few such men could be helpful without altering the basic character of the staff. And this could help to relieve the impossible weight of program planning from your Adams-Sorenson-Califano. But this would not be enough to organize, plan, and oversee the new era of welfare-urban-etc. work.

(b) A broader and deeper White House staff is conceivable with personal staff much like the present, section chiefs who may be major advisers to you and your top staff, and many high-caliber planners, thinkers, and overseers of operations.

(c) The last approach adds depth and creativity at the center of the Executive Branch. It would be central enough to be free of the departments' fortuitous and often irrelevant jurisdictional lines, small enough to be manageable, free-wheeling enough to be unencumbered by bureaucratic inertia and departmental special interests, and elite enough to attract exceptional talent. It would operate at a level where new ideas are welcomed and where official blessing counts. Of course, such scarce creative talents should be located not at the center but in the operating departments. But present departmental organization offers no adequate home for such activity. And until effective reorganization is achieved, the work must be done somewhere. Better that it be done at the center than not at all.

(d) Such a central staff would, of course, transform the White House into a larger and more cumbersome apparatus without the flexibility, spirit, and intimacy of more traditional arrangements. Furthermore, if the new staff were successful, it should have a more permanent institutional character than that traditionally enjoyed by White House personnel. And the fact is that White House location is unnecessary. The Executive Office of the President is the perfect home for institutional staffs peculiarly designed to serve the President such as the Budget Bureau, Council of Economic Advisers, National Security Council Staff, and special Cabinet groups. Like the other Executive Office components, it would be institutional, professional, and President-oriented. Like the NSC staff, it would be in close communion with the departments, coordinating their planning efforts, not "above" the departments though capable of advising those who are, and free to draw aid from the departments and to be drawn upon. To make it a division within the Budget Bureau might submerge it beneath a Director who is already too busy, might unduly routinize it, and might dampen the freely creative advisory quality that makes the concept appealing.

20. Alternatives to staff. Outside the scope of this memorandum, but necessary to round out the above discussion is brief mention of two other approaches to the deficiencies of organization and planning in the domestic welfare area.

(a) You could reorganize all the relevant agencies into a super-department. The kinds of program planning staff just discussed would serve the super-Secretary. He would, of course, be very powerful. But like the Secretary of Defense, he would remain subject to your control and would not relieve you of responsibility. The general concept is appealing, but we do not venture into the detail that would give it meaning: which departments (or parts of departments) belong in the super-department; how should it be organized internally; is it politically feasible?

(b) Until you could plan it and persuade Congress to create a super-department, you could create a Czar or Special Assistant who would be a de facto super-Secretary but without statutory authority or a department. His position would depend entirely upon your confidence in him and your insistence that the relevant Secretaries report to you only through him (as is true of the Secretaries of military departments). He would need

the kind of program staff already discussed. With such a staff, it could be done if you made your intention clear at the time you appointed the relevant Secretaries and if you could find the right man of brilliance, imagination, analytic depth, discretion, judgment, and personal finesse.

21. Staff-departmental relations generally. An additional and distinct aspect of staff-departmental relations deserves mention: Some Secretaries will feel entitled to unqualified access to you without prior staff work by your office. They resent the "competitive" advice you receive from your own staff, and blame your staff whenever you react unenthusiastically to their proposals. They see themselves suffering at the hands of Congress and pressure groups on your behalf while your comfortable, behind the scenes, unpressured staff coolly nit-picks departmental proposals and performances. They see themselves as operating at your level but obstructed by naive and youngish men who are "inferior" and "mere staff" without the Secretary's prominence, prestige, prerequisites, and public exposure.

Not all cabinet members will feel this way. Department heads and especially sub-cabinet officials will see the presidential assistant as both a critic and as a helpful ally in the governmental process. In doing his job for the President, the assistant makes sure that no agency's interests and arguments are overlooked. He points out flaws in agency proposals before submission to the President and thus gives the agency the opportunity for revision if it wishes. The assistant can present an agency matter to the President with a dispatch that the Secretary could not always achieve personally. By faithfully reporting presidential reactions, he can permit the Secretary to estimate whether a direct approach is likely to change the President's reaction. In many circumstances, a Secretary can feel that calling an assistant is an almost perfect substitute for calling the President—perhaps better because the assistant will have more time to listen and to explore.

