Richard Nixon Presidential Library Contested Materials Collection Folder List

| <u>Box Number</u> | Folder Number | Document Date | <u>No Date</u> | <u>Subject</u> | Document Type | Document Description |
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| 4 | 29 | 8/20/1971 | | White House Staff | Memo | From Colson to Higby RE: Nofziger's poor communication skills. 1 pg. |
| 4 | 29 | 8/18/1971 | | White House Staff | Memo | From Colson to Haldeman RE: using Nofziger more effectively in terms of coordinating campaign efforts with the RNC. 2 pgs. |
| 4 | 29 | 8/18/1971 | | Campaign | Letter | From Colson to Nofziger, hoping to spur the RNC into action in regards to attacking the Democrats. 2 pgs. |
| 4 | 29 | 8/10/1971 | | White House Staff | Memo | From Colson to Haldeman RE: using Jaime McLane for a youth project. 2 pgs. |

| Box Number | Folder Number | Document Date | <u>No Date</u> | <u>Subject</u> | Document Type | Document Description |
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| 4 | 29 | 8/5/1971 | | White House Staff | Memo | From Colson to Haldeman RE: a conversation between Lou Harris and Larry O'Brien on the election, the economy, and |

other political matters. 3 pgs.

August 20, 1971

| MEMORANDUM FOR: | LARRY HIGBY |
|-----------------|----------------|
| FROM: | CHARLES COLSON |
| SUBJECT: | Lyn Nofziger |

Just so you will have some appreciation of what I am up against, this is the kind of BS that goes on with Nofziger. First of all, it takes 20 minutes on the phone to get him to agree to anything and then its grudgingly and with innumerable excuses. Apparently his sole complaint is that I lean on him too hard. In my opinion, we are getting goddamned little out of him and as long as I am the only one leaning on him, he is simply going to get mad at me and continue to do nothing. I have got to have some help with other people leaning as well.

August 18, 1971

| MEMORANDUM FOR: | H.R. HALDEMAN |
|-----------------|------------------|
| FROM: | CHARLES COLSON |
| SUBJECT: | RNC/Lyn Nofziger |

Trying as hard as I do not to bother you with the nitty gritty, day to day stuff, I think in this instance I need some help. As you will see from my letter attached to Lyn Nofziger, I couldn't get Lyn today to put a statement out answering Muskie until tonight, notwithstanding the fact I had alerted him yesterday afternoon to the fact that Muskie was putting a statement out. I had at least 5 phone calls with Lyn, Bill Rhatican had several. It was not all that big a production. He was totally agreeable to doing it, but as he has just explained to me in a very heated phone conversation, he had too many other things to do to get to it until 5:45 tonight which means of course that it has not effect and obviously won't get on the networks.

It's all well and good for us to talk about fighting back at the Democrats. Obviously the National Committee is one of our most important, if not the most important resource and we have just got to get a more coopezative attitude from Lyn. When I tried to reach him at noon today he was out for one of his typical 3 hour lunches, then never returned my calls even though I tried to get him 4 times this afternoon. When I just talked to him on the phone, he told me that he had many too many important things to do in the Republican National Committee to worry about the White House requests, that he would do them if he could and that if we weren't satisfied we could shove the whole thing you know where. I told him that I was clearly dissatisfied that this was a case where we had worked very closely together, understood each other, all we wanted was a simple statement out of the Committee and that we had gotten one out of Griffin with a phone call.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Nofziger advised me that the Committee couldn't be bothered with these kind of things and if the President of Bob Haldeman were dissatisfied, all they had to do was tell him.

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I find that when I kiss his fanny which I do more frequently than I like, occasionally something happens but this is not really a good working arrangement. I think the only thing that will bring Lyn up short is a call from you pointing out that today at least he certainly let us down and that this kind of attitude just isn't going to get us through the wars that are ahead.

August 18, 1971

Dear Lya:

Having been unable to reach you by phone all afternoon after several attempts, I have no choice but to express my distress and consternation in writing.

I think you know from my call yesterday afternoon that there was considerable interest in seeing to it that an immediate response be made to Muskie when he finally issued his partisan statement on the President's economic initiatives. Often times you raise a very valid criticism that when we request things like this we do not give you adequate notice. That is hardly the case in this instance. I discussed this with you this morning 3 times and in each instance you assured me it would be handled.

It seems to me that one function of the Committee is to help win an election next year and, therefore, to be aware of what prospective Democratic candidates are going to do. You should have been calling us telling us that this was coming rather than our having to monitor it here. The Muskie statement was issued at 11:00 a.m. this morning. As of the time that I am writing this letter (5:30 p.m.) nothing has come out of the National Committee. Your secretary has advised me that something is in the works. You and I agreed to this at 9:15 this morning and I cannot believe that the communications apparatus of the Committee is so moribund that it takes eight hours to get out a simple statement.

Just by way of comparison, I called Senator Griffin at 11:30 this morning, dictated a statement over the phone to him and it was on the wires by 2:00. This is in addition to trying to do 82 other things here.

Obviously I do not understand the functions of the Republican National Committee. I assumed it was supposed to be engaged in

a partisan business and had the equipment to do the job, but thus far all it has produced today is terrible aggravation and a monumental waste of my time.

If this letter sounds belligerent, I am sorry. I am sincerely looking for constructive ways that we can get the kind of activity that we need in situations like this and we should not have to do it here. Somehow the Committee has to be responsive.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Colson Special Counsel to the President

Mr. Lyn Nofziger Deputy Chairman for Communications Republican National Committee 310 First Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

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August 10, 1971

| MEMORANDUM FOR: | H.R. HALDEMAN |
|-----------------|----------------------------|
| FROM: | CHARLES COLSON |
| SUBJECT: | Jamie McLane/Youth Project |

I have negotiated with Ken Cole an arrangement for the use of Jamie McLane that I think works out very satisfactorily. I have also had a long talk with McLane and while he is not precisely the man I would have chosen, I think he will be able to handle the youth project very effectively. I will have no difficulty working with him. He has grandiose, personal ideas, but I find they are very easy to knock down.

The agreement I reached with Cole involved McLane being the youth project manager reporting to me for his operational activities and to Cole for substance. I will obviously work out with Finch a working relationship which should not be difficult inasmuch as McLane was at one time his executive assistant. Cole wants McLane also to be involved in some of the aging project responsibilities. At first blush, this appeared to be an illogical arrangement, but the more we have thought it through and worked it out, the better I like it. The activities have many similarities. We have an intern available who's going to follow up on a number of the political activities on the aging that George Bell has launched and this will be under Jamie's project supervision. I am sure it will not interfere with what he does with youth. Most importantly, McLane is enthused over doing both since he felt that one alone would not be a full time job. With this I concur.

Hence, we are off and running, have some good concrete projects to start with and I will keep you posted on the progress that we make.

That leaves one open question: Doug Hallett. Hallett wanted to stay on as youth project manager, but the judgment of all was that McLane would be better at this. Hallett is willing to give up law school (he's been accepted at Harvard) if we want him to stay with us through the campaign. He is a difficult person to deal with, brash and abrasive; on the other hand, he is very bright. In fact, he turned out for me in a couple of days the best, most creative and yet most practical ideas on youth activities that we have gotten. We pay him less than even the secretaries that we steal from Gordon Allott and he, therefore, does not disrupt our budget too badly. He could be very valuable working in the youth area and I suspect as time goes on we might find him valuable in a number of other areas. He is not "necessary", however, to fill any organizational billet and I have, therefore, given him no encouragement. I have told him we would give him a decision next week, however. Perhaps this is something you and I should discuss briefly.

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| EYES ONLY | August 5, 1971 |
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| MEMORANDUM FOR: | H.R. HALDEMAN |
| FROM: | CHARLES COLSON |
| SUBJECT: | Lou Harris |

Lou Harris rode down on the plane from New York yesterday with Larry O'Brien. O'Brien talked to him like the old confidant that he once was. According to Harris, O'Brien made the following points:

- The early runners, McGovern, Bayh, etc., are all dead. Scoop Jackson is picking up some support but is making a mistake by putting all of his eggs in one basket, i.e. Florida. O'Brien believes that even though Jackson has Holland and Smathers working for him, Muskie will get Chiles and Askew and Muskie will win the Florida primary.
- Muskie has a big leg up and is improving his lot with the pros; he has picked up some very effective regional coordinators.
- Jackson's one hope is that the defense issue will come back hard. O'Brien believes that in fact it will but he still won't be able to make a strong race.
- 4. Teddy is not out of it "by any means". His problem is that he will have to make a decision next January on the California primary. He probably, according to O'Brien, will not go in (Harris has it from Steve Smith that Kennedy probably will go into California). If he doesn't go in, according to O'Brien, Muskie will win the nomination unless he "commits a terrible goof".
- 5. The one candidate over whom O'Brien feels he has no control is Gene McCarthy. O'Brien considers him a son of a bitch, a spoiler and a sorehead who is still mad at the guys who did him in in 1968. Whoever the candidate is (with on exception) he will stay in and run on a fourth party ticket; he's especially irked at Muskie and Humphrey and would love to stay in the race if either of them are the nominee.

- 6. The one exception is if Teddy were nominated; for some curious reason he does not want to block Teddy. O'Brien says that Teddy's man, Dave Burke, now works for Howard Stein and this could be behind it. O'Brien considers a McCarthy fourth party candidacy as the biggest danger the Democrats face next year. He also says that McCarthy is a "money" man who will run if he thinks he can make something out of it, but he won't unless he has financial backing and there is some money in it for him personally.
- Humphrey will try but can't make it. He'll never quit trying and will go into California.
- Lindsay will become a Democrat in mid-August, but will not run for the Presidency.
- 9. O'Brien feels that the economy is the <u>only</u> issue that the Democrats have. He simply cannot understand why the President has not used selective wage and price controls. This would cut the legs out from the Democrats and take away their only issue. He considers that all the "dove" candidates are dead and that the President has completely taken over the "peace" issue. No Democrat can profit politically in the foreign affairs field, but they can win on the economy <u>unless</u> the President pulls the rug out and does some spectacular things, which O'Brien feels the President is entirely capable of doing. As he puts it, "it's all in the President's control. But, I don't understand why he hasn't done it".
- 10. O'Brien is not concerned at all about money. He has no intention of paying off the \$9 million debt, \$800,000 of which is owed to Daley (who is very unhappy about it). The Committee collected \$1.7 million on their dinner, they will spend it all this year but Strauss is doing an excellent job and thinks that he can raise the funds needed for a Presidential campaign next year without any difficulty.
- 11. O'Brien believes that Texas was a fluke in 1960 and 1968 and that the Democrate should clearly write it off for 1972. He sees no chance of winning it but he does believe that they can win Ohio, Illinois and New Jersey. He, therefore, believes that California will be the swing state in the election. He thinks that the "Nixon South" is gone as far as the Democrate are concerned, that they might pick up one or two border states but that's all and they need Wallace in the race to deny us the deep south. If Wallace were not in, they would lose the entire south.

- 12. O'Brien's attitude is guardedly optimistic. He said as he moves around the country he finds that the economy is really biting people and that if the President does not do something fairly significant and if the Democrats play to this issue <u>alone</u>, they can win. He is very cautious in his outlook, however, and is extremly worried about the McCarthy situation which he kept coming back to in the course of the discussion.
- 13. O'Brien thinks that Reagan is no asset in the coming election, will not help us in California and is the most dangerous problem the President has within the Republican Party.?

From all of the foregoing, two things of significance emerge in my mind. We should be planning how to encourage McCarthy's candidacy. It may all turn on one man, Howard Stein. If Stein agrees to go all the way and bankroll McCarthy's candidacy, McCarthy will stay in the race all the way, even as a spoiler. Stein is Jack Dreyfus' partner as you know and I would think that through Bill Rogers or others, we could perhaps encourage Stein's commitment to McCarthy. Itt would even be worth pumping some money in.

A second point which seems to me to be very important is the Democratic debt. We have an analysis of the Democrat's creditors and we should start on the outside a pressure campaign to force them to pay their bills before they start spending new money. Obviously we can't get involved in this from here but some of our business friends on the outside might be asked to organize a campaign to put the screws on.

You and I talked about this many months ago. It was my judgment then that we should not try to embarrass the Democrats over their debt or create public sympathy for the "poor" Democrats, but rather wait until the campaign was about to get underway and then see that the creditors put the heat on them. If someone from 1701 were to pick a couple of good loyalists on the outside, they could start them to work on this now.