Nevertheless, in many important respects, roles are antagonistic. The staffer's job is to find the flaws in a department's proposal or performance; to find the opposing or qualifying considerations neglected or insufficiently weighted in the department; to make sure that other executive agencies have the opportunity to consider, appraise,

and perhaps oppose; to press the departments to do better; and otherwise to serve you and not the narrower and sometimes different interests of the departments. Some Secretaries will not cooperate fully with your staff and will find ways of urging you to say that your staff doesn't speak for you, that you look to the department heads and not staff for major advice, etc. We do not pause on illustrations and variations, but simply make two points: First, of course you should restrain staff members who are unduly insistent, demanding, arrogant, or disrespectful of your departmental appointees. Second, you must be wary lest you impair your staff's willingness or ability to probe and contest the departments.

Addendum

22. Forging the new team. Your staff and departmental appointees cannot overnight come to know and understand each other and to work together as a functioning team. In fact, once the Administration takes office, everyone will be so preoccupied with his own duties as to have little time for getting to know others. Your appointees should begin to get acquainted before January 20th. At the very least, they should begin meeting together, both on a departmental and an inter-departmental basis. You might want to encourage the top officials of the domestic welfare agencies to meet together with each other and with relevant men from your staff. A similar gathering on the international side would be helpful. If time permits, you and some of your chief appointees might spend a few days together, with all of you getting to know one another, as did President Eisenhower and those who accompanied him on the Helena in 1952. The object: to begin creating a team before your Administration is actually confronted with operating responsibilities.

23. Healing national divisions. At the risk of seeming presumptuous, we offer a final comment on the transition generally: a visit with the defeated candidate, appointment of a prominent Democrat with whom you could work, and similar actions are obviously desirable (if otherwise consistent with your plans). The first overtures towards congressional leaders must also be made, especially if either house remains under Democratic control. More generally, there will be great demand for "news" from the President-elect. He will be overcovered. He can use this fact to make every action or appointment the occasion for a statement that will placate those who might have been disappointed by his election. This is the time to try to disarm one's critics, at least to the point where there they might be willing to "give the man a chance." It is possible—we are not sure—that such a response will be generated not by general statements of goodwill and general appeals for unity, but by specific statements of concern about urban problems and the Negro, compassion for those who are forced to rely on the welfare system, etc. This is, in short, a time to heal the past as you prepare for the future.

## APPENDIX I

### ROOSEVELT'S APPROACH TO STAFFING THE WHITE HOUSE

Reorganization Plan I of 1939, which created a "White House Office" and distinguished it from the rest of the "Executive Office of the President," marks the start of modern presidential staffing. What Roosevelt did, in practice, with the institutions then established shows him at his most relevant for the contemporary Presidency. Relatively speaking, in terms of presidential organization, the immediate pre-war years have more kinship with 1961 than do the crisis years of the depression (or the years after Pearl Harbor, for that matter).

Roosevelt did not theorize about "operating principles," but he evidently had some, for his practice was remarkably consistent in essentials. His "principles" can be deduced from what he did and from the memories of men around him, as follows:

1. White House staff as personal staff: The White House was his house, his home as well as office. No one was to work there who was not essential for the conduct of his own work, day by day. "This is the White House calling" was to mean him, or somebody acting intimately and immediately for him. The things he personally did not do from week to week, the troubleshooting and intelligence he did not need first-hand, were to be staffed outside the White House. The aides he did not have to see from day to day were to be housed in other offices than his. This is the origin of the distinction which developed in his time between "personal" and "institutional" staff. The Executive Office was conceived to be the place for "institutional" staff; the place, in other words, for everybody else.

2. Fixed Assignments to Activities not Program Areas: Roosevelt had a strong sense of a cardinal fact in government: That Presidents don't act on policies, programs, or personnel in the abstract; they act in the concrete as they meet deadlines set by due dates—or the urgency—of documents awaiting signature, vacant posts awaiting appointees, officials seeking interviews, newsmen seeking answers, audiences waiting for a speech,



intelligence reports requiring a response, etc., etc. He also had a strong sense of another fact in government: That persons close to Presidents are under constant pressure—and temptation—to go into business for themselves, the more so as the word gets out that they deal regularly with some portion of his business.

Accordingly, he gave a minimum of fixed assignments to the members of his personal staff. Those he did give out were usually in terms of helping him to handle some specific and recurrent stream of action-forcing deadlines he himself could not escape.

Thus, before the war, he had one aide regularly assigned to help him with his personal press relations and with those deadline-makes, his press conferences: The Press Secretary. Another aide was regularly assigned to schedule his appointments and to guard his door: The Appointments Secretary. Early in the war he drew together several scattered tasks and put them regularly in the hands of Samuel Rosenman as "Special Counsel." (The title was invented for the man; Rosenman, a lawyer and a judge, had held a similar title and done comparable work for FDR in Albany.): pulling together drafts of presidential messages, speeches, and policy statements, reviewing proposed Executive Orders, Administration bill drafts, and action on enrolled bills—in short, assisting with the preparation of all public documents through which Roosevelt defined and pressed his program.

These fixed assignments, and others like them in the Roosevelt staff, were activity assignments, not programmatic ones. They were organized around recurrent presidential obligations, not functional subject-matters. They were differentiated by particular sorts of actions, not by particular program areas. This had three consequences:

a. The men on such assignments were compelled to be generalists, jacks-of-all-trades, with a perspective almost as unspecialized as the President's own, cutting across every program area, every government agency, and every facet of his work, personal, political, legislative, administrative, ceremonial.

b. Each assignment was distinct from others but bore a close relationship to others, since the assigned activities, themselves, were interlinked at many points. Naturally, the work of the Press Secretary and the Special Counsel overlapped, while both had

reason for concern and for involvement, often enough, with the work of the Appointments Secretary—and so forth. These men knew what their jobs were but they could not do them without watching, checking, jostling one another. Roosevelt like it so.

c. Since each man was a “generalist” in program terms, he could be used for ad hoc special checks and inquiries depending on the President’s needs of the moment. So far as their regular work allowed, the fixed-assignment men were also general-utility troubleshooters. No one was supposed to be too specialized for that.

3. Deliberate gaps in activity assignments. There were some spheres of recurrent action, of activities incumbent on the President, where Roosevelt evidently thought it wise to have no staff with fixed, identified assignments. One was the sphere of his continuing relations with the leaders and Members of Congress. Another was the sphere of his own choices for the chief appointive offices in his Administration. A third was the sphere of his direct relations with Department Heads, both individually and as a Cabinet. Every Roosevelt aide on fixed assignment was involved to some degree in all three spheres. These and other aides were always liable to be used, ad hoc, on concrete problems in these spheres. But no one save the President was licensed to concern himself exclusively, or continuously, with FDR’s Congressional relations, political appointments, or Cabinet-level contacts.

4. General-Purpose Aides on Irregular Assignments. After 1939 and on into the war years, FDR had several “Administrative Assistants” on his personal staff, all of them conceived as “generalists,” whom he could use, ad hoc, as chore-boys, troubleshooters, checker-uppers, intelligence operatives, and as magnets for ideas, gripes, gossip in the Administration, on the Hill, and with groups outside government. These men were also used, as need arose, to backstop and assist the aides who did have fixed assignments.

FDR intended his Administrative Assistants to be eyes and ears and manpower for him, with no fixed contacts, clients, or involvements of their own to interfere when he had need to redeploy them. Naturally, these general-purpose aides gained know-how in particular subject-matter areas, and the longer they worked on given ad hoc jobs the

more they tended to become functional "specialists." One of them, David Niles, got so involved in dealings with minority groups that Truman kept him on with this as his fixed specialty. Roosevelt's usual response to such a situation would have been to shake it up before the specialization grew into a fixed assignment.

Roosevelt never wanted in his House more general-purpose men for ad hoc missions than he personally could supervise, direct, assign and reassign. During the war, however, as his needs and interests changed, his White House staff inevitably tended to become a two-level operation, with some aides quite remote from his immediate concerns or daily supervision. How he might have met this tendency, after the war, we have no means of knowing.

5. Ad hoc staff work by outsiders. It never seems to have occurred to FDR that his only sources of such ad hoc personal assistance were the aides in his own office. He also used Executive Office aides, personal friends, idea-men or technicians down in the bureaucracy, old Navy hands, old New York hands, experts from private life, Cabinet Officers, Little Cabinet Officers, diplomats, relatives—especially his wife—as supplementary eyes and ears and manpower. He often used these "outsiders" to check or duplicate the work of White House staff, or to probe into spheres where White House aides should not be seen, or to look into things he guessed his staff would be against.

He disliked to be tied to any single source of information or advice on anything. Even if the source should be a trusted aide, he preferred, when and where he could, to have alternative sources.

6. FDR as "chief of staff." In Roosevelt's White House there was no place for a Sherman Adams. Roosevelt made and shifted the assignments; he was the recipient of staff-work; he presided at the morning staff meetings; he audited the service he was getting; he coordinated A's report with B's (or if he did not, they went uncoordinated and he sometimes paid a price for that). Before the war, reportedly, he planned to keep one of his Administrative Assistants on tap "in the office," to "mind the shop" and be a sort of checker-upper on the the others. But he never seems to have put this intention

into practice. From time to time he did lean on one aide above all others in a given area. In wartime, for example, Harry Hopkins was distinctly primus inter pares on a range of vital matters for a period of time. But Hopkins' range was never as wide as the President's. And Hopkins' primacy was not fixed, codified, or enduring. It depended wholly on their personal relationship and Roosevelt's will. In certain periods their intimacy waxed; it also waned.

7. Wartime Innovations. From 1941 to 1943 Roosevelt brought new staff into the White House. Superficially, the new men and their new assignments made the place look different. But as he dealt with wartime staff, he operated very much as he had done before. He let his prewar pattern bend; despite appearances, he did not let it break.

The principal new arrivals were Rosenman, Hopkins, Leahy, a "Maproom," and Byrnes. Rosenman, as Counsel, has already been mentioned. Hopkins evolved into a sort of super administrative assistant, working on assignments without fixed boundaries in the conduct of the wartime Grand Alliance, and collaborating with Rosenman on major speeches. Leahy, as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, became an active channel to and from the services, and kept an eye upon the White House Maproom. This was a reporting and communications center, staffed by military personnel, in direct touch with the services, with war fronts, with intelligence sources, and with allied governments. As for Byrnes, he left the Supreme Court to be a "deputy" for Roosevelt in resolving quarrels among the agencies concerned with war production and the war economy. Byrnes' assignment was relatively fixed, but limited, temporary, and entirely at the pleasure of the President, dependent on their personal relationship. In 1944, when Congress turned his job into a separate, statutory office (OWMR), Byrnes hastened to resign.

The thing to note about these wartime aides is that none of them had irreversible assignments, or exclusive jurisdictions, or control over each other, or command over remaining members of the peacetime staff. Regarding all of them, and as he dealt with each of them, Roosevelt remained his own "chief of staff." And he continued to employ outsiders for assistance. Winston Churchill, among others, now became an alternative source.

8. Reliance on others than staff for ideas. Wartime changes gave the White House staff much more involvement in, and more facilities for, program development than had been the case in 1939. But Roosevelt never seems to have conceived his personal staff—not even when enlarged by Rosenman, Hopkins, Byrnes—as the sole or even the main source of policy innovators and idea men. Ideas and innovations were supposed to flow from inside the Departments, from the Hill, and from outside of government. His staff was meant to save them from suppression, give them air and check them out, not think them up. White House aides were certainly encouraged to have “happy thoughts,” but they were not relied upon to be the chief producers. The same thing, incidentally, can be said of Budget aides.

9. Operations to the operators. FDR was always loath to let into his House routine activities, except where he chose otherwise for the time being. This seems to be one of the reasons (not the only one) why he never had “legislative liaison” assistants continuously working at the White House. Reportedly, he foresaw what has come to be the case in Eisenhower’s time, that if the White House were routinely in the liaisoning business, Congressmen and agencies alike would turn to his assistants for all sorts of routine services and help. “It is all your trouble, not mine,” he once informed his Cabinet officers, with reference to the bills that they were sponsoring. This was his attitude toward departmental operations generally, always excepting those things that he wanted for his own, or felt he had to grab because of personalities and circumstances.

10. Avoidance of coordination by committee. After experimenting elaborately in his first term, Roosevelt lost taste for interagency committees. Thereafter, he never seems to have regarded any of them—from the Cabinet down—as a vehicle for doing anything that could be done by operating agencies or by a staff. This left small scope for such committees at his level. He used the Cabinet as a sounding board, sometimes, and sometimes as a means to put his thinking, or his “magic” on display. Otherwise, his emphasis was on staffs and on operating agencies, taken one by one or in an ad hoc group.

11. The Budget Bureau as a back-up staff. For routine, or preliminary, or depth staff-work that his White House aides could not take on, Roosevelt usually looked to the

Budget Bureau (or, alternatively, to a man or group he trusted in the operating agencies). In many ways, the modern Bureau was his personal creation; in most ways it has never been as near to full effectiveness as in his time.

## APPENDIX II

### ROOSEVELT'S APPROACH TO THE BUDGET BUREAU

In Roosevelt's time, the Executive Office of the President was little else except the Bureau of the Budget. This agency had been in existence since 1921, housed in Treasury but reporting to the President as his source of staff assistance in preparing the Executive budget. Under the Republicans, budgeting had been regarded very largely as a negative endeavor to squeeze departmental estimates. The Bureau had been staffed accordingly. Its career staff was small, dull, conscientious, unimaginative. But by 1936, FDR's experience had made him sympathetic to the point of view expressed by his Committee on Administrative Management: That the budget process—as a stream of actions with deadlines attached—gave him unequalled opportunities to get his hands on key decisions about operating levels and forward plans in every part of the Executive Branch.

Accordingly, he set to work to revamp and restaff the Budget Bureau. In 1937 he made it the custodian of another action-forcing process: routine coordination in his name of agency draft bills, reports on pending bills, recommendations on enrolled bills, and proposed Executive Orders. This is the so-called "legislative clearance function," involving both the substance and financing of proposals, which the Bureau has continued ever since and which, since Rosenman's time, has been linked closely to the White House Special Counsel.

In 1939 Roosevelt moved the Bureau from Treasury into his Executive Office. At the same time, he appointed a new Budget Director, Harold Smith, and backed a ten-fold increase in the Bureau's career staff. In the five years after 1937, the staff was built from 40 to 400, roughly its present size. Smith's emphasis in staffing was three-fold. First, he enlarged the number, raised the caliber and cut the paper-work of budget analysts, the men who did detailed reviews of departmental budgets. Second, he brought in a separate group of organization and procedures men to look at departmental

work in terms of managerial effectiveness, not sheer economy. Third, he began rather covertly to build another staff group with a still different perspective: program-oriented men, economists for the most part, to review departmental work in terms of policy effectiveness and to provide him special studies on short notice.

From Smith and from the staff that Smith was building, FDR sought service of three sorts: First, he wanted cool, detached appraisals of the financial, managerial, and program rationality in departmental budget plans and legislative programs. Second, he wanted comparable appraisals of the bright ideas originating in his own mind, or the minds of his political and personal associates. Third, he wanted the White House backstopped by preliminary and subsidiary staff-work of the sort his own aides could not undertake without forfeiting their availability and flexibility as a small group of generalists on his immediate business.

All sorts of things now thought to call for special staffs or secretariats, or inter-agency committees, were once sought from the Budget staff or from an ad hoc working group drawn out of the departments by some specialist inside that staff. The oldest "secretariat" now operating in the Presidency is the Bureau's Office of Legislative Reference which handles the clearance function. The precursors of Eisenhower's public works inventories, aviation surveys, foreign aid reviews, and the like, were staff studies undertaken by the Bureau in the 1940's.

With such things sought from him, Smith saw himself as the prospective "chief" of a general-utility "institutional" staff, mainly a career group, quite distinct from personal aides, but tackling in depth, at another level, a range of concerns as wide as theirs. He tried to build and operate his Bureau accordingly, not as a "budget" staff but as a presidential staff which was organized around the budget process for the sake both of convenience and of opportunity.

In Smith's first years, he frequently came close to giving Roosevelt what the latter wanted. The coming of the war, however, interrupted Bureau staffing, drained away much of its new-found strength and eclipsed budgeting (along with legislation) as sources of key presidential actions. The course of battle, and of war production, and of prices



now became the crucial sources and the Bureau proved a far from ideal place for general-purpose staff work oriented toward those action-forcing processes.

As the war drew toward a close, Smith seems to have been planning a new effort to refurbish and expand his Bureau's peacetime capabilities. He hoped to make its program orientation more than match its budgetary focus by having Roosevelt call on him for necessary staff work under the Full Employment Bill. But Roosevelt died, and the Employment Act as subsequently passed created a new presidential agency, the Council of Economic Advisers. The thing Smith needed most to realize his aims and meet Roosevelt's wants was a first-rate, well-established group of program aides, oriented toward the substance of policy, rather than its organization or its cost. But the group he had begun to build by 1945 gradually dispersed in the years after CEA's creation. Its successor has yet to be built.